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United States
1952-1954

Volume V

Western European Security

(in two parts)

Part 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Editor in Chief

William Z. Slany

Editors

John A. Bernbaum
Lisle A. Rose
Charles S. Sampson

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PREFACE

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.

b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.

c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government. The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Until his retirement in 1979, Deputy Historian Frederick Aandahl directed the entire *Foreign Relations* project, including the preparation of this volume. His successor as General Editor, William Z. Slany, supervised the process of review, declassification, and final editing.

Mr. Slany also prepared the compilations on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council and the London Foreign Ministers meeting. Charles S. Sampson prepared those on the implementation of the Lisbon reorganization of NATO, Secretary of State Acheson's trip to Europe and Latin America, the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington, and the Bermuda Conference. John A. Bernbaum edited the documentation on the Nine-Power Conference and the Dulles-Stassen trip to Europe. Lisle A. Rose prepared the compilations on the "New Look" in NATO and the European Defense Community.

Joann Alba of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief), performed the technical editing under the supervision of Margie R. Wilber. Anne K. Pond prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

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INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGY

In presenting the materials in this volume the editors have sought to use records from a wide variety of sources. For the most part, the documentation, as indicated in the individual headings, comes from the central (decimal) files of the Department of State. The records of the central files have been supplemented by materials from decentralized "lot files" of the Department of State, both those of the offices and bureaus within the Department and those of United States Missions abroad. The editors have also examined numerous record collections at the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and lot files of the Mutual Security Agency and its successor organizations held at the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland. Where it proved important to the presentation of the record of United States foreign policy, the editors have also sought documentation from the Truman Library and from other agencies of the United States Government, primarily the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The editors have indicated in all cases the source of the documents presented in this volume, either in the individual headings for the documents printed or in the footnotes or editorial notes. A list of the sources used in the preparation of this volume is printed on page XXXVII.

In the case of documents chosen for inclusion in this volume, the editors have, whenever possible, identified the drafter and those officers or institutions which cleared each document. The editors have also indicated as appropriate the major officers who initialed telegrams for the Secretary of State and have recorded those instances when President Truman, President Eisenhower, Secretary Acheson, or Secretary Dulles drafted, cleared, initialed, or signed any document. In the case of the more significant documents, the editors have further noted officers and institutions, other than the primary recipient, to whom additional copies were sent or to whom telegrams were repeated.

The classification line for each document represents the original classification given that document and does not reflect any further alterations in its security handling. The dateline represents the date of transmittal as well as can be determined; if the dateline is in brackets, that denotes the fact that the source text did not bear a date but that one was supplied by the editors based on other materials. If doubt exists about the information provided in the dateline, the editors supplied a question mark in the brackets.

All documents referred to in the text of this volume have been footnoted. The footnote citations to printed documents are either to a page in the same volume; to a page, compilation, or chapter in another volume of *Foreign Relations*; or to another published source. Those documents which the editors examined but decided not to publish will generally have a footnote citation "Not printed" followed by a description or summary of their contents, unless their substance is obvious from the text, and a citation to the place in which they can be found. Documents which the editors were unable to find have the footnote citation "Not found in Department of State files" or less frequently "The document under reference here has not been identified further." In general these citations have been used for those documents which could be expected to be found in Department of State files but were not located after a reasonable search or were incorrectly or insufficiently identified. Documents transmitted between other countries or agencies which could not be expected to be found in the Department of State files will only be footnoted if they were found. In some cases the editors have presented as editorial notes the substance of larger bodies of documents which were not printed. In these cases they have included appropriate references to the sources from which the material cited was drawn.

To assist in the use of this volume, the editors have prepared a list of abbreviations and a list of identifications of persons. These lists include explanations of the most frequently used abbreviations and the full names and positions for persons who appear more than once in this volume.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

AA, anti-aircraft
ACC, Allied Control Council for Germany
Actel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Acheson while away from Washington
AFP, *Agence France Presse* (French Press Agency)
AGSec, Allied General Secretariat, Allied High Commission for Germany
AHC, Allied High Commission for Germany
AMG, Allied Military Government
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States
AR, Annual Review
Aramco, Arabian American Oil Company
ARC, Annual Review Committee
ARQ, Annual Review Questionnaire
ARS, *Action Républicain et Sociale* (French Political Party)
ASDIC, Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee
ASIC, Associated States of Indochina
AWX, type of airplane
Benelux, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
BHE, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (League of Expellees and Disfranchised)
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
C, Counselor of the Department of State
ca, circular airgram
Cab, Cabinet
CD, Council Deputies
CDU, *Christlich-Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)
CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers
CGIL, *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro* (General Confederation of Labor in Italy)
Chanc, Chancellor
CHANCOM, Channel Command
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIC, Commander in Chief
CINC, Commander in Chief
CINCAAFCE, Commander in Chief, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe
CINC(AF)MED, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Mediterranean
CINCALFCE, Commander in Chief, Allied Land Forces, Central Europe
CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCNorth, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe
CINCSouth, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
Coled, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community
Colux, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Chiefs of Mission meeting at Luxembourg, September 18–19, 1953
Contel, Consulate telegram
Cotel, Country Team telegram
CP, Communist Party
CPF, Communist Party of France
CSC, Coal and Steel Community
CSU, *Christlich Soziale Union* (Christian Social Union)
CY, calendar year

DA IN, Department of the Army incoming telegram
DefDept, Defense Department
DefMin, Defense Minister
Defto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of Defense
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Dep(s), Deputy (Deputies)
Deptel, Department of State telegram
Depto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council
DGB, *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (German Federation of Trade Unions)
DKV, *Deutsche Kohleverein* (German Central Coal Sales Agency)
DM, Deutsche Mark
DMS, Director of Mutual Security
DOD, Department of Defense
DP, *Deutsche Partei* (German Party)
DPB, Defense Production Board
DTG, date time group
Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
EB, Executive Bureau
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECE, Economic Commission for Europe
ECSC, European Coal and Steel Community
EDC, European Defense Community
ED/IC, Interim Committee of the European Defense Community
Edcol, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community
EDF, European Defense Force
ED(S)T, eastern daylight (savings) time
EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Emb, Embassy
Embtel, Embassy telegram
EPC, European Political Community
EPEK, *Ethniki Prodeftiki Enosis Kendrou* (National Progressive Union of the Center), Greek political coalition
EPU, European Payments Union
ERP, European Recovery Program
EUCOM, European Command
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
FDP, *Freie Demokratische Partei* (Free Democratic Party)
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Far East
FEB, Financial and Economic Board
FedRep, Federal Republic of Germany
FinMin, Finance Minister
FM, Foreign Minister
FOA, Foreign Operations Administration
FOCE, Forces of Occupation, Central Europe
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FonOff, Foreign Office
FonSec, Foreign Secretary
FTT, Free Territory of Trieste
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Deputy Under Secretary of State
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
GAF, Greek Air Force
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GER, Bureau (from 1953, Office) of German Affairs, Department of State
GFR, German Federal Republic
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GNP, gross national product
GPA, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State
GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State
H, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HICOG, United States High Commissioner for Germany
HICOM, High Commission(er)
HICOM/P, paper of the Allied High Commission for Germany
HMG, His (Her) Majesty's Government
IC, Indochina
ICJ, International Court of Justice
ILO, International Labor Organization
Indo, Indochina

infotel, information telegram
infra, infrastructure
Infra Comte, Infrastructure Committee
IRC, International Red Cross
IS, International Staff
ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPD, *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (Communist Party of Germany)
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/GER, Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State
LibDef, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Air Attaché in Lisbon
LOC, lines of communication
LST, landing ship, tank
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MC, Military Committee
MC–PC, Military Committee–Political Committee
MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance
MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
ME, Middle East
MEDO, Middle East Defense Organization
Mil Com(ite), Military Committee
MOG, meetings on Germany
MP, Member of Parliament
MRC, Military Representatives Committee
MRP, *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (French Political Party)
MSA, Mutual Security Agency
MSA/G, Mutual Security Agency Mission in Greece
MSB, Military Security Board
msg, message
MSP, Mutual Security Program
MTB, motor-torpedo boat
mytel, my telegram
NA, North Atlantic
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization)
NATO AR, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Annual Review
NATO IS (NATIS), North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service
NATOP, North Atlantic Treaty Organization preparatory paper
NCO, noncommissioned officer
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NNG, Netherlands New Guinea
noforn, no foreign nationals (distribution)
NPC, Nine-Power Conference
NPT, Nine-Power Talks
NRW, Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia)
NSC, National Security Council
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP, offshore procurement
ourtel, our telegram
P/POL, Public Affairs Advisory Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PA/HO, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PCI, *Partito Communista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party)
Perm Rep, permanent representative
Perm Under Sec, Permanent Under Secretary
PM, Prime Minister
PNM, *Partito Nazionale Monarchico* (National Monarchist Party)
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Special Representative in Europe (after June 12, 1953, the U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council)
POW, prisoner of war
PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

PriMin, Prime Minister
PSC, Social Christian Party
PSDI, *Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano* (Italian Social Democratic Party)
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State
RAF, Royal Air Force (British)
RCAF, Royal Canadian Air Force
reEmbtel, regarding Embassy telegram
reftel, reference telegram
Repto, series indicator for telegrams from the Special Representative in Europe to the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington
RI, Republic of Indonesia
ROK, Republic of Korea
RPF, *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (French Political Party)
S, Secretary of State
S/A, Ambassador at Large, Department of State
S/AE, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs
S/MSA, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
Safehaven, code name for a United States program begun in 1944 to block the flight of Axis capital assets to neutral countries
SCAPE, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCEM, Signing Ceremonies in Europe, May
SCS, Screening and Costing Staff
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecGen, Secretary-General
Secto, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
SED, *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party)
SFIO, *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (French Socialist Party)
SG, Standing Group
SGLO, Standing Group Liaison Office(r)
SGM, Standing Group Memorandum
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
Soc, Socialist
SOF, status of forces
SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Social Democratic Party)
SRE, Special Representative in Europe
TAC, Tactical Air Command
TCC, Temporary Council Committee
Tedul, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington
telecon, telephone (teletype) conference
TGG, Tripartite Group on Germany
Todep, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council
Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences
UDSR, *Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance* (French Political Party)
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
UP, United Press
ur, your

URAS, *Union des Républicains et d'Action Sociale* (French Political Party)
urtel, your telegram
USAREUR, United States Army, Europe
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USDel, United States Delegation
USDel/TCC, United States Delegation on the Temporary Council Committee
USEUCOM, United States Army, European Command
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program
USLO, United States Liaison Office(r)
USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations
WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; Western Europe
WEU, Western European Union
WG, working group
Wise Men, Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council

LIST OF PERSONS

ACHESON, Dean G., Secretary of State, January 19, 1949–January 20, 1953.

ACHILLES, Theodore C., Vice Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council after October 3, 1950; Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in France from April 1, 1952; Chief of Mission after September 18, 1952; Minister after October 25, 1954.

ADAIR, Charles W., Jr., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, July 1954; thereafter Counselor of Embassy in Belgium.

ADENAUER, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, after September 1949; Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany after March 1951.

ALDRICH, Winthrop W., Ambassador in the United Kingdom, February 20, 1953–February 1, 1957.

ALESSANDRINI, Adolpho, Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

ALEXANDER of Tunis, Lord, (Harold R. L. G. Alexander), Field Marshal, British Governor General of Canada until March 1, 1952; British Minister of Defense until October 18, 1954.

ALGER, Frederick M., Jr., Ambassador in Belgium, July 22, 1953–March 27, 1957.

ALLEN, William Denis, Head of the Central Department of the British Foreign Office until May 1953; thereafter Assistant under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

ALPHAND, Hervé, French Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council until September 1954.

AMERY, Julian, Conservative member of the British House of Commons.

ANDERSEN, Hans G., Legal Adviser in the Icelandic Foreign Ministry; after 1954, Icelandic Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

ANDERSON, Frederick L., Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris after March 13, 1952.

ANDERSON, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense, May 3, 1954–August 4, 1955.

ANDREWS, George D., Consul at Strasbourg from March 15, 1950.

ANDRONIKOV, Constantin, interpreter in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ARMSTRONG, Frederick S., Jr., Division of Research for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe, Department of State, February 1952–September 1954; thereafter Consul in Quebec.

ARNESON, R. Gordon, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs until April 1954; thereafter Deputy Science Adviser.

ATTLEE, Clement B., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury, July 1945–October 1951; thereafter Leader of the Opposition (Labour Party) in the British House of Commons.

AUCHINCLOSS, John W., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, 1953–1954.

AURIOL, Vincent, President of the French Republic, January 16, 1947–January 15, 1954.

BAILEY, Ronald William, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from April 1952.

BARBOUR, Walworth, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, until May 1954; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 1955.

BARNARD, John L., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, February–August 1952; Assistant United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs after November 1952.

BARNES, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Policy Reports Staff in the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 1951–April 1952.

BATTLE, Lucius C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after June 26, 1951; Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after October 13, 1952; Attaché in Denmark after January 30, 1953; First Secretary after July 26, 1954.

Beale, Wilson T. M., Jr., Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after April 15, 1951; Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, after July 20, 1952.

Beaulieu, Leroy, Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Financial and Economic Board.

Beaumont, Jean Michel Guèrin de, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after June 1954.

Bech, Joseph, Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and National Defense after 1951; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs after December 29, 1953.

Becker, Fritz, Free Democratic Party member in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany after September 1953.

Becker, Walther, Director of the Division of Trade Policy in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Beeley, Harold, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States, February 18, 1953–May 14, 1955.

Begougne de Juniac, Gontran, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States, 1919–1955.

Beigel, Edgar J., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after December 10, 1951.

Belcher, R. H., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.

Benard, Jean, Second Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States until January 1954.

Benediktsson, Petur, Icelandic Minister in France until 1956.

Berard, Armand, French Assistant High Commissioner for Germany.

Beria, Lavrentiy Pavlovich, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, until June 1953; Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, March 1953–June 1955; member of the Politburo (Presidium from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, until June 1953.

Bettencourt, Manuel, Admiral, Chief of the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Bevan, Aneurin, Labour member of the British House of Commons.

Bevin, Ernest, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 1945–March 1951.

Beyen, Johan W., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1, 1952–October 11, 1955 (position held jointly with Joseph Luns).

Bidault, Georges, Deputy Prime Minister of France and Minister of National Defense until March 1952; Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 8, 1953–June 19, 1954.

Bigart, Homer, staff reporter for the *New York Times*.

Birgi, Nuri, Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Blank, Theodor, Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany; *rapporteur* for the Federal Republic of Germany for talks with the Allied High Commission regarding the German financial contribution to Western defense after December 1951; unofficial Personal Adviser to Chancellor Adenauer.

Blankenhorn, Herbert A.H., Director of the Political Affairs Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany after March 13, 1951.

Bluecher, Franz, Deputy Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Free Democratic Party after 1949.

Blum, Robert, Assistant Deputy for Economic Affairs in the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris.

Blumberg, Warren P., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State, 1951–1952; Office of German Political Affairs, 1952–1953; Office of German Affairs, 1953–1954.

Bohlen, Charles E. (Chip), Counselor of the Department of State after March 13, 1951, and member of the Senior Staff of the National Security Council after July 1951; Ambassador in the Soviet Union, March 27, 1953–March 8, 1957.

Bonbright, James C. H., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after June 27, 1950; Special Assistant to the United States Permanent Representative in Europe at Paris, April 1954–January 1955.

Bonnet, Henri, French Ambassador in the United States, January 1, 1945–January 31, 1955.

Bonsal, Philip W., Counselor of the Embassy in France with the personal rank of Minister until March 1952; Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, until September 1954.

Boon, Hendrik N., Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1, 1949–November 1, 1952; Netherlands Minister in Italy after November 25, 1952; Netherlands Ambassador in Italy after January 27, 1954.

Boone, Walter F., Admiral, United States Navy, Navy member of the Joint Strategic Survey Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Boothby, Sir Robert J. C., Labour member of the British House of Commons.

Boris, Georges, Chargé de Mission in the Personal Cabinet of French Prime Minister Mendès-France after June 1954.

Bougenot, André, Independent Republican Party member of the French National Assembly.

Bouhey, Jean, Socialist Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Bourbon-Busset, Jacques de, Director of the Cabinet, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Bourgès-Maunoury, Maurice, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946; French Minister of Armaments and Minister of Finance, March 1952–January 1953; Minister of Industry and Commerce, June 1954–February 1955.

Bowie, Robert R., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after May 18, 1953.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1953.

Brentano, Heinrich von, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany after September 1949; German Representative to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community and German Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Brind, Sir Eric James Patrick, Admiral, British Navy; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe, April 1951–May 1953.

Brofoss, Erik, Norwegian Minister of Commerce until 1954.

Brosio, Manlio, Italian Ambassador in the United Kingdom after March 18, 1952.

Bruce, David K. E., Ambassador in France, May 9, 1949–March 10, 1952; Under Secretary of State, February 7, 1952–January 20, 1953; United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community after February 19, 1953.

Bryn, Olaf, Norwegian Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Buchanan, Wiley, Envoy in Luxembourg after September 1953; Minister after December 1, 1953.

Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador in Italy, May 7, 1952–April 3, 1953.

Burrows, Bernard A.B., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States, January 1950–July 1953.

Butler, Richard Austen, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, October 1951–December 1955.

Butterworth, W. Walton, Ambassador in Sweden, September 18, 1950–December 9, 1953; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom.

Byington, Homer M., Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, from June 30, 1950; Counselor of the Embassy in Spain after August 1, 1953.

Byroade, Henry A., Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from November 1, 1949; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs after April 14, 1952.

Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador in Austria after November 28, 1951; Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office after February 1, 1954.

Calhoun, John A., Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, October 1950–December 1952.

Campilli, Pietro, Italian Minister of Transport, Industry, and Commerce until 1953; thereafter Minister without portfolio.

Carlson, Delmar R., Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from May 1953.

Carney, Robert B., Admiral, United States Navy; Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1950–1952; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, 1952–1953; after May 1953, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations.

Carns, Edwin H. J., Colonel, United States Army; Deputy Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Carpentier, Marcel Maurice, Lieutenant General, French Army; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe.

Carraud, Pierre, Secretary to French Ambassador Bonnet in the United States after April 1953.

Cauwelaert, Jan Frans van, President of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and member of the Christian Socialist Party.

Cayeux, Jean, Deputy in the French National Assembly and member of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire.*

Chaban-Delmas, Jacques, Deputy in the French National Assembly and, after June 1954, French Minister of Public Affairs.

Chapin, Selden, Ambassador in the Netherlands, October 27, 1949–October 30, 1953.

Charpentier, Pierre, Director General of Economic, Financial, and Technical Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Cherwell, Lord (Frederick Alexander Lindemann), British Paymaster General and Adviser to Prime Minister Churchill on Atomic Energy Affairs.

Chiperfield, Robert Bruce, Republican Representative from Illinois.

Chipman, Norris B., First Secretary and Consul in the Embassy in the United Kingdom after December 1953.

Churchill, Winston S. (after April 24, 1953, Sir Winston), Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury, October 26, 1951–April 6, 1955; Minister of Defense, October 1951–January 1952.

Clasen, André, Luxembourg Minister in the United Kingdom after November 30, 1944.

Claudius-Petit, Eugene, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Clausonne. *See* Seydoux de Clausonne.

Claxton, Brooke, Canadian Minister of National Defense until July 1, 1954.

Collins, Denis A., Fiscal Officer in the Embassy in France after January 1954.

Collins, Joseph Lawton, General, United States Army; Chief of Staff of the United States Army, August 16, 1949–August 14, 1953; thereafter United States Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee.

Conant, James B., United States High Commissioner for Germany after February 1953.

Conover, Harry, First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, June 1951–August 1954.

Cook, Orval R., General, United States Air Force; Deputy Commander in Chief, United States European Command, after 1954.

Courant, Pierre, Independent Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Coty, René, President of France, after December 23, 1953.

Courson de la Villeneuve, Comte Tanguy, Counselor of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Couve de Murville, Maurice, French Ambassador in Egypt, 1950–1954; French Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, October 1954–January 1955.

Cowen, Myron M., Consultant to the Secretary of State until June 1952; Ambassador in Belgium, June 11, 1952–June 8, 1953.

Cowles, Willard B., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State.

Crawford, William A., First Secretary of the Embassy in France, February 1952–August 1954.

Crombie, Sir James, Deputy Secretary of the British Treasury.

Cunha, Paulo Arsenio Virissimo, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 2, 1950–September 29, 1958.

Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for National Security Affairs, March 1953–April 1955.

Daladier, Edouard, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946.

Daridan, Jean, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until June 1954.

Davis, Arthur C., Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, November 1951–March 1952; United States Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group until November 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until August 1954; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Dean, Gordon E., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, July 11, 1950–June 3, 1953.

Debré, Michel, French Senator and member of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*; French Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and French Delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

De Gasperi, Alcide, Prime Minister of Italy and Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 1951–August 1953; Secretary of the Italian Christian Democratic Party until July 1954.

De Gaulle, Charles, leader of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, 1947–1954.

De Greef, Edouard, Lieutenant Colonel, Belgian Minister of National Defense.

Dehler, Thomas, Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1953; Chairman of the Free Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag.

Delbez, Louis, Independent Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Delbos, Yvon, Radical Socialist Deputy in the French National Assembly.

de Margerie. *See* Jacquin de Margerie.

de Moustier, Roland, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

de Staercke, André, Belgian Representative on the North Atlantic Council after 1951.

de Tovar, Comte, Portuguese Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador in France, March 13, 1953–January 28, 1957.

Dixon, Sir Pierson John, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after June 1950; British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Permanent Commission.

Dodge, Joseph M., Director of the Bureau of the Budget, January 21, 1953–April 15, 1954.

Donnelly, Walter J., Ambassador in Austria, November 28, 1951–July 19, 1952; United States High Commissioner for Germany, July 1952–January 1953.

Dorsz, Edmund J., Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until May 1952.

Dowling, Walter C., United States Deputy High Commissioner for Austria, January 18, 1952–June 26, 1953; United States Deputy High Commissioner for Germany until May 6, 1955.

Draper, William H., Jr., United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and Special Representative in Europe at Paris, April 1952–June 1953.

Drees, Willem, Prime Minister of the Netherlands and Minister of General Affairs, August 6, 1948–December 22, 1958.

Dulles, Allen, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence after August 1951; Director of Central Intelligence after January 1953.

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State after January 21, 1953.

Duncan, Donald B., Admiral, United States Navy: Vice Chief of Naval Operations from August 10, 1951.

Dunn, James Clement, Ambassador in Italy until March 27, 1952; Ambassador in France until March 2, 1953; Ambassador in Spain after April 9, 1953.

Dupong, Pierre, Prime Minister of Luxembourg until December 22, 1953.

Durbrow, Elbridge, Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State, after July 17, 1950; Counselor of the Embassy in Italy after July 14, 1952.

Duvieusart, Jean, Belgian Minister of Economic Affairs.

Edelston, Sir John H., Admiral, British Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Channel, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Command, 1952–1954.

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1951–April 5, 1955.

Einaudi, Luigi, President of the Italian Republic, May 1948–April 1955.

Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, April 2, 1951–May 30, 1952; President of the United States after January 20, 1953.

Elbrick, Charles Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after December 16, 1953; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after May 26, 1954.

Ely, Paul, General, French Army; French Member of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization after August 1953; French High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in Indochina after June 3, 1954.

Erhard, Ludwig Minister of Economic Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany from September 20, 1949.

Exintaris, Georges, Greek Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Eyskens, Gaston, Social Christian member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives.

Falaize, Pierre-Louis, Director of the Cabinet of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after 1953.
Faure, Edgar, Prime Minister of France and Minister of Finance, January 22–March 11, 1952; President of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly 1952–1953; Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, after June 1953.
Faure, Maurice, Secretary-General of the French Radical Socialist Party after 1953.
Fechteler, William M., Admiral, United States Navy; Chief of Naval Operations, August 16, 1951–August 17, 1953; thereafter Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.
Ferguson, John Haven, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, April 1, 1951–August 12, 1953.
Fessenden, Russell, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after June 1951.
Fisher, William Dale, Counselor of the Embassy in France, February 21–December 21, 1952; thereafter Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.
Foster, Andrew B., Deputy Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after January 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, after September 1954.
Foster, William C., Deputy Secretary of Defense, September 1951–January 1953.
Foulkes, Charles, Lieutenant General, Canadian Army; Chairman of the Canadian Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1951.
Fox, Alonzo P., General, United States Army; Army Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Command, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until 1953.
Fox, Homer S., Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in Belgium, October 1949–1954.
François-Poncet, André, French High Commissioner for Germany, 1949–1955.
Franks, Sir Oliver S., British Ambassador in the United States, June 3, 1948–February 13, 1953.
Freemans, Paul L., Jr., General, United States Army; Deputy Director for Plans and Operations, United States Command, Europe.
Fuller, Leon W., Deputy Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, from June 16, 1952; member of the Policy Planning Staff after September 26, 1952.

Gaillard, Felix, French Secretary of State for Finances, January 1952–January 1953; Secretary of State for the Council of the Presidency, January–June 1953.
Gaitskell, Hugh, British Chancellor of the Exchequer until October 21, 1951; thereafter Labour member of the House of Commons.
Galloway, William J., Special Assistant in the Embassy in the United Kingdom after October 1950; Special Assistant in the Embassy in France after April 1952; Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State after July 1953.
Gerhardt, Harrison A., Colonel, United States Army; Deputy Director in the Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 1953; Deputy Director for European Affairs in the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 1954.
Gerhart, John K., General, United States Air Force; Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Gibson, William M., First Secretary of the Embassy in France after December 1952.
Gifford, Walter S., Ambassador in the United Kingdom, December 21, 1950–January 23, 1953.
Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council after January 1950.
Globke, Hans, General Director of the Office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until 1953; thereafter Secretary of State of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Godley, G. McMurtrie II, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State; after March 1, 1952, Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in France.

Gontran de Juniac. *See* Begougne de Juniac.

Goodpaster, Andrew J., Colonel, United States Army; Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower after October 10, 1954.

Gordon, Lincoln, Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission in the United Kingdom after September 1952.

Gore-Booth, Paul Henry, Director of the British Information Service in the United States, October 1949–November 1953; thereafter British Ambassador in Burma.

Grandval, Gilbert, French High Commissioner for the Saar until January 1952; thereafter French Ambassador in the Saar.

Grewe, Wilhelm, Head of the Office for Changing the Occupation Statute through Contractual Relations of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Chief of the Law Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Gros, Louis Gabriel Marie, Senator in the French National Assembly representing French Morocco.

Gruenther, Alfred M., Lieutenant General, United States Army; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, December 1952–July 1953; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until November 1956.

Gudmundsson, Kristinn, Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 13, 1953–July 24, 1956.

Guillaume, Augustin, General, French Army; Chief of Staff of the French Army, after March 1954.

Gubler. Sahopp, General, Turkish Army; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to President Eisenhower after January 1953.

Halaby, Najeeb E., Jr., Assistant for International Security Affairs in the Mutual Security Agency, 1952; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs after 1953.

Hallstein, Walter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany after March 1951.

Hamilton, William L., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after January 1950.

Hansen, Hans Christian, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 30, 1953–October 9, 1958.

Hansen, Rasmus, Danish Minister of Defense, September 30, 1953–May 23, 1956.

Harriman, W. Averell, Director for Mutual Security, November 1951–January 1953; Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Temporary Council Committee, September 1951–February 1952.

Harris, Michael S., Director of the Office of Economic Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, after July 1951; thereafter Head of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in the Federal Republic of Germany; subsequently, Head of similar Missions for the Mutual Security Agency and Foreign Operations Administration.

Hart, Charles E., Major General, United States Army; Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group in Greece after October 1951.

Harvey, Sir Oliver C., British Ambassador in France, January 1948–April 1954.

Hassler, Horst, *Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Hay, John, Head of German Security and Allied Controls, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.

Hayter, Sir William G., British Minister in France after December 1949; British Ambassador in the Soviet Union after October 10, 1953.

Healey, Denis W., Labour member of the British House of Commons.

Heeney, Arnold D. P., Canadian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council; after August 1953, Canadian Ambassador in the United States.

Heine, Friedrich, member of the Social Democratic Party in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Heinemann, Gustav, former Minister of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Hensel, H. Struve, General Counsel, Department of Defense, 1952–1954; Counsel and Special Adviser to the Secretary of Defense, 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1954–1955.

Herriot, Edouard, Deputy in the French National Assembly, from 1919; President of the National Assembly, January 1947–January 1954.

Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Hans-Heinrich, Chief of Protocol of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Herz, Martin F., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in France, June 1951–February 1955.

Heusinger, Adolf E., General, Military Consultant to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Heuss, Theodore, President of the Federal Republic of Germany after September 1949.

Hillenbrand, Martin J., Officer in Charge of Government and Administration, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, after June 1950; Economic Officer at the Embassy in France after September 1952.

Hoffman, Johannes, President of the Saar.

Holmes, Julius C., Minister of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, April 1950–November 1954.

Hommel, Nic, Luxembourg Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Hooker, Robert G. Jr., Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, November 1953–September 1954.

Hoover, Herbert, Jr., Consultant to the Secretary of State from October 1953; Under Secretary of State from October 1954.

Houtte, Jean van, Belgian Minister of Finance, June 1950–January 14, 1952; Prime Minister, January 15, 1952–April 21, 1954.

Hughes, Emrys, Labour member of the British House of Commons.

Hughes, John C., United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, June 1953–April 1955.

Hugues, Emile, Radical member of the French National Assembly and French Minister of Justice, June–September 1954.

Hull, John Edwin, General, United States Army; Vice Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration until 1953; thereafter Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces in the Far East.

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury after January 21, 1953.

Ismay, Lord (Hastings Lionel Ismay), British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations until March 12, 1952; thereafter Secretary General and Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Jacobs, George R., Director of the Trade and Resources Branch in the Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.

Jacquin de Margerie, Roland, Assistant Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Jaeger, Richard, Christian Social Union member of the Bundestag and Vice President of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1953.

Jebb, Sir Gladwyn Hubert Miles, British Permanent Representative at the United Nations after June 27, 1950; Ambassador in France after April 13, 1954.

Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs after June 26, 1952.

Jessup, Philip C., Ambassador at Large, March 19, 1949–January 2, 1953.

John, Otto, Head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany until July 1954.

Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, after November 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Czechoslovakia, after October 30, 1953; Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, after March 31, 1954.

Jones, John Wesley, Counselor of the Embassy in Spain, November 1949–November 1953; thereafter Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State.

Jonsson, Eysteinn, Icelandic Minister of Finance.

Joyce, Robert P., member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after December 23, 1948; Counselor of the Embassy in France after December, 22, 1952.

Juin, Alfonse Pierre, General, French Army; Inspector General of the French Armed Forces after January 1951; Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces in Central Europe after August 1951; Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forces, Central Europe, after June 1953.

Kanellopoulos, Panayotis, Greek Minister of National Defense.

Karkelis, George, Greek Minister of Economic Coordination.

Kennan, George F., Ambassador in the Soviet Union, May 14–September 19, 1952.

Kessel, Friedrich von, Deputy Chief of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community, 1952–1954.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, member of the Politburo (Presidium from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from 1939; Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1949–March 1953; from March 1953, First Secretary of the Communist Party.

Kidd, Coburn D., Director of Government and Administration in the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, June 1952–March 1953; Deputy Director for Government and Administration, Office of German Affairs, March 1953–September 1954; thereafter Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs.

Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone A., British High Commissioner for Germany after June 1950; Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, after November 1953.

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Acting Chief of the Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, May 26–November 9, 1952; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, until January 23, 1953; thereafter Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat; after October 1954, Deputy Director of Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.

Knight, Ridgway B., Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until July 6, 1952; Adviser on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs after July 1951; Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs until August 11, 1953; Acting Director of the Office of Western European Affairs until January 15, 1954; thereafter Deputy High Commissioner for Germany.

Knudsen, Kai, Norwegian Minister of Defense, May 23, 1954–January 21, 1955.

Koenig, Marie-Pierre, Deputy in the French National Assembly and Minister of National Defense, June 19–September 5, 1954.

Köprülü, Fuad, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 22, 1950–April 15, 1955.

Kraft, Ole Bjørn, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1950–September 30, 1953.

Kranich, Robert H., Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after July 1950; Officer in Charge of North Atlantic Treaty Economic and Military Assistance in the Office of European Regional Affairs after August 1954.

Kristensen, Thorkil, Danish Minister of Finance until September 20, 1953.

Krone, Heinrich, Berlin Christian Democratic Union member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Labouisse, Henry R., Jr., Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in France after August 1951; after January 1952, Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission; Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Mission in France after July 1, 1953.

Ladd, John C., Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State.

Lange, Halvard M., Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs after February 1, 1946.

Langhelle, Nils, Norwegian Minister of Defense, January 5, 1952–May 23, 1954.

Laniel, Joseph, Prime Minister of France, June 28, 1953–June 19, 1954.

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council after January 1950.

le Gallais, Hugues, Luxembourg Minister in the United States after November 8, 1940.

Leishman, Frederick John, Assistant Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary after June 1951; First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after September 1953.

Leite, Joao Pinto da Costa, Portuguese Minister of the Presidency after August 1, 1950.

Le Jeune, Max, Socialist Deputy in the French National Assembly; President of the Commission on National Defense.

Lemnitzer, Lyman L., General, United States Army; Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, United States Army, after 1953.

Le Roy de la Tournelle, Guy, Director General of Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LETOURNEAU, Jean, French High Commissioner for Indochina after April 1952; Minister for Relations with the Associated States, January–May 1953.

LETROQUER, André, President of the French National Assembly after January 1954.

LEWIS, Jeffrey W., Deputy Director, Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from July 1950; Acting Director, Office of German Affairs, after November 1953.

LINDER, Harold F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from February 15, 1951; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, December 12, 1952–May 15, 1953.

LLOYD, John Selwyn Brooke, Minister of State, British Foreign Office, after October 1951; Minister of Supply after October 1954.

LOMBARDO, Ivan Matteo, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of a European Army until May 1954; thereafter Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community.

LOORAM, Matthew J., Jr., Second Secretary of the Embassy in France after July 1952.

LOUSTAUNAU-LACAU, Georges, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

LOVETT, Robert A., Secretary of Defense, September 1951–January 1953.

LUCE, Clare Booth, Ambassador in Italy, May 4, 1953–December 27, 1956.

LUNS, Joseph M. A. H., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs after September 1, 1952 (position held jointly with Johan W. Beyen).

LYON, Cecil B., Director of the Berlin Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, from June 11, 1951; Director of the Office of German Affairs, Department of State, after February 8, 1954.

LYTTELTON, Oliver, British Secretary of State for the Colonies.

MACARTHUR, Douglas II, Counselor of the Embassy in France, February 1951–October 1952; Counselor of the Department of State, March 1953–December 1956.

MACDONALD, Malcolm John, British High Commissioner in Southeast Asia, until September 13, 1955.

MACGINNIS, Francis Robert, Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after April 1952.

MACMILLAN, Harold, British Minister of Housing and Local Government, until October 1954; thereafter Minister of Defense.

MACVEAGH, Lincoln, Ambassador in Portugal, until February 26, 1952; Ambassador in Spain, March 27, 1952–March 4, 1953.

MAGISTRATI, Massimo, Italian Director General for International Cooperation, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until November 1954; thereafter Director General of Political Affairs, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

MAKINS, Sir Roger M., British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 22, 1948–December 30, 1952; British Ambassador in the United States from January 7, 1953.

MALENKOV, Georgiy Maksimilianovich, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, 1946–March 1953; Chairman of the Council, March 1953–February 1955; member of the Politburo (Presidium, from October 1952), 1946–1957.

MALFATTI, Franco M., member of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and Head of the Italian Delegation to the Conference on the European Defense Community.

MANSFIELD, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

MAROGER, Jean, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.

MARRAS, Efisio, General, Italian Army; Chief of the Italian Defense Staff.

MARSHALL, Peter H. R., Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after October 1952.

MARTIN, Edwin M., Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after October 3, 1949; Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs to the Secretary of State from September 28, 1952; Deputy United States Representative on the North Atlantic Council after June 25, 1953.

MARTIN, Jacques, Secretary to French Ambassador Bonnet after April 1953.

MARTINAUD-DEPLAT, Leon, Deputy in the French National Assembly, after 1951; Minister of Justice, March 8, 1952–June 27, 1953; Minister of the Interior until June 18, 1954.

MARTINO, Gaetano, Italian Minister of Education, February–September 1954; thereafter Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Massigli, René, French Ambassador in the United Kingdom from November 1944, and Chairman of the Brussels Treaty Permanent Council.

Matthews, H. Freeman, Deputy Under Secretary of State, July 5, 1950–September 31, 1953; Ambassador in the Netherlands from Ocobter 1, 1953.

Maudling, Reginald, Conservative member of the British House of Commons and Economic Secretary to the Treasury.

Maupeou, Jacques, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.

Mayer, Daniel, Deputy in the French National Assembly and President of the Commission on Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly.

Mayer, René, Deputy in the French National Assembly; Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, August 11, 1951–January 20, 1952; Prime Minister of France, January 8–June 28, 1953.

McBride, Robert H., Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after February 1952; First Secretary of the Embassy in France after September 1954.

McCardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs after January 30, 1953.

McClelland, Roswell D., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until January 1953; thereafter Consul at Madrid.

McCloy, John J., United States High Commissioner for Germany, June 1949–July 1952.

Mende, Erich, Deputy Chairman of the Free Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mendès-France, Pierre, Prime Minister of France, June 19, 1954–February 23, 1955.

Merchant, Livingston T., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until March 24, 1952; Deputy to the United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris until March 11, 1953; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

Merkatz, Hans-Joachim, Chairman of the German Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1953.

Mesta, Perle, Minister in Luxembourg, September 21, 1949–April 13, 1953.

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, from 1946; Minister for Internal and Foreign Trade, March–September 1953; Minister for Foreign Trade, from September 1953; member of the Politburo (Presidium, from October 1952) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from 1935.

Millar, Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer, British Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council until September 1953; thereafter, British High Commissioner for Germany.

Millar, John Y., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, February 1952–February 1954.

Millard, Hugh, Counselor of the Embassy in Belgium, June 1947–October 1954.

Miller, Robert H., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, May 1952–July 1954.

Miller, William K., Office of German Economic Affairs, Department of State.

Mitterrand, François, Deputy in the French National Assembly from 1946; Minister of State, January–March 1952; Minister of the Interior, June 1954–February 1955.

Moch, Jules, French Minister of Defense until August 1951; thereafter Socialist Party member in the French National Assembly.

Mollet, Guy, Deputy in the French National Assembly and President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 1953–1956; member of the Politburo (Presidium from October 1952) from 1926.

Monnet, Jean, Chairman of the Schuman Plan Conference and, from July 24, 1952, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Montgomery, Edward P., Chief of the Current Information Policy Staff, United States Information Agency, November 1952–August 1953; thereafter Acting Public Affairs Adviser for the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Moore, Ben T., First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom after June 5, 1950; Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after September 29, 1952.

Moreland, Allen B., Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations until April 1953; thereafter Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State.

Morgan, Gerald D., Administrative Assistant for Congressional Affairs to President Eisenhower, September 1953–February 1955.

Morgenstierne, Wilhelm M. Munthe de, Norwegian Ambassador in the United States after May 14, 1952.

Morris, Brewster H., Director of the Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State, July 14, 1952–November 1, 1953; Officer in Charge of Political Affairs, Office of German Affairs, until June 30, 1954.

Morton, Thruston B., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, January 30, 1953–February 29, 1956.

Moutet, Marius, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.

Murphy, Robert D., Ambassador in Beligum, November 29, 1949–March 19, 1952; Ambassador in Japan, May 9, 1952–April 28, 1953; Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs from March 20, 1953; Political Adviser to the United Nations Command on the Korean Armistice Negotiations, April 28–July 11, 1953; Chief of Mission, United Nations, May 31–November 30, 1953; Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State, in addition to duties as Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, November 30–December 18, 1953; thereafter, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

Naegelen, Marcel, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Nash, Frank C., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, August 28, 1951–February 10, 1953; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until February 28, 1954.

Navarre, Henri, General, French Army; Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in Indochina, May 9, 1953–June 3, 1954.

Nenni, Pietro, Secretary-General of the Italian Socialist Party.

Nitze, Paul H., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until April 1953.

Nixon, Richard M., Republican Senator from California until January 1953; thereafter Vice President of the United States.

Nolting, Frederick E., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State after October 14, 1951; Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after August 4, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs after January 4, 1954.

Norstad, Lauris, General, United States Air Force; Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe, until July 27, 1953; Air Deputy, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until November 20, 1956.

Nunley, William T., Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after November 1950.

Nutting, Sir Anthony, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after October 1, 1951.

Oakley, Raymond K., Consul at Geneva, June 1951–June 1954.

O'Connor, Roderic L., Assistant to the Secretary of State after January 21, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State after February 21, 1954.

Ogburn, Charlton, Jr., Chief of the Division of Intelligence Research, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, after October 10, 1954.

Ohly, John H., Assistant Director for Policy and Program Development in the Office of the Director for Mutual Security after October 14, 1951; Assistant Director for Programs, Office of the Director for Mutual Security, after April 17, 1952; Deputy to the Director for Program Coordination, Mutual Security Agency, after March 23, 1953; Deputy Director for Program and Planning, Foreign Operations Administration, after October 1, 1953.

Ollenhauer, Erich, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Overby, Andrew N., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, January 24, 1952–February 28, 1957.

Pacciardi, Randolfo, Italian Minister of National Defense until July 1953; Vice President of the Italian Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs.

Page, Edward, Jr., Counselor in the Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe at Paris and Representative on the Brussels Treaty Working Party after June 1953.

Palewski, Gaston, Vice President of the French National Assembly, 1951–1955.

Palmer, Joseph II, First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom after May 23, 1950; Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after October 15, 1953.

Parker, Chauncy G., Chief of the Mutual Security Mission in Italy after July 1952.

Parker, Sir Harold, Permanent Secretary in the British Ministry of Defense.

Parkman, Henry, Director of the Berlin Element, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, after December 1953.

Parodi, Alexandre, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Parsons, James Graham, Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, until May 16, 1952; Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs until July 18, 1952.

Paternot, Marcel, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Pearson, Lester B., Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1948–1957.

Pella, Giuseppe, Italian Minister of the Budget until February 1952; Minister of the Budget and Treasury until July 1953; Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Budget, August 1953–January 1954.

Penfield, James K., Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom from July 1950; Deputy Chief of the Mission in Austria from August 1954.

Perkins, George W., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, August 1, 1949–January 31, 1953.

Petursson, Gunnlaugur, Icelandic Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Philip, André, Head of the French Delegation to the Economic Commission for Europe.

Phillips, Joseph B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, March 6–October 23, 1952; Acting Director of the Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, until June 30, 1954.

Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, February 2, 1953–April 1, 1957.

Piccioni, Attilio, Italian Deputy Prime Minister until July 1953; Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 1953–September 1954.

Pinay, Antoine, Prime Minister of France and Minister of Finance, March 8, 1952–January 8, 1953.

Pinton, Auguste, French Senator in the Council of the Republic.

Pipinelis, Panayotis, Greek Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Pleven, René, Prime Minister of France, August 1951–January 1952; Minister of National Defense, March 1952–June 1954.

Plowden, Sir Edwin N., Chief Planning Officer in the British Treasury, until 1953; British Adviser on Atomic Energy Organization, 1953–1954.

Pollack, Louis H., Legal Adviser in the Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State, until January 1953; United Nations Planning Staff, March–July 1953; thereafter Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs.

Porter, Ivor F., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States after March 1951.

Porter, Paul R., United States Deputy Special Representative for Economic Affairs in Europe at Paris, after January 15, 1952.

Qvistgaard, Erhard J. C., Admiral, Danish Navy; Danish Chief of Defense and Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Committee after 1950.

Radford, Arthur W., Admiral, United States Navy; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1953–August 14, 1957.

Rasner, Will, member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Rasquin, Michel, Luxembourg Minister of Economic Affairs.

Raymond, John M., Assistant Legal Adviser for German Affairs, Department of State.

Raynor, G. Hayden, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, after March 4, 1951.

Reber, Samuel, Director of Political Affairs, Office of Political Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, after May 10, 1950; Deputy United States High Commissioner for Germany, October 13, 1952–June 1953.

Reilly, D'Arcy Patrick, British Minister in France after June 1953.

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Counselor of the Embassy in France, November 10, 1952–April 19, 1955.

Reinstein, Jacques J., Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, from August 1951; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from November 1953.

Reynaud, Paul, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946; President of the National Assembly's Commission on Finances; French Member of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Rhee, Syngman, President of the Republic of Korea after August 1948.

Richards, James P., Democratic Representative from South Carolina.

Riddleberger, James W., Political Adviser to the Economic Cooperation Administration after September 4, 1950; Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, after May 14, 1952; Ambassador in Yugoslavia after July 31, 1953.

Ridgway, Matthew B., General, United States Army; Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, June 1952–May 1953; Chief of Staff of the United States Army after August 15, 1953.

Roberts, Sir Frank K., Deputy Under Secretary of State in the German Section of the British Foreign Office after October 1951; British Representative on the Brussels Treaty Commission after November 1952.

Robertson, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from April 8, 1953.

Rogers, Charles E., Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, 1952–1953.

Roijen, Jean Herman van, Netherlands Ambassador in the United States after September 19, 1950.

Rose, Edward Michael, Political Adviser, Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany, after February 1952.

Rosenblatt, Marcel, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Rossi Longhi, Alberto, Italian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Rothschild, Robert, Counselor of the Belgian Embassy in the United States until May 1954; thereafter Chief of the Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Roux, Jacques, Officer in Charge of Asian Territories and Pacific Ocean Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after December 1952.

Rumbold, Sir Horace Anthony C., British Minister in France from June 1953; Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary after May 1954.

Sakellariou, Alexander, Vice Admiral, Greek Minister of National Defense.

Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, Prime Minister of Portugal after 1932.

Salisbury, Lord (Robert A. J. G. Cecil), British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations from 1952; Acting Foreign Secretary, June–October, 1953.

Sandys, Duncan, British Minister of Supply, October 1951–October 1954.

Santos Costa, Fernandos, Lieutenant Colonel, Portuguese Army; Portuguese Minister of National Defense.

Satterthwaite, Livingston L., Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey after May 2, 1952; Political Adviser to the European Commission after March 17, 1953; Counselor of the Embassy in France after March 16, 1953.

Sauvagnargues, Jean, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Scelba, Mario, Italian Minister of the Interior until July 1953; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, February 1954–May 1955.

Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, October 15, 1950–August 15, 1954.

Schlitter, Oskar, Counselor of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the United Kingdom.

Schmidt, Helmut, Social Democratic Party member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Schneider, Herbert, member of the Executive Committee of the German Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Schreiber, Walter, Mayor of West Berlin from October 1953.

Schumacher, Kurt, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the German Social Democratic Party and member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany until August 1952.

Schuman, Robert, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until January 1953; Deputy in the French National Assembly, 1953–1954.

Schumann, Maurice, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951–1954; Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the French National Assembly.

Schuyler, Cortland T., General, United States Army; Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, until 1953; thereafter Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.

Schwartz, Harry H., Member of the Policy Planning Staff and Department of State Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, May 1953–March 1954.

Scott, Sir Robert H., British Minister in the United States after July 15, 1953.

Scott, Walter K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, September 1950–June 1953; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State.

Seibold, Frank, member of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Seydoux de Clausonne, François Fornier, Director of the Office of European Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after September 1949.

Seydoux de Clausonne, Roger, Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States until February 1952; Minister of the French Embassy in the United States, December 1952–September 1954.

Seynes, Phillippe de, Chief of the Cabinet in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June–December 1954.

Shuckburgh, Charles A. E., Private Secretary to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until May 1954; thereafter Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sieveking, Kurt, member of the Bundesrat of the Federal Republic of Germany and First Mayor of Hamburg and President of the Hamburg Senate.

Silvercruys, Baron Robert, Belgian Ambassador in the United States after March 8, 1945.

Silverman, Julius, Labour member of the British House of Commons.

Skaug, Arne, Norwegian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Skylstad, Rasmus I. B., Secretary-General of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs after May 1, 1948.

Slater, Joseph E., United States Secretary on the Allied General Secretariat of the Allied High Commission for Germany.

Slessor, Sir John, Marshal, Royal Air Force; Chief of the British Air Staff until December 1952.

Smith, H. Alexander, Republican Senator from New Jersey and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Smith, Walter Bedell, Director of Central Intelligence until February 8, 1953; Under Secretary of State until October 1, 1954.

Snyder, John W., Secretary of the Treasury, June 25, 1946–January 20, 1953.

Soames, Arthur Christopher J., son-in-law and Private Secretary to British Prime Minister Churchill.

Soutou, Jean, Assistant Director of the Cabinet of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1954–February 1955.

Spaak, Paul-Henri, President of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community after July 1952; Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 1954–May 1957.

Spalding, Francis L., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until August 1954.

Spiedel, Hans, General, Military Consultant to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Spinon, Antoine, Belgian Minister of National Defense, April 22, 1954–June 25, 1958.

Spofford, Charles M., United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council at London until January 1952.

Sprouse, Philip D., Counselor of the Embassy in France, November 1952–September 1953; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Belgium.

Staf, Cornelis, Netherlands Minister of Defense, March 15, 1951–May 19, 1959.

Starkenborgh. *See* Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.

Stassen, Harold E., Director for Mutual Security after January 20, 1953; Director for Foreign Operations after August 1, 1953.

Steel, Sir Christopher, British Minister in the United States, November 1, 1950–July 15, 1953; from August 18, 1953, Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Steensen-Leth, Vincens de, Danish Deputy Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, April 16, 1952–January 1, 1954; thereafter Danish Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

Stephanopoulous, Stephanos, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, November 23, 1952–October 6, 1955.

Stevenson, Sir Ralph Clement Skrine, British Ambassador in Egypt after June 15, 1950.

Stikker, Dirk U., Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 1948–September 1952; Chairman of the Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Acting Director in Charge of Soviet Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, after March 1, 1953.

Strang, Sir William, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, February 1949–November 1953.

Strauss, Franz-Josef, Christian Socialist Union member of the Bundestag and, from 1953, Minister for Special Tasks of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Strauss, Lewis L., Admiral, United States Navy; Assistant to President Eisenhower on Atomic Energy Matters after March 9, 1953; Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission after July 2, 1953.

Strong, Lester Corrin, Ambassador in Norway, August 10, 1953–February 16, 1957.

Struye, Paul, President of the Belgian Senate and member of the Christian Social Party until June 1954; Belgian Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and Delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Talbott, Harold E., Secretary of the Air Force, February 4, 1953–August 13, 1955.

Tarchiani, Alberto, Italian Ambassador in the United States, March 8, 1945–January 1955.

Taviani, Paolo Emilio, Under Secretary to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs until July 1953; Minister of Foreign Commerce, July–August, 1953; Minister of Defense after August 1953.

Taymans, Roger, Counselor of the Belgian Embassy in the United States until December 1953.

Teitgen, Pierre-Henri, President of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*, May 1952–May 1956; Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, June 1953–June 1954; French Representative to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and French Delegate to the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Terrenoire, Louis, Secretary-General of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français*, 1951–1954.

Thurston, Ray L., Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, June 1952–May 1954; Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, May 1954–March 1955.

Tito, Josip Broz, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia and Minister of National Defense until January 1953; President of Yugoslavia and Chairman of the Federal Executive Council after January 1953.

Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Alidius W. L., Netherlands Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council until 1952.

Togliatti, Palmiro, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party.

Tomlinson, Frank S., Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States, February 1951–December 1954.

Tomlinson, William M., Finance and Economic Adviser of the Embassy in France until August 1952; thereafter United States Deputy Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community.

Trevelyan, Humphrey, Office of the British High Commissioner for Germany until August 1953.

Triboulet, Raymond, Deputy in the French National Assembly.

Trimble, William C., Counselor of the Embassy in the Netherlands until March 1954.

Trivers, Howard, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, July 1952–August 1954.

Trulock, Walter N., Committee Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, after April 1952; Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, after October 1954.

Twining, Nathan F., General, United States Air Force; Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force until June 30, 1953; Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force until June 30, 1957.

Tyler, William R., Counselor of the Embassy in France after September 27, 1948; Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after May 9, 1954.

Ulrich, Guy Ennes, Portuguese Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

Ulver, Henri, Deputy in the French National Assembly after 1946; Secretary of State for the Budget, June 25, 1953–June 18, 1954; Secretary of State for the Budget and Minister of Industry and Commerce, June 19, 1954–February 22, 1955.

Unger, Leonard, Consul and First Secretary of the Embassy in Italy, March 13, 1952–December 13, 1953; thereafter Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State.

Vance, Sheldon B., Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, after April 1951; Second Secretary of the Embassy in Belgium after July 1954.

van Houtte. *See* Houtte.

van Laetham, Gabriel, Second Secretary of the French Embassy in the United States from February 1952.

van Roijen. *See* Roijen.

van Tuyl van Serooskerken, Baron Samuel John, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs after November 1952.

van Vredenburch. *See* Vredenburch.

van Zeeland. *See* Zeeland.

Vass, Laurence C., Officer in Charge of North Atlantic Treaty Economic and Military Assistance Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, May 1951–August 1954.

Venizelos, Sophocles, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 27, 1951–October 9, 1952.

Vestbirk, Anthon, Danish Permanent Represenative on the North Atlantic Council.

Vidal, Germain, Director of the Cabinet of the President of the French Council of the Republic, June–December 1953.

Vimont, Jacques, Director of the Cabinet of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs after March 1953; Minister Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States after June 1954.

Vredenburch, Hendrik F. L. K. van, Head of the Netherlands Delegation to the Conference for the Organization of the European Defense Community, October 1951–May 1952; thereafter Deputy Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Vyshinsky, Andrey Yanuaryevich, Soviet Foreign Minister, March 1949–March 1953; Deputy Foreign Minister and Soviet Permanent Representative at the United Nations, April 1953–November 1954.

Walther, Genhardt von, Counselor of the Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in France, 1951–1955.

Watson, John Hugh Adam, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States until January 1956.

Watts, Philip H., Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, after February 1952.

Webb, James E., Under Secretary of State, January 28, 1949–February 29, 1952.

Weicker, Lowell P., Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, after July 9, 1953.

West, George L., Jr., Officer in Charge of French-Iberian Affairs, Department of State, after September 1954.

White, Miller G., Major General, United States Army; Office of the Secretary of the Army.

White, Paul L., Assistant Chief of the News Division, Department of State, after June 23, 1953.

Wiley, Alexander, Republican Senator from Wisconsin and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after January 1953.

Wilgress, L. Dana, High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, 1949–1952; Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1952–1953; Canadian Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and Canadian Representative to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1953–1958.

Williams, Elwood, III, Office of German Political Affairs, Department of State.

WILLIAMSON, Francis T., Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, June 30, 1950–July 20, 1952; Director of the Policy Planning Staff, July–November, 1952; Counselor of the Embassy in Italy after January 23, 1953.

WILSON, Charles E., Secretary of Defense from January 28, 1953.

WOLF, Joseph J., Acting Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after May 1952; Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs after July 1952; Special Adviser for North Atlantic Treaty Organization Affairs after July 1954.

WOOD, Chester C., Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Commander in Chief of the United States Naval Forces, Europe.

WRIGHT, Jerauld, Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Commander in Chief of the United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 1952–1954; thereafter member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

XANTHAKY, Theodore A., Attaché and Special Assistant in the Embassy in Portugal from March 1945.

ZARUBIN, Georgiy Nikolayevich, Soviet Ambassador in the United States after September 25, 1952.

ZEELAND, Paul van, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, August 10, 1949–April 21, 1954.

ZOPPI, Vittorio, Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1948–November 1954.

ZORLU, Fatin R., Turkish Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

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Bruce Mission Files, Lot 57 M 38

Master file of telegrams, memoranda, briefing and background papers relating to the European Defense Community, the European Political Community, the Saar issue, and the European Coal and Steel Community, for the years 1951–1954 as maintained by the Embassy in Paris. (27 ft.)

CFM Files, Lot M–88

Consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. (254 ft.)

Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on certain official visits of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (13 ft.)

Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of Documentation on certain official visits of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1953–1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. This file is a continuation of Lot 59 D 95. (25 ft.)

EDC Files, Lot 57 M 44

Comprehensive collection of official documentation of the Paris Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community and related reports, memoranda, and correspondence for the years 1950–1951, as maintained in the Embassy in Paris (by Second Secretary Stanley Cleveland).
Retired by: Paris
Location: FRC Acc. No. 68 A 5159, Item 106, boxes 72–80
Volume: 9 ft.

EUR Files, Lot 59 D 233

Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945–1957. (6 ft.)

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff. (42 ft.)

PPS Files, Lot 65 D 101

Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda and related correspondence for the year 1954 of the Policy Planning Staff. (8 ft.)

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and the Heads of Foreign Governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (9 ft.)

Secretary's Daily Meetings, Lot 58 D 609

Chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State's daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. (5/12 ft.)

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238

Chronological collections of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with the President for the years 1949–1952, memoranda of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State for the years 1951–1952, and the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation with Senator Tom Connally of Texas for the years 1950–1951, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. (1 ft.)

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (20 ft.)

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947–1963. (9 ft.)

State–JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

Top secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the period 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954–1956 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. (3 ft.)

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S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95

[illegible]

State-JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417

[illegible]

I. CONTINUING PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

A. Participation by the United States in the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon, February 20–25, and the Meetings of Foreign Ministers in London, February 13–19, and Lisbon, February 20–26, 1952

1. ARRANGEMENTS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE NINTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN LISBON AND THE MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LONDON AND LISBON

740.5/1-352

Foreign Minister Schuman to the Secretary of State [1]

Paris, January 2, 1952.

My Dear Colleague: I have already informed Mr. David Bruce of our need to request the postponement of the Lisbon Conference to Feb 9.

I now write you to explain to you, in a personal way, the imperative reasons which oblige me to take this position. The Fr Parliament will recess from Jan 9 to Jan 29—now it has been most solemnly understood here that, prior to the Lisbon meeting, the National Assembly was to authorize the Fr Govt to commit itself definitively to the course of the Eur Army.[2] It is manifestly impossible to hold the important debate which will be necessary between Jan 29 and Feb 2.

On the other hand, the premature recall of the Assembly wld have, without doubt, an unfortunate effect on the attitude of the Assembly. Your own experience in politics will permit you to agree with me on this point.

In the very interest of the success of our projects, I am thus led to ask you in the most pressing fashion for your support to the end that the Lisbon Conference may be postponed for a week.

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[1] The source text is a "free translation" transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 3953, Jan. 3, from Paris with special instructions to distribute only on authority from the Secretary of State's office.

[2] The telegraphic source text also includes the following French original interpolated at this point: "a s'engager définitivement dans la voie de l'armée Européenne".

My reason for writing you is because I know that I can always count on your understanding and also because I wanted to send you the affectionate good wishes for 1952 of a colleague who honors himself with being at the same time your friend.

Faithfully yours, [Robert Schuman]

740.5/1–352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET Washington, January 4, 1952—7:09 p. m.

3844. For Bruce from Secy. Have studied ur 3957 and 3958[2] and Schuman's request of postponement Lisbon mtg. Tell Schuman that I recd his msg[3] and fully understand situation in which he finds himself. As I clearly indicated in my press conference today, will do best we can to be of assistance. Suggested, however, that date not be announced until it is clearer that results can be achieved on Feb 9. We are so informing Pearson.[4]

Eager to know when Pleven and Schuman plan to go to Brussels and Hague and when they plan to have next EDC Ministerial mtg which shld be the earlier date if at all possible.

Assume Schuman aware Portuguese inability to handle mtg after Feb 16[5] and our Congressional problem if delayed beyond 9th.

Will talk to Van Roijen and Silvercruys along lines you suggest.[6]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Brussels. It was drafted by Perkins (EUR) and Byroade (GER) and was cleared with Secretary Acheson; Perkins signed for the Secretary. A memorandum of Jan. 4 from Barnes (S/S) to Perkins indicates that this telegram was drafted at the request of the Secretary. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "London, Misc")

[2] Telegram 3958, Jan. 3, from Paris, is printed on p. 572. Telegram 3957 from Paris is not printed here, but see footnote 2, *ibid*.

[3] The reference is to Schuman's letter of Jan. 2, *supra*.

[4] Acheson discussed the proposed one-week postponement of the North Atlantic Council session with Snyder, Lovett, and Harriman on Jan. 4. All agreed to the postponement and that it would be wise to find a new date from which the session would not again have to be postponed. (Memorandum by Acheson, Jan. 4, 1952; 740.5/1–452) After exchanges among the NATO nations, the Council Deputies agreed on Jan. 14 to set Feb. 16 as the definitive date of the forthcoming Council session. (Telegram Depto 813, Jan. 14, from London; 740.5/1–1452)

[5] Telegram Depto 763, Jan. 3, 1952, from London, reported a Portuguese statement that postponement of the North Atlantic Council session would seriously inconvenience them since they had requisitioned all the principal Lisbon hotels and a considerable portion of the local university. The Portuguese authorities were in favor of such postponements, despite the inconvenience, if there were improved prospects for achieving concrete decisions at the session. (740.5/1–352)

[6] Regarding Acheson's meetings with Ambassadors Van Roijen and Silvercruys on Jan. 10, see telegrams 904 to The Hague and 1023 to Brussels, both Jan. 11, pp. 580 and 582.

Sending Murphy back to Brussels soonest by way of Paris.[7] Chapin remaining here for Drees visit the middle this month.[8] Also preparing cables to Brussels and Hague along gen lines you proposed we take up with Ambs here.

We are concerned that Brit may not be informed true nature recent Mins mtg in Paris on EDF. If you feel their local reps were not in position to obtain type of info you reported here it might be wise in your discretion, for you to furnish Harvey with substance of 3957.

ACHESON

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[7] Ambassador Murphy, who had been in the United States on leave since October 1951, returned to Brussels and resumed charge of the Embassy on Jan. 14.

[8] Ambassador Chapin had been in the United States on leave since late November 1951. He resumed charge of the Embassy in The Hague on Feb. 1. Regarding the visit of Netherlands Prime Minister Drees to the United States in January 1952, see Acheson's memorandum of conversation with Drees on Jan. 21, p. 589.

740.5/1-1552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, January 15, 1952—8 p. m.

4204. I am inclined to believe, despite the present unsettled governmental situation in France, that there wld be little gained by postponing Lisbon mtg beyond Feb 16, which in fact is date commonly believed here to have been agreed upon fol French request for postponement.

Date shld of course ideally allow not only formation of new govt but also final agreement on EDC at Ministers level and general confirmation by Natl Assembly of Fr adherence to principles EDC, as then agreed. I am in no position to predict that all these things, or indeed any of them, will come about by Feb 16 and it does appear reasonable to suppose, however, that new govt will have been in office by then for sufficient time to approve those EDC arrangements and undertakings which I hope will have been made on *ad referendum* basis by Pleven and Schuman acting as caretakers. Whether Parliamentary debate EDC will have taken place by that time, and whether its outcome will have been clearly favorable, is matter on which it is impossible at this time to conjecture.

As crisis lengthens, importance of pending international decisions and need for France to be prepared for Lisbon can be expected to weigh increasingly in favor of settlement of other issues. Fact remains, however, that despite efforts of most responsible politicians to speed up resolution of crisis by pointing to Lisbon and EDC deadlines, average Deputy (and man in the street in general) appears barely affected by foreign policy considerations in connection with crisis so far.

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[1] Repeated for information to London (for Spofford), Lisbon, and Ottawa.

One of the many unfavorable results of the present drift due to absence of govt is that preparation cannot take place for foreign policy debate that was to have taken place starting Jan 29, as requested by Assembly Foreign Affairs Comite. Considerable advance preparation will be required, and much ventilation of EDC in Parliamentary and political party circles, if new govt is to come through EDC debate safely. Time which shld have been devoted to public and press debate on EDC has been absorbed by discussions centering around political crisis and formation of new govt.

BRUCE

740.5/1–2152

Memorandum for the Record, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] January 23, 1952.

The attached [1] is an excerpt from a telegram from Mr. Eden which was brought in today by Sir Christopher Steel.

I remarked that while we would like to go to London, Paris might prove to be necessary because of EDC activities going on there at that time and because of the possible requirement for Mr. Schuman's presence there.

I also expressed the view that February 13 and 14 might be a little late and would not give us much time to straighten out any problems between the three of us before meeting with Adenauer.

Sir Christopher expressed general agreement with the above but expressed the fear that Mr. Eden's schedule was so tight that he could not participate in tripartite conversations before February 13.

GEORGE W. PERKINS

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[1] In the attachment, not printed, Eden asked the Embassy to approach Acheson on the possibility of holding a tripartite meeting in London about Feb. 13 with Adenauer invited to join the discussions immediately following the meeting.

110.11 AC/1–2852

Memorandum by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] January 24, 1952.

Sir Oliver Franks left with the Secretary this morning the attached message from Mr. Eden. Mr. Acheson asked whether the message we had from the British yesterday [2] which suggested that the quadripartite meeting be held in London before the Lisbon meeting changed this message. Sir Oliver said that that message did not change this one and that they had in fact been sent together. Mr. Eden is, therefore, hoping that the Secretary will come to London before the Lisbon meeting (for the quadripartite) as well as after the Lisbon meeting.

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[1] This memorandum was directed to Barnes (S/S) for action by Perkins (EUR) and for the information of Byroade (GER) and Matthews (G). The points covered in this memorandum were also made in Secretary Acheson's memorandum of his conversation with Franks, not printed. (396.1/1–2452)

[2] Presumably the reference here is to Perkins' memorandum for the record, Jan. 23, *supra*.

Mr. Acheson would like to have some thought given to the question of whether he should do this. He does not want to get in a position of giving too much attention to the British and too little to the other countries.

[Attachment]

CONFIDENTIAL

Personal Message From Mr. Eden to Mr. Acheson

You will remember that I told you in Washington how much I hoped that you would be able to spend a few days in London after the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

I look forward very much to welcoming you here after the Lisbon meeting and hope that this visit will fit in with your other plans and commitments.

Washington, 23rd January 1952.

740.5/2-152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET Washington, January 25, 1952—7 : 58 p. m.

1274. For McCloy. Agree with you mtg of FonMins with Adenauer just prior Lisbon mtg will probably be necessary (urtel 1140 Jan 16, not rptd, and urtel 1215 Jan 21 rptd Paris 374, London 304[2]). Think such mtg might take place from thirteenth to fifteenth. It shld be devoted to ironing out remaining problems and agreeing final texts of as many agreements as possible. Since final determination of necessity and value such mtg can obviously not be made until further negots have pretty clearly indicated scope of remaining unresolved problems, including financial contribution, security safeguards and any others, suggest you keep this question under informal discussion in HICOM but withhold definite recommendation for ten days or so.

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[1] This telegram, repeated for information to Paris (for Bruce) and to London (for Gifford and Spofford), was drafted by Byroade and Laukhuff (GER), cleared by Perkins (EUR) and Matthews (G), and signed by Byroade for the Secretary. A memorandum of Jan. 24 from Barnes (S/S) to Byroade indicates that this telegram was reviewed by Acheson in draft and was slightly amended in accordance with his wishes regarding the specific dates of prospective meetings. (740.5/2-2151)

[2] Neither printed.

We believe that a second mtg with Adenauer will be necessary at some time subsequent to Lisbon in order to sign agreements. Its date might be in week fol Lisbon or might possibly have to be put off until later depending upon success of pre-Lisbon mtg and on ability of EDC countries to finally agree EDC Treaty. Believe that signing of Ger agreements and signing of EDC Treaty must be coordinated in point of time.

The above course indicates that finally agreed and signed docs on both contractual relations and EDC wld not be ready for Lisbon mtg. This wld not seem particularly undesirable to us as NATO shld not formally approve the contractual relations agreements or even the exact treaty establishing the EDC. We have always considered that NATO action on EDC shld be a general approval of the principles contained in treaty. There now seems hope at least that agreement wld be sufficiently complete by time of Lisbon to allow this affirmative NATO action with attendant publicity that they had approved EDC arrangements. (Wld appreciate Bruce's comments on this.) If final signing cld take place shortly after this action by NATO, sequence of events wld be logical and perhaps even more appropriate than finalization EDC and contractual arrangements prior to Lisbon.

Agree that first mtg with Adenauer shld not in any event be in Lisbon and wld think it shld be held London Feb thirteenth and fourteenth as Brit have just requested.

Believe considerable thought shld be given to place of possible mtg subsequent to Lisbon at which Ger agreements will be finally and formally signed shld not be any of Allied capitals nor West Ger, to avoid any possible implication of dictate. This signing, combined with simultaneous signing of EDC Treaty, wld be historical event of great significance and shld be surrounded with considerable ceremony. Occurs to us that Strasbourg wld be eminently satis as place. Is ideally located, has facilities, and above all wld tend to associate Ger settlement in public mind with movement for Eur unity and Ger integration in West. Can think of no other city whose assoc with culmination our Ger policy and with creation EDC wld be so advantageous politically and psychologically.

Agree with you we shld not accept Fr view that three ForMins shld discuss problems and give instrs to HICOM except of course on items still tripartitely disagreed. This wld be time-wasting and particularly undesirable in view successful mtg with Adenauer in Nov.

Pls consider foregoing and after discussion your Brit and Fr colleagues wld welcome your further recommendations.

Paris and London may informally advise FonOffs that our thinking at present runs along these lines except in view of tentative nature of matter no mention shld be made as yet of suggestion of Strasbourg as a place for signing the agreements.

FYI, Secy does not wish to commit himself to staying on in Europe after Lisbon, in view of pressing obligations here. If firm sched involving signing agreements within two or three days after Lisbon cld be presented, however, he wld agree to review problem. Otherwise, or if signing is deferred some days, other arrangements must be considered.

ACHESON

740.5/1-3052

Foreign Minister Schuman to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [PARIS, January 29, 1952.]

On the eve of the conversations preliminary to the Lisbon Conference which we are to have in London on Mr. Eden's initiative, I think it useful to tell you of my concern at the evolution of the Bonn negotiations for the contractual agreements which are to replace the occupation regime.

As you are aware, the French Government can envisage no solution of the problem of the German defense contribution other than that of a defense community excluding the reconstitution of a German national army. The progress of the Paris deliberations gives me the firm hope that the initiative of the French Government in this field will culminate in a positive conclusion. We will thus have passed another stage on the road of an European political organization. The Parliament and public opinion are, in my country, more and more behind these ideas. This attitude is a fact of great importance. We must all the more bear in mind that the creation of a European army, even though it is a French concept which meets with a large area of consent, does impose on France, because of its very nature, very heavy sacrifices of a moral kind; in addition it is a concept which cannot alone solve the problem of security in relation to Germany.

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[1] The source text was transmitted as telegram 4583, Jan. 30, from Paris, with the following brief explanation: "Fol is free translation of ltr from Schuman to Secy dated Jan 29, copy of which Schuman has sent to Eden."

Telegram 4582, Jan. 30, from Paris, further explained the Schuman letter as follows:

"Immed fol tel contains translation of letter addressed by Schuman to Secy covering Fr Govt's position on EDF, contractual relations, relations between Fr and Saar, and question of FedRep's relationship to NATO. This document was handed to us last night by Schuman's *Chef du Cabinet* Bourbon-Busset. It is to [be] considered as secret communication.

"Bourbon-Busset took occasion to state that Fr have not yet made up their minds as to desirability of having Adenauer come to Tripartite mtgs in London next month. Also, with respect to these mtgs, Fr note that Brit have not yet proposed definitive agenda." (751.5/1-3052)

Granting that the European defense community is for us the acceptable form of a participation by the Federal Republic in the common defense, it does not contain and cannot contain because of the principle of non-discrimination involved therein, the precautions and barriers which the allies, at Brussels and then at Washington, have considered to be indispensable to guard against the latent danger which would result from a Germany freed from every restriction. It is therefore only in the agreements defining the future relations between the three allies and Germany that there can be included the special commitments of the Bonn Government.

If this were not to take place, it would be very difficult to get the French Parliament to accept a community treaty from the obligations of which Germany could any day withdraw with the help of a supremacy which she would have been permitted to reestablish at our expense.

From this point of view, the evolution of the Bonn negotiations is a source of much concern; the discussions looking to the drawing up of the annexed conventions which are precisely these which are to contain the guarantees considered indispensable for us, are marking time. The Bonn Government evidently intends to limit the arrangements under discussion to the general convention alone there being included therein the maximum of discriminatory measures which that government alleges it can accept. It is endeavoring therefore to settle in the European framework both the problem of arms manufacture and that of the cost of maintaining the allied troops. In order that its thesis may win out, it adopts a dilatory attitude as to the first point, the French Government has had to recognize the impossibility of reaching a conclusion since the German delegation does not accept in the draft treaty on the European army any article which could be interpreted as applying only to the Federal Republic. Under these conditions I do not see how we could solve in the European framework the problem posed by the maintenance of the prohibitions upon which the three governments are in agreement. Mr. Hallstein, Secretary of State of the Bonn Government, had appeared to recognize this. Besides, if we were to abandon a security agreement, in what framework would we set forth the German commitment re paramilitary formation and police forces—commitment to which the French Government, for obvious reasons, continues to attach an essential importance?

As to the second point, the German thesis which would lead to having the budget of the community bear the cost of upkeep of American and British troops could not even be defended before the Parliament by the French Government. The treaty on the European defense community, the general convention, the annexed conventions—these make up a whole. The rejection of one of the parts would be unacceptable and would compromise the whole.

I do not fail to recognize the difficulties of the Bonn Government. But we must not lose sight of the necessity of rallying French as well as German public opinion to the support of the vast plans being drawn up. The clamorous emphasis given by the Germans to their claims must not lead us to underestimate the depth of French reactions.

At the very moment when it is entering upon an enterprise without precedent in its history, the French Government cannot fail to take into consideration both these reactions and the fact that a serious problem of balance will arise within the future European community. France's outside obligations, the demographic superiority of Western Germany, the rapid recovery of the Ruhr industries and of the German economy as a whole are in different degrees, elements of unbalance, to which we must apply correcting factors. That is why we agreed at Brussels in December 1950 on a clause limiting the German forces to one-fifth of the forces of the Atlantic Army.[2]

Worries of the same kind make it indispensable to maintain our policy regarding the Saar since the economic union of France and the Saar is, in our view, an essential element of economic balance inside the European community. You expressed some concern at our executing a decision reached publicly long ago by the government and recently confirmed by the French Parliament, the aim of which was to create a diplomatic mission in place of the former high commission in the Saar.[3] This measure is not incompatible with the provisional character of the present status of this territory. It simply records an evolution parallel to that envisaged for Federal Germany itself where our high commissioners are to be replaced by ambassadors.

For the immediate present it is indispensable that the three allied governments, by means of a concerted action, should induce the Federal Government to sign, in whatever form may appear to it most expedient for its own public opinion, the commitments which must be set forth in the annexed conventions. This is an urgent matter and it would be highly desirable for the high commissioners to be as soon as possible in a position to present a common front vis-à-vis the German negotiators. I am convinced that, if the negotiations are carried on with the firmness that is desirable, they can be concluded in the very near future. We then will have met the necessary conditions of a satisfactory solution of the problem of German defense participation.

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[2] The reference here is to a decision reached at the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Dec. 18–19, 1950. For documentation on that session, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 582 ff.

[3] On Jan. 25 the French Government announced the establishment of a French Diplomatic Mission in the Saar headed by Gilbert Grandval (with the personal rank of Ambassador) heretofore the French High Commissioner in the Saar. West German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hallstein declared on Jan. 29 that the appointment of Ambassador Grandval violated previous Franco-German agreements on the Saar and was prejudicial to a final agreement on the Saar problem. There were other statements and exchanges by French and West German authorities on the matter. For documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the Saar problem, see volume VII. For additional documentation on the Saar, see pp. 571 ff. and 1370 ff. herein.

As for the long term problem of a possible secession of the Federal Republic, it is obvious that no supplementary text can give a sure solution. We are, I think, in agreement in believing that if the Federal Republic were at a later date to break the treaty to which it has agreed, and, freeing itself from the organization of Europe, were to set up its units as a German national army, it would, as a matter of law, lose the benefit of the advantages which have been granted to it as a counterpart in the general convention. It would further be necessary to avoid a situation in which fresh decisions taken on the basis of the principle of the equality of rights, and I refer particularly to the possible entry of Western Germany into the Atlantic Pact, would deprive this convention of its substance and would permit Germany, free from the limitations of the European community, to recover a complete freedom.

In this connection, Mr. Hallstein's recent declarations[4] make it my duty to remove any misunderstanding.

The relations to be established between the European defense community and NATO create a problem which is by no means insoluble, but which wld become so at the exact moment when the adherence of the Ger Federal rep to the North Atlantic Treaty was envisaged.

There is indeed no doubt that the entrance of Germany into NATO wld run the risk of appearing to a large part of public opinion as a radical alteration in the very character of the alliance. When the pact was signed, the statesmen of all the participating countries, beginning with those of the US, solemnly affirmed that the new alliance, brought about by a manifest threat, presented a strictly defensive character. Cld we renew this affirmation with the same persuasive force if there were to be included in the Atlantic Council a power which—in contrast with all the other members—would be led by its very structure to advance territorial claims?

Reasons of expediency are not the least imperative. It is clear that if the entrance of Ger into NATO were envisaged, the creation of the EDC and the sacrifices involved therein for several countries wld be much less easily accepted by public opinion and by Parliamentary opinion.

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[4] Presumably the reference here is to Hallstein's statements about the Saar made during the Six-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers at Paris, Jan. 26–27; regarding these statements, see telegram 4524, Jan. 28, p. 595 and the last two paragraphs of the background paper, p. 605.

You are familiar especially with the feeling of the French Parliament as resolutely hostile to the accession of Germany to the NAT. There are no grounds for believing that this attitude may be changed in the foreseeable future.

In summary, we wld seriously and perhaps irremediably compromise an enterprise as essential as that of the EDC if, in order to decide a question such as that of the relations to be established between the two communities, a question which can be settled through technical and practical solutions, we were to permit the raising of an insurmountable difficulty.

I can only therefore say to you again what I wrote you on Aug 25, 1951 before that Washington conference: "our entire European policy and especially the integration of German forces wld be compromised by the prospect of direct Ger accession to the Atlantic community. I consider it my duty to point this out to you at this time. At a later date and when the European community, economic, military and political, has been established, we shall be called upon to examine how this community can be adapted to other international organizations."[5]

I am sending a copy of this message to Mr. Eden.

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[5] Regarding Schuman's message quoted here, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 853.

700.00 (S)/2-152: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 1, 1952—12:55 p. m.

Infotel. Secy has sent personal message to UK FonSec Eden expressing appreciation for Eden's invitation[2] to visit London after next meeting of North Atlantic Council in Lisbon but regretting that he cannot fit such visit into his schedule due to pressure of work here. Secy welcomes Eden's suggestion for meeting in London Feb 13 and 14 with French FonMin Schuman and Chancellor Adenauer, before Lisbon meeting, and expresses hope that such meeting can be worked out with others.[3]

ACHESON

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[1] This circular information telegram was sent to Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Moscow, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and Ottawa.

[2] Presumably the reference here is to Eden's personal message to Acheson printed as an attachment to Battle's memorandum, Jan. 24, p. 5.

[3] The text of the Acheson message summarized here has not been found.

740.5/2–152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 1, 1952—4 p. m.

4645. Eyes only for the Secretary. I believe it would be better to postpone a formal reply to letter from Schuman to you forwarded in Embtel 4583, Jan 30.[2] An acknowledgment telling Schuman you would prefer to discuss questions with Eden and himself privately in London wld seem to be safest course to follow.

Schuman's unfortunate ltr was approved by French Cabinet and thus represents an official statement. As we disagree with parts of French position and reasoning a reply at this time might provoke a postponement of French debate on EDC or provide an excuse for certain parliamentary leaders to oppose EDC. A reply might also freeze French position. French and German Govts will both need considerable flexibility to reach agreement on major polit differences relating to FedRep's new status and defense contribution. In this regard the political behavior in Paris and Bonn on the Saar and NATO issues in past week has been most unfortunate. EDF conference steering comite is reconvening today[3] and may give us indication of reaction of both govts to recent developments.

Underlying Schuman letter is complex of French fears of resurgence of Germany that continues to dominate French foreign policy and deeply influences domestic politics. This complex is composed of many elements including: Uncertainty as to impact on European community of peace treaty and Ger unity. Apprehension that Germany will dominate even formative state of European community because US pressure and aid will go for rapid build-up of German contingents for defense on continent while best French contingents are kept engaged in commitments outside Europe especially in Indochina; possibility that US will play less active role in Europe as relative strength of our forces stationed on continent declines; and in particular fear that, regardless of incorporation of armed forces in EDC, German irredentism may, when it suits national designs, cause secession from EDC and a German national force may drag France and other nations into war in the East.

These French fears are nothing new; they have their roots deep in the nation's consciousness; they lead to recurring second thoughts on policy of integrating Germany into Europe on basis of equality; they force French political leaders, if only to provide answers to opposition in Parliament, to advocate continuance of restrictions in Germany.

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[1] Repeated for information to London (eyes only Gifford and Spofford) and Bonn (eyes only McCloy). The source text indicates that 11 copies were made of this message in the Department of State, including at least one copy for S/S.

[2] Reference is to Schuman's message of Jan. 29 to Acheson, p. 7.

[3] The Steering Committee of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community had suspended meetings during the time the Foreign Ministers of the six powers participating in the Conference held meetings in Paris, Jan. 26 and 27. For documentation on these meetings and the resumed sessions of the Steering Committee, see pp. 579 ff.

Devices proposed in Schuman letter represent a combined effort both by those who believe basically that EDC policy is only realistic one but want assurances to give French Parliament, and by those who do not believe in EDC, the latter having more influence than previously because of recent flap over Saar,[4] etc.

I believe we should consider what further action US and UK might take to meet the legitimate concern for the future held by France and Benelux countries. A step in this direction might be to offer not only for French but other EDC member states, some of whom are fearful of German strength, others of French weakness or of both, an assurance that the US and UK wld restrain an attempt by any EDC states to secede and will not permit Germany without specifically mentioning her to obtain right and powers to engage in a national warlike enterprise. Perhaps this might be done through an engagement by NATO in connection with the NATO-EDC relationship to counter with force, if necessary, any such move. No doubt there are other ways in which such assurances might be given without discrimination against Germany. I believe present FedRep govt might also welcome something of this sort. If we cld consider such action, there should be an immediate effort to bring all the related questions together. US and UK guarantees against unilateral military ventures, Saar, EDC-NATO, Germany-NATO, security controls, German financial contribution, French defense budget and program and possibly Dutch apprehensions about end-item deliveries for review and settlement first among ourselves and then with UK, France and Germany.

BRUCE

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[4] Regarding the "Saar flap" referred to here, see footnote 3, p. 9.

740.5/2–152 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, February 1, 1952—7 p. m.

Depto 922. Ref Paris 4583, Jan 30 to Dept;[2] limit distribution accordingly. Various aspects of Schuman's msg are seriously disturbing. Alphand gave me advance notice of it Monday evening, saying it had been sent without consultation with those who had been working on EDC matters; including Alphand. He took most serious view of effect of reassertion of controls on prospects of EDC agrmt and said move represented ascendancy of "cross current" in Fr Govt which does not support EDC, and that he was on point of resigning when he learned of msg after it had been sent.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Telegram 4583 transmitted the text of Schuman's message of Jan. 29 to Acheson, p. 7.

It is possible to take two views of Schuman's ltr. If it is merely statement of Fr extreme position as basis for obtaining US support in tripartite and later in quadripartite talks with Adenauer, it may be dealt with in usual way. If, on other hand, it does represent some second guessing on Fr policy of Ger *rapprochement* or ascendency of those who have not supported Schuman's policy in the past, we are in for real trouble and the entire US policy on Ger rearmament is jeopardized.

There are three points that are of direct concern here. We have been regarding the Brussels decisions on controls as largely obsolete as a practical matter, altho legally still on the books, and in discussions on NATO–EDC relationships and possible Lisbon action this connection have felt that formally or informally position wld have to be taken that EDC, linking Ger inextricably to west, obviates necessity for negative limitations such as ⅕ ratio and most of mil clauses. Hard to see how Fr can seriously propose having it both ways in view course of negots over past twelve months.

Argument that Ger inclusion NATO wld appear to change defensive character of treaty has been effectively answered by Dutch and others many times with query as to what this implied as to nature of EDC. This angle might be considered in connection with draft reply.

Schuman statement that objections of Fr Parliament wld continue for "foreseeable future" presumably made primarily for record, but nevertheless disturbing. Now that Ger have openly raised questions of NAT membership, as it was inevitable that they wld do at some point, negative Fr policy of following public opinion may deal major blow to whole defense effort. Is it impossible to get Fr to take positive lead vis-à-vis their public opinion along line Ger membership in NATO essential for greater assurance against revival Ger militarism that EDC can give.

Unclear at this juncture and at this distance how dilemma posed by Schuman msg can be solved within time limit set by Lisbon schedule.

SPOFFORD

740.5/2-152: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BONN, February 1, 1952—7 p. m.

1385. I have just read Schuman's ltr,[2] and from this distance it appears to me to be outcome of the growing uneasiness on the part of the Fr as it seemed apparent that the negots for a Ger contrib were really coming to a head. It also reflects, I think the utter Fr diff of opinion which has never been entirely resolved during the negots. Though the Eur army is a Fr concept they have never fully accepted its full implications. The Gers will always create difficulties, but I don't believe it was the evolution of the Bonn negots which induced this ltr as much as fundamental hesitation on the part of elements in the FonOff and perhaps in Parliament to accept wholly a Ger mil contrib even within the frame of a Eur army. There have been some maneuvers here, to be sure, on the part of Adenauer, to press for a gen vertrag, leaving the conventions to be dealt with later, but they have been only maneuvers and can be readily blocked in my judgment if we remain firm on this point. In short, I think it has been the Paris negots rather than the Bonn negots which have brought about Schuman's ltr. In the Paris negots the Gers have so completely accepted the concept of the Eur Army that they have rather frightened the Fr of the consequences. The Fr, therefore, seem now to rest their security less upon the Eur army concept and rather more on outside commitments, and as I read the letter there emerges from it more a fear of Ger escape thru their very adherence to the Eur community than anything else.

I do not feel that the Gers can be justly blamed for endeavoring to settle within the Eur framework the problem of arms manufacture and the cost of maintaining allied troops. It helps them politically and they were largely encouraged to this attitude by those Fr reps with whom they were largely dealing in Paris. I do not understand the logic which wld induce the Fr to balk so completely at the thought of having the upkeep of American and Brit troops a part of the community budget. Why not if they are here to support Eur def, but do not believe that this is something upon which the Gers insist if there was real objection.

Everyone who is aware of the situation here has to take into acct the almost hysterical attitude of the Gers on the discrimination issue. The importance of this issue in Ger politics largely accounts for the fact that the Ger Govt wld be induced to embrace the concept of such a community. It now seems that Fr wants both discrimination and nondiscrimination, and being a little appalled at the onrushing dates for decision seeks a pause to try and get both more clearly established.

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[1] Repeated for information to London and Paris.

[2] Reference is to Schuman's message of Jan. 29 to Acheson, p. 7.

Taking up the particular points in the ltr:

(1) I do not feel that their explanation on the Saar is adequate. If it is a mere evolution to a dipl mission from a comm such as we contemplate here, why not wait until that transition takes place in Ger proper? While I discount Hallstein's talk of an SPD takeover (Adenauer being no man to surrender power readily), no observer, least of all one as astute as Francois-Poncet, cld possibly have reported to his govt that his step wld not create a real polit rumpus here and quite possibly destroy the prospect of a successful Lisbon.

(2) On the matter of the possible secession of Ger, I feel that there wld be less chance of secession if Ger were a member of NATO than if she were not. I think Ger is more dangerous outside of NATO than in it. In their present mood, however, I do not believe we are going to convince the Fr of this and I wld not press it.

I believe that were it not for the Saar controversy we wld have no trouble working out the "technical" solution of the NATO problem. What success we can have now, I do not know.

The fin contrib is always serious as long as Schaeffer is negotiating and the only thing is to see what happens with the Wise Men,[3] for I can't believe we will have a solution by Monday, on that here. I believe that, if the present atmosphere cld be clarified we cld settle this security control problem here provided the Fr ease up a little on their rather extreme position re heavy weapons and propellants. I even think we can solve the war criminals problem, but I cannot venture any estimate as yet of these probabilities in the present atmosphere until I have a chance to talk with the chancellor and others again.

The best thing I can think of at the moment is to put to the Fr the necessity of doing something with respect to the Saar, perhaps referring to freedom of elections there even if in a somewhat more qualified form than Hallstein seeks. I wld also keep putting forward the idea of a "European" solution which even seems to be taking on here fairly well. In a partially relieved atmosphere we can restart negots but I am afraid, however, it is going to be terribly hard to pick up the pieces before London.

It might be possible, however, to make some capital out of London mtg by announcing that the Chancellor was being invited to come to discuss not only the question of Germany's def contrib but also other pending problems including that of the Saar. This wld enable him to make an announcement to the Bundestag and ask them not to tie his hands in such important negots by unfavorable votes or decisions.

McCLOY

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[3] The reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council. For documentation on the activities of the Committee during January and February 1952, see pp. 203 ff.

740.5/2–252

The British Embassy to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

The following is a personal message to Mr. Acheson from Mr. Eden.

"I have just had a useful round with the French.[2] They were very pleased by the account I gave them of selected aspects of our recent talks in Washington and seemed particularly reassured by the Tripartite Staff Talks on South East Asia.

2. They are bothered about the possibilities of trouble in the French Assembly if there is any undue pressure from the Germans about the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I think that I was able to reassure them, but they are still afraid that we shall run into difficulties if we commit ourselves definitely to invite Adenauer to London. I feel sure it would be wise to wait for a few days before deciding."

WASHINGTON, 2nd February, 1952.

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[1] An officer of the British Embassy handed this to Byroade (GER) on Feb. 2. The Embassy in London was informed of the communication in telegram 3861, Feb. 4, to London, not printed. (396.1 LO/2–452)

[2] Foreign Secretary Eden visited Foreign Minister Schuman in Paris, Feb. 1–2, 1952 and reported upon the American-British meetings in Washington in January. During those American-British meetings, Eden had indicated to Acheson his intention of making such a visit to Paris. For documentation on these American-British meetings of January, see volume VI.

396.1/2–252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1952.

Subject: Adenauer's Presence at Proposed Meetings, Feb. 13 & 14.

Participants: M. Bonnet, Ambassador of France
Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State
Mr. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State

The French Ambassador came at his request to say that he had had an urgent message from Paris concerning the possibility of Mr. Adenauer's presence in London at the meetings proposed for February 13 and 14. M. Schuman and Mr. Eden, in their current discussions in Paris,[1] had agreed that Mr. Adenauer's presence in London would be inopportune and premature. There were important matters at Bonn which were not yet settled. These primarily affected the financial contribution of Germany to defense and the question of limitation of production of armament in Germany. If these were not settled by the High Commissioners with the German authorities, they felt there was no purpose in Mr. Adenauer's attending the meetings and they saw no prospect of these items being settled by the date of the meeting.

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[1] Regarding the Eden–Schuman meetings under reference, see Eden's message of Feb. 2 to Acheson, *supra*.

I replied that I had said nothing about Mr. Adenauer attending the meeting in London. The meeting had been called by Mr. Eden, and it was in his capital. Any invitation to Mr. Adenauer would, of course, have to come from Mr. Eden. I agreed that Mr. Adenauer should not come if his coming would serve no useful purpose, but I felt quite strongly that the matters under discussion at Bonn should be settled and should be settled promptly. It was also essential to come to a conclusion on these matters if we were to make real progress at the Lisbon meeting.

In conclusion, I stressed that it was not my idea that Mr. Adenauer should be invited to London.

740.5/2–152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 2, 1952—4:31 p. m.

4526. For Bruce. From the Secretary. I am transmitting in my next fol tel[2] text of reply to M. Schuman's letter of Jan 29 contained urtel 4583, Jan 30, rptd London 1244, Bonn 353.[3]

I have considered carefully urtel 4645, Feb 1, rptd Bonn 357, London 1263,[4] containing your reasons for postponing a formal reply to M. Schuman's letter. I note your belief that a reply might freeze the Fr position. This, of course, is one of my deepest concerns. It seems to me, however, that unless our position is made clear to Fr Govt there may be even greater risk that exigencies of parliamentary debate will lead Schuman and others to make further statements which will cause irreparable damage. Also, is it not possible that letter wld strengthen Schuman's position vis-à-vis other elements in FonOff and Cabinet. Our concern is that if steps are not taken immediately the situation will hopelessly drift and make impossible accomplishment in the scheduled London and Lisbon conferences. I believe you will have seen McCloy's Jan 30 from Munich[5] and Spofford's Depto 922[6] which confirm my impressions of this.

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[1] This telegram, which was jointly drafted by Byroade (GER) and Bonbright (EUR) and which Bonbright signed for the Secretary, was repeated for information to London (for Gifford and Spofford) and to Bonn (for McCloy).

[2] Telegram 4527, Feb. 2, to Paris, transmitting the proposed text of Acheson's reply to Schuman, is not printed. For the text of Acheson's letter to Schuman delivered on Feb. 4, see *infra*. Differences between the final text and the text contained in telegram 4527 are indicated in footnotes 3 and 4, *infra*.

[3] The referenced telegram is not printed; for the text of Schuman's message, see p. 7.

[4] *Ante*, p. 12.

Request, therefore, that unless you see over-riding reasons for withholding my reply, you deliver copy to Schuman and also see that Eden, if he is still in Paris, receives his copy.

In presenting ltr you shld, if the occasion seems appropriate, suggest orally in connection with the para on the Saar that any action Fr Govt cld take to liberalize the law in the Saar concerning the formation of political parties wld be helpful in ameliorating the situation. In connection with the possible quadripartite declaration on a final settlement of the Saar problem, you shld inform M. Schuman that you are prepared to discuss the text of such a declaration immediately. If Schuman can give an affirmative response to this suggestion, the drafting might be centered in Paris. The Germans cld be consulted a little later. In our view the declaration, to be helpful to Chancellor Adenauer for the Bundestag debate on Feb 7–8, shld be available for his use by that time. In view of the short time this gives us, the declaration wld necessarily have to avoid dealing with the substance of such a solution, and in our view cld be confined to a very short statement along the lines of what we have said in our message.

London for Gifford. Request you deliver copy of letter to Eden or in his absence to FonOff, upon receipt of word from Bruce.

ACHESON

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[5] Not printed, but see telegram 1385, Feb. 1, from Bonn, p. 15.
[6] Dated Feb. 1, p. 13.

740.5/2–652

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Schuman[1]

SECRET FEBRUARY 4, 1952.

DEAR MR. SCHUMAN: Your letter of January 29[2] reached me when I was depressed and discouraged about recent developments on Germany. I read it eagerly, as I do all your letters, but my discouragement deepened. The central question for all of us revolves around the Lisbon meeting. For better or worse these meetings of NATO register the momentum of this great association. It has been marking time while underlying and historic decisions are being made elsewhere. Ottawa and Rome have passed without mark of progress. The world cannot and should not be asked to face another postponement of hope—which is failure.

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[1] The source text was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 2078, Feb. 6, from Paris which merely explained that this was the final text of the letter handed by Ambassador Bruce to Foreign Minister Schuman on the evening of Feb. 4. The original draft of this letter was transmitted in telegram 4527, Feb. 2, to Paris (repeated to London and Bonn). Telegram 4527 lists Acheson as the drafter but is signed by Bonbright. In his telegram 4698, Feb. 3, from Paris, Bruce recommended certain revisions in the draft letter, and telegram 4537, Feb. 3, to Paris, drafted and signed by Bonbright and cleared by Acheson, refined and approved the revisions. Differences between the original draft and the text printed here are indicated in footnotes 3 and 4, below. The circumstances of the delivery of this letter are described in telegram 4718, Feb. 4, from Paris, *infra*. A copy of the letter was also delivered to Eden on Feb. 5. Telegrams 4527, 4698, and 4537 are included in files 740.5/2–252 and 740.5/2–352.
[2] *Ante*, p. 7.

The negotiations at the Paris Conference and at Bonn had seemed to me encouraging. The problems were great—those presented by the Benelux and those, though lesser ones, presented at the Bonn talks. I was cheered and encouraged by your resilience and leadership at the essential points in the Paris Conference. Now I am deeply troubled.

As you know, I am not one to doubt my friends, or shrink from issues, but I have the gravest doubts about the utility of a conference like Lisbon until I am sure about both the position of my friends and the nature of the issues—

To be specific:

First. I agree that the Germans must agree in the contract with us on the support to be provided for Allied troops. There is no difference on this point.

Second. On security controls. We backed the proposal of a French-German negotiation of this problem. This did not succeed. I would prefer to support a solution by EDC. If this is not acceptable we will support a tripartite insistence on an agreement prohibiting to the FedRep the items agreed at Brussels, less heavy weapons, or a binding declaration by the German government to the same effect. Our suggestion to add civil aircraft we have reconsidered and withdraw. We think any contractual agreement should be reviewed by mutual consent after EDC is in operation. Since this matter is now again in the High Commission I hope you will instruct Mr. Francois Poncet, as I am instructing Mr. McCloy, to pursue it vigorously along one of the above lines in order that a solution may be found before we meet in London.

Third. The Saar. This matter bids fair to upset great and far-reaching plans. No one is more aware than I of the forces which produce this sort of a problem at the worst possible time. The response is not to complain but to surmount the difficulty. In my judgment the problem created is serious. It relates to what is said in your debate and in Adenauer's. This can make or break decisions of vast importance. Because of the timing of the debates it seems imperative that some action be taken now which will remove the question from current discussion or at least lessen present tensions. You and Adenauer are in a much better position than I to determine what can and should be done before the debate starts in the Bundestag. We have given much thought and offer these suggestions for your most earnest consideration:

(A) That you should again make a declaration concerning the intention of your government not to prejudice the ultimate decision about the Saar.

(B) That France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic and the United States issue without delay a joint declaration of their determination to initiate discussions, at an early date to bring about a satisfactory and final solution of the Saar problem. Mr. Bruce is available to help draft the joint declaration.

Fourth. Germany and NATO. We have understood your Parliamentary difficulties on the question of German membership in NATO. We have tried to be helpful. I think we have been. Our attitude has been that the decision is one for the future and should not be allowed to complicate the difficult enough problems of the present. Therefore, it should not be decided now. It is my understanding that Professor Hallstein did not request decision at this time on the question of German membership in NATO, but rather that any immediate solution should be an interim one. I believe this is a sound approach. Thus, we would not expect an affirmative decision from the French government on the question of German membership in NATO. Equally, what is done and said now, should not prejudice a future solution.

I do not believe that it will be possible to obtain a German contribution to defense or to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part of the Federal government if German membership in NATO is to be rejected as an ultimate solution. I am of course prepared to accept an interim arrangement such as the one proposed in the Council of Deputies in London, and I believe that we can persuade Chancellor Adenauer to go along with such an arrangement provided it is plain that the ultimate solution will not be prejudiced thereby.

I do not agree that future German membership and obligations in NATO are inconsistent with or would free Germany from the obligations assumed in the contractual agreements and in the EDC Treaty. Nor do I see why German membership in NATO affects the defensive character of NATO any more than it affects the defensive character of the EDC. Furthermore I do not see the necessity to discuss German membership in NATO at this time. If I may indulge in the vanity of quoting myself: "I do not believe that the way to solve a difficult question is to inject one which is presently insoluble".[3]

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[3] As originally drafted and transmitted in telegram 4527 to Paris (see footnote 1, above), this paragraph read as follows:

"For this reason, and also on the merits of the question, I do not agree that future German membership in NATO is inconsistent with or would free Germany

Footnote continued on following page.

Beyond these specific matters I have a deeper worry. The President and I have done everything in our power to support and strengthen the brilliant and constructive leadership which you and the French government have given to the creation of a European community. This has been true from the very first moment when you talked with me in Paris in 1950 about the idea which became the Schuman Plan. When the French government put forward the idea of a European Army, we turned from the ideas which we had had on the method of obtaining participation in European defense and gave the French proposal wholehearted support. We have believed and still believe that your leadership points the way to results which will be more far-reaching and inspiring than any of us can now realize. Only last week I said to the press that French leadership had made more progress in the solution of Europe's problems in two years than had been made in centuries.

We believe all this here in America for the best of all reasons—because it is true.

We have all been on the right track in developing a "European" policy as a corrective to the imbalance of which you write. Only in such a policy can we find the path to future cooperation with Germany and to future security. We here hold these ends as fundamental. They must not be permitted to fail. We must all continue to press for them. We have an enormous direct interest in bringing about a wise and constructive conclusion of the occupation of Germany, in securing the future against a possible German aggression and in strengthening the West against the never-ceasing menace of the Soviet Union.[4]

Footnote continued from preceding page.

from the obligations assumed in the contractual agreements. Nor do I see why German membership in NATO affects the defensive character of NATO any more than it affects the defensive character of the EDC. Furthermore, I don't see why we have to argue this question now. If I may indulge in the vanity of quoting myself: 'I do not believe that the way to solve a difficult question is to inject one which is presently insoluble.'"

Bruce's proposed revisions in telegram 4698 from Paris (see footnote 1, above) would have added the following sentences after the first sentence printed here:

"We have consistently assumed in connection with our enthusiastic support of your negots to constitute a European Defense Community that this community wld be of an enduring character, that its member states wld observe their obligations to it, and that no member state wld have the right to secede from it. If you consider that further safeguards against the violation of such solemn treaty obligations are necessary I shld be happy to consult with you and Mr. Eden at our forthcoming meeting in London with a view to ascertaining what might be done to give you satisfactory assurance in this regard."

In its telegram 4698 to Paris in reply, the Department of State was not prepared to extend the assurance proposed by Bruce. (740.5/2–352)

[4] As originally drafted and transmitted in telegram 4527 to Paris (see footnote 1, above), this paragraph was followed by two additional paragraphs. At Bruce's suggestion they were omitted. They read as follows:

"In embarking on this course, we have all chosen between two opposing concepts. One is that we should accept Germany as an equal participant in a Euro-

What I plead for is this:

(1) To do what is necessary to insure a constructive outcome of the debates preceding Lisbon in the French Chamber and in the Bundestag—that is, reduce irritations and avoid injecting unnecessary problems.

(2) To reach agreements before and in London so that the contractual arrangements and the EDC can be concluded in accordance with their basic concepts.

(3) To have Lisbon mark accomplishments by

(a) Approving reorganization of NATO machinery;
(b) Admitting Greece and Turkey;
(c) Considering and acting upon recommendations of the TCC;
(d) Approving the establishment of EDC and its relation to NATO;
(e) Noting with approval contractual relations with Germany.

Here at home the disillusionment of American opinion which would come if we falter at this critical moment and lose what seems almost within our grasp would be very far-reaching. The administration would have little chance of saving policies and programs on which all of us have worked for years and which are right. What developments would come out of this frustration I do not know, but they would not be good.

We have put our hands to the plow and we cannot look back. Either we must guide the events we have set in motion to the goal we have chosen, or they will move themselves, we cannot tell where.

I am sending a copy of this message to Mr. Eden.

Dean Acheson

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pean Community. The other is that we should continue long-term inequalities through the imposition by the Occupying Powers of certain restrictions on the Germans.

"The first holds infinite promise. The second has over and over again been proven the road to failure."

740.5/2-452 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, February 4, 1952—8 p. m.

4718. Eyes only for the Secretary. Deptel 4537, February 3, repeated info London 3659, Bonn 1394.[2] I delivered Secretary's ltr tonight to Schuman. He did not read it but said he wld do so in the course of the evening and discuss it with some of his close associates tomorrow and wld hope to give me an answer, on at least one of the items which demand immed attention, namely Saar problem, some time tomorrow, Tuesday.

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[1] Repeated for information to London (for Gifford and Spofford) and to Bonn (for McCloy).

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

He said his personal feeling was that polit future of Saar cld probably be settled more satisfactorily now than at a period a year or more later. He has several solutions in mind, one of which he may shortly propose to Eden and yourself. He is inclining toward some scheme for Europeanizing the territory and making it the seat of the Schuman Plan High Authority. He was careful to say that this was a personal opinion and one that he wld discuss with his colleagues. I referred to the hope expressed in your ltr that some announcement re a deliberation on this subj cld be made before the London mtg. He said he wld give me an answer on that tomorrow.

Mr. Schuman told me that he had talked to Eden about possibility of inviting Adenauer to London. He feels that such an invitation wld not be advisable until and unless the three occupying powers had reached an accord on outstanding questions. This he hoped might be possible on the first day, in which event you cld meet with Adenauer on the second or even the third day.

He expressed himself as being moderately optimistic over issue of outstanding questions. He is to see Berard later this evening and give him instructions for Francois-Poncet on security controls. He has not yet definitely decided what these instructions will be and will read your ltr before defining them.

He hopes that it will be possible during the French parliamentary debate on the EDC to avoid the imposition by parliamentarians of crippling restrictions and except for a few gen reservations to obtain approval in principle of the EDC conf's work.

Bruce

740.5/2–252

The Secretary of State to Ambassador Franks [1]

SECRET [Washington,] February 4, 1952.

My Dear Mr. Ambassador: I should appreciate your transmitting the following personal message to Mr. Eden, in reply to his message to me of February 2 delivered to Mr. Byroade by Mr. Ivor Porter on Saturday evening: [2]

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[1] This letter was drafted by Byroade and was cleared by Perkins (EUR) and Knight (S/A). It was delivered to the British Embassy on Feb. 4, apparently by Calhoun (GER).

[2] *Ante*, p. 17.

"Thank you for your message of February 2. I am delighted that it was possible for you to be in Paris at this particular time and am certain that your talks there will prove to be helpful to all of us.

"I assume that by now you will have seen a copy of my reply to M. Schuman's recent letter,[3] of which he sent you a copy, and are therefore aware of my views on the substantive questions he raised. I shall be glad to leave the specific question of inviting Chancellor Adenauer to meet with us in London next week entirely in your hands. I think we must assume at this stage that a meeting of minds on the major German questions can be achieved between the three of us, and with Adenauer. If the Lisbon meeting is to be productive of accomplishments on matters vital to the forward progress of our defensive efforts, agreement must be reached on these issues. It is my hope therefore that it will be possible to have the Chancellor join us, but I agree that the matter need not be settled for a few days. I gave these views to Ambassador Bonnet, who called on me Saturday at M. Schuman's request to discuss this same question."[4]

Sincerely yours, [DEAN ACHESON]

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[3] Dated Jan. 29, p. 7.

[4] For Acheson's memorandum of his conversation with Bonnet on Feb. 2, see p. 17.

740.5/2-452

Memorandum by the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1952.

Lisbon Conference

I discussed the proposed plan to have a meeting in London prior to Lisbon. I incidentally mentioned that this conflicted with the engagement which the President wished me to keep in Wisconsin. He said that he had forgotten about my going abroad and withdrew his request.

He expressed concern at the difficulties which were developing in the path of the Lisbon conference and thought that we must make every possible effort to get the agreement with Germany and the EDC agreement completed this month.

He offered me the use of the *Independence*, stating that although it was now in the shop going through an overhaul, he would speak to General Landry about it and believed that it could be gotten ready in a week's time. General Landry is to get in touch with us. If he does not do so, we might get in touch with him.

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[1] This memorandum covers a discussion by the Secretary of State during his meeting with President Truman on Feb. 4, one of the periodic meetings of the Secretary with the President to consider major foreign policy questions. Copies of this memorandum were directed to Perkins (EUR), Barnes (S/S), and Matthews (G). Other issues discussed were wholly unrelated to the Lisbon Conference or Europe and are reported on in separate memoranda.

740.5/2-852

Foreign Minister Schuman to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 7, 1952.

In reply to your message of Feb 4[2] I am sending you this ltr to which I wish to give a personal character in order to be able to express myself completely freely.

Your concerns are the same as mine. The French Govt will do all that depends on it to reach results acceptable for all before the Lisbon conf.

I know that Chancellor Adenauer is sincerely attached to the Eur policy which he defends courageously against a more and more vehement opposition. Although he was able to win fairly easily at the time of the vote on the coal-steel community he appears to have underestimated the resistance encountered in the Fed Rep to the participation of Ger to Western def, and that not only in the parliamentary opposition but also within the groups of the majority and in public opinion. To the extent that Fed Govt has made known the state of the negotiations, the projs which have been drawn up at Bonn as well as those studied in the Paris conf have been made the object of heated criticism.

Although the Chancellor was present in Paris at the conf held at the end of Dec he preferred contrary to all expectations and without giving any plausible reason not to be present on Jan 26 and 27.[3] His absence was announced several days before the incident re the Saar.

In order to overcome this growing hostility, the Chancellor is naturally anxious to obtain from the Allies a maximum of concessions of all kinds without measuring the reactions which these fresh claims (pretentions) are capable of provoking in the Allied countries. Ger intends to be paid the highest price for the mil assistance which we have asked of her.

It wld be neither just nor prudent to yield to such pressure. We must confine ourselves to the limits and to the schedules (delais) which we have fixed for ourselves.

The principal conflicts which have arisen during these last few days are the fol: They are also those on which you have made observations.

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[1] The source text constitutes telegram 4850, Feb. 8, from Paris (eyes only for the Secretary, repeated to London eyes only for Gifford and Spofford and to Bonn eyes only for McCloy) together with the following introductory paragraph of explanation:

"Fol is free translation ltr from Schuman to Secy Feb 7 and delivered us this morning. We are informed no copy has as yet been sent to Eden, although Schuman may decide to do so."

[2] *Ante*, p. 19.

[3] Regarding the meetings under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 594.

1. Limitations on manufacture of arms (security agmts).

On February 5 the Chancellor refused to enter into any agmt as well as to make any declaration which wld have the value of a commitment. According to him, the confidence which one must have in him and in the Ger of today and tomorrow constitutes sufficient guarantees. The principle of the equality of rights must free Ger from any special restriction from the moment when she adheres to the def community.

2. NATO. For the same reason, Ger Govt has officially announced that it reserves to itself the right to adhere to Atlantic Pact. At a given moment Ger might thus be brought to invoke a refusal of her demand (to adhere to NATO) in order to justify her exit from EDC.

The debate and adoption of proposed treaty in French Parl have for this reason become remarkably more difficult.

3. Saar. You must know that three weeks ago already the Chancellor without warning us announced officially that in March he wld present before Council of Eur a complaint re violation of rights of man. On other hand, existence of Saar and its present status cannot be neglected with respect to def community; it will indeed be nec that people of Saar be associated therewith and bear their share of sacrifices. Therefore Saar prob was before us once more in any case. It wld therefore be to ignore the true sit if one were to try to impute to my govt the responsibility for having, at an inopportune moment, raised a needless difficulty.

In order to cut short a fraudulent agitation, I had recalled as early as Jan 28 to Secy of State Hallstein that French Govt has always proclaimed that definitive status of Saar can be determined not only by peace treaty but through a special treaty prior to peace treaty; that in these conditions we are ready to examine any proposals which the Fed Govt may wish to make to us, that we are anxious to see settled a quest which weighs upon Franco-Ger relations. On Feb 4 one of Francois-Poncet's associates was approached by a personal associate of the Chancellor to the same effect and it was in reply to this approach that we, through same channel, authorized our HICOM to confirm our attitude which is favorable to an exchange of views and to define views without involving our Allies. All that is important for the present is for the Chancellor to be able make use of fact that negotiations in near future are possible between two countries most directly interested without prejudice to rights of Allied govts and of population of Saar itself.

Under these conditions a quadripartite declaration appears to me neither nec nor useful. We must in no case make with re to Saar the mistake of again putting ourselves in position of petitioners vis-à-vis Ger experience has proved to us how unmeasured are her demands when she has impression that we need her to get out of a difficult position.

What must one deduce from all this?

In first place one must deduce that to yield under Ger pressure wld not be to save our Eur policy but to compromise it definitively because French Parliament wld refuse to follow us: because it wld be to abandon to Ger direction of this policy; because it wld be dangerous to increase tension in Eur without any advantage for our common def.

On contrary it is nec that unity of three Allies become firmer vis-à-vis a Ger which can congratulate herself on the unhoped for results which she has obtained in two years—the Chancellor recently recognized this before his Parliament—vis-à-vis a Ger which wishes in one fell swoop before any peace treaty before the settlement of the serious probs which are still to be discussed with her, to snatch from us all that we can only grant her in prudently measured stages and with indispensable counterparts.

Furthermore, most recent news received from Ger prove that sang-froid which we are showing is producing immediate results. Our policy with re to Ger must be just and reasonable and concerned with establishing itself on basis of reciprocal confidence. But this cannot be achieved either through force or threat nor under pressure, but thanks to a cooperation which at no time will be able to do without patience and firmness.

Very faithfully yours, SCHUMAN

396.1 LO/2–752 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 7, 1952—10 p. m.

1475. Brit yesterday proposed that joint recommendation of HICOM be made to govts concerning invitation to Adenauer to attend second day of London mtg and that tentative agenda be prepared. Fol recommendation was prepared by polit advisers, but Francois-Poncet has not agreed. It is, however, submitted as representing US–UK views.

"[1.] It is clear that the contractual negots with the Fed Govt can not, before the mtg of the three FonMins in London on 13th Feb, be concluded. Far too many points are still outstanding. Nor can they even be brought to a stage at which no more than a few important points remain, which might conveniently be settled by Mins. In these circumstances there can be no question of Dr. Adenauer attending a quadripartite mtg of FonMins to put the final touches to the agreement at this stage.

2. Nevertheless the HICOMs consider it wld be useful for the Fed Chancellor to be invited to attend a conference with the three FonMins in London on 14th Feb, after a tripartite mtg between the three FonMins on the previous day. The three HICOMs consider that such a mtg with the Chancellor cld accelerate progress if it cld lead to decisions of principle on a limited number of disputed points. Furthermore, a mtg of the three Mins in which Ger problems are

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[1] Repeated for information to London and Paris.

discussed wld at this time be misinterpreted in Ger unless followed promptly by a mtg between them and the Chancellor. The HICOMs suggest, however, that no invitation be issued or announcement be made until the results of the Bundestag debate are known since the decision on the invitation will be influenced by the course of the debate.

3. If such a mtg takes place, however, it shld be made clear, both in the invitation to the Chancellor and in accompanying publicity, that its purpose is not the conclusion of our negots, but a general review of the position they have reached and the settlement of a certain number of outstanding points now ripe for decision at ministerial level.

4. The HICOMs consider that an appropriate agenda for such a mtg with the Fed Chancellor in London 14th Feb wld be:

1. Security controls.
2. War criminals.
3. Finance (matters arising from the recommendation of the Three Wise Men).
*4. Compensation for holders of German assets in foreign countries.
*5 Exemptions from Lastenausgleich.
*6. Composition of supreme restitution court and payment of restitution claims against former Reich.

There may be other questions requiring discussion by the four Mins, but these have not yet been crystalized.

5. It will be necessary for the three FonMins to agree their position on 13th Feb on any of the above points on which tripartite agreement does not before then exist.

McCloy

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*Unless previously settled with the Gers. [Footnote in the source text.]

700.00 (S)/2-852: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 8, 1952—7:56 p. m.

Infotel. In view of death of King George[2] Brit FonSecy Eden has proposed revised timetable for forthcoming meetings of US–UK–French FonMins and North Atlantic Council, and we have agreed to his suggestions. New timetable calls for meetings of three FonMins, possibly with Chancellor Adenauer, Feb 16, 18, and 19 in London and meetings of North Atlantic Council Feb 20–23 in Lisbon. We have informed Spofford that we are most anxious to impress on all NATO countries urgency of concluding meeting of Council in Lisbon by Feb 23. We have pointed out that Cabinet Mins from US all have dates for hearings before Congress and that if they cannot leave at that time it will seriously impair their presentations. Therefore we consider it important to cut program to bone and not permit ceremonials which might interfere with work being done efficiently and expeditiously. If sufficient progress is made on Ger problems, Chancellor Adenauer will join meeting of three FonMins in London before North Atlantic Council meeting.

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[1] This circular information telegram was sent to Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Moscow, Oslo, Reykjavik, Rome, and Ottawa. It summarizes a large volume of telegraphic exchanges included in various files, principally 396.1, 396.1 LO, 110.11 AC, 740.5, and 741.11.

[2] King George VI died on Feb. 6. President Truman subsequently designated Secretary of State Acheson and Ambassador Gifford to represent him at the funeral on Feb. 15.

ACHESON

396.1 LO/2–852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 11, 1952—8 : 35 p. m.

3828. Dept agrees in gen with US–UK HICOMers views and recommendations (Bonn's 1475 Feb 7, rptd London 391, Paris 463[2]). Suggested agenda for mtg with Adenauer tentatively acceptable though we strongly hope points 4, 5 and 6 cld be previously settled with Gers as we believe these subjs wld prove difficult for Mins to handle. Mtg with Adenauer obviously depends upon amt of agreement reached in tripartite talks but we share Eden's views reported urtel 3467 Feb 8.[3]

Wish to point out that proposed agenda wld also be agenda for tripartite mtg and results tripartite discussion wld influence final decisions as to items on quadripartite agenda. In addition consider other subjs will likely have to be added to both agendas. In view unsatis nature Schuman reply to Sec's ltr (Paris 4850 Feb 8, rptd London 1338, Bonn 400[4]) believe we will wish include discussion of Saar problem and Ger's relationship to NATO on tripartite agenda. May also be necessary to include on agenda of Adenauer mtg item dealing with action to be taken by NAT Council at Lisbon re EDC treaty and EDC–NATO relationships, including security guarantee, in order to be sure of firm Ger acceptance of all interlocking arrangements (see Deptel 1540 of Feb 11 to Bonn, rptd Paris 4746, London Todep 566[5]). Do not wish to leave open possibility of formal NATO action at Lisbon re EDC followed by subsequent Ger disavowal EDC treaty because of unsatis EDC–NATO relationships. You may indicate to FonOff Dept's thinking along above lines.

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[1] This telegram, which was repeated for information to Paris and Bonn, was drafted by Laukhuff (GER) and cleared in substance with Perkins (EUR).

[2] *Ante*, p. 28.

[3] Not printed; it reported that Eden hoped that Adenauer, who planned to attend King George VI's funeral, would stay on in London a few days until the three Western Foreign Ministers were ready to have talks with him. (396.1 LO/2–852)

[4] This telegram transmitted Schuman's letter of Feb. 7 to Secretary Acheson, p. 26.

[5] Not printed.

ACHESON

762A.022/2–352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 11, 1952—6:44 p. m.

1538. 1. We have waited see Schuman's reaction Adenauer's proposal before replying urtel 1405 Feb 3 rptd info London 374 Paris 439.[2] While interchange indicates area of Fr and Ger agreement exists in connection with idea of "Europeanization" of Saar, that area is so small it wld probably be best not to go further into substance of question present time. To do so wld risk freezing Fr position re continuance of monetary and customs union and stimulating further Ger demands re "democratic freedoms" in Saar. Regret Adenauer had to face Bundestag debates with only Fr reply but hope he will not feel forced make any further statements re substance of settlement. We likewise hope Schuman in Fr debates will say nothing re substance of settlement which will place conditions on future discussions with Gers.

2. We believe next step in solution problem shld be taken at London. We prepared suggest there fol procedure for settlement on Saar:

a. As a first step in settlement Saar problem, three powers shld offer to begin negots with Federal Republic in London or Strasbourg soon as EDC Treaty and Contractual arrangements come into effect.
b. Resulting agreement shld be submitted Saar for approval.
c. Fr, UK and US shld begin discussions at early date on substance of settlement.

If this procedure can be agreed upon among US, UK, and Fr and subsequently Ger it may be possible separate Saar question from EDF and contractual negots and at same time open way to eventual settlement on Saar.

3. In view above and Eden's reaction (London's 3393 Feb 5 rptd info Paris 1658 Bonn 272[3]) believe it best that US and UK not attempt

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris (4737), London (3825), and Strasbourg; it was drafted by John C. Ausland (GER/GPA) and approved for transmission by Perry Laukhuff.

[2] Not printed; it suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom propose an immediate exchange of views on the Saar between France and the Federal Republic with the aim of bringing about a definitive settlement of the question. (762A.022/2–352)

[3] Not printed; it reported that Eden had rejected Bonn's proposal as being precipitous. (762.022/2–552)

at this time make any substantive proposal to Fr and Gers, such as Adenauer has suggested.

ACHESON

740.5/2-1252 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 12, 1952—11 a. m.

4927. USDel/TCC 92. EB members held second mtg with Ger Ministers Bluecher, Erhard and Schaeffer Feb 10 at request FedRep.[2] Attended by Harriman and Draper, Monnet and Roll representing Plowden.

Ger reps furnished copies of Bonn res of Feb 8 setting forth conditions on Ger participation in defense and specific res on financial contribution.[3] (Assume Bonn has telegraphed texts.) They stated Bundestag had not made any specific demands or concrete proposal, but resolutions stated the conditions on which those members of the Parliament supporting the Ger contribution to defense wld approve it.

Ger reps then reviewed their presentation in light of Bonn resolution, noting they had raised most points at previous session. They again defended Ger proposal, adding arguments to those made previously. Schaeffer stated Gers had made maximum offer and cld make no further concrete proposal. Erhard said offer was maximum and if Gers had to make contribution only out of their own resources.

Ger reps stressed negative attitude of opposition, which has ear of labor, and need for getting mass support for defense from Ger population. This wld be difficult if workers felt their social welfare wld be compromised. Ger reps asked that allies demonstrate confidence in Fed Govt, which has sought to create polit basis to make defense contribution possible.

Fol are most significant additional points made by Ger reps.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Bonn and London.

[2] The German Delegation named here previously met with members of the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee in Paris on Feb. 4. Telegram 4733, Feb. 5, from Paris, which reported on that meeting, summarized the West German presentation as follows:

"Bluecher made prepared statement stating willingness of FedRep to make maximum contribution and appreciation burdens of other countries. He defended German submission along familiar lines, emphasizing that German situation different from all other countries. In question period, Erhard defended German figures as optimistic projection GNP. In reply to question why FedRep cld not contribute more than 20 percent of increase of GNP (as shown by its figures), he said higher per head consumption necessary to meet needs unemployed who wld be utilized to get increased production. He and Schaeffer said that no reductions possible in investment or social benefits projected and that all conceivable govt economies had been made. Erhard evaded question whether FedRep taking steps to control unessential investment. Schaeffer stated German taxes cld not be increased. There wld be deficit of 1.5 billion DM next German FY. Any further increase wld be impossible." (740.5/2-552)

[3] Regarding the Bundestag resolutions under reference here, see also telegram 1499, Feb. 9, from Bonn, p. 611.

1. Schaeffer said he had gone over matter with Blank. They believe their offer wld cover costs of support of allied troops and costs of Ger contingents for period under consideration. This estimate was subject to proviso that defense contribution be used only to meet defense costs. On allied costs he indicated it wld conclude infrastructure, transport and communication, and cost of Ger service units. With respect to Ger contingents, it wld cover infrastructure, pay and equipment up to light weapons. Gers do not believe it is possible (apparently both on technical and financial grounds) to produce heavy weapons.

2. Erhard said Ger offer is subject to reservation with respect to types of goods Ger called on to make available. (He apparently meant Gers reserve right to reconsider if significant quantities imported materials required unless covered by aid.)

3. Expansion of level of production beyond that projected by Gers is extremely difficult because Ger economy has reached point where a number of rigid restrictions operate, capacity limitation, shortages of raw materials and dollar balance problem.

4. Gers believe comparison with other countries shld be made in absolute terms rather than in relation to increase in GNP. In these terms, and seen in context of what the defense expenditures wld purchase, they believe Ger wld make largest defense contribution of all EDC countries. Claimed our comparison based on official rates of exchange does not reflect real situation. Estimating purchasing power of DM at 25 to 35 percent more than French franc at official rates, Erhard intimated Ger contribution greater than French.

Monnet said Ger statement reiterated and confirmed position he had suggested at previous meeting, i.e., that Ger proposed to take defense "in its stride", i.e., without making any sacrifice.

Harriman pointed out getting effective defense urgently means postponement some desirable economic goals until security is achieved. However, it is not only important for people to have sense of confidence in their currencies, they must also have sense of personal security, that is, freedom from fear of external aggression.

He said all countries have special problems and that judgment as to appropriate level of defense cannot be made on purely statistical grounds. He pointed out task of making judgment was difficult and that it had not been sought by members of EB. It had been sought by Germans. He remarked request was like seeing a doctor. One might not like the medicine prescribed but it was the doctor's responsibility to make the best diagnosis he could. EB wld give its judgment objectively and wld do so as soon as possible. It wld attempt to indicate some of the factors or factual data which had been taken into consideration.

Subsequently, working group met with Germans and asked a number of technical questions reported on in separate telegrams.

BRUCE

396.1 LO/2–1352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, February 13, 1952—11 a. m.

3517. In exchange of views on Saar question, FonOff rep expressed agreement with analysis and conclusions in paras 1 and 3 of Dept's 1538 to Bonn February 11, rptd Paris 4737.[2]

Recommendations which have been placed before Eden conflicted, however, with procedure outlined para 2. These recommendations are that UK, and if possible US, shld for present confine themselves to exerting pressure on Fr and Gers to solve Saar problem between themselves. FonOff believes that if US and UK discuss substance of settlement with Fr, result will inevitably be some measure of commitment on our part to Fr position with possibility Fr acceptance of position to which they may feel themselves forced by US–UK pressure. Also possibility similar situation for Gers with resultant likelihood mental reservation for both re any agreement thus arrived at. FonOff feels that US–UK participation in working out substance of proposed solution will also involve us in some measure of responsibility, in Ger eyes, for internal situation in Saar. Subject to Eden's agreement, therefore, FonOff conviction is that we shld exhaust possibilities of seeking to induce Fr and Gers to agree between themselves before US and UK participate in working out solution.

FonOff rep also expressed doubt whether Adenauer cld agree that negots for settlement Saar problem shld not begin until after EDC treaty and contractual arrangements have come into effect, even though terms of Bundestag resolution apparently do not make settlement condition precedent to EDC treaty or contractual arrangements.

GIFFORD

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[1] Repeated for information to Bonn, Paris, and Strasbourg.
[2] *Ante*, p. 31.

396.1 LO/2–1352 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 14, 1952—6 : 45 p. m.

3899. Urtel 3517 Feb 13 rptd info Bonn, 291, Paris 1741, Strasbourg unn.[2] In suggesting procedure for handling Saar problem to be discussed London Dept did not wish to preclude flexible approach which cld be adapted to actual developments as well as possible differing views of other FonOffs. What we seek is course of action most likely to achieve immed objective of separating Saar issue from EDF and contractual negots and ratification process. If Adenauer and Schuman feel this can best be accomplished by Franco-German negots we wld certainly not oppose efforts on their part to arrive at a mutually agreeable formula. Our thought, however, was that tripartite offer suggested para 2 Deptel 1538 to Bonn rptd info Paris 4737 London 3825 Strasbourg (pouch)[3] might be of more assistance to Adenauer in his difficult task of obtaining Bundestag ratification without serious intrusion of Saar question.

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[1] This telegram, which was repeated for information to Bonn, Paris, and Strasbourg, was drafted by Hillenbrand (GPA), was cleared by Godley (WE), and Calhoun (GPA) signed for the Acting Secretary.
[2] *Supra*.

While it is true that any discussion with Fr of substance of settlement involves dangers pointed out by Brit FonOff, any settlement, no matter how arrived at, will eventually have to have the agreement of the UK and US, and will therefore at some point necessitate a judgment on substance. Our recent experience when the UK and US let the Fr and Gers attempt to reach an agreement on security controls does not encourage much hope for bilateral approach, but any agreement which the Fr and Gers might actually reach on the Saar wld probably be acceptable to us. The danger is that rigid and irreconcilable positions might develop during the course of negots which cld have been avoided through the moderating presence of the US and UK.

WEBB

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[3] Dated Feb. 11, p. 31.

Editorial Note

In the days immediately preceding Secretary Acheson's visit to London, the British initiated a proposal for the holding of tripartite "official level talks" in London in advance of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. By February 11 the British and French had reached agreement on arrangements for a French mission to be present in London. American authorities were reluctant to hold such preliminary meetings feeling that they would serve no useful purpose. Eventually the Department of State agreed that a decision on such "official level talks" would be settled on the afternoon of February 14 following the arrival of members of the American party with Secretary Acheson. No records, however, have been found of such preliminary talks. Records of the meetings of the Secretary of State printed here do indicate that members of the three delegations did confer apart from the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. Documentation on the proposed "official level talks" is included in the file 396.1 LO.

A special series of briefing papers designated GER–LON was prepared in the Department of State in advance of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in London. The seven papers, all completed between February 6 and 8, were prepared in the Bureau of German

Affairs, were all approved by Bureau Director Byroade, and were generally cleared with other appropriate officers of the Department. The titles of the seven papers, none of which are printed, are as follows:

1. Disposition of German War Criminals
2. Saar (Negotiating Paper)
3. Saar (Background Paper)
4. German-NATO Relationship
5. German Financial Contribution
6. Military Equipment for German Forces
7. Security Safeguards re Western Germany

A complete set of these briefing papers is included in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103.

2. MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LONDON, FEBRUARY 13–19

RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dean Acheson and a small party of advisers arrived in London early in the afternoon of February 13, 1952 aboard the Presidential aircraft *Independence.* From the evening of that same day until midday on February 19 the Secretary of State held a series of meetings with Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. These meetings were interrupted on February 15 when the Secretary of State served as President Truman's principal representative at the funeral of King George VI. In the pages that follow, the editors have sought to present a comprehensive record of all known meetings of the Secretary of State including certain dinner meetings where substantive discussions were held.

Principal American officials participating with Secretary of State Acheson in the meetings in London were:

W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security
David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador in France
Henry A. Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
William H. Draper, Jr., United States Special Representative in Europe
Walter S. Gifford, Ambassador in the United Kingdom
John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner for Germany
Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Other experts included in the Secretary of State's party were the following:

Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Robert G. Barnes, Deputy Director, Policy Reports Staff, Executive Secretariat
Helen P. Kirkpatrick, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Public Affairs
Perry Laukhuff, Director of the Office of German Political Affairs
Samuel Reber, Director of Political Affairs, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany
Jacques J. Reinstein, Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs

British officials joining Foreign Secretary Eden in these talks included:

Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary of State
Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, British High Commissioner in Germany
Sir Pierson John Dixon, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
Frank K. Roberts, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
William Denis Allen, Head of the Central Department (Austria, Germany), Foreign Office
Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Eden

French officials joining Foreign Minister Schuman in the talks were:

Hervé Alphand, French Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council and President of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community
André François-Poncet, High Commissioner in Germany
Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Deputy Director General for Political and Economic Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, Director of the Cabinet, French Foreign Ministry
François Seydoux de Clausonne, Director of European Political Affairs, French Foreign Ministry
Jean Sauvagnargues, Deputy Director for Central European Affairs, French Foreign Ministry

West German officials joining Chancellor Adenauer in the conversations were:

Walter Hallstein, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Hans Schlange-Schoenigen, Consul-General in London
Hans-Heinrich Herwarth von Bittenfeld, Minister Director for Protocol, Foreign Ministry
Walter Becker, Director of the Division of Trade Policy, Foreign Ministry

The principal sources for the documentation presented in this section were the central files of the Department of State and the special comprehensive collection of minutes, papers, and telegraphic reports in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95. The single most complete collection of telegrams (Secto and Tosec) exchanged by the Secretary of State and the United States Delegation in London with the Department of State is included in the CFM files, lot M 88, which also contains certain other valuable papers on the London meetings.

The meetings in London were held in secret, but the outlines of their general course were reported in the world press, mostly on the basis of briefings by officers of the various delegations. Apart from the communiqués on pages 105 and 106, no formal, official reports on the meetings were published or made public. The single most authoritative account in print of the meetings in London appears in Chapter 64 in Acheson, *Present at the Creation.*

WEDNESDAY FEBRUARY 13, 1952

Acheson–Eden Dinner Meeting, February 13, 1952, Eden's Residence, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Harriman	Sir William Strang
Ambassador Draper	
Ambassador Gifford	
Ambassador Bruce	

Editorial Note

No official record has been found of the discussion at this dinner. The information given above is derived from Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, page 610. According to Acheson's brief account, the discussion focused on the issue of the location of the North Atlantic Council and the selection of a Secretary General for the organization. According to the account in Eden, *Full Circle*, page 45, Acheson and Eden agreed during the meeting to the suitability of a joint American-British declaration guaranteeing support for the European Defense Community in the event of threats from within or without. Acheson also told Eden that the United States was considering a new "Monroe Doctrine" for Europe.

According to telegram 3504, February 12, from London, British Chancellor of Exchequer Butler and Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary Strang were also scheduled to attend the dinner. (100.11 AC/2–1252)

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1952

Acheson–Churchill–Eden Meeting, February 14, 1952, Morning, Prime Minister's Residence, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Harriman	Foreign Secretary Eden
Ambassador Gifford	

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle [1]

SECRET LONDON, February 14, 1952.

After his meeting with Mr. Churchill today, the Secretary told me that he had discussed with Mr. Churchill the general situation in Europe and the importance of success on the various pending matters during the next three weeks. The Secretary said that Mr. Churchill was aware that the present crisis in Europe is the greatest since the war. The Secretary said that Mr. Churchill was very determined that we work out solutions to the present problems. He said that France and Germany must get together and work out the Saar problem. In his opinion, the French were acting badly and have been for some time in regard to this matter.

Mr. Churchill stated that we should guarantee non-secession from the EDC.

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[1] The information given above is derived from the source text and from Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 611. This memorandum and the one immediately following are the only official records of this meeting found in Department of State files. Acheson's personal account of the meeting closely parallels and is presumably based upon these official memoranda.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, February 14, 1952.

During a conversation on other matters, Mr. Churchill mentioned the proposed move of the NATO Headquarters from London to Paris. The Secretary said he made a very vigorous speech to Mr. Churchill regarding this problem and that Mr. Churchill was a little surprised and hard-up for answers on points which the Secretary made in which he urged the Headquarters be moved to Paris.

Acheson-Eden-Schuman Dinner Meeting, February 14, 1952, Eden's Residence, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden
Ambassador Gifford	Sir William Strang

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Interpreter

CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "London-Lisbon Meetings"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] February 15, 1952.

We dined with Mr. Eden. There were present Mr. Eden, Mr. Schuman, myself, Sir William Strang, Ambassador Gifford and Mr. Schuman's interpreter. The conversation before and during dinner was purely social.

After dinner Mr. Eden asked me to repeat to Mr. Schuman what I had said to him and the Prime Minister[2] about the critical decisions which had to be made in the next three weeks.

Briefly, I said that in the next three weeks we had to reach conclusions on all of four subjects: The contractual relations with Germany; the EDC treaty; the TCC recommendations;[3] and, connected with the latter, some solution of the French budgetary problem. I reminded Mr. Schuman of what I had said in my letter[4] regarding the importance of French leadership in the last two or three years and stated that we had now brought all the matters with which he and we had been so much concerned to the critical point, and they could either move forward or the entire scheme would result in failure. I thought that in France, in Germany, in Italy, and in the United States matters were now at a crisis. We had very difficult financial and economic problems, as well as military problems, which would take us some time to solve. If we could go into this effort with a great political success coming out of Lisbon, all these things were possible.

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[1] This memorandum appears to be the basis of the account of this meeting in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 613. A 400-word report on this meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 5, Feb. 17, from London. (396.1 LO/2-1752)

[2] The reference here is presumably to Acheson's meeting with Churchill and Eden on the morning of Feb. 14; see the two memoranda by Battle, p. 39.

[3] The reference here is presumably to the Supplementary Report of the Temporary Council Committee, Feb. 8, p. 211.

[4] Dated Feb. 4, p. 19.

If we had a political failure at Lisbon, I felt that they would not be solvable.

I said that there were two extraneous matters which had been introduced into the discussions which increased the difficulty: One was the Saar matter; the other was future German membership in NATO. Our problem now was to remove these two difficulties and then reach conclusions upon the other four.

Mr. Schuman agreed with the analysis and said he thought the resolution which had been introduced into the French Parliament was the best available and expressed confidence that the vote would be favorable.[6]

He was going to return immediately after the funeral to Paris and come back again to London on Sunday. We agreed we would meet at eleven o'clock Sunday morning; conduct tripartite discussions through Sunday and Monday morning; he agreed that Mr. Eden might make firm arrangements for the three of us to meet with Adenauer on Monday afternoon and Tuesday. We agreed that, if necessary, we would meet through Tuesday and put off our departure for Lisbon until Wednesday morning if that should be necessary. The first meeting at Lisbon is at three o'clock. We thought we could reach there by an early Wednesday departure; but, if we had to miss the first meeting in order to reach quadripartite decisions, it would be worth doing that. The first business meeting in Lisbon is at six o'clock Wednesday evening.

We then discussed the Saar question. Mr. Schuman expressed his readiness to meet with Chancellor Adenauer and work out a conclusion on the Saar. He felt very strongly that quadripartite discussions would be the reverse of helpful at this stage, but that the British and Americans should come in later on to support Franco-German conclusions. We all agreed on this procedure, and this is to be taken up with Chancellor Adenauer.

Mr. Eden then asked whether he was correct in believing that one of the fundamental French concerns was over the possibility that Germany might, after beginning re-armament, secede from EDC. Mr. Schuman confirmed this.

Mr. Eden showed me a paper which had been laid before the Cabinet pointing this out and recommending that the Cabinet authorize some sort of British guarantee. He presented this view in a general way to Mr. Schuman.

Mr. Schuman then produced the draft resolution before the French Chamber. This requested guarantees from the United States and United Kingdom against the withdrawal of any country from EDC.

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[6] The French Parliament was at this time considering resolutions regarding the proposed European Defense Community and German participation therein. Regarding this parliamentary action, see telegram 4980, Feb. 14, from Paris, p. 613.

However, Mr. Schuman stressed that the resolution in terms said that the guarantee should take the form of an assurance from the US and UK that we would both keep troops in Germany as long as necessary.

I said to Mr. Schuman that at this point I must stay within the limits of authorizations already made by the Congress. It would not be possible in a short time and particularly during the stresses of a presidential election year to introduce novel ideas. It seemed to me that the existing congressional action was quite adequate for the present purposes. The Congress had repeatedly, by legislation and resolution, stressed its support of European integration in all forms. The EDC clearly fell within this congressional approval. Furthermore, both the House and the Senate had, in connection with troops for Europe debate expressed approval of our maintaining forces in Europe as long as necessary. I felt that I could say to Mr. Schuman that in some form and within the scope of this Congressional action we could help him meet his problem.

Mr. Schuman said that what was necessary was to relate the two matters; that is, to relate the interest of Congress in European integration and the maintenance of troops in Europe. I said that this could be done and that it would probably take the form of a Presidential message in connection with the contractual relations with Germany. In this message the President could stress the relation of the contractual relations with the EDC, maintenance of our armed forces in connection with the EDC, and the fact that the continued solidarity of the EDC was a matter of the most primary concern to the US.

Mr. Eden thought that the UK could go further than this, the exact method being unclear at the present time, but it might take the form of a declaration approved by the Parliament or possibly an agreement with the EDC.

We all stressed the importance, in which Mr. Schuman fully concurred, of not having any action by either Government directed against Germany, but rather toward support of the EDC and opposition to secession by anybody.

We then briefly discussed the German relations with NATO, stressing that the important thing at the present moment was to leave that matter unprejudiced. Mr. Schuman believed that this was a possible and good solution.

We then discussed security controls. At the outset of this discussion, Mr. Schuman expressed his readiness to accept a unilateral guarantee from Germany and did not press for the inclusion in the contractual relations of a security control provision. I strongly supported this view, pointing out that there were in reality three lines of control; one would be the German declaration; the second would be provisions in

EDC requiring member nations to produce only what was allocated to them; the third was the financial controls. These consisted, first, in the fact that all money for military purposes would go through the EDC, and, second, that this would absorb all funds which Germany could raise for military purposes and that, in fact, Germany would be financially powerless to do more than was required through EDC.

Mr. Schuman said that they would wish to discuss some possible limitations on heavy equipment. I urged that we should not go into this, because it would involve us in a technical morass which we could not solve. This matter was left for further discussion.

Mr. Eden then raised civil aircraft. I urged that he drop this because of the controls mentioned above and because it was no more rational to prevent the construction of civil aircraft for fear that would lead to military aircraft than it would be to prohibit the manufacture of motor cars because that might lead to self-propelled guns and tanks. The real control was in the funds and the use of the funds for this purpose. The idea that Germany might break away from these controls really involved the question of Germany remaining in the EDC. We had to rely on the main points rather than wholly peripheral questions. Mr. Eden was very tenacious on this matter, spoke of the British recollection of the bombing during the war, and I am sure that we will have trouble on this point.

The matter of war criminals was referred to only as a subject which Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman wished to discuss. No matter of substance was mentioned in connection with it.

I do not recall that anything of importance was mentioned after this. When Mr. Schuman left, the Ambassador and I remained behind to urge on Mr. Eden the great importance of trying to conclude these questions satisfactorily before we left for Lisbon.[6]

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[6] At this point Acheson presumably also took up the question of Korea with Eden. It is also probable that at this time Acheson and Eden discussed the Egyptian question; see Evans' memorandum of Feb. 15, p. 96.
See also Acheson's comprehensive report to President Truman of his Feb. 13 and 14 meetings with Eden and Schuman, p. 78.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[London,] February 15, 1952.

We dined with Mr. Eden. There were present Mr. Eden, Mr. Schuman, myself, Sir William Strang, Ambassador Gifford, and Mr. Schuman's interpreter. The conversation before and during dinner was purely social.

After dinner I gave Mr. Eden the memorandum for which he and Mr. Churchill had asked,[1] which he read and thought was most helpful.

For the rest of the conversation, see separate memorandum.[2]

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[1] The memorandum under reference here has not been further identified; regarding the meeting of Churchill and Eden with Acheson on the morning of Feb. 14, see the two memoranda by Battle, p. 39.

[2] *Supra.*

Acheson-King Paul Conversation, February 14, 1952, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	GREECE
Secretary of State Acheson Ambassador Gifford	King Paul

CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "London–Lisbon Talks, Miscellaneous"

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle

CONFIDENTIAL [LONDON,] February 15, 1952.

The Secretary called yesterday on King Paul of Greece at the King's request. After the appointment, the Secretary told me among other matters, the King mentioned the question of a visit by him and the Queen to the United States. The King said he had talked to Ambassador Peurifoy about his desire to come, and Peurifoy had shown great interest in this.

The King said that he could see that with Queen Juliana coming, the President might be into an election period in which a visit by the King and Queen might be embarrassing. He said he understood the situation perfectly and it would not make too much difference to him if the visit were not forthcoming.

The Secretary said that Mr. Peurifoy had spoken to him and that the Secretary was also very much interested in this possible visit. He said he hoped when the visit actually came about, it would be under the most favorable circumstances. He said it was true that Queen Juliana was coming and that we would probably have a visit from one of the Latin American countries also. He said that we would then be in the campaign period, and he was sure the King would not want any impression to get around that his visit had any political connotations. The Secretary said that we were still studying the matter, but he gave every indication that an invitation would not be extended.

The King repeated that he was not deeply concerned and that he understood perfectly.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1952

Editorial Note

The funeral of King George VI was held in London on February 15. Secretary of State Acheson was the principal representative of President Truman. Acheson's personal recollections of the day are to be found in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 610–614.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1952

Acheson-Eden Meeting, February 16, 1952, 10 : 45 A. M., Foreign Office, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden
Ambassador Gifford	High Commissioner Kirkpatrick
High Commissioner McCloy	Sir William Strang
Mr. Perkins	Sir Pierson J. Dixon
Mr. Byroade	Mr. Roberts
Mr. Barnes	Mr. Allen
Mr. Reber	Mr. Shuckburgh

CFM files, lot M 88, "London–Lisbon Meetings"

United States Minutes[1]

SECRET [LONDON, undated.]

Mr. Eden opened the meeting by saying that the points that still seemed to be at issue included the EDF and the Saar, which were primarily of concern to other governments; and the questions of war criminals, security controls, and financial arrangements, on which there were peculiarly US–UK differences. He felt that nothing could be profitably done on the financial questions, but proposed that the meeting discuss the other issues. This was agreed.

Mr. Eden then reported on his discussion with Chancellor Adenauer earlier that morning. Mr. Adenauer was quite willing to wait until Monday for quadripartite talks, although he was very anxious to move forward and get as much settled as possible. Adenauer feels that each delay is making political capital for the USSR and he is greatly disturbed by the propaganda advantage which will accrue from the East German proposal.[2] However, Mr. Adenauer seemed relatively confident that progress could be made and indicated that Mr. Schuman had told him that the French Government would get a majority vote in the French Parliament.[3] Adenauer was most anxious for a private talk with Schuman, which both the US and UK support.

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[1] There is no indication on the source text, but Barnes was presumably the officer responsible for preparing these minutes. The information set forth above is derived from the source text. The characterization of this meeting in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 615, is presumably based upon these minutes. A 400-word summary account of the meeting was sent to the Department of State in telegram Secto 10, Feb. 17, from London. (396.1 LO/2–1752)

There was brief discussion of the parliamentary situation in Paris, with Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson indicating that, according to their Ambassadors in Paris, the Government would probably win the vote of confidence and would stay in office no matter how small its majority.

1. *European Defense Force*

Mr. Eden said that the British Cabinet had already approved the idea of giving the French a guarantee against German secession, and it had been agreed Thursday night that Mr. Schuman would produce a draft of what he wanted. Mr. Eden indicated that Chancellor Adenauer would accept this so long as the declaration appeared to apply to all governments, and not just to Germany. In fact, Adenauer felt that the declaration might be quite valid against possible communist control of some member government.

Mr. Acheson said then that in the draft report of the deputies on EDC–NATO relationship[4] we wished to propose that the phrase "continued existence of integrity of the NATO or the EDC is threatened" be added at the end of paragraph 9(b) as a problem requiring joint consultation. Mr. Eden accepted this proposal. In response to a question, Mr. Acheson confirmed that what we had in mind was a mutual application of this provision.

On the question of a guarantee against secession, it was agreed that a working group would attempt to draw up a draft to have available just in case the French draft did not prove to be acceptable. Sir Pierson said that he thought that the points that should be covered were: (1) Support for the principle of the EDC; (2) our intention of maintaining troops in Europe; and (3) a declaration to uphold the decisions of the court created in the EDC treaty.

On the second point Mr. McCloy pointed out that we had to be very careful about the phraseology since the statement on troops should not cut across the security guarantee. All we desired was to have the troops kept in Germany as a guarantee against secession, without explicitly stating this. Mr. Eden added that he thought a preamble for such a declaration might well set forth our purpose as having been the establishment of an army, which the US and UK support and that the two Governments would view with alarm any development which destroyed this army.

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[2] This is perhaps a reference to the letter of Feb. 13 from East German Prime Minister Grotewohl to the four powers occupying Germany requesting an early conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany; for the text, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, p. 79. Full documentation on the United States attitude toward East German proposals for German unity is presented in volume VII.

[3] The French Parliament was at this time considering resolutions regarding a European Defense Force and German participation therein. Regarding this parliamentary action, see telegram 4989, Feb. 14, from Paris, p. 613.

[4] Acheson was presumably referring at this point to document D–D (52) 35, 4th Rev., not printed; for the text of the Deputies report as ultimately approved by the Foreign Ministers, see document D–D (52) 35 (Final), Feb. 20, p. 247.

Mr. Acheson said that the French Assembly resolution asked for a guarantee against anybody's breaking out of EDC, specifically in the form of having US and UK troops kept in Germany. This was all right, but it should not be stated as a direct relationship. He then read the US draft of such a possible declaration,[5] which Mr. Eden thought was most satisfactory.

Mr. Byroade pointed out that there were three separate areas in which we might do something in regard to a guarantee. One was through the proposed revision in the Deputies' report; a second was a possible statement; a third was in further action on the domestic front. He thought that in the latter area it might be possible to do more than could be included in the statement. Mr. Eden inquired as to when we intended making the statement itemized as the second area of action, and Mr. Byroade replied that we had intended issuing it at the time the EDC and the contractual agreement was signed but before ratification. Mr. Eden expressed the view that this was too far away since the financial question might well delay us for some time. Lisbon was a difficult place at which to make the statement, and he therefore proposed doing it in London.

Mr. McCloy felt that there was some disadvantage in getting it out too soon, and Sir Ivone suggested that we might wait to see what was accomplished here in London before making a decision. He thought it would be impossible to get the agreement of the French on industrial controls unless we had this statement, but it was agreed that the French could be told that the statement was coming and perhaps this problem could be obviated.

It was agreed that the working group preparing the draft would make further recommendations to the Ministers as to the best time for issuance.

2. *The Saar*

Mr. Acheson said that on the Saar question the US favored having Schuman and Adenauer issue a formal statement in London that they agreed to work out together the question of the Saar as soon as possible and that this had been discussed with Acheson and Eden, who had indicated their strong support and willingness to join in the statement at the appropriate time.

As to the substance of the problem, Mr. Acheson felt we faced a difficulty between the French desire for a statement of economic union and a German desire for a guarantee of political freedom within the Saar. Perhaps the best solution was not to get into the substance at this time.

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[5] The draft paper read by Secretary Acheson at this point has not been found.

Mr. McCloy said that Adenauer did not insist on a substantive statement now, but before he signed anything he would want firm assurances on political freedom. Sir Ivone pointed out that the French had created difficulties for themselves by bringing the Saar into the Council of Europe and that in fact the French position today was not one of making concessions but only of asking the German Government to commit suicide today rather than five years later. Schuman has promised free elections, but the Saar Constitution prohibits parties favoring union with Germany.

Mr. Acheson said that there were two distinct elements in the problem: One was the right of self-determination; and the other was the kind of political freedom in the Saar. These two may be linked but are not necessarily so. What the French feared was Anschluss. The possible solution would be to secure a guarantee of autonomy for the Saar, which could be coupled with support for the economic union of the Saar with France, and a French guarantee of internal political freedom. Mr. Eden said that he liked this idea very much and Sir Ivone said that it might well be acceptable to the Germans.

3. *War Criminals*

Mr. Eden opened the discussion by saying that there were two points of difference between the United States and the United Kingdom on the war criminals. The first was on the composition of the tribunal. The proposal favored by the United States was a court composed of one representative each from the United States, United Kingdom and France plus an equal number of Germans. The United Kingdom had greater difficulty with this, since the court could never make any decision unless you assumed one of the Germans voted with the Allies or one of the Allies voted with the Germans. The alternate proposal favored by the British was to add a neutral member. They considered this necessary even though they realized that the tribunal was not really a neutral function.

The second difference was over the authority of the tribunal. Whether it should have the power to make recommendations to governments or the power of decision. The British favored the latter solution.

Mr. McCloy said that the US position on neutral membership had a historical background. During the last war we had failed to get any neutral support on the war criminal problem. For us to turn to neutrals now would possibly be an admission of error in the earlier trials. This we did not think we could do and, as we understood it, the French were also strongly opposed.

In response to a question from Mr. McCloy, Mr. Eden said that, if the Germans accepted the United States position, he would be quite willing to go back to his Cabinet for new instructions. He felt quite sure, however, that the present British position was the least the Germans would accept and for that reason it was the only one that had been put up to the Cabinet. If his analysis of the German position was wrong, he was quite willing to propose a change in his own.

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick pointed out that it was difficult to find a neutral acceptable for the job in question and wondered how it would be to offer the Germans one of the smaller Allies such as the Belgiums or Dutch as Chairman of the Tribunal. It was agreed that the United States position would first be proposed to the Germans and failing on this Sir Ivone's proposal would be offered.

Mr. McCloy said that we were opposed to giving full power to a tribunal. If we did we ran the risk that the entire war criminal program might be washed out by a single vote in which one of the allied members was soft and supported a German clemency proposal. In our constitutional procedures we retained the right to review pardon cases and he felt it would be difficult to accept the British position from a legal standpoint. Mr. Byroade added that the British proposal might create difficulties with our Congress. Mr. McCloy pointed out the third problem at issue, as to whether the court sat in small panels or with its full membership. Sir Ivone said that they felt this could be worked with if the major problems could be solved.

Mr. Eden said that the British lawyers felt there was no difficulty about giving the tribunal power to make final decisions. He agreed that the possibility of having a majority decision empty the jails was of some concern but he was not sure what could be done about this type of problem in any case.

Mr. Acheson asked whether it might be possible to work this point out through a formula by which unanimous decisions of the tribunal were final but other decisions would serve only as recommendations to governments. Mr. Eden immediately accepted this proposal and said he thought the French would like it. Sir Ivone added that it would probably be acceptable to the Germans. It was agreed that this proposal would go to the working group for final drafting that afternoon at which time the proposed United States–United Kingdom answers to the points in dispute would be presented to the French. It was hoped that an agreed paper could be presented to the Ministers for final review in the morning. With reference to the French concern over the war criminals held in France, it was agreed that the French should be assured that the proposal on the tribunal does not apply in any way to the Germans in France and that any further difficulty on this point with the Germans should be worked out by the French and German governments.

4. *Security Controls*

Sir Ivone noted that Mr. Schuman had agreed Thursday night[6] to accept a unilateral statement by Mr. Adenauer on this subject but that in his opinion Adenauer would not make the statement. His position was that Germany had gone into EDC and through it had accepted security limitations. He was now unwilling to give a further guarantee to an EDC country, although he would be quite willing to give an equal assurance to the United States and the United Kingdom if they desired.

Mr. Acheson read the present working group draft on a proposed declaration[7] and Sir Ivone said that it might be worth proposing to the Germans but would not be accepted. He noted that the phrase on para-military force created a real difficulty for the Germans. He thought it would be possible to work out any formula that could be expressed entirely through the EDC. Mr. Roberts pointed out that it would not be possible to interpret the para-military force problem in this way and apply it equally to the French through EDC and further noted that the resolution before the French Assembly specifically includes the necessity for reassurance of the subject of police force. He said this would be a really difficult point. The French position was not one of logic but one of emotion.

Mr. Byroade noted that there were two difficult points at issue. One was caused by the reference to police in the French resolution and the other by reference to civil aircraft in the German Bundestag resolution. Mr. Eden said he had a very real problem with his Parliament on the civil aircraft issue.

With reference to Mr. Eden's point, Mr. Acheson said that the real security guarantee on the aircraft issue could only be secured through the EDC framework and not through a separate requirement on civil aircraft. The issue was not whether Germany produces civil aircraft but that the productive capacity for civil aircraft could be converted into manufacturing military aircraft. So long as Germany remains in the EDC it would not be allowed to make this conversion into military production. The control that we desired to establish was therefore against secession from EDC and not necessarily against civil aircraft.

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[6] See Acheson's memorandum of conversation, dated Feb. 15, p. 40.

[7] The proposed draft under reference here cannot be further identified. American, British, and French officials below the Foreign Minister-level apparently held a series of meetings in London during the period of the Foreign Ministers meetings. These appear to be the "official level" meetings proposed by the British in early February and referred to in the editorial note on p. 35. No reports have been found of any of these "official level" meetings or "working groups", but one of their finished papers, designated "MOG" ("Meetings on Germany?"), is included in the section of supplementary papers to the London meetings; see p. 97; also see footnote 3, p. 55 and footnote 3, p. 58. A later draft of the paper read at this point by Acheson is printed as Appendix A to document MOG/3 Final, Feb. 16, p. 99.

Mr. Eden noted, however, that if the Germans were to walk out of the EDC they would be further along with their aviation industry and therefore that much more dangerous.

Sir Ivone and Mr. Roberts noted that the same situation could develop if the Germans were to violate the spirit of the security agreement and manufacture civil aircraft. They further pointed out that the Germans need so few aircraft that authorization of civil production would not produce much of an industry. They also pointed out that Germany had an economic problem which probably made it impossible for them to go into this business and in fact they would have to purchase civil aircraft abroad.

Mr. McCloy felt that Adenauer could simply not afford, from the standpoint of German opinion, to make the guarantee the British wished. Mr. Eden said he realized this problem but that he had a situation with his own Cabinet and his own Parliament that made it impossible for him to not have some reassurance on this point. He wondered whether anything could be accomplished by having a private talk with Adenauer on this subject.

Mr. McCloy and Sir Ivone thought this might be very helpful and that Adenauer might be persuaded to make some kind of informal statement that Germany did not intend because of economic problems to develop the civil aviation industry.

Mr. Roberts confirmed Mr. Byroade's feelings that at the ministerial level the French might be willing to drop their insistence on a guarantee against propellants. He also noted that Mr. Schuman had indicated the other night that a prohibition on research would not have to be included.

5. *EDC–NATO Relationship*

Mr. Acheson said there was a point in dispute in Paragraph 9*b* of the Deputies' report on the EDC–NATO relationship, (D–D (52) 35 4th Rev.) which he would like to take up. It was immediately agreed that there was no necessity for having the vote in both Councils unanimous but that the second and third sentences were useful. It was also agreed that the proposed US terminology on "continued existence of integrity of the NATO or EDC is threatened" should be added to the third sentence.

Sir Pierson said that the real issue was whether the two Councils as a whole had to call a meeting or whether any one member could call a meeting. The British did not disagree at all with our proposed new language. Mr. Acheson said that what we sought was a compromise whereby all minor issues would require the unanimous vote of one or the other Council but on major threats any one member could call a meeting.

Mr. Eden said that he liked this idea and thought it would be acceptable to the French and Germans. He expressed the hope that the language might be revised to be clearer.

Mr. Acheson said there was a final point at issue in Paragraph 10 with respect to the question of whether or not the treaty text had to be attached to the report. As he understood it, the treaty would not be in final form but the Council at Lisbon would have a report from the Paris Conference defining the provisions of the treaty. The United States felt that the Council could approve the treaty based on the report, leaving the Deputies the task of verifying later that the treaty text conformed to the report. This would make possible immediate council approval without further delay.

Mr. Eden said this was entirely satisfactory provided the Paris report set forth a satisfactory statement of principles. The British would be quite happy to accept the report provided it covered the treaty in specific terms. Mr. Acheson then mentioned the draft resolution prepared by the United States and said that Mr. Spofford would communicate this to the Deputies in Lisbon.

It was agreed that no statement or communiqué would be given to the press but that the press would be orally informed along the following general lines:

Following the informal meeting which Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden were able to have with Mr. Schuman on Thursday night, the British and French Foreign Ministers had a meeting together this morning to discuss further questions with respect to the German contractual settlement and were looking forward to being able to meet again with Mr. Schuman on Sunday. The meeting adjourned at 12:45 p. m.[8]

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[8] In telegram Secto 8, Feb. 16, 9 p. m., from London, one of a number of telegrams from London intended to provide background information for the guidance of the press, Kirkpatrick informed Leverich as follows regarding an Acheson press briefing in London that presumably followed the morning bipartite meeting:

"Secretary gave selected press group off-the-record background EDC, Saar, NATO problems in line with US positions. Authorized them explain without attribution following position arising out of Paris story of US–UK guarantee against secession from EDC: While Secretary unable give new guarantee sought by French Assembly, resolution requesting guarantee appears consistent with action already approved by Congress on MSA and troops for Europe. No further comments on requested guarantee possible this time but subject one which might be considered by Congress when contractual treaty with Germany presented.

"Secretary expressed hope NATO would be able approve general lines EDC treaty on assumption London talks will have cleared away basic disagreements." (396.1 LO/2–1652)

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1952

Meeting of Acheson With His Advisers, February 17, 1952, Evening, American Embassy Residence, London

PRESENT

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Bruce
High Commissioner McCloy
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Nash
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Reber
Mr. Linder
Mr. Penfield

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103

Memorandum of Conversation, by James K. Penfield

SECRET [LONDON, February 17, 1952.]

After a short discussion of the seating protocol at the Foreign Ministers' discussions, it was decided that Ambassadors Gifford, McCloy and Bruce would sit at the table with Secretary Acheson.

The rest of the conversation was devoted to a discussion of guarantees of the integrity of the EDC–NATO system. Mr. Bruce made the point, which he emphasized repeatedly throughout the conversation, that the most practicable way of guaranteeing the EDC was not through security controls but through the concept of military self-sufficiency. He said that no country could secede from the EDC unless it was or could become militarily self-sufficient, and that a country could be prevented from becoming militarily self-sufficient through provisions in the terms of reference of the Commissariat based on the principle of balanced effective forces and specifying that military procurement orders would be placed in such a way as to obtain the greatest and most economic production. Alternatively, military self-sufficiency could be prevented unidentifiably through US control of end-item allocations.

Mr. Bruce then outlined a possible statement by the President along the following lines:

We take note of the European association, we hope for further close association and have profound interest in its development. We would view with apprehension (or alarm) any breach of the agreements.

Mr. McCloy suggested a statement neither guaranteeing the EDC nor including the concept of military self-sufficiency but merely stating that we are interested in the European system of collective security and are prepared to consult when there is a threat to the integrity of the EDC.

Summing up the discussion, Secretary Acheson asked Mr. Nitze to work out a wording of a possible statement to be made by the President in his message transmitting the contractual arrangements treaty to the Senate. The Secretary outlined this statement along the following lines:

I am transmitting to the Senate a Treaty restoring Germany to membership in the family of nations. This Treaty is consistent with EDC and with NATO. We are deeply committed to these arrangements which are fully consistent with the intent of Congress as expressed on many occasions (this thought to be underlined and emphasized). Both Congress and the President have stated that American troops will remain in Europe as long as they are needed to maintain the defense of the West. The NATO idea has progressed through various stages and has developed an integrated force. Now within this integrated force there has been created a cohesive EDC force. Our policy is to maintain this balanced European force. Should a threat arise to the integrity of the EDC–NATO system, it would be a matter of the gravest concern to us and a threat to the effectiveness of the defense arrangements of the West which we would consider a matter for consultation under Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Acheson–Eden–Schuman Meeting, February 17, 1952, 11:30 A. M. and 4 P. M., British Foreign Office, Eden's Office, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Bruce
High Commissioner McCloy
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Nash
Mr. Reber
Mr. Laukhuff
Mr. Reinstein

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir William Strang
High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen
Others

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
High Commissioner François-Poncet
M. Jacquin de Margerie
M. de Bourbon-Busset
M. Seydoux de Clausonne
M. Sauvagnargues

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from American minutes of the meetings prepared by Laukhuff and Reinstein of the United States Delegation. The American minutes, comprising some 15 typewritten pages of manuscript, contain no record of any subject not covered in the telegraphic reports printed here. The telegraphic reports of the meetings, comprising five pages of manuscript, include explanatory passages not present in the minutes and are, on balance, a more precise account of the meetings. One copy of the Laukhuff–Reinstein minutes of the two meetings is included in file 740.5/2–1752. Another copy of the minutes, circulated in the Department of State as document GER–LONDON MIN 1 and 2, both April 16, 1952, is included in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103.

396.1 LO/2–1852 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 18, 1952—1 a. m.

Secto 12. Secretary met with Eden and Schuman twice today.

2. Schuman briefly explained situation at Paris. Draft resolution to be voted on in Assembly Tues.[2] It contains series of recommendations, not binding conditions. Nevertheless, they reveal parliamentary state of mind and French Govt must make every effort to meet them. Chances for ratification EDC treaty will be improved to extent recommendations met.

3. Mtgs with Adenauer. Mins agreed to meet Adenauer Mon morning.

4. War criminals. Mins accepted report by subcomite of officials giving text of article proposed for inclusion in Part I of convention on acts and programs (text being telegraphed).[3] This proposed article has subsequently been given to Adenauer and will be discussed

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Lisbon. Like other messages in the Secto series reporting on the talks in London, this telegram was transmitted to Washington in the name of the Secretary of State but was, of course, prepared by officers of the Department who accompanied him to London.

[2] The reference here is to the resolution on a European Defense Force and German participation in the European Defense Community, adopted by the French National Assembly on Feb. 19. For the text of the resolution, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 81–83. Regarding the resolution, see telegrams 5048 and 5049, both Feb. 17, from Paris, pp. 615 and 616.

[3] The report under reference here, circulated as document MOG/2 Final, Feb. 16, 1952, presented a draft article on war criminals for insertion in the proposed Convention on Acts and Interests to be concluded between the occupying powers and the Federal German Republic. The text of the draft article was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 3573, Feb. 18, from London. (740.5/2–1852) For the text agreed upon by the four Foreign Ministers, see p. 101. The composition of the "sub-committee" or "official group" preparing the

Footnote continued on following page.

with him tomorrow. Briefly, proposal commits Germans to accept custody and carry out sentence. Clemency board of six members wld be created, three Germans and one national from each of powers. Such board wld have advisory power only, except that unanimous recommendations wld be binding upon power which imposed sentence. Members of board wld have free access to prisons and to persons confined.

5. German financial contribution. (Reported in separate telegram[4]).

6. Security controls. Mins had before them two drafts of declaration which Germans might make on this subject.[5] US draft based on idea German Fed Govt shld declare itself prepared to accept as nondiscriminatory any decision by EDC commissioners not to allocate for production in Fed Rep items on specified list. UK-French draft was in form of declaration by Fed Rep Govt that it wld not permit production of, and scientific research in fields of certain armaments. Mins agreed declaration shld be unilateral by Germans; French thus relinquished original demand for contractual agreement. Schuman felt US approach was not satisfactory because EDC method of procedure wld not give sufficient protection as it wld operate by majority action of defense commissioners. Secretary felt we all agreed on objective and only question was which method wld most easily bring German acceptance. He was prepared to try UK-French approach and if Adenauer wld not accept that perhaps US approach based on EDC offered possibility. Discussion then centered largely on list of prohibited armaments. All agreed on atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, mil aircraft, naval vessels except minor defensive craft, and guided missiles. British and French wished to add civil aircraft and French wished to add propellants and gun barrels over 105 mm. Secretary offered to accept civil aircraft. He further offered to accept a British-French proposal for German declaration to include commitment to limit police force to scale required or function of maintaining internal law and order, on basis comparable with other EDC countries. He made both concessions conditional on dropping of propellants and gun barrels from agreement. He added he did not believe Adenauer wld accept civil aircraft and aid wld make no effort to persuade him to do so. Schuman, however, insisted on necessity retaining two items involved on ground we shld not build up German war industry. Secretary emphasized speed to bring about German

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

report and article has not been determined, but Frank Roberts presented the report to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Regarding the Foreign Ministers decision to have such an article drafted, see the U.S. minutes of the Acheson–Eden meeting of Feb. 16, p. 45.

[4] Telegram Secto 11, Feb. 18, from London, *infra*.

[5] The two drafts under reference here are printed as Appendixes A and B to document MOG/3 Final, Feb. 16, pp. 90 and 100.

production these items, especially gunpowder, and minimized inherent dangerousness of this particular item from security viewpoint. No agreement reached. Secretary repeatedly stated belief that we must present to Adenauer list we really believe in and will defend. Otherwise we will begin withdrawing items and will get nowhere with Adenauer. Schuman refused to concede point but agreed to consider overnight. Other points brought out in discussion were statement by Schuman that French inclined to permit scientific research in military items, though he made no specific proposal. Secretary also suggested that if Adenauer refuses declaration in UK-French form, and we fall back upon EDC arrangements, we might propose adding whatever list we agree to EDC treaty as items not to be allocated for production in "forward zones."

7. EDC-NATO relationships. Eden raised point of unresolved differences in para 9 of deputies report.[6] Three alternative proposals are to have joint mtgs of EDC and NATO councils (*a*) when either council wishes, or (*b*) when both councils wish, or (*c*) when any member of either organization wishes. Inconclusive discussion followed. Secretary referred to language which US is proposing in CD and indicated US agreement for proposal to permit joint consultation whenever desired by any member of either organization. British indicated agreement. Schuman said he wld consider and reply on Mon.

8. US-UK guarantee to EDC. British circulated draft form which their own guarantee to EDC might take. French circulated drafts of declarations which cld be made by UK and all three powers as well as comments concerning possible US declaration.[7] Secretary indicated we are devoting study to this problem and hoped we cld do something useful. He indicated doubt about possibility of using French text of tripartite declaration which seemed to say US will not change its forces in Europe without agreement by all three powers. Such solution wld be difficult if not impossible for him. Mins agreed that if formal declarations were possible they shld be made when EDC treaty and German agreements were signed. Eden raised question of what cld be said publicly now by Mins in answer to questions sure to arise since French Assembly already fully aware of question. Mins agreed to consider what might usefully be said in communiqué and meanwhile to have experts exchange views on British and French drafts and to tell Adenauer that matter under study. Eden commented he did not believe Adenauer wld raise difficulties as he had already indicated acceptance of idea so long as guarantee was in general terms and directed against anybody in EDC rather than Germany specifically.

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[6] The reference here is to document D-D (52) 35 (Final), Feb. 20, p. 247.

[7] The British and French drafts under reference here have not been further identified. It is possible that the British draft and a later version of the French draft worked out by American, British, and French experts are among the drafts transmitted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103.

9. Deconcentration. Schuman indicated he attached great importance to this subject and had committed himself not to complete negots with Germans unless deconcentration was completed. It was agreed after brief discussion that McCloy shld tell Adenauer that Fed Rep must stop equivocating on DKV.[8]

10. Saar. Secretary asked if it wld be possible for Schuman and Adenauer to have private words about possibility of removing Saar problem from field of controversy and to announce they had discussed the problem with each other and with Eden and himself and that US–UK anxious to be of help on solving problem. Schuman replied he is ready for conversation with Adenauer as he believes Adenauer is and that he wld keep his colleagues informed.

11. It was agreed to have official-level mtg with Benelux rep Mon.[9]

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[8] Documentation on the problem of deconcentration of West German industry and the status of the *Deutschekohlverein* is presented in volume VII.

[9] No record has been found of any "official-level" meeting or any other meeting between American, British, and French officials and any Benelux representative in London.

In telegram Secto 9, Feb. 17, from London, one of several telegrams intended to provide background for the guidance of the press, Kirkpatrick informed Leverich that the tripartite meetings had made "considerable progress," and analyzed the situation as follows:

"Atmosphere appears surprisingly good and promising for producing results prior to Lisbon but much depends on Monday's quadripartite, and media will have to play presently thin news coverage straight avoiding speculation on guarantees, breakdowns or alternatives to EDC." (396.1 LO/2–1752)

396.1 LO/2–1852: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, February 18, 1952—1 a. m.

Secto 11. At mtg Feb 17 tripartite mins took fol action on HICOM report on Ger financial contribution to def:[2]

(1) Agree to take up fol matters with Adenauer:[3]

A. Total Ger contribution. Mins will say that, since, consideration by 3 wise men was undertaken at Adenauer's request they assume he is prepared to accept recoms on behalf FedRep and will be able to provide immed confirmation of this. If he does, 3 govs wld also accept recoms.

B. Procedure for establ total contribution in future. Mins believe procedure similar to that employed shld be contemplated in subsequent yrs, using whatever machinery is set up in NATO in place of TCC. While exact method cld be settled at approp time, gen provs to this effect can be written into convention. Shld be clear, however, this does not prejudge question of FedRep membership in NATO.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Bonn, and Lisbon.

[2] The reference here is to document HICOM/P(52)10/Final, Feb. 12, p. 87.

[3] The agreed position summarized in points A, B, and C here was presented to the Foreign Ministers by a special tripartite subcommittee (Official Group) as document MOG/4 Final, Feb. 16, not printed. (CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "London–Lisbon Misc.") MOG/4 Final was apparently slightly redrafted as an *aide-mémoire* and handed to Chancellor Adenauer on Feb. 18.

C. Material support. Mins will point out substantial allied forces in Ger will require continuous special arrangements for material support which will not necessarily be same as those worked out in EDC or prevailing as among NATO countries. They trust Adenauer recognizes circumstances which make this nec.

D. Mins will point out their numerous other questions which remain to be settled on which allied proposals have been made and will urge that negots proceed rapidly in Bonn.

(2) Mins agreed to instruct high commissioners as fols:

A. Prov of contribution for 52/53 shld be finally negotiated at Bonn and included in contract. Sums to be requested shld not exceed DM 6.8 billion requested by forces, from which shld be eliminated all mil items and particularly those which are politically objectionable in Ger. Force shld make best efforts to effect maximum possible economies, in addition. High commissioners shld attempt reach agmt on div before conclusion Lisbon mtg and shld in any event report result negots so that mins can consider before they leave Lisbon.

B. Provided arrangements satisfactory in substance, payment of costs non-EDC Forces may be effected thru mechanism EDC. EDC will not have any substantive role, but will act merely as transmitting agency.

C. After first 12 month period, amt which may be contributed to support of non-EDC Forces will be determined by negot between EDC and Ger on one hand and non-EDC countries on other. Distribution among non-EDC Forces will be on basis relative troop strength, taking into acct variance in cost of branches of mil serv, such as air, ground and their logistical support.

ACHESON

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1952

Acheson-Eden-Schuman-Adenauer Meeting, February 18, 1952, 10:00 A. M., British Foreign Office, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden
Ambassador Gifford	High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Ambassador Bruce	Sir Pierson Dixon
High Commissioner McCloy	Mr. Roberts
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins	Mr. Allen
Mr. Byroade	Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. Nash	Others
Mr. Reber	
Mr. Laukhuff	

France

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
High Commissioner François-Poncet
M. Jacquin de Margerie
M. de Bourbon-Busset
M. Seydoux de Clausonne
M. Sauvagnargues
Others

German Federal Republic

Chancellor Adenauer
State Secretary Hallstein
Consul-General Schlange-Schoenigen
Mr. Herwarth von Bittenfeld
Mr. Becker
Others

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108

Laukhuff Minutes[1]

SECRET [Washington, undated.]

Mr. Eden opened the meeting by welcoming Chancellor Adenauer. He inquired whether the latter had any general observations to make concerning the problems confronting the four governments. The Chancellor confined himself to remarking that he was glad that the solution of the problems was so far advanced and he hoped that the four governments would soon be able to finish with these problems.

Mr. Eden suggested turning to the question of war criminals first. He asked what the Chancellor's reaction was to the paper which had been submitted to him.[2] Mr. Adenauer said that this subject played a great role in Germany. No one wanted the real war criminals to escape. He thought it would be welcomed in Germany if the previous convictions of these war criminals could be made known. Mr. Eden commented that he thought that this might have some advantages. Mr. Schuman explained that the proposal made by the three Ministers provided for a consultative body which might look into the question raised by the Chancellor to see what could be done and to take these facts into consideration.

Mr. Adenauer felt that his point had been misunderstood. He stressed the psychological role which this question played in Germany and the importance of making known before the Commission started its activity who the war criminals really are. Many of them had had previous criminal records, which fact he wished to have publicized. Perhaps this could be settled in Bonn. More specifically, as concerned the proposals laid before him he suggested a transposition of paragraphs 1 and 2, since the second paragraph dealing with the establishment of the Clemency Board made a better introduction to the subject from the point of view of German opinion than the first paragraph which dealt with the obligation of the German Government to accept custody and to carry out the sentences. He also suggested a merging of paragraphs 1 and 4. He said that the Western Powers could not accept revision of the sentences. But the word clemency (Gnade) implied in German a recognition of the sentences. He asked whether another expression could not be found, having the same meaning but a different connotation, for example "remission of penalty" (Straferlass). He thought there were other crimes involved than those listed in the proposed text and he pointed out that the proposal did not cover persons held in France or those not yet tried in France.

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[1] The source text indicates that these minutes were prepared and possibly completed on Mar. 10, 1952, when Laukhuff and other members of the U.S. Delegation to the London and Lisbon meetings had already long returned to Washington. Copies of these minutes were circulated in the Department of State as document GER–LONDON MIN 3, Apr. 16, 1952. A summary account of the meeting was sent to the Department of State in telegram Secto 16, Feb. 18, from London. (396.1 LO/2–1852)

[2] The "paper" submitted to Chancellor Adenauer was the draft article on war criminals described in telegram Secto 12, Feb. 18, p. 55.

Mr. Eden pointed out that "clemency" was a legal phrase but that perhaps the legal experts could find another word. Or the word could be omitted altogether and the body could be called simply "Board" or "The Advisory Board". Mr. Schuman and Mr. Acheson agreed that there would be no difficulty in changing the name of the Board. It was thereupon agreed by everyone at Mr. Eden's suggestion that the word clemency should be omitted from the title of the Board in paragraph 2 and in paragraph 3 the wording should speak of the "right to pardon or to reduce or eliminate sentence". The change of order suggested by Mr. Adenauer was also agreed.

Mr. Schuman thereupon pointed out that persons imprisoned in France for war crimes were convicted according to French law. It was a question of competence and the Ministers could not change French law. He expressed willingness to have bi-lateral conversations with the German Federal Republic about this problem. Adenauer stated that 345 persons were involved who had been sentenced or who were awaiting sentence. He pointed out that the United Kingdom and the United States had conducted all their trials in Germany and that those sentenced were held in Germany and therefore fell under the terms of the proposed agreement. On the other hand, only a small part of those held by the French came under its terms. It was important that if the agreement were published it should be made known at once that there is a plan for talks between the Federal Republic and France.

Mr. Schuman said that if there were 311 (correcting the figure cited by Adenauer) the reasons were that France was occupied for four years; the United Kingdom and the United States were not so occupied. If in the light of this fact only 311 were held, it indicates that the selection was strict. Moreover, France was not alone in holding German war criminals outside of Germany. He cited Belgium and the Netherlands. He expressed the desire of France, however, to try with the Federal Republic to attenuate the past. However, on this subject he could not enter a multilateral agreement. It concerned France and French law and he would have to consult his Government and Parliament. Mr. Eden suggested that the topic did indeed fall outside the scope of the paper under discussion and since Mr. Schuman had said he was ready to discuss the matter directly with the Germans that would be the best way to handle it. The Ministers were there to discuss only prisoners held in Germany. Mr. Adenauer insisted that he attached great importance to publishing something about bi-lateral talks. Mr. Schuman responded by suggesting that the German Federal Republic could publish something about them. Mr. Eden indicated that there appeared to be general agreement on this point and promised that the paper would be revised in the light of the discussion just had and presented at the next meeting.

Mr. Acheson asked whether it had been agreed that the High Commission would look into the Chancellor's first point and arrange for the publication of the past records of prisoners held as war criminals. Mr. Eden thought that the High Commission would see what could be done and meet the Chancellor on this point.

Mr. Eden asked if the subject of finance could be taken up next. He pointed out that Mr. Adenauer had in his hands the report of the "Three Wise Men"[3] which set Germany's share in defense expenditures at 11.25 billion Deutschemarks. He expressed the hope that the Chancellor would agree to accept this recommendation but asked whether he wished to make some general observations about it. Mr. Adenauer said he had read the report with interest and found it well conceived. He could not, however, say "yes" to it today. He would have to consult his experts but he hoped agreement would be possible.

Mr. Eden said there were three questions outstanding. First, what amount should Germany contribute for this year? Second, what method should be used for determining the amount in subsequent years? Third, what would be the method of taking care of the needs of non-EDC troops in Germany? He asked if the Ministers could make some progress on these points. Mr. Adenauer again rejoined that he had seen the report on the previous evening for the first time and that he could not negotiate about it yet. He thought his experts must study it but he did not anticipate a long delay and he thought he could begin to negotiate about it in Bonn immediately upon his return.

Mr. Acheson noted that the Chancellor had said he thought there would be no important delay. He thought it was of the most vital importance to reach agreement soon. The Lisbon meeting would have before it a report approving the plan for the EDC. Conclusion of the EDC was dependent on the contractual agreements. Each matter depended on the other. He was hopeful that the Ministers could return from Lisbon with agreement in principle on the EDC and on the contractual agreements. Mr. Adenauer inquired how long the Lisbon meeting would last and was told by Mr. Acheson that it would last until a week from the next day. Mr. Adenauer said he thought it could be settled by then. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the Ministers would have to have a reply *before* they left Lisbon in order to make their decisions. Mr. Adenauer said, smilingly, that he understood that, that the Ministers could not wait until their suitcases were packed. Mr. Eden joined his colleagues in pressing for a German reply by the end of the week and Mr. Adenauer said he thought he could give a reply by then.

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[3] The reference here is to the Report of the Temporary Council Committee (often referred to as the "Three Wise Men") of Dec. 18, 1951; that report is summarized in document LIS D-4/1a, Feb. 6, p. 208.

Mr. Eden observed that there did not seem to be much use in expounding the ideas which he, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Schuman had discussed yesterday on other financial points. He suggested that they could give the Chancellor a document based on their conversations. Mr. Adenauer said it was difficult to separate the various questions. Mr. Schuman agreed that they were all aspects of the same problem but pointed out that the second question had to be discussed at Lisbon and that it would be difficult to settle without the answer to all three questions. Mr. Adenauer thought, however, that there was only one great interest for the Lisbon meeting—the total amount. He thought they ought to be satisfied with that and he feared that the time was too short to discuss all the problems.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the difficulty was partly a mechanical and economical one. He and Mr. Schuman and Mr. Acheson would be in Lisbon. The Chancellor would be in Bonn. The division of the German contribution would be discussed in Paris. He wondered whether the EDC could have representatives in Bonn. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the EDC did not exist and that all six countries must be present at any discussion. Mr. Adenauer felt that all of this argued in favor of his thesis. The EDC need only be informed of the global amount after the discussion at Lisbon. Mr. Schuman agreed that this was true from a *formal* point of view. However, all of the members of NATO had to be informed and a gap would exist in their communiqué on this subject.

Mr. Acheson urged that they all keep the great objective in mind. Out of these meetings in London, out of the debates in the French and German Parliaments and out of the meetings in Lisbon something must come. The Ministers must make not only progress but they must reach conclusions. They had to strive to be in a position to say that they had settled the outstanding questions concerning the EDC, the German agreements and so forth. He urged that the Ministers come as close as they could to settlement.

Mr. Adenauer thought that Secretary Acheson was fully justified. He only feared that if the Ministers simultaneously tackled the question of global amount *and* the distribution they would be delayed. He suggested that they put the global amount first in priority and in principle. The other question was really for discussion between the United States–United Kingdom and the EDC. Mr. Schuman pointed out that the division concerned not only the EDC but was a subject also for tripartite discussion and the Germans should discuss it also outside the EDC.

Mr. Eden in summary thought it had been agreed that everything should be done at Bonn to reach agreement by the end of the week on the global amount and also to work there on the principle of the division. He adjourned the meeting until 4:30 p. m.

Acheson–Eden–Schuman Meeting, February 18, 3 P. M., British Foreign Office, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Bruce
High Commissioner McCloy
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Nash
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Reber
Mr. Battle

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Allen
Others

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
High Commissioner François-Poncet
M. de Bourbon-Busset
Others

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the American minutes of the meeting prepared by Lucius D. Battle. The Battle minutes, comprising some nine wide-margined pages of manuscript, contain no reference to any subject not covered in the telegraphic report printed *infra.* The original copy of the Battle minutes is included in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103. Another copy of the Battle minutes is included in CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "London–Lisbon, Misc."

396.1 LO/2-1952 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, February 19, 1952—1 a. m.

Secto 19. The three ministers met three p. m. Monday preceding quadripartite mtg. Decision reached to delay any communiqué until conclusion of mtgs.

Eden asked whether Schuman in position to report on matters he had referred to his govt re prohibition propellants and gun barrels. Schuman said his govt still not ready agree drop these items. Said that if complete agreement reached on other points he wld do all possible obtain agreement these matters. He then stated he had authorization agree drop French insistence on gun barrels.

Eden stated Germans had no intention building civil aircraft and planned purchase from one of three govts. He said Germans prepared make statement that effect, which he thought wld be very helpful. Said statement wld go pretty far and thought this wld be helpful. Eden also mentioned discussion at Cabinet today in which position of Secretary re shortage propellants supported.

Schuman stated he heard in Paris propellants manufacturers being moved from France to North Africa for fear position French exposed. He repeated willingness attempt get Cabinet agree on propellants if other items agreed to.

Re German proposal on security controls, Schuman expressed concern that German proposal omitted any guarantee against orders being placed in Germany. He said agreement Germans not consider failure place orders as discrimination no real guarantee. He said Germans must agree not undertake production arms or new clause EDC treaty must say what cannot be produced. Schuman expressed concern lest vagueness ref geographic area caused difficulty Netherlands, Belgium, or Italy. Did not regard provisions re scientific research adequate. Schuman also mentioned that there was no annex to German proposal, although one referred to.

Secretary agreed Schuman's point re German undertaking on production, necessity for annex, and consultation with other govts which might be affected on redrafting this portion. Agreed also research para inadequate.

Ministers agreed give Germans text declaration discussed Secto 12.[2] Agreed leave brackets out of copy and leave gun barrels and propellants on prohibited list.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Lisbon, Paris, and Bonn for information.
[2] Dated Feb. 18, p. 55.

US submitted redraft Article 9 (*b*) CD report EDC–NATO relations.[3] Agreed text, which being telegraphed separately, but accepted possibility drafting changes in deputies.

Schuman expressed some concern re likelihood emergency mtgs being called too frequently if one member cld request, but accepted Secretary's explanation similar provision in NAT for mtgs requested by one member. Secretary also explained that one of prime points our draft was to meet French concern re secession of members.

Working party submitted draft of portion tripartite communiqué re maintenance US and UK armed forces Europe in association EDF and also draft declaration of three powers on occasion signature contractual agreements with Germany. Also submitted draft British statement to be made Commons early date re interest UK in continued existence EDC. All documents telegraphed separately.[4] Agreed re-work communiqué which expect issue tomorrow, to consider declaration of three, and to work during Lisbon mtg on British statement.

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[3] For the article under reference here, see document D–D (52) 35 Final, Feb. 20, p. 247, the Deputies Report on relations between NATO and EDC. The article in the agreed report is the same as that referred to here and subsequently approved by the four Ministers at their 4:45 p.m. meeting; see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 67.

[4] See telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103.

Acheson-Eden-Schuman-Adenauer Meeting, February 18, 1952, 4:45 P.M., British Foreign Office, London

Present

United States

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Bruce
High Commissioner McCloy
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Nash
Mr. Reber
Mr. Laukhuff

United Kingdom

Foreign Secretary Eden
High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Shuckburgh
Others

France

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
High Commissioner François-Poncet
M. Jacquin de Margerie
M. de Bourbon-Busset
M. Seydoux de Clausonne
M. Sauvagnargues
Others

German Federal Republic

Chancellor Adenauer
State Secretary Hallstein
Consul-General Schlange-Schoenigen
Mr. Herwarth von Bittenfeld
Mr. Becker
Others

396.1 LO/2-1852

Laukhuff Minutes [1]

SECRET

In opening the meeting Mr. Eden inquired whether there was agreement to the publication of the TCC report. He understood that Mr. Adenauer was agreeable and he himself thought it would have the advantage of quieting rumors. There was general agreement.

Mr. Eden thereupon brought up the subject of the relationship between EDC and NATO, for discussion. He recalled that he and his two colleagues had proposed to Mr. Adenauer what they hoped would be a satisfactory arrangement. He had the proposal read aloud.[2] Mr. Adenauer asked whether this meant that the majority of either Council decided upon the joint meeting. Messrs. Schuman and Eden assured him that it meant that any member of either organization can demand a meeting.

Mr. Adenauer observed that there should be close cooperation between the civilian and military organizations. He merely mentioned this as he did not think the absence of any relevant provision here would cause trouble. Mr. Schuman read a portion of the EDC draft treaty dealing with such military cooperation. In reply to the Chancellor's request to see the text from which he had read, Mr. Schuman stated that the German experts knew it and in any event it was not yet finally decided. When Mr. Adenauer observed that they should decide it then and there, Mr. Schuman reminded him that the six EDC countries must decide.

Mr. Acheson felt that the difficulty was a technical and not a real one. He entirely agreed with the principle the Chancellor stated. However, the precise text must be agreed elsewhere and the exact words then cleared with the Chancellor as with the heads of other governments. The Ministers could only decide the principle. Mr. Adenauer indicated agreement.

Mr. Eden then brought up for discussion the question of war criminals. He had a revised version of the paper distributed [3] and stated that the only change other than those suggested in the morning meeting was a change in the position of the last sentence of the first paragraph. This was necessitated by the revised order of the paragraphs. Mr. Adenauer inquired whether the sense of the sentence could not be inserted as a phrase in the second sentence in order to modify its harsh impact.

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[1] The source text indicates that these minutes were prepared or completed on Mar. 12, 1952, when Laukhuff and other members of the U.S. Delegation to the London and Lisbon meetings had returned to Washington. Copies of these minutes were circulated within the Department of State as document GER-LONDON MIN 4, Apr. 16, 1952. A summary account of the meeting was sent to the Department in telegram Secto 24, Feb. 21, from Lisbon. (740.5/2-2152) A photograph of the four Foreign Ministers before this meeting is printed on p. 563.

[2] Presumably what was read at this point was the text of paragraph 9 (*b*) of document D-D(52) 35 Final, the Deputies Report on relations between NATO and EDC, p. 249.

[3] The account of this discussion of war criminals was reported in telegram Secto 24 (see footnote 1, above) as follows:

"2. War criminals. After brief discussion the Mins accepted with one drafting change revised text on war criminals prepared on basis of earlier discussion." For the text of the agreed article on war criminals, see p. 101.

At this point Mr. Adenauer and Mr. Schuman engaged in a somewhat protracted argument over the meaning of the German word Rechtskraft. The upshot of the discussion was a proposal laughingly proffered by Mr. Eden to use the word validity (validité) in English and French and Mr. Adenauer could call it what he liked in German!

Mr. Eden then suggested that the Ministers begin discussion of their most difficult subject, security controls. He recalled that a draft paper[4] on this subject had been agreed by the three Governments and he expressed the hope that the Germans could accept it. Chancellor Adenauer remarked that the paper appeared to be a declaration to be made by the Federal Government. He thought it seemed to go too far. It said three times that the Germans were prepared to give proof of their peaceful intentions. For the most part he was in agreement with the contents of the declaration. But he remarked that it was an odd partner who, on joining an enterprise, was required to say three times over that he expected to be a well-behaved member. He asked to be allowed to read three passages from the draft paper just in order to show how embarrassing this text was. He did not see why the Federal Republic should give a special declaration of its pacific character on joining the EDC. Every one must realize that treaties meant nothing unless they were based on good-will. He felt that if one said to a partner (and the Federal Republic was to become a partner) that in order to show your peaceful intentions you must promise this, that, or the other, that one displays a great lack of confidence. He had just come from seeing Prime Minister Churchill who had remarked to him in another connection that "generosity begets confidence". There was a provision in the EDC treaty that no member will establish a military apparatus. That included any paramilitary forces. Furthermore, it was provided that no member was to produce arms unless instructed to do so by the Commissioners. In other words, it seemed to him that all which was being demanded in the draft declaration was already to be found in the EDC treaty. The U.S. and the U.K. might say that the treaty does not commit the Federal Republic as far as the U.S. and U.K. were concerned. He realized also that the EDC could argue that if no orders were given to Germany Germany might consider that to be discrimination contrary to the provisions of Article 3 of the treaty. Mr. Adenauer was therefore ready to declare that in view of the international tension and Germany's geographical position, the Federal Republic would not regard it as discriminatory if no orders were placed there. He was also ready to give the U.S. and the U.K. a declaration having the same contents as the EDC treaty. He would also declare that the Federal Republic had neither the wish nor the ability to manufacture civil aircraft. He asked the three Ministers to help him to fulfill their wishes but in a manner which would not confront him with unsurmountable difficulties.

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[4] The draft paper referred to here is presumably the declaration discussed at the tripartite meetings of Feb. 17 and 18 and reported upon in telegrams Secto 12, Feb. 18 and Secto 19, Feb. 19, pp. 55 and 65. For the text of the declaration, see Appendix B to document MOG/3 Final, Feb. 16, p. 100.

Chancellor Adenauer expressed a further wish. He said that he needed assurance that German units would be equipped in the same manner and with the same types of arms as other units. He observed furthermore than he did not understand what the anxieties of the three Powers were regarding German police forces when the Germans had no arms. He asked the Ministers to consider the situation in which the Federal Republic would find itself for a number of years. There would be—and this corresponded to his very strong hope—a considerable number of U.S.-U.K. and EDC troops on its territory. Could then anyone be afraid of an unarmed police? If the debate on these points was prolonged, he added, he would go home feeling that the Germans were infinitely stronger than they had known they were!

Mr. Eden suggested removing from the draft declaration the three phrases dealing with "pacific intentions". He felt that these were not in any way necessary. Further to reenforce points he had made elsewhere, Adenauer read a paragraph which he said was from the EDC treaty. Mr. Schuman called his attention to the fact that what he had just read was not a passage from the treaty but from the report. Chancellor Adenauer agreed that it was from the report made by Mr. Alphand. He then read another passage from the treaty itself. He wished to add one word. As soon as the treaty would be ratified the provision prohibiting production, except by order of the Defense Commissioners, would become German law.

Mr. Eden asked how far apart the Ministers were and what was the best method to handle the two texts before them (including a German text).

Mr. Adenauer repeated that the production of *all* weapons would be forbidden so soon as the EDC treaty was ratified. It appeared to him that the three Ministers had not sufficiently considered the legal position. Mr. Schuman recognized that the treaty would create the legal position outlined by Mr. Adenauer. However, the Commission in acting would have to apply a rule. He pointed out that no rule had been specified for the Commission. There was no *prohibition* on placing orders. He re-read the appropriate article of the EDC treaty. The Commission was supposed to utilize the technical and economic capacity of each state. There was no compulsion not to place orders in Germany. The outlook might alter. Decisions would be made by a majority and the majority might prefer to place orders in Germany. He accepted it that the present Federal Government did not desire orders. But he felt the position might change. Mr. Schuman wished to be quite frank. The Ministers must take account of the psychological reaction in different countries. The manufacture of arms in Germany might increase tension. Orders might lead to the construction of new factories. The impression might be created that Germany was becoming an arsenal. Turning to Mr. Adenauer he said that he wanted to pay tribute to the latter's peaceful intention and solidarity. The French were only concerned with certain exceptional armaments. There seemed to him to be only two solutions. First, the Germans could make a voluntary declaration as the three Ministers had suggested. Second, there could be a provision inserted in the EDC treaty giving a directive to the Commissioners with regard to the placing of orders. Of course the other four EDC states would have to agree to this. He saw no other possibilities and asked which of these would be the more acceptable to the Chancellor.

Mr. Adenauer pointed out that the program for production would have to be approved by the Council by a two-thirds vote. "Program" might be clarified and expanded to include references to the geographical situation of areas marked for production. He repeated that he was ready to declare in writing that in view of existing international tension and the location of Germany, the Federal Republic would not regard it as discriminatory if the Commission did not place certain orders in Germany. As for the security worries of other countries to which he understood Mr. Schuman to have referred, he presumed Russia was meant. He thought Russia would not be pleased by *any* of our "works".

Mr. Schuman took the position that "program" was not concerned with orders but only with over-all requirements. The placing of orders devolved on the Commissioners, who had no directive. If the rule were to be introduced that such and such could not be made here or there, that would be all right but such a rule would have to be approved by the other four EDC countries. Mr. Adenauer thought Mr. Schuman over-looked the fact that EDC budget estimates must be based on the programs and that these would run by categories and countries.

Mr. Acheson intervened to say that he felt that there was a large area of agreement. Leaving the drafts aside, the Chancellor was clear that the Federal Republic would carry out the EDC treaty as a matter of German law. He recalled that Mr. Adenauer had said he would not protest non-allocation of orders to Germany. He had also said that he was ready to declare that the same obligation will run to the U.S. and U.K. On the other hand, Mr. Schuman had said there is no rule to guide the Commissioners. For that matter the same difficulty inhered in the proposal of the three Ministers which excepted these items listed by the EDC treaty. He inquired whether it was not possible to put into the EDC treaty a provision listing the items not to be allocated. He thought the Ministers only needed to agree on the list.

At this point there was an intermission.

Upon reconvening, Mr. Eden suggested and the other Ministers agreed that the advisers should be asked to produce a text by 11:00 a. m. the next day. He thought some work should also be done on a communiqué.

Mr. Schuman referred again to the problem of deconcentration and decartelization and said that a settlement was urgent. His Parliament had instructed him not to ratify the coal-steel plan until the question of the DKV was settled. Mr. Adenauer assured him that the Federal Republic had the same wish to end the matter and that his Government was doing everything possible about it.

Acheson–Eden–Schuman–Adenauer Dinner Meeting, February 18, 1952, Evening, Carlton Gardens, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson Others	Foreign Secretary Eden Others
FRANCE	**GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC**
Foreign Minister Schuman Others	Chancellor Adenauer Others

Editorial Note

According to the account in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, page 618, the Foreign Ministers were part of a "large company" which dined with Eden. No record has been found of the dinner. According to the Acheson account, Schuman and Adenauer held a private meeting on the Saar question. This is probably the same meeting alluded to in Adenauer, *Memoirs*, page 409. Acheson further indicates that he met with Eden and gave guidance to a British-American working group preparing a draft paper on security controls. This draft paper is presumably the same as the report on security controls discussed at the tripartite meeting on the morning of February 19; see Barnes' minutes, page 72.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1952

Acheson–Eden–Schuman Meeting, February 19, 1952, 10:00 A. M., British Foreign Office, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Bruce
High Commissioner McCloy

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir William Strang
High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Roberts

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
High Commissioner François-Poncet
M. Jacquin de Margerie

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103

Barnes Minutes [1]

SECRET

Mr. Eden opened the meeting by referring to the short draft communiqué prepared for issuance by the Three Powers.[2] He expressed the hope that it would not be the only reference made to the European Defense Community, adding his understanding there would be another communiqué on this subject.

Mr. Schuman said there was also to be a reference to the EDC in the Four Power communiqué.[3] His major reaction to the present draft was that it was a bit "thin". In his opinion, the tripartite meetings had been more important than this communiqué indicated and he thought the communiqué should reflect this importance. He inquired as to whether the reference to the US and UK interest in the EDC could not be strengthened and also supplemented with some indication that the two powers intended to study means whereby they could display their confidence in and support of the organization.

Mr. Acheson suggested that there were two separate questions at issue. The first was how to handle the tripartite announcement. He felt it might well be issued as a part of but following the quadripartite communiqué. The second question was the wording to be used.

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[1] Neither a telegraphic summary nor any other record of this meeting has been found.

[2] The draft communiqué under reference cannot be positively identified; presumably it is the draft quoted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103. For the tripartite communiqué issued on Feb. 19, see p. 105.

[3] The quadripartite communiqué referred to here has not been positively identified although a draft communiqué is included in CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "London–Lisbon, Misc." For the quadripartite communiqué issued on Feb. 19, see p. 106.

He felt that the tripartite section might be introduced by some terminology such as "while in London the Three Ministers had also found time to cover points not covered with Adenauer". This communiqué would then go on to express the abiding US–UK interest in EDC, as proposed by Mr. Schuman, and then add that this matter would be one of continued consultation among the Three Ministers.

Mr. Schuman said he had doubts about Mr. Acheson's first suggestion since the meetings in London had actually commenced as tripartite discussions. He thought it would create a false impression with the public if the ministers were to handle the two communiqués as a combined document and with the implication that the tripartite talks were subsidiary and subsequent to the quadripartite meetings.

Mr. Eden asked if there was an agreement on a single communiqué. Mr. Schuman said he preferred two communiqués, and Mr. Acheson said that what he had proposed was two communiqués issued on the same piece of paper. Mr. Schuman said the method of issuance was immaterial, but he preferred two communiqués and wanted to start with the tripartite report since that had been the first meeting.

Mr. Eden said he thought they could agree on that and suggested the appointment of a drafting group to go to work on the communiqué. This was agreed and the drafting group immediately left the room. Mr. Eden then suggested that they turn to the report of the working group on security controls.[4]

Mr. Acheson noted that the prohibition on civil aviation remained in the document. He had understood that agreement had been reached the day before to handle it separately.

Mr. Eden replied that Adenauer had said he could not make a separate statement. However, if the Germans preferred that course, the British would be quite willing to accept it. The line suggested the previous day for the separate statement was to the effect that Germany did not have the capacity and did not intend to develop the capacity for a civil aviation industry.

The discussion then turned to propellants, with Mr. Eden pointing out that it was the United States and not Germany which had expressed the hope that propellants could be removed from the list. Mr. Schuman said he would have great difficulty at home on that point. He would do all he could and would use the argument that the United States would not accept a security control agreement which included propellants, but he was not sure he could succeed.

Mr. Eden said he had understood that an agreement was reached the previous day that Mr. Schuman would not allow the negotiations to fail over the issue of propellants. Mr. Schuman said that was not correct; he would rather give way on the question of large guns.

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[4] The report under reference here has not been found. Its content may be further discerned from the account in telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.

Mr. Acheson suggested that the list be agreed *ad referendum*, allowing Mr. Schuman time to raise this point with his government. He said it was probable the United States and Germany could not agree to the security controls so long as propellants remained on the list.

Mr. Schuman said his position would be easier on propellants if civil aviation were retained on the list. Mr. Eden pointed out that civil aviation could not be included in a list of military items, but Mr. Schuman said he thought it could be listed as a non-military item. Mr. Eden said he thought this had been settled the day before but now it appeared the Ministers had made no progress. After Mr. Schuman explained his proposal again, Mr. Eden said he did not understand it but was willing to agree to it. During this discussion, Mr. Schuman also commented that he could not accept the concept contained in the present draft that the Federal Republic of Germany was the only strategically exposed area.

It was finally agreed that the Ministers would proceed with their meeting with Chancellor Adenauer, and that the United States and the United Kingdom would remain silent while Mr. Schuman attempted to persuade Adenauer of his proposal on security controls.

Acheson-Eden-Schuman-Adenauer Meeting, February 19, 1952, 11:15 A. M., British Foreign Office, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Gifford
Ambassador Bruce
High Commissioner McCloy
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Nash
Mr. Reber
Mr. Laukhuff

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen
Mr. Shuckburgh
Others

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
High Commissioner François-Poncet
M. Jacquin de Margerie
M. Bourbon-Busset
M. Seydoux de Clausonne
M. Sauvagnargues
Others

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Chancellor Adenauer
State Secretary Hallstein
Consul-General Schlange-Schoenigen
Mr. Herwarth von Bittenfeld
Mr. Becker
Others

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the American minutes of the meeting prepared by Laukhuff on March 12, 1952. The Laukhuff minutes are somewhat longer but in many important respects not quite as precise as the telegraphic report printed *infra.* Copies of the Laukhuff minutes of this meeting were circulated in the Department of State as document GER–LONDON MIN 3, April 16, 1952.

740.5/2–2152 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 21, 1952—5 p. m.

Secto 30. 1. Final mtg of three mins with Adenauer in London was held Tues, Feb 19.

2. Security controls.[2] Official subcommittee presented draft language which cld be inserted in Art A–4 of EDC treaty as subpara (*d*). After some discussion of majority needed for decisions by EDC Council on this matter, it was agreed exact language shld be left to Paris EDC conference but language recommended shld run along fol lines:

> "Not to place orders, as concerns the materials enumerated in list II, in strategically exposed areas except in accordance with gen directives of the Council of Mins unanimously agreed"

There followed brief discussion of draft text of letter to be sent by Chancellor to other EDC govts.[3] Gers had proposed that sentence assuring equal supply of arms to Ger contingents shld apply to arms "of all kinds" but Adenauer quickly accepted US–UK redraft limiting assurance to arms of types "necessary to fulfill (Ger) assigned task to def of Europe". Adenauer also gave way without discussion on handling of research problem and abandoned proposal to enable Ger scientists participate "in all kinds of research work", in favor of UK–US proposal preventing Ger research in listed armaments except as requested by EDC. Four mins then agreed texts of two ltrs to be sent by Adenauer, as telegraphed textually from HICOG Bonn Feb 20 (telegram numbers not yet known here[4]).

Discussion shifted to items to be listed in list II of EDC treaty. Adenauer suggested list be discussed in Paris by mil experts, and kept returning to this theme. Other three mins however insisted every attempt be made there and then to agree list. Adenauer said many items were ill-defined. Wld "chemical weapons" and "propellant" prohibit production of explosives used in mines and ammunition for sporting weapons and police? How big are "small coastal vessels"? Shouldn't guided missiles mean V-weapons? He said FedRep has no wish or ability to make civil aircraft but how cld he face Ger people and say he had obligated them for 50 years not to make them. Secy said list shld be discussed as decisions on categories were political. It was important to US to know whether propellants and gunbarrels were to be included. We might wish to ask FedRep to make these and such requests shld not be made more difficult by anything in EDC treaty. If list agreed, experts cld then refine it. Schuman felt best solution was to list all proposed items but allow EDC to make exceptions. Adenauer made point he wanted to be sure these prohibitions wld not interfere with peace economy or lead to arguments over meaning.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] The four Ministers presumably began their discussion at this point of the report of the tripartite working group on security controls referred to in Barnes minutes of the tripartite meeting of the morning of Feb. 19, p. 72.

[3] For the agreed text of the letter to be sent by Chancellor Adenauer to the governments of the European Defense Community, see p. 104.

[4] The texts were sent in telegram 1632, Feb. 20, from Bonn, not printed. (740.5/2–2052)

Eden suggested accepting list in principle, omitting civil aircraft and noting French reservation on propellants and gunbarrels. Schuman said however he cld not consider anything accepted unless agreed "in toto". After further discussion, consensus was that everyone agreed list shld include atomic, biological and chemical weapons, long-range and guided missiles, mil aircraft, and naval vessels other than minor defensive craft. Eden indicated he wld drop civil aircraft. That left French position "in suspense" on civil aircraft, propellants and gunbarrels. It was agreed that the High Commissioners shld immed begin discussions with Adenauer in Bonn to define agreed items and mins wld seek agreement in further info discussions in Lisbon on disagreed items.

In reply to final inquiry from Eden, Adenauer said he was prepared to write letter to UK or any govt stating FedRep has no intention of producing aircraft but intends to purchase them.[5] Eden accepted this. When Schuman stated such declaration cld be "repealed" at any time, Adenauer said: "Have confidence"! He added production wld be so costly, especially if mil aircraft not produced, that his successor cld not build them "even if wholly mad". Schuman took note and said he wld refer to his govt. Re police, he added he might propose to EDC conference to define police in terms used in document given to Chancellor day before. (". . . numbers, cadres and equipment of all police forces in FedRep will be limited to scale required for function of maintaining internal law and order, on basis comparable with other EDC countries").

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[5] In his telegram 8 from Bonn to Lisbon for Byroade, repeated to the Department of State as 1663, McCloy reported that Adenauer had been asked to furnish American authorities a written formula embodying the undertaking given orally here to Eden. Hallstein had offered the following text of such a formula: "The FedRep does not intend to manufacture civil aircraft but only to purchase them." (740.5/2–2152)

3. FedRep NATO membership. Adenauer referred to French Assembly resolution mention of countries having territorial claims and stated he reiterated general convention statement that realization of such claims (by FedRep) cld take place only by peaceful means. Further, in agreeing to proposed NATO para re EDC–NATO relationship, FedRep does not relinquish desire to be NATO member. Furthermore, he interprets this provision (para 9*b* of deps report[6]) to mean if NAC decision affects rights and duties of EDC members, Ger will be consulted. Schuman limited himself to observing that French Parliamentary discussions reflect a state of mind. French law must be passed in order to admit new member to NATO. In any event he felt everyone has same aim and cooperation will develop.

4. Statement by Schuman. Announcing vote of confidence in French Assembly.[7] Schuman said it leaves much difficulty still ahead on EDC question. He appealed to colleagues to take into account difficulties which will face any French Govt. His govt firmly desires to achieve EDC, as only policy for France and peace. If socialists abstain or vote against, there will be no majority for EDC. French Govt not discouraged, however, though there is no guarantee its aim will be achieved. Eden and Secretary assured him they wld do all they cld to help him and each other.

5. Communiqué. Draft communiqué was presented by subcommittee, discussed, revised and agreed.[8]

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[6] The reference here is to paragraph 9 (*b*) of document D–D (52) 35 Final, the Deputies Report on relationships between NATO and EDC, p. 249.

[7] The reference here is presumably to the adoption on Feb. 19 by the French National Assembly of a resolution on a European Defense Force and German participation in the European Defense Community. Regarding the resolution, see telegrams 5048 and 5049, both Feb. 17, from Paris, pp. 615 and 616.

[8] The reference here is presumably to the draft communiqué quoted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103. For the tripartite communiqué as agreed and issued on Feb. 19, see p. 105.

Acheson–Churchill Meeting, February 19, 1952, Afternoon, Prime Minister's Residence, Cabinet Room, London

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

According to the account in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 620–621, the Secretary of State met in private with Churchill following an audience with Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip, at the Royal residence of Clarence House. At that audience, at which Foreign Secretary Eden was also present, Acheson apparently spoke of his satisfaction at the outcome of the completed quadripartite meetings. The conversation with Churchill was concerned with Acheson's proposal for a revision of Churchill's impending speech to the House of Commons on the conduct of military operations in Korea. A detailed account of Acheson's receipt and revision of Churchill's proposed speech early in the morning of February 19 and his conversation with Churchill in the afternoon of that day is presented in Acheson, *Sketches from Life*, pages 71–75.

MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT

740.5/2–1652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President[1]

SECRET [LONDON, February 16, 1952.]

[DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:] One of the matters which we find in discussions which we have had with Eden alone and with Eden and Schuman together[2] is the intense worry of French over the possibility that the Germans having begun their rearming might secede from European Defense Community and shake themselves loose from association with and control by Western Europe. This had already become apparent in the messages which Schuman sent to me before I left Washington.[3] This has now reached the point where French Govt has included in proposed compromise draft resolution on EDC a recommendation from the Parliament to the Govt "to ask British and US Govts to guarantee the undertakings made with respect to EDC against breach or violation of treaty by one member nation, this guarantee being realized (realisee) by maintenance of sufficient US and British troops on the European Continent as long as it appears necessary". These troops would be in effect the so-called guarantee. This question of a "guarantee" was discussed by Schuman with Eden and me. Eden has some sort of Cabinet approval for a "guarantee", the exact form of which is not decided but which in his words will put Great Britain against anyone who breaks out of the ring.

I said to them that the President had under consideration the possibility of stating in his message to the Congress transmitting contractual agreements with Germany that this whole arrangement was premised upon Germany's joining in and loyally adhering to the EDC and should that supposition prove unfounded, it would be a matter of greatest concern to the US. They were interested in the possibility of our going further. I said to them that I believed the President would feel in the political situation existing in the US at this time that he must stay within policies which already had strong and expressed Congressional approval. Fortunately, there were such policies. In the ECA and MSA legislation and separate resolutions of the House and Senate, Congress has gone on record many times in insisting that American policy support in the most emphatic way the integration of Europe. Certainly the EDC represented that policy. Also Congressional resolutions, particularly those relating to troops for Europe, had approved the maintenance of our forces in Europe as long as those might be necessary for the security of the West. The latter was along the lines of what had been suggested to the French Parliament as a guarantee of the integrity of the EDC. Therefore, we must keep our action along lines of this sort.

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[1] This message was transmitted as niact telegram Actel 2, Feb. 16, 9 p. m., from London, with the instructions that it be delivered as soon as possible to the President. A copy was also to be furnished to the Acting Secretary.

[2] The reference is to Acheson's meetings with Eden on Feb. 13, 14, and 16, and his meeting with Eden and Schuman on Feb. 14; for the records of these meetings, see pp. 38, 39, 45, and 40, respectively.

[3] For Schuman's message of Jan. 29 to Acheson, see p. 7.

In our discussion with Schuman and Eden, one or the other of them suggested we must relate these two matters. That is, our interest in integration and the presence of our troops in Europe. Today we further discussed this with Eden and everyone agreed this was most unwise. I said I understood that Adenauer would take a most adverse attitude toward any position which appeared to be directed solely against Germany. Therefore, whatever was done must be general in scope. It also came out clearly that the problem was not merely a German problem, but might result equally from Communist developments in Italy or De Gaullist developments in France and that, therefore, the lines must clearly be general. It must be made clear that our troops are not in Europe to police the obligations of friends but to prevent aggression from without. Any suggestion to the contrary would be most disadvantageous.

Eden believes that some statement along the guarantee lines should be made prior to or at Lisbon. We have expressed grave doubts about that. We have felt that any statement on behalf of the US should be made by you either at the signing of the EDC treaty or the submission of the contractual relations to Congress or both and should not be put out here. It should be done only after you have had a chance to lay a foundation with the Congressional leaders showing that what you had done was well within the line already laid down by Congress. We might, however, make a statement at the end of the quadripartite meetings in London which would not carry any connotation of guarantees, but would underline the basic character of EDC as fundamental to the contractual agreements and our future relations with NATO.

It is possible that it might be desirable for the British, if they wished, to make a separate statement on this subject of guarantees in the near future. This could be made before the US made any statement. In thinking about this possibility, we ought to have in mind that one of the great criticisms in the US of British is their aloofness to the EDC and to continental European arrangements generally. Here might be an opportunity where the British could take the initiative and disarm a great deal of criticism. As I have said, I am not clear what Mr. Eden has in mind, but if it is constructive as I believe it to be, their making an announcement before we did ought to be an act which would be gladly accepted in the US and on the continent. Therefore we should not oppose a statement by the UK just because it preceded whatever action the US might take.

Since this was dictated we have had word from Paris that Mr. Schuman in the French Parliament has made statements which to say the least put the rosiest light upon our exploratory talks. We have not wished to make his task harder by engaging in a battle of statements, but have tried to guide the press into the line that our talks were exploratory within the limits of existing and expressed Congressional policy.[4]

ACHESON

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[4] Telegram Actel 3, Feb. 18, from London, reads as follows:

"For ur info Secy has recvd from Pres through Air channels reply dtd Feb 18 to Actel 2 which reads: 'Your blank seems to be right approach. Fr Govt seems to have reached conclusion which can make Lisbon conf success, keep Brit and Fr on objective as ur msg shows you are doing.'" (740.5/2–1852)

740.5/2–2152

The Secretary of State to the President[1]

SECRET [LISBON, February 21, 1952.]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The series of meetings between Eden, Schuman, and myself and later on with Adenauer on problems affecting Germany and the Eur Army were concluded in London yesterday just prior to my departure. In addition to various informal meetings, we had one bipartite with the Brit; three tripartite and three quadripartite mtgs. The pace of events and the fluidity of the situation have caused me to delay general reports during the mtgs until I could see more clearly what was being accomplished. I am glad that I can now report what appears to me to be substantial progress out of these meetings.

The meetings were surrounded with considerable confusion at the beginning. There was the question as to whether Schuman cld agree to hold meetings with Adenauer at all in the situation his govt faced at home. The awkwardness of this situation with Adenauer already in London for the funeral was quickly cleared up after Schuman's arrival. There was also in the background a possibility that at any time the Fr Govt might fall. This situation caused the absence of Schuman from London the day we had planned to initiate our formal discussions.

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[1] This message was transmitted as niact telegram Actel 4, Feb. 21, noon, from Lisbon.

More importantly we were faced with the necessity of meeting on problems recently debated in the German Bundestag and being currently discussed at length in the French Parliament. In both cases it appeared that restrictions of serious nature were being placed upon their govts which might make compromise and agreement impossible.

The talks with Adenauer and Schuman eased this situation somewhat. In prior discussions with Adenauer we found that he felt he had been able to retain sufficient vagueness and escape clauses in the Bundestag resolutions so as to be able to enter true negotiation. He seemed far more concerned over current and possible future difficulties in the Fr Parliament. Schuman, obviously fatigued and greatly worried, likewise was prepared to proceed in a spirit of compromise to the maximum extent possible, hoping that statements and leaks to the press wld not produce further crisis in France prior to the final vote there. On his return from Paris Sunday, he told us that the points which wld be made in the resolution by the Fr Assembly wld be in the form of recommendations and would not be binding on the govt. They did, he said reflect, however, the state of mind in the Assembly and the more they could be met, the more assurance there would be of the ultimate approval of the agreements.[3]

In this atmosphere we decided the only course was to tackle the specific problems before us with vigor on the assumption that the underlying difficulties in both France and Germany could be surmounted. Questions that were unsolvable at the moment, such as the status of the Saar and eventual German membership in NATO were not developed to a point of difficulty in the meetings. Our strategy on questions of this sort was to remove them from current discussion until after the treaty on the EDC and the new relationship with Germany cld be signed. As things stand now, it appears this can be done.

Proceeding in this fashion, we were able to settle or to make substantial progress on almost every outstanding issue of real importance in our tripartite negots with Germany. In addition to this we cleared up several matters of relative lesser importance but which were holding up completion of various conventions in Germany. The major issues were as fol: The question of German membership in NATO was by-passed without difficulty. Adenauer made a brief statement for the record indicating that he hoped the interim arrangements to be worked out at Lisbon wld not prejudice a final solution to the problem.[3] Schuman helped by not requesting that a negative decision be arrived at this time. The problem, therefore, was to find some means of assuring effective German liaison with NATO and giving her a voice on matters of real importance. The German position was logical as otherwise her troops wld be under command of NATO without her having any voice in their disposition.

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[3] Regarding the tripartite meeting of Feb. 17 under reference here, see telegram Secto 12, Feb. 18, from Lisbon, p. 55.

We were able to meet this problem to Adenauer's satisfaction by providing that there cld be joint meetings of the EDC and NATO councils under certain specified conditions.[4] This wld in effect add Germany to the Council discussion at appropriate times and we also agreed that under conditions of extreme gravity in which the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the members of the NATO and the EDC is threatened, a combined meeting of the two Councils cld be called at the request of that party. This wld allow any country, including Germany, to call a combined mtg under these conditions. This was meant also indirectly to be a kind of guarantee of consultation in case any country (e.g. Germany) withdraws and thus helped calm Fr anxieties on this score.

We also reached full agreement with Adenauer on the future handling of war criminals in Germany.[5] We cannot of course, maintain prisons of our own on her territory after the new arrangements go into effect. The solution here was quite similar to that in the case of Japan whereby custody wld be turned over to the Germans under agreement that they wld carry out the remainder of the sentences. An advisory board of equal Allied and German representation is to be established to handle matters of admin and clemency. The right to terminate or reduce sentences remains exercisable by the power which imposed the sentence but the three govts wld agree to be bound by a unanimous recommendation of the board. On other than a unanimous recommendation the power concerned retains the right of final decision, it being understood that the recommendations of the board wld be given great weight.

The question of continued restriction over the production of armaments or other implements of war in Germany was our most difficult problem. You will recall we had difficulty on this subject in our last mtgs in Paris and Rome. Substantial agreement was obtained but there still remain outstanding questions between the three of us and with Adenauer. We were able to reach full agreement on the method of handling Germany's commitment to us, but cld not agree upon the list of items to be prohibited. As to the former, it was agreed that the EDC treaty shld contain a provision to the effect that certain articles cld be produced in strategically "forward" areas only by unanimous consent in the EDC. Adenauer agreed with us on the form of ltr to be sent to the Three Occupying Powers stating that Germany wld not, in view of international tensions and of its exposed position, consider it discriminatory against Germany if orders were not placed by the EDC for production in the Federal Republic of items on this list. Adenauer further stated his willingness to give assurances to the US and UK which wld make the commitments she undertakes in this field by treaty obligation in the EDC equally binding as regards our two nations.[6]

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[3] Presumably Acheson's reference here is to Adenauer's statement at the quadripartite meeting on the morning of Feb. 19; see telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.

[4] The reference here is to the agreed text of paragraph 9 (*b*) of document D-D(52) 35 Final, the Deputies Report on relations between NATO and EDC, p. 249.

[5] See the agreed draft article on war criminals, p. 101.

As regards the list, all four of us were able to agree on the inclusion of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, long-range and guided missiles, naval vessels other than minor defensive rail comm and mil aircraft. We were not able to reach agreement to civil aircraft, gun barrels over 105 millimeters and propellants (e.g. gunpowder). Eden felt strongly as regards civil aircraft. However, as this field cld not be covered under the approach we had adopted, (the EDC will have no control over production for civilian use) we cld see no way to obtain a German commitment that he wld not produce civil aircraft. Adenauer indicated his willingness to furnish a separate statement on this subject indicating that they had neither the intent nor in fact the capacity to produce civil aircraft[7] (huge subsidization wld be necessary for civil aircraft manufacture as military aircraft was denied). Eden and I felt we cld accept this but Schuman was unable to agree.

Schuman's position on the other two disagreed items (gun barrels and propellants) was most awkward as he was apparently under strict instruction not to agree to their deletion from the list. Our feeling, with which the Brit agree, was rather strong on these two items from two points of view. In the first place, we felt that such a restriction indicated such distrust as to shake the whole fabric of continental organization. We likewise felt that as the West is in such short supply of ground armament and powder German resources shld be utilized. This is, of course, particularly of concern to the US as it is we who have to meet the gap in both of these fields. It became clear in the course of the discussion that Eden, Adenauer, and I were in agreement on the deletion of these two items from the list. We therefore, left the matter in suspense and are hoping that Schuman can obtain the necessary authorization from his govt to allow us to finish this subject while we are in Lisbon.

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[6] For the texts of the two draft letters to be sent by Adenauer, see the paper agreed upon by the four Foreign Ministers, p. 104.

[7] Regarding the undertaking referred to here, see telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.

In the meantime, the High Comm will work out with the Germans exact definitions in the fields of the agreed items.

The report of the Three Wise Men, indicating that 11.25 billion marks (approximately 2.6 billion dollars equivalent) would be a fair German contribution, was received just before our meeting began and after Adenauer had arrived in London. He was unable to agree to this figure without consulting his Cabinet. We urged the necessity of agreeing upon a final figure prior to the end of our meetings here in Lisbon so that final action could be taken on use to be made of the total Ger contribution. Adenauer indicated that this wld be possible and promised every effort wld be made to have the matter settled by the end of this week.[8]

McCloy heard from Bonn just before I left London that the finan negot might be more difficult than Adenauer thought but we are still hopeful of an early agreement.

The three of us agreed upon several additional points in this field which had hitherto been unresolved. We decided that the contemplated and recently reduced 6.8 billion mark budget for the support of occupation forces in Ger was to be the maximum requested of the Gers for the 12-month period after the agrmt goes into effect. This amt shld be further pared down to the maximum consistent with mil effectiveness. We suggested a 10 percent cut but left the exact amts to be determined by the High Comm. We also agreed that in a mechanical sense the entire Ger contribution shld be paid to the EDC with prior agreement that the support costs for our forces wld be automatically returned to us and the Brit. This is purely a matter of procedure but will allow the Gers politically to fuzz up the issue of continued "occupation costs" which wld otherwise cause Adenauer considerable domestic difficulty. We also agreed that in future years Ger wld be submitted the same treatment as other nations in whatever form of equalization of burden sharing exercise under NATO wld succeed the TCC.

Considerable difficulty was encountered over the question of the amt of Ger's contribution for the support of US and UK forces (Fr's problem by that time being within the EDC) in subsequent years. We feel that in subsequent years Ger will not be able to meet both the costs of her own def effort and the cost of supporting Allied Forces. The Brit are not willing to agree to this premise as they cannot make a decision at this time ever to go on a "pay-as-you-go-basis" for their troops in Ger. We were able to avoid this sitn by leaving the matter open and at the present time merely deciding the procedure under which the matter wld be agreed later. As a final item we agreed that any funds that might be available after the first year shld be split between us approx in relation to our respective troop strength in Ger.

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[8] Regarding the discussion summarized here, which took place at the quadripartite meeting on the morning of Feb. 18, see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 60.

The question of a so-called guarantee for the continued integrity of the EDC (which I outlined in my previous cable) caused both Eden and me difficulty. We referred to the prob in a preliminary and gen way in our communiqué yesterday,[9] in which we emphasized our intention of continuing to seek means of giving the Eur Def Community cooperation and support.

We have also worked out with Eden a statement we each might make at the time of the signing of the EDC treaty and the agreements with Ger. I feel confident that this statement, as now drafted is within the framework of past congressional action. I have, however, told Eden that we wish to continue working on the language and that the whole thing must be submitted to you on my return to Wash. In the meantime, Eden plans to make an early statement in the Commons. As now framed, this will go farther than any previous Brit statement re their ties to the continent and wld be most helpful.[10] Finally, I have stated that you are considering what you might say at the time you transmit the Ger agreements to the Senate. This is without commitment and can be worked out subsequently.

Eden and I agreed the best procedure in seeking a solution to the question of the Saar was to encourage Schuman and Adenauer to attempt to work the prob out between themselves after the signing of the EDC treaty and the new arrangements for Ger. We hoped to obtain their agreement and obtain a joint statement from them to the effect when they were in London. This proved impossible. One factor against obtaining agreement was undoubtedly the tight schedule we are faced in London. It proved impossible to allow adequate time for Schuman and Adenauer to meet privately to discuss subjs such as this. I am hopeful this can still be worked out and we will continue to pursue the matter in Paris and Bonn.

I hope that at Lisbon we can proceed to take formal action on the establishment of the EDC. The principles seem worked out in enough detail for us all to give gen approval for NATO with emphasis on getting on with the job. This wld mark real progress and shld do much to dispel pessimism growing out of developments in France and Ger in the past few weeks. This wld mean that, without the delay of waiting for another NATO mtg, the Eurs wld proceed with agreement on and ratification of their def treaty. This document wld, of course, be gone over by the NATO deps at the time to insure that it was consistent with the principles we wld agree to at Lisbon.

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[9] For the text of the communiqué, see p. 105.

[10] Presumably the reference here is to the statement quoted in telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103.

McCloy and his colleagues in the High Comm are already at work with Adenauer in an effort to conclude the many outstanding but relatively minor points left in the agreements to be concluded with Ger. Our hope is that similar and speedy progress can be made in final agreement on the EDC treaty. The task looks possible of completion and we have urged as strongly as possible that it all be finished in about three weeks, but there can, of course, be no certainty of this. It is based on the assumption that the sitn in Fr and Ger can be kept on even keel. In view of all the above and complications, the Fr Govt may soon face again on domestic issues, the sitn in Fr seems to me the more critical of the two.

Your msg of encouragement [11] was delivered to me yesterday in one of our mtgs. It cld not have been more appropriately timed nor more appreciated.

I am sorry for the delay in getting off this report to you. Our last day in London was very hectic. We met thru lunch, and I was then slated to call on the Queen, saw the PriMin on a matter I will report to you personally,[12] and boarded your airplane for Lisbon in a space of about one hour. I arrived here just in time for a dinner and weariness got the better of me after that.

It appears now that our mtgs here in Lisbon will conclude next Tues or Wed. I hope to return at once—John Snyder and Lovett may have to leave together on Monday. But Harriman and I shld, I think, not impose a deadline if something really possible of conclusion is still open.

ACHESON

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[11] See footnote 4, *supra*.

[12] Regarding Acheson's audience with the Queen and his visit with Churchill on Feb. 19, see the editorial note, p. 77.

CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

Editorial Note

In the pages that follow, the editors present a brief selection of principal substantive papers considered or agreed upon during the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in London, February 13–19. All these conference documents are concerned with German contractual relations and related problems. Also included in this section of papers are two supplementary documents, a proposal on Korea, not printed, and a summary of the attention given the matter of Egypt during the London meetings.

Regarding the special series of briefing papers prepared for these London meetings, see the editorial note, page 35.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, "London–Lisbon on German Relations"

Report by the Allied High Commission for Germany to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France[1]

SECRET [BONN,] 12 February 1952.
HICOM/P(52)10/Final

STATUS OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and the Federal Chancellor in Paris in November 1951[2] considerable progress has been made in the negotiations with the Germans of the contractual agreements. The following report is intended to summarize the present state of the negotiations and, in particular, to indicate those points outstanding which should be resolved by the Foreign Ministers themselves. These problems, which are listed in Part II, include points on which there is tripartite disagreement and points on which there is disagreement between the High Commission and the Chancellor. Annexed to the Report are brief summaries[3] of the present status of each of the "Related Conventions" which complement the General Agreement approved in Paris on November 22, 1951.[4] Draft texts of the Conventions themselves are being forwarded separately.

2. The High Commissioners desire briefly to describe the present political situation in the Federal Republic. It is the aim of the Chancellor to show that the complex of agreements which he is now negotiating (including the present contracts and the treaty creating the European Defense Community) will give Germany equality of rights. The thesis of the SPD and the rest of the Opposition is, of course, that, far from achieving equality of rights, they perpetuate the Occupation, do not give Germany equal partnership and ought to be rejected. The attitude of all parties is influenced by the problems of the unification of Germany and by anxiety about the financial burdens of defense.

3. The views of the Bundestag took concrete form in the adoption on February 8 of a series of resolutions proposed by the Coalition parties, expressing a willingness to cooperate in the common defense, through the European Defense Community, but only as "an equal

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[1] This report was discussed at the tripartite meeting in London on Feb. 17; see telegram Secto 11, Feb. 18, from London, p. 58.

[2] For a record of that meeting, see telegram 3086, Nov. 22, 1951, in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1605.

[3] The annexed summaries are not printed here. For additional documentation on the continued participation of the United States in discussions on establishing contractual relations with the Federal Republic, see volume VII.

[4] The text of the proposed General Agreement (General Convention) between the three occupation powers and the German Federal Republic is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1592.

partner".[5] In other respects, the resolutions are chiefly devoted to specific problems, many of which show concern over equality of rights. In general, these resolutions (the texts of which appear as Annex A to this Report[6]) are worded in terms sufficiently moderate and general or have sufficient escape clauses to leave the Chancellor reasonably free to meet the Allied requirements.

4. The following are the only points on which it appears certain that difficulties will arise:

(*a*) The Bundestag asks for the release of all war criminals not convicted of a crime in the traditional meaning of the word. It also asks that a review of the individual cases take place without delay;
(*b*) The Bundestag categorically rejects any unilateral limitation of industrial production or research;
(*c*) The Bundestag asks that the German financial contribution to defense should be assessed in accordance with the criteria applied to other countries. It asserts, in this connection, that the present German tax burden is the heaviest in Europe; and, which is more serious, it demands that the cost of aid to Berlin should be included in the German contribution and that the expenditures for the troops stationed in Germany should come out of the contribution to EDF.

5. One other factor, involving both legal and political considerations, should be drawn to the attention of the Foreign Ministers. The SPD and other elements of the Opposition contend that the Basic Law now prohibits rearmament and conscription, so that German participation in the common defense requires amendment of the Basic Law. The SPD has referred this question to the Constitutional Court, which, however, may hold itself unable to determine the problem until a Law is actually before it. Should the Court now or later support the contentions of the SPD, it would mean in effect that no German defense contribution would be possible without the consent of a ⅔ majority of the Bundestag and Bundesrat, i.e., requiring in turn the concurrence of the SPD. Without going into the merits of the legal arguments advanced by the Coalition and the SPD, it is impossible to discount altogether the possibility that the Court will uphold the latter.

II. POINTS SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION BY THE MINISTERS

A. *Subjects on Which Tripartite Agreement is Needed Before Discussion With the Federal Chancellor*

1. *War Criminals* (Convention on Acts and Interests)

On this subject, on which the Bundestag approved a separate resolution (see Introduction, paragraph 4(*a*) above), the Chancellor is being advised that the Three Powers are prepared to turn over custody of the war criminals to the Federal Republic, if it will accept the judgments and will agree to carry out the sentences. He has also been told that the Three Powers contemplate a mixed Clemency Board consisting of an equal number of Germans and of representatives of the Three Powers. The Board would presumably consist of six members, three being Germans and one representing each of the Three Powers.

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[5] Regarding these Bundestag resolutions, see telegram 1499, Feb. 9, from Bonn, p. 611.

[6] The resolutions are not printed here; for the texts, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 76–79 or *10th Report on Germany*, pp. 86–88.

Beyond this, it has been impossible to go because of inability to reach an agreement tripartitely.

There are, in effect, two disagreements between the Allies which are submitted to the Foreign Ministers:

(*a*) *Authority Exercising the Right of Clemency: Role of Clemency Board*

The U.K. High Commissioner is of the opinion that the right of clemency should be exercised by the proposed Clemency Board itself.

The U.S. High Commissioner believes that the granting of clemency is the right and a normal function of the convicting Power, and that the Clemency Board should consequently have power only to make recommendations.

The French High Commissioner considers that the right of Clemency should be exercised jointly by the Three Allied Powers; but he is ready, if necessary to reach tripartite agreement, to accede to the point of view of his U.S. colleague in this respect. He believes, however, that a unanimous recommendation of the Board should be binding on Governments.

(*b*) *Procedure of the Board*

The U.K. High Commissioner is of the opinion that the Board should normally act in panels composed of a German and a representative of the convicting power, and the U.S. High Commissioner is prepared to accept this position if the Board's recommendations are advisory only.

The French High Commissioner, on the other hand, believes that the Board should always act as a single body.

2. *Security Safeguards*

At the meeting with the Federal Chancellor at Paris on 22 November, the Foreign Ministers indicated to him that certain limitations must be accepted by Germany in the field of manufacture of armaments and aviation and in the scientific research relative to them. It was then agreed that the High Commissioners in Germany should seek a solution in subsequent discussion with the Chancellor.

On 26 November, the High Commissioners stated to the Federal Chancellor that the Federal Government must agree not to manufacture certain arms on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to submit certain scientific research to control, either by means of an appropriate provision in the Convention on General Relations, or by accepting a special Convention to be included as one of the related Conventions.

The Federal Chancellor categorically refused any commitment of this nature; he emphasized that such a request constituted a discrimination against his country which was contrary to the principle of equality on which the European Defense Community was based. He stated that the requirements of the Allies were covered by provisions in the draft EDC Convention, and he was prepared to extend his obligations under these provisions to the U.S. and U.K. Governments by an exchange of letters.

As a result of this attitude of the Federal Chancellor, the question was further discussed by the Three Allies at Governmental level, but it did not prove possible to reach unanimous agreement thereon. It was then agreed that the French Government should discuss the question directly with the Federal Government. These discussions likewise produced no further result.

Following this refusal, a new discussion took place at the Governmental level in Paris on 2 February. The French representative submitted to his colleagues the text of a protocol which should be annexed to the Convention on General Relations and approved by the Bundestag at the same time as the rest of the contractual arrangements.

Before the U.K. and U.S. Governments had given their opinion on this proposal, the question was raised again with the Federal Chancellor in the course of the meeting with the High Commissioners on 5 February. The U.S. High Commissioner, as Chairman, submitted to the Federal Chancellor, purely as a basis for discussion, a document which laid down the following three principles:

(1) The Allied controls on German industry would be lifted and the Military Security Board would be abolished at the date of the entry into force of the Conventions.

(2) The Federal Government would declare that in order to give a strictly defensive character to the participation of the Federal Republic in defense and in order to take into account the international situation, it would not permit the production in the Federal Territory of certain items and would take all necessary measures to forbid scientific research on experimental models or on any other form of the items in question.

(The list of items involved was left blank.)

(3) The Federal Government would not permit the creation on its Territory of military or para-military forces other than those which constituted its contribution to the European Defense Community.

The strength of the police forces directly subordinated to the Federal Government would be fixed at a specific figure.

The Federal Chancellor once again categorically refused any limitation which would not be applicable to the other countries forming part of the European Defense Community. He re-stated the position which he had taken on 26 November 1951. He objected particularly to the Allied demands concerning police and para-military formations, which had not been involved in the previous discussions, and to which

M. Francois-Poncet had only made a reference after the Washington Conference on 24 September 1951.

The Governments are therefore faced with the following problems:

(1) *What attitude to adopt as a result of the position taken by the Federal Chancellor?*

The Federal Chancellor considers that the provisions of the Convention on the European Defense Community with regard to the manufacture of arms and forces not included in the Community completely satisfy the Allied desires in this direction. He maintains in particular that the provisions are in full accord with the commitment made by Herr Blank in his discussions with the Allied representatives at the Petersberg in February and May 1951. (Herr Blank had stated in effect that Germany was prepared to renounce all armament production and would not carry on such production except upon the specific request of France.)

The Federal Chancellor refuses to accept any restriction; he is however prepared to give official notification to the U.S. and U.K. Governments, at the time of signature of the Convention establishing the European Defense Community, that the Federal Government considers that those provisions of the Convention which relate to armament are also binding on the Federal Government vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and the United States. Meanwhile, the Bundestag has adopted a resolution rejecting any unilateral discriminatory restrictions on industrial production and research.

The French and U.S. Governments would hope to obtain from the Federal Government the signature of a protocol which would have the same validity as contractual arrangements and, in the view of the French, should be annexed thereto. The U.K. Government would be satisfied with a unilateral declaration by the Federal Government.

(2) *What limitations do the Allies wish to impose on the Federal Republic?*

(*a*) With regard to para-military formations and police;
(*b*) With regard to armament manufacture.

The prohibitions involved in (*b*) are the following:

(*i*) Atomic weapons,
(*ii*) Chemical and biological weapons,
(*iii*) Naval vessels other than minor defensive craft,
(*iv*) Military and civilian aircraft,
(*v*) Guided and long-distance missiles,
(*vi*) Heavy military equipment,
(*vii*) Scientific research on experimental models or on any other form of the above items.

There is disagreement between the Three Allied Governments on items (*iv*) and (*vi*). With regard to item (*iv*), the U.S. Government is ready to accept the manufacture of civilian aircraft.

With regard to item (*vi*), the French Government wishes to prohibit the manufacture of all propellants and gun barrels exceeding a calibre of 105 millimeters. The U.K. Government would not insist on this prohibition but would not oppose it if the Germans were willing to accept it. The U.S. Government is opposed to any limitations in this field of production.

B. *Other Subjects On Which There Is Disagreement Between the High Commission and the Federal Chancellor*

1. *Composition of the Supreme Restitution Court: Obligation of Federal Republic to Satisfy Restitution Judgments Against the Former Reich.* (Convention on Acts and Interests, Part III)

Two separate questions arise under Part III of this Convention (Internal Restitution) and the Charter of the Supreme Restitution Court annexed thereto.

The first question relates to the composition of the panels of the Supreme Restitution Court which is to replace the three zonal Courts now in existence. The Allies propose panels consisting of three judges appointed by the Power concerned and two Germans appointed by the Federal Republic, whereas the Germans propose a court composed of an equal number of Allies and Germans and one or more neutrals. The instructions from the London Study Group (IGG/P(51)89 Final, Annex B to Appendix I) [7] recommended a court with an Allied majority in the proportion indicated, although they authorized the Allies to recede to a court composed as proposed by the Germans.

This question was referred to the High Commissioners and the Chancellor. The Chancellor, while expressing the view that the retention of Allied majorities on the court might encourage anti-Semitism, said that, if the Three Powers insisted, he would accept the three-to-two arrangement. At a subsequent meeting, however, he reverted to his original objection to the composition of the court and linked this question with a second and unrelated one.

This second question relates to the obligation which the Federal Republic is asked to assume (under Article 5(*a*) of Part III) to ensure the satisfaction of restitution awards against the former Reich. The Germans are not prepared to accept this undertaking unless the obligation is made dependent upon the Federal Republic's capacity to pay. The Allies insist that the obligation to pay should be unconditional, but have proposed that the Federal Republic's capacity to pay could be taken into consideration in determining the time and method of payment.

The Chancellor discussed both questions on political and financial grounds. He referred to his experts' estimates of liabilities ranging from 5 to 7 billion DM. He stated that his difficulties would be considerably lessened if the amount were not so high, mentioning a range of from 1 to 2 billion DM. An Allied analysis of the German report, showing that the actual liability is substantially under 1 billion DM, was submitted to the Germans on 11 February.

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[7] The reference here is to one of the final reports of the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany which had been convened in London in 1950 and concluded its activities in February 1951. For documentation on the concluding activities of the Intergovernmental Study Group (London Study Group), see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1344 ff. Regarding the document in question, see *ibid.*, footnote 5, p. 1409.

2. *Exemptions From Equalization of Burdens Taxation* (Convention on Acts and Certain Interests, Part X, Art. 6)

This problem involves both the extent of the exemption to be accorded from the special capital levy taxation designed, among other things, to meet charges arising out of the war or out of reparation or restitution, and the categories of persons and corporations entitled to exemption.

The proposed Federal Equalization of Burdens Tax will be payable over a thirty-year period from 1949 to 1979. It will supersede, with retroactive effect, the so-called Immediate Aid Tax which has been in effect since April 1, 1949.

As to the period of exemption, the Allies have asked for six years out of the thirty, beginning with 1949. This was based on the fact that the proceeds of the tax are to be used for certain social purposes inside Germany, in addition to the war damage purposes. The Germans originally proposed limiting the exemption to three years.

As to the categories of persons entitled to exemption, the Germans have offered to exempt from this tax the same categories of persons as now in effect enjoy exemption from the Immediate Aid levies; namely, United Nations nationals, corporations organized under the law of any United Nation, and corporations organized under German law which are 95% or more U.N. owned. The Allies proposed extending this exemption as follows:

(*a*) As to United Nations nationals, altering the qualifying dates for holding United Nations nationality so as to widen this category;
(*b*) Exempting certain persons who hold both United Nations and German nationality;
(*c*) Exempting certain victims of Nazi persecution now living abroad who do not have United Nations nationality;
(*d*) Exempting to the extent of the United Nations interest therein certain corporations organized under German law which are less than 95% UN owned.

The Chancellor has proposed as a compromise an exemption for six years of the persons and corporations included in the categories proposed by the Germans.

3. *Compensation for German External Assets Taken in Safehaven Countries* (Convention on Acts and Certain Interests, Part VI)

The Federal Republic is willing to undertake to pay compensation to a German whose property was seized for purposes of reparation "in accordance with its financial capacity and in accordance with the Basic Law" (Part VI, Article 4). The Allies proposed an undertaking, applicable only to assets in Safehaven countries (Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland), whereby the Federal Republic would pay compensation in accordance with provisions of agreements between the Allies and the governments of those countries. The Germans made the objection that under Article 3 of the Basic Law all former owners of German external assets must receive equal treatment, which would mean that the present agreement must provide the same measure of compensation for German assets in all countries. In addition to the constitutional argument, the Germans make the practical point that the Bundestag is unlikely to ratify a provision which would result in payment of full compensation to a German whose assets were located in Spain and much lower compensation to a German whose assets were located in France. The Germans contemplate that the compensation actually paid will necessarily be small in relation to the value of the property taken.

The undertaking proposed by the Germans is, of course, acceptable as to assets taken in countries other than the Safehaven countries above mentioned. In the case of these countries, however, the Three Powers have entered into agreements which contain obligations to ensure provisions for compensation in terms which envisage more nearly complete compensation to those German owners than would be paid by the German formula.

This question was referred to the High Commissioners and the Chancellor. The Germans proposed that the Convention should provide for compensation of all former German owners by the Federal Republic but leave the working out of details of such compensation to be handled subsequently, in no event later than the Peace Treaty. The proposal contemplated that the Federal Government be permitted to negotiate directly with the Safehaven countries involved, with the Allies participating in the negotiations.

4. *Convention on Financial and Economic Contribution*

The Foreign Ministers should also consider such differences respecting the Convention on Financial and Economic Contribution as may arise as a result of the discussions between representatives of the Federal Republic and the "Three Wise Men".[8] Although it is not possible at present to predict and describe such differences, it is clear from the Bundestag Resolutions that they will include the questions whether the German financial contribution will be made only to the European Defense Community, which will reallocate a part of it to non-EDF powers having forces stationed in Germany, and whether the Federal Republic's expenditures in support of Berlin are to be treated as part of its financial contribution to defense. The preliminary negotiations have shown that after the transitional period the Germans will be reluctant to grant Allied forces a further degree of support than afforded EDC forces.

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[8] The reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council; for an account of one of the discussions between Executive Board of the TCC and West German officials, see telegram 4927, Feb. 12, from Paris, p. 32.

The following questions should be discussed and, if possible, settled by the three Foreign Ministers, who may then wish to take them up with the Federal Chancellor.

Total Contribution 1952/53

1. Should the Foreign Ministers emphasize to the Chancellor the necessity for an immediate acceptance by the Federal Government of the findings of the Three Wise Men relating to the total contribution and the categories of expenditures to be included in it?

Division of the Contribution 1952/53

2. Should the Foreign Ministers ask the Chancellor to confirm that the division of the contribution for 1952/53 will be finally negotiated in Bonn and written into the contract?

3. Are the Foreign Ministers prepared to accept that the funds for the support of Allied Troops should be paid by EDC out of the German contribution to it?

Contribution in Future Years

4. Should the Foreign Ministers ask the Chancellor to agree to express the continuing obligation as an obligation for the support of the Allied Forces and for the German contribution to the European Defense Community and not merely as a German obligation to the European Defense Community?

5. Do the Foreign Ministers agree that the German total contribution in 1953/54 and thereafter should be fixed in the same way as the contribution of the other EDC countries, without prejudging the question of the Federal Republic's admission to NATO? Should this be written into the contract?

6. Should the High Commission include in the contract the method by which the German contribution for 1953/54 and thereafter will be divided?

Material Support

7. Should the Foreign Ministers ask the Chancellor whether the Federal Government will agree to the special arrangements required for the material support of the Allied Forces in Germany (e.g. supply, transport, communications, housing, etc.) continuing for the duration of the contract; although these arrangements may differ from the corresponding arrangements which will be fixed by the European Defense Community for the treatment of the Forces of the Community which are given in another member country? The Federal Authorities have indicated that they would agree to special arrangements from the date the treaty enters into force until the end of the calendar year 1952.

CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "Lisbon–London Talks, Miscellaneous"

Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Personal Assistant (Evans)[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] February 15, 1952.

EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

The Secretary has had several conversations about Egypt in the last two or three days. This memorandum combines the report of all of them.

Yesterday General Eisenhower telephoned the Secretary to say that he had had a talk with the representative of the King of Egypt, here for King George's funeral. He is Prince Abdul Moneim, and General Eisenhower talked with him in the presence of a member of the British Government. Prince Moneim said he had had a talk with Mr. Eden. General Eisenhower, in the course of setting forth strongly his view that the present quarrel between Egypt and Britain was a tragic mistake at the time when the Western World should present a solid front against communism, called forth from the Prince what General Eisenhower interpreted as a broad invitation to our government to intervene in the crisis, probably with the hope on the Egyptian part to save face. Prince Moneim had asked directly whether or not our government was willing to invite the British and Egyptians to get together to make a new approach to the quarrel. General Eisenhower said he had not committed himself as to a guess on the part of the U.S. Government on this question, but he was reporting the matter to Mr. Acheson, because he thought it was a very cordial and open invitation.

The Secretary told him that he and Mr. Eden had talked[2] about the matter in the light of this approach which was known to them, and would be discussing it again at subsequent meetings.

Today the Secretary had a talk about this matter with Sir Louis Greig, one of General Eisenhower's aides. Sir Louis said the conversation between Eisenhower and the Egyptian had been stenographically taken down[3] and would be sent to the King. It was seemingly a very direct request from the Egyptian Government that the U.S. Government should bring about conversations between the British and Egyptian Governments to settle the matter.

(However, the Secretary mentioned in reporting the conversation that Prince Moneim is not a person who has authority or special knowledge of the matter. The person who has this authority is Ambassador Amr, and the Secretary expressed his opinion that the last thing we should do is get in the middle.)

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[1] A summary of this memorandum was sent as telegram Secto 7, Feb. 16, from London, not printed. (396.1 LO/2-1652)

[2] Presumably Acheson talked to Eden about Egypt near the end of their dinner meeting on Feb. 14; see Acheson's memorandum of that conversation, p. 40.

[3] No stenographic or other record of the Eisenhower–Moneim meeting has been found in Department of State files.

The Secretary said to Sir Louis that he was aware of the matter and had discussed it with Mr. Eden, who is hard at work on the matter. He said we were very grateful to the General for giving the matter a push and his help. However, he thought the thing to do was to leave it to Eden and to him. The Secretary had reported the Eisenhower approach to Eden.

Mr. Eden has verified that he was putting a great deal of time and effort into the matter. Instructions were being sent to the British Ambassador and talks should start. Eden is having a hard time with the Prime Minister, who thought a great victory had been won in Egypt and should not be frittered away, and with the Cabinet. But Mr. Eden thinks the matter should be settled right away. Eden, himself, had said he wanted to get the regular army troops and infantry out of Egypt and that he was reconciled to having only technical troops in Egypt, and he thought something could be worked out along this line. The Secretary thought that Mr. Eden was vigorously doing everything he could.

With reference to the Sudan, the Secretary had needled Mr. Eden again, and the latter had agreed that something must be done. He was trying to get the Egyptians to send some people to the Sudan for talks to see if they could work out something in the way of an agreement with the Sudanese, so that the British would not be in a position of imposing something on the Sudanese. Eden is quite willing to put down on an agenda for talks between the British and Egyptians the question of "Sudan", and he and the Secretary agreed that it was important to have it on any agenda. His position on including the Sudan has therefore broken down sufficiently so that there is no danger of the British saying the Sudan must be excluded. However, they have no solution on the Sudanese problem as yet.

396.1 LO/2-1852

Report Presented to Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] 16th February 1952.

MOG/3 Final

SECURITY CONTROLS

The Official Group[2] considered two different approaches to this problem.

The United States delegation circulated the attached memorandum

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[1] This report was discussed by Acheson, Eden, and Schuman at their meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 17 (see Secto 12, Feb. 18, from London, p. 55) and by

Footnotes continued on following page.

(Appendix A) based on a concept that controls would essentially be exercised within the framework of the European Defence Community and any action by the European Defence Community to prevent the manufacture of specified armaments in the territory of the Federal Republic would be accepted by the Federal Government as non-discriminatory.

The French and United Kingdom delegations were in favour of a declaration by the Federal Government undertaking not to make specified items, including civil aircraft.

The French delegation emphasized that no provision of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community permitted the prohibition in Germany of certain types of armaments. Nor could this be covered by a new clause in the Treaty to the effect that the European Defence Commissioners must take into account geographic and strategic factors, because of the difficulty of interpreting a provision so generally worded. It was therefore necessary for arrangements to be made outside the framework of the Treaty. These must have the character of an international undertaking which would be binding on the Federal Republic and of which the European Defence Community would have to take account. The French delegation therefore thought it necessary that the declaration made by the Federal Government, and the acknowledgements by the various Governments, should be treated as an exchange of letters and submitted to the Bundestag at the same time as the contractual agreements and the Treaty creating the European Defence Community.

The United Kingdom delegation had difficulty in accepting the approach in the United States draft memorandum as it did not cover civil aircraft. Moreover, the French delegation had explained that, although the European Defence Community draft treaty at present covered naval vessels, it was by no means sure that the relevant clause would be maintained, as naval craft in general were outside the competence of the European Defence Community.

The United States Delegation felt that a declaration of the type contained in the United States draft would be easier for the Federal Government to accept. They considered that if agreement could be reached to drop civil aircraft from the list of items, it would be desirable to take the position that the clause in the European Defence

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Footnotes continued from preceding page.

Acheson; Eden, Schuman, and Adenauer at their meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 18 (see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 67). The source text was included as an annex to the Laukhuff minutes.

[2] No comprehensive collection of the records of the "Official Group" has been found, nor can its composition be definitely determined. It is presumed to have been a tripartite group probably including Byroade for the United States and Roberts for the United Kingdom in its membership. Meetings of this "Official Group" seem to have derived from the decision to hold official preliminary meetings of American, British, and French officials preceding the meetings of the Foreign Ministers; see the editorial note, p. 85.

Community Treaty covering naval vessels should by all means be maintained and that a provision should be added to the European Defence Community Treaty enabling the European Defence Commissioners to take geographical and strategic factors into account in their allocations of military production.

A second draft declaration agreed by the French and United Kingdom delegation, except for two disagreed passages shown in brackets is attached (Appendix B). Subject to a decision on the question of the general approach, this draft memorandum would also be acceptable to the United States delegation except for two brackets indicated in the text.

An agreed draft note from the three Governments taking formal note of the proposed declaration by the Federal Government is also attached (Appendix C[3]).

Appendix A

United States Draft 16th FEBRUARY.

DRAFT DECLARATION TO BE MADE BY THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME OF SIGNATURE OF THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS

On the occasion of the abolition of Allied controls on German industry and of the dissolution of the Military Security Board, as a result of which there will be no further restrictions on German industrial activity, the German Federal Government wishes to make clear the strictly pacific nature of the contribution which it is preparing to make to Western Defence.

The Treaty establishing the European Defence Community contains provision for the allocation by the European Defence Commission of production of armaments. The Federal Government has, by its signature of the Treaty, subscribed to this arrangement and intends most loyally to abide by the allocation so made.

It is the desire and intention of the Federal Republic not to build a military machine, nor to create forces which are in fact military or para-military, nor to develop its economic capacity for military production, other than or beyond what is necessary to provide for its agreed contribution to defence through the European Defence Community. Accordingly, not only by reason of the foregoing intention, but also for strategic and tactical considerations, the Federal Government will not regard as discriminatory any decision by the European Defence Commission not to allocate for production in Germany weapons and instruments of warfare, and more especially those in the fields of:

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[3] Not printed.

atomic, biological and chemical weapons;
long range and guided missiles;
military (and civil)* aircraft;
naval vessels other than minor defensive craft;
(gun barrels of more than 105 mm, and propellents)†

It will be the policy of the Federal Government to take such steps under Article 26 of the Basic Law as may be necessary to ensure observance in the Federal Republic of such decisions.

The Federal Government will, further, maintain controls in the field of atomic energy and adopt such measures as may be necessary to provide effective security checks on persons engaged in research activities in this field.

With regard to research in the fields of these types of weapons, the Federal Government is likewise prepared, and for the same reasons, to prevent such research except as it may be requested by the European Defence Community. This does not apply, of course, to scientific research directed towards medical, industrial and other non-military developments in pure and practical science.

Appendix B

16th February.

Draft Declaration To Be Made by German Government at Time of Signature of Contractual Agreement

On the occasion of the abolition of Allied controls on German industry, as a result of which there will be no further restrictions on German industrial activity, and of the dissolution of the Military Security Board, the Federal German Government, in order to demonstrate the strictly pacific character of the Federal Republic's contribution to Western Defence and as a gesture of goodwill, declares as follows.

It is the desire and intention of the Federal Republic not to build a military machine or to develop its economic capacity for military production beyond its agreed contribution to the European Defence Community. Acting in accordance with its powers under Article 26(2) of the Basic Law, the Federal Government will not permit the production on Federal territory of the materials listed below, and will take all suitable steps to forbid scientific research devoted to the development of models and the construction of equipment specifically designed for the production of the materials in question, [except as may be requested by the European Defence Commissioners in the interests of Western Defence (United States/United Kingdom)]:[4]—

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*France and the United Kingdom. [Footnote in the source text.]

†France. [Footnote in the source text.]

atomic, biological and chemical weapons;
long range and guided missiles;
aircraft [including civil aircraft (France/
  United Kingdom)];
naval vessels other than minor defensive craft;
[propellents and gun barrels of more than 105 mm
  (France)]

It should be understood that there will be no limitation on scientific research directed towards medical, industrial or other non-military developments in pure and applied science. The Federal Government will, however, maintain controls in the field of atomic energy and adopt such measures as may be necessary to provide effective security checks on the persons engaged in research activities in this field.

Further to demonstrate its pacific intentions, the Federal Government declares that it will not allow the creation of forces which are in fact military or paramilitary beyond or other than those which constitute its agreed contribution to the European Defence Community. [With these ends in view, the numbers, cadres and equipment of all police forces in the Federal Republic will be limited to the scale required for their function of maintaining internal law and order, on a basis comparable with other European Defence Community countries (United Kingdom/France)].

The Federal Government has decided to make the foregoing declaration, which is complementary to the undertakings given by the Federal Government in the European Defence Community, as an earnest of its goodwill and pacific intentions.

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[4] Brackets throughout appear in the source text.

396.1 LO/2-1852

Paper Agreed Upon by Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, Foreign Minister Schuman, and Chancellor Adenauer[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] 18th February 1952.

ARTICLE ON WAR CRIMINALS

There is hereby established a Mixed Board (referred to in this article as "the Board"). The task of the Board will be without calling in question the validity of the convictions to make recommendations for termination or reduction of sentence, or for parole, in respect of persons convicted by a tribunal of an Allied power of crime against humanity or against the laws and usages of war or of crimes committed during the war, commonly referred to as "war crimes", and confined by the Three Powers in prisons in the Federal Republic on the date of the entry into force of this convention.

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[1] This proposed article was agreed upon by the three Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor at their meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 18; see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 67. Regarding the origin of this draft article, see footnote 3, p. 55.

2. The Board shall consist of six members, of whom three shall be appointed by the Federal Republic and one by each of the Three Powers. The members of the Board shall be independent persons not exercising other official functions in Germany and not subject to instructions of the appointing Government in formulating their recommendations. No person may be appointed who has participated in any manner in any war crimes trial.

3. The right to terminate or reduce sentences and to grant parole in respect of persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall be exercisable by the Power which imposed the sentence. The right shall not be exercised unless the Board has previously made a recommendation. A unanimous recommendation of the Board shall be binding upon the Power which imposed the sentence. Save on matters dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 7 below, the Board shall act only at the request of one of the Four Governments relating to a particular case or on the receipt of a petition by or on behalf of a person referred to in paragraph 1.

4. The Three Powers will transfer to the Federal Republic on the date of the entry into force of this Convention custody of the persons referred to in paragraph 1. The Federal Republic will accept the custody of such persons and will carry out their sentences as then in effect or as thereafter modified by the procedure herein provided.

5. The Federal Republic will confine the persons referred to in paragraph 1 under the same conditions that govern their detention on the effective date of this Convention. Changes in those conditions shall be made only in accordance with decisions of the Board. In these matters the Board's decisions shall be final. The members of the Board shall have free access to the institutions in which the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are confined and to such persons themselves.

6. The Board shall act by the vote of a majority of its six members.

7. The Board shall have exclusive power to decide questions of interruption of sentence on compassionate or other grounds without reference to Governments, in accordance with rules of procedure which it may adopt.

396.1 LO/2–1852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, February 18, 1952—11 p. m.

Secto 17. Fol texts of drafts re guarantee of EDC discussed by 4 ministers this afternoon.[2]

"1. *Draft communiqué for issue February 19 after tripartite meeting.*

"During their meetings 17th and 18th February, FonMins of UK, USA and Fr examined among questions which will be discussed at Lisbon conf, relation to be estab between EDC and NATO.

"In particular they studied means by which govts of US and of UK wld mark their abiding interest in establishment and integrity of EDC and afford its institutions their cooperation and support. The govts of UK and USA recalled their decision to maintain armed forces in Eur which as associated with EDF will contribute their fair share to joint defense of North Atlantic area.

"2. *Declaration of 3 powers on occasion of signature of contractual agreements with Ger.*

"Govts of USA, UK and Fr have today marked establishment of new relationship between themselves and FedRep of Ger through signature of conv on gen relations and related convs. These convs and agreements for EDC and Eur coal and steel auth provide new basis for uniting Eur and for associating Ger with West, whilst ensuring against any further revival of Ger militarism. They make possible removal of special restraints hitherto imposed on Ger and permit participation of FedRep as an equal partner in West defense.

"These agreements respond to desire to provide by united efforts for prosperity and security of West Eur. US and UK Govts share that desire and wish to assist in establishing and maintaining measures necessary to fulfill it. They will support and cooperate with Eur institutions established by these agreements.

"West defense is common enterprise in which US and UK govts are already partners through their membership in NATO. They have each expressed their resolve to station such forces in Eur as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute their fair share to joint defense of NA area. Thus they have each abiding interest in effectiveness of treaty creating EDC and in strength and continuing integrity of community. Accordingly if any action threatens continuing integrity of community or of NATO with which it is linked or impairs ability of their members to fulfill their obligations to those bodies, two govts would consider it matter of gravest concern to them calling for consultation under Art IV of NAT in order to agree measures to meet sit thus created.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris, Lisbon, and Bonn.

[2] The draft texts that follow here do not appear to have been discussed at the quadripartite meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 18; see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 67. These drafts were discussed at the tripartite meeting of Feb. 18; see telegram Secto 19, Feb. 19, p. 65.

"3. *British statement to be made by FonSec in House of Commons at an early date.*

"HMG does not consider that establishment of EDC will relieve them of their present commitments in Eur or maintenance of peace. Defense of West Eur is joint enterprise, in which UK is already partner by virtue of Dunkirk treaty, Brussels treaty and NAT. HMG believes that EDC will help to consolidate peace and to ensure that principles laid down in preamble of North Atlantic Treaty are upheld. They thus have an abiding interest in strength and continued existence of community and will afford its institutions their cooperation and support. They declare that they wld consider any action which threatens integrity of community as matter of gravest concern calling for consultation under Art 4 of NAT."

ACHESON

396.1 LO/2–1952

Paper Agreed Upon by Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, Foreign Minister Schuman, and Chancellor Adenauer [1]

SECRET [LONDON,] 19th February, 1952.

SECURITY CONTROLS

A. AGREED TEXT OF LETTER TO BE SENT BY THE GERMAN FEDERAL CHANCELLOR TO [EDC] GOVERNMENTS

Having regard to the existing international tension and to the fact that the Federal Republic is in a strategically exposed position in the sense of Article 4(*d*) of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, the Federal Government will not consider it a case of discrimination that the European Defence Commissariat in issuing licenses for the production of such armaments as are enumerated in List 2 of the Treaty will not place any orders with plants in the Federal Republic except in conformity with a general instruction of the Council of Ministers'. This, however, is based on the supposition that the German contingents in the European Defence Community will not be treated on a less favourable basis in respect of their supply with armaments of the above types which are necessary to fulfill their assigned tasks in the defence of Europe than the contingents of other member states of the European Defence Community, irrespective of the sources from which they will be supplied.

With regard to research in the fields of the above armaments, the Federal Government is likewise prepared to prevent such research except as it may be requested by the European Defence Community. This does not apply, of course, to scientific research directed towards medical, industrial and other non-military developments in pure and practical science.

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[1] This paper was agreed upon by the three Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor at the quadripartite meeting on Feb. 19 reported upon in telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75.

B. AGREED TEXT OF LETTER TO BE SENT BY THE GERMAN FEDERAL CHANCELLOR TO THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS

Upon ratification of the Treaty establishing the E.D.C. the content of the Treaty will become German domestic law. This accordingly applies likewise in regard to the provisions concerning the limitation of armaments production in the member states of the E.D.C. The prohibitions laid down also have effect as regards the United Kingdom and the United States.

740.5/2–1952

Communiqué Issued by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [1]

[LONDON,] 19th February 1952.

During their meetings at the Foreign Office on the 17th, 18th and 19th February the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and France considered a number of questions which were subsequently discussed with the Federal Chancellor. They also examined the relationship to be established between the European Defence Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States of America declared their abiding interest in the establishment and integrity of the European Defence Community and, in association with the Foreign Minister of France, studied means by which their Governments could support and cooperate with the Community. These subjects will be matters of continuing consultation between the three Ministers and between their Governments, in order to find the appropriate means of giving the Community the desired cooperation and support.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and the United States of America recalled the decision of their Governments to maintain armed forces in Europe, which, in association with the European Defence Forces, will contribute their fair share in the joint defence of the North Atlantic area.

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[1] This communiqué was discussed by the three Foreign Ministers at their meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 18 (see telegram Secto 19, Feb. 19, from London, p. 65) and their meeting on the morning of Feb. 19 (see Barnes minutes, p. 72). For an earlier draft of this communiqué, see telegram Secto 17, Feb. 18, from London, p. 103.

740.5/2-1952

Communiqué Issued by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic[1]

[LONDON,] 19th February 1952.

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic, met for discussions in the Foreign Office on 18th and 19th February. They reviewed the position reached in the parallel negotiations in Paris and in Bonn, now approaching a successful conclusion, for the establishment of the European Defence Community and for the creation of a new relationship between the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, based on a series of freely negotiated Conventions.

The Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor are well pleased with the results of their work. They reached agreement on outstanding issues arising from the negotiations in Bonn. The question of Germany's financial contribution to European defence is dealt with below. On the difficult problem concerning the future regulation and distribution in the interests of Western defence of arms production in states of the European Defence Community they have reached certain conclusions and provided for a series of meetings which they are confident will produce speedy results. They reached agreement on methods for dealing with the question of war criminals now detained in the Federal Republic.

They reviewed the report made by the Executive Bureau of the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, on the financial contribution of the Federal Republic to Western defence. The Ministers agreed that this report, which reached them on 16th February, should be published tonight. There is every prospect that an agreed decision on the total financial contribution of the Federal Republic to defence will be reached by the end of the current week. Negotiations on other matters arising out of this report, including the distribution of the Federal Republic's contribution, will proceed at once in Bonn between representatives of the German Federal Republic and of the Three Powers.

The Four Ministers welcome the progress made towards the conclusion of the Treaty for the establishment of the European Defence Community which will provide a solid foundation for the agreements to be concluded between the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. This Treaty and the agreements will constitute a single structure designed to bring about the association of the Federal Republic with the free world and to solidify the defence of Western Europe. The Four Ministers discussed the relationship between the European Defence Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and agreed on certain recommendations which will be made by the Three Foreign Ministers to the North Atlantic Council for settling this question. It will be the concern of the Four Governments, together with the other interested Governments, to ensure the preservation and the progressive strengthening of the European Defence Community which, as a part of the wider Atlantic community, creates a partnership for peace.

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[1] This communiqué was discussed at the tripartite meeting on the morning of Feb. 19 (see Barnes minutes, p. 72) and at the quadripartite meeting of that same day (see telegram Secto 30, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 75).

The Four Ministers are agreed that continuing efforts should be made to accomplish the unification of Germany through democratic and peaceful means.

The Four Ministers are convinced that their meeting has removed the obstacles which have hitherto delayed the conclusions of the negotiations, and has thus marked a decisive advance in the cause of peace.

3. NINTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN LISBON, FEBRUARY 20–25; MEETINGS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS IN LISBON, FEBRUARY 20–26

RECORDS OF THE MEETINGS

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson and other American officials and advisers who participated in the London Foreign Ministers meetings, February 13–19, flew to Lisbon on the afternoon of February 19 where they joined other members of the United States Delegation to the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council. Between February 20 and February 25, the Council held five plenary meetings. The NATO Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Finance Ministers also held various meetings during this time. From February 20 to 26, concurrent with the formal NATO meetings, the Secretary of State held a series of meetings on the German question with Foreign Secretary Eden, Foreign Minister Schuman, and the Belgian, Netherlands, and Luxembourg Foreign Ministers; he held separate meetings with Eden and Schuman on a variety of topics; and he also met with Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio de Salazar and Foreign Ministers of other NATO countries. In the pages that follow, the editors have sought to present a comprehensive record of all known meetings of the Secretary of State, both inside and outside the formal North Atlantic Treaty Organization framework, during his stay in Lisbon. Where possible, the editors have also presented records of other formal Treaty Organization meetings.

The principal sources for the documentation presented in this section were the central files of the Department of State and the special comprehensive collection of minutes and papers in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95. A valuable, but far less comprehensive collection of papers on the meetings in Lisbon, particularly the single most complete collection of telegrams (Secto and Tosec) exchanged between the Secretary of State and Delegation in Lisbon and the Department of State, is included in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 161.

As in the case of the meetings in London, the single most authoritative account in print of the meetings in Lisbon appears in Chapter 65 of Acheson, *Present at the Creation.* Vital, but less thorough, coverage of the meetings also is provided by Eden, *Full Circle.* For Acheson's report to Congress on the meetings, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, volume IV, 1952 (Washington, 1976), pages 163 ff.

A brief official summary of the proceedings of the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon and a complete list of the United States Delegation at the session is presented in *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1951–June 30, 1952*, Department of State Publication 4900, Washington, 1952), pages 27–31.

Here follows a list of the principal members of the various delegations to the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council.

Belgium

Paul van Zeeland, Minister for Foreign Affairs
André de Staercke, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Jean Duvieusart, Minister of Economic Affairs
Lt. Col. B. E. M. de Greef, Minister of National Defense

Canada

Lester Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Chairman of the North Atlantic Council
Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defense
A. D. P. Heeney, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
L. Dana Wilgress, High Commissioner for Canada in London; Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Denmark

Ole Bjørn Kraft, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thorkil Kristensen, Minister of Finance
Admiral E. J. C. Qvistgaard, Chief of Defense
Vincens de Steensen-Leth, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council

France

Robert Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Edgar Faure, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Georges Bidault, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for National Defense
Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Minister of Armaments
Hervé Alphand, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council

General of the Army Alphonse Juin, Inspector General of French Armed Forces; President of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff; Commander in Chief of Allied Land Forces in Central Europe

Greece

Sophocles Venizelos, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vice Admiral Alexander Sakellariou, Minister for National Defense
George Kartalis, Minister for Economic Coordination

Iceland

Bjarni Benediktsson, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Gunnlaugur Petursson, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Eysteinn Jonsson, Minister of Finance

Italy

Alcide De Gasperi, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Giuseppe Pella, Minister of the Budget
Randolfo Pacciardi, Minister of Defense
Alberto Rossi Longhi, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
General Efisio Marras, Chief of the Defense Staff
Ivan M. Lombardo, Chief Italian Representative at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community

Luxembourg

Pierre Dupong, Minister of State and Minister of Finance
Joseph Bech, Minister of Foreign Affairs
André Clasen, Minister in London; Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Michel Rasquin, Minister of Economic Affairs

Netherlands

Dirk U. Stikker, Minister for Foreign Affairs
P. Lieftinck, Minister of Finance
C. Staf, Minister of Defense
A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Vice Admiral E. F. van Holthe, Chairman, Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee
H. F. L. K. van Vredenburch, Delegate to the Conference on the Organization of a European Defense Community

Norway

Halvard Lange, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Nils Langhelle, Minister of Defense
Erik Brofoss, Minister of Commerce
Dag Bryn, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Portugal

Joao Pinto da Costa Leite, Minister of the Presidency
Colonel Fernando dos Santos Costa, Minister of Defense
Paulo Arsenio Verissimo Cunha, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Guy Ulrich, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Admiral Manuel Ortins de Bettencourt, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces

Turkey

Fuad Köprülü, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Fatin Rüstü Zorlu, Assistant Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry; Secretary General for International Economic Cooperation
General of the Army Sahap Gurler, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Nuri Birgi, Assistant Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry

United Kingdom

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Lord Ismay, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth McLean, Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence (Winston S. Churchill)
Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor, Chief of the Air Staff
Sir James Crombre, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council
Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Frank Roberts, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Charles A. E. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Eden
Kenneth M. Wilford, Assistant Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Eden

United States

Dean Acheson, Secretary of State
John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense
W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security
Charles M. Spofford, Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council; Chairman of the Deputies
General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
David K. E. Bruce, Ambassador to France
Henry A. Byroade, Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State
William H. Draper, Jr., U.S. Special Representative in Europe
Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador to Portugal
John J. McCloy, High Commissioner for Germany
Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1952

Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, First Meeting, Palace of the National Assembly, Lisbon, February 20, 1952, 3 P. M.

PRESENT

Chairman

External Affairs Secretary Pearson (Canada)

BELGIUM

Foreign Minister van Zeeland
Economic Affairs Minister Duvieusart
Defense Minister de Greef
Council Deputy de Staercke

CANADA

Defense Minister Claxton
Council Deputy Wilgress

DENMARK

Foreign Minister Bjørn Kraft
Finance Minister Kristensen
Council Deputy de Steensen-Leth

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Defense Minister Bidault
Council Deputy Alphand

GREECE

Foreign Minister Venizelos
Defense Minister Sakellariou
Minister for Coordination Kartalis

ICELAND

Foreign Minister Benediktsson
Finance Minister Jonsson
Council Deputy Petursson

ITALY

Prime Minister De Gasperi
Budget Minister Pella
Defense Minister Pacciardi
Council Deputy Rossi Longhi

LUXEMBOURG

Foreign Minister Bech
Finance Minister Dupong
Economic Affairs Minister Rasquin
Council Deputy Clasen

NETHERLANDS

Foreign Minister Stikker
Finance Minister Lieftinck
Defense Minister Staf
Council Deputy Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer

NORWAY

Foreign Minister Lange
Defense Minister Langhelle
Commerce Minister Brofoss
Council Deputy Bryn

PORTUGAL

Minister of the Presidency Leite
Foreign Minister Cunha
Defense Minister Santos Costa

TURKEY

Foreign Minister Köprülü

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations Ismay
Council Deputy Hoyer Millar

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder
Secretary of Defense Lovett
Council Deputy Spofford

Also Present

Temporary Council Committee Chairman Harriman
Military Committee Chairman Lt. Gen. Foulkes
Defense Production Board Chairman Gen. Kahn
Financial and Economic Board Chairman Leroy Beaulieu
SHAPE Chief of Staff Gen. Gruenther
NATO Executive Secretary Sutton

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the official NATO summary record of this meeting, document C9–R/1. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105)

740.5/2–2052 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State

LISBON, February 20, 1952.

Secto 25. Public opening session of NAC held National Assembly 3 p. m. today. Greece and Turkey formally welcomed into NATO. Port FonMin Cunha's welcoming address to NATO guests lamented fact that improved security in East Mediterranean resulting from accession Greece–Turkey not matched in West Mediterranean by inclusion Spain. Secretary made short statement exhorting colleagues to exert utmost efforts to make genuine progress at this mtg and to turn defense plans into actual defense machinery.[1]

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[1] For the text of Acheson's address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 10, 1952, pp. 370–371. For Acheson's brief summary account of the meeting, see Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 622. A photograph of Secretary Acheson addressing the opening session is printed on p. 564.

Acheson–Schuman Meeting, American Embassy Residence, Lisbon, February 20, 1952, Afternoon

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	FRANCE
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador MacVeagh	
Mr. Battle	

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle [1]

SECRET [LISBON,] February 20, 1952.

Following the opening meeting of the North Atlantic Council,[2] Mr. Acheson spoke to Mr. Schuman and invited him to the residence for tea. He offered Mr. Schuman a chance for him to bring any of his people he wanted to, but indicated that it would be a very informal session. Mr. Schuman arrived alone.

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[1] The information set forth above is derived from the memorandum printed here.

[2] See Secto 25, above on this page, for a summary report.

The conversation was very pleasant, friendly, and amusing. There was no evidence of any feeling on Mr. Schuman's part that he had been subjected to "rough treatment" in the last meeting in London. Most of the conversation is of no great interest, but a few points should be noted.

Mr. Schuman expressed his pleasure at the outcome of the London meetings. He said that he thought progress had been made. He repeated again several points which he has made in the meetings, such as the fact that France is the only country which would give up a national army under the European defense force arrangement. He spoke of the fact that time was required to solve all the problems involved.

Mr. Acheson asked him whether he had consulted his government on the outstanding issues which are unsettled, and mentioned particularly the question of security controls. Mr. Schuman's reply was not a definite one. He implied that his government in Paris was working on the matter, but indicated he would talk to his Prime Minister, Mr. Faure, when he arrived in Lisbon tonight. The Secretary said that he would await word from Mr. Schuman as to when it was desirable to get together again, and Mr. Schuman replied that he would try to tell Mr. Acheson tomorrow, at the 11 o'clock meeting of the Council,[3] when there should be subsequent meetings on these problems. Mr. Acheson said he was available at any time. Both the Secretary and Mr. Schuman agreed that it would be useful for meetings to continue here on the unresolved questions left over from London.

There was some interesting talk about the comparison of the European defense community to the Charlemagne Empire. Mr. Schuman replied that there was a body of opinion in France which considered the European defense force more nearly like the army of the Holy Roman Empire, and said that there was some fear that the force was being created under some sort of "Vatican" policy. Mr. Acheson said he had not known of this, and expressed great interest in it.

Mr. Schuman brought up the question of the guarantee against non-secession from the EDC. Mr. Acheson said that he had consulted the President by telegram, and the President was willing to do what he could.[4] He said he thought that the President would send up a message to the Congress when the German arrangements went up, and that the message would refer to the actions of Congress on stationing of troops in Europe, on European integration, etc., and possibly ask for a reaffirmation of the wish of the Congress with regard to these matters. The message would also say that the arrangements with Germany were conditioned on Germany becoming a member of the European defense force, and would indicate that membership was expected to be a conditioned one, so that no interpolation could be given that Germany could join the force, then resign, and thus meet the condition in the setting up of the contractual arrangement. Mr. Schuman said that he thought that Mr. Adenauer had made a clear decision to stay with the West. He said that he had no fear that he personally would make any move to withdraw, because he thought his decision was a considered one and a firm one.

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[3] There was no North Atlantic Council meeting scheduled for 11 a. m. on Feb. 21. The Foreign Ministers were scheduled to meet at that time: see Secto 34, p. 120.

[4] Presumably the reference here is to Acheson's message of Feb. 16 to President Truman, p. 78; regarding the President's reply thereto, see footnote 4, p. 80.

Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Second Meeting, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 20, 1952, 6 P. M.

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the two official NATO records of the meeting: the 6-page summary record, C9–R/2, and the 29-page verbatim record, C9–VR/2. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105) The list of participants at this meeting is identical with the list of the first meeting (see page 111), except that Prime Minister Faure attended as the head of the French Delegation. This meeting is briefly noted in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, page 623.

740.5/2–2152 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LISBON, February 21, 1952—7 a. m.

Secto 28. 1. Formal NAC mtg proceeded without incident.[2] Cordial welcome given Greece and Turk.

2. At first business session tonight [3] report of MC [4] was referred to committee of Def Mins who will meet tomorrow morning. In considering MC comments on TCC report chairman indicated Def Mins wld also have before them TCC report, supplemental report, and proposed resolution.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to other NATO capitals.

[2] For the brief report on that meeting, see telegram Secto 25, p. 112.

[3] At the beginning of this meeting of the Council, the following agenda was adopted (document C9–D/6):

"1. Opening statements
2. Adoption of agenda
3. Reports by permanent North Atlantic Treaty organizations
4. Report on Soviet foreign policy and exchange of views on political matters
5. Coordinated analysis of NATO defense plans; report by Temporary Council Committee

3. DPB, FEB, and Deps reports [5] noted.

4. Deps report on mil status agreement [6] referred to Def Mins for consideration and report to Council.

5. Deps recommendation that public statement summarizing discussion under items 5 to 8 of Rome agenda [7] not be prepared was agreed.

6. Discussion of political issues by Fon Mins scheduled for tomorrow morning. No new items proposed.

7. Harriman made brief statement on TCC report [8] which was released to press. Discussion deferred until Def Mins views available.

8. On infrastructure Gen Gruenther defined hard core of third slice program and stressed urgency of decision at Lisbon. Proposed as slogan for Lisbon conference "Praise The Lord And Pass The Infrastructure". Report on infrastructure just prepared by joint working grp, "C–9–D/11 revised" [9] and para 10 of TCC resolution and

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6. Infrastructure
7. German participation in Western defense
8. Future organization of NATO
9. Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic community
10. Other business
11. Communiqué"

A copy of the agenda was transmitted in telegram Secto 35, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, not printed. (740.5/2–2152)

[4] Military Committee Chairman General Foulkes presented document MC 5/4 Final, a report on the progress of NATO; document MC 38/2 Final, a report on the command arrangements when Greece and Turkey became members of NATO; document MC 40 Final, a report on the military effectiveness of the arrangements proposed by the Paris Conference on the European Defense Community; and documents MC 39 Final and MC 22/12 Final, containing the military comments on the report of the Temporary Council Committee. None of these Military Committee documents are printed.

[5] The three reports were circulated to the Council as a 24-page document C9–D/2, Feb. 11, not printed. The progress report of the Council Deputies was an outline of formal actions taken by the Deputies since the Rome session of the North Atlantic Council in November 1951. The progress report of the Finance and Economic Board was a factual statement of activities of the Board since the Rome session of the Council. These activities included such things as inaugurating a system of reporting quarterly defense expenditures, collecting information on wartime shipping requirements, and submitting a report to the Council Deputies on scarce materials. The progress report of the Defense Production Board outlined significant activities since the Rome Council session. These activities included a report on the industrial aspects of the standardization of small arms and ammunition and an appraisal of the possibilities of additional aircraft production in Europe. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101)

[6] Document C9–D/5, Feb. 8, 1952, was a report by the Council Deputies regarding the status of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, signed in London, June 19, 1951. The report summarized the progress of legislation in process or being considered by member governments in implementation of the agreement and progress of ratification of the agreement. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101)

[7] Under consideration at this point was document C9–D/9, Feb. 9, 1952, a report on the relative strength and capabilities of NATO and Soviet forces prepared by the Council Deputies and the Military Committee at the direction of the Council at its session in Rome in November 1951. The Council had directed that a version of such a report be prepared for public use. The Council Deputies and the Military Committee agreed that on security and military grounds it would not be possible

Footnotes continued on following page.

annex A of supplementary TCC report referred to ministerial committee of countries concerned.[10] Purpose is reach agreement at Lisbon on cost-sharing for hard core of third slice and on immediate action by host countries to acquire land.

9. Decision as to whether to hold plenary tomorrow to be made on basis progress ministerial committees during morning. Next scheduled items are consideration TCC report and Ger contribution to Eastern def, which will be taken up tomorrow afternoon or evening if possible.

Footnotes continued from preceding page.

to prepare a paper on the subject for public use. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101)

[8] Under consideration at this point was the report of the Temporary Council Committee of Dec. 18, 1951 (see the summary, p. 203), the supplementary report of the Temporary Council Committee (p. 211), and a draft resolution of the Council on the Reports of the Committee, document C 9–D/13, Feb. 19 (for the approved version of the resolution, see C9–D/20, Feb. 23, p. 220).

[9] Document C9–D/11 (Revise), Feb. 20, 1952, "Problems Connected with the Financing of the Third Slice Infrastructure Program", under discussion at this point was a 15-page paper including the Council Deputies review of the problems faced in implementing a Third Program (or "Slice") for the construction of airfields, communications facilities, and military headquarters buildings (the items referred to as "infrastructure") in the 1952–1953 period. The First and Second Programs (or "Slices") had covered Western Union Defense Organization and NATO infrastructure activities in the 1950–1951 period; see Ismay, *NATO*, pp. 114–115. C9–D/11 (Revise) also presented the details of a SHAPE infrastructure program for 1952–1953 (the so-called "Third Slice Program") described by the Council Deputies as the "minimum hard core of high priority projects" involving the construction of 53 new airfields, 58 communications facilities, and 10 military headquarters. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101)

[10] The Ministerial committee referred to here was more formally identified as the Special Committee to Consider the Financing of the Third Slice Infrastructure Program. It was also referred to as the Special Committee on Infrastructure. This committee, on which Secretary of Defense Lovett served as principal American representative, began meeting the following day and met at least once each day until Feb. 25. No formal records of the committee sessions have been found in Department of State files. For a summary account of the committee deliberations through Feb. 23, see telegram Secto 53, Feb. 23, from Lisbon, p. 192. For the report of the committee, see C9–D/21, Feb. 25, p. 196.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1952

Dorsz–Köprülü Meeting, Lisbon, February 21, 1952, Morning

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	TURKEY
Mr. Dorsz	Foreign Minister Köprülü Others

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the despatch, *infra*, and from the following excerpt from a letter of February 22, 1952, from Dorsz to William Rountree:

"The same afternoon [February 20], Ed Martin asked me to seek Greek and Turkish clearance on a draft paragraph to be added at the end of the TCC resolution. The text of this is being forwarded today by telegram. I got to the Greek and Turkish Delegations just in time before the first NAC meeting and handed a copy of the draft to Foreign Minister Koprulu and Mr. Pipinelis. I asked both of them to look it over and suggested that they might want me to drop around the following morning to discuss the matter. That night I was asked to see Mr. Koprulu early yesterday morning. The whole Turkish Delegation was there at the time and I was asked to clarify many of the points which were troubling them. An airgram which is shortly going out gives the highlights of this meeting and will become available to the Department and to our Embassies in Greece and Turkey." (740.5/2–2252)

The airgram referred to by Dorsz is presumably the despatch printed *infra*. Regarding the other documents cited by Dorsz, see footnotes 1 and 2, *infra*.

740.5/2–2252 : Despatch

The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Department of State

SECRET

No. 606

LISBON, February 22, 1952.

Highlights conversation morning 21st between full Turk delegation and NEA Rep follows:

1. Referring to proposed amendment for inclusion as separate numbered para at end TCC resolution,[1] text of which being sent by telegram,[2] FonMin sought clarification expressing idea now that Turkey is member NATO Turkey expects participate on full and equal basis with other members NATO and therefore favors multilateral approach to NATO problems. He stressed particularly Turk's expectation participate fully with other NATO members in strategic planning. Military members Turk delegation echoed latter thought.

2. FonMin originally thought suggestion in proposal that Greece-Turkey be invited to consider with NATO applicability TCC findings and recommendations as inconsistent with multilateral approach. Both countries on admission automatically required work with NATO on such matters. Therefore seemed superfluous. NEA Rep explained this incorporated because obvious unfamiliarity Greeks–Turks with TCC reports, in which Turks acquiesced, and indicated proposed amendment would record NATO expectation that both countries wld participate on full multilateral basis with other members NATO. Amendment also pointed up fact that Greece–Turkey had not been considered by TCC. By implication, this served to indicate Greeks–Turks not

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[1] The amendment under reference here, circulated to the North Atlantic Council as document C9–D/17, is quoted in footnote 8, p. 153. The Temporary Council Committee resolution was discussed at the fourth meeting of the Council, see Secto 59, Feb. 23, p. 150.

[2] Telegram Secto 37, Feb. 22; from Lisbon, not printed. (740.5/2–2252)

being required this time pass on TCC findings and recommendations. Further, under customary NAC procedure, Govts do not vote in sense of filing ballot. Instead, Chairman asks NAC Reps for comments. If comments do not require substantive changes, resolution considered accepted. Turks considered explanation satisfactory.

3. Turks in beginning expressed qualms re suggestion they participate annual review pursuant Article 17(*b*) (ii) of draft TCC resolution. They thought this clause too limiting as it might imply Turks would have to be invited in each individual instance to participate in a specific NATO activity. NEA Rep explained that this amendment in no way limited Turks participation in NATO activities but was specifically incorporated in TCC Resolution because of all-inclusive nature TCC activity. Turks accepted this.

4. Turks wondered whether references to "NATO bodies" or "agencies" in any way qualified participation by governments. NEA Rep indicated governments fully represented on appropriate NATO bodies and agencies mentioning specifically NAC, CD, MC and MRC. Hence, governments seemed be adequately represented. Turks expressed reassurance.

5. NEA Rep raised question Turk views re NATO reorganization, particularly re headquarters question. Turks said they inclined go along with US idea establishing headquarters in Paris. They consider this desirable for psychological reasons, indicating establishment headquarters in Paris should have beneficial effect in countries on continent. Before departure from Ankara, Brits handed Turks *aide-mémoire* requesting Turks support Brit position re retention certain NATO bodies London. Turks indicated this obviously for purposes "pride". They thought more important put vitality in NATO and simplify NATO operations than satisfy prestige requirements any individual state. Although their views not yet firm as they wish hear all sides, they reiterated inclination go along with US.

LINCOLN MACVEAGH

Meeting of Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 21, 1952, 10:30 A.M.

Editorial Note

No official NATO record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files, and no list of participants is available. Secretary of Defense Lovett presumably headed the United States Delegation at this meeting. The telegraphic report printed *infra* is the only record of this meeting available to the editors. The decisions and recommendations made at the meeting by the Ministers were reported upon to the North Atlantic Council in document C9–D/15, February 22, 1952, not printed. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105)

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102 : Telegram

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster)[1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LISBON, February 21, 1952—11 : 15 p. m.

LibDef 11. Def Mins today considered items referred to them by Council and took fol major action.

Item 1. Approved mil effectiveness of arrangements proposed by Paris conf on EDC (MC 40 final[2]) and noted that Council action this subject will be on joint CD–MC report on NATO–EDC relations (C9–D/7[3]).

Item 2. Noted report by MC on mil progress in NATO MC 5/4 (final)[2] and recommended that Council note this report.

Item 3. Recommended Council approval of command arrangements regarding Greece and Turkey (MC 38/2 final[4]) after Italians withdraw their reservation.

Item 4. Requested Council to urge national action on implementation of mil status agreement (C9–D5[5]).

Item 5. Noted recommendations summarized in para 18A (1) of mil comments on TCC report (MC 39 and MC 22/12 final)[6] and approved remaining recommendations contained in para 18 and recommended similar Council action. Agreed to recommend an amended para 5 (A) of TCC draft resolution (C9–D/13) to read "recognizes that the force targets recommended by the TCC represent a buildup which would greatly facilitate the eventual achievement of the force requirements formulated by the Mil Com, referred to in MC 39 (final) and hereby noted, these requirements being subject to future revision".[7]

At US instance Def Mins agreed they should have additional meeting to consider certain aspects of TCC report before this matter is discussed in plenary session now scheduled for 22 Feb. TCC supplementary report does not contain an agreed 1952 firm force plan. We propose to table at next meeting of Def Mins firm force plan for NATO based on country comments on TCC report. This plan to be agreed by nations and recommended for Council approval. For this purpose we are negotiating with France to arrive at French force plan for 1952.

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[1] This telegram was transmitted through the facilities of the United States Air Attaché in Lisbon.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 115.

[3] For the text of document C9–D/7 (Revise), Feb. 21, see p. 251.

[4] Not printed; for a summary of the substance of MC 38/2, see telegram 710, Feb. 13, to Ankara, p. 269.

[5] Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 115.

[6] Neither printed, but see footnote 4, *ibid.*

[7] According to the account in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 623, a meeting of the U.S. Delegation at some point early in the Lisbon session of the North Atlantic Council revealed a sharp difference of view between Harriman and General Bradley regarding the adequacy of the military forces which the Temporary Council Committee had recommended as being within the economic capability of the NATO countries. Acheson sought to resolve the dispute by having Harriman formulate language which would characterize the proposed force levels in a manner which would satisfy General Bradley. No documentation on these events has been found in Department of State files. No records of any U.S. Delegation meetings at Lisbon have been found. Presumably, the language quoted here represented a resolution to the conflict alluded to by Acheson.

Special comte of ministers appointed to consider infra problems[8] commenced work today. Details on this subject and on 1952 force plan will be cabled later.

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[8] Regarding the Special Committee on Infrastructure referred to here, see footnote 10, p. 116.

Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 21, 1952, 11 : 15 A. M.

PRESENT

BELGIUM
Foreign Minister van Zeeland

CANADA
External Affairs Secretary Pearson

DENMARK
Foreign Minister Kraft

FRANCE
Foreign Minister Schuman

GREECE
Foreign Minister Venizelos

ICELAND
Foreign Minister Benediktsson

ITALY
Prime Minister De Gasperi

LUXEMBOURG
Foreign Minister Bech

NETHERLANDS
Foreign Minister Stikker

NORWAY
Foreign Minister Lange

PORTUGAL
Foreign Minister Cunha

TURKEY
Foreign Minister Köprülü

UNITED KINGDOM
Foreign Secretary Eden

UNITED STATES
Secretary of State Acheson

Editorial Note

No official North Atlantic Council record of this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the telegraphic summary report printed *infra* and from information in Department of State files.

740.5/2–2152 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 21, 1952—7 p. m.

Secto 34. Fourteen FonMins met in restricted session this morning to discuss agenda item IV on report on Soviet fon policy and exchange of views on polit matters.[2] Mins agreed that in keeping with informal and frank discussion they hoped achieve only record of decision would be maintained.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to all NATO capitals.

De Gasperi opened discussion by saying he would have liked see Sov paper supplemented with discussion of methods of meeting problems of Sov policy and mentioned in particular difficulty individual countries had in determining how best counter Sov propaganda attacks. In this connection, he said we needed develop closer cooperation between milit and polit, citing as example current press reports from "Allied milit sources" about Ital milit plans which De Gasperi said was most harmful in view of the forthcoming municipal elections.

Pearson pointed out that Rome directive was to produce paper on "aims and means" of Sov policy and not to discuss countermeasures. He felt present job was good and perhaps reps could now do further task recommended by De Gasperi. Eden agreed that CD might well undertake further step proposed by De Gasperi. In this connection, he referred back to Acheson's address at opening meeting re broad objectives of NATO, stressing that this was concept which needed be reiterated and which would help counter Sov propaganda.

Under exchange of views Schuman pointed out applicability of Sov paper to situation in Indochina where French resistance was contributing to common def against common danger. France had undertaken this action as purely defensive measure and intended continue it as essential operation in support of free world. However, he pointed out Viet Minh were being reinforced, trained and equipped more and more with Commie support and danger to French force was becoming greater and greater. France he said could not alone handle situation if there were "official" invasion from Commie China. Nor would France be able indefinitely maintain defensive action in Indochina and build necessary defensive organization in Europe.

Schuman paid tribute to strong US–UK support Indochina, and Acheson and Eden both agreed with importance of job which French were doing in that area. Acheson referred to both polit and mil gain through increased strength of native force, and Eden mentioned similar problem UK faced in Malaya against local Chinese elements.

Acheson then took up problem of recent Sov restrictions on fon natls, mentioning current US proposal presented in Deps,[3] and expressing hope other countries would support our line of action. He said that while we had agreed delay presentation of note, US Govt found it impossible withhold action longer than end of month.

Schuman said France would support any measures jointly agreed upon but said his govt on basis Albanian experience increasingly dubious as to whether maintenance diplomatic relations in Sov area worthwhile. Lange said present situation unsatisfactory but Norway doubted whether retaliation served useful purpose. In fact his security people believed there was positive advantage in having Sov diplomats freely move about as means of determining Sov contacts. In contrast Stikker said that in Netherlands with dense population they did not desire free movement but were not even sure restrictions would work. He preferred proposal to limit total movement of personnel and proposed more time for fuller study of all possible steps.

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[2] The reference here is to document C9–D/1, Feb. 6, p. 280.

[3] Regarding the proposal under reference here, see Spofford's memorandum of Feb. 20 to Secretary Acheson, p. 288.

Pearson said Canadian Govt had already approved policy similar US proposal but suspended implementation pending discussion in NATO. He agreed with Schuman that democracy could not equal totalitarian control measures but still thought this was right action. However, he did not believe agrmt on this point should appear flow directly from Lisbon meeting and he therefore hoped implementation of final decision could be postponed for 10 days or two weeks. Van Zeeland seconded request for delay, expressing hope that those govts who wished take similar action could do so jointly. De Gasperi said Italy has taken similar measures with respect to satellites and would be glad join in action vis-à-vis USSR. He also hoped there could be delay in implementation and suggested need for study other related problems.

Greece and Turkey supported US proposal. Venizelos pointed out that Greek Govt has already gone even further in outlawing Commie Party. Cunha said Portugal did not face this problem since it had no relations with USSR or satellites, while Eden suggested need for delay in order give more time to study possible effect of US proposal on diplomats in Moscow. Mr. Acheson concluded on this topic by saying he would report to Washington general desire for delay in proposed action but said he was not in position make any promise that US would be able accede to this wish.[4]

Eden then referred briefly to recent developments in Egypt. He said that while discussions had not started, HMG was ready at any time and hopeful of reaching agrmt. UK willing commence talks on any basis Egypt desired—either 2 or 5 power basis. Eden thought this might be worked out with Amr Pasha on latter's return London after Lisbon meeting. On Sudan, Eden said he had encouraged Egypt undertake direct discussions with Sudanese. To him essential element was agrmt on use of Nile water, since some day there would be independent Sudan and Future of Egypt would depend on satisfactory agrmt. Venizelos raised problem of credentials for new Amb, stating that while unwilling accept proposed form, prolonged lack of Amb to Cairo was matter of concern. Eden thanked Venizelos and others with similar problem and promised UK would try reach agrmt as soon as possible.

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[4] On the afternoon of Feb. 21, the Council Deputies met to continue the discussion of the possible restriction of the travel of Soviet officials. In his telegram Secto 40, Feb. 22, 3 p. m., to Acting Secretary Webb, Secretary Acheson gave the following account of the meeting and his views on the problem:

"Deps restated natl position outlined by Mins previously. All Deps agreed matter should be dealt with through concerted action of NAT govts all of which with exception of Norway, Iceland, Portugal, and probably Denmark are disposed take restrictive measures at an early date. They could not however make necessary arrangements by end of this month and, while appreciating US position, urged that US postpone action at least until March 10 in order permit necessary decision be taken by other NATO Govts. All Deps expressed hope that agrmt could be reached shortly on measures to be taken and stressed importance of acting jointly even though US Govt may not be able agree to further postponement.

"In view of response of NATO Govts to this proposal and fact that there seems excellent prospect of concerted action by most NATO Govts by March 10, I believe it would be wise to agree to delay presentation of note.

"Furthermore since US public was already aware of our intention to propose concerted action in NATO, isolated action by US now might be misinterpreted as failure of our efforts vis-à-vis other NATO powers.

"Please let me know tomorrow." (740.5/2–2252)

Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Lisbon, February 21, 1952

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden
FRANCE	BELGIUM
Foreign Minister Schuman	Foreign Minister Stikker
NETHERLANDS	LUXEMBOURG
Foreign Minister Van Zeeland	Foreign Minister Bech

Editorial Note

There is no indication from documentation in Department of State files where and precisely what time this meeting took place. The information set forth above is derived from the telegraphic report printed *infra* and a very brief note on the meeting also in file 740.5/2-2152.

740.5/2-2152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

LISBON, February 21, 1952—7 p. m.

Secto 32. Secy, Eden and Schuman met with Benelux FonMins to bring them up to date on London conversations with Adenauer. Eden stated he would only hit high spots in view of reports which Mins had already recd from their Ambs at London who had been given full acct of present state of negots by US, UK and Fr officials concerned with Ger. He outlined remaining problems to be settled and read proposed preliminary draft of UK declaration intended counter possible secession from EDC by stressing great interest of UK therein. He described this as a "modernized Locarno" and summarized by saying that general atmosphere was good and that Adenauer seemed anxious conclude soonest. In his opinion complex of contractual relations and EDC present not only best short term arrangement possible but also possible long term solution of Ger peril and Franco Ger problem.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Bonn, Paris, London, Brussels, and The Hague.

Schuman expanded on security safe-guards and Ger finan contribution. His statement that Ger contribution of 11,250,000,000 DMs for 1952 excluded all Berlin costs and pensions was questioned. Secy said it was his understanding that a portion of Berlin expenditures, of whose exact amt he was unsure but which he estimated about 400,000,000 DMs, was included as representing true def expenditures.

Secy presented US thoughts re problem of secession from EDC, stressing importance US places on EDC which will be reflected in Pres's msg to Congress transmitting contractual agrmts (London tel Secto 5, Feb 16 rptd Paris 1776, Bonn 302, Lisbon 126 [3]).

Stikker, who acted as spokesman for Benelux Mins, expressed gratification that atmosphere had improved after recent difficulties in French and German Parliaments. He stressed that in an undertaking such as EDC such intangibles as atmosphere and intention are more important than specific arts. He then raised only serious problem which developed during mtg: what would be Ger fin contribution to EDC not only in 1952 but also in 53 and 54. He stressed at great length need for Benelux countries have precise and detailed info on this point in order make sure that there would be adequate fin resources available to EDC to take care of their forces which would be merged therein. In addition Benelux wanted be sure that Ger fin contribution (*after* deduction of support costs of allied troops) *plus* external aid rec'd by Ger would permit implementation of Ger's 12-division etc program. Benelux had be sure EDC would be solid mil force with effective Ger mil contribution.

Eden and later Secy said that Ger funds available for support of Ger contingents in 1952 could be defined precisely and would in all likelihood be greater than Ger can spend but absolutely impossible give precise figures for 1953 and 1954. Principles however were important, and these had been agreed: Ger's fin contribution would be established in accordance with same standards as those applying in NATO countries and this would be done in EDC; with ref to allied costs in Ger, there would have to be negots each year between EDC on the one side and US and UK on the other.

In response to Benelux request for further clarification, Benelux experts mtg today with US–UK–Fr experts. No further ministerial talks scheduled pending result expert talks.

ACHESON

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[3] Not printed; it transmitted a summary account of the tripartite meeting in London of Feb. 14; see Secretary Acheson's memorandum, p. 40.

Meeting of Experts on Germany, Lisbon, February 21, 1952

740.5/2-2552 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 25, 1952—3 p. m.

Secto 72. Ref Secto 32,[2] Feb 21, rptd Bonn 10, Paris 68, London 97, Brussels unn, The Hague 12.

Reps of three occupying powers met experts from Benelux dels on Feb 21 for further discussion[3] Ger financial contribution to defense. Roberts UK del outlined present state of negots and instrs which FonMins had sent to HICOM (US del had proposed giving Benelux text of instrs, but UK del was unwilling).

Main points made by Benelux reps were:

1. Benelux govts had been promised info on this subj at various times, notably in connection with EB consideration of Ger case. They had recd nothing except text of EB recommendation.

2. They felt procedure which had been followed was wrong. Matter was one affecting all NATO countries and shld be considered on 12-power basis.

3. They expressed concern that major share of Ger contribution wld be used to support non-EDC troops stationed in Ger. This wld either make it impossible to achieve proposed build-up of Ger contingents or wld result, thru operation of common budget, in placing burden of financing build-up on other EDC countries. Benelux reps expressed particular concern re arrangements after first year, Neth rep stated Neth Govt wld want to know what Ger contribution wld be before concluding EDC treaty.

In response, reps of three powers made fol points:

1. They undertook to ascertain whether Ger submission to EB and material failed [*filed*] with EB by HICOM cld be made available to other NATO Govts.

2. Arrangements for first year of necessity had to be handled on tripartite basis, since they were part of contractual arrangements. Informal consideration of Ger total contribution by EB members acting personally necessary because Ger not member of NATO and no procedure developed for dealing with problem. In future, three powers contemplated total Ger contribution wld be dealt with in similar way to that of NATO countries, without prejudging question of NATO membership. Division of total wld be subject to free negots between EDC, Ger and non-EDC countries.

3. The three powers believe that there will be adequate funds available in first year, after deduction of amount contemplated for Allied troop support to meet costs of Ger contingents during that period. As time goes on, Ger costs will rise and the problem will become difficult

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Bonn, Paris, London, Brussels, and The Hague.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] No record has been found of the previous discussions with Benelux representatives indicated here.

for US and UK. Roberts states frankly that, if UK costs not met, UK wld have to contemplate reducing number of forces. He pointed out difficulty of trying to deal now with situation which will exist many months from now and undesirability of forcing UK to take position now on what it wld do at that time. It was stressed that arrangements being concluded now wld in no way prejudge the decisions to be reached with respect second and succeeding years. Byroade concluded mtg with statement of belief problems foreseen by Benelux wld be solved in a manner satisfactory to them. He stressed overriding importance of concluding negots on contract and EDC at earliest possible moment.

Acheson-Lange-Kraft Luncheon Meeting, Lisbon, February 21, 1952

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	NORWAY	DENMARK
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Minister Lange	Foreign Minister Kraft
Ambassador MacVeagh		
Assistant Secretary of State Perkins		
Mr. Battle		

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the Battle memorandum printed *infra*. There is no indication there or elsewhere in Department of State files as to where and when this meeting took place.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle

TOP SECRET [LISBON,] February 21, 1952.

Mr. Lange and Mr. Kraft asked to see the Secretary to discuss "regional problems". The Secretary invited them for luncheon, at which Mr. Perkins, Ambassador MacVeagh, and Mr. Battle were present.

After a few general observations, Mr. Lange stated the problem which the two wanted to present to the Secretary.

He said that it was politically impossible for Norway and Denmark to agree to the permanent stationing of forces on their territory in peace time. He referred to the recent exchanges of notes with the Russians regarding this matter and stated that he had no alternative but to adhere to this policy of not permitting permanent stationing. He said that he realized it was a calculated risk which the two took.

Mr. Kraft then said that certainly for the time being the two countries had to adhere to this policy.

Mr. Lange went on to say that Norway and Denmark were building airfields as rapidly as possible, which could receive the planes and personnel needed in the event of emergency. He said that to meet partially their problem they had worked out an arrangement whereby the two countries received visiting airplanes for short periods of time, which would not be interpreted as permanent stationing of forces. He said that these visitors would rotate and that they would try to extend their terms of stay as long as possible.

He said that approximately 450 planes were to be in the forces of the two countries, but that approximately 900 were considered necessary by SHAPE headquarters and the military men. He said that this meant that airfields must be constructed in other parts of Europe where the difference between 450 and 900 planes could be stationed. This, of course, resulted in duplicate facilities in view of the airfield construction program in the two countries.

Mr. Acheson said that these facilities would probably not really be duplicate because if they were needed, they would all be needed and we would be very glad that we had the extra ones.

Mr. Lange said that both countries had a serious problem of financing the construction program, which they had undertaken and that there was a gap of between $2 million and $7 million needed for the program. He said that since the fields under construction could not be made available for permanent stationing of personnel, Norway and Denmark were not getting credit for them under infrastructure arrangements. While he did not so state, he seemed to hope that the two countries could receive credit for the cost of construction of these fields. Mr. Kraft said twice that after sufficient strength was acquired it would be possible to use these fields permanently regardless of the existence of an emergency.

Mr. Lange's primary points seemed to be that they did not want to run any risk of being told that they must provide for permanent stationing of troops and that he hopes the necessity for duplicating airfields in other parts of Europe would not be charged against them under the infrastructure arrangement.

With regard to the first point, the Secretary said that he thought it would be most unwise politically for either of the countries to have to accept troops for permanent stationing now. He said he realized all the political difficulties for them and thought that it was proper that they not try to arrange for permanent stationing. He said nothing could be more foolish at this time.

With regard to the second point the Secretary said that he understood the situation and would do what he could to help them. He promised to get to work on the problem.

Mr. Lange said that a journalist from Norway had been here and had written an article which had caused great excitement in Norway and which he thought would stir up some trouble. He thought the article might lead people in Norway and Denmark to the conclusion that they must accept permanent stationing.

Mr. Acheson assured the two foreign ministers of his understanding of the problem and of his endeavor to cooperate in its solution.[1]

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[1] A 90-word summary report on the topic discussed here was transmitted in telegram Secto 66, Feb. 24, from Lisbon, not printed. (740.5/2–2452)

Acheson–De Gasperi Meeting, Lisbon, February 21, 1952, Evening

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	ITALY
Secretary of State Acheson	Prime Minister De Gasperi

Editorial Note

No record of this meeting has been found. The only specific information about it comes from the following memorandum on February 21 to Acheson from Assistant Secretary Perkins:

"Before you meet de Gasperi tonight you should know that General Bradley with the Italians this morning reached a solution of the command set up for Greece and Turkey which is acceptable to the Greeks and Turks. This provided that the Greeks and Turks would be under Admiral Carney and the exact details of it would be worked out by General Eisenhower." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102)

In one of her periodic press telegrams, Secto 33, February 21, from Lisbon, not printed, Kirkpatrick indicated there probably would be an Acheson–De Gasperi meeting that day. (740.5/2–2152) An Acheson–De Gasperi meeting on February 21 was alluded to in Secto 95, February 26, from Lisbon; see footnote 4, page 171.

State Dinner, Palace of Queluz, Lisbon, February 21, 1952, Evening

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the accounts of the dinner in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, page 627 and Acheson, *Sketches from Life*, pages 111–113. No official record of the discussions during the dinner have been found, and presumably no substantive matters were taken up.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1952

Acheson–Salazar Meeting, Sao Bento Palace, Lisbon, February 22, 1952, Morning

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	PORTUGAL
Secretary of State Acheson	Prime Minister Salazar
Ambassador MacVeagh	
Special Assistant Xanthaky	

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from the memorandum of conversation printed *infra* and from the detailed accounts of the conversation in Acheson, *Sketches from Life*, pages 113 ff. and Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 627–628. No other official record of this conversation, other than the memorandum printed here, has been found.

740.5/3–452

Memorandum of Conversation, by Special Assistant Xanthaky [1]

TOP SECRET [LISBON, undated.]

The Secretary of State called on Dr. Salazar on February 22nd at the Sao Bento Palace. He was accompanied by Ambassador MacVeagh and Theo. A. Xanthaky who acted as interpreter. Mr. Acheson expressed to Dr. Salazar the warm appreciation of President Truman, as well as his own, for the friendly cooperation and understanding which the Portuguese Government had shown in the recent Azores negotiations. The Secretary also thanked and congratulated the Prime Minister for the hospitality and splendid facilities which the Portuguese Government had made available to the NATO conference and which were contributing so much to the success of the meeting. Dr. Salazar replied that Portugal was anxious to do her full share in all matters pertaining to NATO and that the Azores represented an important link in our mutual defense system. He then inquired whether the Secretary thought that an attack on the West by Russia was imminent. The Secretary said he did not believe that the Soviets would precipitate an all-out assault as their governmental set-up was not conducive to such action. The Secretary added, however, he believed that such peripheral disturbances, always at the expense of others, as in Korea and Indo-China, would continue to be fostered by the U.S.S.R. The Secretary mentioned that as our strength increased we had to contend with certain sectors of American public opinion which are taking the line that if the Russians are going to attack us eventually, why not attack them first: the so-called preventive war philosophy. On the other hand, as far as the Government is concerned, for obvious reasons, it is important that the danger of a Russian attack should not be minimized. Concerning the possibility of eventually coming to an understanding with the U.S.S.R., Dr. Salazar stated that in his opinion difficulty lay, in negotiating even from strength, in our complete lack of confidence in them. He believed, for example, that the Soviets would give anything to make an arrangement at this juncture with the Germans, the only people in Europe they really fear, but that this is not possible because of complete lack of faith which all concerned have toward them.

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[1] This memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 627, Mar. 4, 1952, from Lisbon.

Concerning Spain, the Prime Minister emphasized that the Portuguese Government has no particular love of, or ideological affinity for, Franco. Portuguese interest in Spain, he said, is purely a matter of geography; the defense of Western Europe and particularly the security of Portugal is incomplete without the active integration of Spain in the over-all defense system. The Prime Minister added, however, he realized that for practical political reasons (British, French, Dutch and Belgian socialist opposition) it may be a long time before it is possible to admit Spain into NATO and he expressed the hope that an adequate bilateral defense arrangement would be worked out between the United States and Spain to take care, in some measure, of the present lacuna. The Prime Minister also took occasion to express his regret at the transfer of Ambassador MacVeagh who he said had been so successful in his mission to Portugal. He realized, however, that there was an important job for Mr. MacVeagh to do in Spain which he was fully qualified to handle. Concerning the differences of opinion regarding the headquarters of NATO, Dr. Salazar said that in his opinion London or even Lisbon was a more appropriate site than Paris. However, he was not intransigent on this point and would of course go along with the British if they agreed to Paris. The Secretary explained the practical reasons for centering NATO in Paris but it was clear that Dr. Salazar's approach to this problem is political rather than operational.

Mr. Acheson then told Dr. Salazar he would like to speak to him about uranium. The present arrangement between the British and Portuguese calls for the delivery of a hundred tons of ore a year. "We would like very much to see this amount increased to 200 tons," said the Secretary, "as there is urgent need for this material." Dr. Salazar replied that Mr. Eden had spoken to him the day before on this subject and had left a memorandum with him which he had not as yet had an opportunity to study. He inquired as to the interest of the United States, and the Secretary told him that the British and ourselves had a pooling arrangement covering this commodity. Dr.

Salazar stated that a main difficulty with the British is the question of payment in sterling. Portugal was unable to purchase much-needed manufactured goods in Great Britain because of short supply there and was obliged to seek them in the United States with a consequent drain on their dollar resources. The Prime Minister said he also felt that once the present armament fever was over and it was possible to utilize fissionable materials for non-defense purposes he believed the price of uranium would go up and since Portugal's resources of this mineral are limited, he desired to preserve them for a time when they could bring greater return. He said, however, that he would give immediate and sympathetic consideration to the Secretary's request and would examine Mr. Eden's memorandum in that spirit.[2]

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[2] For documentation on U.S. atomic energy policy, see volume II.

Acheson-Eden Meeting, Lisbon, February 22, 1952, Morning

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden
Assistant Secretary Perkins	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Battle	Mr. Shuckburgh

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle[1]

SECRET [LONDON,] February 22, 1952.

Mr. Acheson saw Mr. Eden today on a number of problems of interest to the Ministers.[2]

Mr. Eden first brought up the question of the British declaration on non-secession from EDC and gave to Mr. Acheson the present draft, which is attached to this memorandum.[3]

Mr. Eden said that he was going to see Faure, the Prime Minister of France, who had announced he was coming to Lisbon to invite the British to join EDC. Mr. Eden said he was inclined to tell Mr. Faure about the proposed declaration.

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[1] Another copy of this memorandum of conversation is included in the CFM files, lot M 88, "Lisbon mtg Feb 1952".

[2] This meeting apparently resulted from a meeting between Perkins and Pierson Dixon on Feb. 21. At the end of their meeting, which was largely given over to a discussion of the draft statement concerning the integrity of the EDC along lines closely following the Acheson–Eden discussion recorded here, Perkins and Dixon talked briefly about a bilateral meeting to discuss the issue of a NATO Secretary General and the question of Austria. Perkins also mentioned that the British apparently wished to discuss Burma. Pierson was unfamiliar with the matter but indicated that the British were opposed to the establishment of any commission in connection with Chinese Nationalist troops on the Burma border. (Perkins memorandum, Feb. 21, 1952; Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102)

[3] For the text of the draft declaration referred to here, see p. 250.

Mr. Acheson said that Mr. Schuman had remarked to him that some of the French reservations could not be taken too seriously. Mr. Acheson said that Mr. Faure had spoken to him and made the comment that there were some things which the Government must go through with, but they may or may not be able to do anything about them. Mr. Acheson said he thought probably the reservation on British membership in EDC was one of these and that probably Mr. Faure was simply going through the motions of inviting British participation.

Mr. Eden said that he was considering making his declaration next week here in Lisbon. He wanted to know whether this was agreeable to us. He said he thought it important to do it if it would help in the French vote.

Mr. Acheson said that if it would help in the French situation he was in favor of the British going ahead. He suggested that Mr. Faure could then say that he had spoken to the British about joining EDC and that the British non-secession declaration had grown out of their conversation. Mr. Acheson thought this would help the French somewhat.

The question was brought up of whether Mr. Acheson was in an awkward position when he failed to make a statement following Mr. Eden's. It was generally agreed that it could not do any serious damage and would be understood since Mr. Acheson was far away from his own Government, and the constitutional difficulty would be apparent to everyone.

Mr. Eden said that the British were often accused of doing nothing regarding Europe. He said what they did with the US was not as important as what they did alone. He, therefore, thought it would be very helpful if the UK went ahead regardless of the fact that US was unable to follow.

It was agreed that Mr. Eden would issue his declaration when it would be most helpful to the French, and that he was to check the time of the French vote and, if time permitted, delay issuance until after his return to London.[4]

Mr. Eden then mentioned the British financial situation and said they had serious balance of payments difficulties. Mr. Acheson said that he knew about the problem and said Mr. Snyder and Mr. Harriman had spoken to him about it and the US was working on it. Mr.

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[4] In a memorandum of Feb. 23, Barnes recorded the following subsequent information on the British-French talks about a possible declaration:

"Later in the day Sir Pierson reported that this declaration had been discussed with the French and that the French were most anxious that it not be made public at this time. Mr. Faure had felt that it might create additional difficulties for the French Government in its parliament and had therefore suggested that the British declaration might be released just before the signing of the Treaty. Sir Pierson said that the British Government proposed to go along on this time schedule, and in the meantime he hoped that the declaration would not leak to the press." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102)

Eden said that the British had gotten very little cash from us since the end of 1950.

Mr. Eden then brought up Hong Kong and said that we both had complaints we could make about the other there. He said that there was a great deal of unemployment in Hong Kong and that they were urgently in need of cotton to go into the manufacturing industries and thus decrease unemployment. He said he knew we had worries about goods being shipped into China from Hong Kong. But that he thought we were willing to accept now that things were not going in there to the extent that we had believed. He said the British would give us a note on this matter very soon and he hoped we would consider it carefully.

Mr. Acheson said that we had recently set up a new set of rules which he thought were somewhat more liberal. Sir Pierson Dixon said that he thought our new rules would not aid in the cotton situation. Mr. Acheson promised to look into it after the note was given to us.[5]

The two Ministers then moved to the discussion of Austria, at Mr. Acheson's suggestion.

Mr. Acheson said that he had been considering the last paragraph of the communiqué.[6] We wanted to omit one step, which was provided for in this paragraph. This step asked the USSR to instruct its deputy to attend a meeting of the deputies to consider the treaty. We thought this would result in a long delay, and we might find ourselves with a reply from the Russians to the effect that they would be glad to talk about it, but wanted to add Trieste or other problems. Mr. Acheson said that he thought we had already taken this step.

Mr. Eden said that he had no objection to leaving it out if we could work out the language of the communiqué. He said he had some doubt as to the meaning of the language as it stood. It sounded as though we might be doing something like throwing the Russians out of Austria or something to that effect. He said it sounded as though we would take drastic steps.

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[5] The discussion between Acheson and Eden regarding the need for imports of cotton into Hong Kong was briefly reported upon in a 60-word telegram, Secto 55, Feb. 23, from Lisbon. (740.5/2-2352) Transmission of this telegram followed receipt of a letter of Feb. 22 from Eden to Acheson enclosing a copy of a memorandum prepared by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Colonies which described the serious local situation in Hong Kong resulting from (1) the control of strategic exports to China applied by NATO countries and (2) those further American measures against China including the embargo on all American exports to Hong Kong and the prohibition of imports into the United States of all goods manufactured in Hong Kong from Chinese materials. Eden's brief letter emphasized the serious unemployment in Hong Kong resulting from the trade controls, pointed out the risk that the local population might become targets for Communist agitation, and requested that, in view of the importance of the American-British interests in maintaining a position in Hong Kong, the embargo on trade with Hong Kong be relaxed and the importation of vitally needed raw materials be allowed. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102) A summary of the Eden letter and accompanying memorandum was transmitted in telegram Secto 69, Feb. 24, from Lisbon, not printed. (740.5/2-2452)

Documentation on U.S. strategic export control policy with respect to Communist countries is presented in volume I.

[6] The text of the communiqué on Austria agreed upon at this meeting is not printed; for the final text approved by the three Foreign Ministers on Feb. 26, see telegram 2153, Feb. 27, p. 278.

The Secretary and Mr. Eden agreed that this language should be worked over and the ideas of further initiative on the part of the three be worked in. It was generally believed that the lapse of time between the issuance of the communiqué and the announcement on the short form treaty made this desirable, as the looseness of the language as presently drafted might be interpreted as threats, etc. Mr. Perkins and Sir Pierson Dixon are to look into that portion.

Mr. Acheson then said that the other question was whether the short form treaty was an alternative to the longer one and whether it would be presented to the Russians as an alternative. He said he thought that in our presentation to the Russians we might simply not answer that question at all. We might simply continue to focus our attention on the short form. If the Russians brought up the question of the old treaty, we could ask whether they were willing to sign it. If they should say they were willing to sign the old treaty, we would, of course, have to do it.

Mr. Eden expressed surprise that this question was not solved, as he thought they had agreed to handle it in this manner in the discussions in Washington. Mr. Perkins pointed out that the High Commissioners had raised the question again. Mr. Acheson said he thought that the High Commissioners were trying to answer a question which it was not necessary to answer. He mentioned again that no one was suggesting withdrawing anything, and he thought we went ahead with it, dealing with it in terms of alternatives.

Mr. Acheson then mentioned the questions of the reorganization of NATO and the location of headquarters.

He said he thought Mr. Pearson would take the job of Secretary General if he were asked to do so. Mr. Acheson said that Mr. St. Laurent had, he understood, told Mr. Pearson that he would be sorry to lose him, but would approve his accepting it if he thought the interest of the world required him to do so. Mr. Acheson said he thought Mr. Pearson would probably be glad to take the job, provided sufficient action were taken here on the EDC and related matters to give him a really constructive job. He said that if action were not taken here, he did not think Mr. Pearson would want the job. Mr. Acheson said that the functions of the Secretary General would determine who it would be and that we must solve the matter in order to put final touches on the organizational changes.

Mr. Eden said, "Mike is the sort of person we want." This remark was made after the Secretary had discussed briefly the desirability of getting a former foreign minister or someone of that level to accept the position. The implication of Mr. Eden's remark was that he thought Mr. Pearson would be perfectly acceptable and that he saw the functions of the Secretary General in about the same way as the Secretary did.

Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden agreed to talk with Mr. Pearson at dinner tonight regarding these and related problems.[7]

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[7] No record has been found of the Acheson–Eden–Pearson dinner meeting referred to here.

Meeting of the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 22, 1952, 10:30 A. M.

Editorial Note

No official NATO record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files, and no list of participants is available. Secretary of Defense Lovett presumably headed the United States Delegation at this meeting. The telegraphic report printed *infra* is the only record of the meeting available to the editors.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102 : Telegram

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

LISBON, February 22, 1952—11:35 p. m.

LibDef 12. Noforn. Def Mins met at 1030 Feb 22 at call of chairman.[1] Original intent of mtg was to finalize firm 1952 force plan including Fr contrib and to clarify uncertainties in wording of Para 18 A of MC 39 (previously report to you by LibDef 11 [2]). Since US and Brit delegations had been unable to arrive at any specific agreement on Fr force contrib for 1952 US delegation declined to discuss this subj. Brit delegation opened discussions on previous Def Mins action on MC 39 by indicating that Executive Bureau Of should agree to such revisions of para 18A as Def Mins were proposing. UK further indicated no discussions profitable until that accomplished. On this basis US refrained from comments on para 18A and action reported in LibDef 11 remained unchanged. However it was well understood that some changes to para 18A were going to be needed before council approval. This problem has become subject of discussion amongst various delegations and should be solved by Sat mtg of Def Mins. Problem revolved around degree of emphasis given to MC 26/1 as requirements plan without regard to time of accomplishment.

Mtg produced conclusive results and efforts will be made to resolve differences and reach agreement for Def Mins mtg now scheduled for

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[1] Canadian Defense Minister Claxton served as chairman of the meeting of the Defense Ministers.

[2] Dated Feb. 21, p. 119.

Sat at 1130. At this mtg on Sat Def Mins will attempt to agree to precise wording on para 18A of MC 39 and produce firm 1952 force plan to be substituted in appropriate TCC document. In this connection draft resolution has been submitted to chairman of NAC which reads in part as follows: "The NAC having considered the military committee comments on the TCC report (MC 39) and having decided that the proposed measures contained therein are necessary to the implementation of the council's decisions on the TCC report: Approves para 18 of the report in a manner yet to be determined and notes the remainder of the report and approves the attached force objectives recommended by the Def Mins as the forces which countries have indicated their willingness to raise and support during the year 1952. This plan for 1952 shall be applicable to the objectives of the TCC report."

[Here follow discussion of another meeting of the Special Committee on Infrastructure, an outline of the schedule of meetings for February 23, and a very brief résumé of the third meeting of the North Atlantic Council.]

Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Third Meeting, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 22, 1952, 3 P. M.

Editorial Note

The list of participants at this meeting is identical to the list for the first meeting (see page 111) with the following exceptions: Belgian Minister for Economic Affairs Duvieusart did not attend; French Minister Bourgès-Maunoury joined the French Delegation; only Harriman, Lieutenant General Foulkes, and Sutton were listed as "also present". There are two official NATO records of this meeting: a 12-page summary record, document C9–R/3 which includes the full list of participants, and the 54-page verbatim record, document C9–VR/3. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105) There is no United States Delegation record of the meeting other than the telegraphic report printed *infra.* This meeting was described briefly in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 624–625.

740.5/2–2252 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LISBON, February 22, 1952—midnight.

Secto 49. A. Second business mtg of NAC [2] opened this afternoon with agreement to postpone action on "coordinated analysis of NATO def plans"[3] pending completion of report from DefMins.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to all other NATO capitals.

[2] The second Council meeting was regarded as the first business meeting; see Secto 28, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 114.

B. Chairman reported on meeting of FonMins yesterday.[4] Agreed to ask Deps to prepare doc to be considered at later Council mtg setting forth methods for NATO countries to combat jointly Sov propaganda.

Also agreed on desirability of coordinated action by NATO countries with respect to freedom of movement of Sov officials. FonMins agree Deps shld consider other issues of this gen type on broader basis than just movement of officials.

Chairman announced in absence of objections this report of FonMins will be noted by Council (believe Deps intended to take action on recommendations as if report approved).

C. Ger participation in Western def. Four reports were presented to Council.

(1) Eden gave report on behalf of occupation power dealing with contractual arrangements (copies of report had been previously circulated[5]). He stated there was hope for satis conclusion in near future of two major remaining preoccupations, namely Ger fin contrib and fulfillment of Brussels decisions on security safeguards.

(2) Schuman presented report on Paris EDC Conf.[6] Pointing out lack of precedents, he said we cld congratulate selves that project so near completion. Decisions reported were unanimous. Great difficulty arose because one country concerned was not NATO member but solution has been found. Decisions taken have made Eur unification "definitive and irrevocable".

(3) Gen Foulkes gave report of Mil Comite endorsing EDC plan as militarily effective. He stressed full advice given by Eisenhower, who believes plan is best and most rapid means of obtaining Ger contribution.

(4) Spofford presented Council Deputies report which represented joint approval of Mil Comite and Deputies and included resolution and protocol which Council asked to approve.[7]

Stikker (Neth) said atmosphere now seemed to indicate both contract arrangements and EDC treaty will work. However, Parliaments will discuss and to be able to satis questions in his Parliament, he must ask three questions.

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[3] Under consideration at this point was Item 5 of the Council agenda covering the Report of the Temporary Council Committee (for a summary, see p. 203), the Supplementary Report of the Committee (dated Feb. 8, p. 211), and a draft resolution (for the final text, see p. 220). The Defense Ministers discussed this item at their meetings on Feb. 21 and 22; for the records of those meetings, see telegrams LibDef 11, Feb. 21, and LibDef 12, Feb. 22, pp. 119 and 135.

[4] For the summary record of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, see telegram Secto 34, Feb. 21, p. 120.

[5] The seven-page report was circulated as document C9-D/16, Feb. 21; it reviewed the status of the negotiations for German contractual arrangements since the Rome 1951 session of the North Atlantic Council and the course of the trilateral and quadrilateral discussions in London regarding these arrangements. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105)

[6] For the text of the report, document C9-D/12, Feb. 19, see p. 230.

[7] Ambassador Spofford at this point was presenting document D-D (52) 35 Final, Feb. 20, the report by the Council Deputies on the relationship between NATO and EDC (see p. 247); document C9-D/7, Feb. 21, the joint report of the Council Deputies and the Military Committee on German Participation in Western Defense; and a resolution for adoption by the North Atlantic Council. For the text of C9-D/7 (Revise), see p. 251; the resolution on German Participation in Western Defense (C9-D/19) is on p. 252.

(1) What is priority for Ger contribution?
(2) Can we expect same number of NATO forces to remain in Ger or does ref to economies to be made by Three Powers mean their troops will be replaced by Ger troops?
(3) Are amts of Ger contribution for next three years sufficient to realize mil goals set for Ger?

De Gasperi (Italy) noted truly Eur spirit present in EDC countries and other NATO countries especially US. He also noted Fr Parliament has indicated France is willing to contribute to Eur cooperation. Unless defense community is to be mere assoc of forces, mil integration will only be achieved by more complete political cooperation.

Eden (UK) answered Stikker's questions as fols.

(1) There is no priority for first year because we calculate there will be enough funds if TCC basis accepted to cover what Gers can do and all other forces' requirements.
(2) Economies referred to have already largely been made and there is no intention reducing forces now in Ger.
(3) Cannot yet make estimates of amts for future years. Parenthetically, we consider McNarney figures provisional and overestimated. Three Powers suggest future consultation between EDC and Ger on one hand and US, UK on other to decide how figure is to be divided. We also agreed that future assessments of Ger contribution shld be made by same method as applied to determine this year's figure.

Secy supported what Eden had said. EDC interests were fully protected and Schuman had represented them in London with utmost vigor. We prepared to consult fully with EDC in future.

He expressed hope acceptance of reports and resolution wld be voted with enthusiasm. Step being taken is of greatest significance to whole world. We have even greater responsibility than our responsibility for defense. We must meet not only immed problem but must also build for future. This step is one of most imaginative, powerful and forward-looking. Contra-concept is French and France in midst of all her problems has had imagination to conceive this idea. Paid tribute also to all others who had joined in this historical step including Ger FedRep. US Cong has indicated its hope steps of this nature wld be taken. EDC and NATO are completely interconnected. Neither complete without other. US wishes to join in enthusiasm of this vote, in congratulations to all who have made it possible and in determination to give full support to EDC.

Schuman (France) thanked Secy. In effect, France had made great sacrifice of renouncing Natl Army. Fr Parliament did not wish to disavow his govt's initiative. Fr Govt asked Parliament's advice and authority to conclude negots. Parliament's vote was advisory but importance shld not be underestimated. Reflected state of mind which must be taken into acct. Parliamentary preoccupations were following:

(1) Desire to have other countries participate in enterprise. (*Note:* This was apparently ref by Schuman to UK.)

(2) Community must have cohesion. Parliament wishes outside guarantees against rupture of community and sets great store on presence in center of EDC territory of forces of other Atlantic nations. He spoke of "internal" guarantee which planners had sought to achieve in EDC structure, citing common budget and common procurement.

(3) Equilibrium of forces. There shld be no superiority of number of anyone's part over France and these clauses must be respected.

(4) He wished to speak quite frankly of another preoccupation. Parliament has said Ger cannot be included in NATO membership. Ger is cut in two, not by our will but because of disagreements by the former allies. For same reason there is no peace treaty. Ger has territorial claims and French ask "without passion and without prejudice" whether our Atlantic organization wld not be harmed by including such party. Acknowledged that Adenauer has declared he expects to achieve Germany's claims by peaceful means. Nevertheless situation itself contains risks. Why then has France been willing to enter EDC with FedRep? Has assumed this risk in interests of Eur unity and peace and because Ger shld not be left to proceed on own initiative. EDC alone will not have resources.

Even to attempt to achieve Ger claims. Schuman concluded that with confidence in sane evolution of EDC, with goodwill and sense of reality we can achieve result which will be point of departure for new Europe.

Van Zeeland (Belg) paid tribute to EDC report which represents point of equilibrium among diverse forces. Belg desires to enlarge Eur community while maintaining it as integral part of Atlantic community. While sharing Stikker's preoccupations, he saluted spirit of Eden and Secy and reposed confidence in their future efforts to find solutions. Belg ready to make additional sacrifice for common aims. She wants to accent Eur's capacity for defense but also to accelerate reintegration of Ger and unification of Eur.

Cunha (Portugal) expressed satis with which Portugal views creation of EDC to aid in defense of Western civilization. Though most logical solution of Ger integration wld be admitting Ger to NATO, Portugal recognizes difficulties of other countries, especially France.

Council thereupon *adopted* all reports before it.

Schuman requested slight modification of para 9(*a*) of resolution[8] in order to make quite clear it was not Council's intention to recruit Ger soldiers in advance of EDC treaty ratification. (For text of resolution see Lisbon's 384 to Dept Feb 19, rptd London 85, Paris 57, Bonn 1 and also Lisbon Secto 23 Feb 20 rptd London 80, Paris 60, Bonn 4.[9]) He accepted wordings suggested by Secy so that para 9(*a*) would read: "To consider and initiate any measures which might henceforth be taken prior to or in anticipation of ratification in order to bring about immed after ratification the raising of Ger contribution to EDF." With this change the resolution, including protocol extending NATO guarantees to EDC members, *was adopted.*

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[8] The reference here is to the resolution on German Participation in Western Defense originally presented to the Council in document C9–D/7 (see footnote 7, above) and subsequently circulated as approved by the Council as document C9–D/19, Feb. 22, p. 252.

Pearson (Canada) concluded discussion this item by saying Council had completed one stage, but vital stage, in historical development. EDC is part of greater development of Atlantic community. The two communities are one and indivisible and must not be allowed to grow apart. He paid special tribute to Schuman and his work on EDC and to US and UK. Those countries know that Eur defense is defense of all, is defense of freedom and decency in world.

D. Clifton [*Claxton*] reported for Def Mins on documents C9–D/15,[10] sections III, IV, V, VI. There was no discussion of this item.

Was agreed to note section III on military progress of NATO–(MC5/4 final [11]).

Section IV on command arrangements re Greece and Turkey was approved as amended and SG directed to proceed at earliest possible date. (MC38/2 final.[12]) Amendment postponed for subsequent decision by treaty military authorities arrangements for handling Greek and Turkish air forces, as well as ground forces, "under the over-all command of SACEUR through Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe".

Section V covers report by CD on implementation of military status agreement (C9–D/5 [13]). Was agreed that Council urge each member country to expedite passage national legislation where necessary and give immediate effect in advance ratification to fullest extent possible.

Re section VI on standardization, particularly regards small arms and small arms ammunition, agreed council request all NATO agencies and member govts take all possible actions expedite this work.

Section I on TCC report not completed. Section II on military effectiveness of EDC covered under preceding agenda item.

E. Report by committee on North Atlantic community presented by chairman with standard speech this subject plus full summary of report (C9–D/8 [14]).

Amendment distributed by US deleted para 36, which included reference to information policy committee working with Parliamentarians, and substituted new para referring only to "voluntary bodies". New para added after para 37 suggesting council may wish to consider development parliamentary interest in North Atlantic community along constructive lines.

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[9] Neither printed.

[10] Not printed; this three-page report of Feb. 22 presented the decisions and recommendations arrived at by the NATO Defense Ministers at their meeting of Feb. 21; for a report on that meeting, see telegram LibDef 11, Feb. 21, p. 119.

[11] Not printed.

[12] Not printed, but for a summary of the substance of the paper, see telegram 710, Feb. 13, to Ankara, p. 269.

[13] Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 115.

[14] For the text of the report, see p. 180. Lester Pearson presented the report at this meeting in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community.

Report approved as amended without significant discussion except for brief Pella statement on manpower and except for introduction by Eden of long resolution on broad purposes of NATO which had not been distributed in advance and on which action was put over. Will cable text when available.[15] In concluding discussion chairman suggested that most specific recommendation was final one to abolish committee of five. Justified this proposal on ground necessary participation all 14 countries to develop useful and vigorous action this field. This also agreed.

F. Agreed ministerial committee on infrastructure meet right after council meeting and Defense Mins meet 11:30 Sat chairman announced expect hold another plenary at 3:00 Sat afternoon to discuss, if possible, TCC, NATO reorganization and infrastructure.

G. Not possible predict yet when meeting may adjourn. Depends progress infrastructure and French problem as relates preparation force table to be included in TCC action. Both being worked on actively but important problems still to be solved.

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[15] The original text of the proposed resolution referred to here was circulated as document C9–D/18, Feb. 22, p. 190.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1952

American–French Meeting, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 23, 1952, 10:30 A. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Secretary of Defense Lovett
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder
Mr. Harriman
Ambassador Bruce
Ambassador Draper
Mr. Nash
Mr. Pawley

FRANCE

Prime Minister Faure
Foreign Minister Schuman
Armaments Minister Bourgès-Maunoury
Mr. Buron
Mr. Gaillard
Mr. Monnet

Editorial Note

The information set forth above is derived from telegram Actel 9, *infra*; from telegram LibDef 14, page 146; and from telegram 5098, February 29, to Paris (see footnote 2, *infra*). No other record of this conversation has been found.

751.5/2-2552 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY LISBON, February 25, 1952—9 p. m.

Actel 9. Webb from Acheson. Please call attention President. No distribution except Lovett, Snyder, Harriman. Paris for absolutely eyes only Bonsal and Labouisse. The following represents an agreed memo of conversation between the representatives of France and the United States at Lisbon. The French Ministers present were Faure, Schuman, Buron, Bourges-Maunoury, Gaillard. The American representatives present were Acheson, Lovett, Snyder, Harriman, Bruce, Nash, Draper, Pawley. This English text is now being conformed to French text and is therefore subject to minor changes.

Begin text.[2] Mr. Faure stated that he had reviewed with his Ministers the situation of the French defense budget after the previous exchange of views with the representatives of the United States. He indicated that if a total of expenditures for 1952 of 1,400 billion francs is accepted on the understanding that 1,100 billion francs are already provided in the French budget in accordance with the estimates of the "wise men" on the financial capacity of France and on the understanding that 175 billion francs are to be provided by assistance from the United States, a gap of around 125 billion francs still remains. These 125 billion francs would not correspond to an additional armament effort but would just cover the increase in expenditures resulting from (*a*) the increase in prices (approximately 50 billion francs), (*b*) the increased requirements for the war in Indo-China not included in the "wise men" estimates of defense expenditures (approximately 60 billion francs), (*c*) the requirements for the French expenditures in 1952 for third-slice infrastructure. Thus, it is to be concluded that a budget of 1,400 billion francs will not make it possible for French to mount adequately twelve equipped divisions. The figure should more reasonably be fixed at ten divisions. If France is to declare itself prepared to attempt one or two divisions in addition to ten divisions, it must be understood that there is no question of these units being placed on a war footing. It is understood that the eighteen month service will not be reduced although administrative changes may be necessary to keep the number of conscriptees at an appropriate level.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for information.

[2] In response to a request for detailed information about the initialing of this memorandum and the related U.S.-French memorandum of understanding of Feb. 25 (p. 273), telegram 5098, Feb. 29, to Paris, reported as follows:

"Reurtel 5252 memo of understanding as transmitted Actel 10 plus corrections given in Actel 12 was signed by Acheson and Schuman February 25 in Lisbon. Text dated February 25. Minutes of conversation as transmitted Actel 9 with corrections given in Actel 14 rptd Paris 98 was initialled by Acheson and Schuman. Minutes dated February 23, 1952. Signed originals in English and French files State Dept Washington and FonOff Paris." (751.5/2-2852)

Telegram 5252, Feb. 28, from Paris, bears notations indicating that Acheson and Schuman initialed this memorandum of conversation on Feb. 25. (751.5/2-2852) Regarding telegrams Actel 10 and 12, see footnote 1, p. 273. Telegram 262400Z, Feb. 26, from Nash to Lovett, p. 167, reporting on the Acheson-Eden-Schuman meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 26, indicates that this memorandum was "executed" at that time.

Moreover, under these circumstances France would have to reduce considerably its armament program with all the major difficulties that that implies on both the industrial and political planes. It is indispensible in this regard that an additional effort by the United States should make it possible for France to avoid a drastic cut in its essential defense production.

Even if the suggested financial solution is adopted, the French Government will be forced to ask for supplementary resources in the amount of 100 to 125 billion francs either under the form of new taxes or in the form of reduction of expenditures now programmed. This action would be in addition to the 200 billion francs in new taxes already projected.

The purpose of the French Government is to check the developing inflation in France, but Mr. Faure stressed that he could not disregard the considerable risks being taken by the French Government in presenting a financial program of this magnitude, nor could he disregard the political consequences that might develop from a French crisis at this time.

He continued that the basic source of the French difficulties arose from the war in Indo-China. The French Government now believed that it would be necessary to spend an additional 60 billion francs to meet the requirements in Indo-China but tomorrow an additional 80 or 100 billion francs might be required. Moreover, the best part of the French officers and NCOs are engaged in the Far East. It is becoming more and more apparent that France is not in a position to carry at the same time the burdens imposed by the war in Indo-China and the necessary contribution to defense in Europe. Mr. Faure said he was compelled state that if a special solution to this problem did not soon arrive or if supplementary assistance was not soon allocated, he would be obliged to ask his government to reconsider the program of Indo-China.

Mr. Acheson indicated that the question of the number of divisions was both a military and political program and that he was prepared to discuss the various aspects of the question.

Mr. Bourges-Maunoury insisted on the need of keeping any reductions in defense production in France to a minimum. There are two categories of production:

(*a*) Production not yet undertaken but which is necessary in order to make the French divisions "operational", for example, vehicles. This production could either be replaced by end-item deliveries from the United States or by carrying out an off-shore purchase program in France.

(*b*) Production contracts which have already been placed and which must be cancelled if assistance from the United States does not enable these contracts to be taken up under an off-shore purchase program.

Mr. Lovett thought that from a political point of view it would be much more preferable for French to plan on twelve divisions in 1952. All the NATO countries in fact envisaged an increase in their number of divisions. It would be very difficult to justify a request for funds from Congress if France did not follow the general rule. However, Mr. Lovett said he understood very well that the two additional divisions would be "skeleton" divisions.

Mr. Faure indicated that in fact without adequate external aid in end-items the equipment deficit of the French forces would increase by the creation of the additional two divisions.

Mr. Lovett pointed out that military assistance would provide an amount of $300,000,000 from the funds under the responsibility of Mr. Harriman and an additional $200,000,000 which would be used in France for off-shore purchases particularly for arms and equipment for the forces in Indo-China. In order to carry out this program of assistance considerable effort would have to be made to work out the necessary administrative procedures.

Mr. Bourges-Maunoury believed that a misunderstanding existed. In addition to the $200,000,000 off-shore purchase program referred to, the French Government believed that in order to maintain an adequate level of production and to avoid the industrial, social and military difficulties which would arise from an excessive cut-back in French production, it was necessary to envisage the passage of off-shore purchase contracts over and above this $200,000,000 program.

Mr. Lovett replied that it was impossible to give any definite information on what the United States would be able to do to make off-shore purchases over and above the $200,000,000 foreseen, but that the question could be studied by the experts of the two governments. With reference to the $200,000,000, these funds could be utilized for placing new contracts representing production in progress if the French Government could carry out the cancellation of these contracts.[3]

Mr. Edgar Faure stated that it would be practically impossible to obtain from the French Parliament a considerable amount of new taxes if at the same time he could not refer to a solution which would give satisfaction to France from the point of view of national defense and French defense production.

Mr. Jean Monnet recalled that the work which had been followed by the TCC with a view to determining the defense burdens of the different countries [*sic*]; speaking to Mr. Harriman he declared that there could be no question but that France would be the country in Europe carrying the heaviest burdens this war if the financial solution envisaged was adopted. Italy had not accepted the solution of the "wise men". Everyone knew the position taken by Belgium. The United Kingdom had just declared in a white paper that it would transfer to 1953 a part of its 1952 expenditures which would result in the total of its defense expenditures being approximately equal to those of France even though its national income was one-third higher than that of France. The amount of the French contribution established by the "wise men" at 1,100 billion francs had been one of the important elements of comparison which was used in the establishment of the German contribution. Therefore, as the situation had now developed, France must accept a burden higher than that of any of her partners. Moreover, the other European countries were able to establish firm military programs and to foresee the basis of their financial position while France must accept the uncertainty of additional expenditures at any time for the war in Indo-China. These expenditures overburdened its economy and placed in peril the continuation and the execution of the French program for European defense.

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[3] Telegram Actel 14, Feb. 26, from Lisbon (see footnote 2, above), requested that this sentence be changed to read as follows:

"With reference $200,000,000 these funds could be utilized for placing new contracts representing production in progress if the French Govt should find itself obliged to cancel such contracts." (751.5/2–2652)

Mr. Jean Monnet concluded in affirming his conviction that the weight of the military expenditures that France was going to support were far too heavy. Moreover, the expenditures which would result from the war in Indo-China were necessarily uncertain.

Mr. Edgar Faure called attention again to the consequences which would result from the present situation not[4] with regard to the position of his own government, but also with regard to the policy of western defense which all the NATO countries conduct in common.

Mr. Schuman, making specific reference to the remarks of Mr. Faure on the need for a special solution for Indo-China, or for supplementary assistance, stressed that the program of Indo-China dominated the situation. It had to be examined first by France but also by its Allies. A solution was necessary this year, if not we will be led into an impossible position. The program will impose upon us the gravest decision that is to be taken in the course of 1952.

Mr. Acheson replied that this program of Indo-China was now the subject of a serious examination by the American administration.

It was understood by the representatives of both governments that the memo of understanding, dated the twenty-fifth of February, 1952, was drawn up on the basis of the above discussion. *End text.*

Text of agreed memo of understanding to be signed this afternoon after conforming French and American texts follow in separate cable.[5]

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[4] Telegram Actel 14 (see footnotes 2 and 3, above) requested that the word "only" be inserted at this point in the memorandum.

ACHESON

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[5] For the text of the U.S.-French memorandum of understanding of Feb. 25, see p. 273.

Meeting of the Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 23, 1952, 11:30 A. M.

Editorial Note

No official NATO record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files and no list of participants is available. Secretary of Defense Lovett presumably headed the United States Delegation at this meeting. The telegraphic report printed *infra* is the only record of the meeting available to the editors.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102 : Telegram

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Foster)

TOP SECRET LISBON, February 23, 1952—11:30 p. m.
PRIORITY

LibDef 14. Noforn. US Del met with France 1030 in effort to arrive at agreement on 1952 French force levels. Basis for agreement was secured but not authenticated in time for scheduled 1130 meeting of Def Mins. Agreement with France will be reported separately.[1] Def Mins confined their action to finalizing agreement on MC 39.[2] Para 18 was approved in full and remainder of report noted with fol as agreed final version Para 18:

"A. Approve the force targets of the TCC report as firm goals for 52, as provisional goals for 53, and for 54 as goals for planning purposes for guiding the early actions required to make possible the achievement of these targets, subject to the recognition of the fol:

"1. That the Council accepts from the MilCom Part 1 of MC 26/1,[2] revised as necessary by developments, as the official judgment and recommendations of the mil advisers of the Council as to the militarily desirable goals for planning purposes beyond 54.

"2. That 'firm goals' may be subject to minor adjustments for military reasons, as recommended by the Supreme Commanders.

"3. That the Council recognize the existence of the risks involved until the requirements are achieved.

"4. That the MilCom keep under continuing review the 'provisional goals' and 'goals for planning purposes', to the end that the most effective force buildup within economic ceilings and political limitations can be achieved.

"5. That the importance be stressed of each country taking every opportunity to increase and accelerate the buildup and readiness of forces, particularly to enable a more rapid buildup in the battle area after D Day (Encl 3)."

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[1] For a report on the tentative general agreement referred to here, see telegram Secto 62, Feb. 24, from Lisbon, p. 272.

[2] This Military Committee document not available for inclusion in this volume.

Following MilCom meeting there was meeting of Special Comte on Infra. This meeting was generally inconclusive. Infra Comte reconvened at 1430. At this meeting some prog made toward reaching agreement on funds required for 52 but no final agreement is yet in sight. Infra prob being reported separately.[3]

Def Mins convened at 1500 at which time French Del had just given agreement to firm 52 force levels of 12⅓ div, 478 acft in units, no new Naval construction during 52. Def Mins approved resolution reported to you in LibDef 12.[4] Force levels agreed to by each country are summarized as fol on all 12 nations including US.

a. Army—M Day 25, M plus 3 days 30⅓, M plus 15 days 39, M plus 30 days 50⅔ (includes total of 12⅓ French Divs), M plus 90 days 52⅔.

b. Naval Forces—No significant changes from TCC report.

c. Air Forces—In front line aircraft Belg 409, Canada 96, Den 131, France 478, Italy 275, Neth 207, Norway 135, Port 100, UK 1516, US 695, total 4042.[5]

[Here follow a summary of the course of the fourth meeting of the North Atlantic Council (mentioned in the meeting in the afternoon of February 23 of the Special Committee on Infrastructure) and a schedule of meetings for February 24 and February 25.]

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[3] Regarding the meetings of the Special Committee on Infrastructure, see telegram Secto 53, Feb. 23, from Lisbon, p. 192.

[4] Dated Feb. 22, p. 135.

[5] According to the official NATO verbatim record of the fourth meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the afternoon of Feb. 23 (C9–VR/4), these air force targets were corrected by changing the figure for Italy from 275 to 300 and by changing the total figure from 4042 to 4067. For the American account of the Council meeting, see telegram Secto 59, Feb. 23, p. 150.

Acheson-Venizelos Meeting, American Ambassador's Residence, Lisbon, February 23, 1952

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	GREECE
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Minister Venizelos
Mr. Dorsz	Minister Melas

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 23, 1952.

Venizelos called on me today and said he wanted to discuss two

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[1] The information set forth above is derived from the memorandum printed here which was drafted by Dorsz.

NATO questions, i.e., command and location of NATO headquarters, and also the current Greek political situation.[2]

On the command, Venizelos said he was disturbed because he understood that the Italians were still pursuing the question of getting an Italian designated as deputy to Admiral Carney. In this intermediary role, the Italian Deputy would be directly over the Greek and Turkish land and air forces. He feared Italian pursuance of this issue would adversely affect Italy's relations with Greece. He therefore thought that establishing two deputies under Carney would solve the problem: an Italian over the Italian forces, and an American over Greek and Turkish forces.

I told Venizelos that I knew that the Italians had suggested creating a position for an Italian to serve as deputy to Admiral Carney. Admiral Carney, however, had turned it down as the suggestion did not find favor outside of Italian quarters. I would, however, speak to General Bradley and tell him about the Greek fears.

As regards the location of the headquarters for NATO, Venizelos said it was a very embarrassing matter for a small country such as Greece to take a definitive position before the major countries worked out a mutually agreeable solution. The Greeks wanted to cooperate with all of the NATO countries. He, therefore, wondered whether a possible solution might be the following: United States retain the Standing Group; Paris serve as NATO headquarters; and a British national serve as Secretary General.

I told Venizelos that I had talked several times with Mr. Eden on the NATO reorganization problem. Currently only two questions were still unsettled, i.e., the name of the Secretary General and the location of the headquarters. We considered it impossible to split the functions of the organization. I was, however, hopeful that we could find a solution, even though it appeared that these particular points may have to come before the NAC for decision.

On the political crisis in Greece,[3] Venizelos mentioned that he was principally responsible for putting into effect the modified proportional electoral system which resulted last Spring in the election of three main parties, instead of the customary 15 or so small parties under the previous electoral systems. His Liberal party, while smallest of the three, feels it can work with the other two. By inclination, however, his party is nearer to that of Marshal Plastiras than that of Marshal Papagos. Venizelos had been willing to join in a three party coalition, but Papagos had shown no disposition to accept this formula. Instead, he was campaigning for new and early elections. Further, rumors were current in Greece to the effect that the United States Government approved the Papagos program. This tended to increase instability in Greece. For his part, he was not satisfied with the effectiveness of the present government. However, if new elections were undertaken a serious rift would occur and a more unfortunate situation would result. The Liberals would have to merge with one of the two main parties. Up to the present, the Liberals were able to keep EPEK from going too far to the left. If the Liberals withdraw from association with EPEK, the country might drift further left. Further, if the Liberals joined with Papagos, the general impression would be that the government was reactionary and Greece would find itself in the same position as in 1946 when the right wing took over and Liberal ideas were suppressed. At that time, Henderson persuaded him to step into the breach and form a government for the purpose of trying to heal the wounds.

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[2] Pipinelis and Melas of the Greek Delegation to the North Atlantic Council session called on Dorsz and other unnamed representatives of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on Feb. 22 and 23 to discuss NATO reorganization and command problems in a preliminary way. At both meetings the Greek officials also brought up a Greek proposal regarding the adequacy of countermeasures against Communist activities in NATO countries. On Feb. 22, the Greek officials mentioned that Venizelos had discussed the Greek proposal with North Atlantic Council Chairman Pearson. Pearson suggested that the proposal be deferred because of the Council's heavy schedule and the short time available. The Greek Delegation agreed to withhold action on the proposal at the current Council session but raise the matter in the Council Deputies at some early time. The two conversations were reported upon in despatch 607, Feb. 22, from Lisbon (740.5/2–2252), unnumbered despatch of Feb. 23, from Lisbon (740.5/2–2352), and telegram Secto 46, Feb. 22, from Lisbon (740.5/2–2252). Regarding the political issues raised at these meetings, see also telegrams 436, Feb. 19, to Lisbon and Tosec 18, Feb. 20, to Lisbon, p. 270.

[3] The portion of this conversation on the political crisis in Greece was reported upon in summary in telegram Secto 57, Feb. 23, from Lisbon. (740.5/2–2352)

For the reasons he gave, Venizelos said he hoped the United States government would not give the impression that it favored Papagos. So long as this impression lasts, Papagos' attitude would be stiffened. If we indicated that we were not favoring any particular side, Venizelos implied that everything would be all right.

In commenting on Venizelos' special plea, I said that we wanted to see as broad a government as possible in Greece and that some of our people thought that a coalition between Papagos and the Liberals might be the answer. I would get in touch with Ambassador Peurifoy, letting him know of our conversation and would seek his views and recommendations in the matter.

I myself raised with Venizelos two questions: (*a*) Greek political interference in the high command of the Greek armed forces, and (*b*) the excessive leniency of the government in releasing political prisoners. I said we had been giving a lot of thought to the general situation in Greece and that we were very disturbed about such developments as I had mentioned. We understood that under an agreed procedure the Greek government is required to consult with General Hart and take his views into account before putting into motion major transfers in the high command of the Greek armed forces. I was under the impression that this understanding had been recently violated, and I therefore hoped that Venizelos would be able to do something about this matter as well as on the current Greek policy of excessive leniency in the release of political prisoners.

Venizelos implied that the only problem regarding the proposed transfers in the Greek armed forces was that relating to General Kitrilakis and said that before his departure from Athens he had assured General Hart that he would arrange for cancellation of the Kitrilakis removal order if General Hart would wish this to be done. As regards the releases from prison, Venizelos said that he had signed an agreement with Marshal Plastiras at the time the coalition government was being formed which indicated that he would go along with the "clemency" laws. He, therefore, would find it very difficult to do anything which might be considered a violation of this agreement.

Before the meeting broke up, I reiterated my hope that Venizelos would be able to do something on the two points which had been worrying us so much lately.[4]

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[4] Documentation on U.S. relations with Greece during 1952–1954 is presented in volume VIII.

Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Fourth Meeting, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 23, 1952, 3:30 P. M.

Editorial Note

The list of participants at this meeting is identical to the list for the third meeting, February 22 (see page 136). There are two official NATO records of this meeting: a 5-page summary record, document C9–R/4, which includes the full list of participants, and the 36-page verbatim record, document C9–VR/4. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105) There is no United States Delegation record of this meeting other than the telegraphic report printed *infra.*

740.5/2–2352: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 23, 1952.

Secto 59. 1. Plenary session NAC opened 3:30 with discussion TCC resolution. Chairman pointed out Council requested only to note report and supplemental report, as necessary action is embodied in resolution.[2]

2. Pella opened discussion with long speech spelling out general spirit in which Ital Govt is approving TCC report. Emphasized econ problems with usual stress on manpower problem. Cited recognition need for 450 thousand annual migration for 5 years and stated report

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to all NATO capitals and also to Wiesbaden and Heidelberg. The source text indicates that this message was never received "electrically" in Washington but was brought to the Department by Robert G. Barnes when the U.S. Delegation returned to Washington on Feb. 28.

[2] Under consideration at this point was the Dec. 18, 1951 report of the Temporary Council Committee (see summary, p. 203), the supplemental report of the Committee, p. 211, and the proposed resolution set forth in document C9–D/13. For the resolution as adopted by the Council, see document C9–D/20, Feb. 23, p. 220.

contained recognition govts should review migration policy. Urged all govts join Brussels Committee whose work should be continued. Asked govts undertake without delay study manpower problem for report and consideration next Council mtg. Pella stated Ital making relatively greater effort than other countries which should be taken into account in 53 review. Gave thanks to EB for work, approved resolution, and promised full cooperation to NATO commanders.

3. Portugal also expressed thanks for work of EB, agreed to aims as defined, agreed adopt methods, and stated report and resolution have full approval.

4. Eden reported HMG fully supports resolution which it welcomed as important step in building defense North Atlantic area. Considered sound basis for planning and will do utmost to carry out. However, called attention to fact (recognized in report) that accomplishment depends upon circumstances not under control UK. Most important problems are balance of payments and supply of raw materials. UK defense program already slowed down but this should not affect reaching amended force targets this year. Cited stringent measures already taken to meet balance of payments deficit, but gap not closed. Difficulties so grave and risks so great that unless position improved by mid-year UK defense effort would be retarded and even imperiled. Welcomed TCC statement UK program cannot be carried out unless dollars found. Pointed out UK undertook 4.7 billion pound program on assumption there would be equitable burden-sharing, i.e., if UK did more than fair share there would be adjustments. Welcomed reference to burden-sharing in TCC report. Paid tribute to US aid program, characterizing US as making greatest contribution to common effort but expressed disappointment that dollars have not been made available more quickly which would give double value.

5. Eden also commended TCC recommendation of flexibility between end-items and econ aid and in administering each type program. Supported para 52, emphasizing shortage of steel and nonferrous metals, and para 13*c*. Stated even with US steel would need import more from Eur. In turn UK anxious to give where can, recognizing importance coal to Eur. Pointed out UK since TCC report has raised price of coal in UK and agreed increase exports to Eur. by 2 million tons. Stated would continue try increase availabilities.

6. Eden urged early study in connection with annual review of def burden in later years particularly after build-up. Pointed out problem would be serious after 54 since build-up not complete and will be necessary maintain large forces while continuing build-up. Urged early action on such study pointing out danger that countries otherwise may find themselves over-committed.

7. Greece and Turkey both expressed appreciation of US amendment to TCC resolution and indicated acceptance resolution. Gr del

stressed importance burden-sharing and necessity for strengthening economic basis. Both dels expressed appreciation for US aid.

8. Faure in short speech described TCC as "satisfactory" step forward. Underlined relationship between "strategic defense and economic defense" and stressed need for Fr internal equilibrium, gravity of her currency problem, and stated Fr at limit her resources. Faure said military alliance should be completed by an economic alliance and called for strengthening econ ties wherever possible to assist in carrying out TCC plans.

9. Chairman pointed out Council should consider DefMins comments before acting on TCC resolution and requested chairman DefMins report. Claxton reported final action by Committee DefMins on C9–D/15.[3] Explained that DefMins had revised para 18*a* and recommended that Council approve para 18 of MC 39 final as amended.[4] Such action would automatically include approval of revised terms of ref SACEUR. DefMins had eliminated para 9 of MC 39 and revised para 18*a* to read as fol:

> *a.* Approve the force targets of the TCC reports as firm goals for 1952, as provisional goals for 1953, and for 1954 as goals for planning purposes for guiding the early actions required to make possible the achievement of those targets, subject to the recognition of the following:
>
> > (1) That the Council accepts from the Military Committee Part I of M.C. 26/1, revised as necessary by developments, as the official judgment and recommendations of the military advisers of the Council as to the militarily desirable goals for planning purposes beyond 1954.
> >
> > (2) That "firm goals" may be subject to minor adjustments for military reasons, as recommended by the Supreme Commanders.
> >
> > (3) That the Council recognize the existence of the risks involved until the requirements are achieved.
> >
> > (4) That the Military Committee keep under continuing review the "provisional goals" and "goals for planning purposes", to the end that the most effective force build-up within economic ceilings and political limitations can be achieved.
> >
> > (5) That the importance be stressed of each country taking every opportunity to increase and accelerate the build-up and readiness of forces, particularly to enable a more rapid build-up in the battle area after D-Day (Enclosure 3).

10. Claxton also reported that DefMins had been able prepare agreed force table for 52,[5] and proposed fol resolution for Council action:

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[3] Before the Council at this point was document C9–D/15 (Revise), Feb. 23, a four-page report presenting the decisions and recommendations arrived at by the NATO Defense Ministers at their meeting on Feb. 21 and their morning meeting of Feb. 23. For brief accounts of those meetings, see telegrams LibDef 11 and 14, Feb. 22 and 23, pp. 119 and 146, respectively.

[4] This Military Committee document not available for inclusion in this volume.

[5] For a brief summary of the force levels agreed upon by the Defense Ministers at their meeting of Feb. 23, 3 p. m., see telegram LibDef 14, Feb. 23, p. 146.

The NAC, at its Ninth Session in Lisbon on 23 February 1952, having considered the MC comments on the TCC report (MC 39) and having decided that the proposed measures contained therein are necessary to the implementation of the Council's decisions on the TCC report:

> Approves para 18 of the report, and
> Notes the remainder of the report, and
> Approves the attached force objectives recommended by the Defense Ministers as the forces which countries have indicated their willingness to raise and support during the year 1952. This plan for 1952 shall be applicable to the objectives of TCC report.[6]
> Later, on motion of Lovett, final clause "and shall be substituted for Annex B of TCC supplemental report" [7] was deleted as duplicate action.

11. Harriman as Chairman TCC expressed gratitude to DefMins and govts who made it possible to clarify 52 force targets thereby establishing definite goal for 52. Stated had consulted EB re desirability revising para 2 of TCC resolution to incorporate reference to new Annex B (which is DefMins force table) and conform to agreed action by Council on MC 39: EB proposed to amend para 2 to read as fol:

> "While recognizing that many financial and other problems remain to be solved before the goals can be fully met,
> "Resolves that the force targets set out in Annex B to the supplementary report of the TCC be adopted as firm goals for 1952, and that the force targets recommended by the TCC be adopted as provisional goals for 1953, and for 1954 as goals to be used for planning purposes to guide the early actions required to make possible the achievement of these targets;"

12. Without objection by TCC members or by govts, Pearson announced amendment adopted by Council with TCC approval.

13. Council then approved DefMins resolution (para 10), which had effect of endorsing para 18 and noting balance of MC 39 final.

14. Council then adopted amended TCC resolution, including Greek-Turkish amendment and amended para 2.[8]

15. Council then considered UK draft declaration (C9–D/18 [9]) which had been distributed previous mtg. Pearson proposed that countries having drafting suggestions submit in writing and constitute drafting committee. Acheson stated had no objection to proposed procedure for handling but stated first reading raised questions of sub-

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[6] This resolution does not appear to have been circulated as a numbered NATO document; for an earlier version of the draft resolution, see the summary report of the Defense Ministers meeting of Feb. 22, telegram LibDef 12, Feb. 22, p. 135.

[7] The quoted portion here appeared as the concluding phrase of the resolution proposed by Defense Minister Claxton and paraphrased above.

[8] The amended paragraph 2 of C9–D/13 is quoted above. The "Greek-Turkish amendment" under reference here was an amendment to be added as a separate

Footnotes continued on following page.

stance re advisability of proceeding at all on resolution. Did not want create impression that agreement on procedure meant had only drafting changes to submit. Chairman broadened terms of reference ad hoc drafting group to consider substantive issues as well.

16. Chairman then introduced agenda item VIII: C9–D/4 [10] (report on NATO Organization). Spofford summarized report and outlined remaining issues which appear in bracketed text. Stated deputies regretted inability present fully agreed paper but at chairman's request were submitting present paper including alternate proposals.

17. Pearson proposed Council consider and act upon agreed paras of report, and refer disputed articles to Committee of FonMins for mtg 10:30 Mon limited to one or at most two advisers. On Schuman objection, Council agreed refer entire report to Committee FonMins.

18. Meeting adjourned.

Footnotes continued from preceding page.

numbered paragraph to the end of document C9–D/13 and circulated for consideration by the North Atlantic Council at the request of the U.S. Delegation in document CD–D/17, Feb. 21, 1952. The proposed amendment reads as follows:

"(a) Recognizes that Greece and Turkey have not been considered in the TCC analysis and report;

"(b) Invites the governments of Greece and Turkey to consider in co-operation with the appropriate NATO bodies the applicability of these findings and recommendations to Greece and Turkey; and

"(c) Directs the NATO agencies to undertake the necessary actions so that there may be full and equal participation by these new members of NATO in the annual review to be undertaken pursuant to Article 17 (*b*) (ii) of this Resolution."

According to the official NATO summary record of this meeting (C9–R/4), the Council approved the resolution in C9–D/13 also subject to the substitution of tables of force targets, which countries had indicated their willingness to raise and support during the year 1952, in place of Annex B of the Supplementary Report of the TCC.

[9] Dated Feb. 22, p. 190.

[10] Not printed, but see C9–D/4 (Revise), Feb. 29, p. 198.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1952

Acheson–Eden Dinner Meeting, American Embassy Residence, February 24, Evening

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden

110.11 AC/2–2552

Memorandum for the Record, by the Adviser on NATO Affairs (Knight)[1]

TOP SECRET [LISBON,] February 25, 1952.

Subject: Dinner with Mr. Eden on February 24, 1952.

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[1] The ribbon copy of this memorandum is included in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102. Another copy is in file 740.5/2–2552. The brief account of this meeting in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, is presumably based upon this memorandum.

The following were the main points discussed after dinner at the Residence on February 24, 1952:

1. *NATO Reorganization.* Both the US and UK will state their case in the Foreign Ministers' meeting on Monday morning February 25th.[2] However, Mr. Eden expressed agreement with Paris should this be the consensus of the Foreign Ministers' opinion. It was also agreed that Sir Oliver Franks would be the best man for the job of Secretary General. It was agreed that some power other than the US or UK should make this proposal. Mr. Eden will take care of this. The Secretary made it quite clear that in view of his personal relations with Mr. Pearson he could do nothing which would put him in the light of opposing Pearson's candidacy, undeclared as it was.

. . . .

3. *Egypt.* Mr. Eden made suggestions on a purely personal basis concerning a new "hat" to cover resumed negotiations with the Egyptians. (See telegram to Cairo No. 1, February 24, 1952, Secto 71.[3]) Mr. Eden seemed exceedingly anxious to arrive quickly at some agreement with the Egyptians. Seemed fully cognizant of the increasing danger of proceeding too slowly and appeared to be very open minded as to method of proceeding. During conversation Eden said that the question of the Sudan was now included on the tentative agenda for talks with the Egyptians.

4. *UK Draft Resolution.* The Secretary expressed serious concern over the latest draft of Mr. Eden's proposed resolution on the non-military objectives of NATO[4] where reference is made to NATO's having acquired a permanent character at Lisbon. He said that Congress might derive the impression that the US had extended its commitments without appropriate Congressional consultations.

It was left that the US Delegation should work up alternative language.

UK definitely wants separate declaration.

It was not clear whether there would be additional communiqué. This to be worked out Monday the 25th.

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[2] The reference here is presumably to the fifth and final meeting of the North Atlantic Council which was held on Feb. 25 at 5 p. m. For the record of that meeting, see Secto 79, p. 157.

[3] *Infra.*

[4] The reference here appears to be to the proposal for a draft declaration circulated as document C9–D/18 (Revise). That document is not printed, but differences between it and the subsequent draft approved by the Council as C9–D/18 (2nd Revise) are indicated in annotations to the latter paper printed on p. 193. The original proposal by the British Government is printed on p. 190.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [1]

TOP SECRET LISBON, February 24, 1952—midnight.

1. For Ambassador. From the Secretary. I have been discussing Egyptian situation with Eden this evening [2] and am much encouraged by his open-minded approach to method of solving problem. He is searching for new idea which cld permit fruitful resumption of talks with Egyptian Govt.

Eden fully realizes that Aly Maher can not accept same conditions and proposals refused by preceding govt without incurring serious political risks in current over-charged atmosphere. Searching for new proposals for discussion which might be made by the Egyptians he has suggested, on a purely personal basis to me, the possibility of a broader framework than the Four-Power proposals made and rejected by Nahas Pasha last Nov. Eden's thought is that the Egyptians might suggest talks associating the Arab States with the US, UK, Fr and Turk. Four Arab States joining the original four proposing states and Egypt might be a possible suggestion, but he has no set formula in mind.

I wish you wld discuss this idea privately with Stevenson, and only with him, and let me have your reaction and any other suggestions at Lisbon by Tuesday morning,[3] when I expect to meet again with my Brit colleague and perhaps later in the day with Mr. Schuman as well.[4]

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was repeated to the Department of State for information as Secto 71; it was also repeated to London.

[2] For a record of the meeting under reference, see Knight's memorandum for the record, *supra*.

[3] No response to this message has been identified.

[4] In telegram 2, Feb. 25, 4 p. m. from Lisbon to Cairo, repeated to the Department of State as Secto 73, Acheson sent the following additional information about the meeting with Eden:

"In addition points mytel 1, February 24 rptd Dept Secto 71, Eden said he appreciated urgency moving along as quickly as possible in finding solution of Sudan prog [*sic*]. Sudan is on tentative agenda for forthcoming talks with Egyptians." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102)

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1952

Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Fifth Meeting, Instituto Superior Técnico, Lisbon, February 25, 1952, 5 P. M.

Editorial Note

The list of participants at this meeting is identical to the list for the third meeting, February 22 (see the editorial note, page 136).

There are two official NATO records of this meeting: a 2-page summary record, document C9–R/5, which includes the full list of participants, and the 36-page verbatim record, document C9–VR/5. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105) There is no United States Delegation record of this meeting other than the telegraphic report printed *infra.*

740.5/2–2552 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

LISBON, February 25, 1952—midnight.

Secto 79. Council opened final session 5 p. m. with adopting drastically amended version UK declaration transmitted Secto 54.[2] Agreed text released to press tonight with final communiqué.[3] Both texts sent Dept via press wireless.

2. Pearson reported agreement reached by FonMins re NATO reorganization.[4] Ministerial meetings will be held in city other than permanent headquarters only in "special" instead of "exceptional" circumstances. Re vice chairman, Pearson stated some preferred other alternatives in principle but because issue so closely related to function SecGen FonMins prepared recommend first alternative (i.e. US position) if preferred by SecGen. Committee agreed permanent headquarters shld be in general area Paris. At Eden's request agreed communiqué indicates that in reaching decision council had in mind political and administrative importance of location near other international organizations having responsibilities and interests closely related to NATO.

3. FonMins also included paragraph stating SecGen functions along following lines: should initiate and prepare matters for Council action; take appropriate steps to follow up and coordinate actions; submit progress reports every six months to Council. SecGen should have direct access to all NATO agencies and govts. Relationships with govts should be organized in consultation with each permanent representative concerned. Portuguese representative put in record that in case his country relationship subject country approval. Chairman noted this applied all countries. Re access to commands, FonMins

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to all NATO capitals.

[2] The telegram under reference here is not printed; for the text of the draft declaration, circulated to the Council as C9–D/18 (2nd Revise), Feb. 25, see p. 193.

[3] For the agreed text of "The Declaration of Aims" of the Council as released to the press on Feb. 25, see p. 195; for the text of the final communiqué, see p. 177.

[4] For the final approved version of the paper under consideration by the Council at this point, C9–D/4 (Revise), Feb. 29, see p. 198.

agreed should not interfere with existing chains of authority and MC and SG should be kept fully informed of contacts.

4. Pearson informed Council that he had phoned Franks at request FonMins to discuss possibility his accepting position of SecGen if Council approved FonMins' recommendation. Franks requested 48 hours to consider. Council authorized Pearson confirm offer on behalf Council. Also agreed deputies would follow up and Franks could become SecGen through their action. If Franks unavailable deputies would make other recommendation to govts. Communiqué will not name SecGen nominee but Pearson will state job offered to Franks.[5]

5. Agreed leave open date when reorganization will become effective until known when SecGen will be appointed.

6. Agreed paragraph re international secretariat would read that secretary shld play "an effective" not "major" role.

7. Council approved paper with other minor changes.

8. Pearson expressed council appreciation for services permanent staff stressing Spofford's contribution. Council approved resolution thanking Spofford.

9. Report on cost-sharing third slice infrastructure adopted without discussion.[6] Details being cabled separately.[7]

10. Council approved communiqué issued this evening after considerable discussion. Re para on EDC and NATO, Schuman objected to inclusion sentence taken from approved deputies report stating relationships between communities should be based not on concept of two separate bodies working independently toward same objective but on concept of one so far as this objective concerned, working with framework, of other. This proposal generated typical EDC debate, Stikker strongly opposing apparent weakening of statement of relationship to NATO and DeGasperi emphasizing federation aspect EDC. Solution proposed by Secretary which deleted negative phrase but retained balance of sentence, agreed. During discussion Pearson twice pointed out that inclusion or exclusion of particular language in communiqué could not alter formal decision already taken by Council in approving resolution re EDC.[8]

11. Pearson proposed and Council agree next meeting Ministerial level should be at new headquarters if established with date meeting left for subsequent decision in light developments.

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[5] Soon after the conclusion of the Council session, Franks indicated his intention not to accept the proffered position. Eventually, Lord Ismay was chosen to become NATO Secretary General. For documentation relative to that appointment, see pp. 180 ff.

[6] For the text of the report, document C9–D/21, Feb. 25, see p. 196.

[7] Telegram Secto 89, Feb. 26, is not printed.

[8] For the text of the final Council communiqué, document C9–D/22 (Final), see p. 177.

Acheson-Eden-Schuman Meeting, British Embassy, Lisbon, February 25, 1952, 10:00 P. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Bruce	Mr. Roberts	Mr. Leroy-Beaulieu
Mr. Byroade	Mr. Trevelyan	Mr. Bourbon-Busset
Mr. Laukhuff	Mr. Richards	Mr. Sauvagnargues
Mr. Harris		
Mr. Nash		
Mr. Reinstein		

CFM files, lot M 88, box 161

United States Delegation Record [1]

SECRET

[LISBON, undated.]

MEETING WITH THE BENELUX FOREIGN MINISTERS

It was reported that a message had been received from Mr. Van Zeeland requesting another meeting between the Benelux Foreign Ministers and the three Foreign Ministers on the subject of the German financial contribution to defense. It was agreed to meet with the Benelux Foreign Ministers the following morning, February 26th, at 10:00 a. m.,[2] and to continue with the tripartite meeting at 11:00 a. m.

GERMAN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE

Background: On February 24, the members of the *Rapporteur* Group of the High Commission,[3] which was negotiating with the Germans regarding the German financial contribution to defense, came to Lisbon to report to the Foreign Ministers on the discussions which had taken place regarding the total contribution. The group submitted drafts which had been prepared by the German negotiators, the texts of which were contained in Bonn's telegrams numbered 1678, 1679, 1680, 1681 dated February 23rd.[4] The group reported that while the High Commissioners did not recommend acceptance of the German proposals as a satisfactory response by the Federal Government to the Foreign Ministers' request that the Federal Government accept the recommendation of the members of the Executive Bureau of the TCC on the total contribution, in the opinion of the High Commissioners, the German proposals were the best which the Commissioners felt they could obtain.

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[1] The information set forth above is derived from the source text, entitled "Notes on a Meeting," which bears no indication of authorship, but which was probably drafted by Reinstein. No other American record of this meeting has been found, nor has a documentary source been found for the account of this meeting set forth in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 625–626. According to that account, the meeting was given over to reports by the High Commission group and an apparently argumentative discussion thereon. The meeting appears to have eventuated in an agreement on the tripartite message to Adenauer transmitted in telegram 19 to Bonn (repeated to Washington as Secto 82), Feb. 26, p. 258.

[2] For a record of that meeting, see the Reinstein minutes, p. 161.

[3] Membership of the *Rapporteur* Group referred to here has not been determined, but the American element was presumably headed by Byroade.

The U.S. Delegation concluded, after study of these documents, that while the essential features of the German proposal were acceptable, the documents were not satisfactory as a basis for agreement. The U.S. Delegation prepared redrafts of the documents for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers.[5] These were considered at an official level tripartite meeting on the evening of February 24th.[6] The British Delegation indicated its willingness to accept the American re-drafts. The French Delegation, however, was unwilling to agree to accept the documents, since they did not contain an explicit statement that the Germans accepted the finding of the members of the Executive Bureau that an expenditure of DM 11.2 billion would be within Germany's economic capacity and would be comparable to the defense burdens of other principal Western countries.

A further official level meeting was held on the afternoon of February 25th[6] at which time the French Delegation stated that it was not in a position to accept the essential feature of the German proposal, namely a total contribution of DM 850 million per month beginning with the entry into force of the contractual arrangements and the EDC Treaty. The French Delegation stated that acceptance of this proposal would mean, in the event the entry into force of the agreements were delayed beyond July 1, 1952, that the German defense burden would be correspondingly reduced below the level of the French defense burden. The French Delegation proposed that the Germans should undertake to make a total contribution of DM 11.2 billion during the NATO fiscal year 1952–53, regardless of the date on which the agreements entered into force.

In view of the inability of the Delegations to reach agreement, the issues involved were referred to the Foreign Ministers.

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[4] Telegrams 1678, 1679, and 1680 are not printed; for text of telegram 1681, see p. 256.

[5] The American "redrafts" referred to here have not been found, but presumably the final approved versions of such papers are those transmitted in telegrams 19, 22, and 23 to Bonn, Feb. 26, pp. 258, 260, and 261, respectively.

[6] No record of the meeting under reference here has been found.

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1952

Acheson–Eden–Schuman–Stikker–Van Zeeland Meeting, French Embassy, Lisbon, February 26, 1952, 10:00 A. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Acheson
Ambassador Bruce
Assistant Secretary Perkins
Mr. Byroade
Mr. Nash
Mr. Reinstein

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Roberts
Mr. Richards
Mr. Wilford

FRANCE

Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Alphand
Mr. Sauvagnargues
Mr. Bourbon-Busset

NETHERLANDS

Mr. Stikker

BELGIUM

Mr. Van Zeeland

740.5/2–2652

Reinstein Minutes [1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, April 1, 1952.]

GERMANY

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE

Mr. Schuman opened the meeting by reviewing the negotiations with the Germans regarding the financial contribution to defense. He said that the negotiations had been concerned primarily with the total amount of the contribution. The three members of the Executive Bureau had recommended a total contribution of DM 11.25 billion, from which there were to be deducted certain NATO approved defense expenditures. These had been estimated by Allied experts at DM one billion. The remainder, which would involve a monthly expenditure of DM 850 million seemed likely to be agreed to by the Germans. The payment at this rate would only begin when the new arrangement goes into effect and would run until the end of the NATO fiscal year. After that a new exercise would be necessary to determine the total German figure.[2]

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[1] Copies of these minutes are included in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103 and in CFM files, lot M 88, box 161 as document GER–LONDON MIN 7, Apr. 16, 1952. A summary of this meeting closely paralleling the minutes printed here was transmitted in telegram Secto 96, Feb. 26, 11 a.m. from Lisbon. (740.5/2–2652) A 400-word report on this meeting was also transmitted in telegram 262400Z of Feb. 26 (p. 167) to Lovett in Washington (Lovett departed from Lisbon for Washington late on Feb. 25) from Nash. Nash's summary followed the same lines as the minutes printed here. An excerpt from the summary is presented in footnote 2, below.

[2] Nash's summary in telegram 262400Z (see footnote 1, above) recorded Schuman's review as follows:

"Schuman summarized situation by stating out of TCC Executive Bureau

Footnote continued on following page.

Mr. Van Zeeland said that he and Mr. Stikker had asked for the meeting in order to make their viewpoint on this subject clear. They wished in particular to indicate the importance which they attached to the principle that the result of these negotiations should not be to involve additional expenditures for the other EDC countries, who had already undertaken heavy defense burdens. He realized that this point could not be written into the agreements, but he wished a moral guarantee.

Mr. Stikker said he understood that only the total contribution had been considered. He further understood that when the division of this contribution was discussed, the agreement of all the interested parties would be obtained. He wished to know how this would be done. He emphasized the importance of getting a real German contribution which would involve additional strength for the West, and he hoped that the division would be made with this concept in mind. He indicated that this was a point on which both he and Mr. Van Zeeland felt strongly.

Mr. Eden said the discussions on the division would begin very soon.

Mr. Acheson said there were several matters to be gone over with the EDC, which he listed as follows:

1. The division of the contribution during the first year and how this would be handled with the EDC.
2. How the total contribution would be worked out in the future, that is, by what type of exercise. Perhaps this would be dealt with in the EDC Treaty.
3. What expenditures of a defense character would be deductible from the total contribution in the future. For the first year a lump sum allowance had been made.
4. What procedure would be followed in making the division of the German contribution after the first year.

Mr. Acheson said that he believed that under the arrangements which were being worked out, the interests of the Benelux countries were wholly protected.

Mr. Stikker asked whether it would not be possible to obtain copies of the documents which had been submitted to the members of the Executive Bureau by the Federal Government and by the High Commission.

Footnote continued from preceding page.

recmd of 11250 billion DM one billion DM would be allocated to cost of Berlin's support, police pensions, etc. Leaving figure of 10 billion 250 million or the equivalent of 850 billion DM monthly payable from date EDF agreement goes into effect. Prior to date of effectiveness of EDF, Germany would carry occupation cost at rate between 500–600 billion DM monthly, with Ger stating figures should be at rate of 500, and US–UK–French holding out for 600. Arrangements in payment at rate of 850 monthly to go into effect upon execution of EDF would go to end of NATO year that is 30 June 53. After that date there would have to be a new determination." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108)

Mr. Eden said that the release of the German submission would require the consent of the Federal Government. This was being sought and it was hoped that the document could be made available within a few days.

Acheson–Eden–Schuman Meeting, French Embassy, Lisbon, February 26, 1952, 11:00 A. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Minister Eden	Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Bruce	Mr. Roberts	Ambassador Alphand
Assistant Secretary Perkins	Mr. Richards	Mr. Sauvagnargues
Mr. Byroade	Mr. Wilford	Mr. Bourbon-Busset
Mr. Nash		
Mr. Harris		
Mr. Reinstein		
Mr. Laukhuff		

740.5/2–2652

Laukhuff–Reinstein Minutes [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, April 1, 1952.]

AUSTRIA

Mr. Eden asked if there were agreement on the proposed tripartite declaration on Austria.[2] He remarked that the first sentence of the second paragraph did not seem to follow the language of the Moscow Declaration on Austria.[3] He felt that the phrase "promised her sovereignty" should read "promised to restore her full sovereignty". It was agreed that the exact words of the Moscow Declaration would be used.

Mr. Schuman asked that the reference to the French Committee of National Liberation in the following sentence be altered and that the sentence read "France associated herself with this declaration on the

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[1] The source text indicates that Laukhuff was the drafter as of Mar. 17 and Reinstein on Apr. 1. Copies of these minutes as circulated within the Department of State as document GER–LONDON MIN 8, Apr. 16, 1952, are included in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103 and in CFM files, lot M 88, box 161. A 275-word summary account of the portion of this meeting dealing with Austria, closely following the minutes printed here, was transmitted to the Department as Secto 92, Feb. 26 and repeated for information to Paris, London, and Vienna. (740.5/2–2652) A 600-word account of the entire meeting, following the lines of the minutes printed here, was also included in telegram 262400Z, Feb. 26, from Nash to Lovett (p. 167).

[2] For the text of the tripartite declaration under consideration at this point, see telegram 2153, Feb. 27, p. 278.

[3] For the text of the declaration under reference here, dated Nov. 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 761.

16th of November 1943." The following sentence would begin "The Governments then announced their determination", etc.

With these changes the text of the declaration was agreed. It was further agreed that the declaration would be released on Thursday, February 28 at 3:30 p. m., (Greenwich mean time).

Mr. Acheson said he understood this was the first step. In about two weeks each of the governments would send a note to the Soviet Government proposing the abbreviated treaty. The treaty would include the French proposal regarding the prohibition of an Anschluss.

Mr. Schuman asked what the advantages of the abbreviated treaty are.

Mr. Acheson said that it had the advantage of constituting a new proposal. This was a new Allied initiative designed for its effect in Austria.

Mr. Schuman remarked that the proposal would not facilitate agreement with the USSR.

Mr. Acheson agreed.

Mr. Schuman suggested that the note to the Soviet Government should recall that it was not the content of the treaty which had given rise to difficulties, but the raising of unrelated points such as the Trieste question.

Mr. Perkins asked what language would be used with regard to the prohibition of an Anschluss. He said the three Allied High Commissioners in Austria had recommended two formulas. One was the inclusion in the treaty of the following language:

> "The Allied and Associated Powers declare that political and economic union between Austria and Germany is prohibited. Austria recognizes its responsibilities in this matter."

The other method would be a three power declaration on the subject with which the Soviet Government would be invited to associate itself.

Mr. Schuman pointed out that there has been a clause on this subject in the old treaty which had been agreed to by the Soviets.

It was agreed that the prohibition would be included in the treaty subject to a further study of the wording set forth above. It was further agreed that the note to the Soviet Government would be dispatched two weeks after the tripartite declaration.

Mr. Schuman asked whether the abbreviated treaty would be proposed as an alternative to the present draft.

It was agreed that the abbreviated draft would be put forward as the basis for discussion by the Allies, but that this would not include a discussion of the long treaty or any proposals which the Soviets might put forward.

GERMANY

SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

Mr. Schuman said that on the question of security control everything appeared to be settled except the list of items which would not be allocated for production in the Federal Republic. In the name of his Government he wished to make the following proposal with respect to propellants. The manufacture of gun powder could be concentrated in a few factories which should be in less exposed regions. This was a standardized job. It should be given to the EDC as a common task. All members of the EDC would participate and there would be no discrimination. He thought that new factories could be set up at once. In setting them up, attention would be paid to such factors as labor. Italy, for example, has an unemployment problem. He said that he had spoken to De Gasperi who supported the idea and suggested Sardinia as a location for the factories. France would also like to use North Africa. He thought this would be a constructive proposal, in the common good. He recalled also that the German Chancellor had informed the Ministers that he had no intention of building new factories. He pointed out that France produces only half the pre-war amounts and that Germany was in the same position. There was thus a common European need and the burden of supply should be taken off the United States.

Ambassador Bruce inquired how Mr. Schuman would deal with the existing powder factories. Would they be bought by the EDC, he inquired? Mr. Schuman replied that they would continue as they are at present and they would not be bought by the EDC. His proposal was only that any new construction should be undertaken by the EDC. The treaty would specify that the Commissioners would have a monopoly for the future. Mr. Acheson observed that our only concern was to get practical results.

Mr. Schuman then said that he wished to maintain civil aviation on the list. Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden both pointed out that the ED Commission would not place orders for civil aircraft. Mr. Schuman rejoined that the difference between civil and military aircraft was not great and that civil aircraft production could easily be converted to military aircraft production.

Mr. Acheson said he had trouble not with the abstract logic but with the practical result of adding civil aircraft to the list. He read out the proposed text of Article A-4 of the EDC treaty. As he saw it, under Mr. Schuman's proposal the EDC would not place orders for civil aircraft but the German Government would be free to do so. Mr. Schuman replied that there were two lists involved. In list 1 are found *all* armaments which are not to be made except with EDC approval.

List 2 are those which are not to be made in strategic areas. His proposal was to add civil aircraft to list 2.

Mr. Acheson agreed that this would get us around the legal point but thought it would not get us around the political one. He recalled that Chancellor Adenauer had indicated he could not accept this arrangement. Mr. Eden felt that it was discriminatory. Mr. Acheson said the Chancellor had indicated he believed this would be discriminatory, just as a similar listing of automobiles would be. The Chancellor had indicated, however, that he was willing to make a statement about civil aircraft.

Mr. Schuman thought a statement was not a commitment but Mr. Eden pointed out that the three Governments could take note of the statement. He asked if it was not a fact that a civil aviation industry cannot be developed where there is no production of military aircraft.

Mr. Schuman protested that he had great confidence in Adenauer but that if we had another government in Germany in two, three or four years, it would be difficult—. Mr. Eden said such a development could be difficult also for the British but he thought that if the government got a declaration of which they could take note plus a prohibition on military aircraft, this would be satisfactory and we could not get much more.

Mr. Schuman said he had every wish to end this matter in agreement. On the other hand, Adenauer also had the same wish. Adenauer was very much pressed, he thought. The list after all was very short. He thought that if the Ministers considered German public opinion and German difficulties too much, they risked forgetting their own difficulties. There was a great psychological difficulty on aviation. He thought it ought to be met especially since the rest of the agreement was fair and just.

Mr. Schuman went on to say that his military advisor told him that gun barrels were not so important. The only practical difficulty was that the Krupp works might be reconstituted—although he thought they would find plenty of profits elsewhere for a while! On the whole, however, the French Government would be more inclined to drop gun barrels than propellants. He said he would write personally to Chancellor Adenauer explaining the French difficulties and appealing for this sacrifice by the Federal Republic.

Mr. Acheson summarized rapidly the state of the discussion about the list and said he felt Mr. Schuman was mistaken about the intensity of the Chancellor's feeling on aircraft. He wondered whether the Ministers could play around with the language of the Chancellor's letter and strengthen it in some way as to make it more acceptable to Mr. Schuman. For example, we could have him say that he would not change his mind without consultation, that we regard this matter of the production of aircraft as a very serious one, etc.

Mr. Eden felt he had an even more sensitive public with which to contend on this point than did Mr. Schuman. But in his opinion the public was not right; it was thinking in terms of the last war and not the next.

Mr. Acheson pointed out that from the Chancellor's point of view all these matters were connected. He would not like to make a final agreement on the all-important question of a financial contribution until the question of security controls was settled. Mr. Schuman warned his colleagues that the Germans wanted everything difficult settled in their favor without delay.

Mr. Acheson, again thinking aloud, suggested that the Chancellor should be asked to send a letter in which he would add that he was fully aware of the importance of the policy he was stating, he would assure us that the German Government would not alter its intention without consulting us, and then he would say that the whole letter would be laid before the Bundestag.

The Ministers adjourned in order to give time for further thought on this problem.

Acheson–Eden–Schuman Meeting, French Embassy, Lisbon, February 26, 1952, 5:00 P. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	FRANCE
Secretary of State Acheson	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Minister Schuman
Ambassador Bruce	Mr. Roberts	Ambassador Alphand
Assistant Secretary Perkins	Mr. Richards	Mr. Sauvagnargues
Mr. Byroade	Mr. Wilford	Mr. Leroy-Beaulieu
Mr. Nash	Others	Mr. Bourbon-Busset
Mr. Harris		Others
Mr. Reinstein		
Mr. Laukhuff		

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103 : Telegram

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

LISBON, February 26, 1952—midnight.

262400Z. Further distribution this msg made only at discretion of Secretary.

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[1] The source text appears to be one of several copies of this message received in the Defense Department as telegram DA IN 110307 and distributed in the State Department. Lovett departed from Lisbon for Washington on Feb. 25. For two other reports on this meeting, see *infra* and p. 171.

[Here follow Parts 1 and 2 reporting upon the Acheson–Eden–Schuman–Stikker–Van Zeeland meeting of February 26, 10 a. m. (see the Reinstein minutes, page 161) and the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting of February 26, 11 a. m. (see the Laukhuff–Reinstein minutes, page 163).]

Part 3. Afternoon mtg commenced on encouraging word just received from Bonn of Ger agreement to def contribution recmd by TCC. Acheson then proposed folg add to Adenauer declaration to Bundestag re Federal Republic intentions concerning civil acft production.

[Here follows the paragraph on civil aircraft quoted in Secto 100, *infra.*]

Schuman and Eden both indicated agreement, thus concluding final remaining question concerning security controls. In view of agreement on two remaining questions on Ger contractual agreement of Ger def contribution and security controls, Acheson asked Schuman when he anticipated EDC treaty would be ready for signing. Schuman said that it would be approx six weeks. Acheson asked whether this could be expedited. Schuman stated that they would do their best but said that negotiations had been on for a year est was still six weeks. Acheson said would like personally to attend signing of EDC treaty and contractual agreement. Some discussion of place for such signing took place. Schuman recmd Paris as the site for signing of EDC treaty. French and UK indicated preference of Bonn for signing of contractual agreement, US reserving its position with suggestion of Strasbourg as alternative. It was further agreed mtg of three foreign ministers might well take place at time of foregoing action.

Part 4. Folg conclusion of foregoing, Eden inquired whether he might raise several non-scheduled items stated he had just concluded mtg with De Gasperi on Trieste [2] wherein De Gasperi indicated situation had worsened with Yugoslavs making further difficulties. Schuman commented Austrian question with Russia would be greatly ameliorated if Trieste question was solved. Acheson referred to press interview by Tito stating Italians and Yugoslavs further apart on Trieste than year ago and similar unhelpful statements. Schuman emphasized US, UK and France presently giving economic and mil asst to Yugoslavia pointing out only three weeks ago French parliament voted 5½ billion aid to Yugoslavia. He suggested we must use our aid as lever for correcting Yugoslavia recalcitrant on Trieste situation. Acheson noted French, US and UK currently discussing future asst to Yugoslavia in Wash. Agreed to req such consultations to take foregoing suggestion into consideration in such discussion. Eden then referred to fact he had recently seen results of discussions of US, UK and French mil reps on future courses of action in Southeast Asia.[3] Eden stated we must do something about it although he was not proposing attempt to meet question in Lisbon. Acheson replies US having a thorough going over the entire question of Southeast Asia, including Indo-China stating we are hoping to come up with something in way of proposal. Schuman evidenced great interest in latter possibility and asked when results of US study might be ready. Acheson replied optimistic est would be approx in month. Schuman emphasized great importance of US position toward Indo-China to political situation in France and reqd earliest advise of US decision. Acheson agreed to furn info concerning US position when finally determined. Schuman inquired concerning possibility of discussing Indo-China at proposed tripartite foreign ministers mtg est to take place six weeks hence in connection with signing of EDC treaty and Ger contractual agreement. Acheson refrained from any commitment. Eden then inquired whether Acheson had any further info on the Korean situation. Acheson stated he had only fragmentary info of most recent developments in Korea. He further stated his understanding remaining questions related to period of rotation of troops stationed in Korea: Question of exchange of POW, inspection by neutrals, and mil recmd of matters to be discussed in political conf folg armistice. On POW question, he indicated there was greater difficulty of finding way to avoid return of POW likely to be killed upon return, but at same time not to force Communists to accept theory of voluntary repatriation. Indicated some optimism solution to problem could be reached but stated it would take time. Re question of inspection of ports of entry neutrals Acheson pointed out our willingness to stretch our conscience to permit participation with Swiss and Swedes by such satellites as Poles and Czechs but complete inability to cut Soviet Union in on deal. Agreement indicated by French and UK on latter point on question of matters for discussion at conf folg armistice Acheson stated Ridgway position as UN mil comdr that his recmds could not go beyond matters relating to Korea. Schuman indicated agreement with this point of view. British view point not indicated. Schuman stated he thought it would be of interest to other foreign ministers to know that proposed Communist labor strike set for Feb 12 had proved complete flop with only 10% of workers showing up. He commented Commies have had successes on question relating to such matters as wage but on any political question were proving complete failure. He further commented Soviet propaganda in France had taken turn away from concentration on peace proposals to questions particularly those relating to East–West trade. He referred to international trade conf set for Moscow in April which Commies were making every effort to build up. He stated French were advising against any French participation in such conf but emphasized Soviet propaganda efforts to impress French industrialists on advantages in developing East–West trade.[4] Mtg ended on general note of felicitation on success fairly enthusiastic on results. Folg conclusion of mtg Schuman and Acheson proceeded to execute memorandum of understanding [5] and minutes of conversation [6] with ref to $200,000,000 off shore procurement asst designed to assist French in support of force figures submitted by them to council on last Sat. In final note, would like to emphasize complete understanding and acceptance by State reps and other members of US delegation on points advanced in behalf of Def Dept.

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[2] No other information has been found in Department of State files regarding the course of the Eden–De Gasperi meeting. For documentation on Trieste, see volume VIII.

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[3] The discussions under reference here are further documented in the East Asia regional compilation in volume XII.

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[4] Documentation on U.S. export control policy is presented in volume I.

[5] For the text of the United States-French memorandum of understanding under reference here, see p. 273.

[6] For the text of the agreed memorandum of conversation of Feb. 23 under reference here, see telegram Actel 9, Feb. 25, from Lisbon, p. 142.

740.5/2-2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL LISBON, February 26 [27?], 1952—11 a. m.[1]

Secto 100. 1. Final mtg of three Mins took place late afternoon of Feb 26.

2. Financial contribution. Schuman did not feel he cld accept change in language proposed by Chancellor reported in Bonn's 20 to Lisbon Feb 26 (rpt numbers not known).[2] He agreed to footnote with statement he accepted its existence but not its content. It was agreed press release shld accordingly be issued as planned.[3]

Schuman has apparently given instrs his position shld be made clear at Bonn. (Fr fear that Ger desire to include Allied troop support in budget is designed to increase Ger voting power in EDC and are anxious to make clear Ger statement in no way prejudges negots in EDC conf.) They desire that this be done on tripartite basis and suggest oral statement that we regard footnote as unilateral Ger statement which in no way commits Three Powers. We think this is correct but are somewhat concerned that statement might be taken to foreclose payment of Allied troops costs mechanically through EDC budget, to which we are prepared to agree. Suggest you attempt work out appropriate statement with Francois-Poncet; if impossible without prejudice to agrmt now achieved, believe it best to allow him to make individual statement.

3. Security controls. A brief discussion produced agrmt along fol lines: Gun barrels over 105 mm. will be deleted from list. Propellants

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[1] The dateline in the source text is probably in error. The telegram was received on Feb. 28 at 2:33 a. m.

[2] *Post*, p. 262.

[3] For the text of the agreed press release, see telegram 23, Feb. 26, from Lisbon, p. 261.

will also be deleted but Fr will press for arrangement in EDC treaty whereby all new capacity for production of propellants in EDC will be monopoly of community itself, will be provided for from common budget and will be located outside strategically exposed areas (i.e. outside FedRep). On civil aviation, Secy proposed this be deleted from list but that Adenauer be asked to include in a communication to three govts assurance in fol terms:

"In respect of civil aircraft, none are being produced in the FedRep at the present time, nor are there any facilities available for such production. The Govt of the FedRep intends to purchase from other countries such civil aircraft as may be required in Ger. If in the future condition shld change, the FedRep will seek agrmt on this matter with the Govts of the US, UK, and France in the light of the sitn then prevailing".

Schuman said he cld recommend this to his govt as satis settlement of civil aviation question.

4. Other problems. The Mins then touched briefly on certain other questions (Trieste, Indochina) which are being separately reported.[4] Secy also gave brief acct of situation in Korea.

Acheson

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[4] The two telegrams under reference here are Secto 94 and Secto 95, both Feb. 26, 10 p.m. from Lisbon. Secto 94 reads as follows:

"Eden in tripartite mtg this afternoon raised question of Indochina. Commented on divergence of milit views. We indicated US making thorough review which from the milit point of view shld be completed within a month, and wld take another month of interdepartmental and other consultation. At end of that time, we might be ready to talk further." (740.5/2-2652)

Secto 95 reads as follows:

"De Gasperi expressed concern to both Secy and Eden about progress Trieste negots. Matter touched on briefly at tripartite Tues afternoon. It was agreed we shld work out common approach to problem and, in particular, in relation to Yugo. Because of tripartite talks in Washington on econ aid to Yugo, suggestion is that these be widened to include what, if anything, be done concerning Trieste." (740.5/2-2652)

A record of the discussion on Trieste, Indochina, and the situation in Korea is also covered in Part 4 of telegram 262400Z, *supra*.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 103

Laukhuff–Reinstein Minutes[1]

SECRET

[Washington, April 1, 1952.]

Germany

FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO DEFENSE

Mr. Acheson reported that a message had been received from Mr. McCloy that Dr. Adenauer accepted the documents which had been agreed on by the Foreign Ministers the previous evening with two minor amendments.[2] First, in the letter from the Chancellor to the three Foreign Ministers to delete the sentence reading: "These payments will cover its contribution to the EDC and the support of Allied forces in the Federal Republic", and substitute the following: "These payments will include the support of Allied forces in the Federal Republic." Second, in the letter of reply to the Chancellor by the Three Foreign Ministers, delete the phrase "and will be used exclusively for the Federal Republic's contribution to the EDC and the support of Allied Forces in the Federal Republic" and substitute the following: "and will include the support of Allied Forces in the Federal Republic."

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[1] The source text indicates that Laukhuff was the drafter of these minutes on Mar. 17 and Reinstein on Apr. 1. Copies of these minutes were circulated in the Department of State as document GER-LONDON MIN 9, Apr. 16, 1952.

Mr. Acheson explained that these changes were proposed to safeguard the position of the Federal Government which it had formulated as follows:

> "The Federal Republic proceeds on the assumption that in the sense of the EDC Treaty the payments for the support of the Allied forces in the Federal Republic are reckoned as part of the Federal Republic's contribution to EDC."

In the event that the Foreign Ministers were unable to accept the two amendments proposed by the Chancellor, he would be willing to agree to the documents as they were drafted with a footnote safeguarding the position of the Federal Republic in the exact words quoted above.

Mr. Acheson said that unless the High Commission received contrary advices from the Foreign Ministers, it was proposed to publish the communiqué at Bonn at 6:00 p. m., G.M.T. (Lisbon time).[3]

Mr. Schuman indicated he was unwilling to modify the texts which had been submitted by the Chancellor, and it was agreed to maintain them. It was understood that this meant that the footnote would be included. Mr. Schuman remarked that he accepted the existence of the footnote, but not its content. The Federal Government would make the assumption and the Allies would take note of it.

It was agreed to issue the communiqué at Lisbon at 6:00 p. m. It was also agreed to send a message to the three High Commissioners congratulating them on their handling of the negotiations with the Germans on this subject.[4]

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[2] Telegram 20, Feb. 26, from Bonn to Lisbon, p. 262.

[3] The agreed press statement referred to here is quoted in telegram 23, Feb. 26, from Lisbon, p. 261.

[4] The message of congratulation under reference here, as transmitted in telegram 28, Feb. 27, from Lisbon to Bonn, repeated to Washington as Secto 98, reads as follows:

"Three Foreign Mins, before leaving Lisbon, wish to congratulate Allied HICOM most warmly on securing Fed Govt's agreement so promptly to the total figure for Ger's financial contribution to defense for the first year, and on their handling of these whole contractual negots." (740.5/2-2752)

SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

Mr. Acheson proposed that the civil aircraft problem be dealt with by omitting civil aircraft from the list in the EDC treaty of articles not to be produced in strategic areas and that Dr. Adenauer be asked to include in a communication to the three Governments an assurance in the following terms:

"In respect of civil aircraft, none are being produced in the Federal Republic at the present time, nor are there any facilities available for such production. The Government of the Federal Republic intends to purchase from other countries such civil aircraft as may be required in Germany. If in the future, the condition should change, the Federal Republic will seek agreement on this matter with the Governments of the US, UK and France in the light of the situation then prevailing."[5]

After reading the US draft Mr. Schuman said he could recommend this to his Government. If they got a real community in Europe a sense of community would arise and there would be comprehension on both sides.

Mr. Acheson recalled that the Chancellor was going to make a general statement to the three Governments on security controls. Either in that communication or in one appended to it and having the same effect he would say what was in the US draft on civil aviation. Mr. Acheson thought this would be more acceptable to Adenauer than some arrangement prohibiting production for 50 years. Summarizing the position reached, he said the Ministers proposed to remove cannon from the list, to put a proposal on gun powder along the lines suggested in the morning session (that is to let the EDC work it out) and then they would ask Adenauer to say this on civil aviation.

CONCLUSION OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS

During the course of the general exchange of remarks on the conclusion of the contractual arrangements and the EDC Treaty, Mr. Acheson said he hoped to be able to come to Europe for the signature of the General Agreement.

TRIESTE

Mr. Eden said he wished to raise another issue briefly, that of Trieste.[6] He said he was worried about this. The Yugoslavs were raising difficulties. They want to go back to the older arrangement. We ought to look at this problem to try to find a common approach to it.

Mr. Acheson agreed that we should study it together. He said he had been told by De Gasperi that the UP was having an interview with Tito today. According to De Gasperi the Italians and the Yugoslavs were further apart now than a year ago. The Secretary said the United States had felt that the Yugoslavs were not negotiating in good faith. They were now encouraging the idea of a free state.

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[5] The paragraph quoted here was quoted again in the telegraphic report on this meeting, Secto 100, *supra* and in telegram 262400Z from Nash to Lovett, p. 167.

[6] For documentation on U.S. efforts to assist in the conclusion of the dispute over Trieste, see volume VIII.

Mr. Schuman observed that we were giving aid to Yugoslavia and we should impose conditions. Mr. Perkins informed the Ministers that the United States was having talks with the French and British now in Washington on the question of aid to Yugoslavia.[7] Mr. Eden thought that we ought to toughen up a bit.

It was agreed to include this subject in the Washington discussions.

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[7] Documentation on U.S. economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia is included in volume VIII.

Editorial Note

In a radio-television address to the American people, made in Washington on the evening of February 29 following his return from Lisbon, Secretary of State Acheson reviewed in some detail the discussions and decisions reached by the North Atlantic Council during its meetings in Lisbon. For the text of the address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1952, page 363.

For Secretary Acheson's brief personal account of the Lisbon meetings sent to President Truman in messages of February 24 and 26, see *infra* and page 175.

MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT

740.5/2–2552 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET NIACT [LISBON, February 24, 1952.]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will have had our reports on the latest developments in the meeting here. I hope you believe that they are good. This conference will be a success. The only questions remaining are whether (1) it will be a success or a great success and (2) whether other events, such as a government crisis in France or German developments may detract from its success.

As to the first: We have only two problems left here.

(A) Contributions to NATO infrastructure which Bob Lovett is battling out manfully,[2] I think and (B) NATO location and organization, which I believe I have worked out with Eden so that, with luck that will be resolved.

As to the second: (A) France: With complete cooperation and agreement among your Cabinet representatives, we presented a proposal to France within US governmental authority which they have accepted and will present to the French Parliament.[3] No man can do more or predict the result.

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[1] This message was transmitted to Washington from Lisbon as telegram Actel 8, Feb. 25, 10 a.m. It was obviously drafted by Acheson on the evening of Feb. 24.

[2] For the report on the final decisions of the Special Committee on Infrastructure of which Secretary Lovett was a member, see document C9–D/21, Feb. 25, from Lisbon, p. 196.

(B) Germany: Adenauer replied today to our proposals on the German contribution to defense.[4] In substance he accepts. In form his govt raised too many points for German internal consumption, that, for French internal consumption the lower levels of the French could not agree on a proposal we made to resolve the problem. This is too bad. If they would have allowed Schuman to meet with Eden, who agreed, and with me, we might have had a grand slam tomorrow with all points on your European policy agreed for submission to Parliaments.

But life is never as clean as this. So the situation is about as fols: The Lisbon meeting has done all and more than was expected. Tomorrow Eden will, I firmly believe, resolve the last problems of organization [5] and the financing of infrastructure will permit doing what can be done in the next year. Then the Lisbon conference will adjourn.

On Tuesday we, the British and I will try and I hope succeed, in concluding between us all German questions including the contribution to defense and the control of industry question.[6] If Adenauer can agree before we leave Lisbon the structure will be complete. If it could have been agreed upon before the conference adjourned, it would have been better, but I have tried and failed to do this. The second best Four Power agreement on Tuesday is not as good but is pretty good. The third best Three Power Agreement on Tuesday and German concurrence shortly thereafter will be good enough.

We are all united doing our best and believe we can achieve either two or three above.

I write this too late at night to be sure that it is all clear or that I am.

Most respectfully,

DEAN ACHESON

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[3] See the U.S.-French memorandum of understanding, Feb. 25, p. 273.

[4] Regarding the West German reply referred to here, see telegram 20, Feb. 26, p. 262.

[5] The North Atlantic Council adopted the paper on the Reorganization of NATO (C9–D/4 (Revise)) at its fifth and final meeting on Feb. 25; see telegram Secto 79, Feb. 25, p. 157. For text of the paper, Feb. 29, see p. 198.

[6] Regarding the proceedings of Feb. 26, see pp. 161–174.

740.5/2–2652

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET

LISBON, February 26, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Our last meeting—one with Eden and Schuman—has just ended and I send you this brief report. Details will follow.[3] Recalling my midnight note of 2 days ago, I can report that we have something pretty close to a grand slam. Only 2 questions remained after yesterday afternoon. The first was to get German agreement on their financial contribution to defense. Work here nearly all last night and in Bonn all this morning has secured that agreement. The other question was to get tripartite agreement on a proposal to the Germans on control of armament production which would not undo what has been accomplished in Germany and which has a chance of acceptance. We got that this afternoon.

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[1] The source text was transmitted to Washington in telegram Actel 16, Feb. 26, 9 p. m., from Lisbon, which was received in the Department of State on Feb. 26 at 6:30 p. m.

That finishes the docket, I hope and believe successfully.

John and I, the last of the Four Musketeers, leave tonight and will report to you when you can see us.

Most respectfully,

DEAN ACHESON

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[3] For other accounts of the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 26, see pp. 167–174.

CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

Editorial Note

In the pages that follow, the editors have sought to present the principal substantive papers considered or agreed upon during the meetings of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon as well as during those meetings between Secretary of State Acheson and various other Foreign Ministers in Lisbon between February 20 and 26. Also included here is a selection of supplementary papers with direct bearing on the major issues considered during those meetings in Lisbon.

The editors have felt it possible and appropriate to include here only a very few of the many background and position papers drafted in preparation for the meetings in Lisbon by an interagency Steering Group for Lisbon Preparations. Between early December 1951, when the Steering Group first began meeting, and February 12, 1952, more than 40 separate background, position, and negotiating papers were drafted. These papers, designated "LIS–D" papers, numbered from LIS D–1 to LIS D–21 and comprised more than 300 typewritten pages. The papers covered all the topics likely to be taken up during the North Atlantic Council session, particularly those issues relating to the organization, financing, and command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The LIS–D series also included those papers on the German problem originally prepared in advance of the London meetings of the Foreign Ministers and designated GER–LON documents (see the editorial note, page 35). The most complete set of LIS–D papers, together with sets of minutes, memoranda, and agenda papers of the Steering Group, is preserved in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 161. Another set of the papers only is included in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101. Copies of a few LIS–D papers have found their way into the numbered central files of the Department of State.

COMMUNIQUÉ

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 104

Final Communiqué of the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council [1]

C9–D/22 (Final)

LISBON, 26th February, 1952.

1. The Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council was held in Lisbon from February 20th to February 25th, 1952, under the chairmanship of the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

On February 18th, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey acceded to the Treaty, and representatives of their respective governments attended throughout the Session. In all, thirty-five ministers of fourteen countries took part in the discussions of the Council.

2. The Council made further progress in dealing with current and long range problems of the Atlantic Community. The decisions taken and the agreements reached by the Council are the practical result of projects initiated at earlier sessions and reflect the continuing work of the Treaty agencies. They represent the united efforts of member governments to safeguard the peace, stability and well-being of the North Atlantic Community through the strengthening of their collective defence.

3. The Council took note of a report of the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community [2] and a report by the Occupying Powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic.[3] The Council found that the principles underlying the Treaty to establish the European Defence Community conformed to the interests of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. It also agreed on the principles which should govern the relationship between the proposed Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Council agreed to propose to its members and

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[1] This communiqué was adopted by the Council at its fifth and final plenary meeting, Feb. 25; for the report of that meeting, see telegram Secto 79, Feb. 25, from Lisbon, p. 157.

[2] See document C9–D/12, Feb. 19, p. 230.

[3] Document C9–D/16, Feb. 21, is not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 137.

to the European Defence Community reciprocal security undertakings between the members of the two organizations. Such undertakings would require ratification in accordance with the constitutional processes of the states involved. All these decisions are inspired by the conviction that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defence Community have a common objective, to strengthen the defence of the Atlantic area, and that the development of the European Defence Community should be carried forward in this spirit. Therefore, the Council considered that the obligations and relationships between the communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and reinforcing the other.

4. The Council took detailed and comprehensive action based on the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee.[4] The decisions taken by the Council provided for the earliest building-up of balanced collective forces to meet the requirements of external security within the capabilities of member countries. Agreement was reached on the specific defensive strength to be built this year, and on a definite programme of measures to be taken this year to increase defensive strength in following years. A number of important steps were agreed to be taken by the Treaty Organization and by member governments to accomplish this building-up with a more efficient use of resources. Policies designed to maintain and strengthen the economies and social stability of member countries were agreed and recommended to governments.

5. Agreement was reached on the financing of a further portion of the infrastructure programme, for airfields, communications and headquarters.[5]

6. The terms of reference of the Standing Group and of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, were revised to reflect added responsibilities, notably for equipment priorities and planning for the logistical support of the military forces.

The Council agreed that the ground and air forces of Greece and Turkey assigned to NATO will operate under the overall command of SACEUR through Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe. The Naval Forces of Greece and Turkey will remain for the present under their national Chiefs of Staff, operating in close coordination with all other naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Standing Group was directed to continue its study of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean area and their coordination with land and air forces and to submit a definitive report to the Council at its next meeting.

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[4] See document C9–D/20, Feb. 23, p. 220.

[5] See document C9–D/21, Feb. 25, p. 196.

7. The Council also took action to adapt the Treaty Organization to the needs arising from the development of its activities from the planning to the operational stage.[6] The North Atlantic Council, while continuing to hold periodic Ministerial meetings, will henceforth function in permanent session through the appointment of Permanent Representatives. The Council decided to appoint a Secretary-General, who will head a unified international Secretariat designed to assist the Council in the fulfillment of its increasing responsibilities. All civilian activities of the Organization will be concentrated in the geographical area where are situated other international agencies whose work is closely related to that of the Treaty Organization and with which close administrative connection is essential to efficiency. These are presently situated in the vicinity of Paris. When these changes become effective, the Council will assume the functions hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board.

8. The Council adopted a report of the Atlantic Community Committee,[7] established at its Ottawa meeting. This report emphasised the importance of economic cooperation, the expansion and liberalisation of trade, and the possibility of working out closer cooperative arrangements with other bodies, particularly the OEEC. In approving the analysis of the problem of the movement of labour between member countries in the report of the Atlantic Community Committee, the Council acknowledged the importance of this problem and endorsed the resolution of the Temporary Council Committee on this subject. It was agreed that the permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organization should keep this problem under continuous review, and make recommendations for the elimination, by the most effective utilisation of manpower resources, of general or specific manpower shortages which hinder defence production. As cooperation in the field covered by the Five Power Atlantic Community Committee is of direct and common concern to each member of the Council, it was decided that the future work in this sphere should be transferred to the Council.

9. The Council issued a Declaration reaffirming the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the promotion of peace through defensive strength and enduring progress.[8]

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[6] See document C9–D/4 (Revise), Feb. 29, p. 198.
[7] See document C9–D/8, Feb. 19, *infra*.
[8] The final text of the declaration is printed on p. 195.

REORGANIZATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION; THE QUESTION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SECRETARY GENERAL

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community to the North Atlantic Council[1]

CONFIDENTIAL LISBON, 19th February, 1952.

C9–D/8

REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY TO THE NINTH SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its Eighth Session, the North Atlantic Council considered and adopted a report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community, C8–D/6,[2] and accepted the recommendations set out therein at paragraph 40, page 21. It invited the Committee to continue its work with the same terms of reference and membership, and, in particular, to study the question of the movement of labour (discussed in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the report), taking care not to duplicate the efforts of other international organisations in this field (C8–R/5, paragraph 46[3]).

2. The Committee set up a working Group, which held a series of meetings between 10th January, 1952, and 5th February, 1952, and prepared a draft report for consideration by the Committee. The Committee met in Lisbon on 18th February, 1952, and approved this report in its present form.

3. In view of the short interval which has elapsed since the Eighth Session of the Council at Rome, it has only been possible for the committee to make progress in a limited field in the continuation of the work outlined in its previous report. As indicated below, the Committee is now ready to propose to the Council the adoption of more specific programmes of action in the fields of movement of labour, and the exchange of persons in the educational field, and to report continuing study of informational needs. The Committee wishes to emphasize that the process of achieving cohesive relationships among the countries of the North Atlantic Community is necessarily a slow one, and that it would be a mistake to expect rapid or spectacular achieve-

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[1] This document was presented, discussed, and approved by the North Atlantic Council at its third meeting, Feb. 22; see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, from Lisbon, p. 136 for a report on that meeting.

[2] This document is not printed; the record of the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council in November 1952 at which C8–D/6 was adopted is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 693 ff.

[3] Under reference here is the official NATO Summary Record of the fifth meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Nov. 27, 1951; the record is not printed.

ments. In this field it is necessary to build carefully on a solid foundation. The immediate and urgent aim of the North Atlantic Treaty is the common defence. The degree of success which is attained in defence cooperation will in large part determine the progress which can be made in strengthening the Atlantic Community in its wider aspects. The sense of community, the experience, and the habits of cooperation which the development of collective defence has engendered form the essential basis for the growth of collaboration in fields other than defence.

4. For this reason the Committee wishes to call to the attention of the Council certain positive steps which have been taken since the Eighth Session of the Council which represent substantial progress in establishing closer relationships between the countries which are members of the Treaty Organisation:

First, a collective examination of the capabilities of member governments in relation to defence programmes has been completed by the Temporary Council Committee and is reflected in its report to this session of the Council. The results of this consultation, and the experience gained in the process, can have an important bearing on further cooperation in all of the fields covered by the Treaty, military, economic, social, and political.

Second, the Council Deputies have proposed a reorganisation of the civilian agencies of the Treaty Organisation, which, if approved by the Council, will strengthen the institutions of the Treaty and provide for much closer coordination of the efforts of member governments, and for clarifying the relations between NATO and other international organisations.

Third, five of the member governments together with representatives of the German Federal Republic meeting in the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community, are negotiating agreements which provide for extremely close coordination in the defence field. The establishment of the European Defence Community within the North Atlantic Treaty framework would be a significant step towards the long-term goal of developing the Atlantic Community.

5. The Committee feels that the long-term development of the North Atlantic Community is essential not only for our present purposes, but also for the purpose of consolidating and strengthening the coalition against the day when the threat to our security, which gave it birth, itself diminishes. The existence of close ties among the members of the Community will be most important for dealing with the many problems of adjustment—economic, political and social—which can be expected to appear at that time.

6. The enduring nature of the North Atlantic Community must rest on something broader and deeper than military co-operation alone. Indeed, this is explicit in the Atlantic Pact itself, through Article 2, and is reflected in the growing habit of consultation and feeling of community within the group. This concept of the "North Atlantic

Community" cannot easily be defined. Nor does it necessarily have to express itself always and immediately in institutional terms. But the idea itself is of vital importance and advantage should be taken of every opportunity to transform it into reality.

7. The Committee feels, however, that this transformation, though essential, will not be easy, indeed, it may not even be possible if economic collaboration does not develop and increase; if the members of the North Atlantic Community do not take early and concrete steps to liberalise and expand trade between them and with other friendly countries. They must give their peoples the hope of greater human welfare by increased production and exchange of goods on an easier and wider basis than is now possible.

8. The Committee is conscious of the fact that questions of economic co-operation are already being examined by numerous international agencies, many of them with wider membership than NATO; and that duplication and unnecessary over-lapping should be avoided. The Committee is also conscious of the difficulty and even the danger of attempting to liberalise trading policies and practices within a group, the members of which have important trading relations with other countries and, in some cases, have already developed special and constructive arrangements with countries outside this group.

9. Nevertheless, NATO has an important interest in the expansion and freeing of trade, and its members should study what role they might play in this respect. This may require working out co-operative arrangements with other bodies, of which the OEEC might be particularly mentioned. The initiative in proposing such arrangements might come from the OEEC itself, but if and when this is taken, NATO should be quick to take advantage of it. Possibly some form of joint consultation and joint action with OEEC in the purely economic field, could be agreed on. If so, it would certainly prove of the greatest value to both organisations.

10. The Committee calls attention to the urgency of this problem of economic co-operation without which other forms of co-operation are not likely, in the long run, to prove effective. A committee, however, representing only five of the countries of NATO, and not including the most important economically, is not the best agency to make recommendations for a specific programme of action in this field. For this—and for other reasons—the responsibilities of the Committee should be transferred to the Council itself where the views of all members can be obtained. This recommendation is all the more appropriate because of the proposal to maintain the Council in continuous session by which it would be possible to give this whole question of non-military co-operation the active consideration it should have on the highest level.

11. Therefore, the Committee recommends that, if and when the Council is established in continuous session, the functions of the Committee shall be transferred to the new Council. A draft of a resolution for consideration by the Council is attached as Annex A.

II. COORDINATION AND CONSULTATION ON FOREIGN POLICY

12. In reviewing the report adopted at the Eighth Session of the Council (C8–D/6) the Committee stresses the importance which it attaches to the provisions of Section A of the report dealing with coordination and consultation on foreign policy.

13. It is felt that this section of the report does not require elaboration but rather practical application. The attention of the Council is drawn to the continuing need for effective consultation at an early stage on current political questions of common concern. This is essential in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of an awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO.

14. The proposals for reorganisation referred to in paragraph 4 above will have an important bearing on the field of coordination and consultation on foreign policy. It is the hope of the Committee that the new procedures will be utilised by member governments to the fullest extent for frequent exchanges of information and views on urgent and important issues. Such procedures will be effective to the extent to which North Atlantic Treaty Governments are prepared to grant their representatives the necessary measure of authority and discretion to participate fully in such discussions.

III. THE MOVEMENT OF LABOUR

15. In the report of the Committee adopted at the Eighth Session of the Council, it was stated in paragraph 25 that:

"The Committee believes that further consideration should be given to the possibilities and problems of movements of labour within the North Atlantic area (including a review of legislative difficulties) with a view to proposing practical measures to facilitate such movements from North Atlantic countries with excess manpower to North Atlantic countries where manpower could be effectively utilised. Such consideration might involve a meeting of experts in the field, and should take into account the results of the conference on the subject that has very recently been convened in Brussels."

16. The Committee has reviewed the action being taken by other organisations in this field, and is now ready to propose certain practical measures to the Council for action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and by member governments.

(*a*) *Action taken by other organisations*

17. *The International Labour Office:* The concern of the ILO with migration has been of long standing. A permanent Migration Commit-

tee exists, but its most useful practical work has been in the field of technical assistance. In 1949 the ILO adopted a "Migration for Employment Convention" which has been ratified by the United Kingdom and New Zealand. In October 1951 the ILO held a conference on migration in Naples which adopted plans for a Consultative Council on European Migration.[4]

18. *The OEEC Manpower Committee:* This Committee, established in 1948, and numerous working parties established by it, have considered the complex of problems relating to manpower, unemployment, migration and labour mobility, and have prepared a considerable volume of reports which have been accepted by the OEEC Council and which provide valuable information in this field.[5]

19. *Council of Europe:* The Consultative Assembly in 1950 adopted a recommendation to establish a European Manpower Board to coordinate the study of manpower problems, including migration. The Assembly also adopted a recommendation that the Council of Ministers should establish a European organisation to deal with refugees. A committee of experts on refugees and surplus population is studying these matters and has written a report recommending, *inter alia*, that a special committee within the Assembly be established, consisting both of members of governments and parliamentarians.[5]

20. *The Brussels Migration Conference:* The conference of sixteen nations, which met at Brussels in December 1951, agreed to form a "provisional intra-governmental committee for the movement of migrants from Europe", and established a budget to finance the movement of approximately 116,000 migrants from Europe to North and South America, Australia and New Zealand. Tentative quotas were established for the countries receiving migrants. The conference did not discuss the question of intra-European migration of labour, since this question was not regarded as being within its frame of reference.

21. *The Temporary Council Committee:* The TCC report[6] draws attention to the serious surplus of manpower in Italy, and to the fact that manpower limitations in other areas may act as a hindrance to production, particularly the production of coal.

(*b*) *Summary of the general manpower situation in the North Atlantic Community*

22. The following is a highly summary estimate of the current manpower situation. A more detailed picture could be developed from available information, but, since there are many gaps in the informa-

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[4] For documentation on the conference under reference here, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume IV.

[5] For documentation on the interest of the United States in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, see volume VI.

[6] Presumably the reference here is to the Temporary Council Committee's report of Dec. 18, 1951; for documentation regarding the preparation of that report, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 379 ff.

tion available from any one source, it is believed that the elaboration of such details should be left to the expert study recommended below.

23. Whereas prior to 1951 the manpower problem in Europe consisted almost exclusively of surpluses (with the exception of chronic shortages in almost all mining areas and prevalent but manageable agricultural shortages) the steady increase in total employment from 1947 onwards has served to change the problem from one of simple surplus to one of surplus in some areas and shortage in others. The surpluses, highly concentrated in Italy and West Germany, greatly exceed in magnitude and as a social and political problem, the present shortages and any which may be reasonably expected even if the maximum increase in European production is brought about. The need for continuing migration from Europe to overseas territories is thus apparent.

24. Certain general manpower facts and predictions can be positively stated:

(*a*) There will continue to be a great shortage of miners.

(*b*) Building trades labour will be in generally short supply.

(*c*) Shortages will grow and new shortages appear in engineering, metal trades and steel.

(*d*) Housing will be a severe limitation upon full labour utilisation in virtually every shortage area.

(*e*) Shortages will generally be critical in direct proportion to degree of skill.

25. It can be stated that Norway and the United Kingdom will be increasingly characterised by full employment; Belgium, Canada and the United States, while experiencing unemployment in some sectors, will have some degree of shortage in others: France will experience some shortages and the degree to which domestic readjustments will compensate for them is problematical; the Netherlands while characterised by a growing over-all population in younger age groups, may have shortages in some sectors of the population; Italy will continue to have very large and pressing surpluses in a significant range of skilled and unskilled workers; West Germany will have coexisting shortages and large surpluses; Denmark and Luxembourg will be relatively stable, with spot shortages. If production output in Europe reaches the 25% increase goal set by the OEEC Council, all the shortage aspects in European countries of these predictions will be aggravated.

26. A study conducted by the DPB staff for the TCC included a survey of the manpower needs of the North Atlantic Treaty countries on the continent of Europe under the impact of a programme of near capacity utilisation of defence industry in the nine major materiel categories. It showed that, at the peak production year (1953–1954) over half a million additional workers would be required. The manpower needs for other equipment and services for augmented military

personnel, and the requirements of the infrastructure programme would be in addition, as would any needs of the other North Atlantic Treaty countries. The conclusion which may be drawn from this study is that, even after allowance is made for internal measures in each country, these additional manpower requirements could only be met by movement of labour among the North Atlantic Treaty countries.

27. It is apparent that the general approach to this problem described in paragraph 17, 18 and 19 above has produced little effective action by Governments, although it has produced much valuable information. The Brussels Conference has devoted its attention to the overseas movement of labour from Europe. However, without duplicating the work of other agencies, there remains an area in which it should be possible for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to take effective action, since the manpower shortages which may be expected as a result of the steadily increasing needs of defence production should provide a direct stimulus for action by member governments. In thus attempting to increase productivity by the fullest utilisation of the manpower resources of member governments, a first step can be taken in solving the broader social problem which was referred to in paragraph 15 of this report, and which should continue to concern the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as well as other agencies acting in this field.

(c) *Recommendations*

28. The Committee endorses paragraph 14 of the resolution put forward by the TCC and, in support thereof, recommends that the permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation should:

(*a*) Keep the general problems relating to the freedom of movement of labour between member countries under review and devote, in particular, its attention to the problem of eliminating general or specific manpower shortages which may hinder present or planned defence production by:

(i) providing effective manpower planning through the necessary action by the Treaty Organisation and by member governments, and

(ii) member governments taking such steps as are necessary and practicable, including the admission of foreign labour, to eliminate such shortages whenever they are shown to exist or to be imminent.

(*b*) Make recommendations for eliminating such manpower shortages, its consideration to include the following elements:

(i) an assessment of the resources and facilities of existing organisations for providing analyses of shortages and for assisting Governments in the solution of problems of housing, training, transportation and administrative questions;

(ii) consideration of the most effective manner of presenting data on present and prospective shortages of manpower;

(iii) an analysis of the legislative and other difficulties which impede the movement of labour;

(iv) Steps which should be taken to obtain the views of organised labour within member countries.

IV. SOCIAL COOPERATION

29. After reviewing the various possibilities suggested in the report to the Eighth Session, and after obtaining further information on the Council of Europe's activities in the social field, the Committee has reached the following conclusions. To a large extent, cooperation in the social field between the European members of the North Atlantic Community is already the subject of active consideration by the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe, and the Nordic countries. There would appear to be little that could be done by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which would not duplicate the work of these other organisations, unless there were an opportunity for trans-Atlantic collaboration between members of NATO. However, in view of the differences in the development of social legislation and practices on opposite sides of the Atlantic, and particularly because of the effect of the federal systems of the United States and Canada, where responsibility for social legislation is divided between federal governments on the one hand and state and provincial governments on the other, there do not appear at this stage to be any significant areas for such trans-Atlantic cooperation.

30. The Committee recommends that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation keep this subject under review so that action might be taken as soon as specific opportunities appear. Meanwhile, the meeting of experts referred to in paragraph 31 of the first report of the Committee need not be held at this time.

V. CULTURAL COOPERATION

31. The long-term project for cultural co-operation mentioned in the Committee's interim report, should be further considered and put into effect as soon as the Council feels it is desirable to do so. Meanwhile, the Committee recommends for immediate attention a limited number of experimental practical projects with the understanding that this should not prejudice later consideration of and action on the other longer range projects.

32. Such immediate projects would include the following:

(1) *A scheme of educational exchange which would give to university students in the various North Atlantic Treaty countries the opportunity of taking a semester or year of their chosen course of studies at a university in another North Atlantic Treaty country:* This is a long-term objective. As a first stage it is proposed that experimental projects should be undertaken by pairs of countries which would provide for the exchange of students across the Atlantic. The studies taken

abroad by these students should be credited toward their degrees by their home universities. Arrangements should be worked out for an exchange of a small number of qualified students and comparable qualifications should be established for the particular courses in which these students would be exchanged.

(2) *Encouragement of travel by groups of young people:* Young people in the North Atlantic Treaty countries should be given the opportunity of using their vacation to travel across the Atlantic in order to gain a knowledge of the life and problems in other North Atlantic Treaty countries and to develop a consciousness of the reality of the North Atlantic Community. A study should be made of the problems involved in the provision of administrative facilities, facilities for group travel at low cost, and the planning of specific tours with a definite educational aim. The cooperation of existing youth and exchange organisations should be enlisted. The Committee recognised the importance of the establishment of leave centres for service personnel in the NAT countries, and the possibilities which they afford for educational purposes.

(3) *Seminars of teachers:* Such seminars could be organized along the lines of those sponsored by the Brussels Treaty Organisation for the teachers of the five Treaty nations. Subjects of study might include the definition of those aspects of the culture and ideals common to the civilizations of the North Atlantic Treaty countries which could be introduced into teaching practice. The seminars might aim at collating the results of the studies in such a form that they could be widely distributed among interested authorities.

33. The Committee recommends that the Council Deputies consider and make recommendations concerning the projects listed in the preceding paragraph and the additional objectives described in paragraph 35 of the Committee's report to the Eighth Session.

VI. INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

34. In paragraph 37 of its report to the Eighth Session, the Committee referred to a programme which the NAT Information Service had under consideration. The Committee has reviewed the preliminary recommendations of the Information Service concerning this programme. It is apparent that much more needs to be done, both by member governments and by the Treaty Organisation itself, to increase public knowledge of NATO objectives and activities, and to encourage awareness of the community of interest among North Atlantic Treaty countries. The Committee wishes to endorse the following comment on this subject which was made by the Chairman of the Council Deputies in his report to the Seventh Session of the Council (C7–D/3 [7]):

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[7] Not printed.

"I believe that too little is known of the growing effectiveness of the common defence forces. This is primarily a matter for national action, but national information services can, through the NATO Information Service, be provided with more effective materials to assist in the problem of developing strong public support. The NAT Information Service, has made a good beginning, but its scope and effectiveness must be increased. If this is properly done, increased public understanding should be of the strongest possible support to governments in working towards adequate defence measures.

"It may be that the presentation of NATO to the public has tended to over-stress the burdens of defence. This may have given the impression that military strength was the end and not the means to an end chosen by the North Atlantic Community. Therefore, ways and means should be found to emphasize to public opinion in each country that military strength provides the shield behind which the Atlantic community can continue its progress, with closer cooperation toward peaceful objectives as the basis of the policies of each member and of the common effort."

35. The preliminary studies of this subject made by the Committee have revealed major problems as regards basic policy, financial support, and form of organisation, which can be resolved only by agreement between all member governments. The Committee has taken note of proposals for the setting up under the reorganized Council of an Information Advisory Committee (see D-D(51)277 [8]) or Information Policy Committee (see D-D(52)44 [8]).

36. Such a committee, if and when it is set up, should also make recommendations to the Council on methods of encouraging voluntary bodies whose aim is to foster public interest in the Atlantic Community and the work of NATO.

37. The Committee has noted that the Information Service is reviewing its programme in detail with a view to indicating the relative priority of possible projects designed to accomplish the following objectives:

(*a*) Increased awareness of the work of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the contribution of each individual country towards achieving the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community;

(*b*) The promotion by educational and other means, of a sense of participation in the North Atlantic Community.

(*c*) The increase of knowledge of each other's countries and of their common civilization.

38. The Council may also wish to consider, through the Permanent Representatives or otherwise, how parliamentary interest in the North Atlantic Community and its problems may be developed along the most constructive lines.

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[8] Not printed.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON COMMITTEE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

The North Atlantic Council

Having considered the report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community (C9-D/8);

1. *Approves* the report;

2. *Recommends* that the functions and terms of reference of the Committee shall be transferred to the full Council as soon as that Council is established in continuous session.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Proposal by the United Kingdom Delegation[1]

RESTRICTED LISBON, 22nd February, 1952.

C9-D/18

DRAFT DECLARATION BY THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of the fourteen Nations of the North Atlantic Treaty, met together in Lisbon to review the progress of our work, have considered afresh the principles on which our association is founded and have resolved to give greater definition to the ideals which we hold in common.

2. The North Atlantic Treaty was designed, first, for the protection of our peoples from aggression. The preservation of freedom is thus the most urgent of our objectives and the greatest of our common interests at the present time. For if freedom is not assured all else is in danger, and we cannot move forward with our full resources towards the construction of a united, peaceful world in which the safety, dignity and welfare of the individual shall be inviolable. We are therefore determined to resist the subjection of nations by force from without or by treason from within; to expose, discredit and confine the exercise of tyranny; and to combat doctrines of hatred and division.

3. The strength of our association does not rest upon arms alone. Far more it rests upon the earnest desire of our peoples to concentrate in freedom and peace upon the betterment of the world in which they live. History has taught us that systems of tyranny carry within them the seeds of their own decay and soon begin to weaken the vitality of

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[1] This draft declaration was introduced by Foreign Secretary Eden toward the conclusion of the third meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Feb. 22: see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, from Lisbon, p. 186, for a report on the meeting. For a later version of this draft declaration, see document C9-D/18 (2nd Revise), Feb. 25, p. 193. The final text of this declaration is printed on p. 195. The text of the draft declaration printed here was transmitted in telegram Secto 54, Feb. 23, from Lisbon to the Department of State. (740.5/2-2352)

the peoples subjected to them. Our peoples know that a free society, imperfect though it may be, has the breath of life within it and adds to its strength by constant growth and self-improvement.

4. Our association therefore has a second positive objective, just as urgent as the first. This is to secure the prosperity and social and economic betterment of our peoples. For this purpose we are resolved to work towards the freest possible intercourse of men, money and goods; towards maintaining full employment and a high standard of living; and towards the elimination of degrading or unhealthy conditions of work. We believe that the immense resources and technical skills of our peoples are ample for these ends.

5. In accordance with the principles that bind us together in one community, we shall pursue this aim by the method of free and close co-operation that has brought us safely thus far. We shall work with other peoples of like mind and in the various organisations that already exist for the same high purposes. By the operation of the free forces of life and growth, our Atlantic Community will strengthen and develop itself until it comes to seem part of the natural order around us, and presents an example that others will be inspired to follow. We believe in the freedom of the individual to think, to speak, and to live his own life. For this faith we shall fight if attacked, and in this faith we shall work at all times for peace without shackles which is the real peace to which all free men aspire.

740.5/2-2252

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET

[LISBON,] February 22, 1952.

Subject: NATO Reorganization

It is reported that Snyder and Bradley have some reservations about the current U.S. position on the new NATO organization.

Bradley is reported to question a change made in the U.S. draft of an unagreed paragraph,[2] as the result of a Harriman, Draper, Monnet, Spofford meeting,[3] which would authorize the Secretary General to have direct access to governments, NATO agencies, and major *NATO Commands*. Access to Commands may tend to short-circuit the Standing Group. On the other hand, for a Mike Pearson to have to contact Eisenhower solely through or with the permission of the Standing

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[1] A checkmark on the source text appears to indicate that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.

[2] The reference here appears to be to the Council Deputies draft report on the reorganization of NATO which was subsequently adopted by the North Atlantic Council as document C9–D/4 (Revise), Feb. 29, p. 198.

[3] There are no other materials in the Department of State files regarding such a meeting.

Group does not make operating sense. No line of authority is involved; it is entirely a matter of information.

Snyder is reported to doubt in general the wisdom of giving the Secretary General and his staff too strong a position. The main points at issue are the direct access language referred to above, and making the Secretary General also Permanent Vice Chairman of the Council.

Harriman favors a strong organization as essential to continue TCC type of approach.

I concur with his objective. The man is probably more important than the language of his terms of reference. And present troubles with the latter may largely disappear once an acceptable name has been found.

740.5/2–2352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LISBON, February 23, 1952—midnight.

Secto 53. Dept pass Defense and MSA.

1. On basis TCC recommendations and supplementary report and CD report stressing urgency of providing financing for high priority third slice infrastructure program, Council at Feb 20 mtg referred problem of reaching agrmt on division of cost to Comite of Mins of ten nations concerned, Lovett representing US.[2]

2. Estimated total cost on obligations basis of "hard core" prog submitted by SHAPE is pounds 162 million of which pounds 130 million is est obligation auth needed for 1952.

3. In series of subsequent mtgs of ten nation Ministerial Comite and of CD special comite on infrastructure, participants have stated amts each is prepared to contribute. Total reached pounds 97 million on basis US share of one-third. With some minor increases in offers by others and a US share of 40 percent of pounds 162 million, total reaches about pounds 115 million.

4. Expedients, such as requesting host govts to proceed with work on basis of funds now obtainable, were explored but discarded.

5. Most formidable initial obstacle is firm British position that UK contribution must be limited to free provision of equipment for signals prog (no direct UK contribution in kind to airfields), plus financing of pounds 780 thousand of facilities for which UK is host govt. This results in British contribution of pounds 9 million, whereas a 16 to 20 million pound UK contribution seems indispensible to further progress in negot. At working level we have informally suggested UK might offer to take larger share making contribution in sterling to be

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and Bonn.

[2] Regarding the Council decision referred to here, see telegram Secto 28, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 114.

made available to host govts for purchases related to infrastructure program. If such arrangement were agreed it wld have to be carefully formulated to avoid conflict with EPU. Working along lines "UK will provide goods and services for this program to the value of" might accomplish this. We have had no British response to this suggestion.[3]

6. If Brit problem were resolved and Fr contributions increased from present offer of pounds 12 million to pounds 25 million, we will face need for increasing Belg share from present offer of pounds 3.5 million to contributions in neighborhood of pounds 12 million, and need for further increased contribution from others.

Acheson

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[3] Telegram Secto 68, Feb. 24, 4 p. m., sent priority to London as 111, reaffirmed that British acceptance of a share of 18–20 million pounds of the projected 162-million-pound third slice infrastructure program was indispensable to further progress in reaching a settlement of the infrastructure negotiations. The Embassy in London was asked to take any action considered appropriate to induce the British to accept a higher share of the program prior to the conclusion of the Lisbon Conference. (740.5/2–2452)

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Draft Declaration by the Members of the North Atlantic Council[1]

RESTRICTED

Lisbon, 25th February, 1952.

C9–D/18 (2nd Revise)

In the course of their discussions in Lisbon the Members of the North Atlantic Council reviewed the aims of their association.

They wish once more to emphasize that this association was formed as a shield against aggression. Its first aim is peace, and the armed strength which is being built up by the united efforts of the member nations will be used only for the defence of their countries and the security of their peoples.

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[1] The earliest version of this proposed declaration was circulated by the British Delegation as document C9–D/18, Feb. 22, p. 190. Subsequently, a revised text, circulated to the North Atlantic Council as C9–D/18 (Revise), Feb. 24, was transmitted to Assistant Secretary Perkins by Sir Pierson Dixon under cover of the following brief note:

"After our telephone conversation this morning I have further altered the wording of our alternative draft, in order to reduce the contrast between it and a communiqué. I enclose a copy of the revised alternative draft.

"As I explained, the Secretariat are being asked to circulate this alternative draft, and to say that Mr. Eden may be mentioning it during the meeting of the Foreign Ministers tomorrow morning." (CFM files, lot M 88, "London Misc Docs")

As circulated in the Council as document C9–D/18 (Revise), the revised draft declaration was accompanied by an explanatory note of the NATO Secretariat indicating that Eden hoped to bring up the paper during a meeting of the Foreign Ministers scheduled for the following morning (Feb. 25) and that a drafting committee would also be meeting the following morning to consider the revised version. The latest British draft was also discussed by Acheson and Eden at their dinner meeting on the evening of Feb. 24 (see Knight's memorandum, p. 154). The text printed here was considered and approved by the Council at its fifth and final meeting on Feb. 25 (see Secto 79, Feb. 25, p. 157), subject to certain minor drafting changes. The drafting changes were incorporated into the text issued to the public on Feb. 26 as "The Declaration of Aims," *infra*.

Differences between the text printed here and the earlier revision circulated as C9–D/18 (Revise) are indicated in footnote 2, below.

The plan for the build-up of defence forces for the North Atlantic Treaty area laid down by the TCC has been adopted at the present session of the Council in the belief that defensive strength will prove the best deterrent to aggression. The Council has learned with approval of the main provisions of the plan worked out between five of its members and the German Federal Republic for a European Defence Community. The establishment of this Community will help to promote the closer association of the Western European countries and to strengthen the defence of the North Atlantic area. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, respecting the principles on which the Community is founded, will support and cooperate with its institutions. The arrangements to govern the relationship between the two Organizations which have been approved at Lisbon will ensure that in pursuit of the common objective, the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the EDC will reinforce and work within the framework of NATO.

The partnership between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty exists not for defence alone but of [*for*] enduring progress. The members of the Council look forward to the time when the main energies of their association can be less concentrated on defence and more fully devoted to cooperation in other fields, for the well-being of their peoples and for the maintenance of human progress in a basis of social justice.

Then, as now, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will have to play its part, and to this end it has been agreed in Lisbon to strengthen its structure so that it may become a still more effective association of like-minded nations determined to maintain in peace the unity of purpose and effort achieved in the force of present dangers, and to express itself by continuous collaboration on common problems.

The understanding and sense of fellowship which the Members wish to see develop between their countries cannot be achieved by governmental action alone. All citizens can play their part in the work of uniting the peoples in one Atlantic Community which will afford, in ever increasing measure, the benefits of peace, freedom and prosperity.[2]

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[2] In the previous version of this draft declaration, C9–D/18 (Revise), Feb. 24, the final three paragraphs of this paper appear as a single paragraph reading as follows:

"The partnership between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty exists not for defense alone but for enduring progress. The members of the Council look forward to the time when the main energies of their association can be less concentrated on defense and more fully devoted to the well-being of their peoples. Then, as now, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must play its part, and it has been agreed in Lisbon to remodel its structure so that it may become a permanent association, intimate but not exclusive, which will maintain in peace the

Declaration by the North Atlantic Council[1]

[LISBON, February 25, 1952.]

THE DECLARATION OF AIMS

In the course of their discussions in Lisbon the members of the North Atlantic Council reviewed the aims of their association.

They wish once more to emphasize that this association was forged as a shield against aggression. Its first aim is peace, and the armed strength which is being built up by the united efforts of the member nations will be used only for the defense of their countries and the security of their peoples.

The plan for the build-up of defense forces for the North Atlantic Treaty area laid down by the TCC has been adopted at the present session of the Council in the belief that defensive strength will prove the best deterrent to aggression.

The Council has learned with approval of the main provisions of the plan worked out between five of its members (France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) and the (West) German Federal Republic for a European Defense Community.

The establishment of this community will help to promote the closer association of the Western European countries and to strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, respecting the principles on which the community is founded, will support and cooperate with its institutions.

The arrangements to govern the relationship between the two organizations which have been approved at Lisbon will insure that in pursuit of the common objective, the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the E.D.C. will reinforce and work within the framework of NATO.

The partnership between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty is not for defense alone but of [*for*] enduring progress. The members of the Council look forward to the time when the main energies of their

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unity of purpose and effort achieved in the face of present dangers, and express itself by continuous cooperation in every field of human activity. The understanding and sense of fellowship which the Members wish to see develop between their countries cannot be won by governmental action alone: all citizens can play their part in the work of uniting the peoples in one Atlantic Community which will afford, in ever increasing measure, the benefits of peace, freedom and prosperity." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105)

[1] The source text is a copy of Department of State press release 145, Feb. 26, 1952. A full set of the press releases is included in the library of the Department of State.

The declaration was approved by the Council at its final session, Feb. 25; see telegram Secto 79, Feb. 25, from Lisbon, p. 157, for a report on that meeting. For the previous draft of this declaration and an explanation of its origin, see document C9–D/18 (2nd Revise), Feb. 25, *supra*.

association can be less concentrated on defense and more fully devoted to cooperation in other fields for the well-being of their peoples and for the advancement of human progress.

Then, as now, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will have to play its part, and to this end it has been agreed in Lisbon to strengthen its structure so that it may become a still more effective association of like-minded nations determined to maintain in peace the unity of purpose and effort achieved in the face of present dangers, and to express itself by continuous collaboration on common problems.

The understanding and sense of fellowship which the members wish to see develop between their countries cannot be achieved by governmental action alone. All citizens can play their part in the work of uniting the peoples in one Atlantic community which will afford, in ever increasing measure, the benefits of peace, freedom and prosperity.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 104

Report of the Special Committee of Ministers on Infrastructure to the North Atlantic Council[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 25, 1952.

C9–D/21

The Special Committee of Ministers representing the ten countries directly concerned with the Third Slice Infrastructure Programme have had a series of meetings to consider the reports referred to them by the Council at the meeting on 20th February, 1952.[2]

I. *Report by the Council Deputies on Physical Progress of Infrastructure* (C9–D/3)[3]

1. The Committee noted this report and recommended that the Council note with approval the recommendations in paragraphs 3 (*c*) and (*f*) of C9–D/3.

II. *Report by the Council Deputies on problems connected with the financing of the Third Slice Infrastructure Programme* (C9–D/11 (Revise))[4]

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[1] This report was adopted by the Council without discussion at its fifth and final meeting, Feb. 25; see an account of the meeting in telegram Secto 79, Feb. 25, from Lisbon, p. 157. A summary of this report was transmitted in telegram Secto 89, Feb. 26, CFM files, lot M 88, box 161, "Secto–Tosec".

[2] The Council meeting of the afternoon of Feb. 20 was reported upon in telegram Secto 28, Feb. 21, p. 114. The 10 countries represented on the Committee were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States. Secretary of Defense Lovett represented the United States.

[3] Dated Feb. 9, 1952, not printed. In response to a recommendation to the Council at its Eighth Session in Rome in November 1951, the Council Deputies had prepared the report on the basis of reports by the Military Committee of NATO and after consultation with representatives of the NATO Standing Group and SHAPE. The six-page report was not discussed by the Council at Lisbon.

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 9, p. 116.

2. The main task of the Committee was to endeavour to agree on a method of sharing the total cost of the Airfields, Signals Communications and Headquarters Programme, as submitted by SHAPE in SHAPE/LOG/1–166/5, SHAPE/LOG/1–39/5, SHAPE/LOG/87–52, amended by recommendations of SACEUR in MCM 13–52 and approved by the Military Committee (MCM 14–52) as the Third Slice of Infrastructure estimated to cost 162,500,000 pounds sterling as set out in Appendix A of C9–D/11 (Revise).[5]

3. Upon examination it was found that this programme included the provision of three deployment airfields to be used by Germany and located outside Germany. The Committee felt that work on these airfields should not form part of the Third Slice but should be postponed for later consideration.

4. The member nations agreed to contribute to the remaining total estimated cost of the Third Slice as follows:

	(Millions of Pounds)
Belgium and Luxembourg	10. 0
Canada	8. 1
Denmark	6. 1
France	20. 0
Italy	12. 0
Netherlands	6. 2
Norway	4. 6
United Kingdom*	20. 0
United States	65. 0
Total	£152. 0

5. The procedure with respect to payments under the Ottawa Agreement of 5th October, 1951 (AC/4–D/27)[6] will apply to payments for the Third Slice of Infrastructure and also, as far as practicable, to the allocation of the contribution in kind made by the United Kingdom.

6. Every effort will be made to ensure that the programme is carried out for the sum provided, but in the event of the costs exceeding such a sum the additional cost will be borne pro rata to the sums mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

7. The cost of land and local utilities required to carry out this programme is not included in the sum to be shared under this agreement. Such land and local utilities will be provided by the countries in which the land is located.

8. The arrangements set out above will not constitute a precedent for any future Infrastructure programme.

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[5] None of the cited documents are printed.

*The United Kingdom contribution will be furnished to the greatest extent possible in kind, and host countries will undertake to accept a contribution in kind from the United Kingdom to the greatest extent the programme will bear to a maximum of 20 million pounds. [Footnote in the source text.]

[6] Not printed.

9. The provisions relating to the civilian economic benefits of the signals element of the programme and to the ultimate disposal of infrastructure facilities which were set forth in paragraphs 5(*a*) and 8 respectively of the Ottawa agreement will be applied to the Third Slice Infrastructure programme. The provisions of paragraph 7 of the Ottawa agreement relating to standards and rates of construction and other technical details will also apply.

10. All host countries will start immediately the procedures necessary for the acquisition of land required for airfields.

III. *Recommendations for the Future*

11. The revised terms of reference of SACEUR give him responsibility for "making recommendations, as necessary, to the Standing Group and to nations on Infrastructure. . . .", and it is the Committee's recommendation that a firm, time-phased programme of common infrastructure should be prepared and made available well in advance of the annual reviews, and should be presented in detail as to purpose, priority, cost, etc. Infrastructure programmes for the years 1953 and 1954 should be agreed upon and an arrangement for the sharing of the cost included as part of the total defence effort in the annual review of the NATO defence build-up by the Council as provided in paragraph 17(*b*) (ii) of the resolution on the report by the Temporary Council Committee (C9–D/20).[7]

12. This procedure should also be applied to Infrastructure programming in other Supreme Commands which should be completed in time to enable the countries concerned to make the necessary budgetary provision for their shares of the cost.

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[7] Dated Feb. 23, p. 220.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Paper Adopted by the North Atlantic Council[1]

SECRET LONDON, 29th February, 1952.

C9–D/4 (Revise)

REORGANIZATION OF NATO

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its meeting in Rome the North Atlantic Council directed the Council Deputies to undertake a study of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the coordination of its activities with the activities of other international organizations, taking into account any conclusions that might be reached by the Temporary Council Committee.

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[1] The earlier version of this report was approved by the North Atlantic Council Deputies on Feb. 9, 1952 in London as document D–D (52) 41 and was subse-

2. The Temporary Council Committee in its interim report dated 17th December, 1951[2] expressed the view that changes in the organization of NATO appeared advisable in the light of the new and more operational phase confronting the Treaty members, and recommended that the organizational problems outlined in Part V of its report be considered by NATO and by governments in order that decisions might be reached at the Council meeting in Lisbon.

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

3. The experience of the last two years in developing collective strength for the maintenance of peace and the increasingly broad scope of the activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have demonstrated the need for improved means of obtaining prompt coordination of governmental decisions and for strengthened and unified international machinery to lay the basis for such decisions and to follow up and assist in carrying them into effect. The activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been progressively changing from planning to implementation; thus the organization must become more operational in character. The Report of the Temporary Council Committee points up the urgent need for staff action, on a continuing basis, in the direction of current reconciliation of screened military programmes and politico-economic capabilities and calls for measures to ensure effective action along those lines.

4. Accordingly, two basic organizational steps are now recommended. The first is that the North Atlantic Council, while continuing to hold periodic Ministerial meetings, should hereafter function in permanent session through the appointment of Permanent Representatives and that it should assume responsibility for the tasks hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board and the Financial and Economic Board, as well as for those initiated by the Temporary Council Committee. The second is that a Secretary General should be appointed and that a single integrated and strengthened international staff/secretariat should be established to assume responsibility for the functions hitherto performed by the international staffs of the various civilian agencies of the Treaty, and to provide

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quently circulated as document C9-D/4 to the North Atlantic Council. As D-D (52) 41, the report was apparently considered at the joint meeting of the Council Deputies and the NATO Military Committee in Lisbon on Feb. 19. C9-D/4 was first considered by the North Atlantic Council at its fourth meeting on Feb. 23 (see telegram Secto 59, Feb. 23, p. 150). The report was considered further and approved, subject to some drafting changes, at the Council's fifth and final meeting on Feb. 25. The final approved version printed here was obviously not completed by the NATO Secretariat in London until several days after completion of the Council session in Lisbon. Differences between the text printed here and the earlier version, C9-D/4, can be discerned from the report of the transactions of the Council's fifth meeting reported upon in telegram Secto 79, Feb. 25, p. 157.

[2] For a summary of the Temporary Council Committee report of Dec. 17, 1951, see document LIS D-4/1a, Feb. 6, p. 208.

the Council with the necessary assistance in its broadening fields of activity.

5. These two measures will require the concentration of all North Atlantic Treaty Organization civilian activities at a single headquarters.

6. The Council Deputies are well aware that organizational changes alone cannot be relied upon to provide solutions for the many pressing problems confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Governments. Nor do they feel that the changes now recommended should necessarily be final. However, they do believe that the measures recommended herein represent an essential and timely step in the development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization machinery more nearly adequate to provide effective collective action for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.

7. The following recommendations are designed to establish the broad outline of proposed changes in the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. If these recommendations are approved, action to complete the structure in detail will have to be taken. The procedure by which this may be accomplished is recommended in paragraph 22 below.

III. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Composition and Functions

8. The terms of reference of the North Atlantic Council should continue to be the North Atlantic Treaty. As at present it should be a Council of Governments who should be represented by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and/or Ministers of Defence or by other competent Ministers, especially by Ministers responsible for financial and economic affairs, as required by the Agenda of each meeting. When they consider it appropriate Governments may be represented by Heads of Government. Ministerial meetings should be held at least three times a year. In order to enable the Council to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each member Government should appoint a Permanent Representative who should represent his Government on the Council when its Ministerial representatives are not present.

Meetings of the Council

9. Only in special circumstances should Council meetings be held at a place other than the permanent headquarters.

Chairmanship

10. The Chairmanship of Ministerial meetings of the Council should continue to rotate annually by countries as at present.

[The Secretary-General should serve as Vice Chairman of the Council and should preside in the absence of the Chairman.] [3]

Permanent Representatives

11. The Permanent Representative of each country should represent his government as a whole. He may be of Ministerial rank or a senior official according to the practice of the State concerned. In any case he should be sufficiently close to his government and entrusted with adequate authority to enable the Council to discharge its collective tasks as a body and to reach prompt decisions.

12. Each Permanent Representative should be at the head of a national delegation comprising such advisers and experts as may be necessary to assist him in all phases of the work of the Council.

Committees

13. The Council should retain maximum flexibility in regard to the organization of its work. It should, whenever necessary and in order to relieve itself of matters of detail, set up on a permanent or temporary basis committees to assist it in arriving at necessary governmental agreements.

14. Specialized functions, such as those now assigned to the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping and the Petroleum Planning Committee, should continue to be directed by the Council under such organizational arrangements as may be deemed most appropriate in the light of experience.

Location of Permanent Headquarters

15. The Permanent Headquarters of the Council should be located in the general area of Paris.

[IV.] THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

16. A Secretary-General should be appointed by and be responsible to the Council. He should not be a member of any national delegation. He should be responsible for organizing the work of the Council and directing the work of the International/Staff Secretariat.

17. He should initiate and prepare matters for Council action and ensure that appropriate steps are taken to follow up Council decisions and to coordinate the actions of member Governments in the implementation of such decisions, particularly in carrying out the responsibilities referred to in paragraph 18 of this report. He should submit to the Council every six months a report on progress in carrying programmes into effect. He should submit recommendations to the Council and should have direct access to all NATO agencies and to Governments. Relations between the members of the international staff and the national agencies shall be organized in consultation with each

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[3] **Brackets in the source text.**

permanent representative concerned. His contacts with major NATO commands should not interfere with the existing chain of authority, and the Military Committee and the Standing Group should be kept fully informed.

V. INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

18. The International Staff/Secretariat, under the direction of the Secretary-General and composed of nations of North Atlantic Treaty countries, should be unified and strengthened so as to play an effective role in the initial preparation and follow-up of action in all matters for which the Council is responsible. It should perform analytical and planning functions at the request of the Council, including preparatory work for the annual TCC-type review. It should be so organized as to support the Council in its various fields of activity. The criterion to be used in appointing the staff should be one of quality rather than quantity. Close liaison and coordination with the military agencies should be ensured.

Measures necessary for continuing Reconciliation of Requirements with Politico-Economic Capabilities

19. The Council and the International Staff/Secretariat should in particular be so organized as to perform the functions of reconciling the NATO programmes with politico-economic capabilities. The precise method by which the Council and the International Staff/Secretariat should be organized to carry forward this task on a continuing basis will be determined by the Council in the light of the TCC recommendations and with the advice of the Secretary-General. However, the following steps appear to be required:

(*a*) Continued screening and costing of military plans. This may require a section of the International Staff/Secretariat organized and technically equipped for the purpose. This section should work closely with the military agencies of NATO;

(*b*) Annual review of economic capabilities. For their work in connection with this review the International Staff/Secretariat may require to be temporarily augmented by analysts and experts in the economic, military and other fields, as appropriate;

(*c*) Final determination by the Council of annual programmes, including force targets and programmes required for the supporting build-up.

VI. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NAT CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AGENCIES

20. The position of the North Atlantic Council in relation to the military agencies of NATO should continue unchanged.

21. Liaison arrangements between the appropriate military agencies and the Council should be strengthened. These and other arrangements designed to ensure closer cooperation between the civil and military sides of NATO should be worked out by the Council with the advice of the Military Committee and the Standing Group.

VII. PROCEDURE FOR CARRYING RECOMMENDATIONS INTO EFFECT

22. The Council Deputies believe it important that such changes as the Council may decide upon in the organization of NATO should be made effective at the earliest possible date, not only in order that the benefits of the changes proposed may be realized as soon as practicable, but to preserve continuity and the ability of the Treaty Organization to deal with its many pending problems.

23. To this end the Council Deputies recommend the following procedure:

(*a*) The Council should approve this report;

(*b*) The Council should designate the Secretary General at the earliest opportunity, preferably at Lisbon;

(*c*) The Council should request the Council Deputies, with the advice of the Secretary General designate, to prepare the necessary detailed action to establish the new organization;

(*d*) The new arrangements should become effective and the new Treaty agencies should assume their functions at a date to be fixed by the Council Deputies. On that date the Council Deputies, the FEB and the DPB shall cease to exist.

TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101

Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET

[LIS D-4/1a] [WASHINGTON, February 6, 1952.]

SUMMARY OF THE TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT

The Temporary Council Committee was created to reconcile NATO military requirements with national politico-economic capabilities. The Committee worked in two directions: screening down requirements and building up country contributions where possible. The basic elements of the final report of TCC, issued December 18, 1952 [*1951*], are as follows:

Force requirements

Screening and Costing Staff of TCC has developed revised program of forces build-up, based on country submissions, reviews of country efforts, MC 26/1, and consultation with SHAPE. Proposes force standards and targets for end of 1952, 1953 and 1954. Recommends that 1952 targets be accepted as firm for planning purposes—those for 1953 and 1954 be regarded as provisional.

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[1] This was one of a series of background and position papers prepared in the Department of State and other agencies in preparation for the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon in February 1952. This paper was drafted by Laurence C. Vass, Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs in the Office of European Affairs of the Department of State, and it was approved by the interagency Steering Group which guided the preparation of these papers.

For documentation on the preparation of the Report of the Temporary Council Committee of Dec. 18, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

The report of the Committee of Dec. 18, 1951 was presented to the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on the evening of Feb. 20; see telegram Secto 28, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 114. It was discussed and approved by the Council at its meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 23; see telegram Secto 59, Feb. 23, p. 150.

One major aim of SCS recommendations (in accordance with Eisenhower desire for maximum effective force at earliest possible date) is to provide force by end of 1952 which will be combat-worthy and will have considerable deterrent effect. To this end, proposes increase in effective divisions, including U.S. and Canadian, available M plus 30 from 34 at present to 54 and 2–3 at end 1952. Increase in aircraft, including U.S. and Canadian, from 2907 to 4230 during same period. Believes these goals can be met if other recommendations in report are adopted.

SCS schedule contemplates continued build-up to 69 1–3 divisions, 7005 aircraft by end 1953 and to 86 2–3 divisions, and 9965 aircraft by end 1954. These final 1954 figures compare with MC 26–1 recommendations of 98 divisions and 9285 aircraft on D+30. Naval build-up (virtually non-existent for 1952) would increase from present M-Day strength of 361 major and 359 small vessels to 402 large and 447 small by end 1954. This compares with MC 26/1 requirements of 642 large and 753 small vessels by 1954. Thus the SCS exercise resulted in general reduction of requirements.

Divisions visualized by SCS will be equipped and maintained on "austerity" basis but with assumption of full combat-readiness at times indicated. Total four-year costs of build-up by European NATO members and Germany estimated at 73.9 billion dollars, as compared 92.7 billion costs estimated prior SCS screening.

Expenditures and financial shortfall

For FY 1952–1954, the report recommends that European defense expenditures be raised $2.8 billion above the intended levels shown in the country submissions to the TCC; it recommends a Canadian increase of $0.7 billion in the form of assistance to European members. If the recommendations in the report are accepted, the defense budgets of the NATO European members and Germany would total $41.8 billion. This level of defense expenditures is considered to represent a realistic European defense effort consistent with the political-economic capabilities of member countries under conditions short of general economic mobilization.

European expenditures of $41.8 billions plus U.S. end-item assistance of $18.6 leaves a financial shortfall of $6.1 to be met. However, programmed European production of $7.6 plus U.S. end-items leaves an equipment gap of $11.6.

Production and supply

The Defense Production Staff estimates that the annual maintenance and replacement cost of major equipment for the five years after 1954 may well exceed $4 billions. Since programmed European production of major items will only reach $3.4 billion in FY 1954 there is urgent need to immediately expand the European production base. The report recommends extensive use of U.S. off-shore procurement. It also underlines the need for NATO logistical plans which will ensure the allocation of produced equipment to meet on a priority basis the most urgent troop needs. And further, the fulfillment of the equipment plan would require a favorable priority for NATO in distribution of U.S. production.

Economic conditions

The Executive Bureau report assumes that the European NATO countries have the economic capabilities to meet the revised military targets on schedule. However, this assumption is predicated upon the following conditions:

1. An over-all increase of GNP of about 14 percent, providing a basis for a 5.7 billion increase in defense expenditures over 4 year period, and leaving a balance allowing for a 7–8 percent increase in consumption over same period. (The Executive Bureau considers this possible on basis of present facts.)
2. The provisions of an adequate supply of raw materials and sources of energy. Report urges special attention to critical coal problem, and also emphasizes to lesser degree the current steel and electricity shortages.
3. Solution of the manpower problem. Report recommends special attention to migration of labor, especially from Italy.
4. Equitable allocation of basic raw materials at stable prices.
5. Internal measures to halt inflation.
6. Achievement of offset to dollar deficit estimated at $7 billion for 3 year period ending in July 1954. Report concludes continuation present level of economic aid, plus expanded off-shore procurement, plus U.S. expenditures in Europe for infra-structure, bases and military supplies can solve this problem.
7. Solution of intra-European balances of payments problems and continued effective functioning of EPU.

The Report notes that, even after defense build-up, continuing cost of maintenance will be heavy burden for Europeans, and urges decisions now which will enable them to meet burden at later date. Believes expansion of off-shore procurement will assist in building long-term armament industry capable of sustaining forces in future, and regards general GNP expansion as essential condition of future maintenance.

Military conditions

TCC recommends two types of measures as essential military conditions for fulfillment revised program. First aims at achieving maximum immediate standards of readiness through such means as increasing personnel on active duty, improving training of specialists, improvement of training techniques, allocation of equipment in terms of potential combat-readiness, etc. Second aims at maximum economy in use of resources, with countries using SCS screening criteria as guidance, setting military priorities in terms recommendations NATO commanders, keeping forces in balance, and avoiding expenditures not essential to NATO plans.

NATO organization

TCC draft report indicates improvement of NATO operation is essential to fulfillment of its other recommendations. Believes inadequacies in organization have delayed government decisions both on policies and technical matters and have been important factor in limiting progress toward defense goals. Also points out that shift in emphasis toward "most rapid practical build-up of effective combat forces" makes it necessary that NATO organization structure be modified to provide more emphasis on operations rather than planning.

Report makes two specific recommendations re organization: (1) appointment of a Director-General of NATO to head an international planning and coordinating staff and execute decisions reached by governments through Council and Council Deputies; (2) The institution of an annual re-analysis of defense plans and capabilities along lines of TCC procedure, in order to provide periodic readjustments. In addition, report suggests that many other readjustments may be necessary in NATO structure, including improved machinery for prompt reconciliation of government differences, which might involve improvement of Council Deputies set-up as well as DPB and FEB. At same time, report recognizes sudden, wholesale reorganization would interrupt progress and recommends appropriate time-phasing.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 101

Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, February 6, 1952.]

[LIS D-4/2]

WORK OF THE TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PRIOR TO LISBON

Status of TCC Work

Governments were requested by TCC to submit their comments on its report of December 18th[2] no later than January 15th. The U.S. response was in support of the general lines of the report. The country comments are now being analyzed by the TCC Executive Bureau (Mr. Draper for the U.S.). The Executive Bureau has prepared a supplemental report, based on these comments, and a draft resolution for Council action on the TCC. These are being considered by the TCC itself at its meeting started Wednesday, February 6th. Attachments A and B summarize the current drafts of these documents, the general lines of which are acceptable to us.[3]

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[1] This was one of the series of background, position, and negotiating papers prepared in the Department of State and other agencies in preparation for the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. This paper, which was

Mr. Harriman is representing the U.S. at the TCC meeting, which is expected to run through Friday. After adjournment to permit TCC members to consult their governments, TCC will reconvene in Lisbon on the 13th or 14th. The purpose of this final meeting is to put the report and resolution in final shape, after receiving governmental guidance, and to coordinate action with the Military Committee, which will be meeting at Lisbon during that week.[4]

In its Rome meeting, the Council requested the Military Committee to comment on the TCC report. The Standing Group prepared a report [5] which was submitted to Governments last week, to be acted on by the Military Committee at Lisbon. Copies of the Standing Group report are available to the TCC. However, there has been no opportunity to coordinate views with either the Standing Group or the Military Committee prior to the present meeting. Therefore, the parallel meetings in Lisbon are set up to provide an opportunity for the TCC members to consult their colleagues on the Military Committee and for staff consultation between the Committees to insure the maximum coordination between the military portions of the TCC report and the Military Committee comments on the TCC report.

Basic Issues Before TCC

Both the country comments and the Standing Group report indicate a wide area of agreement on the TCC plan of action. While the Council should have relatively few issues before it, the issues that remain may be of critical importance. The more important issues now before the TCC are indicated below.

1. *Firm Acceptance of 1952 Force Targets*

The TCC approach is to propose a firm force target to be reached at the end of calendar 1952, and provisional targets for later years,

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drafted by Vass of RA, was distributed for information to the members of the interagency Steering Group which guided the preparations for the Council session.

[2] For a summary of the Temporary Council Committee Report of Dec. 18, 1951, see *supra*.

[3] The attachments under reference were not found. For the TCC Supplementary Report, see p. 211. For the text of the resolution on the reports of the Temporary Council Committee as adopted by the North Atlantic Council on Feb. 23, see document C9-D/20, Feb. 23, p. 220.

[4] For accounts of the concluding meetings of the Temporary Council Committee in Lisbon, see telegram Secto 22, Feb. 20, from Lisbon, p. 219.

[5] The editors have not had access to the report under reference.

largely as planning guides for long-lead actions. The country comments contain a number of reservations and the draft supplemental report recognizes these shortfalls. It is essential that TCC and Council agree that the plan of action for 1952 is feasible. Otherwise, there will be no sound basis for our Fiscal Year 1953 aid program presentation, or any blueprint to guide the permanent agencies of the NATO in implementing the buildup. The draft report and resolution handle this problem in a satisfactory manner. Unless the TCC itself "waters down" the report, this will not be an issue for Council.

2. *The Belgian Challenge of TCC Procedures and Recommendations*

The Belgian comments consisted of an ill-tempered blast at TCC procedures and recommendations, i.e., that Belgium should substantially increase its defense effort, through mutual aid if necessary. This country took vigorous exception to the Belgian position. Ambassadors Murphy and Draper have been engaged in informal bilateral negotiations to bring the Belgians into line prior to the TCC meeting. The procedural and interpretative problems can be handled in the drafting of the Council resolution. If, as it now appears, Belgium endorses the draft resolution, the problem need not go to Council. If the Belgians hold out, Ambassador Draper is authorized to circulate to TCC members a strong U.S. reply to the Belgian note, and thrash out the issue in the TCC. However, it is expected that the Belgian representative will make a satisfactory statement to TCC, which should settle the procedural issue.

The Belgians have also reconsidered their position regarding their own effort and have indicated their willingness to consider a larger effort, although their proposals to date have been somewhat less than generous. It is believed that enough progress on this can be made prior to the Council meeting so that it need not become an issue there.

3. *The French Crisis*

Whether or not the TCC will be able to affirm that a reconciliation has been achieved between military requirements and politico-economic capabilities is still questionable, largely because of the gap between the cost of the French force plans and the expenditures they can undertake, with the support we can give them from Fiscal Year 1952 mutual aid funds. While the French have told us that they must cut back their force plans sharply—so sharply that we consider it doubtful that a German contribution of 12 divisions would be politically possible—the French submission to the TCC indicates their intention to proceed with the buildup recommended by TCC. If, however, the French should take the position in TCC that they must scale down their plans, it would be difficult for the Council to take meaningful action on the TCC report, without having found some solution to this problem.

Editorial Note

The Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held four meetings, February 6–8, 1952, at the quarters of the Financial and Economic Board of NATO in Paris. The Committee discussed and ultimately adopted at its meeting on February 8, pending a final review at a later meeting in Lisbon on February 17, the texts of a draft Supplementary Report of the TCC and a draft resolution to the North Atlantic Council. For the text of the Supplementary Report, which was circulated to the Committee as document TCC–D/28, see page 211; for the text of the resolution, which was circulated and adopted by the Committee as document TCC–D/27, 2nd Revise, as it was subsequently adopted by the North Atlantic Council on February 23 as document C9–D/20, see page 220. The basic telegraphic reports on the meetings of the Temporary Council Committee and its Executive Bureau are included in the Department of State central files under 740.5. Formal summary records of the four meetings of the Committee, designated documents TCC–R/17 to TCC–R/20, are included in the top secret Paris Embassy files, lot 57 M 44, "NATO Documents." For a statement issued to the press by the Committee at the conclusion of its meetings, see telegram 4883, from Paris, *infra*. For an account of the events leading to the meetings of the Committee, see the Background Paper of February 6, *supra*.

The records in the Department of State indicate that the following representatives participated in the Committee's meetings:

United States	Mr. W. Averell Harriman (Chairman)
Belgium	Mr. Duvieusart
Canada	Mr. Wilgress
Denmark	Mr. Kristensen
France	Mr. Monnet and Mr. Hirsch
Iceland	Mr. Benediktsson
Italy	Mr. Malagodi
Luxembourg	Mr. Wehrer
Netherlands	Mr. Hirschfeld
Norway	Mr. Brofoss
Portugal	Mr. Costa Leite
United Kingdom	Sir Edwin Plowden

740.5/2–852: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State

PARIS, February 8, 1952.

4883. USDel TCC 89. The following background material on the current meetings of the Temporary Council Committee of the North Atlantic Council[1] was prepared by the NATO information service and released to the press at 5 p. m. GMT Feb. 8, 1952. It is not a formal communiqué of the TCC, but the information it contains is authoritative and is released in this form for the convenience of the press.

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[1] Regarding the meetings of the Temporary Council Committee of Feb. 6–8 referred to here and the documents adopted there, see the editorial note, *supra*.

"The Temporary Council Committee reassembled in Paris on Wednesday, February 6, to draft a supplementary report and a resolution to be presented to the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. These meetings of the TCC reached agreement on both the supplementary report and a resolution to be presented to the council for action.

"The committee cannot take final action on these papers, however, until it meets again in Lisbon just prior to the council meeting, after staff consultation with the Military Committee of NATO (composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries). The consultation is required to obtain the views of the Military Committee on certain military aspects of the TCC report, which were forwarded to the Military Committee for review. The North Atlantic Council at Rome assigned to the Council Deputies the task of working out details and to make recommendations to the council for a reorganization to strengthen NATO along the lines recommended by the TCC.

"The resolution provides for a realistic over-all plan of action to carry forward the building of the defensive strength of the North Atlantic community, based on the report that the TCC submitted for the consideration of NATO governments last December 18. The supplementary report is based on country replies received from governments after they had examined the TCC report and its recommendations.

"In all the country comments that were received by the TCC, there is a strong, general agreement on the value of the TCC work and on the imperative need for the continuation of this type of analysis on a permanent basis by NATO. Supplementary replies received this week from several countries helped to affirm an atmosphere of basic agreement on objectives, on the principles involved, and on the courses of action to be followed.

"The country reports, furthermore, indicated that many governments were proceeding to carry out TCC recommendations without waiting for the formal action of the TCC report by the North Atlantic Council. The following are examples:

"The Belgian Government has indicated that it was giving consideration to additional measures to contribute to the common defense. In the course of the meetings this week the Canadian delegate advised the committee that his government was prepared to recommend to its Parliament additional mutual aid in excess of the figure previously provided for, but within the framework of its original defense budget for the coming year, without impairing Canada's own defense program.

"The Norwegian Government has not only increased substantially its defense expenditures, but also agreed to the extension of its military service from 12 to 18 months, to establish a program for the expansion of regular long-term personnel, and to provide the additional accommodation required.

"The Danish Government has increased its defense expenditures and reported that it has already taken measures to increase its national service from 12 to 18 months.

"The United States Government has agreed to give the highest possible priority to deliveries of arms to NATO forces, subject to the requirements of combat areas, and to a system of equipment priorities adjusted to the forces build-up in Europe, and has assured that the deliveries of arms to NATO forces in Europe urged by the TCC report will be accomplished, subject to developments in actual combat areas. In addition, the United States Government declared that it was giving fullest consideration to the recommendations of the TCC regarding 'off-shore' procurement and was in the process of accelerating its 'off-shore' procurement programs.

"The TCC will meet again in Lisbon on the afternoon of Sunday, February 17."

BRUCE

EDC files, lot 57 M 44, "NATO Documents"

Supplementary Report of the Temporary Council Committee[1]

SECRET

[PARIS,] 8th February 1952.

PROVISIONAL TEXT

INTRODUCTION

1. The Report of the Temporary Council Committee which includes the report of its Screening and Costing Staff as an annex, was forwarded to Member Governments for their consideration on December 18, 1951.[2] The Committee requested comments from Member Governments on these reports. The comments of Member Governments, which indicate their measure of agreement with the policies set forth in the Report and the suggestions contained in the country annexes, are attached to the present Report.* The purpose of this Supplementary Report is to make these comments available to the Council together with a summary thereof and an indication of their effects on the general plan of action and forces build-up proposed. It will also serve as an opportunity for re-emphasizing some of the general problems which, although discussed in the Report, are of continued concern to many Member Governments and which must be passed on to the permanent NATO organization for continued study and action.

2. The replies of Member Governments indicate that there is strong support for the principles, method of approach, and general plan of action proposed in the TCC Report and the SCS Annex. The essentials of this plan are the adoption of firm goals for 1952, provisional goals for 1953, and for 1954 of goals to be used for planning purposes, these goals taking account of politico-economic capabilities and of the principle that the development of a sound economic structure in the North

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[1] This report was presented to the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on the evening of Feb. 20; see telegram Secto 28, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 114. It was discussed and approved by the Council at its meeting in the afternoon of Feb. 23; see telegram Secto 59, Feb. 23, p. 150.

[2] For a summary of the report of Dec. 18, 1951, see p. 203.

*They have been circulated separately under the serial reference TCC–CC. [Footnote in the source text. None of the comments or suggestions is printed.]

Atlantic Community must go hand in hand with the build-up of the required defensive force. A further element of the TCC plan is the proposal for close follow-up of the forces build-up, and for an annual review of defence programs in the light of changing requirements and changing politico-economic conditions.

3. There have been comments regarding certain aspects of the procedures followed by the Committee. For the unprecedented task performed by the TCC special procedures and techniques had to be evolved by the Committee. Experience has shown that the task given to the Committee is a continuous and important one, and should be made an integral part of the functions to be performed by NATO. This should ensure that governments will have adequate information and time to consider problems, formulate their views, and discuss difficult points with or within the appropriate NATO agency.

4. The TCC Report reaffirmed a major principle of NATO, that there should be an equitable sharing of the burden of the joint defence effort. A first effort was made to apply this principle, while giving full consideration to limitations cited by countries on their politico-economic capabilities. Work on relative defence burdens should be continued in accordance with accepted NATO principles, in order to accomplish their more effective application.

SUMMARY AND GENERAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY REPLIES

5. The country comments were concerned mainly with the proposed build-up for 1952 and the problems incident to achieving the goals proposed therefor by the TCC Report. This concern is consistent with the Committee's proposed system of military programming in which firm goals are set for the coming calendar year only, while the goals for succeeding years are provisional and defined only to the extent necessary to establish a positive basis for the short-term actions necessary to achieve the longer-term provisional goals.

6. Countries generally agree to the Committee's concept of firm goals for 1952, including such steps as are necessary in that year for the further build-up. The comments indicated that many military recommendations of the Committee are already being implemented. Examples are accepted increases in length of national service, increases in regular content of forces, and additional training of reserves.

7. The impact of problems now envisaged, if these problems are not resolved successfully during the year, is generally to be measured in terms of time as well as number of combat units. Moreover, since 1952 is only the first step toward a larger buildup in 1953, failure to achieve a force target in divisions can be measured either in terms of the added number of days after mobilization (M+ ? Days) required for each affected unit to reach combat readiness as of 31 December 1952, or alternately the number of weeks or months in 1953 before the particu-

lar unit will develop to the standards of combat readiness programmed for it in the TCC Report.

8. The principal causes of concern expressed by countries in relation to 1952 appear to be the timely delivery of MDAP end-items and the financial and economic problems incident to the essential support of the defence programs. Another factor recognized as affecting the NATO force build-up is the existence of combat priorities in other parts of the world. As to MDAP the United States comment shows that the United States Government is now giving a very high priority to delivery of MDAP end-items. Sufficient equipment has been included in current MDA programs, in conjunction with quantities on hand and European production, to provide the major items of equipment for units of the European countries in the proposed build-up for 1952; however, no firm guarantee can be given, primarily owing to combat priorities, that all the equipment will be delivered during 1952.

9. As to the economic difficulties in 1952, some countries have indicated that, while accepting the 1952 build-up, the defence programs to implement the build-ups are dependent upon the solution of economic problems. Any unfavourable impact of economic factors in 1952 would affect more the level of readiness of forces than the actual existence of units. The economic and financial problems affecting the build-up, as presented in the country comments, are discussed in more detail later in this supplementary report.

10. The information provided in the comments indicates, assuming adequate and timely deliveries in 1952 of MDAP end-items as presently programmed, the following estimate as to forces build-up:

a) *Army.* The status, largely one of combat readiness, of approximately one quarter of the divisions programmed by the Committee in 1952 is dependent on successful solution of a variety of problems, most of them stemming from economic and financial difficulties.

b) *Navy.* Country comments showed that under present plans on the basis of SCS recommendations the 1952 build-up for naval forces will be achieved.

c) *Air Forces.* All countries have indicated that they accept the SCS recommended build-up for 1952 in number of units, assuming MDAP deliveries as scheduled. The possible total "slippage" in relation to present plans should not be greater than 10%. One of the major problems in achieving or exceeding the 1952 air targets is neither units nor delivery of equipment, but provision of adequate air infrastructure to make the units operationally effective. Unless the infrastructure keeps pace with equipment and provision of trained units, the statement of availability of operational aircraft loses its meaning. It is noted that, while pilot training will not seriously affect the air build-up in 1952, the deficiency in training this year can have very serious effects on the continuing build-up in 1953 and 1954. It is understood that certain steps are being taken toward strengthening the pilot training program.

11. While country comments did not emphasize difficulties presently foreseen for 1953 and beyond, it is obvious that the main ones will almost certainly be the solution of economic and financial problems. There were problems mentioned in other categories, but not of the degree of difficulty of the foregoing. Replies indicated that some of the problems now interfering with achievement of force goals might be overcome or eased later.

12. As regards the further build-up in 1953 and 1954, country comments differ considerably in the extent to which governments are now prepared to accept the force goals recommended in the TCC Report. Some countries have made specific exceptions relating to particular items of the TCC proposals for 1953 and 1954. While the general tenor of the replies seems to justify the assumption that countries intend to put in hand the action needed in 1952 if the provisional force targets for 1953 and later are to be achieved, the information provided is not sufficiently explicit on this point. Further clarification is therefore necessary.

13. Nearly all of the NAT European countries call attention in their replies to the existence of additional indigenous military production capacity. The prospective shortage of major military equipment in these countries for the years of build-up after 1952 appears, on present information, to be a major limiting factor in the attainment of the SCS target forces within an acceptable time limit. Country replies are, however, with two exceptions, silent on the question of what measures they propose to take in the field of production to reduce this shortage. In all cases emphasis was on activation of the available production capacity by United States off-shore procurement. The estimate in the TCC Report (paragraph 43) that European countries might be able, from self-financed additional production, to reduce the equipment gap after 1952 by about $1.6 billions does not appear likely to be fulfilled.

14. The TCC plan of action has requested a considerable reorientation in the military programs of some countries. Reports indicate that important steps along the line of the proposed reorientation have been taken already by some countries even in the short period since the TCC Report was presented.

15. The proposed force build-up, if it is to be achieved on the time schedule programmed, necessitates close control of the disposition of available equipment. This is true even if units are held to the minimum equipment standards, such as 75% of major equipment for M–Day divisions. It is essential that, at an early date, the NATO authorities know the total equipment needs, the equipment already available to nations and in the hands of troops, and the time-phasing of equipment needed to meet at least the minimum standards—all to be related to potential equipment availabilities. Until a NATO supply plan is avail-

able there will be inefficient distribution of equipment even with the adoption of the essential system of priorities in assignment of end-item equipment. No nation expressed objection to the proposed system of priorities.

POLITICO-ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES

16. The comments by Member Governments which most directly affect the TCC plan for build-up of forces are those concerning the suggested levels of defence expenditure. In weighing requirements on the one hand, and politico-economic capabilities on the other, the TCC had put before governments for their consideration certain assumptions for an increased defence expenditure above existing country plans. The following assumptions were made in the TCC report for additional expenditure for the consideration of European NATO governments: (in $ million) 576 in 1951/52, 817 in 1952/53 and 1033 in 1953/54. Additional expenditure accepted by countries in their replies amounts to 223 in 1951/52, 469 in 1952/53 and 529 in 1953/54.† The Canadian Government has decided to ask Parliament for an additional sum of $ Can. 100 million to be added to the existing provision for mutual aid ($ 225 million) for the year 1952/53, such additional assistance to be made within its declared budget for defence, and to be governed by the needs and priorities existing at the time. This would not interfere with the accomplishment of the physical defence program of the Canadian Government. The total financial gap shown in the TCC Report will present an increasingly important problem for which solutions must be found, and this gap has been somewhat increased by the fact that the financial suggestions made in the Report have been only partially accepted.

17. The overall reconciliation between politico-economic capabilities on the one hand, and defence requirements on the other, can be made on a country by country basis only if a means exists for transferring resources among countries where this is required to maximize the defence effort. The United States and Canadian military aid programs are the most important means of achieving this result. However, it is desirable that if possible, arrangements be worked out for transfers from other countries.

Dollar Balance of Payments

18. Certain countries have pointed out that some further deterioration in the dollar balance of payments position has occurred since the TCC Report was prepared, and hence that the size of the dollar gap may be larger than was forecast earlier. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the prospects for relief of the dollar shortage through the off-

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†Revised figures based on latest information from member Governments will be submitted to the TCC at its meeting in Lisbon. [Footnote in the source text.]

shore purchase program or through dollar contributions to international infrastructure in Europe are not likely to be very large in the immediate future. The comments of the United States Government make it clear that it fully recognizes the desirability of activating the production potential of European industry and of pressing on with the common infrastructure program. It therefore intends to give the fullest consideration to the recommendations of the Committee for accelerating these programs. Many directives have already been issued to procurement officers and it is expected that the volume of contracts placed will increase rapidly. The fullest cooperation is needed from European member countries in concluding bi-lateral agreements and in simplifying administrative and contracting procedures, so that the targets for off-shore procurement and expenditures by United States authorities can be realised.

19. Many of the country replies re-emphasize the need to maintain flexibility and to avoid delay in the application of the means available for dealing with the dollar balance of payments problem. In this connection the United States Government indicated that it intends to administer its military and economic assistance programs so as to maximize collective defensive strength on a sound economic basis.

European Payments Union

20. Certain European countries have stressed that if there were any fundamental change in the arrangements for the liberalization of trade and payments brought about by the efforts of the OEEC or if the problem raised by the present situation of the European Payments Union remained unsolved, the resulting economic situation might be such as to impair the defence effort as a whole.

Raw Materials

21. The conclusions and recommendations of the TCC Report with respect to basic materials found general acceptance in the country comments. In respect of coal, the European shortage of which seriously affects both the general level of production and the dollar balance of payments deficit, a specific recommendation in the TCC Report was for an increase in exports by the United Kingdom. Its reply states that such exports will be increased immediately by 2 million tons a year. With regard to steel, the agreement recently negotiated between the United States and the United Kingdom will substantially alleviate the steel problem for the United Kingdom described in the TCC Report, and will ease the aluminium and tin shortages in the United States. None of the countries, except the United Kingdom, mentioned any additional steps they planned to take for the conservation of raw materials.

Manpower

22. The Italian reply (TCC–CC/9 [3]) shows the increasing concern of the Italian Government with the problem of surplus man-power. It is noted that, with some exceptions, the replies of the other countries were not addressed to this problem. It is therefore suggested that governments and the North Atlantic Council give early and earnest consideration to the problem as recommended in the TCC Report and stressed in the Italian reply by reviewing their immigration policies and regulations, where necessary, in order to facilitate labour mobility in and between NATO countries and by considering what further practical steps they can take to make more effective their cooperation in other international bodies in this field, of which they are members, such as OEEC, the Provisional Committee set up in Brussels, the ILO, etc.

Financial Stability

23. The comments of the governments indicate that a difficult and continuing inflationary problem is anticipated. They explicitly support the Committee's conclusion that the avoidance of inflation is necessary since inflation accentuates the difficulties of diverting resources to defence, puts additional pressure on the balance of payments, and causes social discontent. Particular emphasis has been laid by some countries on the importance of budgetary problems in connection with the possibility of carrying out the defence effort.

Maintenance Costs

24. The problem of the length of the build-up period for the rearmament effort and of the cost of maintenance of military forces in the future is emphasized in the replies of several governments. The time has not permitted adequate study by the Committee of this problem, and it will require early attention by the appropriate NATO bodies.

Annex A

INFRASTRUCTURE

1. The analysis of country comments on the TCC Report has developed very clearly a major deficiency in country plans for the implementation of the basic TCC concept of "the most rapid practicable build-up of balanced effective forces." This deficiency reflects the fact that several countries have not provided, within the resources available for their defence programs, for the financing and construction of essential common infrastructure.

2. The availability of a minimum of airfields needed for the operational deployment of tactical air forces is essential to the effectiveness

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[3] Not printed.

of all NATO forces in the field. Construction required to provide these airfields is a lengthy process. Failure to provide such airfields would have the effect of wasting resources put into military forces which cannot be adequately supported by tactical aircraft. The fact that the start of planning for the airfield infrastructure program has been belated and thus far been so complicated that it has fallen badly behind the planning for other elements of the defence effort, makes it imperative to provide urgently the minimum number of airfields required to maintain a proper balance with the build-up of military force.

3. The obligations of commonly financed funds required in calendar year 1952 for the "third slice" airfields infrastructure program recommended by SHAPE is under $500 million. Of this amount, SHAPE has indicated that, according to the best estimates available, actual expenditures involved in the calendar year will be substantially less. The specific airfields required, their location and technical layout, their approximate cost, and their relation to the build-up of tactical operative air forces in 1952 though not yet finally clear can readily and rapidly be clarified. The immediate initiation of work on the program is, however, held up by the budgetary and balance of payments difficulties, and by failure to arrive at an agreement on the sharing of the cost.

4. The magnitude of probable expenditure on the "third slice" of infrastructure is, however, small in relation to other elements of the build-up and it should therefore be possible to agree on the necessary initiation of work on the high priority parts of the program in advance of a final and definitive allocation among nations of their cost. The TCC is therefore recommending to the North Atlantic Council, in paragraph 10 of the Draft Resolution on the TCC Report, urgent action by governments to enable the immediate initiation of needed construction, even though this may require, on the part of some countries, a deferment of other elements of defence efforts, in order to bring infrastructure and other elements of the forces build-up into appropriate balance.

740.5/2-1752: Telegram

The Ambassador in Portugal (MacVeagh) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 17, 1952—8 p. m.

376. In brief TCC mtg this afternoon request for comments of govts on res[2] approved by TCC earlier resulted in several essential textual changes, suggestions from French delegate which are being considered,

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London.

[2] For the text of the resolution under reference as ultimately approved by the North Atlantic Council, see document C9–D/20, Feb. 23, p. 220.

statement of gen approval by Italian delegate accompanied by desire to emphasize certain points previously made by Italian Deputy at TCC mtgs in Paris and indication by Netherland delegate that his Govt had not completed consideration of the report. It was made clear by chairman[3] that all govts were of course free to make further comments and proposals for amendment of res at council mtg.

In response to inquiries chairman suggested and it was agreed that at subsequent meeting, tentatively scheduled for Tues,[4] TCC cld discuss it with respect to NATO reorganization in light of further work being done by deps at mtg on Mon[5] and might at that time have before it report from SC's [*MC's*] working group on forces annex.

Chairman announced that at request of mil comite, standing group and exec bureau were meeting today to consider suggestions for changes in TCC res from mil comite. Chairman made clear any substantive changes wld be presented to TCC for discussion and that if necessary to resolve difference, joint TCC-mil comite mtg cld be considered.

Chairman announced several recent developments respect infrastructure, including further definition by SHAPE of hard core requirements made it possible in his present view to attempt during Council session to reach agrmt on sharing cost of hard core of third slice. Naturally in view import subj this shld be completed if at all possible.

MacVeagh

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[3] Harriman.

[4] For a report on the final TCC meeting held on Tuesday, Feb. 19, see telegram Secto 22, from Lisbon, *infra*.

[5] At its meeting in Lisbon on Feb. 18, the North Atlantic Council Deputies agreed to form a special group drawn from the staffs of the Council Deputies Special Committee on Infrastructure, SHAPE, TCC, and the Standing Group to draw up a new paper containing all the latest developments on infrastructure for presentation to the North Atlantic Council. (Telegram 379, Feb. 18, from Lisbon; 740.5/2-1852)

740.5/2-2052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET LISBON, February 20, 1952—2 p. m.

Secto 22. 1. At final TCC mtg yesterday[1] agreement was reached to modify provisions of TCC resolution[2] on infrastructure to bring them into line with current status of works on this subj in NATO interagency working group which is preparing way for completion of hard-core third-slice cost-sharing at Lisbon. In particular, [garble] this point stressed by Fr, wld delete ref to interim advances in para 10 *c* and *d*.

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[1] Regarding the previous Lisbon meeting of the Temporary Council Committee, see telegram 376, from Lisbon, *supra*.

[2] For the final text of the resolution as adopted by the North Atlantic Council on Feb. 23, see document C9-D/20, Feb. 23, *infra*.

2. Agreed on statement to be included at appropriate point in supplementary report [3] to effect that based on country comments all M-Day divisions in SCS force table for end of 1952 are expected to be ready but that will be lag in readiness of post-M-Day divisions. Overall expect up to 25 percent of total divisions called for may not be ready on time. Also 10 percent of air force requirements will probably slip. This statement replaced at least temporarily summary force table based on country comment which cannot be prepared until Fr capabilities and Ital figures clarified, on both of which US is still working.

3. Harriman and Monnet on personal basis distributed prepared TCC recommendation to council stressing importance of effective NATO reorganization and in particular calling for director-gen who wld also be permanent vice chairman of council and who wld have direct access to govts, NATO bodies, and major commands. Most reps felt unable to act without consulting their govts but they were urged in light TCC experience to press their govts to agree to adequate organizational changes.

4. Meeting closed with usual amenities.

ACHESON

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[3] For the text of the Supplementary Report of the Committee, Feb. 8, see p. 211.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Resolution by the North Atlantic Council [1]

SECRET 23rd FEBRUARY 1952.

C9–D/20

THE REPORTS OF THE TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE

Whereas, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has, from its inception, been developing programmes for the creation of adequate defensive strength essential to the maintenance of peace and freedom, and has been, in accordance with Article 3, implementing these programmes through national efforts to build up forces, and through mutual aid including the extension of assistance freely undertaken to each other in the form of economic resources and military equipment; and

Whereas, the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Ottawa on 19th September, 1951, authorized the establishment of a committee to prepare an analysis of the issues involved in reconciling on the one hand the requirements of external security, in particularly in fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe, with, on the other hand, the realistic politico-economic capabilities of member countries;[2] and

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[1] This resolution was adopted by the North Atlantic Council at its fourth meeting on Feb. 23; see the report in telegram Secto 59, Feb. 23, from Lisbon, p. 150. This resolution was circulated in draft to the Council as document C9–D/13, Feb. 18, not printed. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105) Differences between that draft and the text printed here are indicated in the report in telegram Secto 59.

Whereas, in accordance with this resolution the Temporary Council Committee has completed such an analysis and prepared a report thereon dated 18th December, 1951,[3] as well as a supplementary report dated 8th February, 1952,[4] to which are annexed the comments of the North Atlantic Treaty Governments;

Therefore, the North Atlantic Council

1. *Agrees* that it is necessary to promote by every means the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its Military Commands as operationally effective bodies; and

Invites Governments and directs NATO Agencies and Commands, in consultation with national Governments and within their respective authority, to take as a matter of urgency all steps necessary to ensure the continuous development of the operational effectiveness of the Organization, and to report progress to the Council at regular intervals;

2. While recognizing that many financial and other problems remain to be solved before the goals can be fully met,

Resolves that the force targets set out in Annex B to the Supplementary Report of the TCC, which countries have indicated their willingness to raise and support during the year 1952, be adopted as firm goals for 1952, and that the force targets recommended by the TCC be adopted as provisional goals for 1953, and for 1954 as goals to be used for planning purposes to guide the early actions required to make possible the achievement of these targets;

3. *Recognizes* that the achievement of the forces recommended for 1952 will provide an increased deterrent to aggression; that the plan of action laid down in the TCC Report provides a militarily acceptable method for progressing towards the effective achievement of an adequate deterrent force in Western Europe based on a sound economic structure in the North Atlantic Community;

4. *Resolves* that the general method of NATO programming proposed in the TCC report be adopted: namely, the determination of the maximum effective forces which can be achieved in the short-term, and the definition of the steps which must now be initiated to achieve a progressive build-up to militarily acceptable force levels;

5. (*a*) *Recognizes* that the force targets recommended by the TCC represent a build-up which would greatly facilitate the eventual

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[2] For text of the resolution establishing the Temporary Council Committee, see Secto 23, Sept. 19, 1951 in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 677.

[3] For a summary of the Dec. 18, 1951 report of the Temporary Council Committee, see LIS D-4/1a, Feb. 6, p. 203.

[4] *Ante*, p. 211.

achievement of the force requirements formulated by the Military Committee, these requirements being subject to future revision;

(*b*) *Notes* the assumption of a substantial German participation in the build-up through forces in a European defence community as well as contributions by Germany in other ways;

6. (*a*) *Recognizes* that, on the basis of estimates of requirements formulated by the Military Committee, there remains a military risk after the force build-up recommended by the TCC has been achieved;

(*b*) *Notes* that the TCC Report and other NATO studies to date have not taken into account in detail the effects of certain new weapons and techniques; and

Recommends that, as it becomes possible these effects should be more definitely taken into account in determining the risks, the force requirements and the organization of NATO forces;

7. (*a*) *Resolves* that the TCC recommendations with regard to the readiness and effectiveness of forces and economy in use of resources are generally sound, that (with adjustments in actual application in particular cases as found to be appropriate by countries in consultation with the major NATO commands) each country should do its utmost to implement these recommendations, coordinating implementation with the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander with respect to forces assigned or earmarked to his command;

(*b*) *Adopts* the SCS standards of readiness of forces as a means of measuring progress for calendar year 1952;

(*c*) *Directs* that the Military Committee undertake further studies to fix the standards for subsequent years in order to ensure the readiness of the greatest possible number of units from resources available and improve continuously the state of readiness of military forces;

8. (*a*) *Approves* the revised directive of the Standing Group (Annex A) and revised terms of reference of SACEUR (Annex B);

(*b*) *Invites* nations to take all possible action to enable SACEUR to fulfill the responsibility and authority placed upon him under his revised terms of reference;

(*c*) *Stresses* the importance of the closest possible liaison in the area of his expanded responsibilities between SACEUR and the appropriate national authorities; and

(*d*) *Directs* the Military Committee to continue to review arrangements for mutual support between different NATO commands within NATO areas and between them and national military commands with a view to maximum economy of force and military effectiveness;

(*e*) *Directs* the Military Committee to study the terms of reference of other NATO Commanders, to bring them into consonance with the decisions resulting from the TCC recommendations;

9. (*a*) *Directs* the Military Committee, in consultation with major NATO commands, to devise and put into operation a system designed

to achieve the highest priority for the most important units and activities (including the provision of infrastructure) and lower priority for less important units and activities, this system to be based on the accepted concept of the provision of collectively balanced NATO forces; and

Invites Governments to take fully into account in the build-up of their forces the guidance so provided; and

(*b*) *Directs* the Military Committee to establish immediately a system for the recommending of priorities for assignment of major items of equipment, which should be related to priorities in the development of other elements of the military build-up, such a system of priorities to be based on the principle of priorities as between commands being recommended by the Military Committee and priorities within major commands by the Commander concerned, and

Invites Governments to take these recommended priorities fully into account in the provision of equipment;

(*c*) *Directs* the Military Committee and the major NATO Commanders to prepare the plans and groundwork for an operative logistics and supply system in support of NATO defence;

10. (*a*) *Resolves* that the financing and construction of increments of common infrastructure in phase with the build-up of military units are essential to the effectiveness of NATO forces;

(*b*) *Requests* all North Atlantic Treaty Governments, in budgeting for their respective defence expenditures, to accord a sufficiently high priority to the essential common infrastructure programme for 1952 to ensure that the country contributions to this programme will provide the funds needed for its completion even should this necessitate adjustment in other items of defence expenditures;

(*c*) *Notes* that the recommendations on 1952 infrastructure made by the Council Deputies and the Military Committee to the Council, are consistent with the need for urgent attention to this subject emphasized by the TCC.

11. (*a*) *Directs* the Military Committee to determine with the assistance of major NATO commands the screened, time-phased, essential equipment needs of NATO forces in recommended orders or priority;

(*b*) *Directs* the NATO military and civil agencies to produce, in collaboration, recommended measures to meet critical deficiencies and to achieve proper balance in the equipment of NATO forces;

(*c*) *Invites* governments, through the provision of appropriate current information and in other appropriate ways, to assist the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the expeditious conduct of such studies, which will be part of the reviews provided for in paragraph 17 below.

12. (*a*) *Resolves* that the realisation of adequate defensive strength and its continued support by the governments and peoples of the North

Atlantic Treaty countries require sound economic and social foundations which can be developed only by a satisfactory rate of general economic expansion; and

(*b*) *Recommends* that governments undertake to the fullest extent possible to adopt those measures necessary to ensure the economic strength and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, giving special attention to the economic and financial aspects of Parts I through V of the TCC report which have been recommended for the acceptance of governments, as well as the OEEC declaration on the expansion of output endorsed by the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa; and to this end

(*c*) *Notes*

(i) that there exist within the Community actual and potential resources adequate to provide an expanding economic base, both for adequate defence and for the general strengthening of the Community;

(ii) that the efficient utilisation of these resources requires actions both by national governments alone and by governments acting together;

(iii) that actions in the economic field by any member country may affect, in some way, the economic strength and stability of others; and therefore

13. *Recommends*

(*a*) that particular attention be given to budgetary problems which exert a powerful influence on the possibility of carrying out the defence effort;

(*b*) that each country should adopt appropriate fiscal, financial and monetary policies in order to avoid creating a total demand which outstrips available supplies of key resources, or puts additional pressure on the balance of payments, or prejudices progress towards social equity;

(*c*) that vigorous action be taken to increase production of scarce raw materials, especially of coal, steel and certain non-ferrous metals, and through adequate conservation, and where needed allocation measures, to achieve greater economy in their use, and to channel them to the most essential uses;

(*d*) that the above considerations should be taken into account in the annual reviews provided for in paragraph 17(*b*)(ii) below;

14. *Agrees* with the analysis of the man-power problem as stated in the TCC Report;

Notes the importance of emigration, particularly for Italy, but also for other countries; and in line with the foregoing and in order to overcome man-power shortages in defence and defence-supporting industries.

Recommends that North Atlantic Treaty Governments review their immigration policies and regulations where necessary with the aim of facilitating labour mobility in and between NATO countries; and that to the same end North Atlantic Treaty governments consider what further practical steps they can take to make more effective their cooperation in other international bodies in this field of which they are members such as OEEC, the Provisional Committee set up by the Brussels Conference and ILO; and that the North Atlantic Council keep this matter under review;

15. (*a*) *Notes* that the TCC Report has recognised as particularly critical for European countries the satisfactory solution of the dollar balance of payments problem, and as contributions towards such a solution

Recommends

(i) the adoption of measures to facilitate and increase European dollar earnings, including increased exports to dollar markets, of vigorous mutual measures to facilitate US military expenditures in Europe, and also of all possible measures to assure more rapid progress on the infrastructure programme, thereby increasing dollar expenditures in Europe;

(ii) the achievement of an appropriate balance between the components of the mutual aid made available, with a view to achieving maximum defensive strength on a sound economic foundation;

(iii) the rapid development of off-shore procurement programmes (the primary purpose of which, however, is the most economic use of resources and the expansion of military production in Europe), including action by all NATO countries to enlarge, facilitate and accelerate off-shore procurement;

(*b*) *Notes* that a satisfactory solution of the intra-European payments problem is also of critical importance to European countries;

Notes the views to this end contained in the TCC Report and

Recommends the adoption by the interested Governments of effective measures to provide during the defence build-up a satisfactory functioning of the European Payments Union;

16. *Directs* the appropriate NATO agencies to study, and to report to the North Atlantic Council not later than next fall, together with the review foreseen in paragraph 17(*b*) (ii), the longer-term economic implications of the defence build-up, and in this connection to examine the annual cost to individual NATO countries of currently approved NATO defence plans, projecting these costs into the future as far as these plans permit, and taking into account both the cost of achieving the forces goals and the cost of maintaining the forces contemplated;

17. *Agrees* that the effective execution of the Plan of Action recommended by the TCC depends upon a reorganisation and strengthening of NATO machinery in accordance with the general principles laid down in Part V of the TCC Report;

Notes that this question is dealt with in a separate Resolution of the Council, and

(*a*) *Resolves* that the appropriate NATO agencies should continuously review the requirements for building adequate defensive strength and reconcile military needs with the politico-economic capabilities of member countries, and, in the carrying out of this resolution, should have regard to relevant past decisions of the North Atlantic Council;

(*b*) *Resolves* that, in addition, provision should be made for follow-up action by NATO agencies and governments pursuant to decisions of the Council

(i) to maintain up-to-date information on the progress of the forces build-up and

(ii) to prepare necessary material for comprehensive annual reviews of the requirements for building and maintaining adequate defensive strength on a realistic foundation of politico-economic capabilities, the first such review to be completed in the fall of 1952;

18. (*a*) *Notes* that country comments indicate the existence of military, economic and political problems of varying degrees of severity; that urgent and sustained action on these problems is of vital importance to the achievement of the full build-up proposed; and accordingly

(*b*) *Urges* that governments and NATO agencies and commands undertake without delay necessary actions in accordance with the principles embodied in this Resolution to promote the achievement of the goals for 1952 and the continued build-up in 1953 and beyond, and that the member governments, as well as NATO agencies and commands, provide the Council with reports of actions taken to this end.

19. (*a*) *Recognizes* that Greece and Turkey have not been considered in the TCC analysis and report;

(*b*) *Invites* the governments of Greece and Turkey to consider in co-operation with the appropriate NATO bodies the applicability of these findings and recommendations to Greece and Turkey; and

(*c*) *Directs* the NATO agencies to undertake the necessary actions so that there may be full and equal participation by these new members of NATO in the annual review to be undertaken pursuant to Article 17(*b*) (ii) of this Resolution.

Annex A

PROPOSED REVISED DIRECTIVE TO THE STANDING GROUP

Reference—MC 2/1, 6 October 1949, Pages 8–12 incl.

3. *Functions of the Standing Group*

In accordance with the above stated terms of reference, the Standing Group is agent for and will act for the Military Committee. The Standing Group will also act as a steering and executive agency for the

Military Representatives Committee under the conditions outlined in DC 24/3.[5] The Standing Group will be primarily responsible for the performance of the following functions:

(*a*) With regard to plans prepared by Regions or Commands:

(i) Review, integrate and coordinate plans as necessary for their consideration by the Military Committee.

(ii) *Reconcile any points of disagreement between NATO Commands.*

NATO Commands

(*b*) With regard to relative priorities for the raising of forces and the provision of equipment:

(i) *Provide the information to Commands and Regional Planning Groups and appropriate agencies on which their recommendations for priorities can be based.*

(ii) *On the recommendations received from NATO Commands and Regions, determine the relative priorities between those Commands and Regions and recommend to the appropriate authorities the priorities to be established.*

(*c*) When disagreement on the subjects referred to in (*a*) and (*b*) above cannot be resolved through direct contact with the interested Commands, Regional Planning Groups or Nations, refer them for consideration and resolution by the Military Committee.

(*d*) Prepare plans, studies and recommend policies of a military nature on issues referred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by the national or regional staffs for multilateral consideration.

(*e*) *Review equipment deficiency lists submitted by the Commands and Regions and recommend the priority for the supply of equipment which is available to meet those deficiencies.*

(*f*) No change.

(*g*) Maintain coordination with the *Defence Production Board.*

(*h*) No change.

Annex B

PROPOSED REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS IN EUROPE

Commander

1. A Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe is hereby designated. His command will be established in a Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE). The Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) shall have an integrated staff composed of officers from all nations contributing to his command. Nations will be represented to his staff by national liaison representatives.

Command area

2. The command area of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and his major subordinate commanders, will be defined by responsible authority. SACEUR's command area, unless and until later redefined,

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[5] Dated Dec. 12, 1950; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 548.

will include the area of the three former European Regional Planning Groups of NATO, exclusive of the Channel Command area.

3. The control and the defence of the zones of the interior, including French North Africa, is the direct responsibility of the National Authorities concerned, who will grant the Allied Commanders under SACEUR all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of their operations. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall have authority to conduct such combat operations in these zones, including French North Africa, as he deems necessary for the defence of Western Europe.[6]

Forces

4. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe will have command responsibility over all Army, Navy and Air Force forces assigned to him for the defence of Western Europe.

Responsibilities and powers in war

5. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe will be responsible to the Standing Group for the overall direction and conduct of wartime operations within his command area. The division of responsibilities between the National Territorial Commanders and Supreme Allied Commander Europe and subordinate Allied Commanders will be as defined in MC 36.

6. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe in war will exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander. These powers may later be defined in greater detail by the North Atlantic Council after consultation with the Military Committee.

Responsibilities in peace

7. The main function in peacetime of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe is to ensure that, if an emergency occurs, the NATO forces made available by nations for the defence of Western Europe will be organized, equipped, trained and ready to implement agreed war plans. Since a Supreme Commander's peacetime functions are in effect a prelude to his wartime responsibility for the defence of his area of command, his peacetime responsibilities shall include:

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[6] In a memorandum of Mar. 3 to Byington (WE), McBride (WE) pointed out that there had been press comment, particularly an article by Cyrus Sulzberger in the *New York Times* to the effect that Morocco and Tunisia had been added to the NATO area in a decision made at the Lisbon session of the North Atlantic Council. After quoting this paragraph, McBride added the following comment:

"It would appear from this document, a copy of which must have been studied by Mr. Sulzberger, that it would be inaccurate to say that Tunisia and Morocco have been added to the NATO area for other than purely command functions. It does not appear that the peoples of the area would receive any NATO guarantees nor that the native governments would be in any way involved, even with France acting on their behalf. On the contrary, it will be noted that the paragraph refers purely to defense and combat operations in French North Africa, and it accordingly is my conclusion that the *Times* headlines to the effect that two protectorates have been added to the NATO area are not accurate." (740.5/3–352) (*a*) The organization and training of national units assigned to his command into an effective integrated force.

(*b*) The preparation of plans for the execution of his assigned missions, and their coordination with other NATO, national and Allied Commanders in accordance with the applicable principles laid down in MC 36.

(*c*) The deployment of major elements of forces assigned to his command in consultation with the appropriate National Authorities and in consonance with operational plans.

(*d*) The exercising of these forces in manoeuvres after consultation, as appropriate, with the national authorities concerned.

(*e*) Informing National Authorities of his operational, personnel and logistic requirements for these forces.

(*f*) Making recommendations, as necessary, to the Standing Group and to nations on infrastructure, training standards adequacy of forces, priorities for the organization and equipping of assigned and earmarked forces, and for construction of facilities to train, house and support these forces, and such other military matters as will affect his ability to discharge his war and peace-time mission.

(*g*) The maintenance of an efficient organization, including the subordinate planning and command organizations with staff elements charged with logistic support planning which will be the nucleus for expansion in war for the control of the battle for the defence of Europe.

(*h*) Proposing to the Standing Group any increase, elimination or reorganization of subordinate Allied planning and command organizations which he considers necessary.

Powers in peace

8. To execute the peacetime functions detailed above, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe will have: Operational control to the extent necessary for the accomplishment of his mission, over all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime. This includes:

(*a*) Direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime and the inspection of training of all forces assigned to his command. Furthermore, he should be given facilities by nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces earmarked for his command.

(*b*) Authority to place requirements upon national governments for the deployment of forces assigned to his command in consonance with operational plans.

(*c*) Authority to recommend to national governments the provision of logistic resources for their national contingents both for combat zone and communications zone support of Allied Command Europe.

(*d*) Authority to recommend to appropriate authorities the priorities of raising and equipping units and organizations assigned to his command in peace-time and those earmarked for his command.

General

9. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is authorized direct access to National Chiefs of Staff and to communicate with their respective Defence Ministers, and Heads of Government, directly as necessary to facilitate the accomplishment of his mission.

10. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is authorized to make recommendations direct to National Chiefs of Staff on logistic and administrative matters affecting the efficiency of readiness of these forces placed or to be placed under his command.

11. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe may delegate to his major subordinate commanders, such authority as may be necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities.

12. The responsibility for logistic support to national component forces will, in general, remain with the responsible authorities of the nations concerned. The responsibility for coordination will, however, rest with the Supreme Commander, and with his major subordinate commanders at the appropriate levels.

13. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is empowered to propose to the Standing Group, for its review and further submission to the Military Committee such modification of these Terms of Reference as he may deem desirable.

Editorial Note

On the evening of February 24, the Temporary Council Committee issued in Lisbon an agreed statement to the press setting forth a lengthy summary of the principal points of the Resolution by the North Atlantic Council, document C9–D/20, February 23, *supra.* In issuing the report to the public, the Temporary Council Committee indicated the successful conclusion of its work as envisaged by the North Atlantic Council on September 19, 1951. The Report of the Temporary Council Committee, as the statement to the press was identified, was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 63, February 24, 2 a. m. (740.5/2–2452) and was issued to the press in Washington on February 25 as Department of State press release 138. For the text of the Report, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 10, 1952, page 368.

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Report of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community to the North Atlantic Council[1]

SECRET
C9–D/12

Lisbon, 19th February 1952.

Introduction

On 28th November 1951, the Atlantic Council, meeting in Rome, adopted a Resolution stating, among other things:

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[1] This report was presented to the North Atlantic Council at its third meeting.

"The Council hopes that the Paris Conference will conclude its activities at the earliest possible moment so that a definitive report can be made to the Council for consideration at its next meeting."

The Delegations of the six countries represented at the Paris Conference are therefore submitting to the Atlantic Council the following Report on the results they have achieved in preparing the draft Treaty establishing a European Defence Community.

This report will not go into the details of the circumstances in which the French Government addressed invitations for this Conference to all European States signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, as well as to the German Federal Republic. The two non-European members of NATO, the United States and Canada, were requested to be represented by observers.

The Conference began work on 15th February, 1951, on the basis of a plan submitted by the French Government. Germany, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg had decided to accept at once the French invitation, and to take part actively in the work of the Conference. On 8th October, the Netherlands Government decided to join these countries. The other countries considered they could participate in the Conference only as observers. In accordance with the unanimously expressed wishes of the participating states, the representatives of the Atlantic Supreme Command attended the Conference and were responsible for keeping in close touch with the General Staff of the Allied Supreme Commander, Europe. They gave, like the observers of the United States and United Kindom, invaluable technical help every time this was necessary.

The work was continued over a year, except for such interruptions as were necessary to enable delegations to report to their Governments and to receive fresh instructions. The Ministers of the countries represented at the Conference considered it necessary to meet on several occasions to review the situation and jointly give general directives to their experts. Four such meetings were held: in November and December 1951, and, quite recently, on 26th and 27th January 1952.

At the present time, the Conference is proceeding with the preparation of the draft Treaty and the Protocols to be annexed thereto.

As will be seen from this Report, general agreement has been secured on most points. Those still under discussion do not call into question the general organization of the system.

After setting out the objectives and general principles of the plan for a European Defence Community, this Report will review the solutions proposed in the military, institutional, financial and arma-

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Feb. 22, 1952; see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, from Lisbon, p. 136. The Council approved the report at that meeting.

Regarding the preparation and approval of this report by the Paris Conference, see telegram 4774, Feb. 6, from Paris, p. 609.

ment fields, and the solution proposed for the status of the Community's Forces.

I. *Objectives and General Principles*

1. The Treaty will set out the principal objectives of the member States, and in particular:

Creation of a Community.

—That the final aim is the merging, under common supra-national institutions, of the armed forces of member states with a view to permanently ensuring the defence of Europe and to safeguarding peace against all threats, both present and future.

—That the moral authority and European character of these Defence Forces will be guaranteed through an integration which will be as complete as possible—insofar as is compatible with military requirements—of the human and material components grouped under a single European political and military Community.

—That the establishment of a Defence Community of the free peoples of Europe represents an essential step towards achieving a united Europe.

—That this integration must develop the effectiveness and fighting value of the Western forces without holding up the execution of Atlantic military plans.

—That the Treaty will in no way discriminate between member countries.

2. To meet common expenditures, the European Defence Community will have a common budget, the burden of which will be shared equitably between member countries.

The European Forces will make use of a common supply system, and a common armament programme will be prepared. This should make possible the standardisation of arms and the specialisation of arms production, thus permitting a better and more economical utilisation of the member countries' resources. Further, European defence must not interfere with social progress.

In all spheres the European Defence Community will proceed in close co-operation with the nations of the free world, in particular with those of the Atlantic Community.

Peaceful character of the plan.

3. The Delegations which took part in preparing this plan have constantly emphasized that it is of a purely peaceful character, for it has no other object than to assure the defence of Europe against any aggression. The merging of the interests of peoples hitherto opposed is a guarantee for all that nationalistic considerations and the dangers these imply will disappear, to make way for the single will of the European Community. This conception does not in any way bring to an end national patriotisms but superimposes on them a European patriotism.

4. The six Delegations, considering the dangers which now threaten

Placing of European Forces at the disposal of the Supreme Atlantic Command.

the world, envisage that as soon as the European Defence Forces have been set up, the Atlantic Supreme Command will be empowered to ensure that the Forces are satisfactorily organised, equipped, trained and ready for duty. As soon as they are in a position to be utilised, these Forces will be at the disposal of the Supreme Atlantic Command which will make the necessary recommendation for the preparation of plans for articulating and allocating them which will then be carried out by the organs of the Community. In wartime, the Atlantic Supreme Command will exercise the operational command of the forces.

From the beginning, the delegations taking part in the Paris Conference studied the military questions submitted to them in constant and close liaison with SHAPE, and they also kept informed of the progress of their discussion the military observers of NATO member countries not participating in the Conference.

II. *Military Questions*

Principles of integration.

5. The European Defence Forces will be composed of units contributed by the various member States. These forces will be so organized, trained and combined as to make up homogeneous and effective entities.

To this end, common principles will be applied in connection with:

—Recruiting, partly on conscription, and partly on the basis of regular personnel,
—the status of personnel,
—uniform,
—the administration of the Forces,
—tactical and technical regulations,
—the organization of the Forces,
—equipment,
—training,
—the formation of cadres.

The elements so standardised will be integrated, the basic units being of homogeneous nationality, defined for each category of Forces as required for military effectiveness.

Basic Units and level of integration.

6. In the land forces, the basic unit which has been adopted is the "Groupement", in which the operational functions of the various Arms are combined for the purposes of limited tactical operations. This "Groupement" will carry out the usual tasks of the conventional division, but it will be as streamlined as possible and in particular its supporting services will be very small, which means that it will be closely dependent on the next higher level, namely the Army Corps.

Three types of "Groupements" are foreseen, infantry, armoured and mechanised, composed respectively of 13,000, 12,600 and 12,600 men; these figures represent the effectives required to ensure the immediate combat readiness of the unit, and will be augmented in wartime by the addition of approximately 2,000 men.

The level of integration will be the Army Corps. It will comprise three or four "Groupements" of different nationalities, an integrated General Staff, and integrated tactical and logistical support units (each homogeneous unit corresponding approximately to a regiment).

The overall strength of the integrated European Army Corps will vary. It will be approximately 80,000 when composed of 3 "Groupements".

The integrated Corps will be the real major battle unit. It will be in a position to rely on its own resources to carry out a complex and prolonged tactical manoeuvre by coordinating the operations of the "Groupements" which it will provide with the necessary support, as it can make available substantial reinforcements. Lastly, it will have considerable logistical resources with which to ensure the maintenance of the subordinate units.

In the Air Forces, the basic Unit which has been adopted is the wing having homogeneous equipment and, comprising for most types of units, 75 aircraft; its organization will resemble that of the United States "wing". Its numerical strength will be 1,200 to 1,800 men.

The level of integration will be the Air Division, bringing together for a common task wings of different nationalities and of different types. The integrated supporting services and elements will be grouped together on a higher level known as the "Tactical Air Force".

The European Naval Forces will comprise elements capable of ensuring the coastal defence of the European continent, and will be organised in homogeneous groups including all elements required for the fulfillment of a single tactical task; they will vary according to the sectors of the coastline. The naval elements cannot be integrated in view of their special nature.

In each category of Forces, homogeneous basic Units may be incorporated into NATO formations which are not members of the European Defence Forces and NATO Units may likewise be incorporated into integrated European formations.

7. They will comprise all the land and air Forces of the Member Countries with the following exceptions:

Definition of the European Defence Forces.

a) Member States may recruit and maintain national Forces for use in the defence of their overseas territories and also Units stationed in their country of origin which are required for the maintenance and relief of those Forces. The total size of such Forces, including maintenance units, should not be so large as to affect the size of each national contribution to the Forces of the Community as laid down by the Treaty. Nevertheless, it was agreed that, in the event of a serious crisis affecting the overseas territory of a Member State, a fraction of the contingent contributed by that State to the European Defence Force will, at its request, be temporarily placed at its disposal by the Board of Commissioners with the approval of the Supreme Commander and after consultation with the Council of Ministers. The contingents detailed for this duty will immediately lose their European Defence character; they will resume it on the completion of their mission when they are returned to the Defence Community. In each individual case, the effects of the withdrawal of such a contingent, particularly in the financial and armament fields, should be the subject of special examination.

b) Member States may recruit and maintain national Forces to carry out international missions which they have undertaken. This clause will apply in particular to the detachments serving at present in Berlin, Austria and Korea.

c) Member States will be entitled to rotate personnel between the contingents contributed by them to the European Defence Forces and the Forces outside the European Defence Community.

d) Member States may recruit and maintain, on a national basis any necessary police forces and *gendarmérie*, as well as the Guard for the Head of the State.

e) The internal defence of each national territory against attacks either instigated or launched by an external enemy will be assured by units of European Defence status, which will be used in accordance with the instructions of the authorities specified in NATO Agreements.

f) A special clause of the Treaty provides that, in the event of a serious internal crisis threatening public order, a Member State may call upon units of the European Defence Forces composed of contingents of that State's nationality.

In the case of the Navy, Forces allocated to the protection of shipping along the coasts of the territory of Member States will be included in the European Defence Forces. The following will remain national Forces: Forces needed to protect overseas territories for the defence of which the Member State has assumed responsibility, and to protect communications with and between such territories, and also Forces carrying out NATO missions agreed prior to the Treaty. This excludes High Seas Naval Forces from the European Defence Force. The use of European Coastal Defence Naval Forces will be controlled by the authorities designated in NATO Agreements.

Size of the European Defence Forces.

8. The draft Treaty says nothing of the anticipated size of the European Defence Forces. These figures will depend on the result of studies carried out elsewhere by the military bodies of NATO and by the Temporary Council Committee known as "The Wise Men", and on the agreements entered into by the Contracting nations. The objectives to be achieved in 1954 will be included in the Military Protocol annexed to the Treaty.

General Organization.

9. The European Defence Community will include centralized bodies which will be charged with the organization, training, administration and maintenance of the Forces. In order to carry out these tasks, such bodies will have at their disposal, on the one hand, the military Commands described above, and on the other hand, a European territorial military organization.

The nations will remain responsible for certain functions in connection with the European Defence forces (as, for example, recruiting); certain countries will also be entrusted with the task of maintaining Forces which have remained national because of their extra-European commitments.

This means that the European territorial military organization will be controlled by the Board of Commissioners as regards purely European tasks, and should take orders from national bodies as regards tasks for which the latter are responsible.

Centralised national military bodies will only be retained when they are required by those Countries which maintain national Forces because of their extra-European commitments.

Raising of Forces.

10. The raising of the European Defence Forces will be a complex operation, whether it means converting national type Armies with their command and administrative bodies, or creating entirely new contingents within the European Defence framework. It should be carried out in such a way as to ensure that the efficiency of the NATO Forces in Europe is not adversely affected. It is the intention of the Conference that preparations for the raising of these Forces will be made in the interval between the signature of the Treaty and its implementation, and will be carried out over a transitional period.

During the preparatory period, an Interim Committee set up as soon as the Treaty is signed will have the task of preparing the constitution and initial duties of the Board of Commissioners; in each country, on general instructions of the Interim Committee, a Planning Group will develop as far as possible the studies and preparations required for the conversion or creation of units to be carried out without loss of time in the following period.

The operations of the transitional period, which will take place under the instructions of the Board of Commissioners, should be carried out in such a manner that the military organizations already in existence can be converted without any loss of efficiency, and that the new units can be constituted with the desired accuracy and flexibility.

III. *Institutions*

List of Institutions.

11. As the ultimate aim of the authors of the Treaty was the amalgamation of the Armed Forces of the Member Countries with a view to ensuring the defence of Europe, these Armed Forces must depend on supra-national political institutions. In defining these institutions the draft which was used as a basis for discussions followed the precedent provided by the Coal and Steel Community Treaty, while taking into account the obvious differences between the two cases. The authors of the Treaty were also careful to

avoid useless multiplication of the number of institutions and to make use as far as possible of those already planned.

Agreement was reached on the list of institutions of the Community, comprising a Council of Ministers, a General Assembly, a Board of Commissioners (referred to as the Board), and a Court of Justice.

Structure and Functions of the Board of Commissioners.

12. The Board will be composed of nine members appointed for six years and chosen for their general qualifications from the nationals of the Member States. In the carrying out of their duties, the members of the Board will neither ask for nor receive instructions from any government. They will refrain from any action inconsistent with the supra-national character of their duties. They may not exercise any other professional activity during the period of their service.

The members of the Board will be appointed by agreement between the governments of the Member States. Membership will be renewed by one-third every two years.

The Chairman of the Board will be chosen for four years from the members of the Board and with the agreement of the governments of the Member States. His term of office, like that of the other members, may be renewed.

The decisions of the Board will be taken either collectively, in the case of the more important decisions, or delegated to the members acting individually. In cases where voting is necessary for a collective decision, the decision will be taken by majority vote, the Chairman having a casting vote in the case of a tie.

The duties of the Board will be allocated among the different members. The Chairman will be responsible for coordinating the way in which the different functions are carried out, ensuring implementation of decisions, and administering the services of the Community.

In virtue of its working rules and the responsibilities entrusted to the Chairman, the Board, in spite of the number of its members, will always be capable of taking decisions, if necessary at short notice.

Any member of the Board who ceases to meet with the necessary conditions for the exercise of his functions, or is guilty of a serious offence, may, on a request from the Board or from the Council of Ministers, be declared by the Court to be relieved of his duties. The Council of Ministers may in similar circumstances provisionally suspend him from his duties, pending the judgment of the Court. There may also be brought before the Assembly of the Community a motion of censure on the Board; if this motion is adopted, its members must collectively resign.

The Board will have the following powers with respect to the European Defence Forces:

—to prepare and implement organizational plans for the Forces;
—to supervise recruitment activities for the European Defence Forces

carried out by the Member States in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty;
—to carry out the training and equipping of the Defence Forces in accordance with a common plan and methods;
—to prepare plans, in consultation with the governments of the Member States, for mobilisation of manpower and economic resources;
—to control the Community's Training Colleges for officers and specialists;
—to carry out reviews and inspections of the Forces;
—to determine, in consultation with the governments of the Member States, the territorial distribution of the Forces within the framework of the recommendations of the Atlantic Command in Europe;
—to draw up programmes for armaments, equipment and supplies with a view to achieving their standardisation, and to ensure the execution of these programmes, while bearing in mind a homogeneous allocation of armaments;
—in agreement with the sending governments, to appoint officers in the basic units,* and to make appointments to the higher ranks with the unanimous agreement of the Council of Ministers;
—to make appointments to all the offices depending on the Board;
—to administer staff and equipment;
—to carry out all necessary liaison with the Member States of NATO and with the international organizations with which cooperation is necessary;
—to assume important responsibilities with respect to finance and external aid, as indicated later in a chapter of the Report dealing with these subjects.

In order to carry out these responsibilities, the Board will have at its disposal the necessary civilian and military personnel, who will also have supra-national status.

In the exercise of its powers, the Board will take decisions which will be uniformly binding and will make recommendations with binding force so far as the objective to be achieved, but leaving to the States concerned the choice of methods to be employed to achieve the objective.

13. The Council of Ministers will be composed of Representatives of the Member States, each state delegating a member of its government.

Functions of the Council of Ministers.

It will be so constituted as to be able to function at any time. To this end Ministers may if necessary be represented by Deputies.

The general task of the Council will be to harmonise the activities of the Board with the policies of the governments of Member States.

To this end it may issue general directives, approve decisions, and in certain special cases it may itself take decisions.

(*a*) The Council may issue general directives to the Board of Commissioners.

These directives will be agreed unanimously. With respect to questions on which the Council has not had occasion to issue directives, the

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*Any State may select a procedure whereby its appropriate authorities may make nominations on the proposal of the Board. [Footnote in the source text.]

Board will act of its own accord under conditions specified by the Council, with a view to achieving the objectives laid down by the Treaty.

(*b*) The Board will request and obtain the approval of the Council of Ministers before taking decisions or making recommendations.

Such approval will require, according to circumstances, a unanimous vote (for example, to settle the total amount of the Budget and the contributions of Member States, to draw up organisational plans for the Forces and to make appointments to higher ranks); or a two-thirds majority (for example, to approve estimates of expenditure and the armaments programme), or a straight majority.

(*c*) The Council of Ministers will take decisions direct covering a wide sphere, chiefly with respect to alterations to constitutional and statutory texts of the Community (status of personnel, texts relating to general organisation, recruitment, total strengths, officering), and to the plans for the constitution of the European Defence Forces. In such cases the decisions of the Council must be unanimous. Where decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority, the Council may, at the suggestion of one of its members, request the Board to take any measures within the limits of its powers. As noted above, the Council may bring to the notice of the Assembly of the Community a motion of censure on the Board. Appeal may be made to the Council, in the case of a pressing emergency, to take any provisional steps designed to meet the emergency.

It may be deduced from the above that where decision lies with the Council of Ministers, a careful distinction has been made between cases in which unanimous agreement is necessary, in order that member States may have full say in matters which remain national responsibilities; and cases of a straight majority or two-thirds majority vote, which ensure the efficient working of the European Community.

A system has been adopted by means of which voting in the Council of Ministers may be weighted. In cases where decisions are taken by a straight majority, this will be obtained either by four votes in six, or, where there is a tie vote, by the votes of the Representatives of Member States who together make available to the Community at least two-thirds of the actual contributions in men and money to the common budget.

The same principle of weighting has been adopted for the two-thirds majority, i.e. this majority will be obtained by four votes if they include the votes of States providing the two-thirds of the contributions referred to above. No account is taken of abstentions in registering a unanimous vote.

Composition and Functions of the Assembly.

14. The Assembly of the Defence Community will be composed in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of the European Coal and Steel Organisation Treaty, but the German Federal Republic, France and Italy will each nominate 21 Delegates, 18 of which will be members of the Coal and Steel Community Assembly. This composition will be provisional, as explained subsequently.

The functions of the first Assembly will be to take decisions on the motions of censure on the administration of the Board of Commissioners and to give its views on the draft estimates of expenditure prepared by the Board and adopted by the Council under conditions which will be examined later.

The First Assembly will also, as soon as the Treaty comes into force, examine the constitution of a Defence Community Assembly which will be specially elected on a democratic basis, and will study the new powers which might devolve on such an Assembly and also any changes which should be made in the other Institutions of the Community. The Assembly will be guided in its examination by the principle that the final organisation should be so conceived as to be able to constitute one of the elements in a federal or confederal European structure at a later date.

In this connection, the Assembly will examine problems arising from the co-existence of different agencies for European cooperation already established, or which might be established, with a view to ensuring coordination within the framework of a federal or confederal structure.

Proposals by the Assembly in this field will be submitted to the Council of Ministers within six months from the assumption of duties by the Assembly. On the advice of the Council, these proposals will thereafter be transmitted by the Chairman of the Assembly to the governments of the member States, who will, within three months from the date on which the matter has been brought to their notice, call a conference to consider the proposals. If no agreement has been reached in this conference within one year of its first meeting, the provisions relating to the composition of the Assembly will be revised without awaiting the end of the discussions.

15. The Court of Justice will be the same as for the Coal and Steel Community.

Court of Justice.

The Court will ensure respect for law in the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty. It will give judgment on appeals concerning the violation of texts or the misuse of its powers by the Board of Commissioners. Any Member State may bring to its notice an appeal against an action of the Board which might give rise to fundamental and recurring disputes among the Member States. In the same way the Court will have limited jurisdiction with regard to the decisions of the Council and the Assembly in civilian and military penal questions.

Adaptation of the Organisation to a Future Federal Structure.

16. It was agreed that the organisation of the institutions described above shall remain in force in its present form until the establishment, as soon as possible, of a federal or confederal structure for Europe. This provision is designed to allow of an adaptation of these bodies to possible new con-

ditions and political institutions in Europe; it does not affect their supra-national character or the general principles on which the Community is based.

The Treaty will be concluded for a lengthy period. Certain delegations have suggested that this period should be fifty years. Other delegations consider that the Treaty should last as long as the North Atlantic Treaty.

Site.

17. The site of the various institutions has not yet been settled. This question will be studied by the Conference as soon as possible.

IV. *Financial Questions*

Existence of common budget from the entry into force of the Treaty.

18. A common budget will be drawn up for the Community as soon as the Treaty enters into force. The existence of a common budget, its preparation and execution by the Board of Commissioners constitute an essential factor in the unity of the European Army.

The common budget will cover all the revenue and expenditure of the Community. The Treaty lays down methods for its preparation, approval and implementation.

Preparation of the Budget.

19. The revenue of the common budget will be made up of the contributions from Member States, the Community's own revenue and possibly revenue from external aid.

Subject to special provisions concerning the transitional period which will be set out later, the common budget will be prepared by the Board of Commissioners, who will for this purpose enter into consultation with the national departments. The draft budget will contain in an annex a common plan for armaments, equipment and supplies. The Board will bring the draft budget before the Council of Ministers. The Council will decide the total amount of the budget and the contributions from each Member State. This decision will require a unanimous vote.

The allocation of expenditure among the different chapters of the budget, and the common armaments programme, will be determined by the Council of Ministers, a two thirds majority being necessary.

The common budget of revenue and expenditure, as thus determined by the Council, will be referred in its entirety to the Assembly, which may recommend alterations, but may not increase the sum total of expenditure.

The budget as finally approved by the Council will be executed by the Board of Commissioners.

Contributions from Member States.

20. The contributions from Member States will be determined by the Council of Ministers, in accordance with the procedure adopted by NATO.

The Council will examine a more automatic method of determining contributions. This method will not, however, be put into effect until approved by all Member States. If no agreement is reached on such a method, contributions will continue to be determined in accordance with the former procedure, i.e. that adopted by NATO.

The Governments of Member States will present an annual estimate to their national parliaments of the total contributions, determined as indicated above, by the appropriate authorities of the Defence Community.

These points have all been agreed on in principle by the six Delegations.

The methods of allocating and administering external aid in cash or equipment directly assigned to the Community are still under discussion. It is already agreed that external aid in equipment will be administered by the Board of Commissioners.

Financial commitments already entered into by Member States.

21. As soon as the budget is prepared, the authorities of the European Defence Community will ensure that financial commitments already entered into by Member States in their capacity as NATO members are respected. Contracts placed by Member States with third parties before the entry into force of the Treaty will be carried out insofar as they cannot be altered to the advantage of the Community, and with the agreement of the national authority which placed the contract.

Transfers of Currency.

22. All technical measures will be taken to ensure that the implementation of the budget shall not entail transfers of currency which might threaten the economic and financial stability and the balance of payments of Member States.

In particular, it will be laid down that, unless there is a special agreement to the contrary, a large proportion of the contributions of Member States shall be utilised in the corresponding monetary zone of each Member State. Conversely, and also unless there is a special agreement, the amounts paid in settlement of expenditures in the monetary zone of a Member State will not exceed a certain percentage of the contribution paid by that State.

Transitional financial arrangements.

23. The provisions of the Treaty set out above will come into force during the final pre-federal period which might begin—if the Treaty entered into force some time in 1952—on 1st January, 1954.

The budgetary provisions for the year during which the Treaty is signed will be as follows: as soon as the Treaty is signed, a committee of financial and military experts will draw up a common budget for the remainder of the current civilian year; this budget will have to be drawn up and executed as soon as the Treaty comes into force. This Committee will acquaint itself with existing national budgets and military programmes in progress or contemplated. As there is no German military budget, the German contribution will be determined according to principles similar to those used in NATO in fixing the contributions of other Member States.

On the basis of these various documents, the Committee of Experts will group under a common budget the expenditures of the Community and the corresponding revenue. The total amount of this budget will be made up of the national contributions appearing in the transitional convention, while the division of expenditures will be put to the vote in the Council of Ministers, a two-thirds majority being necessary.

In the execution of this first budget, the Board of Commissioners, in so far as its own services do not enable it to carry out the necessary work, will delegate to the administrative services of each country the task of effecting on its behalf the financial transactions in respect of the European Defence Forces.

The budget provisions for the year which will follow the first financial year of the Community i.e. probably 1953, will be those set out above in respect of the final period. However, it will be specified in the transitional Convention for this initial period that the Community will submit this budget to NATO for its views or for arbitration at the request of any Member State which may consider that the common budget does not permit commitments entered on by that State, vis-à-vis NATO to be carried out. This latter formula is still being studied by delegations.

V. *Questions Concerning the Production of Arms, Equipment and Supplies*

Principles Governing the Powers of the Board of Commissioners.

24. From the beginning the plan for a European Defence Community provided that the Board would prepare European armaments programmes, on the advice of a Consultative Committee, and be responsible for their execution. That will be a really important function of the Board: the integrated armaments programmes prepared by it, submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval, and financed out of common resources, will be executed under the control of the Board's services. The task of the latter will be to ensure the most uniform standardization and the greatest specialization possible in military production. All these tasks will be carried out in close liaison with NATO.

In the same original plan it was envisaged that the Board would receive material assistance from the Mutual Aid Programme, which it would allocate in such a way as to create the necessary balance in the arms and equipment of European contingents.

Agreement was reached among the delegations on the essential provisions to figure in the Treaty or the Protocols annexed to it.

The Conference also provided for the establishment of a research group for armaments questions, which will be convened in the period between the signature of the Treaty and its ratification. In order to help the Board to begin exercising its powers in connection with arms, equipment and supplies, this research group will have the task of examining, on the basis of the Articles setting forth the principles, detailed arrangements to guide the action of the Board's services, as the latter are set up.

25. The Board will prepare common programmes for arms, equipment and supplies for the European Defence Forces, in consultation with governments.

Preparation and Execution of Production Programmes.

The expenditure necessary for the execution of the programmes will be submitted in estimates which will carry in Annex an indication of the execution of the work, by categories and by countries. Approval of the estimates will be equivalent to approval of the programmes.

The Board may prepare arms, equipment and supply programmes extending over a period of several years. It will notify these programmes to the Council and will ask the latter to approve in principle those programmes which include financial commitments extending over several years. Such approval will be obtained in the same conditions as those governing the approval of the estimates.

The Board will ensure the execution of the common arms, equipment and supply programmes for the European Defence Forces in consultation with the Council and member governments, and in the best interests of the Community.

The methods of executing the programmes will be defined in a convention annexed to the Treaty.

In the preparation and execution of the common arms, equipment and supply programmes of the European Defence Forces, the Board shall:

(*a*) Make the best possible use of the technical and economic skills of each member state and avoid creating serious disturbances in the economy of any member state;

(*b*) take account of the contributions to be provided by member states, and respect the regulations set forth in the Treaty with regard to monetary transfers;

(*c*) simplify and standardize arms, equipment and supplies as much and as rapidly as possible.

The Council may give the Board general directives within the framework of the principles outlined above.

In order that the Board may be in a position to appreciate the economic and social consequences of the execution of the programmes, it will be assisted by a Consultative Committee. The draft Treaty defines the circumstances and manner in which the Committee will be consulted, and lays down the composition of the body in question, in which producers and workers will be represented in equal numbers.

26. In periods of normal economic activity, the placing of military

orders presents no special difficulty. On the other hand, in periods of great economic activity and of full employment, which always coincide with periods in which military requirements are considerable (and this is the case in the present period), the realisation of an arms programme would be likely to be seriously compromised if the Board did not dispose of certain powers.

Powers of the Board of Commissioners in periods of shortages.

If the Board finds that the execution of all or part of a programme is meeting with such difficulties that it cannot be carried out, for example, as a result of a shortage in the supply of raw materials, a lack of equipment or installed capacities, or abnormally high prices, or that the execution of the programme cannot be carried out within the time required, it should inform the Council of the position and discuss with it the best method of overcoming the difficulties.

The Council, by a unanimous vote, will decide, in consultation with the Board, the measures to take to ensure the execution of the programme as approved.

Failing a unanimous decision by the Council as to the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Board, after consultation with the Governments concerned, will make recommendations to them to ensure that orders are placed and executed within the time limit laid down in the programme and at prices which are not abnormally high, taking into account the necessity to share as fairly as possible the charges resulting from such orders with regard to the economies of member states.

27. A problem directly linked with the question of equipping and arming the Forces is that of research in the military field. Here, too, it is provided that the Board will draw up a common scientific and technical research programme in the military field and will decide how it will be carried out. This programme will be subject to the Council's approval under the same conditions as the common arms, equipment and supply programmes of the European Defence Forces. The Board will be responsible for carrying out the common research programme.

Scientific research.

The Board, finally, will be responsible for relations with the technical Atlantic agencies with regard to arms questions interesting the Community, and also with third party states with a view to preparing mutual aid programmes.

28. To ensure the proper implementation of the arms programme, and also to safeguard the internal and external security of the Community, it is provided that the following will be subject to authorization to be given in advance by the Board: Production of war material, the import and export of war material coming from or going to third party states, the setting on foot of arrangements leading directly to the production of war material, the production of prototypes, and technical research relating to war material.

Production, import and export permits.

With regard to war material intended for forces retaining their national character, the Board will deliver a general permit and establish a control to ensure that the countries granted such a permit do not make use of it beyond their requirements.

29. The draft Treaty, finally, will refer to certain special provisions relating to the customs and fiscal system in respect of equipment and supplies.

Customs and fiscal system.

VI. *Questions Concerning the Status of the European Defence Forces*

30. A Special Committee of the Conference composed of experts of the six delegations was charged with the preparation of draft texts dealing with the status of the European Defence Forces in the legal, fiscal and customs spheres, and in those of public security and the use of public services by the Community.

Questions regarding the status of the Forces.

These various questions, which are still being examined, will only be covered in the Treaty itself by general principles. They will continue to be examined by the competent committee and will be dealt with in a Protocol which will have the same legal validity as the Treaty, and will enter into force at the same time as it.

VII. *Transitional Arrangements*

31. The Conference agreed that on certain points the Treaty would have to provide for transitional arrangements necessary to ensure in the most favourable circumstances the establishment of the institutions and the raising of the Forces of the Community.

CONCLUSION

Aware of the need to create without delay a European Force to be included in the Atlantic Forces sufficiently powerful to act as a deterrent against any intended aggression, the Governments represented at the Paris Conference never lost sight, throughout their work, of the following essential preoccupations: To create a European Defence Community which can fulfill the imperative requirements of military effectiveness; to give the Western World a guarantee against the rebirth of conflicts which have divided it in the past; and to give an impetus to the achievement of a closer association between the Member countries on a federal or confederate basis.

The six Governments have advanced so far in their discussions that it is possible to envisage within a short period the final drafting and signature of the Treaty and of the Protocols attached to it, which will ensure the creation of the European Defence Community.

It is for the Atlantic Council to decide whether the European Forces thus constituted fulfill the conditions formulated during its previous Sessions.

740.5/3-2152

Report by the North Atlantic Council Deputies[1]

SECRET
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LISBON, February 20, 1952.

RELATIONS BETWEEN EDC AND NATO

A. *Introduction*

1. At its Sixth Session in December 1950, the North Atlantic Council (C6-R/1 paragraph 10) approved the recommendations of the Council Deputies and of the Military Committee on the German contribution to the defense of Western Europe which provided (C6-D/1, paragraph 10[2]), with respect to the proposal that there be included within the NATO framework a European Army, that any such institution, if and when created, must:

(*a*) strengthen the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area;
(*b*) be integrated into the NATO framework;
(*c*) promote the closer association of the countries of Western Europe and the more intimate relationship of Western Germany with the Western powers.

2. At its 8th Session, the North Atlantic Council adopted a resolution (C8-D/14)[3] requesting the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty Agencies "to give early attention to the problem of correlating the obligations and relationships of the European Defense Community with those of the North Atlantic Treaty, so that discussions with the Paris Conference on this question may be held and concluded as soon as possible".

3. During their discussions, in which the French Deputy, who is also the Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Paris Conference participated, the Council Deputies agreed that since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defense Community have one identical objective, to strengthen the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, their mutual obligations and relationships should be based

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[1] In accordance with a decision of the North Atlantic Council at its Eighth Session in Rome in November 1951, the Council Deputies considered during January and early February the various legal and practical relationships that would obtain between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the proposed European Defense Community. A tentative text of a report by the Council Deputies on this subject, an earlier version of the paper printed here, was considered by Acheson, Eden, and Schuman and by Acheson, Eden, Schuman, and Adenauer at their meetings in London on the afternoon of Feb. 18 (see pp. 64-71). The text approved by the Foreign Ministers is essentially the same as that printed here, although the Council Deputies continued to make further minor drafting changes during meetings in Lisbon on Feb. 19 and 20. This final version of the report was presented by Ambassador Spofford to the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on the afternoon of Feb. 22; see Secto 49, Feb. 22, p. 136.

[2] Not found in Department of State files. The joint report C6-D/1, entitled "German Contribution to the Defense of Western Europe," dated Dec. 13, 1950, is a composite document consisting of D-D/196 (see D-D/196 (Final), *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 531), and D/MC-D/2, *ibid.*, p. 538.

[3] Not printed.

not on the concept of two separate bodies working independently towards the same objective, but rather on the concept of two closely related organizations, one working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and reinforcing, the other.

B. *Correlation of Obligations*

4. *Article 8:* In this Article of the North Atlantic Treaty, Signatory Governments undertook "not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty". Insofar as this Article is concerned, the Council Deputies considered that the problem was primarily one of ensuring that the obligations contained in the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community were consistent with and did not conflict with those of the North Atlantic Treaty. The applicable obligations under the latter are those contained in Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6.

5. *Article 3:* This Article sets forth the basic objective which the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty have in common, and the achievement of which the European Defense Community is designed to assist. It was felt therefore that Article 3 gives rise to no problem and that the obligation of the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty separately and jointly by the means of continuous self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack would in no way be affected by the establishment of the European Defense Community. The fact that this obligation may be discharged in part through the European Defense Forces would not it is considered be incompatible with the terms of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

6. *Article 4:* It was considered in the light of the information available about the contents of the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community that the obligation under this Article on the Parties namely to "consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened", would not be affected by the establishment of the European Defense Community. No problem was envisaged in the fulfilment of these obligations in this connection, since the European Defense Force will receive its strategic direction and political guidance exclusively from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (See paragraph 8 below.)

7. *Articles 5 and 6:* These Articles were considered together since Article 6 merely defines the area and forces upon which an armed attack would bring Article 5 into operation. The problem of correlation of obligations under the European Defense Community with the obligations arising from these Articles is caused by the fact that the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty do not have the same membership. The Council Deputies recognized that it was essential that all members of the European Defense Community and of the North Atlantic Treaty should be reciprocally bound by the

obligations set out in the present Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council Deputies came to the conclusion that the North Atlantic Treaty ought to be adapted to the new situation arising from the establishment of the European Defense Community by a Protocol which could be signed when a Treaty establishing the European Defense Community had itself been signed. This latter Treaty would require to contain suitable articles to correlate the obligations. (See paragraph 10 below.)

C. *Relationships between the Two Organizations*

8. The Council Deputies agreed that there must be no possibility of a conflict of authority between the two Organizations. Such conflict would be disastrous in the case of a major emergency or war. In this connection it was noted that the Paris Conference had already agreed that the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community will provide that the command and employment of the forces of the European Defense Community should be entrusted, from their creation, to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and with regard to naval forces that the use of European Coastal Defense forces will be controlled by the authorities designated in NATO agreements. Under their terms of reference, the appropriate NATO Commanders receive their strategic direction from the Standing Group of the Military Committee, which in turn receives its political guidance from the Council. It was considered essential that all forces under appropriate NATO Commanders, whether European Defense or other forces, should be subject solely to their command and that they should receive strategic direction and political guidance in the employment of these forces solely from the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty Agencies.

9. The Council Deputies recommend that the following principles should, until otherwise agreed, govern these relationships:

(*a*) *General:* The creation of the European Defense Community will have no effect upon the representation in the North Atlantic Council or its Agencies of those member States of the European Defense Community who are also parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. The relationships between the two Organizations should maintain maximum flexibility and should seek to avoid duplication of responsibilities and functions wherever possible.

(*b*) *Councils:* On questions affecting the common objectives of the two Organizations there would be reciprocal consultation between the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the European Defense Community and, whenever either Council decides that it is desirable, combined meetings of the two Councils. Whenever any of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or any of the parties to the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community considers that the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them or the continued existence or integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Defense Community is threatened, a combined meeting will be summoned at the request of that party in order to consider the measures necessary to meet the situation.

(*c*) *Civilian agencies:* In order to avoid overlapping responsibilities and the duplication of personnel and work, there should be continuous contact with a view to close coordination on the technical level between members of the staffs of the European Defense Community and of NATO. These relationships should be of a liaison nature and in no sense representational.

(*d*) *Military agencies:* It is understood that as soon as the European Defense Forces have been placed under the command of a NATO Commander, he will have officers of the European Defense Forces as members of his own headquarters and of the appropriate subordinate headquarters. NATO Commanders will ensure such liaison as may be necessary between European Defense Forces under their Command and the other military agencies of NATO.

D. *Recommendations*

10. The Council Deputies understand that, at its 9th Session, the Council will have before it not only this report, but also a report of the Paris Conference concerning establishment of the European Defense Community, and a report from the Military Committee on the military effectiveness of the proposed arrangements. If, as a result of their examination of these documents, the Council are satisfied that the establishment of the European Defense Community will meet the conditions set forth in paragraph 1 above, which were laid down by the Council at its 6th Session in Brussels, then the Council Deputies recommend that the Council adopt the draft resolution jointly prepared by the Council Deputies and the Military Committee.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102

Draft British Declaration[1]

SECRET [LISBON, undated.]

H.M.G. in the United Kingdom have been greatly encouraged by the progress made by the Governments of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the German Federal Republic towards agreeing on the establishment of a European Defence Community, and they wish once more to make clear, after consultation with those Governments, what their attitude to the Defence Community will be when it is established.

H.M.G. do not consider that the establishment of the E.D.C. will relieve them of their present commitments in Europe for the maintenance of peace. The defence of Western Europe is an enterprise in which the United Kingdom is already a partner by virtue of the Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. H.M.G. believe that the E.D.C. will help to consolidate peace and to ensure that the principles laid down in the Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty are upheld. They thus have an abiding interest in the strength and continuing integrity of the Community and will afford its institutions their cooperation and support. They declare that they would consider any action which threatened the integrity of the Community as a matter of the gravest concern to them calling for consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to agree on measures to meet the situation thus created.

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[1] This draft declaration was discussed by Acheson and Eden during their meeting on the morning of Feb. 22; see Battle's memorandum of that meeting, p. 131.

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Joint Report by the North Atlantic Council Deputies and the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council [1]

SECRET

21st February 1952.

C9–D/7 (Revise)

German Participation in Western Defence

1. At its Sixth Session in Brussels in December 1950, the Council approved the joint report on the German contribution to the defence of Western Europe by the North Atlantic Council Deputies and the Military Committee (C6–D/1 [2]). The Council invited the Occupying Powers to discuss with the German Federal Republic the question of German participation in the defence of Western Europe and took note of the French Government's intention to call a conference of the countries, including the German Federal Republic, which might wish to participate in a European Army. At its Seventh Session in Ottawa in September 1951, the Council received a report from the Occupying Powers that the discussions between them and the German Federal Republic had been discontinued in the expectation that the solution to this problem would be provided by the results of the Conference on the European Defence Force.[3]

2. At its Eighth Session, the Council received a further report on the status of negotiations for the establishment of a European Defence Community,[4] and requested the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty agencies to give early attention to the problem of correlating the obligations and relationships of the European Defence Community with those of the North Atlantic Treaty.

3. The Council Deputies have prepared a report on the relations between the European Defence Community and NATO (D–D(52)35

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[1] This report was considered and approved by the North Atlantic Council at its third meeting, Feb. 22; see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, from Lisbon, p. 136.

[2] Regarding this document, see footnote 2, p. 247.

[3] Documentation on the Seventh Session of the North Atlantic Council held in Ottawa in September 1951 is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 616 ff.

[4] For the report under reference here, see *ibid.*, p. 933.

(Final))[5] and the Military Committee has prepared a report on the military effectiveness of the arrangements proposed by the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community (M.C. 40(Final)[6]). These reports have been considered by the Council Deputies and the Military Committee in joint session and are submitted separately for consideration by the Council.

4. In addition to the above reports, the Council will have before it, at its Ninth Session, a report from the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community[7] and a report by the Occupying Powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic.[8]

5. The Council Deputies and the Military Committee have discussed whether the security safeguards for which the Occupying Powers are responsible under the Brussels Agreement will become unnecessary as a result of the creation of the European Defence Community. The Council Deputies and the Military Committee consider that insofar as such safeguards are not rendered unnecessary by the creation of the European Defence Community or by the altered circumstances the responsible Powers shall see to it that they are provided for in any general settlement with the German Federal Republic.

6. The Council Deputies and the Military Committee recommend that the reports be adopted by the North Atlantic Council, and that it approve the attached resolution which is proposed jointly by the Council Deputies and the Military Committee.[9]

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[5] Dated Feb. 20, p. 247.

[6] Not printed.

[7] Document C9–D/12, Feb. 19, p. 230.

[8] Document C9–D/16, Feb. 21, is not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 137.

[9] The texts of the draft resolution and the draft protocol attached to the source text are not printed here; differences between these drafts and the texts approved by the Council on Feb. 22 are indicated in annotations to the approved texts printed in document C9–D/19, *infra*.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105

Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council[1]

SECRET [LISBON,] 22nd February 1952.
C9–D/19

GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN WESTERN DEFENCE

The North Atlantic Council

Having considered the reports presented to it at its Ninth Session on the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community (C9–D/

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[1] This resolution was adopted by the North Atlantic Council at its third meeting on Feb. 22; see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, from Lisbon, p. 136. An earlier version

12[2]), by the Occupying Powers concerning the proposed contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic (C9–D/16[3]), by the Council Deputies on the relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defence Community (D–D(52)35 (Final)[4]), and having accepted the conclusions of the Military Committee on the military effectiveness of arrangements proposed by the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community (MC.40 (Final)[5]),

1. *Approves* the principles which will, as set forth in the report of the Paris Conference, underlie the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community;

2. *Reaffirms* the urgency for the defence of Western Europe of establishing at the earliest possible date a militarily effective European Defence Force, including a German contribution of the size and nature recommended by the Military Committee, in close conformity with the principles and provisions described in the report on the Paris Conference;

3. *Considers* that the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community and the entry into effect of the protocol and relationships recommended in the report of the Council Deputies would establish a European Defence Community which would meet the following requirements of the Brussels decision (C6–D/1[6]);

(*a*) it would strengthen the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area;

(*b*) it would be effectively integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization framework;

(*c*) it would promote the closer association of the countries of Western Europe and the more intimate relationship of Western Germany with the Western Powers;

(*d*) it would fulfil, from the point of view of military effectiveness, the requirements set forth in the Brussels decision;

(*e*) it would fulfil the provisions of the Brussels Agreement relating to security safeguards to the extent that such safeguards are not rendered unnecessary by altered circumstances or will not be provided for by the Occupying Powers in any general settlement with the German Federal Republic.

4. *Adopts* the reports of the Council Deputies and of the Military Committee;

5. *Agrees* in particular that the principles set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report of the Council Deputies shall govern the relationships between the two organizations;

6. *Takes note* that the Paris Conference proposes to insert in the

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of this resolution and the annexed protocol was circulated as an attachment to document C9–D/7 (Revise), Feb. 21, *supra*. The difference between the text printed here and the earlier draft is indicated in footnote 7, below.

[2] Dated Feb. 19, p. 230.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 137.

[4] Dated Feb. 20, p. 247.

[5] Not printed.

[6] Regarding this document, see footnote 2, p. 247.

Treaty establishing the European Defence Community guarantees between the members of the European Defence Community and to the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty equivalent to the guarantee contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

7. *Agrees* that, contingent upon the insertion in the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community of such guarantees, the obligations contained in the proposed Treaty establishing the European Defence Community will be consistent with and will not conflict with those of the North Atlantic Treaty;

8. *Therefore recommends* that when the Council Deputies have confirmed that the text of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community is in accordance with the principles approved by the Council in this resolution and that the said Treaty, as signed, contains the equivalent guarantees referred to in paragraph 6 above, the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty should sign a protocol on the lines set out in Annex A; and

9. *Invites* the Governments which are members of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defence Community Conference:

(*a*) to consider and initiate any measures which might henceforth be taken prior to or in anticipation of ratification, in order to bring about immediately after ratification the raising of the German contribution to the European Defence Forces;[7]

(*b*) to provide in the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community for that flexibility essential to the implementation of a plan of this nature, and necessary to ensure that the timing and manner of implementation will increase to the maximum extent possible the effectiveness of the defences of Western Europe;

(*c*) to establish the European Defence Community without delaying their force build-up efforts within NATO.

Annex A

DRAFT PROTOCOL

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington 4th April 1949,

Being satisfied that the creation of the European Defence Community set up under the Treaty signed at Paris on __________ will strengthen the North Atlantic Community and the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area, and promote the closer association of the countries of Western Europe,

Agree as follows:

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[7] In the earlier version of this resolution circulated as an attachment to document C9–D/7 (Revise), *supra*, this paragraph reads as follows:

"(a) to consider and initiate any measures which might henceforth be taken prior to or in anticipation of ratification, to expedite the raising of the German contribution to the European Defence Forces;".

ARTICLE I

An armed attack

(i) on the territory of any member of the European Defence Community in Europe or in the area described in Article 6(i) of the North Atlantic Treaty (as modified by the protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey), or

(ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of the European Defence Community when in the area described in Article 6(ii) of the said Treaty,

shall be considered an attack against all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, within the meaning of Article 5 of the said Treaty, and Article 5 shall apply accordingly.

The expression "member of the European Defence Community" in paragraph (i) of this Article means Belgium, France, German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force as soon as each of the Parties has notified the Government of the United States of its acceptance, and the Council of European Defence Community has notified the North Atlantic Council of the entry into force of the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE III

This Protocol shall remain in force for so long as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty signed at Paris ________ establishing the European Defence Community remain in force, and the latter Treaty contains guarantees to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty equivalent to the guarantee contained in Article 5 of the latter Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and of all the Parties to the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Done at ______ the ______ day of __________ 1952.

740.5/2-2352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, February 23, 1952—6 p. m.

1681. Fourth cable.[2] Press communiqué to be issued by FedRep not to be released prior to time set by FonMins in Lisbon.

The negots between the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, on the one hand, and the Ger FedRep, on the other, in respect of the amt of the FedRep's financial def contribution have produced as a provisional result the fol proposal of the Fed Govt.

The Fed Govt has declared its willingness to base the assessment of its def contrib in NATO year 1952/53 (1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953) on the recommendations of the three Wise Men (Exec Bureau of TCC). In this connection, the contracting parties based their considerations on the assumption that the expected effective date of the convention on the estab of a Eur def community and of what is referred to as the general agrmt will be at a date which will probably not require more than eight monthly installments of the def contrib to be charged against the Fed fiscal year which ends on 31 March 1953. Final determination of the deductible budgetary expenditures in the Fed Govt for def purposes cld not take place, since the recommendations of the Exec Bureau of the TCC gave no specific figure hereon. Therefore, the Fed Govt has suggested a provisional arrangement. This arrangement provides that the FedRep will pay a monthly def contrib averaging DM 850 million up to the end of NATO year 1952/53 (i.e. up to 30 June 1953). In doing so, the Fed Govt has made the proviso that, if the increase in the Ger national income as envisaged in the Exec Bureau's recommendations were not to be forthcoming to the extent expected, which wld mean that the FedRep's capacity to pay was being overtaxed, it will request financial aid for such period as will lapse until the def contrib can be re-assessed.

The def contrib is to be re-assessed in the light of the econ and fin development before 30 June 1953 not later, however, than simultaneously with the periodic reviews, of the def contribs of all participating countries, which are to take place in August of each year. The purpose of such review is to assess the Ger FedRep under the same principles as apply to all participating countries. Simultaneously with such review, a final ruling is to be made as to what budgetary expenditures of the FedRep are to be recognized as expenditures for def purposes and are, consequently, chargeable as part of the def contrib. In this connection and in addition to the clarification of the problem of maintaining internal peace, there is, in particular, to be brought about a final solution of the problem of deductibility of aid to Berlin.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Lisbon, Paris, and London. It appears that this telegram was discussed at tripartite meetings in Lisbon on Feb. 24 and 25; see the U.S. Delegation record of the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting, Feb. 25, p. 159.

[2] This is the last telegram in a series of four reporting on the German financial contribution to defense. The others, telegrams 1678, 1679, and 1680, are not printed.

The recommendations of the Exec Bureau already emphasized that Ger has to bear the heaviest or, at least, one of the heaviest of the tax burdens shouldered by any of the Western nations. The recommendations likewise recognize that a further substantial increase of the Ger tax burden is not deemed feasible. The arrangements proposed by the Fed Govt will presumably permit refraining from increases in the Ger tax burden.

If the convention on the estab of an EDC and the gen agrmt shld become effective as from 1 August 1952, the expenditures for occupation costs and the contrib for the 1952/53 fiscal year will add up to approx DM 8.8 billion. The amt of def contrib for the fol NATO year (1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954) will, by means of a further revision, be assessed according to the same principles as apply to all countries and in the light of the development of natl income and financial capacity.

McCloy

740.5/2-2352 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, February 23, 1952—6 p. m.

1682. 1. HICOG considers that strict interpretation London agreements four FonMins wld limit controls in field atomic energy to those which properly fall under definition of atomic weapons to be eventually included in annex to EDC treaty. Bonn's tel sent Dept 1664 rptd Paris 535 London 444 Lisbon 9, Feb 21[2] gives verbatim text definition suggested by tripartite working party and notes that this definition does not include the key prohibition on facilities capable of producing atomic weapons or significant quantities of nuclear fuels or the less important limitation on production, processing and stockpiling of natural uranium. Deptel to Bonn 1694 rptd London 4036 Paris 4965 Lisbon Tosec 23 Feb 21[3] (which apparently crossed above reftel) now raises addit problems re scope FedReps commitments in field of atomic energy.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and Lisbon.

[2] Not printed. It reported that an American-British-French working party, acting under instructions of the Allied High Commissioners for Germany, had recommended the following definition of atomic weapons:

"Atomic weapon includes any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilize, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury, or mass poisoning. It includes also any part, device, or assembly especially designed for, or primarily useful in, such a weapon. The production of less than 500 grams of nuclear fuel per year will not be considered as contributing to the production of atomic weapons.

"Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, U-233, U-235, uranium containing over 2.1 percent by weight of U-235, materials containing the foregoing or any other materials capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy thru nuclear chain reaction of the material." (740.5/2-2152)

2. It is HICOGs tentative view that some device outside of EDC framework, such as third letter from Chancellor will be necessary if commitment re facilities for production of atomic weapons and nuclear fuels is to be obtained. This could, if para 7–A–(iii) of FonMins Sept decisions not abrogated by London decisions, also include provisos re export and source material controls and security checks along lines Depts previous recommendations as well as commitments on legislation in atomic energy field.

3. Comments US delegation to London now at Lisbon solicited urgently re fourth sentence Deptel to Bonn 1694 rptd Lisbon Tosec 23.[4]

McCloy

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[3] Not printed. It proposed consideration be given to measures to assure that the Federal Republic of Germany would undertake to maintain controls in the field of atomic energy beyond the prohibition of the production of atomic bombs. (740.5/2–1952) Such an undertaking had been specified in paragraph 7 A(iii) of the letter of instructions from the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers to the Allied High Commissioners for Germany agreed upon at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in Washington, Sept. 10–14, 1951. Documentation on those meetings, including the instructions under reference, is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1163 ff.

[4] The sentence under reference reads as follows: "Not clear to us whether this problem considered at London or whether instr para 7 A(iii) remains in effect."

740.5/2–2652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET NIACT Lisbon, February 26, 1952—2 a. m.

19. Foll is msg from the three FonMins to Chancellor Adenauer. We have given immed consideration to a report just recd of the Ger

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Washington as Secto 82 (the source text). It was presumably prepared during the meetings reported upon in the U.S. Delegation record of the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting of Feb. 25, 10 p. m., p. 159. The circumstances attending the transmission of this and the next following four messages from Lisbon to Bonn were explained in telegram 24, Feb. 26, 4 a. m., from Lisbon to Bonn, repeated to Washington as Secto 86:

"We are transmitting to you in separate tels bearing five previous numbers [telegrams 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23, from Lisbon to Bonn, repeated to Washington as Secto 82, 83, 81, 84, and 85, respectively] msg from three FonMins re Ger financial contribution to def and revised drafts of exchange of communications between FonMins and Chancellor and draft quadripartite communiqué. These documents, which shld be communicated immed to Chancellor, are substitute for Ger drafts brought to Lisbon by tripartite *rapporteur* group.

"It is expected of FonMins to get Ger agrmt to these documents in time to proposals with regard to acceptance of the recommendations of the members of the exec bureau of the TCC for the amount of the German financial contribution to def in 1952–1953.[2] As we understood the position, you are prepared to accept these recommendations as the basis for the contribution. You also express the hope that in the pre-contractual, pre-EDC period expenditures of the 3 powers will be kept to a minimum, with 500 million DM suggested as a possible figure.

We are all pleased that you have so promptly responded to our hope for an early and favorable decision. While we cannot commit ourselves to a figure in the matter, of reductions which we may be able to make in our own expenditures in the pre-contractual, pre-EDC period, particularly as our calculations are in excess of the amt you suggest, we can assure you of our earnest intention to make our best efforts to keep these expenditures down.

As we told you in London, we have considered it to be of the utmost importance to reach and announce agrmt on this matter while we are here in Lisbon. We have been able to report very encouragingly about the progress of our pol arrangements with the FedRep. NATO has futhermore given full and final approval to the plans for the EDC and to the arrangements for the relationships between EDC and NATO. We know you have not overlooked the deep significance of these actions. They represent a great political success and have produced an atmosphere of confidence, of achievement and of progress toward Eur unification which is extremely encouraging.

This atmosphere must be strengthened by the way in which we complete the chain of achievement and understanding in announcing that Ger's def contribution is now fixed and agreed. The documents which have been proposed to us are not satis as a basis for such an announcement. The substance of the position taken on the recommendations of the members of the exec bureau is satisfactory but this position is so obscured as to be unrecognizable. The agrmt with us ought to be as straight-forward and simple as possible and ought to be divorced from Ger domestic argumentation. We are accordingly suggesting [apparent omission] generally. This may well be regarded as the touchstone of the cooperation which the Atlantic community can expect from a restored Germany.

[Acheson]

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permit release of communiqué in Lisbon and Bonn at 1800 Tues GMT i.e.—1900 Bonn time. This will require our receiving reply by 1700 GMT. Secy leaves Lisbon for US 2100.

"Brit are also transmitting texts, which may arrive earlier in their system. Suggest you coordinate texts with them." (740.5/2–2652) Telegram 20 is not printed; for text of telegrams 21, 22, and 23, all dated Feb. 26, see *infra*, and pp. 260 and 261, respectively.

[2] The report on the German proposals under reference here was reported upon in telegrams 1678, 1679, 1680, and 1681, Feb. 23, from Bonn to Washington. The first three are not printed; for text of telegram 1681, see p. 256.

740.5/2–2652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET NIACT LISBON, February 26, 1952—3 a. m.

21. For McCloy. Please give this msg from the Secy personally to the Chancellor.

"In the next few hours we shall succeed or fail in the last step in a truly historic series of achievements—the London meetings, the Lisbon mtgs, and the final agrmts with the FedRep. I have done my best solve all the problems involved with a view to the parliamentary problems of all of us. Yours, exposed as you are to hostile propaganda, have been always before me. I think you have seen this.

We have recd your govt's views on the financial matters. What you propose to do is good. What has been proposed to be said is bad. Eden, Schuman and I are sending you proposals for procedure and announcement.

What I wish to add, personally, is the vast importance of your govt's agreeing to our suggestions quickly. If the settlement of these questions—and those of the controlled items of armaments production which I hope to work out among us three tomorrow along lines which you know—can be added to the achievements of London and Lisbon, we shall have made vast progress. Without it all is obscure.

What is needed now is another of those acts of statesmanship of which you have proved yourself so capable in the past—an act of help to me in my efforts—which only you can give. I am counting on it. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson."

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Washington as Secto 81. Regarding the circumstances attending the preparation and transmission of this message, see footnote 1, *supra*.

740.5/2–2652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET NIACT LISBON, February 26, 1952—3 p. m.

22. 1. Fol is text of draft reply to Chancellor from FonMins: The Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and France have received the Federal Chancellor's communication.[2] They have noted with satisfaction the willingness of the Federal Govt to make a defense contribution in an amount which is based on the recommendation of the members of the executive bureau of the temporary council committee which was for DM 11.25 billion for the financial year 1952/53 beginning July 1, and which would be comparable with the contributions of the principle

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Washington as Secto 84 (the source text) and also to Paris and London. Regarding the circumstances attending the preparation and transmission of this message, see footnote 1, p. 258.

[2] Not printed.

member countries of NATO. They have taken note that payments will be made on a monthly average of DM 850 million from the entry into force of the contractual arrangements and the treaty establishing the EDC and will be used exclusively for the Federal Republic's contribution to EDC and the support of allied forces in the Federal Republic.

The FonMins confirm the Federal Govt's understanding of the procedure which they contemplate to be followed in future years in determining the total German contribution to defense. As they pointed out in the discussions at London, the agreement of the other interested countries to this procedure will, no doubt, have to be obtained.

The FonMins understand that provisions regarding all these matters will be included in the appropriate convention to be annexed to the general agreement.

The FonMins have requested the allied authorities in Germany to take the necessary steps to keep expenditures for occupation costs, during the period prior to the entry into force of the general agreement and the treaty establishing the European Defense Community, to the minimum. However, the amount of these expenditures cannot be determined at this time. They must also point out that there can be no link between the amount of occupation costs paid during that period and the Federal Republic's contribution to defense after the entry into force of contractual arrangements.

The FonMins have taken note of the Federal Govt's statement regarding the possibility of its being obliged to appeal for financial assistance to carry out its defense obligations. The three powers are making a maximum effort in the interest of western defense. On the assumption that the Federal Republic was making a like contribution to defense out of its own resources, a request for aid from it would receive the same consideration as that of other countries participating in the common effort.[3]

Acheson

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[3] The proposed text reported here was subsequently sent to Chancellor Adenauer together with an explanatory footnote. Regarding the final approval by the Allied High Commissioners of the text and the text of the footnote, see telegram 1747, Feb. 28, from Bonn, p. 264.

740.5/2-2652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET NIACT

Lisbon, February 26, 1952—4 p. m.

23. Following is draft quadripartite press communiqué to be issued simultaneously in Lisbon and Bonn:

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Washington as Secto 85 (the source text) and also to London and Paris. Regarding the circumstances attending the preparation and transmission of this message, see footnote 1, p. 258.

The negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the French Republic on the one hand and the German Federal Republic on the other, regarding the amount of the Federal Republic's financial contribution to defense in 1952/53, have now resulted in agreement.

The Federal Government has declared that it will base its defense contribution in the NATO year 1952/53 on the figure recommended by the members of the Executive Bureau of the TCC. This means that, in addition to those expenditures for defense purposes in the regular public budget of the Federal Republic, there will be an average monthly defense contribution of 850 million deutschmarks following establishment of the European Defense Community. It is proposed that the amounts of future total German defense contributions will, of course, be established under the same principles as apply to all participating countries.

In the meantime, the three powers will exercise their best effort to maintain at the lowest possible figure their occupation costs for the period prior to the coming into effect of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community.

ACHESON

740.5/3–152 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Embassy in Portugal[1]

SECRET [BONN, February 26, 1952—3 p. m.]

20. For three Foreign Ministers Lisbon.

Chancellor accepts all documents submitted by three Foreign Ministers with fol minor amendments.

First, in ltr from Chancellor to the three Foreign Ministers delete sentence reading "these payments will cover its contribution to the EDC and the support of Allied forces in the Fed Rep" and substitute the fol "these payments will include the support of Allied forces in the Fed Rep".

Second, in ltr of reply to Chancellor by three Foreign Ministers delete phrase "and will be used exclusively for the Fed Rep's contribution to EDC and the support of Allied forces in the Fed Rep" and substitute the fol "and will include the support of Allied forces in the Fed Rep".

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[1] The source text was transmitted in an unnumbered telegram, Mar. 1, from Bonn to the Department of State in response to the Department's request for this text. This message was discussed at the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting of Feb. 26, 5 p. m.; see pp. 167–174, for reports on that meeting.

The above two changes are necessary to safeguard the Fed Rep position as fols: The Fed Rep proceeds on the assumption that in the sense of the EDC treaty the payments for the support of the Allied forces in the Fed Rep are reckoned as part of the Fed Rep contribution to EDC. In case you are not in a position to accept the above two amendments the Chancellor wld be willing to accept the documents as they stand with footnotes which safeguards Fed Rep position in the exact words set forth above.

Unless we hear to the contrary from you will proceed to publish the communiqué in Bonn at 1800 GMT (1900 Bonn time).

McCloy

740.5/2–2652 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 26, 1952—9 p. m.

26. 1. Agmt reached at London among three Fon Mins and with Adenauer did not constitute prohibition of manufacture of atomic weapons and other items so far agreed (re 3rd para Bonn's 1682 to Dept, Feb 23, rptd Lisbon 17, London 453, Paris 548[2]). It merely provides basis whereby Gers agree to respect EDC decisions not to order production these items in strategically exposed areas (which everyone agrees to understand to mean the FedRep).

2. Moreover, London agrmts do in effect abrogate para 7 A (III) of Fon Mins Sept decisions. Other UK–Fr, and US drafts prepared by experts for consideration tripartite Mins did contain, though widely divergent on other points, exactly same language obligating Fed Govt "to maintain controls in field of atomic energy" and to maintain security check on researchers in this field. However, this provision was not referred to in Mins discussions and completely dropped out of agrmt with Adenauer. Therefore, agrmt only covers atomic weapons, not atomic energy, and must moreover be read in light of comments in para 1 of this tel.

3. US del here inclined to think HICOM Working Party's definition (Bonn's 1664 to Dept Feb 21, rptd Paris 535, London 444, Lisbon 9[3]) is acceptable and next to last sentence thereof is ingenious if backhanded way of putting some limitation on production of nuclear fuel.

Acheson

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Washington as Secto 97 (the source text) and also to London and Paris.

[2] *Ante*, p. 257.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *ibid.*

740.5/2-2852 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 28, 1952—7 p. m.

1747. Inform Defense. AgSec from Slater. Fol is brief summary report informal mtg of three HICOMers held 28 February.

1. *FedRep fin contrib to Western def.*

I opened mtg with statement my disappointment at report that Fr were now taking position they wld not agree to accept ltr from three FonMins to Chancellor[2] with inclusion of footnote contained in para 3 of Bonn sent Lisbon 20 of 26 February.[3] I informed mtg that I had informed Adenauer at 1900 hours 26 February (in accordance with reftel) that his proposals had been accepted and, therefore, it wld be very embarrassing to reopen this matter with him. Kirkpatrick then said cable report of FM mtg[4] stated that altho Schuman cld not accept amendments to texts as contained in reftel, Fr cld accept both footnotes. (Word footnotes—in plural—appeared twice in his cable from Lisbon as it had in ours to Lisbon.) I pointed out Chancellor had made it abundantly clear that acceptance of either amendments to text or insertion footnotes which clearly stated FedRep's reservation were a condition to his agrmt to global contrib. Voting implications were also mentioned by him in explaining his proposals. Further, I did not believe he was attempting to obtain an overriding position for FedRep vis-à-vis Fr.

After considerable discussion and telephone calls between Berard and Schuman, Fr agreed to accept both footnotes provided that the one contained in Chancellor's reply wld clearly indicate that the vote [*note?*] merely stated a Ger position without being binding on the FonMins. Berard said Schuman's main concern was that discussion on voting issue shld not be prejudiced by current exchange of ltrs. After clearance with Paris after the mtg, Berard gave me fol wording which I will personally give to Chancellor, as chairman, later this afternoon to determine if agreeable with him.

The footnote shld now commence with the phrase: "The three Fon Mins have taken cognizance of the position of the FedRep according to which the FedRep proceeds on the assumption that in the sense of the EDC treaty etc." Same as footnote in reftel.[5]

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and London.

[2] For the proposed text of the letter under reference here, see telegram 22, Feb. 26, from Lisbon to Bonn, p. 260.

[3] Not printed.

[4] For reports of the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting of Feb. 26, 5 p. m. under reference here, see p. 167–174.

[5] Telegram 1824, Mar. 4, from Bonn, briefly reporting on an informal session of the Allied High Commissioners that day, indicated that the High Commission had agreed that the text of the letter from the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers to Chancellor Adenauer, as amended here, should be sent immediately to the three capitals for signature by the Foreign Ministers. (740.5/3-452)

Kirkpatrick insisted real problem to be solved now was not exchange of ltrs or presence of footnote, but rather question of voting formula within EDC. Question of ltrs wld be academic if Ger conditions for a rep vote in accordance with their contrib were not accepted. Kirkpatrick said that Fr wld, in his opinion, be most ill-advised not to include in their over-all contrib for voting purposes the amt which they expend on the Indochina campaign. (Fr had previously indicated Paris had not yet decided whether to include Indochina expenses.) If France did not include this figure, Ger might have a preponderance of voting strength within EDC, a fact which was of vital concern to UK. (In this connection, Fr replied their govt did not wish Benelux to be in position to review or pass on Fr expenses in Indochina as Fr Govt wanted free hand this matter. Benelux wld probably claim expenditures were too high.) While I agreed with Kirkpatrick that voting issue was of primary importance and must be resolved as soon as possible if further progress was to be made on subj of fin contrib, I stated it was still to Allied advantage (if only psychological) to have signature now on fin contrib commitment.

2. *Publication war criminals records.*

In accordance with para 2 of London sent Dept Secto 16 rptd info Paris 1780, Bonn 310, Lisbon 143 of 18 February,[6] we agreed to instruct experts to compile facts on records of war criminals with particular ref to those who fall in fol categories: (*a*) those who have had previous criminal convictions; (*b*) those who had personally committed murder (as opposed to those who had given orders to others to do so); and (*c*) those who had been convicted of concentration camp atrocities. I added and they agreed that guilty mil leaders shld also be included. It was further agreed task shld be completed by end of March in order that info cld be made public in advance of Bundestag consideration of proposed contractual provision establishing mixed boards on clemency and criminals of war.

I took occasion to announce that except in special cases involving compassionate grounds, I did not intend to take any action on outstanding petitions which have been or wld be submitted to me, but rather that I intended to leave such cases for consideration by mixed board when established. Kirkpatrick indicated he hoped to finish review which he was currently undertaking in about two months time.

3. Security safeguards being reported separately in next two fol cables.[7]

McCloy

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[6] Not printed. It reported upon the Acheson–Eden–Schuman–Adenauer meeting of Feb. 18, 10 a. m. For a record of that meeting, see the Laukhuff minutes, p. 60.

[7] Telegram 1748, *infra;* telegram 1749 is not printed, but see footnote 5, *infra*.

740.5/2–2852 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, February 28, 1952—7 p. m.

1748. Pass Defense. AgSec from Slater. Fol is brief summary report portion HICOMers informal mtg Feb 28[2] on security safeguards.

1. Verbatim text definitions (other than atomic weapons and aircraft reported in immed fol cable[3]) as fols:

"*Biological weapons.*

Biological weapons are defined as any weapons, equip or apparatus expressly designed to use harmful insects or other harmful living or dead organisms, pathogenic organisms, or their toxic products of such nature and in amounts making them capable of being used for milit purposes, including such organisms and their toxic products quantities not exceeding peaceful civilian requirements of the above insects, organisms or their toxic products will not be considered as biological weapons. *Note:* The above definition of biological weapons does not cover facilities capable of producing such weapons, subject of one of the most important of the integrated prohibitions included in Appendix C of the final report of the TGG.[4] It is understood that such facilities are included in provisions of the convention of the EDC. If this is not so, it is recommended that above definition be supplemented by a provision with respect to these facilities.

Chemical weapons.

Chemical weapons are defined as any weapon, equip or apparatus expressly designed to use the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant growth regulating, antilubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance for milit purposes, including the chemicals capable of use in such weapons. Quantities of the above chemicals not exceeding peaceful civilian requirements will not be considered as chemical weapons. *Note:* Above definition of chemical weapons does not cover facilities capable of producing such weapons, subj of one of the most important of the integrated prohibitions included in Appendix C of the final report of the TGG. It is understood that such facilities are included in provisions of the convention of the EDC. If this is not so, it is recommended that above definition be supplemented by provision with respect to these facilities.

Long range and guided missiles.

Long range or guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the velocity or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launch by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile (combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the velocity) included in this definition are the V-type weapons, developed in the recent war, and subsequent modifications thereof. Also included are any parts, devices or assemblies especially designed for use in or with such a weapon.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Paris and London.

[2] For a report on another portion of this meeting, see telegram 1747, Feb. 28, from Bonn, *supra*.

[3] See footnote 5, below.

[4] Documentation on the activities of the Tripartite Group on Germany during 1951 is included in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, pp. 1647 ff.

Naval vessels.

By naval vessels other than minor defensive craft is meant all warships over—displacement tons, all submarines and other types of warships with propulsion equip utilizing nuclear or special high efficiency fuels (e.g., the Walther system)."

2. Fr consider control productive capacity not adequately provided by EDC treaty and used atomic weapon approach to reopen whole capacity issue. I explained since atomic energy field a special case, special handling justified and stated that based on my talks with him I believed Chancellor wld probably accept without objection. Kirkpatrick equally opposed to considering capacity controls within framework instructions from Fon Mins which he held were limited to defining weapons. Furthermore, he stressed it was impossible to define precisely what constitutes capacity. Fr extremely persistent this point and because of it no agreement on any point was possible.

3. Instructions from Admiralty UK suggested substitution "a long range or guided missile is a weapon whose velocity, direction of motion or time of burst can be influenced after the instant of its launch by any device (other than time or contact fuses) inside or outside the weapon" for the first sentence of missiles definition. I pointed out such a definition wld include not only all influence mines but also proximity fused projectiles. Fr accepted at once as it covered one of their naval vessels reservations. I rejected on grounds this a subterfuge to broaden list Fon Mins agreed to with Chancellor. Kirkpatrick did not press and promised seek recision this instruction.

I agreed limit vessels to 1500 displacement tons. Fr pressed for prohibition ASDIC to which both Kirkpatrick and I objected. Poncet seeking further instruction from govt.

4. Berard stated Schuman agreed drop question gun barrels only if they get satisfaction within EDC re propellants which according to UK cable indicated new capacity to be constructed only Sardinia or North Africa.

5. Agreement was reached on draft letter from Adenauer to govts and definition atomic weapons. (See immed following cable.[5])

6. Am concerned over Fr tactics on security safeguards and believe unless we restrict our efforts to simple definitions of weapons on special list we run risk of reopening entire case with FedRep which wld jeopardize progress made to date.

7. After HICOMers adjourned, working group met briefly at which time Fr indicated they were primarily concerned over erecting com-

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[5] Telegram 1749, Feb. 28, from Bonn, not printed. (740.5/2-2852) The draft text was further revised in subsequent negotiations and exchanges. For further documentation on the definition of and limitations on atomic weapons, see volume II.

plete plants designed for production of weapons these categories except for naval vessels.

8. In WG talks Brit proposed revised wording re propulsion equip reading "all naval vessels powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines or jets". Request Dept instructions soonest. At same time Fr expressed desire to include "all vessels and craft fitted for the reception or launching of aircraft or guided missiles". UK lukewarm this proposal, US objected. Fr agreed to recommend to their govt this proposal be dropped.

McCloy

740.5/2–2952 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 29, 1952—5:52 p. m.

1801. For McCloy. Please deliver personally following message from Secretary to the Chancellor. Msg replies to Adenauer's telecommunication Feb 27, 1952 cabled separately.[2] Adenauer reply is to Lisbon 21 sent niact Bonn Feb 26, 1952.[3] I am most grateful for your thoughtful and appreciative reply to my personal message from Lisbon. Under your expert leadership the Federal Government has indeed taken steps to strengthen the free world that will be remembered in history. I must add, too, that the progress of our recent undertakings owes an inestimable debt to your skillful statecraft, wisdom, and untiring effort. I trust we can all now look forward confidently to an early and successful conclusion of negotiations on both the Contractual Agreements and the European Defense Community Treaty. Sincerely yours"

ACHESON

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[1] The source text is signed personally by the Secretary.

[2] Not printed.

[3] *Ante*, p. 260.

GREECE AND TURKEY

Editorial Note

The question of the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Alliance was first considered by the North Atlantic Council in 1950 and was further discussed in detail among the member governments during 1951. The Greek and Turkish Governments formally renewed their request for membership in May 1951. Following prolonged study of the Greek-Turkish accession issue by the NATO governments, the North Atlantic Council Deputies adopted on

October 17, 1951 a protocol inviting Greece and Turkey to join the North Atlantic Treaty. The draft protocol modified the definition of the territories and forces contained in Article 6 of the original North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949. The formal accession of Greece and Turkey took effect on February 15, 1952. For the text of the Protocol of October 15, 1951, see 3 UST 43; TIAS No. 2390; 126 UNTS 350. For documentation on the negotiation of the protocol, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume III, Part 1, pages 460 ff.

740.5/2-1352 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1952—7:04 p. m.

710. FYI Dept understands Mil Comite has subject to Ital reservation discussed below approved for NAC action following Command arrangements:[2]

1. Ground forces of Grk and Turk operate under over-all command of SACEUR through CINCSOUTH.
2. Grk and Turk Air Forces report to Air Commander Southern Eur Command.
3. Naval forces of Grk and Turk remain under own national Chiefs of Staff.
4. Details of Southern Command will be worked out by SACEUR and national authorities and submitted to Standing Group.
5. Under this arrangement only organizational change to NATO command structure is addition of Turk and Grk land and air force command under Commander in Chief South.
6. System of command and naval forces in Medit and coordination with Army and Air Force reserved pending further consideration with object of submitting an agreed report to the Council at its next mtg. Progress on org of ME Command will be reported to Council at next mtg.

Itals have reserved on point they cannot agree to arrangement which makes final the placing of Turk and Grk land forces directly under CINC Allied Forces Southern Eur. We believe all member nations can be expected apply maximum pressure upon Itals to withdraw their reservation.

Dept understands Grk and Turk observers aware mil comite discussions and informing their govts thereof. Because we believe desirable Grks Turks estab direct channels with appropriate NATO bodies soonest feasible, we think US shld not initiate bilateral discussions this matter Grks or Turks.

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[1] This telegram, which was also sent to Athens as 3838, was drafted by Moore (GTI), approved by Dorsz for transmission, and signed for the Acting Secretary by Parsons (RA).

[2] Summarized here is the contents of document MC 38/2, entitled "Command Arrangements Regarding Greece and Turkey." The summarized paper was approved by the NATO Defense Ministers at their meeting on Feb. 21 (see telegram LibDef 11, Feb. 21, p. 119) and by the North Atlantic Council at its meeting on Feb. 22 (see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, p. 136).

WEBB

740.5/2–1952 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Portugal [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 19, 1952—6 p. m.

436. For Dorsz. Emb Athens urges Sec and Mr. Lovett as well as Gen Bradley indicate to Grk Reps at Lisbon our displeasure and anxiety at polit intervention GAF.[2] Dept believes, if opportunity offers, that emphasizing our views at that level might have salutary effect. Sakellariou who is prime mover in "purge" of GAF, will be member of Grk Del.

WEBB

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Porter (GTI) and signed for the Acting Secretary by Rountree.

[2] This sentence is a paraphrase of telegram 3792, Feb. 19, from Athens, not printed. (740.5/2–1952)

740.5/2–2052 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Lisbon [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, February 20, 1952—7 : 43 p. m.
PRIORITY

Tosec 18. For Dorsz and Kirkpatrick. Reports reaching Dept indicate Athens trial Commies and collaborators not receiving warranted attention in Eur press.[2] Dept believes this unusual and excellent opportunity demonstrate Cominform technique of subversion and interference internal affairs non-Commie nations which is common danger to all Western nations. Stimulus for wider coverage might be induced by very brief Grk exposé of these events at NATO mtg calling attention to internatl implications of trials. If no objection perceived suggest Grk Del Lisbon be approached recommending they raise this matter and offer complete record of probe and trial to NATO govts. Believe Lisbon or NATO dateline wld greatly increase interest in subj and promote Western Eur press coverage.

WEBB

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Dixon (P/POL) and signed for the Acting Secretary by Rountree. The telegram was repeated for information to Athens as 3959.

[2] Comprehensive documentation on U.S. relations with Greece, including papers on the incident referred to here, is printed in volume VIII.

781.00/2-2552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State, at Lisbon[1]

SECRET NIACT ATHENS, February 25, 1952—5 p. m.

1. Ref Lisbon's 7 Feb 23.[2]

(1) Venizelos . . . misrepresented situation to you. Both Emb and MSA/G have done everything imaginable to help present govt function successfully on both econ and polit fronts. Govt's repeated failures, hesitation and even apparently deliberate stalling caused us to make repeated representation to govt leaders. Unfortunate for governmental sensibilities they permitted news of these meetings to leak. Naturally they were distorted and played up by opposition press to govt's detriment.

Further in view of Govt's dismal showing its thin parliament majority and general uneasiness throughout country Emb felt it essential to examine possible alternatives to present recent coalition. Not to do so wld certainly have been remiss. We have been most careful to give no indication of favoritism for any particular party or group of parties and I am confident any reasonable witness wld certify to our absolute public impartiality. Hence Venizelos suggestion of statement by Emb appears unnecessary . . . especially in view my press statement before leaving US to effect that Greek people and not US Emb chooses Greek Govt.

(2) Liberal-Rally coalition which we had hoped for as eventual outgrowth of current confusion now seems virtually ruled out as Venizelos disclosure to King of his secret mtg with Papagos has confirmed Rally leaders doubts as to Venizelos dependability. Further leading Liberals realizing precariousness of their present position and minor roles they wld play in harness with Papagos have made it clear to Venizelos that they wld not support alliance with Greek Rally. Consequently we are re-examining situation but frankly see little hope of substantial improvement other than through elections.

(3) In Kitrilakis affair Venizelos has been of no help. . . .

Govt's or more properly Palace's intervention in Grk Army far bigger problem than mere dismissal of one Lt Gen. For example govt insisted on exploiting idea affair for purely partisan reasons and only yesterday King's man and Chief of Army Staff Tsakalotos told Hart he was proposing important changes for a score or more senior officers. It is also clear that Defense Min Sakellariou who is simply Palace rep in present govt is determined to purge high command of pro-Papagos officers. It seems also likely that when Sakellariou has finished Plastiras plans purge of his own.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to the Department of State as 3873 (the source text).

[2] Not printed. It transmitted a summary account of that portion of the Acheson-Venizelos conversation of Feb. 23 dealing with the political crisis in Greece; for Secretary Acheson's memorandum of the entire conversation, see p. 147. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 102)

(4) Release of Commie prisoners bears no relationship to Lib-EPEK agreement on quite reasonable draft leniency law which has not yet been introduced in Parliament. As even Venizelos well knows only gauge of leniency law is its implementation. Our concern here has been with nonchalance with which govt has released Commie exiles on indefinite furloughs and ease with which number of seemingly dangerous Commies have been freed by examining comites. . . .

I hope you will have another opportunity to tell Venizelos of our concern and perhaps to warn him that an army adversely affected by polit interference might not be most effective user of American aid. You might also remind him that we still hope for an able and stable Grk Govt which his cooperation might greatly facilitate.[3]

Peurifoy

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[3] Telegram 12, Feb. 26, from Lisbon to Athens, repeated to the Department of State as 406, reported that this message had reached Lisbon too late for the Secretary to see Venizelos before leaving for Washington. (740.5/2-2652)

AID TO FRANCE

740.5/2-2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET LISBON, February 24, 1952—4 p. m.

Secto 62. Following discussions over past few days [2] general agreement reached with French this a. m.—

a. French will present 1400 billion franc budget on assumption of US aid of $500 million during fiscal 1952. This aid to consist of $300 million direct economic and $200 million offshore procurement with emphasis on Indochina needs. US Military expenditures accepted as likely to reach $100 million and, accordingly, previous assurance of $600 million recognized as fulfilled.

b. French military program will be 12 divisions, 27 air squadrons and navy approximately as at present.

French presented above force figures to NATO for inclusion in force plan approved this afternoon by Council.

There are still number of points precised [*sic*] with French. Prime Minister Faure and Foreign Minister Schuman emphasized relationship of Indochina burden on France to France's NATO contribution. Faure stressed 1400 billion franc budget involved increase of 125 billion francs to be borne by France above 1100 called for by TCC. It has been necessary to provide 50 billion francs to take care of increase in price since June and 60 billion francs to take care of stepped-up operations Indochina. Consequently net additional financing available for rearmament program is less than difference between 1190 and 1400 (i.e. 210 billion less 110 billion or 100 billion). French strongly stressed also consequences of cutback in existing contracts and failure to place planned contracts, both as regards consequent unemployment and also failure to develop industrial mobilization basis required for future armament efforts. Requested urgent US consideration of financing this production for US use or end-item program for all countries.[3]

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris for information.

[2] For the agreed memorandum of conversation of the meeting of American and French representatives on Feb. 23, see telegram Actel 9, Feb. 25, p. 142; see also telegram LibDef 14, Feb. 23, reporting on the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers that day, p. 146.

ACHESON

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[3] For the agreed text of the U.S.-French memorandum of understanding of Feb. 25, see *infra*.

751.5 MSP/2-2752

United States-French Memorandum of Understanding[1]

TOP SECRET

[LISBON,] February 25, 1952.

I—In conformity with the engagements undertaken in common in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with specific reference to the approval by the Council on February 23, 1952 of the Supplementary Report of the Temporary Council Committee,[2] The Government of France and the Government of the United States have made the following arrangements:

1. The report of the Temporary Council Committee recommended French military expenditures at 1190 billion francs in October 1951 prices, of which 1100 billion francs was to be the financial contribution from France's own resources. This contribution was accepted by the French Government as corresponding to the economic and financial capabilities of the country. Since this report was prepared in addition

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[1] The source text is included in the Department of State files under cover of a memorandum of Feb. 27 from Lincoln Gordon of the Office of the Director of Mutual Security which explained that this copy was brought back to Washington by Harriman. Authenticity of the text was subsequently explained in telegram 5098, Feb. 29, to Paris (quoted in footnote 2, p. 142) reporting on the American-French meeting of Feb. 23. The text of this memorandum of understanding was originally sent to Washington in telegram Actel 10, Feb. 25, 9 p. m. from Paris, from Secretary Acheson to Acting Secretary Webb with instructions to bring the telegram to the attention of President Truman and to limit distribution to Lovett, Snyder, and Harriman. Actel 10 also contained the following explanatory sentence: "Following is American text of memorandum of understanding to be signed this afternoon after confirmation with French text." (751.5/2-2552) Two corrections to the memorandum were subsequently transmitted to Washington in telegram Actel 12, Feb. 26, from Lisbon. (751.5 MSP/2-2652) The nature of those changes is indicated in footnotes 3 and 5, below.

[2] For the text of the Supplementary Report of the Temporary Council Committee, Feb. 8, 1952, see p. 211; for an account of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on Feb. 23 at which the report was approved, see telegram Secto 59, Feb. 23, p. 150.

to necessary adjustments for price increases there has been an unforeseen increase in the expenditures for military operations in Indo-China. Faced with the necessity of constituting forces in Europe as well as carrying these additional charges in Indo-China, the French Government has decided to contribute to defense in excess of the amount recommended in the report. The French Government underlines, however, that it considers this supplementary effort to have an exceptional character and stresses that the level of its 1952 contribution is not to serve as a basis for any estimation which might subsequently be made by the NATO organizations of the capability of France to contribute to the defense effort in 1953.

2. In consideration of this decision by the French Government and subject to its approval by the French Parliament, the United States Government has decided, under the conditions set out below, to modify its program of assistance to France out of fiscal year 1952 funds in a manner which will provide additional budgetary resources for the defense effort to be carried out by France in 1952.

3. In view of these financial resources the French Government has declared itself prepared to establish the defense forces set forth in Annex B of the Supplementary Report of the Temporary Council Committee as approved by the North Atlantic Council in its meeting on February 23, 1952.

II—In accordance with this agreement the representatives of the United States Government informed the French Government that the program of assistance from the United States from fiscal year 1952 funds would be as follows:

1. An amount of $500 million is to be made available to the French Government from the funds voted by Congress for the fiscal year 1952 under the Mutual Security Act. This $500 million will give rise to financial resources in francs which can be applied to defense expenditures foreseen in the French budget for 1952.

The $500 million is to be broken down in the following four categories:

(*a*) An amount of $170 million in economic aid has already been made available to the French Government.

(*b*) An additional amount of $100 million in economic aid has been earmarked to be made available to the French Government before March 15, 1952. It is understood that of this $100 million an amount of $25 million is to be available to the French Government before the end of February, 1952. The two Governments agree that in future discussions to take place in Paris to determine the utilization of the French franc counterpart of American assistance, the counterpart of this additional amount of $100 million is to be earmarked for defense expenditures in Indo-China.

(*c*) An amount of $30 million will be applied to finance French orders for supplies in the United States for the needs of the forces in Indo-China. These funds are available for orders previously placed in the United States by the French Government.

(*d*) The remaining $200 million will be provided under "offshore purchase" contracts to be placed in France primarily for arms and equipment for the forces in Indo-China, and if funds of this amount cannot be fully utilized for forces in Indo-China, for arms and equipment for the French forces in Europe, subject to the following conditions:

1. The realization of these offshore purchases is dependent upon the conclusion very promptly of an agreement now being discussed between the two Governments concerning taxes in France applicable to United States expenditures in France for the common defense and upon the coming into force of that agreement soon enough to permit the offshore program to be carried out.
2. It will only be possible to place these contracts for offshore purchases if the French prices quoted are in general comparable to the going prices for similar items delivered in France from the United States.
3. Subject to the two reservations indicated under Paragraphs 1 and 2 immediately above, the United States Government will take all practicable measures to provide that the French Government will receive for balance of payments purposes the $200 million before the end of June, 1952, or in any case as soon thereafter as is administratively feasible, although the timing of the actual payments of liabilities in French francs under the contracts is to take place in accordance with the terms of the contracts. If the United States Government so elects, it may obtain this result by increasing the sum of $100 million foreseen under paragraph (*b*) above as a substitution for a comparable amount of offshore purchases under the $200 million foreseen in this paragraph. The United States Government may also substitute for a part of the $200 million procurement program, if this cannot all be placed in France, the purchase in the United States of items now budgeted by France for the needs of the forces in Indo-China.
4. The offshore purchases may, if the United States so elects, apply to contracts already placed, if the French Government had been forced to cancel such contracts.
5. The United States Government is to select the items to be included in the offshore purchase program of $200 million from the contracts which are scheduled for franc financing under the French defense program for 1952 as defined in Section V below.
6. The United States Government may, if it so elects and with the agreement of the French Government, make a contract with the latter for all or part of these items. Appropriate procedures are to be evolved permitting the representatives of the United States Government to participate in inspection to insure minimum quality standards of deliveries and in consultations to insure prompt payment arrangements with producing firms in France to encourage rapid production.

III—The two Governments agree that the receipts in dollars of the French Government coming from the expenditures of American forces in France, including the contribution by the United States to infrastructure and the purchase by the United States of material and supply,[3] are likely to reach a level of $100 million before June 30, 1952. Accordingly, the present arrangements are considered as superseding earlier discussions relative to assistance to France from fiscal year 1952 funds.

IV—The two Governments agree that the conversations now in progress with a view to facilitating the placement in France by the United States of contracts for material, supply, and labor, and for infrastructure, including airfields and other installations must be brought to a prompt and satisfactory conclusion in the interest of the common defense.

V—In view of the new program outlined by the representatives of the United States in Section II above, which will provide budgetary assistance not previously foreseen, the French representatives stated that the French Government will provide for a military budget of 1400 billion francs in 1952 (according to NATO definition of defense expenditures).

This budget of 1400 billion francs is to be based on the provision of the forces committed by France to NATO at the Ninth Session of the Council at Lisbon and included in Annex B of the Supplementary Report of the Temporary Council Committee, dated February 24, 1952.

VI—(*a*) The two Governments recognize that the French program of 1400 billion francs set out under Section V above will result, despite the $200 million offshore purchases to be effected by the United States Government, in the cancellation of a certain number of production contracts and the severe curtailment of new contracts. Thus the level of defense production in France will be seriously reduced.[4]

It is therefore requested urgently by the French representatives that the United States Government carry out purchases in France over and above the program of $200 million of offshore purchases mentioned under Section II above, either for the needs of the French forces or for the needs of the forces of the United States and of the forces of other countries of NATO. The representatives of the United States indicated that this possibility was not excluded if the prices and technical conditions were acceptable, without, however, being in a position to take any engagements on this subject. It was understood that the French Government would present to the Government of the United States a list of equipment which is now being produced in France or which could be undertaken within a very short time for possible procurement by the United States.

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[3] Telegram Actel 12, Feb. 26 (see footnote 1, above) amended this sentence by adding the phrase "for its own use" after the word "supply".

[4] Telegram Secto 76, Feb. 25, from Bruce, Lovett, and Harriman in Lisbon, reported that, with reference to Section VI, paragraph *a* of the memorandum of understanding "to be signed today", Bourgès-Maunoury considered the question of off-shore purchase over and above $200 million particularly urgent and had instructed his Ministry to prepare information on French production in progress which might have to be cut back or canceled. Telegram Secto 76 requested that American officials in Paris prepare such information for consideration in advance of the scheduled meeting in Paris on Mar. 3 of Draper, Pawley, and officials of the French Ministry of Defense. (740.5/2–2552)

(*b*) The French Government pointed out that, in any case,[5] the French program as set forth in Section V above will only permit French forces to be equipped in small measure from the French financial resources foreseen. In view of this and the changes in the French military program, the French Government requests a review of the end-item program with a view to offsetting the shortfalls in French production by a reprogramming of end-items and also to including, if necessary, a wider range of articles in the end-item program for French forces. The French Government requests strongly that any deliveries of end-items which may be feasible for these purposes be filled at least in part by production in France financed in accordance with Paragraph (*a*) immediately above.

VII—The Government of the United States makes clear that it is not able to take any engagement with regard to fiscal year 1953 funds, including the utilization of counterpart, before Congress has voted the necessary funds. The Government of France is informed, however, that in the projected budget for the fiscal year 1953, the United States Government has made provision whereby the amount of funds which could be made available to France under economic aid and under offshore purchase program for end-items could during the course of that fiscal year be comparable to the level available in the fiscal year 1952. The Government of the United States also points out that any additional financial resources in French francs which might become available to the French Government from these funds can be utilized only in connection with defense expenditures in France and only in the course of the calendar year 1953.

For the Government of
the Republic of France:
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For the Government of
the United States of America:
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[5] In the text transmitted in telegram Actel 10 (see footnote 1, above), the phrase "in any case" was not surrounded by commas. Telegram Actel 12 directed that the commas be inserted.

AUSTRIAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

396.1 LO/2–1952 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, February 19, 1952—7 p. m.

3609. Secretary and British French Foreign Ministers did not discuss Austrian affairs in London. Secretary said before leaving for Lisbon that he wld discuss abbreviated treaty and proposed statement with Eden and Schuman in Lisbon[2] and that if agreement is reached, the statement will be issued by the three respective Foreign Offices rather than by the Ministers in Lisbon. The reason for this is to avoid associating Austria with NATO. It is possible that agreement on the abbreviated treaty and statement will be reached before the end of this week in which case a statement will be released by the Foreign Offices immediately thereafter.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to Vienna, Paris, Lisbon, Bonn, and Moscow.

GIFFORD

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[2] For Acheson's discussion of Austria with Eden on Feb. 22, see Battle's memorandum of conversation, p. 131; for the discussion of Austria with Eden and Schuman on Feb. 26, see the Laukhuff–Reinstein minutes, p. 163.

740.5/2–2252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LISBON, February 22, 1952—8 p. m.

Secto 45. Secy discussed Aust treaty with Eden this morning.[2] Understanding reached to be checked with Fr as soon as possible. Brit agreed that announcement by three western powers shld be made soon after Lisbon mtg, this to be made by govts in three capitals on the same day and hour.

Fol is agreed text.

[Here follows the agreed draft text of the statement on the Austrian Treaty. Differences between this draft text and the final agreed text approved by the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers on February 26 are indicated in the final text transmitted in telegram 2153, February 27, to Vienna, *infra*.]

Papers in connection with short treaty to be prepared and, if possible to be delivered approx three weeks after release of communiqué.

On prob of whether short treaty constitutes alternative draft, Brit reaffirmed understanding reached in Wash that matter shld be left blurred.

Will communicate as soon as talks with Fr completed.

ACHESON

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and Vienna.

[2] For the record of the Acheson–Eden meeting under reference, see Battle's memorandum of conversation, Feb. 22, p. 131.

396.1 LO/2–2852 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Austria[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 27, 1952—4:31 p. m.

PRIORITY NIACT

2153. Fol is our understanding text of statement Aust treaty agreed by FonMins (Secto 92 Feb 26 [2]). Word “independence” has been substituted for “sovereignty” in first sentence para two to conform with Moscow declaration [3] as agreed by FonMins.

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Allen (WE) and which Bonbright (EUR) signed for the Acting Secretary, was also sent to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.

“The govts of Fr, the UK and the US of Amer are concerned that arrangements which had been made for discussion by the deputies for the Aust treaty to take place on the 21st Jan, for the purpose of concluding the treaty, were frustrated owing to the failure of the Sov Dep to attend.

The three govts recall that Aust, the first country to be occupied by Hitler, was promised her independence [4] in a declaration made in Moscow in the name of the govts of the UK, the US of Amer and the USSR in 1943. France associated herself with this declaration on the 16th Nov 1943.[5] The govts then [6] announced their determination that Austria shld be liberated from Ger domination and re-established as a free and independent country. Yet 8 years afterwards and despite 258 mtgs of the Deputies to conclude the treaty, Austria has not yet regained her full independence. Her laws are submitted to a foreign body before being passed, her communications are controlled and censored, and all her territory is divided into zones occupied by fon troops with all the econ and moral hardship on the Aust people that this implies.

The Austs ardently desire to see terminated a state of affairs which shld rightly have ended long ago. The three govts fully share this aspiration and consider that renewed efforts shld be made to solve a problem with which the world ought not longer to be confronted. They are, therefore, urgently examining new proposals so that the four powers may be enabled to fulfill their pledge made in the Moscow declaration to restore to Austria her full freedom and independence.”

Statement will be released 10:30 am Washington time Feb 28. As stated Tosec 39 Feb 25 [7] Dept will emphasize at time announcement issued that no consideration is being given to conclusion of separate treaty for Austria without Sov participation. Aust Emb Wash informed.

Other phases abbreviated text program referred to in Secto 92 will be considered in separate msg.

Webb

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[2] Not printed. It was a summary account of the Acheson–Eden–Schuman meeting of Feb. 26, 11 a. m.; for the Reinstein–Laukhuff minutes of that meeting, see p. 163.

[3] The reference here is to the Tripartite Declaration on Austria of Nov. 1, 1943; for the text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 761.

[4] In the draft text of the statement on Austria agreed upon by the three Foreign Ministers on Feb. 22 (see telegram Secto 45, *supra*), the word “sovereignty” appeared here instead of the word “independence.”

[5] In the draft text of the statement on Austria of Feb. 22, this sentence reads as follows: “The French Committee of National Liberation made a similar declaration on the 16th November 1943.”

[6] In the draft text of this statement on Austria of Feb. 22, this sentence begins with the phrase “In this declaration they . . .”.

[7] Not printed.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 104

Report by the Council Deputies to the North Atlantic Council[1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] 6th February 1952.
C9–D/1

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Council at its Eighth Session requested that the Council Deputies complete their study of Soviet foreign policy, its aims and means, as a basis for a report to the next meeting of the Council (C8–D/13, paragraph (*b*); C8–R/5, paragraph 19).[2] In response to this request, the Council Deputies present the following report to the Ninth Session of the Council.

I. *Main basis of Soviet foreign policy*

1. Soviet foreign policy under Stalin is the offspring of a marriage between traditional Russian imperialism and Communist doctrine as developed by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It is revolutionary, expansionist and fundamentally hostile to all non-Communist forms of government. It has the character of an inspired crusade and is based on the belief that time and history are on the side of Communism. It aims ultimately at establishing a Communist world order dominated and directed from Moscow. No other form of Communism is acceptable; Soviet policy therefore risks alienating those Communists who do not accept the thesis that Soviet national interests are paramount, as happened in Yugoslavia.

2. Soviet foreign policy relies for its internal acceptance upon tra-

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[1] This report was considered by the Foreign Ministers at their meeting on the morning of Feb. 21 (see telegram Secto 34, Feb. 21, from Lisbon, p. 120) and at the third meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the afternoon of Feb. 22 (see telegram Secto 49, Feb. 22, p. 136).

This report was evaluated in document LIS D–17b, Feb. 19, 1952, one of a series of preparatory papers drafted in the Department of State in advance of the Lisbon session of the North Atlantic Council, as follows:

"As a result of discussions at the working group level and by the Council Deputies, we have been able to reach agreement with the other Governments on all major points in the report prepared on this subject. This report now represents an agreed paper, which in its final version includes several concessions to objections which we had raised to the original draft paper. We have reservations now about only two relatively minor points: we are not convinced that the 'USSR is ready to give China the main role' in Southeast Asia (paragraph 10), and we disagree that the Soviet intelligentsia supports the regime to the extent indicated in paragraph 8, Annex.

"While our position eventually was accepted, there was a strong tendency at the working group level to interpret Soviet policy toward Germany as one of offering 'considerable concessions' in order to secure a 'neutralized united Germany'—an interpretation which we strongly oppose—and there is the possibility that this view may be advanced again." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 105)

[2] For documentation on the Council decision described here, done at Rome on Nov. 28, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 693 ff.

ditionally strong Russian nationalist sentiments, supported by the ideology of the "liberation of the masses" through Communism, and by the thesis that the Soviet people is threatened by hostile capitalist countries. The internal political conditions which support Soviet foreign policy are set forth in the Annex. A review of the Soviet economic and military potential appears in the joint report of the Council Deputies and the Military Committee to the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, entitled "Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at present and in the immediate future" (MC 33 [3]).

3. A primary factor in all Soviet policy is that the Soviet Union itself, as the seat of the Stalinist power and the essential base of the Stalinist world revolution, must not be exposed to any excessive risk. Fear of encirclement and of aggression, whether real or artificial, is therefore a characteristic of Soviet policy. Hence the Soviet leaders' first preoccupation is to secure the strategic approaches to the USSR and to prevent the establishment in Europe or Asia of forces capable of threatening the USSR. For this purpose the Soviet Union seeks to consolidate Russian control over the states in the Soviet bloc, to extend this area wherever an opportunity is offered to do so without serious risk to the USSR or to its interests, and to obstruct the growth of Western strength and unity. This process serves at the same time to expand the Communist Empire.

4. The Soviet leaders consider NATO a threat to the success of Soviet policies and perhaps a potential threat to their own security. To weaken and disrupt NATO is therefore an immediate Soviet objective. Similarly, the Soviet Government seeks to paralyse any non-Communist power combination and, in the longer run, to see pro-Soviet régimes established wherever possible.

II. *Principal aims of Soviet foreign policy*

(*a*) *Europe*

5. The Soviet aims in Eastern Europe are to consolidate Soviet control over the satellites and to develop their economic, political and military integration with the Soviet Union so as to make the maximum use of their industrial potential, to seal the area off from Western contact and to reinforce the Soviet military potential.

6. In Finland, the Soviet aim is to keep the country neutral and open to immediate use by Soviet forces in the event of war.

7. In Yugoslavia, the Soviet aim is to eliminate Marshal Tito's régime and to replace it by a government subservient to Moscow. Short of a concerted satellite attack on Yugoslavia (which is a possibility) this aim is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. In the meantime, Soviet policy relies on economic, diplomatic and psycho-

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[3] Document MC 33 is not printed, but it is considered further in the documentation cited in footnote 2, above.

logical pressure and internal subversion, with a view to discouraging any deviationist tendency in the satellite states.

8. Morally, politically and economically, Western Europe is of profound importance in the world struggle. It is therefore a vital aim of Soviet policy both to weaken Western Europe and to increase Soviet influence in the area. To do this, the Soviet Union seeks to divide Western Europe from the United States and to prevent the successful execution of the NATO defence programme, to hamper economic recovery and development and, in the longer run, to bring Communist governments into power in countries of the area.

9. Germany's formidable industrial and military potential makes her, in the Soviet view, the key to control of all Europe. It therefore seems that the Soviet aim is to neutralize the whole of Germany and to set up there, if possible, a government devoted to Moscow, the changes which have taken place under Soviet authority in Eastern Germany being intended to serve as a starting point for carrying out their plans with regard to the country as a whole. But if they realize Germany's potential value to Soviet policy, the Soviet leaders, especially after their wartime experience, are equally conscious of her as a potential threat. In view of Germany's natural Western orientation, the immediate Soviet aim must be to prevent Western Germany from being effectively integrated into Western Europe, above all in the military sphere. To this end Soviet policy will continue to exploit German fear of war and desire for unity. The Soviet Government, through its East German satellite, is following the tactic of offering ostensible concessions in an attempt to wean the West Germans away from the Western Powers and to induce them to support German unification along the lines desired by the Soviets. The Soviets, however, have given, up to the present time, no indication that they are willing to sacrifice effective Communist control of East Germany to secure either German unity or German neutrality. In any case, since the Soviet leaders might well regard any prospect of a rearmed *united* Germany, free to associate with the West, as intolerable, they are hardly likely to withdraw from the Eastern zone on any terms involving such a threat. Rearmament limited to Western Germany, provided it remains subject to the safeguards now proposed by the Western Governments, is not considered likely in itself to provoke the Soviet Government into action risking war; but they will do their utmost to prevent it by means short of war, and the undertaking must contain an element of calculated risk for the West.

(b) Far East and South-East Asia

10. Soviet policy in the Far East is broadly aimed at eliminating Western influence and establishing Communist régimes, although the degree of direct Soviet control of these régimes will presumably depend in large measure on the nature of the relationship established

with China. It is probable that the Soviet Government not only regards this as an end in itself, but still holds to Lenin's doctrine that victory throughout Asia will ultimately assure victory in the West as well. To this end the USSR, like China, is supporting violent but limited warfare throughout the area, especially in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya. The Soviet's alliance with China is of vital importance but is still for the most part an unknown factor. The Immediate aims are to consolidate China's membership of the Soviet bloc and, to the extent consistent with this, to develop China's economic and military potential, to overthrow with Chinese co-operation the present Governments in South-East Asia and replace them by Communist régimes, and to promote the maximum tension and unrest throughout the area in order to deny its economic resources to the free world and divert Western military effort. It appears that for the present at least the USSR is ready to give China the main role in the carrying out of this policy.

11. Although the Communist powers are now committed primarily in Korea, they have other tempting objectives in South-East Asia. The position of the non-Communist Government in Burma is especially weak, and the Chinese Government may well increase its aid to the Burmese Communists in the hopes of enabling them progressively to win control. There is a continuing threat of large-scale Chinese intervention in Indo-China. If both countries fell, Siam might soon follow, and the Communists would not only deprive the West of essential raw materials but control the main rice-exporting area in Asia. They could then exert effective economic pressure on the rice-importing countries, Malaya, India, Ceylon and Indonesia. Moreover, such a débâcle in Burma, Indo-China and Siam would give great, and possibly decisive, encouragement to the Communist movements in Malaya and Indonesia.

12. The Soviet Union has only limited opportunities for direct pressure upon India, but is seeking to spread Communist influence there, and in the long run India probably ranks in importance second only to China as a Soviet objective in Asia.

13. With regard to Japan, the Soviet aim is first to neutralize the country in order to prevent its becoming a threat to Chinese and Soviet security, to exploit its industrial power and ultimately to integrate it into the Soviet bloc. Both the Soviet and Chinese Governments would probably regard a substantially rearmed Japan as a serious threat to their position in the Far East, but it is difficult to forecast their reactions to Japanese rearmament except in the light of the general development of the world situation.

(*c*) *Middle East and North Africa*

14. An important traditional element in Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East is to prevent any hostile power from gaining control

over the Straits. Similarly, it wishes to prevent the emergence of any military threat from unfriendly forces in Turkey, Persia or Afghanistan. Soviet policy seeks further, to under-mine Western influence in the area, to deny to the West the resources and communications of the area, and ultimately to secure control of all these countries.

15. Social and economic conditions throughout most of the Middle East and North Africa provide a favourable ground for Communist subversive and revolutionary tactics; however, the Communist Parties are generally weak or have been forced underground by Government action. Communist policy is therefore forced at present to operate indirectly. It does so:

(*a*) by seeking to encourage and ultimately control the so-called "anti-imperialist" movements, e.g. in Egypt and Morocco, and

(*b*) through the "Peace Campaign", which seeks to encourage "Neutralism" and hamper co-operation with the West, especially in defence.

Communist propaganda and the "Peace Campaign" are now beginning to take a much more active interest in the area both because of the opportunities offered by disputes with the West and to meet the challenge of the proposed Middle East Command. The Soviet Government has begun, and may well continue, to exploit the present uneasy situation by diplomatic pressure on the Middle East Governments to dissuade them from co-operating in Western defence arrangements.

(*d*) *Dependent and colonial territories*

16. In the dependent and colonial territories, which Communist theory regards as one of the chief economic and strategic bases of "imperialist" power, Soviet policy attempts to foster national aspirations for independence in order to weaken Western influence as the first step toward the establishment of eventual Communist control.

(*e*) *United Nations*

17. The Soviet Union regards the United Nations merely as an instrument in its foreign policy adapted to serve three basic and overlapping objectives: the protection of fundamental Soviet state interests; aggravation of differences in the non-Soviet world, and worldwide dissemination of Soviet propaganda. The value of the United Nations to the Soviet Union has somewhat decreased, largely as a result of the General Assembly's increased authority in security matters. The possibility of a Soviet withdrawal, and the proclamation of the World Peace Council as a substitute, even though it appears less likely now than some months ago, cannot be discounted.

III. *Methods and timing of Soviet policy*

18. As stated in paragraph 3 above, it is a cardinal principle of Soviet policy not to expose the Soviet Union itself, as the base of Stalinist power and world revolution, to any excessive risk. The Soviet Union is therefore likely to rely, wherever possible, on methods of

"cold war"—diplomacy, propaganda, and subversion—and to keep the Soviet forces in the background to strengthen Soviet policy simply by the *threat* of overwhelming military power. The Soviet leaders have made great gains since 1945, and despite the growing pressure of Western containment the probability is that they still believe they can ultimately achieve their longer-term aims by means short of deliberate initiation of full-scale war. It can be considered that the cold war waged by the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War is a logical expression of Communist ideology. In the most plausible interpretation of the texts which serve as a basis for Communist teaching, the Capitalist and Communist systems in fact seem hardly compatible. It would therefore seem that the statements by the Soviet rulers to the effect that "peaceful co-existence" between the Communist and non-Communist world is possible should not be regarded as sincere. Soviet theorists have frequently admitted that offers of "peaceful co-existence" between the Communist and capitalist systems are purely tactical: such "peaceful co-existence" merely means absence of war, a period during which the political struggle continues and the Soviet Union builds up overwhelming strength for the final decisive conflict with capitalism.

19. "Cold war" methods include: utilization of Communist parties (sometimes in "united fronts") and Communist-controlled organizations, building up of the Cominform, intensification of the "peace campaign", and political intimidation, all of which seek to destroy the will and ability of free peoples to resist Soviet expansion. More direct methods of Soviet policy include encouragement of nationalist uprisings in various parts of the world and support of localized military actions ("war by proxy"). Indeed, these latter methods enter the sphere of "hot war", although they fall short of military measures by the Soviet armed forces. Enthusiasm for "war by proxy" has doubtless been dampened somewhat by the Korean experience. It nevertheless remains true that in Asia there are several areas favourable to the method of "war by proxy", in particular Indo-China and Burma, and that, in addition, China is passing through a period of revolutionary dynamism the consequences of which are at present difficult to forecast. It is not unlikely that Soviet planning in the field of "cold war" and "war by proxy" is stimulated by the thought that the Western World, and particularly the United States, in attempting to meet and counteract Communist irritations at all points where they occur, will overtax its resources and suffer economic collapse.

20. Nevertheless, Stalinist doctrine holds that certain wars are "just" and therefore does not exclude the aggressive use of the Soviet military forces. If the Soviet Government decides that there are no other means of reaching its objectives there is the possibility that it may resort to armed attack involving Soviet forces. In assessing this possibility it

may be assumed that the Soviet rulers realize the danger—or in the case of attack on the NATO powers the certainty—that such a step will result in military counter-measures by the Western alliance and lead to world-wide war. They must therefore consider the factors which would weigh for and against their ultimate victory. The main factor in favour of this is at present Soviet predominance in military power both as regards land and air forces. Other favourable factors are the presence of considerable potential fifth columns in Western countries, unrest in vital areas like the Middle East and war-weariness coupled with defeatism in some Western countries. Against such a victory the Soviet rulers must reckon with the present Western supremacy in naval power and in atomic weapons and the potentially greater ability of the West to sustain a long war. On the other hand, if the Kremlin concluded that a western attack on the USSR were imminent and unavoidable, and that Soviet chances of surviving such an attack were improved by seizing the initiative and attacking first, it would almost certainly do so.

21. Soviet foreign policy follows a preordained general strategy of revolution, the implementation of which is facilitated by the Soviet Government's almost complete immunity to the pressure of public opinion. But Soviet policy is also extremely flexible and the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to modify their strategy when expediency dictates. There is, moreover, no evidence for the existence of any timetable laying down dates by which particular objectives must be achieved.

22. Thus, while the broad strategy of Soviet policy is to an extent preordained, current tactics will be dictated largely by the way the outside world reacts to Soviet moves. On the one hand this raises the possibility that, in resisting aggression and creating positions of strength, the West may convince the Soviet leaders, for instance as a result of German and Japanese rearmament, that vital Soviet interests are threatened to an extent justifying military counter-measures, even at the risk of general war. Action by the Western Powers that might be regarded by the Soviet Union as unnecessary provocation, especially in bordering territories, could also result in military measures being taken by the Soviet Government. On the other hand there are grounds for believing that, with prudence as well as firmness, the West can succeed in building such strength as to deter the Soviet Union from further encroachments, whilst yet avoiding war. In following this policy the West is accepting a calculated risk; but without accepting it there is no foreseeable means of inducing the Soviet Union to relax its aggressive and expansionist pressure. The West should prepare for a long drawn-out period during which they must remain firm and vigilant.

Annex

Political Conditions

A. *Stability of the Regime.*

1. There can be no doubt about the internal stability of the Soviet regime. It is probably more secure today than it has been at any time since 1917, and unless some chance or outside agency (e.g. a world war) brings about a radical change it is likely in future to become even stronger. In the past the regime has survived domestic crises more severe than any which now seem likely to develop.

2. For its secure exercise of power the Stalinist regime relies upon communist party machinery and the security forces. The monolithic character of the regime, the rigidity of Communist Party discipline and its all-pervasive activities enable the leaders effectively to control every aspect of life in the Soviet Union. While the death of Stalin might create difficulties over the succession it is not thought that it would produce a split in the Party or a modification of the present system.

3. The strength of the Soviet Government can also be attributed to the efficiency, skill and effectiveness of their propaganda to an uncritical public deliberately isolated from all outside influences. The authorities are able to present to the Soviet people a convincing picture of the threat to their homeland from the so-called "capitalist-imperialist" countries. They are also successful in enlisting the national pride of the Russian people in the accomplishments of the Government, a process which has been greatly aided by the victories of the Second World War.

4. The hope which the Government holds out to the people for an improvement in living conditions is reinforced by a certain gradual raising of the standard of life.

B. *Areas of Discontent*

5. It is recognised that areas of discontent do exist but except perhaps in the event of war they are not such as to present a threat to the regime. Under the present system it is impossible to foresee the creation of any centre around which opposition to the regime can crystallize.

6. Dislike of the regime and passive resistance is undoubtedly widespread among the peasants but there is no evidence that this resentment ever flares up except in the new territories such as the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine where land collectivization is being implemented for the first time. There may also be discontent occasioned by the new Agrogorod programme; the caution shown in top Soviet circles at the beginning of March, 1951, with respect to some phases of the consolidation campaign, would appear to support this conclusion.

7. While there is evidence of discontent among industrial workers,

this discontent does not constitute a threat to the security of the regime.

8. The intelligentsia form a relatively privileged class which has a vested interest in the regime for both material and intellectual reasons. Many intellectuals must privately resent the tight controls exercised by the Party over the intellectual life of the country, but these very controls preclude the possibility of overt opposition from this quarter.

9. Care has been taken by the Soviet regime to subordinate the military to civilian control, though the military in general occupy a preferred position. The average soldier is at least better off than the average peasant; the officer class is one of the privileged groups. Broadly speaking, there is no possibility of the military threatening the regime during peacetime. One of the possible reasons why the Soviet Government would prefer the continuation of the cold war to actual hostilities is that under present conditions the military can be used most effectively to support both the foreign and internal policies of the regime.

10. The regime may regard the church as a possible rallying point of opposition but control is so thorough that the church could not, under present conditions, prove a danger to the state.

11. It is impossible to make an estimate of the degree of discontent among the various nationalities, but nationalism amongst the non-Russian groups in the Soviet Union is the product of a long historical process, is still a potent force and is one of the factors most likely to be productive of latent hostility to the regime. This is probably most true in such new territories as the Baltic States and the Western Ukraine, but applies also to such territories as the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia which have always been a part of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet regime has been skilful in reconciling the national minorities to the process of Sovietization by allowing them to retain a degree of cultural autonomy.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRAVEL OF SOVIET OFFICIALS

601.6111/2-2052

Memorandum by the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State [1]

[LISBON,] February 20, 1952.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Restrictions on Travel of Soviet Officials in the United States and Other NATO Countries

I understand that this subject, which has been considered in the

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[1] A handwritten notation on the source text by Barnes (S/S) reads: "Seen by Secy".

Council Deputies during recent weeks, may be raised at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on discussion of political matters.

About three weeks or a month ago I made a general statement to the Council Deputies regarding Soviet and satellite treatment of NATO nationals and outlined the measures which the United States intended to adopt, as a retaliatory move, to restrict travel of Soviet officials in the United States.[2] It developed that certain other NAT nations were contemplating similar action with regard to Soviet officials accredited to their capitals, and it was suggested that such action concerted as to timing between NATO nations would be more effective than individual action. Accordingly, I suggested to Washington that United States action be delayed until it could be taken with other members. Washington telegraphed first that the note (text attached,[3] the substance of which has been communicated to the Council Deputies) would be delivered to the USSR on February 16 but, as a result of a request for further delay, agreed to withhold delivery until Tuesday, February 19. On February 18 at the Deputies' meeting in Lisbon I reported the intention of my Government to proceed with delivery of the note.[4] However, the other Deputies again stressed the desirability of a concerted move and requested that I again seek to delay U.S. action until joint action could be taken. This discussion was reported to Washington and word was received on February 20 that delivery of the note had been postponed until February 29.* At the same time, Washington reserved the right to move quickly should any news regarding this matter leak to the press.

Some of the other NAT countries may be able to complete the necessary administrative and legal preliminaries in time to join with the United States in its proposed action on February 29. I seriously doubt if all of them will be able to do so. It is our understanding that further postponement on the part of the United States could not be accepted.

I suggest that if the opportunity presents itself, you inform the Foreign Ministers that the United States cannot delay its action after February 29 and express the hope that as many other countries as possible can take similar action at or near the same time.

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[2] Comprehensive documentation on the formulation of U.S. policy with respect to restrictions on the travel of Soviet officials in the United States and other NATO countries and the expression and discussion of that policy within the North Atlantic Council Deputies during January and February 1952 is presented in volume VIII.

[3] The attachment referred to here is not printed. For the final text of the note delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on Mar. 10, 1952, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451.

[4] Spofford reported upon the Council Deputies meeting in Lisbon on Feb. 18 in telegram 379, Feb. 18, from Lisbon. (740.5/2-1852)

*Department plans to publish at noon on Feb. 29. [Handwritten footnote on the source text.]

740.5/2–2252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY LISBON, February 22, 1952—3 p. m.

Secto 40. For Webb from Acheson. Fol FonMin session morning Feb 21 (Secto 34 [1]) at which question of restricting movements of Sov natls was raised, Deps pursued discussion at mtg that afternoon. Deps restated natl position outlined by Mins previously. All Deps agreed matter should be dealt with through concerted action of NAT govts all of which, with exception of Norway, Iceland, Portugal, and probably Denmark are disposed take restrictive measures at an early date. They could not however make necessary arrangements by end of this month and, while appreciating US position, urged that US postpone action at least until March 10 in order permit necessary decision be taken by other NATO Govts. All Deps expressed hope that agrmt could be reached shortly on measures to be taken and stressed importance of acting jointly even though US Govt may not be able agree to further postponement.

In view of response of NATO Govts to this proposal and fact that there seems excellent prospect of concerted action by most NATO Govts by March 10, I believe it would be wise to agree to delay presentation of note.[2]

Furthermore since US public was already aware of our intention to propose concerted action in NATO, isolated action by US now might be misinterpreted as failure of our efforts vis-à-vis other NATO powers.

Please let me know tomorrow.

ACHESON

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[1] Dated Feb. 21, p. 120.

[2] In telegram Secto 70, Feb. 24, from Lisbon, Acheson reported that assurances of concurrent action on the note in question had been received from all NATO countries except Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and Iceland. For reasons of the utility of a display of political solidarity by the NATO countries, Acheson urged that delivery of the note be delayed until Mar. 10. (740.5/2–2452)

740.5/2–2352

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Barbour) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1952.

Subject: Regulation of Soviet Nationals

Burke Elbrick telephoned from Lisbon at 11 a. m. Washington time, February 23, with reference to Sectos 34 [1] and 40 [2] of February 21 and

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[1] *Ante*, p. 120.

[2] *Supra*.

22 concerning the regulation of the movements of Soviet nationals. He stated that the Netherlands Deputy has called a Deputies' meeting at 7 p. m. on February 23 to consider the matter further, and asked what could be said as to the US position in response to Secto 40 at that meeting.

I said that it is my understanding that the President is on the *Williamsburg* and in any event the interested Congressional officials are not available today so that it is impossible to give any definite response before Monday. I added that in view of the Secretary's recommendation I assume it will be possible to arrange the requested postponement but could not assure him positively at this time. I noted that the present postponement is in effect already until February 28.

I remarked that the *New York Times* story to the effect that this matter has been discussed in Lisbon will not make it any easier to effect this further postponement and with reference to the third paragraph of Secto 40, which he said was based on information from the Departmental officers at Lisbon, I pointed out that it is not correct. There have been public rumors here but we have never confirmed that the matter was other than under consideration.

Finally I emphasized the necessity of avoiding any commitment not only that this further postponement could be effective but also that we would not take separate action in the event agreement on concerted action is not reached by March 10 which seems to me likely. In this connection I noted that the Secretary had been careful to avoid any such commitment.

740.5/2–2752 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL LISBON, February 27, 1952—3 a. m.

Secto 91. At Deputies mtg yesterday Spofford announced action proposed by US to regulate travel of Soviet officials wld be postponed to March 10 to permit other governments to take simultaneous action. Proposed action by US originally scheduled for February 16 had been postponed to February 29 at request of NATO governments and has now been further deferred in view of desire of all governments, except Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal, to take similar steps. In discussion this subject deputies placed great emphasis on desirability of concerted action.

US now proposes to send following note to Soviet Embassy Washington on March 10.

[Here follows the proposed text of the note to the Soviet Embassy on the restriction of travel of Soviet officials. The draft was essentially the same as the text ultimately delivered to the Soviet Embassy on March 10; see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 24, 1952, page 451.]

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[1] This telegram was also sent to all other NATO capitals.

It is hoped NATO governments, with exception those noted above will be prepared to take similar action by March 10. In view of fact that any further deferment of proposed US action is highly unlikely, suggest you urge government to which accredited to arrange for necessary measures by that date. Action taken need not be identical provided it is generally similar and taken at same time.

ACHESON

B. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REORGANIZATION OF NATO APPROVED AT LISBON AND THE CONTINUED STRENGTHENING OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENSE, MARCH 1952–DECEMBER 1953

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, and Director for Mutual Security W. Averell Harriman, accompanied by a large delegation of advisers and experts, participated in the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, February 20 to 25, 1952. During this session, the first to include representatives from Greece and Turkey, the North Atlantic Council adopted a plan of action prepared by the Temporary Council Committee to reach a specific defensive strength during 1952 and to increase defensive strength in later years, approved a comprehensive plan for the reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, reviewed the negotiations being carried on in Paris for the creation of a European Defense Community, agreed on principles governing the relationship between the proposed Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and adopted a report by the North Atlantic Community Committee particularly concerned with economic cooperation among the Western European countries.

Prior to the Lisbon session of the North Atlantic Council, Secretary of State Acheson was in London from February 12 to February 19 during which time he held preliminary conversations with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden and tripartite conversations with Eden and Foreign Minister Schuman. These conversations were mostly concerned with problems arising out of the negotiations for a European Defense Community and those "contractual arrangements" being negotiated in Bonn for the creation of a new relationship between the Western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. The conversations culminated in meetings of Secretary Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman with Federal Republic Chancellor Adenauer in London, February 18 and 19.

Concurrent with the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, Secretary Acheson held meetings with Foreign Secretary Eden on such topics as Austria, the Far East; with Foreign Minister Schuman, and other French officials on aspects of the American financial aid to France; with Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos; and with Portuguese Head of State Salazar. On February 25 and 26, Secretary Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman held a series of meetings in Lisbon following the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council session and completed a series of preliminary agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany defining the relationship between the Federal Republic and the prospective European Defense Community.

For documentation on Secretary Acheson's meetings in London, February 13 to 19; his meetings in Lisbon, February 20 to 26; and United States participation in the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, February 20–25, see pages 1 ff.

740.5/3–752

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 7, 1952.

NIACT

We are very much disturbed at the situation which has developed with regard to the appointment of a Secretary General of NATO[2] and believe it very important that you and we fully appreciate each other's point of view and reach an understanding on this matter. The purpose of this message is to try to make our attitude clear and to see where we go from here.

In Lisbon I thought that you and I both believed that the man selected for the appointment of Secretary General should be a man of the highest ability, reputation and prestige. These qualities were summed up in the phrase "Ministerial rank". I kept stressing these qualities in the Foreign Ministers' meeting because of the profound conviction that the person selected must give direction to NATO and bring to it the same caliber of leadership on the civilian side as General

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[1] The source text was transmitted to London in telegram 4399, Mar. 7, for Gifford and Spofford with the instruction that it should be delivered if neither of them saw any objection. Telegram 4399 was repeated to Paris.

[2] Regarding the decision by the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held Feb. 20–25, at Lisbon, to appoint a Secretary General, see pp. 180 ff.

Eisenhower has given in the military field. It seemed to me that unless we got a man capable of doing this, rather than even the most capable official, we would in large part nullify the objective of the NATO reorganization to which we all agreed at Lisbon and to which we attach the greatest importance.

While believing that the qualities of the candidate were more important than his nationality, we have fully recognized the sacrifice involved for you in the decision to move the NATO headquarters from London to Paris.

It was with these thoughts in mind that we took a strong and, I thought, helpful position getting agreement that we should try to get Sir Oliver Franks to take the appointment. We felt that he possessed all the qualities for which we were searching and it was a matter of deep disappointment to us that he did not find it possible to accept.

When Sir Oliver indicated his unavailability we were happy to agree on Mr. Pearson who, in turn, proved not to be available. In our desire to be helpful and consistent with the standards which we were trying to set in this matter we then suggested Lord Alexander and Malcolm MacDonald. When this suggestion did not prove to be practicable, we felt that we should turn to Mr. Stikker who was the remaining person of "Ministerial rank" mentioned in Lisbon who was still available. We understood that at one point the choice of Mr. Stikker had the approval of your Government and it was again a source of real disappointment to us when his name was not accepted.

Certain problems arose for us in connection with your suggestions of Sir Edwin Plowden for whom we have high regard as well as Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who in spite of his qualities does not, in our opinion, meet all the criteria which we have set.

I know how great a sacrifice it would be asking to suggest that a man high in your Government should be made available. Therefore, I do not suggest it but say only that if Oliver Lyttleton, Lord Alexander or Sir John Slessor were available, we should be most happy. Perhaps the same difficulty for you would not arise in connection with Lord Portal, who is not now, as I understand it, in the Government. He also would seem to us to possess the high degree of leadership which the gentlemen mentioned could bring to this important work.

If it should prove that no man of such outstanding caliber and reputation is available, we should perhaps consider turning to a solution of separating the position of Vice Chairman of the Council from that of Secretary General. I am aware that sentiment toward a solution of this kind already exists particularly among some of our continental colleagues. For our part we would come to such a solution with great reluctance since it would not only mean the abandonment of our concept of the job which we still feel is the correct one, but would also inevitably reopen the whole question of the functions and terms of reference of the Secretary General, thereby further delaying a decision which in the interests of our whole enterprise should be taken at once.

I should be most grateful to have your thoughts on this tangled subject. I am most eager that we should come to a meeting of minds about it. Do you agree that we should try to do this before the matter again comes before the Deputies?

Thank you for your kind message to me on my statement regarding Malaya.[3]

I have been distressed to hear that you have been laid low by the grippe and hope that you are now entirely well again.

With warm regards.[4] ACHESON

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[3] For the text of Secretary Acheson's statement on British policy in Malaya, made at his press conference on Mar. 5, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 427. The reference to Eden's message has not been identified further.

[4] On Mar. 8, Gifford reported that he had delivered Secretary Acheson's message to Eden who said that he would try to find someone who would meet U.S. specifications. Eden stated further that he knew Lord Portal very well and had some doubts about whether he was the man for the job. (Telegram 3918 from London; 740.5/3–852)

740.5/3–1052

Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 10, 1952.

Subject: Lord Ismay as Secretary General of NATO.

The Secretary telephoned Mr. Lovett to say that he had just received a telegram on a top secret basis from London which informed us that the British were suggesting Lord Ismay as Secretary General of NATO.[1] Mr. Lovett said he thought that this would be all right; that Lord Ismay was very favorably disposed toward this country and had a very excellent sense of history. Lord Ismay might not be the best possible choice but had many advantages that some of the others who had been suggested did not have. He thought that Lord Ismay would need a strong staff and that probably Draper would have more influence under Ismay than under some of the others.

The Secretary then telephoned Mr. Harriman and told him of the suggestion and that the British had asked us to keep the matter very secret because it involved Cabinet changes. Mr. Harriman expressed a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction with the suggestion. He said that he had worked very closely with Lord Ismay during World War

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[1] Telegram 3933, Mar. 10. (740.5/3–1052)

II and that Lord Ismay had basically sound judgments. He said he was never bewildered by difficult situations that developed. He thought Lord Ismay was absolutely straight and had an excellent sense of the relative importance of things. Mr. Harriman agreed with what Mr. Lovett had said, that Lord Ismay would need a strong staff particularly in such matters as production problems and on details such as in the matters that arose under the TCC. He reiterated that he thought Lord Ismay had an excellent sense of balance as between political, military and economic considerations. He thought that the appointment would give NATO a lift.

The Secretary then called Mr. Snyder and told him about the suggestion. While Mr. Snyder was not as enthusiastic as Mr. Lovett and Mr. Harriman had been, he said he could not see that we could object to it and that he would support the appointment.

The Secretary then telephoned Mr. Pearson who had already heard about the suggestion. Mr. Pearson thought that the fact that Lord Ismay was a great figure and very close to the present Government of Britain would make him an acceptable choice, although he was afraid that perhaps Lord Ismay's military background might worry some of the smaller countries.

There was some discussion between the two as to the next step and Mr. Pearson suggested that Mr. Spofford should get the deputies together informally to discuss the matter with them. The Secretary said that the British probably would not want this done because they wanted to keep it very quiet for the moment. Mr. Pearson said he thought that we should at least talk with the Dutch and Norwegians about the matter and thought they could be trusted. He said he would try to get through to Wilgress in London and asked Mr. Acheson to hold up any telegram to London for about an hour. The Secretary agreed to do this.

After Mr. Matthews talked to Mr. Spofford, it became clear that the British were most concerned about any possible leak on the name they had selected. In the light of this, the Secretary called Mr. Pearson again and Mr. Pearson said that he would not have Wilgress talk to the Dutch and the Norwegians. Mr. Pearson said that he had talked to Ottawa, was reasonably certain of no objection from the Canadians and would go ahead and tell Wilgress to tell the British that the Canadians approved the appointment of Lord Ismay. The Secretary said he would proceed with our telegram to Gifford and would try to call him at the same time. There was no success in getting the call through but a message was sent to Gifford asking him to tell the British of our approval of the appointment.

Later in the evening (approximately 9:00 o'clock) Mr. Battle called Sir Oliver Franks and informed him of the United States acceptance of the British proposal. Sir Oliver asked Mr. Battle whether we had consulted with the Canadians and if there would be any opposition from the Canadian Government. Mr. Battle said that he could not speak for the Canadians but he told Sir Oliver he did not think the British need worry about objections from that quarter.[2]

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[2] On Mar. 11, Spofford reported that an informal meeting of the Council Deputies had been held that day at which the British had stated that they were ready to make Ismay available for the post of Secretary General. While some of the Deputies were uninstructed, all spoke warmly of the choice. (Telegram 3967 from London; 740.5/3–1152) On Mar. 13, at their 22d meeting, the Deputies appointed Ismay Secretary General of NATO. (Telegram Depto 1081 from London, Mar. 13; 740.5/3–1352)

Editorial Note

On April 2, General Eisenhower, in a letter to Secretary of Defense Lovett, asked to be relieved as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Secretary Lovett replied on April 8 that he was initiating the appropriate action to secure General Eisenhower's release, effective June 1. On April 28, President Truman announced that General Matthew B. Ridgway had been appointed to succeed General Eisenhower. For the text of the letters exchanged by General Eisenhower and Secretary Lovett, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1952, page 614. For the text of the statement by President Truman, see *ibid.*, May 12, 1952, page 743.

Editorial Note

On April 8, President Truman designated William H. Draper, Jr., to be the United States permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council and nominated him to be United States Special Representative in Europe with the rank of Ambassador. In this dual capacity, Ambassador Draper would represent the President of the United States, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Director for Mutual Security, and the Mutual Security Agency. To assist Ambassador Draper in his role as permanent representative, President Truman designated Livingston T. Merchant, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, as alternate permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, and to assist Draper in his role as Special Representative in Europe, designated Frederick L. Anderson, the Deputy Special Representative in Europe, to be Ambassador Draper's general deputy.

740.5/5–2152

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, May 21, 1952.

U.S. EYES ONLY NOFORN

Subject: Notes for Informal Discussion with General Ridgway, May 22, 1952.[2]

A. *Political Content of Position:*

General Ridgway is, of course, fully aware of the fact that the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has a high political content. Nevertheless, it may be useful to emphasize this fact, and to point out three unusual characteristics of the position, as follows:

1. The Supreme Commander, perhaps more than any other single individual, is popularly regarded as the personal embodiment of NATO itself. In popular eyes, SACEUR is the key international servant of NATO. The tone set by him in submerging the national outlook in favor of the international point of view will set the pace throughout the whole organization. Moreover, the very nature of his position gives him certain politico-military responsibilities, such as helping to build public support for the NATO defense program, helping to improve European morale, helping stimulate national leaders to take desired actions, soothing national differences arising within the NATO command structure, etc. As a natural consequence of his position, everything he says and does carries great weight.

2. While the Supreme Commander, in his official capacity, is only 1/14 American (as General Eisenhower put it), he is much more than that to the peoples of Europe. He is inevitably regarded as a leading U.S. spokesman, and to some extent as a roving U.S. Ambassador. This tendency is aptly illustrated by the delegation of Egyptian officials who called on General Eisenhower to seek his assistance in connection with their difficulties with the UK. General Eisenhower, of course, politely declined to enter into discussions, but the mere fact that such a request was made indicates the delicacy of the Supreme Commander's political situation. Even the most trivial statement by SACEUR may be seized upon by unfriendly elements as a basis for a propaganda barrage against the U.S. Every word of SACEUR is marked by all who hear it.

3. The force commanded by SACEUR is similar to the UN force in Korea only in that it contains elements from various nations. The main differences of course, are that most of the NATO troops are not American, that the proportion of Americans will gradually diminish, and, most important, that this is a peacetime coalition, operating under peacetime political conditions and more limited peacetime powers and

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[1] The source text, which was drafted by Joseph J. Wolf and William T. Nunley of the Office of European Regional Affairs, bears the handwritten notation "Original taken directly to Sec[retary]."

[2] According to a memorandum of conversation dated May 23, Acting Secretary Bruce, Matthews, Bonbright, and Parsons briefed General Ridgway along the lines of the source text and gave the General a copy for his use. Presumably, the briefing took place on May 22. A copy of the memorandum of conversation, drafted by Parsons, is in 740.5/5–2352.

processes. This inevitably results in a higher interest by other governments in basic SHAPE decisions, and requires more attention to such considerations as national capabilities as well as prestige.

B. *Current Political Situation in Europe:*

Outlined below are some of the major political considerations which it may be useful for General Ridgway to be familiar with in performing his duties:

1. *EDC ratification*—One of the major objectives of U.S. policy in Europe during coming months. Many obstacles faced, especially in French and German parliaments. (Saar controversy as illustration.)[3]

2. *Economic difficulties affecting defense program*—Perennial problem of economic limitations on European defense capabilities. (Illustrate by reference to current situations in France and UK.) Congressional cuts in U.S. aid requests may intensify problem. New annual review of requirements versus capabilities scheduled for autumn of 1952.

3. *Communist situation*—Communists have been largely eliminated from military and governmental posts in NATO countries, and overall influence greatly reduced since 1946. Voting strength, however, remains high in France and Italy. Current Communist tactics aimed primarily at capitalizing on European fears of war and on economic hardships arising from rearmament program. Campaigns are having some effect; opinion polls show European doubts of U.S. pacific intentions have increased measurably during past year. Commies now plan huge protest demonstration to greet General Ridgway's arrival in Europe.

4. *Sensitivity to U.S. influence*—While U.S. leadership in NATO has been accepted as a necessary fact of life, there is considerable sensitivity in European political circles to outward signs of American influence and pressure. The Europeans expect Americans to be in a hurry, to be slightly inexperienced and to be insensitive to European political reactions. Several governments have suffered opposition attacks for having been allegedly too susceptible to U.S. influence, and these attacks do not come exclusively from Communists and fellow-travelers. In consequence, it is in our interest to arrange as often as possible for Europeans to take the lead in important NATO developments.

C. *Civilian Relationships:*

1. As an international military commander, line of contact with political agencies of NATO and with national political representatives will normally run through NATO military channels. However, there will inevitably be some informal contacts on the political side, both with the NATO international staff under Secretary General Ismay and with national political representatives.

2. U.S. political representatives in Europe may be able frequently to provide useful advice and assistance on an informal basis. This includes both U.S. Ambassadors in particular countries and Ambassador Draper's regional staff in Paris. Douglas MacArthur II, who

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[3] For documentation on the signing of the European Defense Community agreements, attempts to secure their ratification, and their relationship to the Saar, see pp. 571 ff.

served as U.S. political advisor to General Eisenhower and who remains available to General Ridgway, is the best channel for all such contacts. He worked with NATO matters from the very beginning of NATO, has good relations with civilian organizations in Paris and with U.S. missions throughout Europe, and is kept currently informed of State Department thinking on wide range of subjects. Believe Doug can prove extremely useful.

D. *Specific Politico-military Problems:*

1. There is a continuing problem between the "big three" countries, members of the Standing Group, and the smaller powers represented through the Military Representatives Committee. Although it is doubtless imperative that the Standing Group concept be maintained, full consideration needs to be paid to the point of view of the smaller countries, and in cases which do not in fact substantially prejudice the integrity of the Standing Group operation, that sensitivity should be deferred to.

2. Basing their position on their membership in the Standing Group, the French have traditionally sought to extend their role in NATO to a key role in global planning. With full deference to French ambitions and sensitivities and to their efforts to keep the French union before us, we disagree with the French as to the extent of their global responsibility and interest.

3. There is growing in Europe a feeling that our force goals established at Lisbon are overly optimistic in light of capabilities.[4] A concomitant to this is the tendency to place too great reliance upon the development of new weapons. Full consideration must be given to this ground-swell of opinion and although capabilities—our own as well as theirs—may be a limiting factor, a let-down based on false premises should be combatted. . . .

4. Operation "Mothball" contains serious political implications.[5] The British have expressed to us their concern at the political implications of SACEUR's alert plan. This is a most delicate problem, and will have to be pursued with great care. We shall have to be careful not to over-commit to actions which would result in prejudicial political reactions.

5. The military role of NATO is, by force of circumstance, of highest priority. The political and social goals of NATO, evidenced by Article II of the Treaty, remain the long-term goals of NATO and are of very high importance in the European mind. It is important that the Europeans not be led to believe that we consider NATO only in its military role, but view it as a means to accomplish these other goals and will strive to work with them to that end.

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[4] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, held at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, see pp. 107 ff.; regarding the force goals established at Lisbon, see pp. 203 ff.

[5] The code name MOTHBALL was the term used for alerts in NATO. The political aspects of the problem concerned who within NATO was authorized to call particular types of alerts from the simple alert to complete mobilization. The British believed that anything beyond a simple alert necessitated unanimous approval from the Council or from the Standing Group and the governments concerned, while the United States favored giving SACEUR more discretion to act as it saw fit. A memorandum of conversation, Mar. 31, 1953, presents both sides of the question. (740.5/3–3153)

Editorial Note

Secretary Acheson traveled to Bonn and Paris, May 23 to 29, 1952 to participate in bilateral, tripartite, and quadripartite negotiations with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, incident to the signing at Bonn on May 26 of the Convention on General Relations between the Federal Republic and France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and related conventions, and to the signing at Paris on May 27 of the treaty establishing a European Defense Community and related conventions, protocols, and declarations.

For documentation on the Secretary's trip to Bonn for the signing of the various agreements concerning contractual relations, see volume VII; for documentation on his trip to Paris for the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty, see pages 571 ff. Also see pages 675–688 herein.

Editorial Note

Among the several documents signed on May 27, 1952 at Paris were three protocols relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The first protocol outlined the relations between the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the second was a guarantee by the members of the European Defense Community to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the third was a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty extending guarantees of assistance to the European Defense Community. For the texts of these three protocols, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pages 163–167.

740.5/6–1952

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 19, 1952.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In a letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense, dated May 23, 1952,[2] the Department of State was requested to take the necessary action to prepare a governmental position for submission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group regarding SGM 874–52—"Force Goals for 1953, 1954, and 1955"[3]—taking account of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in their memorandum attached to your letter.

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[1] The message was drafted by Lawrence C. Vass of the Office of European Regional Affairs on June 18.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] Not printed; a copy of this three-page document with three enclosures and ten appendixes is in the NATO Registry at Brussels.

Such a position has been reached and is conveyed in this letter with respect to the force goals for the European Lisbon Plan countries. It represents the agreed views of the Department of State, the Director for Mutual Security, the Deputy Director for Mutual Security, and has been discussed with the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget, which are in general support of the position. This position has been worked out in consultation with the United States Special Representative in Europe, the Deputy United States Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group, and your Assistant for International Security Affairs.

The Standing Group force plan constitutes the initial step in the development of the 1952 Annual Review, agreed at Lisbon as the successor to the Temporary Committee of the Council. As such, it must be considered in the light of its effect on the success of that operation. The position taken by this Government on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force plan inevitably involves certain assumptions and implications regarding the aid and military production intentions of this Government. The position upon which we have agreed takes full cognizance of these aspects of the problem.

An initial analysis has been made of the cost and aid requirements for meeting both the Standing Group force proposals and the plan as revised to take into account the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Preliminary estimates of the cost of achieving the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended force targets for the Western European North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and Germany have been prepared in the Department of Defense. The Mutual Security Agency has made a preliminary study of the politico-economic capabilities of these countries for defense expenditures and defense production, in relation to the force goals for 1952 through 1955 recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It should be emphasized that the estimates contained herein are necessarily tentative. Many of the economic and statistical data necessary for more accurate conclusions are not yet available. A number of assumptions favorable to accomplishment of the plan have been used, and it is probable that the deficit is under-estimated. For example in this initial analysis, the estimates of European defense expenditures in 1954 and 1955 optimistically assume continued United States dollar expenditures in Europe, including defense support, at levels approximating those used in the original Executive Branch request for Fiscal Year 1953. Prices assumed in the calculations are those of September 1951, and the effect of price increases since that date has undoubtedly been to raise costs relative to European expenditure capabilities by an unknown but perhaps significant amount. It has been assumed, but can hardly be fully realized, that European expenditures will be concentrated on highest priority essentials. It has also been assumed that the ability of European countries to continue increasing levels of military expenditure through 1955 will be unaffected by shortages of dollar exchange as defense support is reduced or withdrawn, or by the political and psychological effects of any tapering off that may occur in the United States domestic defense program.

On the other hand certain factors indicate that the deficit may be overestimated. The preliminary costing was based on 100% equipment and three months war reserves except for the Air Force where no war reserve was provided. Present North Atlantic Treaty Organization planning envisages a lower standard of readiness for equipment and reserves in 1953 which presumably would be improved in subsequent years. The costs are based on lower peace and war attrition rates than have been accepted by national authorities.

The results of these estimates, subject to the above qualifications, are shown in the table below. The deficit shown in meeting equipment requirements takes account of European production that may be expected during the entire period, and of United States end-item assistance provided for under all appropriations to date, including an assumed appropriation of the full amount authorized for Fiscal Year 1953, but not taking into account further United States end-item deliveries financed by appropriations which may be made for Fiscal Years 1954 and 1955.

Lisbon Plan European Countries

Total Costs

	1952	*1953*	*1954*	*1955*
Total Cost, Joint Chiefs of Staff Plan	12. 9	21. 3	27. 5	14. 7
Major Matériel	5. 4	11. 8	16. 5	5. 1
All Other Costs	7. 4	9. 5	10. 9	9. 7
Major Matériel Only				
Cost, Joint Chiefs of Staff Plan	5. 4	11. 8	16. 5	5. 1
European Expenditures	1. 9	3. 2	4. 4	5. 2
External Financing*	2. 3	5. 0	3. 1	. 8
Deficit (plus is surplus)	−1. 2	−3. 8	−9. 0	+. 9
Cumulative Deficit	−1. 2	−4. 8	−13. 8	−12. 9

The Mutual Security Agency study mentioned above indicates that the estimated other than major matériel costs for 1953 and 1954 will be approximately covered in the aggregate by European defense expenditures which appear feasible on the basis of the relatively favorable economic assumptions used in that study. It may be assumed, therefore, that the deficit shown above for major matériel indicates the approximate order of magnitude of the overall gap that must be dealt with.

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*Includes appropriations through Fiscal Year 1952 and amount authorized for Fiscal Year 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]

At the end of 1953 it appears that there will be a shortfall of nearly $5 billion in the equipment needed to meet the targets set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that year. By 1954 the situation would be considerably worse, with a cumulative deficit of nearly $14 billion. In 1955, during which the force increment would be smaller on the assumption that 1953 and 1954 targets had, in fact, been met, the cumulative deficit would be reduced to $12.9 billion. It should be pointed out that these calculations are based on full unit equipment at austere equipment standards. They provide for 90 days combat reserve and a year's peacetime attrition, except for aircraft where no reserve has been included. It should also be pointed out that the costed Joint Chiefs of Staff force plan deleted 900 aircraft from the Standing Group plan for reasons of unavailability of aircraft, and the effects of this adjustment is a reduction in costs of over $1 billion.

Focusing attention on the two years immediately ahead, for which firm and provisional plans would be under consideration, it can safely be said that there is no possibility, within the framework of limited mobilization, of matching with equipment the forces called for under the proposed forces plan. It is estimated that the equipment deficit at the end of 1954 would be over $10 billion, even on the assumption of a 1954 appropriation equal to that for 1953 with the entire value delivered in the same year. Even to attain a level of equipment as much as, say, 20% below the 1952–1954 requirements would necessitate United States deliveries in 1954, even on the assumption that the deliveries postulated for 1952 and 1953 are supplied as scheduled, of over $10 billion of equipment of which more than $7 billion would still not be financed upon the passage of the 1953 appropriation.

A further problem, especially critical in considering the forces proposed for 1954 and 1955, is the growing level of maintenance costs of the forces being raised in Europe. The possible implications for United States aid after completion of the buildup have not yet been analyzed. The specific technical nature of much of the equipment being provided suggests extreme difficulty of supply from European sources after the buildup; and the development of a European dollar earnings surplus with which to procure any substantial portion of such equipment from the United States is quite out of the question. It would be unwise for this country to press for force levels so high as to create an unmanageable maintenance problem after the buildup.

The basic issue which this analysis poses is whether the United States should endorse a force schedule of the magnitude proposed by SGM 874, knowing that it is not feasible unless the United States takes drastic steps it has no present intention of taking, or unless the European countries go into a state of virtually full mobilization immediately, and recognizing that the other North Atlantic Treaty

Organization countries are aware that the plan would be accomplished only if the United States filled virtually the entire equipment gap.

Three considerations argue strongly against such endorsement. First, however, we may qualify the statement of our intentions, insistence on force goals clearly beyond the present capacity of the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries would be or could be construed as an implied United States commitment to fill most of the present equipment gap. It is not realistic to expect the European Governments to believe that we estimate their present financial and productive capabilities to be adequate to fill a matériel gap of the size indicated. Second, even if we should succeed in making clear our intention not to supply sufficient equipment for completion of the plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries would be confronted with a plan so beyond their reach on the schedule indicated as to discourage realistic negotiation and planning. Third, an initial force target from which very large adjustments would be necessary during the reconciliation process, does not provide sufficient guidance as to the composition of a reduced program to permit an orderly sequence of steps during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Annual Review to reach a militarily sound action program before the end of this year. Further military guidance on such matters as the balance among ground, naval and air forces; the distribution of forces and equipment among regions and commands; and the balance between initial equipment and war reserves, would be necessary to provide a framework for the reconciliation process of the Annual Review. The more closely a militarily developed plan approximates the aggregate size and cost that can be actually achieved, the more certain it is that the reconciliation of military goals with political and economic feasibility will result in an action program that is sound in its military composition.

Under the circumstances, it appears essential that the United States make known its conclusion regarding the feasibility of the Standing Group force levels, and follow a course of action calculated to facilitate the development of a force plan within the capabilities of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations, which is properly balanced from the military standpoint.

It is proposed that the United States follow two lines of action, one immediately in the Standing Group and Council, and the other during the next two months within the United States Government.

It is proposed that the United States comments on SGM 874, as transmitted through appropriate channels to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group should be addressed in an appropriate degree to this question of feasibility. It should be made clear that, while from the purely military point of view the Standing Group plan is acceptable as modified by the military comments transmitted, and represents the best presently available military guidance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agencies, the United States has serious reservations on the feasibility of accomplishing the force levels proposed, especially for 1954 and 1955, and is unable to commit itself to a schedule of end-item assistance of the magnitude that might appear to be implied in those force levels for 1953, 1954 and 1955. The United States is vitally concerned in achieving the greatest improvement in the immediate defense buildup through a critical analysis of the 1953 proposal and of achieving the maximum firm agreement on armament programs within demonstrated national capabilities. However, the United States does not believe that the presently proposed force levels for 1954 and 1955 should be considered as a firm basis for the Annual Review, but should be given the countries only as guidance on the general direction and character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization buildup. The United States does, of course, believe that the Annual Review itself must result in recommendations to the Council not only in firm goals for 1953, but also in provisional goals for 1954 and in planning goals for 1955. The United States endorses the force levels for 1953, as set forth in SGM 874, as militarily sound and desirable to achieve. The United States proposes that the recommended 1953 force plan be costed by the countries, including in the costing an analysis of the maintenance costs of such forces. The United States does not imply by this recommendation any certainty in the feasibility of fully achieving such forces within calendar year 1953, especially in regard to levels of equipment and war reserves. For the reasons indicated above, the United States also reserves its position on the pace and magnitude of the further buildup.

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council, the United States should express the same position and should also press its view regarding the use of the Standing Group 1953 force levels in the costing and maintenance cost analyses. In addition, the United States should state that our preliminary analysis indicates a shortfall (mostly in major matériel), compared with our best present estimates of European defense capabilities and American military assistance, amounting to $4 or $5 billion a year in Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954 in total resources available for the part of the buildup assigned to the European countries included in the Lisbon Plan. It would appear that a similar problem exists in Greece and Turkey. This gap, though not of overwhelming proportions, undoubtedly will require changes in the force plans as previously considered. At the same time, the gap does not seem so serious as to impair the basic purposes of the European defense buildup.

The statement should [illegible] indicate the United States view that this situation makes the successful conduct of the 1952 Annual Review a matter of the utmost importance. It will be necessary during the review to analyze, both in the aggregate and country by country, the most effective way in which both physical and financial resources can be applied to attain the maximum of balanced collective strength. The problem of continuing maintenance costs, and how they can be met both production-wise and financially, must be explicitly dealt with. The objective of the Annual Review should be not only a firm plan for 1953, but a provisional force goal for 1954 and a planning goal for 1955, which are in the range of feasibility.

It is further proposed that the United States Government develop, over the next two months, a position with respect to the best size, balance, and degree of equipment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces that could be achieved on the hypothesis of an availability of resources close to what now seems likely to be available. It is our belief that successful negotiation, in the course of the Annual Review, of force levels and their supporting defense budget and defense production plans, will depend upon the availability to the United States negotiating team of such a unilaterally developed position, which should be available by the latter part of August. For this purpose it will be necessary to combine military analysis and guidance with politico-economic analysis and guidance. On the one hand this position should reflect the military judgment as to the most effective force and equipment levels, country by country, that should be sought within the financial and economic limits foreseen, and, at the same time, reflect the views of the responsible civilian agencies with respect to the politico-economic capabilities of the individual North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to sustain the defense expenditures and defense production and provide the manpower. The indicated force levels should not only be feasible in terms of total resources but should be feasible country by country. It should furthermore reflect a reasonable assumption as to the amounts of assistance which might be provided for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries during the coming years, and a realistic estimate with respect to the volume and composition of end-items which the United States will deliver.

It is, therefore, proposed that the Department of Defense develop a proposed United States position as to the size, balance, and standards of equipment for Calendar Year 1953 and 1954 forces to be raised and maintained by the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) and Germany. Such a proposed force plan should represent the best military use of available resources on the assumption that the limit of resources is $8 billion less in Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954 (taken together) than the presently estimated costs of the force levels contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 20 May 1952. This assumed limit on the cost of the plan is consistent with a planning figure of approximately $4 billion of new obligational authority in Fiscal Year 1954 for Title I military assistance (other than Spain and Yugoslavia) which has been tentatively agreed to by the Bureau of the Budget as a planning figure.

Fiscal Year 1954 and Fiscal Year 1955 deliveries resulting from this additional financing would approximately cover the equipment deficit through Fiscal Year 1955 shown in the table on page 3,[4] after the $8.0 billion deduction. The study should also include any indicated revision in the force levels for Greece and Turkey based on the assumption of equipment supplies from the United States at a rate in 1954 no larger than that now expected during 1953, and also assuming flexibility in the distribution of United States equipment among all North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries including Greece and Turkey.

We believe that the most successful integration of military planning with the political and economic judgments necessary to assure feasibility of plan, particularly as regards individual country capabilities, would be accomplished by consultation at staff level between the military authorities and the other responsible agencies, who are prepared to designate individuals for this purpose.

Particular importance will attach to the question of the annual maintenance costs that can be borne by the European countries and the annual maintenance costs implicit in the force plan. An immediate United States analysis of this part of the problem must be initiated if its results—so important to the analysis of feasibility and implications for United States aid—are to be available in developing the United States position on forces to be negotiated during this Annual Review.

As indicated above, we consider it essential that the United States take the initiative in developing an initial position on a militarily sound forces plan capable of approximate achievement. In the absence of such a United States position which can be the basis for United States action in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Annual Review, we do not believe that an effective framework will exist for ultimate reconciliation of the requirements for defense with the politico-economic limitations on the resources available for defense, or that the developed plan of action will be militarily sound, so that the Military Committee can recommend it to the Council as an important step towards our goal of an adequate deterrent force.

In view of the importance of a clear understanding in the United States Government of the issues involved in such a United States study, I should like to suggest the desirability, at an appropriate time, of meeting with you, General Bradley, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Snyder, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Lawton and Mr. Kenney to talk over the matters that have been only briefly touched on in this letter.[5]

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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[4] Printed here on p. 303.

[5] On June 25, Ambassador Draper presented the substance of this report to the North Atlantic Council. A copy of the verbatim text of Draper's statement was transmitted in telegram Polto 1437 from Paris, June 25. (740.5/6–652) On June 28, the NATO Annual Review Committee discussed Draper's statement and agreed to report to the Council that it supported the U.S. position. Based on this decision, the Council Secretariat would revise the questionnaires for the Annual Review accordingly. (Telegram Polto 1461 from Paris, June 28; 740.5/6–2852)

740.5/7-952 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, July 9, 1952—10 p. m.

Polto 40. Subj: Informing NAC of reply to Sov note.[2]

At todays NAC mtg small country reps were obviously primed and waiting for three Powers on Sov note reply. After text note circulated and before Alphand cld make statement on behalf Three Powers, Starkenborgh took floor and scorched Three Powers for procedure under which smaller countries informed of proposed reply only after it thoroughly thrashed out among three and only 24 hours before delivery to USSR. He recalled that ever since formation CD it had been intended that discussion and consultation on polit probs of common interest wld become well developed in NATO form. CD had failed to carry this activity to desired point, only completing various desultory and academic studies conditions in certain Iron Curtain countries and noting statements on other polit matters of little consequence. However, smaller powers and his govt in particular continued to hope that consultation cld be developed much more fully. He stressed that opposition to NATO in Neth, at least, was not primarily Communist, but from those who believed their country compelled to support policies in whose formulation its voice not heard. Present tactics did not assist govt in mtg this sort of attack.

Turning to present sitn, he stated Ger prob was obviously of primary and direct concern to all NAT countries. Certain Eur nations had actually entered into arrangements pooling their armed forces with those of Ger, and, as consequence, future of Ger very intimately affected future other free Eur nations. Secondly, the Sov problem was one which also was of primary interest not only to Three Powers but to all NATO powers. Starkenborgh deplored present procedure and took position that reply to Sov note shld have been drafted only after views all NATO countries were obtained. He ended by observing that NAC cld only feel frustrated that matter had been handled in this summary fashion.

Starkenborgh's statement quickly and forcefully endorsed by Itals, Belgs, Nors, Grks, Danes, Turks and Ports, who also added own comments re *fait accompli* nature present procedure and fact that matters concerning Ger had NATO-wide direct interest. Can endorsed these views and quoted from Comite of 5 report endorsed by NAC at Lisbon re desirability full consultation at early stage.[3] He suggested that on matters such as present issue views other NATO countries shld be ascertained before drafting actual reply, i.e., smaller countries shld be brought in at early stages. It was recognized that drafting not feasible in 14 member Comite, but considered imperative that views be heard and heeded.

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[1] Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

[2] Further documentation on the Soviet note of May 13 and the tripartite reply of July 10, concerning German unification and all-German elections, is presented in volume VII.

Ismay said it appeared to him that ques Ger was perhaps principal problem with which NATO immediately concerned. He had been somewhat unhappy that matters with which NAC had been dealing in past few months seemed to be of lesser significance when compared with Ger prob. It seemed to him that the reply to Russian note was matter with which NAC shld have been concerned. He ended by saying that perhaps he shld have instigated NAC discussion, but felt that perhaps one of reps now objecting shld have requested NAC consultation earlier.

Starkenborgh in replying to latter point said that reluctance occupying powers to discuss reply had been made known and he and colleague did not therefore feel they shld raise matter. He also said it had seemed to him and certain colleagues that initiative for such consultation shld have been on part of those powers preparing reply. Further he pointed out that this was not only case where consideration matters of direct concern to all NATO countries had been carried out in forums other than NATO. He cited as an example appointment SACLANT where action had been withheld in NATO circles while discussions carried on between Three Powers. When he raised this matter on several occasions in CD there had never been satisfactory response, but merely embarrassed silence. He pointed out that there were still other problems with which NAC shld be concerned and on which consultation was being carried on elsewhere, e.g., CMND in Medit and Near East.

Alphand, in replying to statements previously made, brought out juridical aspects Three Powers relations with USSR in Ger attempted suggest these precluded Three Powers adopting procedure other than that followed. US rep then said he had listened with considerable sympathy to statements made and felt that certainly as far as US Govt concerned there was no desire exclude other powers from consideration and discussion probs of common concern. He observed, however, that previous exchanges with USSR were common knowledge and that all reps present have been in position to formulate ideas and that such views cld have been expressed at any time in NAC or to

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[3] For the text of C9–D/8, Feb. 19, 1952, "Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community," see p. 180.

Three Powers. He emphasized he was not using this as an excuse, but said it seemed important distinguish between consultation in gen terms and in actual drafting note, latter process being one which he felt different from NAC type activity and one which he felt NAC not technically best arranged to handle. UK rep supported Alphand's and Draper's statements. US, UK and Fr stressed that they continued to support wholeheartedly principle of consultation and wld gladly join in any effort to strengthen NAC in this direction.

Discussion then turned to consideration whether NAC shld actually discuss proposed reply in view fact it was agreed language and no possibility modification. It was agreed that after "unofficial" Sov reaction had been observed, probably some two weeks hence, NAC shld discuss matter in larger context "Ger prob."

DRAPER

740.5/8–452: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, August 4, 1952—5:03 p. m.

552. Verbatim text. Convey fol to FonMin as personal msg from Secy:

On Aug 2, 1952 the President signed the instrument of ratification of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty dated May 27, 1952 on Guarantees Given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to the Members of the European Defense Community. I would like to take this occasion to point out that ratification was approved by the Senate of the United States on July 1, 1952 by a vote of 72 to 5, which is well over the two-thirds required by our Constitution.

The vote of the Senate demonstrated the degree to which Americans are united on the issue of European and American defense and it records the satisfaction felt here over the progress toward greater European unity which has been achieved in the past few years.

In informing you of the approval of the United States, dear Mr. Minister, permit me to express the hope that it may facilitate early ratification by your Government and continued progress toward a peaceful and prosperous European Community of nations firmly bound to the other free nations of the world.

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Barnard and cleared by GPA, GTI, G, and EUR, was also sent to Ankara, Athens, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Oslo, Lisbon, Copenhagen, and Reykjavik.

740.5/7-3152 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT PRIORITY WASHINGTON, August 4, 1952—6 : 22 p.m.

Topol 64. Ref Polto 99 and Polto 114 Jul 25 and 31.[2]

Series of tels of which last was Topol 30 Jul 15 [3] reiterated strong desire here avoid fall NAC min mtg. In view continuing pressure we may now face decision whether despite views Polto 114 we must inform NAC appears impossible for US arrange suitable representation for full scale min mtg before Dec.

NATO proponents of mtg are putting us in embarrassing position and we wish SRE wld make clear to Ismay very informally that US opposition to mtg in Sept or Oct stems from more than belief (which is sincere) that not enough substance for worthwhile mtg of mins before completion AR. Pls tell Ismay that (1) US Cab mins can not commit themselves now to leave US at height election campaign; (2) during that sensitive period it is difficult to predict how much NATO and related EUR matters will be injected into campaign but min mtg wld probably increase risks of this kind; (3) US presidential election campaign is event which regularly every four years for brief period produces certain difficulties and complications in conduct of affairs and NATO partners shld recognize and accept consequence of this. Embs shld explain situation to Eden, Schuman and Pearson along similar lines and seek their support. Eden and Schuman shld be sympathetic to our difficulties in this matter for they have both declined to come to US for opening of GA and have decided to stay away until after election. Incidentally, we doubt if UK or Fr wld wish to have mtg if they were in final stages gen election campaign.

SRE may use foregoing in informal talks with other perm reps (not incl last sentence above except with Brits and Fr). We desire cooperate with others and wld try to meet an emergency situation somehow but no case has been made for an emergency mtg of mins. Separate tel deals with WG mtg Aug 5 which US shld participate in only on distinct understanding no commitment as to date of next mtg.

FYI since it is unlikely agreement cld be reached to sched two mtgs before Christmas, one in Oct and one Dec, we suspect renewal of pressure for early fall mtg is move to delay min mtg to consider AR until new year. This most undesirable for reasons set forth Topol 48 Jul 22[4] and likely delay such mtg till late Feb or Mar. In any event we doubt very much if Secy who is in Honolulu wld agree make two more trips to Eur before end of year.

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Parsons and cleared by Bonbright, Harriman, Lovett, and Snyder, was transmitted to Paris for the Embassy and Ambassador Draper, and repeated to London, Ottawa, and to Kaneohe, Hawaii for Secretary Acheson who was attending the first ANZUS Council meeting, Aug. 4–6. Documentation on this meeting is presented in volume XII.

[2] Neither printed; the former reported that there was general support for an NAC Ministerial meeting in September or October, while in the latter Ambassador Draper stated that he felt the United States should accept the prospect of a ministerial meeting early in the fall. (740.5/7-2552 and 7-3152)

[3] Not printed; it reported that the United States was opposed to an NAC Ministerial meeting in September unless the proponents could bring forward substantial reasons indicating that such a meeting could have useful results. (740.5/7-052)

We are seriously concerned re this matter and request SRE make every effort persuade Ismay and Perm reps so we may be spared embarrassment of standing alone in NAC in refusing to go along with autumn mtg.[5]

Snyder and Lovett agree with this position and this tel is being rptd to Secy. Harriman is out of town and could not consult him, but he expressed himself previously against a meeting before AR ready for ministerial consideration.[6]

BRUCE

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[4] Not printed; it reported that delay in considering the annual review would make it impossible to involve NATO plans in the normal U.S. budget timetable. (740.5/7–1852)

[5] On Sept. 3, Draper reported that the North Atlantic Council had on that day agreed to hold the ministerial meeting at Paris beginning Dec. 15. (Telegram Polto 250 from Paris; 740.5/8–352)

[6] On Aug. 15, Draper reported that he and Merchant were planning a vigorous campaign to complete the annual review by December. (Telegram Polto 170 from Paris; 740.5/7–1852)

740.5/8–1652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 16, 1952—2:13 p. m.

1129. Recent news reports emanating from London and Paris on NATO force plans very disturbing. Both BBC and Fr radio broadcasts, plus press stories allegedly quoting high govt sources, give evidence of deliberate campaign to throw blame on US for failure UK and Fr to meet Lisbon force goals. This publicity has other unfortunate overtones, including suggestion that: (1) NATO force plan has already been revised unilaterally; (2) Sov tension has diminished; (3) entire NATO defense program is facing collapse.

This kind publicity having bad impact public opinion both abroad and in US where evidences of alleged NATO failures tend undermine basis for US reliance upon NATO as contributing to security of US. Pls undertake soonest informal approach to FonOffs at high level to express US concern. In this connection fol points may be useful:

1. US aware current Eur economic problems and also aware lag in US end-item deliveries. Will continue offer all practicable coop find

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by William T. Nunley of RA and cleared *inter alia* by Knight, Perkins, and Parsons, was also sent to the Embassy at Paris and for information to Draper.

solutions. Meanwhile, however, believe govts must give serious attn to manner in which these difficulties, incl possible shortfall in Lisbon goals, are presented to public. It is misleading to suggest that as result difficulties goals have been scaled down. This requires NATO action and cannot be done unilaterally.

2. US uncertain degree to which current Eur publicity actually comes from govt sources. In any event, this publicity creating extremely unfav reaction US and in end likely be self-defeating. A continuance of such publicity may well endanger next year's mutual security program. Specifically:

a. Exaggerated reports of current difficulties are widely interpreted in US as foreshadowing imminent collapse of entire NATO program, thereby dampening public support for foreign aid and whole collective security policy.

b. Eur suggestions that Sov tension is easing irritate US public still acutely aware of sacrifices of Korea. US Govt has no info to indicate Sov threat is diminishing. NAC reached no such conclusion when matter last discussed.

c. References to "reduction" in US aid misleading. US will meet all aid commitments. Suggestions that US is chiefly to blame for prospective shortfalls not only present false picture to Eur public, but infuriate Amers and cause them recall with indignation vast US contributions to Eur recovery and defense. Tends to reinforce arguments of NATO critics who assert Eur is "bottomless pit" and will "do nothing for itself". Goes without saying US Govt does not share this attitude. But cannot ignore fact that feeling exists and is growing.

3. To date domestic and fon info programs of US Govt have deliberately emphasized important contributions Eur allies are making to mutual defense effort, primarily to counteract false criticism that US carrying whole burden. Still believe this sound policy. However, if current Eur publicity continues, US may be compelled stress facts re own contribution such as: US defense expenditures four times total all other NATO countries combined; US with smaller population has more men under arms than all other NATO countries combined; percentage of GNP spent by US is above all others and twice NATO average, US per capita defense expenditures are six times NATO average. Obviously US wld prefer not to take any action which leads away from cooperative press policies but cannot allow damaging and inaccurate impression of US effort become accepted in public mind.

4. US hopes UK and Fr govt officials will find opportunities to clarify defense situation to public, especially fol points:

a. There has been no revision NATO targets adopted at Lisbon; cannot be revised unilaterally. What we face is possible shortfall in mtg targets.

b. US is fulfilling aid commitments and has not reduced them.

c. There is no evidence easing of Sov threat, and NATO defenses remain inadequate.

d. Prospective shortfall, while increasing and prolonging security risks, shld not be interpreted as NATO "breakdown". Defense buildup will continue forward as rapidly as possible.

e. Annual Review will provide authoritative basis for such NATO action as may be necessary because of present difficulties.

Pls note also Polto 169 Aug 15 rptd to you today as Deptel to London 1130–Paris 916.[3] Dept endorses proposed Draper statement NAC Aug 20 and hopes you can take action on this tel by that date.

Bruce

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[3] Not printed; in it Draper stated that he would make a statement at the Council meeting on Aug. 20 about the unfortunate publicity which was being given to meeting the goals established at Lisbon. The Permanent Representative indicated that he would stress the many difficulties that had been overcome in the preceding 6 months and attempt to clear away the confusion in the minds of some Council members as to what the Lisbon commitments were. (740.5/8–1552) The text of the statement Draper made to the Council on Aug. 20 along these lines was transmitted in Polto 182 from Paris, Aug. 20. (740.5/8–2052)

740.5/8–2652 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, August 26, 1952—11 p. m.

Polto 208. Limit distribution. I spent nearly 2 hours Aug 26 alone with Lord Ismay and Merchant. Without making any ref whatsoever then or later to the paper he had mailed Van Vredenburch from England,[2] Lord Ismay plunged into a description of a background assessment paper which he desired to prepare for the benefit of the perm reps in connection with the AR. He said when he had completed the draft he wished to go over it informally with me prior to distribution. In outlining his thoughts for this paper Lord Ismay said that the first point he wld make is that the Russians are not reckless adventurers but cold calculating men. Consequently, they will not strike unless they are sure to win and the North Atlantic Alliance has now acquired teeth which give them pause. From this he draws the conclusion that if we do not slacken our efforts or fail in our res, war is not inevitable but can be averted. This requires, however, an increased and a sustained def effort and in planning it we must make sure that we do not in the process lose the cold war by straining our econ and social fabric.

Secondly, in his paper he will combat the insidious view, which incidentally he says is held in certain high governmental quarters in the UK that we shld concentrate on the def of Eur and somehow end the peripheral wars in Kor and Indochina. Lord Ismay said this point of view must be scotched "for we all know what happened when they called the Roman Legions home."

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] On Aug. 22, Draper had reported that Lord Ismay had sent Van Vredenburch a paper based on his conclusion that the Lisbon goals were impossible to attain. Van Vredenburch attempted to dissuade Ismay from circulating the paper and the Department of State instructed Merchant to do the utmost to prevent the paper from being released. On Aug. 24, Draper reported that Ismay had agreed to withdraw the paper. (Telegrams Polto 193 and 198 from Paris, Aug. 22 and 24, and telegram Topol 114 to Paris, Aug. 23; 740.5/8–2252, 8–2452, and 8–2252) No copy of Ismay's paper has been found in the Department of State files.

Finally, NAC shld recognize that it is in effect the Cab of the North Atlantic Alliance and that one of its responsibilities is to develop from a polit point of view and refine the directives to the mil commanders. He then elaborated a thought he has expressed to us before that the present def plans must be modified along lines of putting more in the shop window and less in the back of the store, on the basic assumption that if war comes the crucial battle will be fought in the first 6 weeks during which period retaliation wld have a chance to make its weight felt. Lord Ismay believes that this wld require a substantial revision of the composition of forces with a concentration on immed mobilizable reserves and an increased emphasis on air.

I was impressed and encouraged by the fact that Lord Ismay's attitude was not one of discouragement and that he is increasingly conscious of the role of leadership which he must play in the council.

I read him excerpts from my report to the Pres [3] and explained in great detail to him the reasons why we believe so strongly that in the interest of all of us the AR must be completed and ready for the Mins by Dec 15.[4] I drew on our experience in the TCC [5] to confirm the reasonableness of achievement provided all of us and particularly the internatl staff played their part. I also discussed with him frankly why a ministerial mtg before Dec wld be out of the question for the US. On the first point Ismay seemed somewhat surprised but impressed; on the latter he indicated a complete understanding and sympathy. He urged me to raise this point at the closed NAC meeting Aug 28 and to circulate in support of it a short paper to the other perm reps giving the underlying reasoning. Both I shall do.

At one point in the discussion I asked Lord Ismay if he thought it wld be helpful were I to go to London and with Gifford to see the PM and Eden in an effort to impress upon them our point of view and encourage them to reverse the note of pessimism toward NATO's achievements which still seems to run in the Brit press. Ismay indicated that a talk with Eden in this gen connection might be helpful.

In leaving I raised the question of consultation in NAC re Ger and expressed regret that in light of our willingness to participate in such discussion it had not eventuated that the first round cld have been held prior to receipt of the latest Sov note.[6] I told him that the US was willing to go ahead and wld have no objection if he informally brought subj up on Aug 28 since initiative had been left in his hands at previous council discussion this subj.[7] He indicated that he wld probably do so and I told him we were mtg with UK and French perm reps later in day on this subj.

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[3] No copy of a report of this nature has been found in the Department of State files.

[4] Regarding the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting in December, see the editorial note, p. 348.

[5] For documentation on the work of the Temporary Council Committee (TCC), see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III. Part 1, pp. 1 ff., and pp. 203 ff. herein.

[6] For documentation on the Soviet note of Aug. 23, which outlined the agenda for a proposed four-power meeting, see volume VII.

DRAPER

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[7] Draper reported on the Council meeting on Aug. 28 in Polto 228 from Paris, Aug. 29. (740.5/8-2952)

740.5/9-852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1952—7 : 26 p. m.

1326. Eyes only Draper and MacArthur. Ref Deptel 1257 Sept 4 to Paris rptd 1555 London, fol is text of Memo of Comments on Eden msg.[2] Memo was handed to Brit Chargé this A.M.[3] and was cleared with Def, DMS and MSA.[4]

"Mr. Eden's msg states in substance that he now agrees that an Oct min mtg of the NAC is impracticable and that any report on the Annual Review prepared for a mid-Dec mtg cld be little more than a consolidation of national replies and a statement of the main problems to be solved, leaving the reconciliation phase to a mtg in the spring. He gives as reasons for this view the fol:

1. Revised force requirements in the light of new mil and strategic info can not be ready until Dec so that any report on the Annual Review in mid-Dec wld take no account of the strategic reconsideration.
2. The Council will not have before it the latest appreciation of the Soviet threat.
3. The Brit submission for the Annual Review can not be provided until about the end of Oct.

Mr. Eden's understanding of the difficulties which made an Oct min mtg impracticable for the United States and his willingness to abandon the proposal for an Oct mtg will be greatly appreciated throughout the govt.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Parsons and cleared by Bonbright: it was repeated priority for information to London with instructions to limit its distribution. The source text bears the typewritten notation "No distribution inside or outside Dept."

[2] Telegram 1257 is not printed (740.5/9-452); it transmitted the text of the message from Foreign Secretary Eden to Ambassador Franks which is summarized in the memo of comments presented here. A copy of the message, left at the Department of State on Sept. 2, is in file 740.5/9-252.

[3] A memorandum of Bonbright's and Parsons' conversation with Steel on Sept. 8 is in file 740.5/9-252.

[4] The first draft of this memorandum was prepared by Parsons on Sept. 4 and sent to Perkins, Nitze, Martin (S/MSA), Moore, Vass, Raynor, and Merchant. It is the same in substance as the text transmitted here. (740.5/9-452) The text sent in this telegram was also drafted by Parsons, apparently on Sept. 8 and was cleared by Parsons with General Bradley, Admiral Davis, Lovett, Halaby, Nitze, Ferguson (S/P), Merchant, Perkins, Raynor, Moore, Vass, and Martin. (740.5/9-252)

Since the receipt of Mr. Eden's msg, the North Atlantic Council has agreed that a min mtg shld be held in mid-Dec in Paris for the primary purpose of considering the AR. Therefore, in connection with Mr. Eden's request for State Dept comments on his assessment of the situation, there remains only the question of what can be accomplished at the Dec mtg in connection with the Annual Review. This question can perhaps best be handled by taking up in turn the three points mentioned above.

1. It appears that there may be some misunderstanding in regard to the study of future force requirements which Gen Ridgway has stated to the Standing Group that he will prepare. According to our info, this study is for the year 1956. Moreover, we understand that a future study of the magnitude which Gen Ridgway is going to prepare will require at least six to eight months and, therefore, will not in any event be available for consideration in connection with an Annual Review useful for 1953 budgetary purposes whether it be fully concluded in Dec or even early spring. This being the case, we do not understand the relevance of this new and future strategic reconsideration to the Annual Review which has as its object the determination of firm goals for 1953, provisional goals for 1954, and planning goals for 1955.

The emphasis in this year's Annual Review, as clearly laid down by the action of the Council at Lisbon, will be to firm up our goals for 1953, and to develop tentative goals for 1954 and 1955 primarily as guides for actions which must be undertaken in 1953 to make possible a further buildup. It wld, in our view, be most unlikely that the force goals which can be developed for 1953 and 1954 will be of an order of magnitude which wld be inconsistent with the requirements for 1956 and after to be developed as a result of Gen Ridgway's study. The current deficiencies and the degree of danger to be faced over the next several years are such that the planned increase of forces in 1953 will partially remedy weaknesses rather than create an excess of strength that may possibly not be required in 1956. Furthermore, we cannot fail to take steps to increase the presently inadequate level of deterrent strength in Eur in the hope that the present estimate of mil targets might by 1956 be lowered sufficiently to be then attainable.

2. We entirely concur that the latest appreciation of the Soviet threat must be before the Council when it meets to discuss the Annual Review. The Standing Group is already at work on a revision of the current appreciation and it is believed that there is adequate time before Dec 15 for it to complete this work and to pass its conclusions through the mil reps and the mil comite to the Council before it convenes.

3. If, as Mr. Eden's msg indicates, the UK will not be able to take necessary decisions and provide NATO with its basic data for the Annual Review before the end of Oct, it will doubtless cause serious difficulty in carrying the work on the Annual Review forward so that the reconciliation may take place at the mid-Dec mtg. We wld hope that HMG wld find it possible to submit at least the broad outlines of its program by early Oct, with full details to be submitted later. Unless this is done the danger wld certainly arise that the annual cycle agreed by the Council at Lisbon wld indeed be impossible of completion. It will be recalled that the Council agreed that the process shld be completed well before the end of the year.

However, to accommodate the work of the Annual Review to this situation, this govt is prepared to support all steps so as to postpone as long as possible consideration of the U.K. submittal without jeopardizing the overall schedule. According to current indications most, if not all, of the submissions from the other members of NATO will be available by mid or late Sept. It shld, therefore, be possible to complete, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the country interview stage without too great deviation from schedule and to study the broad outlines of the U.K. program so that the actual drafting of the report to the Council can proceed expeditiously as soon as the detailed Brit data are received and examined and fitted appropriately into the picture as a whole.

As the foregoing will indicate, our principal comment on Mr. Eden's msg is that we cannot agree that it is impossible to complete the current Annual Review by mid-Dec. Moreover, as this govt is fully committed to a policy of administering the Mutual Security Program in accordance with agreed NATO plans, we wld face, as indicated in previous communications, special difficulties in connection with the presentation to our Congress of requests for appropriations for that program for our fiscal year 1953–1954 if agreement on a force plan were too long deferred. Other govts, we are sure, wld be faced by similar difficulties if the AR is delayed. We therefore believe it to be in the general interst of NATO that the United States continue to strive, and urge all other NATO govts to strive, to expedite the Annual Review. It will be our desire to discuss in detail and on a continuing basis with the United Kingdom Govt any special difficulties which must be overcome in order that the mid-Dec Council mtg just agreed upon by the Permanent Representatives may successfully conclude the AR. In the meantime, it shld be very clear that this govt believes it essential to overlook nothing which wld contribute to completion of the Annual Review, as agreed by the Council in time for the mid-Dec mtg."

ACHESON

740.5/8–2852 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 9, 1952—7:34 p. m.
PRIORITY NIACT

Topol 150. Ref Polto 208 Aug 26 and Polto 223 Aug 28.[2]

Fol are our reactions to Ismay paper for ur guidance in closed NAC discussion:

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Moore and Parsons and cleared with Perkins, Nitze, Martin (S/MSA), the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of Mutual Security, was repeated priority for information to London.

[2] Polto 208, p. 315; no copy of Polto 223, a cosmic top secret telegram, has been found in the Department of State files. Presumably, it transmitted the text of Ismay's paper.

1. As we understand memo, purpose is to provide basis for discussion broad political, econ and mil factors for eventual development NAC guidance in forthcoming AR. Such purpose indicated by informal comments Ismay on need for statement of broad pol objectives for NATO similar to heads of states pronouncements during last war and on competence of new perm reps which Ismay considers much greater than former Council of Deps. Similarity of Ismay views to trend recent Brit thinking may be coincidental but chances are basic thoughts of memo are of Brit origin.

2. Ismay memo raises two basic problems: (*a*) Completion of AR as conceived at Lisbon to establish firm goals for 1953, provisional goals for 1954 and planning goals for 1955; and (*b*) review and reassessment of Allied strategy. These two aspects discussed separately below. Believe as primary point you shld bring out clearly that these two aspects involved and that it is US view that Council discussion of overall strategic factors shld not be permitted to interfere with or delay in any way completion of AR. (Ref Deptels 1257 Sept 4 to Paris, rptd London 1555 and 1326 Sept 8 to Paris, rptd London 1679[3])

3. *Completion of AR at Dec 15 min mtg.* As set forth in ref Deptels para 2, US desires completion of AR at Dec 15 mtg and you shld urge all efforts be made to achieve this objective. NATO in urgent need psychological uplift of continued buildup NATO strength to counteract recent feeling of slump. (Eden has recognized need for booster in recent urging of Oct mtg.) Ismay paper as a whole does not carry sufficient emphasis on this point and impact on other countries may be to reinforce their tendency to relax their efforts. Necessity to evaluate 1952 accomplishment and to set goals for 1953–55 therefore of paramount importance. However "*completion*" of AR as contemplated at Lisbon is not inflexible requirement. Goals established for 1953 shld be firm and feasible. Goals for 1954 and 1955 are progressively less firm and are inflexible only to extent of long lead time requirements.

4. *Reassessment and review of Allied Strategy:* US glad to see this example of initiative and leadership in Council by Ismay and hopes it will be followed by others. In US view Sov threat is long-term and continuing. Periodic review of mil, econ and pol factors therefore necessary and US welcomes and supports such action. Such review, however, shld be deliberate and undertaken as carefully thought out process to enable all relevant and current info to be considered. Such process, by very definition, cannot be concluded in a few months and almost certainly not before AR. It is US view that undertaking of such a review might well be a matter for NAC to recommend at an early date for completion in 1953, such an assessment to take full acct of 1952 AR decisions. US notes that discussion of problems raised in Ismay memo is under way in appropriate NATO agencies but that

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[3] Telegram 1326, *supra*; regarding telegram 1257, see footnote 2, *supra*.

NAC might well undertake concentration of effort to effect a more coordinated result. Logic of Ismay memo itself dictates consideration of various elements of strategic review by competent NATO Agencies, in particular SG advice on mil problems.

5. To sum up, US supports idea of Council initiative in matter of review of broad pol, econ and mil considerations and wld assist Council efforts, to extent practicable, in this regard. US considers that forward progress in AR is more immed and attainable goal on which NAC shld set sights. It is obvious that no NATO country shld undertake Def program which wld bankrupt its natl economy. However, problem with which we are jointly confronted in this year's AR, as in last year's TCC exercise, is how much can each country contribute to common effort within limits imposed by need to maintain solvency on the one hand and to meet Sov threat on the other. We feel countries will agree that this point has not yet been reached and buildup must continue.

6. US recognizes that strength of NATO is dependent upon morale, unity and pol will as well as size of mil forces. Progress to date with respect to all these factors is so encouraging that given "the determination to continue to make sacrifices" of which Lord Ismay speaks, we shld be able to reach objectives of making both Eur and Free World secure.

Acheson

740.5/9–1852 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, September 18, 1952—9 p. m.

Polto 317. Subj: NAC restricted meeting, September 16.

Full report discussion Ismay strategic paper [1] follows by airgram.[2] Highlights herewith:

Chaired by M. Pearson, session lasted three hours in which all permanent representatives except Portugal, Luxembourg and Iceland spoke at least once.

Ismay briefly introduced subject making following points:

1. Mistitled "Background for AR" and important should not delay progress AR.
2. Origin entirely personal.
3. Addressed in part to eminent military opinion given him to effect concentration required in Europe at expense Korea and Indochina which view he considered fatal.
4. Necessary consider character of war with which we might be confronted.

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[1] Not found in Department of State files.

[2] Polto A–46, Sept. 24. A copy of this six-page report is in file 740.5/9–2452.

Van Starkenborgh opened discussion with tribute imp [*to importance of?*] paper which reflected level of activity for which NAC designed. Agree Ismay evaluation present situation, risk and need husband resources. Emphasized importance early German contribution via EDC [3] and necessity NAC learning essence military plans for defense Europe on which strategic concept military requirements based. Said lacking knowledge former intelligent action on latter by NAC impossible.

Alphand followed with long speech, obviously foreshadowing upcoming French paper, burden of which was statement risk exists and exposure prolonged by failure provide authoritatively stated military requirements needed to meet it. Said NAC must decide if threat now reduced and implications new weapons "rule of equitable cost sharing of the burden" must prevail. European economies already overstrained. Implication was clear that answer lies in elastic US economy and latter's large non-NATO budget.

Kraft, De Staerke, Rossi Longhi and Pipinelis all paid fulsome tributes to Ismay paper and in varied degree emphasized importance NAC making major politico-strategic decisions which in turn must rest on more complete knowledge military plans.

Hoyer Millar recommended paper be forwarded to SG for military comments after consultation with MRC with view SG joining NAC in late Nov for joint discussion for purpose of submitting agreed paper to ministerial mtg Dec 15.

Heeney objected latter course after indicating general agreement with subject paper but agreed in cross-play with Hoyer Millar that military advice needed but object not necessarily agreed paper but NAC document for Ministers after receipt military advice.

Skaug agreed above procedure but commented on Ridgway July 12 report [4] as "80 percent dismal" and asked what are facts re relative atomic strength and our strategic plans for its use. Asked "are Ismay assumptions correct?"

I congratulated Ismay on paper as thought provoking and opening NAC discussions of its proper business. I urged SG be requested for military comments on it. Adding US felt military threat undiminished, I said paper raises basic strategic considerations which could not be adequately considered in period less than six months and in any event not prior to this year's AR. Such reassessment, in US view, I said, wld not affect build-up contemplated for 1953 and 1954 at Lisbon. I omitted any discussion strategic concepts or atomic weapons.

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[3] For documentation on the European Defense Community (EDC), see pp. 571 ff.

[4] The report under reference here has not been identified further. However, at a press conference on Aug. 11, General Ridgway stated *inter alia* that the military means available to NATO to carry out its defensive purposes were still seriously inadequate in certain vital categories and that the threat of a Communist attack had in no way decreased. (*New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1952, p. 1)

Turk sturdily commended Ismay paper and said while agreeing need for military advice on its content, all shld go to limit their economic capabilities since maximum collective effort required to meet obvious risk.

Pearson closed animated debate with highly helpful, lengthy statement, commenting Ismay paper asked more questions than it answered. He emphasized economic capabilities as much matter of national will as statistics and stated his opinion, contrary to growing public opinion, that risk is as great as year or two ago. If risk remains, he said, we must be concerned not only with building forces to meet attack but also with those needed to launch counter-attack. He added this raised query were Lisbon goals high enough. Pearson then referred to disturbing contents Ridgway July report and cautioned against announcement of higher "firm goals for 1953" in December until we had in fact met 1952 goals.

Debate closed with agreement to transmit Ismay paper to SG with covering note to be agreed by NAC Sept 18 stating paper still under study by NAC which desired SG comments after consulting MRC with view early discussion with SG in NAC in expectation preparation by NAC paper to be submitted to Ministers Dec 15.[5] Meanwhile subject paper will be further considered by NAC.

The discussion on whole lively and deadly serious with obvious intent to continue and majority interest in delving deeper into military aspects of alliance. I consider it milestone in movement NAC to proper plane and sphere with no serious risk it will overstep bounds necessarily set by considerations of military security.

Draper

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[5] On Sept. 20, Draper reported that the Council was still considering sending Ismay's paper to the Standing Group, but that he had asked General Bradley about the possibility of meeting with the Council on Sept. 22 to give a broad outline of the defense plans under consideration by the Standing Group. (Telegram Polto 328 from Paris; 740.5/9-2052)

740.5/9-1952 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, September 19, 1952—7:25 p. m.

Topol 180. Sent Paris for action SRE and Emb.

1. Major elements in dissatisfaction NAT members with former Council Deps were tendency become immersed in detail and failure to deal with policy questions. One of principal purposes Lisbon reorg was to correct this and to endow Perm Council with stature and authority sufficient to encourage consultation on important questions.

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Parsons on Sept. 11, cleared with Merchant, Perkins, Jessup, and Martin (S/MSA), and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Bonbright, was repeated on Sept. 20 to the other NATO capitals.

Report of Atlantic Community (Comite of Five) endorsed at Lisbon by NAC also stressed importance of this subj.[2]

In recent weeks Dept has heard comments NAC was drifting toward situation in old CD. Incident last Jul 9 over tripartite reply to Sov note on Ger was particularly damaging and has caused us renew efforts correct situation.[3] Realize no org change can substitute for willingness govts to discuss major NATO and other fon pol questions in NAC but believe it useful for Dept in this tel to review reasons for its support of principle of fon pol consultation in NAC and to suggest steps which might bring about regular and substantive discussion. Desire emphasize this tel relates to NAC handling of pol policy questions of common interest rather than to problems connected with def buildup; i.e. NATO as a developing association of states rather than as a mil alliance only.

2. Consultation in NAC important in natl interest for fol reasons:

a. It is fundamental to NATO concept which as indicated in NAT Preamble and in Art 2 clearly contemplates more than medium term mil coalition to cope with present Sov threat.

b. Continued progress of Fr–Ger–Ital–Benelux integration leading to solid core of Eur community requires concomitant evolution of well-knit larger grouping of Atlantic states within which new EUR grouping can develop, thus ensuring unity of purpose of entire group and precluding possibility of Eur Union becoming third force or opposing force.

c. US leadership of free world is crucial. Consultation which wld permit elucidation of US problems, motives and concepts shld serve to strengthen confidence in US leadership. At same time contribution of fresh ideas and viewpoints of others thru consultation in NAC shld give greater range and bal to US determinations.

d. Believe experience in CD, NAC and elsewhere indicates that explanations of US viewpoints more often than not results in smaller powers preferring position of US to that of UK or Fr.

e. Advantageous to emphasize willingness proceed multilaterally in NATO as offset to some of bilateral aspects of relationships under MSP.

f. Polto 40 Jul 9 [4] on reply to second Sov note clearly demonstrated that presenting smaller partners with *fait accompli* on matter of legitimate, in fact vital interest to them can cause serious difficulties. Leaders of govts having to ask parliaments to support policies face much more difficult task if they have had no share in determining policies. Altho prior discussion of some polit matters by Big Three has proved desirable, we shld bear in mind that prior determination of policies in trilateral forum tends to raise headaches similar to those of old SG problem on mil side. Practice of fon pol discussion in Council shld minimize this risk.

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[2] For the text of C9–D/8, Feb. 19, "Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community", see p. 180.

[3] Regarding the discussion under reference here, see Polto 40, July 9, p. 309; for documentation on the tripartite note to the Soviet Union, July 10, see volume VII.

[4] *Ante*, p. 309.

g. If Art 5 NAT is ever invoked it wld obviously be crucial test solidarity of NATO as govts committed take only such action each deems necessary. Practice of fon pol discussion may help predispose them to prompt parallel action thus minimizing a very basic problem.

3. Given incentives which exist for fon pol consultation and fact that smaller countries tending increasingly to insist on discussion of various questions (cf. Polto 110[5] re Grk request for discussion on Near East and Polto 219[6] re Ital request discuss Yugo), question arises how to make NAC fon pol discussions more than perfunctory in nature without (*a*) limiting US freedom of action unduly, or (*b*) incurring unwarranted security risks. In this connection, Dept believes NAC has developed useful device in informal Thurs mtgs at which, as we understand it, attendance is limited to perm reps plus one asst each, no minutes are recorded, and no decisions taken. This of course is not complete safeguard against leaks but shld materially reduce risk. Problem of avoiding premature US commitment shld be manageable in most cases not only because there wld have to be agreement by us to discuss any topic suggested, but also because US cld have some control over how far discussion shld go. Success of recent NAC discussion on Ger (Polto 260 and 228[7]) confirms our view as to importance of objective of affording others opportunity for comment and suggestions. US comment can range from rather full exposition of problem with suggested course of action to frank exposition of difficulties we see in any given subj (which are often not known to or properly evaluated by smaller powers) and reasons why we cannot go beyond certain point in discussing it. If our reasons well founded and convincingly presented, believe they will be respected by NAC partners who readily recognize our global responsibilities and often merely seek reassurance as to our attitudes.

4. Even tho we all agree in principle that reg and substantive discussion in NAC important step toward giving Council and hence Atlantic Community real vitality, progress in this direction certain to be gradual and may not take place at all unless effective means are found to stimulate it. This task may be eased somewhat if other NAC countries, esp UK and Fr, are clear on purposes of consultation. In gen these are implicit in para one this tel, particularly as regards US purposes. However, it equally important that all realize consulta-

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[5] Not printed; it reported that on July 24 the Greek Representative had proposed that the North Atlantic Council discuss the situation in the Middle East. (740.5/7–2952)

[6] Not printed; it reported that the Italian Representative had asked his Greek and Turkish colleagues to inform the Council concerning their talks with Yugoslavia. (740.5/8–2752) Further documentation on the talks for a Balkan Pact is presented in volume VIII.

[7] Neither printed; the latter reported on a closed NAC session on Aug. 28 at which *inter alia* Germany was discussed; while the former reported that an informal NAC session on Sept. 4 was devoted entirely to the German question. (740.5/8–2952 and 9–452).

tion as rule is not for purpose of reaching final agreements or of drafting in 14-nation forum any doc embodying agreement. Purposes are rather to exchange info, create broader understanding of problems discussed, and generate mutual support as well as, where feasible, common attitudes. Above all consultation shld create sense of participation in important affairs which is often dangerously lacking even to point of fostering propaganda that small NATO powers are becoming mere satellites. In problems external to NATO area it is of course always essential to keep in mind danger of lending substance to propaganda alleging NATO is white imperialist bloc or is encroaching upon or creating conflicts with UN.

Problem of agreement to discuss many subjs is also closely related to timing of discussion. It is our belief that some subjs (such as Sov notes on Ger) shld be introduced into NAC at early stage. Belated discussion creates adverse reaction whereas early discussion makes it possible for natl reps to set forth pros and cons of a particular position without committing their govts or even revealing their preferences.

5. Dept has considered possible techniques for promoting fon pol discussions incl Nor suggestion for polit comite. As you aware, we oppose Nor proposal which wld lead backwards toward creation another CD and risk perm reps abdicating from what shld be important field for them. Wld seem to us more fruitful to remember that another major purpose of reorg was to create strong internatl staff with real responsibility for guiding and stimulating NAC actions. In view Ismay's concern at progress of reorg thus far believe he might agree that Fenoaltea as asst SecGen for polit affairs shld have as major continuing duty consideration of fon pol problems of concern to NATO members and selection of those on which in his opinion useful purpose wld be served by NAC discussion. Info as to what problems are of concern wld reach him from various sources incl those perm reps who proposed subjs for NAC discussion. Before bringing forward such subjs for agenda, however, it wld be his function to sound out appropriate dels incl Big Three as to feasibility of introducing them and as to timing of NAC discussion. Assignment of Cumming as dep to Fenoaltea inclines us toward this possibility.

Variant of foregoing wld be to have Fenoaltea assisted in this function by comite set up by NAC to be composed of three perm reps, one from Big Three and two from other dels. Membership on this comite wld rotate frequently, say every 3 mos. Possible disadvantage this variant is increased danger of leaks or of comite itself getting into substantive discussions which belong in NAC.

It is apparent others in NAC likely avail themselves increasingly of right to propose discussion on fon pol topics as Grks and Itals have lately done. It shld be recognized that any NATO rep is free to propose an exchange of views on any subj. When such proposal made directly in NAC believe it might be referred to Fenoaltea who wld consider it from standpoint of (*a*) importance, (*b*) timeliness, (*c*) priority in relation to current business of NAC, (*d*) whether or not members cld or wld make really substantial contribution thus making it worthwhile topic for agenda. He wld also consult and give particular weight to views of dels from countries whose interests most affected by proposed discussion. Only at that stage wld Fenoaltea come back to NAC with recommendation as to whether or not subj shld be discussed and, if to be discussed, define its scope, and suggest a method of proceeding. In some cases at least might have internatl Staff paper as basis for discussion. Usually more profitable for members have specific doc to discuss and often preferable for US be in position of commenting upon staff paper rather than either putting forward US paper or commenting on paper put forward by another member. Wld for instance have been less desirable to discuss in NAC Anglo-US differences on basis UK or US paper than on basis recent Ismay paper.[8] On other hand disadvantages of proceeding on basis staff paper wld sometimes be controlling. Disadvantages we see are (1) danger formalizing discussion prematurely, (2) increased risk of leaks, (3) scanty resources of internatl Staff for preparing adequate studies based on sufficient info, (4) time factor. Also it is possible that countries reluctant to discuss a particular issue cld make their objections known to Fenoaltea who might then in reporting to Council not wish to identify such countries thus permitting them to escape onus of frustrating Council discussion. Accordingly strong leadership by internatl Staff wld be required.

6. Would therefore appreciate comments and suggestions both pro and con. Must emphasize Secretary has not made up his mind whether or not to proceed with this course of action or how far to proceed.[9]

ACHESON

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[8] Regarding Ismay's paper, see Polto 317, *supra*; Topol 150, Sept. 9, p. 319; and Polto 208, Aug. 26, p. 315.

[9] No immediate reply to this telegram has been found in the Department of State files; however, in telegram Topol 1476, June 23, 1953 (p. 413), the Department of State informed the Embassy in France that the U.S. position on political consultation in the North Atlantic Council was that set forth in Topol 180.

740.5/9–2252: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, September 22, 1952—9 p. m.

Polto 340. Limit distribution. Subject: Informal NAC mtg Sept 22.

Lord Ismay introduced General Bradley. Latter described military organization NATO and emphasized each country via military reps and staff members on commands has access plans affecting it. He then asserted that there were certain detailed plans and data which no one shld want to know. It was fully recognized that the civil authority has final approval of all that military may advise and further that there were economic and political aspects in deciding strategic concept, setting force goals etc.

General Bradley said NATO still needs large forces for absolute security but recognized they cld not all be organized right away. He thought point was being reached where it might be assumed that war was not quite as likely to happen as earlier but re new weapons a considerable wishful thinking was apparent. It was necessary to have ground forces to prevent overrunning Europe and in order to cause such enemy concentrations as to be remunerative A targets. The USSR is increasing its atom capability all the time and it is hoped that the US is increasing even faster. He concluded by emphasizing that there cld be no reliance on atom weapons by themselves.

Ismay introduced subject his paper and its ref to military agencies (as discussed last NAC mtg[1]). Council accepted a suggested US redraft for the proposed message to the SG (cabled separately[2]).

Alphand asked General Bradley when the SG cld conveniently come to Paris for a joint mtg with the Council. Bradley replied that it was up to NAC and wondered whether it wld be better before AR or after. He said the revised strategic guidance wld probably not be ready for military reps until Nov 15. In the ensuing discussions it was agreed that General Bradley shld consult SG on his return and suggest to NAC a date when talks wld be of maximum use.

De Staercke then noted that recent statements on atomic weapons by Mr. Dean, General Collins and General Bradley seemed to be in conflict. He thought General Bradley implied that large ground forces would always be needed. Was it possible that atomic weapons might have an effect on strategic plans or on the current AR.

General Bradley said there was in fact no conflict between the statements mentioned. His own statement had been cleared by all US agencies concerned and the White House. General Collins was in full accord with it and with the view that A weapons will not reduce requirements below the maximum obtainable within the next two years. He said General Ridgway had been informed of the number of weapons he wld probably have in 1956 and had been asked to make a study of forces needed then. Such a study wld probably require six to eight months.

Ismay thanked Bradley and in summation said expected hear from him re SG visit (which wld probably be about three to four weeks hence and two or three days duration).

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[1] See Polto 317, Sept. 18, p. 321.

[2] The message from the Secretary General to the Standing Group, transmitting a copy of Ismay's paper, was sent in Polto 339 from Paris, Sept. 22. (740.5/9–2252)

General Bradley's informal talk this morning had a most favorable effect on NAC and made relatively simple the task of resolving what seemed last Thursday to be a very difficult matter. Also, his discussion went long way toward answering many of the difficult points raised both in Lord Ismay's paper and the paper distributed just today by the French rep.[3]

Draper

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[3] Regarding the French paper under reference here, see Polto 395, Oct. 2, p. 330.

740.5/9–2252 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, September 22, 1952—9 p. m.

Polto 333. Cotel. Subject: US Objectives for NATO Annual Review.

Consider it essential provide US negots AR broad outline US basic objectives for this operation. Wash comments desired soonest on fol text:

1. Firm mil goals for 53 based upon complete reconciliation between MRC–12[1] 53 targets and pol and econ capabilities each participant.
2. Definitive plans to increase mil effectiveness of existing 53 forces.
3. Definitive plans to make most effective use defense budgets.
4. Programmed further expansion of mil forces for 54–55 on basis realistic appraisal of capabilities, with emphasis on action necessary in 53 to attain this expansion.
5. Assessment of NATO continuing maintenance and replacement requirements in determination of and on basis of agreed force goals.
6. Development definitive realistic NATO supply plan on basis agreed force goals and maintenance and replacement requirements, including acceptable NATO recs to US re end item allocations and OSP.
7. The acceptance by each country of an appreciation of common danger no less vivid than US appraisal that danger, to the end that larger def efforts are accepted and regarded as first charge on national revenues.
8. Review shld proceed on assumption that cost of def will remain high for indefinite future. Major portion of any expansion of GNP of other NATO partners and Germany shld be devoted to increasing def budgets.
9. Provision of effective mechanism for continuing inspection and reporting progress toward fulfilling commitment accepted by participants, with provision for follow-up action.

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[1] The paper under reference has not been identified further.

10. Program itself and process of negotiation shld be of a character which, when presented to public, will justify continued US support.

11. A positive plan for reassessment of NATO strategic concept during 53 shld be adopted, but prospective re-examination of resultant NATO requirements shld not be permitted to affect the firmness of 53 goals, nor necessary forward planning against 54 and 55 programs.

12. Strengthening NATO's capacity to arrive at sound common decisions for attainment of major objectives vital to defense of NAC.[3]

DRAPER

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[3] In the source text Ridgway Knight had written "O.K." next to all the numbered paragraphs except 7 and 8. Next to 7 he had written "Intell[igence]?" while next to 8 he had written only a question mark.

The Department of State replied at length to this telegram on Oct. 17, indicating general agreement with the substance of the message, but pointing out that the brevity of the statements might "evoke comments which might not apply if statements were expanded to provide more precise content to and relationship amongst objectives." Draper was informed particularly of the special need to stress the objectives in paragraph 3. (Telegram Topol 255; 740.5/10–1752)

740.5/10–252 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, October 2, 1952—9 p. m.

Polto 395. Subject: Informal NAC mtg October 1.

Ismay asked Alphand to introduce Fr Govt papers.[2]

Alphand gave brief topical summary and said he realized some points raised might be embarrassing to some govts and that all questions contained in paper cld not be answered now. He knew many problems wld be dealt with during course AR but felt discussion probs by NAC wld provide fitting prelude to AR. Fr Govt had felt it necess give expression to certain apprehensions, and they had not felt it was mistake in timing to present paper now. He said that part of paper treating strategy was really elaboration Ismay's paper [3] and that there was little divergence between two. Fr paper had been drafted before NAC discussion with Gen Bradley [4] which had thrown light particularly in question new weapons, but Alphand thought NAC wld discuss this question further. He thought milit advice shld be obtained on certain other questions posed in Fr paper.

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[1] This telegram was transmitted in two sections.

[2] No copy of this paper, sometimes referred to as the Alphand paper or memorandum, has been found in the Department of State files. Alphand had given Draper a copy of the paper on Sept. 20 and had had it circulated to the North Atlantic Council on Sept. 22, explaining that it was nothing really new, but merely an attempt to put the whole defense problem into a broad political, economic, and military complex. (Telegram Polto 329, Sept. 20, from Paris; 740.5/9–2052) The Department of State summarized the paper in NATOP D–10/6, dated Dec. 15, a negotiating paper for the December North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, as follows:

"1. In the French paper of September 1952, it is proposed that the authority of the Standing Group be extended toward global competence and that global military requirements on NATO countries be related to 'equitable' sharing of cost on a long-term basis. French objectives appear to be:

"*a.* To obtain voice in global planning.

"*b.* To obtain further formal international recognition and long-term guarantee of French military support in Indo-China.

"*c.* To obtain a calculation which would show the widest possible gap between requirements and capabilities, thus demonstrating need for a long-term U.S. aid program." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 128)

In summary Alphand thought discussion can be carried to point where no difference of views existed between individual nationals and between civilian and milit auths in NATO as to NATO strategic policy.

Ismay then requested comments other reps and after prolonged silence called on US to begin discussion.

Merchant observed that silence other reps tended confirm impression that Fr paper directed primarily at US Govt. It raised questions of greatest importance and US Govt has not had opportunity to give it consideration and study deserved. Therefore, he spoke personally and without instrs.

He said policy on forward strategy unchanged as far as he knew and if any doubt existed on this point, forthcoming visit SG wld provide opportunity fully to discuss.

US shared disappointment that there has been slippage timewise in defense build-up and knew this disappointment existed with other govts.

As to poss effect new weapons on over-all requirements, Gen Bradley had adequately dealt with this point and had, he thought, largely dispelled any doubts as to need for further build-up.

Merchant agreed on desirability developing coherent production plans in Eur and said US OSP policy shld help on this score. A start had been made by aircraft production program and progress wld be continued with completion of ammo study. In implementing its OSP policy US wld be influenced by NATO staff recommendations on production programs, and it was hoped that development of EDC wld broaden poss area of progress.

Treating econ and finan aspects of paper, Merchant said that in US view there has been a real performance in burden sharing. He cited fact that over $10 billion had been appropriated for end-item assistance by US since 1950 and over $13 billion econ aid provided since 1948.

He then rejected idea that any one country is residual underwriter of any deficit, particularly when, as may be the case, size of gap is affected by deficiencies in efforts other countries in meeting agreed goals.

Re proposal for long term planning resting on assured assumptions all cld agree that this desirable in theory; however, Merchant said in his personal opinion there was no practical possibility any US Cong committing future Congresses. Reasons for this were obvious and probably existed in most if not all parliamentary systems.

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[3] Not printed; but see footnote 8, p. 327.

[4] For a report on General Bradley's meeting with the North Atlantic Council on Sept. 22, see Polto 340, Sept. 22, *ibid.*

Merchant then said he cld not accept assumption which seemed to underlie paper that def resources limited to present levels. Forecasts of increases in GNP held out poss for defense budgets to continue on present upward slope. Furthermore, it shld always be borne in mind that an increase in risk translated into increased willingness to sacrifice wld present poss of further increased def budgets.

In summation, Merchant observed that paper required further study but said it shld not interfere with progress AR since many answers to questions posed wld come from AR. He then said NAC might consider poss over-all re-examination policy, strategy and programs some time next year based on results AR and papers now in preparation by milit agencies.[5]

Hoyer-Millar expressed appreciation to Fr Govt for producing paper which clearly stated important questions requiring consideration. He doubted value detailed study by NAC prior to AR since many questions raised wld be discussed and considered during process of AR and subsequently. UK Govt regarded AR as continuing process and Dec 15 mtg mins[6] as first in series addressed to problem of balancing requirements and capabilities.

He agreed certain parts of paper shld be sent SG for info and felt attention shld be called particularly to question proportion between reserves and front line forces.

With respect to that part paper suggesting some process of screening and pruning natl milit budgets, UK felt most Eur govts so hard pressed financially that they cld be relied upon to screen their own budgets.

In any event UK wld not favorably view proposal for NATO screening world wide programs or suggestion that SG auth shld be extended globally.

Canad rep spoke without instrs but welcomed paper since in his view it went to heart of matter and was frank. He believed all main strategic issues raised shld be discussed with SG at forthcoming joint mtg. As to econ and polit questions, these wld be dealt with during AR but still it was right that they shld be brought forth now. He hoped both Fr and SecGen papers wld continue be discussed by NAC and felt such consideration wld inevitably influence AR.

De Staercke spoke without instrs and observed that strategic aspects of paper were in essence same covered by Ismay previously. Study was already under way in milit agencies on these issues. As to various econ questions raised, he knew Belg Govt wld strongly support move for integrated production program and some form burden-sharing arrangements. He called particular attention to Belg proposals for prefinancing system.

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[5] In Topol 198 to Paris, Sept. 30, the Department of State had transmitted the outline of a suggested comment on Alphand's paper along the lines made by Merchant in the meeting on Oct. 1. (740.5/9–2952)

[6] Regarding the December Ministerial meeting, see the editorial note, p. 348.

Starkenborgh observed strategic aspects Fr paper largely same as those raised in Ismay paper. As regards relation between NATO and non-NATO program, he thought Fr paper properly sought to establish link between two. However, he did not agree that SG shld be injected into non-NATO field and expressed hope that when SG gave views on NATO strategy three powers wld give some general idea global (non-NATO) strategy.

As for econ questions raised, they were all essential part AR and there wld be little value in discussing them separately. He spoke favorably of proposal find some means for long term programming and for development integrated production program.

Pipinelis thought Fr and Ismay papers shld be taken together and emphasized factor of degree of danger as controlling in reaching polit decisions on def effort. He felt it not necess await final completion AR to draw conclusions which wld benefit mins in Dec 15 mtg; in particular, he felt it poss to reach conclusions soon as to degree of danger. He viewed Sov threat as spreading in areas other than NATO and consequent effect in these areas, while not legally NATO's concern, as vital concern to each member country.

He concluded by observing that if risk not diminished and if NATO cld not count on help for "others" there wld have to be supplementary effort.

Alphand replied to some comments. Fr Govt most grateful and fully understood importance US contributions. Merchant had said no one country cld accept respon for deficit. Fr Govt agreed that Eur effort cld and shld be more but felt in aggregate it so small as to be infinitesimal in relation to gap. Fr Govt felt choice had to be made if strategic objectives were as stated whether or not means were available.

In brief summary Ismay suggested paper be transmitted SG under same type covering memo as for his paper and that certain problems raised be discussed in forthcoming joint mtg.

He then commented that it was imposs to compartment strategy. NATO's strategy must be considered in context global strategy and not separately. Problem was who shld consider global strategy and how shld it be done.

Entire discussion was of a very prelim nature, most reps speaking without instrs. Fact that Ismay's paper had already been subj of considerable discussion largely took edge off strategic aspects Fr paper. Further there was general recognition that politico-econ problems pointed up were inherent part AR and that most decisions or answers to them cld not be reached separately. Coming discussion with SG will probably serve to ventilate further main strategic points raised both in Ismay and Fr papers, altho probably few reps, if any, expect conclusions now held to be altered significantly. Both papers remain on agenda for informal discussion NAC and next round will be two weeks hence.

DRAPER

740.5/10–1052 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 14, 1952—4 : 19 p. m.

Topol 243. Ref Poltos 395, Oct 2 and 439, Oct 10.[2] Gen feeling here that Merchant's excellent presentation at informal NAC mtg Oct 1 adequately covers points raised in Alphand paper for purposes of current discussion. We are consequently not inclined to encourage further discussion of paper by an additional statement of US views. No objection of course to your stating that views expressed by Merchant Oct 1 have US Govt concurrence.

Dept will appreciate being kept informed developments this discussion especially re question of global strategy. If discussion this question shld be renewed SRE might take opportunity remind dels that NATO not a global planning org; that while it is agreed NATO shld be generally informed of developments in other parts of world of special interest to NATO all NATO countries shld exercise care to avoid (1) creating impression in ME and FE that NATO is planning strategy for areas not in NATO and (2) lending substance to propaganda alleging that NATO is "white imperialist bloc" or is encroaching upon or creating conflicts with UN.

FYI re summary observation 5(*a*) of Alphand paper Dept wonders whether suggestion that Atlantic Community in course of AR "examine through a critical scrutiny the mil budgets of member states etc" is not inconsistent with Fr attitude as reported in Emb tel 2153 Oct 8,[3] especially statement to effect that composition and size Fr mil budget is matter for Fr determination alone. In view present delicate status relations with Fr we see no special advantage to be gained by pointed reference this apparent inconsistency at this stage.[4]

BRUCE

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Adair, cleared by Knight (WE), Bonbright, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of Mutual Security, and initialed for the Acting Secretary of State by Perkins.

[2] Polto 395, *supra*; Polto 439, not printed, asked for any additional views on Alphand's paper in time for its informal discussion on Oct. 16 by the North Atlantic Council. (740.5/10–1052)

[3] Not printed.

[4] At the end of this telegram the following sentence had been deleted before transmission: "If in course normal NAC business, however, opportunity shld arise where reference wld appear useful Dept wld have no objection SRE expressing appropriate observation thereto."

740.5/10-1652 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Special Representative in Europe (Anderson) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 16, 1952—11 p. m.

Polto 462. Subject: NAC informal mtg Oct 16, discussion French paper.

Van Vredenburch in chair asked if Alphand wished make any general comments before discussion proceeded on Fr paper.

Alphand used this opportunity to attack US on AR submission. He said Fr paper was particularly appropriate at this time since it recalled principles agreed at Lisbon forming basis for AR.[2] Incomplete answers by US and Canada to AR questionnaire wld not allow AR to be carried thru as agreed. Prospect now facing NAC was mere addition of individual programs rather than integrated program arrived at multilaterally based on common interest.

Merchant said he had nothing further to say on substance Fr paper but wished to reject Alphand's sug that nature of US reply to AR questionnaire prejudiced carrying out AR as agreed. He then restated what he had explained at length in hearings, i.e., controlling consideration of US Govt in making decision on AR reply was security. While US had not supplied all info asked for in questionnaire, if questions arose during course of AR requiring info on production and supply position of equip, US wld do best to provide answers.

Heeney then spoke in somewhat heated and blunt fashion. He said that at least US and Canada had already submitted their replies to the questionnaire, a condition which did not apply to many other nations, and he had not expected that US and Canada wld be made objects of rather sweeping and unjustified attack such as Alphand had made as reward for getting submissions in early. He stated Canadian Govt's decision that it cld not forecast program in financial terms beyond March 31, 1952 had been taken with full realization its implications for NATO deliberations and other NATO countries. Canadian Govt was now giving intense study to its program which wld be put before Parl early next year. He emphasized two aspects in which Canada's position differed from other countries—Canada considered its whole def program as falling within NATO, and Canada was not a recipient but a giver of aid. He then noted that other govts were having difficulty in determining their def programs. He completely rejected Fr suggestion that nature of Canadian and US submission wld prejudice carrying thru AR as agreed at Lisbon.

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, see pp. 107 ff.

Speaking with considerable feeling, Heeney said NAC was not a sovereign body and was dealing with individual natl programs whether they liked it or not and that problem was to arrive at practical solution taking into account facts of situation.

UK rep then said he had nothing to add to previous views re Fr paper and thought there was little to be gained in discussing problems raised therein apart from AR.

Alphand said reasons why Fr program had not been submitted were publicly known. Fr Govt cld have replied to questionnaire in way Canada did without any appreciable difficulty but thought such submission wld not conform to Lisbon decisions and principles.

In absence further comment, Van Vredenburch observed that underlying motive of Fr Govt's paper was to strengthen NATO. He knew all wld agree to this goal but question was what is best way to achieve goal. Obviously certain proposals advanced by Fr Govt resulted from its experience with EDC. Perhaps some features adopted by EDC might eventually be found desirable for NATO, but this was matter for govts to decide.

He then suggested that many questions raised by Fr Govt wld find answers during joint mtg with SG. Further, certain problems wld be solved during AR and after completion AR undoubtedly gaps in organ and deficiencies in procedures wld be apparent and require solution later. He observed also that events were taking place in many countries concerned which wld have great affect on NATO's future and expressed hope that after these events it wld be possible to continue strengthening NATO.

Van Vredenburch's remarks appear to us to mark demise, for time being, of Fr paper, general discussion with SG shld serve further to clarify strategic policy issues for NAC.

Alphand's attack did not gain him many friends within NAC. Before mtg, Heeney told Merchant he thought Fr were behaving in pretty disreputable fashion and wondered if we had not had about enough of it. Hence Alphand's attack coupling Canada with US and alleging that their actions were contrary to Lisbon agreement for AR undoubtedly startled Heeney and prompted his rather stinging comments.

It is difficult to escape conclusion that Alphand's action today and general line and tone of Clermond-Tourneres' questioning of US Oct 11 and 15 in AR examination are concerted and indicative, at least within NATO framework, of aggressively critical attitude toward US.[3]

Anderson

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[3] No records of the examination of the U.S. submission for the Annual Review on Oct. 11 and 15 have been found in the Department of State files.

740.5/10-2952 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, October 29, 1952—8:19 p.m.

2484. Eyes only for Merchant from Perkins and Martin.

1. Wish to convey to you for ur info certain considerations which are in our minds in weighing what shld be done about Annual Review time schedule. Want to make clear these are not US Govt views and are not even Dept of State views.

2. It seems to us of great importance to do everything possible to have AR decision at Dec 15 mtg of Council if at all possible. We are quite prepared to say this limited to 1953 force targets if necessary. It is important to US to have 1953 figures as guides to distribution of 1953 aid, some of which is being withheld pending AR decisions. We wld also assume that some other countries need 1953 targets as soon as possible to guide their 1953 mil programs. Part of our feeling of urgency about doing the job in Dec reflects the difficulties we see in doing a much better job later on. We also fear that a decision not to have an AR in Dec will be interpreted, regardless of when the decision is made or what is said about it, as reflecting uncertainty arising from US election. This kind of uncertainty is not good in Eur, particularly at time when the Soviets are bending all their efforts to exploiting and expanding differences between US and Eur.

While we wld have to defer to ur judgment as to what can in fact be done about 1953 in time for Dec 15 mtg, we wld not want to postpone action without exploring every possibility of securing reasonably sound set of 1953 targets. We think US might even be ready to accept lower targets than we might otherwise want to argue for if this were necessary to secure agreement by Dec 15.

If delay in British submittal is major stumbling block, believe approach at highest level shld be made to Brit by Draper or you immediately to attempt to speed up their submittal. However, on basis London tel 2488[2] rather doubt that Brit figures will become major issue.

3. Believe we are reasonably well reconciled here to not getting much, if anything, for 1954 or 1955 by Dec 15. However wld be very valuable if quite tentative 1954 figures cld be agreed even though more

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Martin (S/MSA) and cleared in substance by Matthews and Perkins, was repeated to London, eyes only for Gordon. The source text bears the typewritten notation "No distribution outside State".

[2] Not printed; it reported that the British seemed to be reverting to the sponsorship of a two-part annual review, comprising a very limited December agreement confined practically to status of forces for 1953 and a second Ministerial meeting in May or June 1953 to consider 1954 and 1955. The telegram stated further that the British view seemed unattractive since it would mean a major Council meeting at the peak of U.S. Congressional consideration of the 1954 program and would be too late to help such consideration and too early to take full advantage of studies being done by SHAPE. (740.5/10-2852)

qualified than Lisbon second year figures were. This again relates to practicality of dealing with these years more efficiently at early subsequent mtg and need for both US and Europeans to have guidance in training and production fields on forces to be created by end 1954.

4. Our assumption wld be that if despite best efforts impossible have AR decision by Dec 15, Council mtg wld be called off. However, in view long time since last mtg before reaching final decision, wld want explore further other items on agenda and decisions Council might take on 1952 and 1953 AR, or both, which wld make subsequent mtgs on them more effective operations.

5. Can not tell extent to which, by Dec 15, US position on AR can have bipartisan backing until after next Tuesday. Under certain circumstances consensus here wld be, we believe, that it wld not be possible by that time. However, it is not clear to us that that shld make major difference with respect to 1953 since end items needed in 1953 all funded and by and large counterpart accruals in last half of CY 1953 will be from FY 1953 dollar aid. While might be some uncertainty in minds Europeans, do not believe in nature of situation as it has developed that there is justification for any more uncertainty about what US will do in FY 1954 which wld affect the 1953 buildup than there was re 1952 last Feb before Congress had acted.

6. One possibility which has occurred to us is that if problem is primarily one of processing time in Paris, mtg might be postponed 3 or 4 weeks and held some time first half of Jan. However it will be quite difficult if not impossible for top personnel to be away from here then.

7. Agree fully with London tel 2488 criticisms of Brit proposal for May–June mtg to handle 1954 and 1955.

8. Real question about alternatives to Dec 15, none of which we like, seems to us to be whether late Feb mtg wld be feasible or useful. Clearly if Dec mtg cancelled, wld provide time to process submittals and secure better 1953 figures. Believe it shld be possible to have firm position with respect to those US matters which affect 1953 by this time but probably will be difficult to detach cabinet members for period necessary for Council mtg if purpose was solely to firm up 1953. In first 4 to 6 weeks after installation of new administration there will be many demands on them.

In addition to above factor it seems to us highly desirable that by Feb some decisions are reached about 1954 and at least tentatively 1955 in order to permit proper planning to go forward here and in Eur. Although perhaps not absolutely essential, wld be very helpful to Congressional presentation to have such targets agreed.

However, hardly think it likely that new administration wld have reached conclusions by this time which wld enable them to project firmly US plans for 1954 and 1955, or to have views about what NATO goals as a whole shld be.

Not clear from London tel 2488 what Brit are holding up on with respect to 1954 and 1955. If it is just matter of spelling out their programs, assume that by late Feb this might well be possible. If however, as we suspect, they wish either to have high level talks with new US administration about whole range of economic relationships or wish to take advantage of new strategic and tactical thinking prior to firming up 1954 and 1955, or both, we wld think late Feb clearly much too early for them.

9. If Dec 15 mtg not held we are thus in dilemma to which we do not see easy solution. Perhaps it lies along line of setting, either at Dec or Jan or Feb mtg, or at permanent Council mtg, very rough 1954 and 1955 targets, even being perhaps ranges in some cases, pending anticipated basic re-evaluation of both requirements and programs which we have anticipated wld take place in connection with 1953 AR and which, by starting early, might be completed in Sept or early Oct.

10. Appreciate any views or comments you or your asssociates may have on above. Feel strongly that alternatives to Dec 15 mtg are all bad but that if must be considered they are sufficiently affected by Tuesday outcome that we wld be unable to reach US Govt position until latter part next week. For example, above pessimism about US being ready to deal with 1954 and 1955 by late Feb might, under certain circumstances, be excessive. Appreciate usefulness of making decision prior to Tuesday from certain public relations angles but believe a change in plan will be interpreted the same way regardless, and do not think we can make as wise decisions before as we can after. In any case believe strongly shld continue to press for actions necessary to adequate Dec 15 operation for another week at least.

11. Martin cancelling reservation per suggestion Vass tel con.

BRUCE

740.5/11-652 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, November 6, 1952—11 p. m.

Polto 605. Eyes only for Acheson and Bruce from Draper.

1. Further delay in the Brit budget decision and Adenauer judgment that Ger submission shld be delayed to prevent interfering with Ger ratification of EDC make it increasingly apparent that at best only an incomplete and confused annual review report can be ready for consideration by the Military Committee and by govts prior to Dec 15 Ministers mtg.

2. The time available will give little opportunity for reconciliation between force goal costs and available budgetary resources even for countries whose replies are already submitted. Also the point has been

made that no hard-boiled reconciliation negots for one country are justified before all submissions are in. If this view prevails, no reconciliation cld really begin until after the Brit case if filed Nov 20 or later which wld make any realistic reconciliation practically impossible.

3. Ismay announced yesterday that even a sketch 1953 goal report wld be impossible unless all replies (Ger was not mentioned) were recd by Nov 16. All except the Brit were promised by next Monday and it is still conceivable that the Brit force goals if recd about Nov 20 cld be dropped into place after only sketch examination which other countries might resent.

4. Much as I personally have favored pulling through a Dec 15 mtg to set at least 1953 goals and getting this much of the problem out of the way before the new administration takes office, I am fast reaching the conclusion that we may be attempting the impossible.

5. If the Brit do not come to a budget decision tomorrow, the problem will probably solve itself particularly when the status of the Ger submission becomes known, and without our intervention the Council will probably recognize that firm and reconciled 1953 goals cld not be determined at a Dec 15 mtg.

6. The alternatives are:

(*a*) Postponement to Jan 8 which does not give sufficiently greater time in view holidays to assure a much better result and wld involve obvious difficulty coming just before new administration takes office;
(*b*) Postpone mtg until new administration prepared to deal with AR and related problems;
(*c*) Hold mtg in New York in early Dec while Fon Mins still there for GA. Probably Def Mins and Mil Comite shld attend but Fin Mins possibly not needed (i) to hear progress report from SecGen on AR, (ii) to hear report from Mil Comite, (iii) to discuss political problems including progress ratification EDC, et cetera.

7. Actual sitn is, as I see it, that training, equipping and building up of mil forces is proceeding slowly but surely as evidenced by maneuvers, etc., regardless of AR, and that govts have been carefully examining possibilities for further build-up and availability of budgetary resources. It seems unlikely that the AR and its resulting pressures can in any case largely increase the budgetary effort at this time and that the reconciliation will largely consist of forcing down unrealistic goals in certain cases and in attempting to apply better standards of personnel, training and other criteria. This does not mean that the AR this year is not highly important but that, except for its psychological influence, it probably wld not greatly change the immed application of resources to the mil build-up.

8. While either a complete postponement or a less decisive mtg in New York wld undoubtedly be ascribed partially at least to the change in administration, this might not be entirely bad since our NATO

partners will be themselves unwilling to make too many irrevocable decisions or commitments in Dec in the face of a new administration a month later.

9. In view of the above, my personal view shared by Merchant with whom alone I have discussed this cable is to let nature take its course for the next few days but to be prepared, if and when it becomes apparent to the Internatl Staff and to the Council that no conclusive mtg is possible in Dec, to suggest or fall in with the suggestion that a mtg such as described in No. 6(*c*) be held in New York. The change in location to New York, where the UN mtg will also be going on shld re-emphasize the NATO mtg and wld take the spotlight off the AR. It wld enable appropriate publicity as soon as possible after the decision is made to the effect that govt replies to the annual questionnaire have come in too late for final consideration of force goals in Dec and that to meet the convenience of various Fon Mins the mtg is, therefore being held in New York.

10. We may encounter reluctance from the British who give every evidence of desiring to go ahead with Dec 15 meeting as scheduled, notwithstanding absence conclusive AR report reflecting no doubt their reluctance to bear major responsibility for postponement. Also Ismay may desire to have first meeting under his auspices at permanent headquarters. Such arguments, however, shld not prove insuperable.

In summary, I now recommend New York meeting as the lesser of two evils (even if initiative required on our part to secure agreement in NAC), with another meeting to finalize force goals as early in 1953 as the new administration is prepared to hold it.[1]

DRAPER

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[1] In his next telegram (Polto 606 from Paris, Nov. 11; 740.5/11–752) Draper elaborated on the reasoning for his recommendations. A principal consideration, he stated, was the possibility for President-elect Eisenhower and/or his Secretary of State to meet informally with the NATO Foreign Ministers and listen to their comments and suggestions. Draper believed this procedure would be welcomed in Europe and would help bridge the delay before the next ministerial meeting without giving the appearance of avoiding the European Ministers.

740.5/11–652: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 8, 1952—5:13 p. m.

Topol 350. Eyes only for Draper from Acheson and Bruce. Ref: Poltos 605 and 606 Nov 6.[2] Subj: Dec 15 min mtg.

1. We have considered alternatives set forth para 6 Polto 605 and comment as fols:

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Parsons and approved by Perkins.

[2] Polto 605, *supra*; Polto 606, not printed, but see footnote 1, *supra*.

(*a*) We considered postponement to Jan 8 and agreed here it was impractical and of limited value anyway as you suggest.

(*b*) You of course know how strongly we feel that indefinite postponement is a last resort which we must continue to try to avoid (Topol 308[3]).

(*c*) While recognizing advantages of having President-elect appear before NAC shld he desire to do so, we cannot agree a NY mtg in early Dec either desirable or feasible. Quick check reveals Schuman and Eden plan go home much earlier and most of other NATO FonMins wld have returned to Eur. Schuman in particular has reasons for not wishing to be in NY for more than just next week. It wld be far more difficult for me and other US members to meet with NAC in this country at time of transition than to meet in Paris as scheduled. Moreover, proposal to shift mtg to NY wld be connected in everyone's mind with new US admin and thus we cld not entertain it without full clearance of President-elect. It wld not be possible to place all the considerations which bear on this before him in time even if we agreed it was desirable to do so. Therefore there shld be no suggestion given in Paris that US wld desire mtg be shifted to NY if no conclusive mtg is possible on AR in Dec. If it is proposed by other countries US shld oppose. Anyway first min mtg after reorg shld be at permanent NATO hdqrs.

2. We are still assuming that after canvass of AR situation early next week with Merchant, Nash and Martin you will send us your recommendation as to how much can be accomplished on AR at Dec mtg. Believe it still premature to reach final judgment especially as we do not yet know Brit budget decision and advice from Ger indicates Adenauer still considering possibility of sending in Ger submission before Bundestag Debate. Moreover arguments presented your para 6*c* to effect that buildup is proceeding anyway suggest to us that task of obtaining agreement on 1953 force goals except Ger may be less difficult than earlier assumed. In this connection hope you and others considering type of AR consideration we cld have at Dec mtg will continue give emphasis to broad essentials rather than to detailed reconciliation which there is obviously not time to accomplish.

3. However matters develop over next few days it is very clear that we are not in position to entertain idea of mtg the success of which wld depend on our bringing strong pressures to bear on others. Obviously too many imponderables lie ahead for US to indulge in any arm twisting to produce unrealistic goals which might well be tied to unrealistic levels of aid or other courses of action not approved by incoming admin. Any action contemplated by US must be within framework of policies and commitments already widely accepted and limited to near term. Within that framework reasonable 1953 goals can be accepted and supported by US but I neither can nor wish to come to mtg and take an aggressive line.

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[3] Not printed; it informed Draper that U.S. agencies were unwilling for the present to abandon the plan for a December meeting and expressed the belief that the United States should make the maximum effort to hold such a meeting primarily aimed at the 1953 goals. (740.5/10–3152)

4. If in light of events of next few days it becomes obvious mtg shld be cancelled, move for cancellation shld not come from US. As you recall, we held out against mtg in Sept or Oct and insisted on Dec date. We shld therefore do nothing to give rise to impression that NAC mtgs can be held only when convenient to US. Initiative on our part to cancel wld inevitably be associated with problems in US incident to turnover to new admin rather than with AR considerations which shld be basis for cancellation. We do not wish to do anything to further impression US is powerless to act at all until after Jan 20. Therefore although you may when time is ripe indicate you do not think mtg without AR wld be profitable, you shld not yourself propose cancellation and shld do no more than try to set stage for initiative from Ismay, Kraft or some other delegation such as Canada.

5. If on other hand majority members shld strongly favor Dec min mtg in Paris without agreement on 1953 goals and limited to progress report as regards AR, US in that case shld not seek to prevent mtg or take rigid position in opposition. We wish to leave situation entirely open pending developments of next few days. Hope you will continue report developments in full as they occur.[4]

BRUCE

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[4] On Nov. 9, Draper replied as follows to this telegram:

"I understand your instructions and guidance and the reasons back of your thinking and we will do our level best to get sufficient agreement on 1953 goals to make a Dec. 15 meeting in Paris as useful as possible." (Telegram Polto 631 from Paris; 740.5/11-952)

740.5/11-1152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)

SECRET NEW YORK, November 14, 1952.

Subject: Meeting of Certain Foreign Ministers[1] to Exchange Views Concerning NATO Meeting on December 15.

Participants: Mr. Kraft, Denmark
Mr. Eden, United Kingdom
Mr. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Mr. Eden
Mr. Schuman, France
Mr. Pearson, Canada
Mr. Bech, Luxembourg
The Secretary of State
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Byington

Mr. Kraft said that he had been very pleased to request this meeting at the suggestion of Mr. Pearson. He wished to bring up the question of a NATO meeting in Paris on December 15. He had already had an opportunity to consult with Mr. Lange of Norway and Mr. Luns of the Netherlands, neither of whom were now in New York. Mr. Lange had expressed himself very strongly in favor of holding a meeting in Paris on December 15. Mr. Luns, while not as keen as Mr. Lange, had also been in favor of it. Mr. Kraft assumed that Mr. Luns would want to consult with the other Netherlands Foreign Minister. He had communicated with Lord Ismay to ascertain the latter's views and had learned that in Ismay's opinion failure to hold a meeting as planned on December 15 would have a very bad effect on public opinion. Ismay considered it would be both useful and in the general interest to hold the meeting in Paris as planned.

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[1] The Foreign Ministers were in New York for the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly which met Oct. 14–Dec. 22.

Mr. Kraft said there were a number of things that could be taken up at this meeting. First, there was the annual review. He felt that some sort of a report could be submitted for consideration and decision; second, there was the German question; third, Lord Ismay's reorganization—what he had accomplished up to date and his plans for the future; fourth, he understood there was a paper which had been prepared by the Standing Group, and, finally, he pointed out that only one NATO meeting had taken place this year instead of the three that had been promised. At this point he turned to Mr. Acheson and asked him for the US view. He said that he assumed there had been no change in policy towards the NATO as a result of the elections in the U.S.

The Secretary replied that the elections did not change in any way the U.S. attitude toward NATO. He did not know, however, what would be the position of the new administration with regard to financial aspects of the question. He said he thought that consideration of the annual review would have an important bearing in that regard. As far as holding the meeting on December 15 was concerned, there were some disadvantages. It was now clear that the gap between force goals and financial capabilities would not be covered in the annual review in time for the December 15 meeting. In other words, the gap between what was possible and what was desirable had not been closed. Accordingly, he doubted whether at the meeting in December we could report much progress.

The Secretary also referred to the problem of public opinion. Any communiqué that was drawn up as a result of this proposed meeting will have little to say about Germany, which will probably not have ratified the EDC by that time; nor will the EDC have received consideration in the Parliaments of France and Italy or the Benelux countries. There would be little to say about the annual review. In short, it would be a slim communiqué. Consequently, we should give a good deal of thought, if the meeting were to be held, to preparing public opinion. The Secretary also suggested that the Chairman should have similar consultation with those governments in NATO not represented here at this meeting before any decision was made. Finally, he concluded that the U.S. attitude was one of being glad to be in accord with the general view of the other members of the organization. In other words, we were not urging that a meeting be held in December but would go along with any general recommendation concurred in by the others.

Mr. Eden said it seemed to him that there was a balance of difficulties but on the whole holding a meeting had less disadvantages than did postponement. Also, he felt it important that we should relieve Western Europe of any misconception that the U.S. attitude towards NATO had changed as a result of the election. He felt that holding the meeting as planned would help in that regard.

Mr. Schuman suggested that the group examine what items were ready, not only for discussion at the meeting, but also for a communiqué. He feared that we would not have much to say. The report of the Military Committee would not be ready, policy questions of common interest were also without decision, the threat of the Soviet aggression was not material for the communiqué, and defense plans were not ready. Kraft interpolated saying there was a paper on this. Schuman concluded by saying that even though there was not much that could be put in a communiqué he still thought it was better to have a meeting and would go along with that proposal if the others agreed, although he did not feel strongly.

Mr. Pearson said that obviously military topics were not ready for productive discussion or decisions. He pointed out, however, that it was widely known that there was going to be a meeting. He felt it would be unfortunate for it to become known now that this meeting was postponed merely because we were not ready to discuss military plans. He felt that the NATO in the public mind was already too identified with military plans and that postponement would accentuate that impression. Moreover, he thought postponement would be interpreted as having to do with the results of the U.S. elections. He believed we could produce a communiqué and that we should hold the meeting. Moreover, we ought to get away from the impression that we can only have NATO meetings when there is an important decision to announce. He thought at this meeting in December it might be better to have small delegations and that in a quieter atmosphere we might be able to accomplish a good deal. In any event, there would have to be another meeting in two or three months.

Mr. Bech said he felt there should be a meeting. He asked how far off would we have to postpone this meeting in order to have a satisfactory communiqué. Mr. Schuman replied at least two months. Mr.

Bech said that would be too far off and that we should have the meeting on December 15.

Mr. Kraft said he agreed with Mr. Pearson's argument about avoiding an impression that we had NATO meetings only when there was something important to announce. He said that he was convinced a meeting would be very useful at this time to discuss existing problems and it was also important to Lord Ismay that he should report on the way he is reorganizing the Council, what he plans for the future, and that he should obtain the views of the Ministers of the various NATO countries. Mr. Kraft said he would write to the other NATO Foreign Ministers asking for their views. He felt sure that they would all be in favor of holding a meeting. He then urged that the Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers of each country all come to the meeting. Mr. Pearson said that he did not think all three had to be there. The Secretary said he would like to have some latitude about his colleagues being present. He would urge them to come; a lot would depend on the annual review, and whether it would be far enough along to justify the presence of the Secretary of the Treasury. However, if his colleagues did not come they would send their deputies. After further discussion the question was left without commitment by any of those present. Mr. Pearson again emphasized that it should be a small meeting and considered by the public as a ministerial meeting at Paris, not a big meeting such as the one at Rome. In other words, it was a regular NATO meeting at its own headquarters in Paris.

A discussion then took place with regard to what Mr. Kraft should tell newspaper correspondents who were already asking him whether there was to be a meeting in Paris or not. Mr. Eden suggested that to head off speculation Mr. Kraft should say that he knew of no change in present NATO plans, but any announcement would be made from Paris probably in about two weeks. Mr. Kraft agreed to this and Mr. Pearson stressed the importance that the announcement of the meeting should not come from New York. It was agreed that Mr. Kraft would follow the line suggested by Mr. Eden. Mr. Kraft said that he would probably make the announcement of the December 15 meeting when he went to Paris on the 25th of this month to discuss with Lord Ismay necessary preparations.[3]

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[3] A summary of this meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 879 from New York, Nov. 14. (740.5/11–1452)

Editorial Note

At the conclusion of the national elections on November 4, 1952, the Truman Administration began to explore ways and means of insuring an orderly transition of administrations. The President invited President-elect Eisenhower to the White House for a briefing on the afternoon of November 18, 1952, and both before and after that meeting various high officials of the Truman Administration, including the Secretary of State, established close liaison with representatives of President-elect Eisenhower.

During the period November 7, 1952–January 20, 1953, a number of briefing and background papers were prepared in the Department of State on a number of topics, including the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris, December 15–18, 1952, whose approach and outcome intensely interested both Acheson and Secretary of State-designate John Foster Dulles and which was the subject of extended remarks by Acheson at the November 18 meeting between Truman and Eisenhower at the White House. Documentation on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a topic of interest in discussions and papers dealing with the transition of administrations in 1952–1953 is in volume I.

740.5/12–952 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, December 12, 1952—7 : 01 p. m.

Topol 600. Ref Polto 948 Dec 9.[2] Dept concerned over pos implication Alphand sug that mins adopt res re Indochina; especially in light his subsequent comment "Fr Govt attaches great importance to acceptance by NATO of responsibility in connection with the conduct of war in Indochina".

For fol reasons Dept considers highly advisable avoid proposal any res on Indochina:

(*a*) While consultation in NAC on Indochina cld be supported on basis Art 4 NAT, any res purporting extend direct NATO responsibility to Indochina wld be contrary Art 6.

(*b*) Presumably any res re Indochina which wld be satis to Fr wld emphasize magnitude Fr burden Indochina as limiting factor Fr contributions within NATO area, with at least implied need additional aid Fr. Such res, if omitting ref to direct NATO responsibility in Indochina, cld conceivably find support among other dels, and cld subsequently be used by Fr as added pressure in US aid negots.

(*c*) Any overt US opposition or participation in process of sidetracking or defeating such a res wld risk danger creating impression US minimizing Fr contrib SEA and constitute further major irritant in Fr–US relations.

(*d*) Any res re Indochina wld tend set precedent for similar res re Malaya, Korea, etc.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Adair and cleared by Knight, Bonsal, Bonbright, and Williamson.

[2] Not printed; in it Draper reported that he had talked with Alphand about a NATO resolution on the European Defense Community. Toward the end of the conversation, Alphand, who said he was speaking without instructions, asked whether it would be desirable for the NATO Ministers to adopt a resolution on Indochina. (740.5/12–952)

On balance wld think any NATO res re Indochina wld cause deep concern to Scandinavian countries, Benelux and Canad who ever eager limit their commitments to NATO area and deeply opposed to extension either directly or by implication. Wld hope therefore these countries wld carry burden this subj inside and outside NAC and permit US remain in background.

Dept in process discussing with Def proposed liaison arrangements in SEA, in implementation of recommendation of 5-power mil conference Oct 1952. (Paris tel 3314 Dec 5.[3]) Wld hope if agreement can be reached here prior tripartite talks Paris next week Fr wld be willing abandon idea obtaining res at NAC Mins mtg.

In event res is avoided and Alphand feels press conference (reported Tomus 404[4]) has committed Fr to obtaining reaction NAC to a Fr statement re Indochina at mins mtg (proposed Schuman statement under agenda item 3[5]), wld it not be adequate if US and UK simply stated appreciated Fr efforts and indicated NATO shld bear in mind burden the Fr and other NATO members bear which tho outside NATO area constitute contrib to gen def of free world against Commie aggression.

Secy shld be briefed on status this Fr move prior his seeing Schuman. If by that time subj res not abandoned Secy might sug to Schuman that any action beyond statements outlined immed preceding para shld more appropriately be the subj of bilat talks rather than NAC consideration.

BRUCE

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[3] Not printed; it reported that the French wanted the NATO Foreign Ministers to discuss the question of establishing a liaison staff organization for Southeast Asia. (790.5/12–552)

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

[5] Item 3 of the proposed agenda was "Exchange of Views on Political Matters of Common Concern." Copies of the proposed and final agenda are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 128.

Editorial Note

The first NAC Ministerial meeting (Tenth Session) following the reorganization at Lisbon, was held at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris, December 15 to 18, 1952. Secretary Acheson, who led the United States Delegation together with Secretaries Snyder and Lovett, Special Representative Draper, and Director for Mutual Security Harriman, stressed before leaving for the meeting that it would probably not reach "any very great conclusions" and that it should be considered more as a regular meeting of Ministers than as a session for dealing with matters of far-reaching importance. (Press release 912, December 10; Department of State *Bulletin*, December 22, 1952, page 985)

In preparation for the meeting, two major sets of documents were drafted to cover various topics that were expected to arise during the sessions. One set was drafted by the Office of the Special Representative in Europe and dealt almost exclusively with technical aspects of NATO problems, in particular with the annual review. A set of these papers, undesignated by any series indicator, is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 126. The other set was drafted in the Department of State and in a few cases by either the Embassy in France or by the Office of the Special Representative. These negotiating papers, prepared to correspond with the various items on the 15-point agenda (see below), were designated NATOP D-1 through NATOP D-14. Copies of these papers including preliminary and final drafts are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 128. The Department of State also prepared a set of background papers for Secretary Acheson to brief him on topics which he might want to raise with the Ministers on problems not related to NATO. These documents, designated PBT D, were divided under four headings: (1) General, dealing largely with the question of the European Defense Community; (2) Eden, dealing with the Saar, Iran, Buraimi, Egypt, Japan, and Kashmir; (3) Schuman, dealing with Southeast Asia, East-West trade, the Middle East Defense Organization, Yugoslavia, and aid to France; and (4) Kraft, dealing with the delivery of a Danish tanker to the Soviet Union. Copies of the PBT D documents are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129. Regarding the discussion of the European Defense Community with French officials during the course of the Ministerial meeting, see editorial note, page 698.

The first session of the Ministerial Council meeting took place at 3:30 p. m. December 15 under the Chairmanship of Danish Foreign Minister Kraft. Under consideration was the following 15-point agenda:

"I. Report by the Secretary General
II. Military Progress Report
III. 1953 Infrastructure Program for SACEUR, SACLANT and Channel Command
IV. Command Organization for the Mediterranean
V. Exchange of views on Political Matters of Common Concern
VI. Discussion of Implementation of Article II
VII. Trends of Soviet Policy
VIII. Estimate of Strength and Capabilities of Soviet Bloc from Present through 1954
IX. Revision of NATO Strategic Guidance to reflect Accession of Greece and Turkey
X. General Discussion of the Military Estimate of Risk
XI. First Report on the Annual Review
XII. General Discussion Concerning Determination of NATO Defense Effort
XIII. Principles Governing Future Ministerial Meetings of Council, including Date and Place of Next Meeting

XIV. Any Other Business
XV. Communiqué" (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 121)

At the first session the Ministers took note of the Secretary General's report (C–M(52)125, dated December 8) on the progress made by NATO during the period April 4 to November 30; took note of the report by the Standing Group (MC 5/5 Final) on the military progress of NATO; heard statements by General Ridgway (SACEUR) and Admiral McCormick (SACLANT) that the means for defending Europe were not yet at hand; referred the question of infrastructure to a special committee; and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a draft resolution on the implementation of Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty. Copies of the Secretary General's report and the statements made by Ridgway and McCormick, C–M(52)136 and C–M(52)137, respectively, are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 123. A copy of the summary record (C–R(52)37) of this session is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 122.

At their second session at 11 a. m. December 16, the Ministers discussed the release of General Ridgway's statement, considered the draft resolution on Article II and agreed to remit it for redrafting, took note of a report on trends in Soviet policy (C–M(52)116, dated December 1), approved the recommendations of a report by the Standing Group to the Military Committee on the command organization in the Mediterranean (MC 38/3 Final, dated December 10), and discussed Indochina. Copies of C–M(52)116 and MC 38/3 Final are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 123. A copy of the summary record (C–R(52)38) of this session is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 122.

At their third session at 11 a. m. December 17, the Ministers continued their discussion of Indochina and adopted a resolution on the subject proposed by Secretary Acheson (C–M(52)140). They also discussed Germany and relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, approved resolutions on the European Defense Community (EDC) (C–M(52)141) and on the implementation of Article II (C–M(52)138(Final)), took note of a report by the Standing Group (MC 44) on the strength and capabilities of the Soviet bloc through 1954, and approved MC 14/1 Final, dated December 9, which revised the NATO Strategic Guidance Plan to reflect the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. For the texts of the resolutions on the EDC, Indochina, and Article II, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1953, pages 4–5. Copies of MC 14/1 Final and the summary record of this session (C–R(52)39) are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 124 and 122, respectively.

The fourth session at 3:30 p. m., December 17 was devoted largely to the Annual Review with the Ministers also considering a report by the Military Committee (MC 45 Final) on the military risk in 1953.

A copy of this four-page report is in the NATO Registry files at Brussels. A copy of the summary record of this session (C–R(52)40) is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 122.

The Ministers held two further sessions on December 18. In the morning they considered what action needed to be taken on the first report (C–M(52)130, parts I and II, dated December 12) on the Annual Review, and agreed that the next meeting of the Ministers should take place as early as possible in the spring of 1953 at Paris. In the afternoon final session the Ministers approved or adopted various reports on military procedures, infrastructure, and command organizations (C–M(52)144), and approved the text of a communiqué (C–M(52)146(Final)) on their meeting. For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 5, 1953, pages 3–4; copies of parts I and II of C–M(52)130 are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 124 and 125, respectively; a copy of C–M(52)144 is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 125. Copies of the summary records of the morning and final sessions (C–R(52)41 and 42) are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 122.

The largest collection of documentation on the ministerial meeting is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 122–131. This includes the summary records of the sessions, sets of the papers prepared by the Department of State and the Special Representative, documents of the meeting, briefing papers for Secretary Acheson on topics not related to NATO, telegraphic reports on the sessions, and other documents relating to the work of the United States Delegation. Another collection of materials on the meeting is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 163. It includes the papers prepared by the Department of State, six folders of materials relating to the German submission for the 1952 Annual Review, and a folder of miscellaneous materials on the meeting. A small amount of documentation, comprising mostly telegraphic reports on the sessions, is in file 740.5. For Secretary Acheson's appraisal of the meeting, see his letter to the President, *infra*.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 130

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET

PARIS, December 17, 1952.

Today at close of third day of current NATO mtg we can begin to see where we stand. While I look forward to reporting to you in detail when I arrive home, I wanted in meantime to give you a brief account. Thus far mtg has proceeded in most respects more smoothly than we had expected, but, as you know, it will not produce results comparable to those of Lisbon mtg. Here in Paris we are confronted with an atmosphere quite different from that of Lisbon.

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[1] The source text was transmitted in priority telegram Actel 1 from Paris, Dec. 17, with instructions to the Executive Secretariat to pass it immediately to the President.

In the first place quite evidently other countries recognize that at this late stage we cannot commit U.S. on any new proposals and so they have not chosen to press us too hard on a number of matters of interest to them such as a greater share of load in Indochina. No doubt this is being reserved for our successors. Also this is the first mtg since the reorganization last spring and we now have an international staff under Lord Ismay which has taken control of the Conference quite well and is independent of the national delegations. This is good for NATO and probably also for us in long run but it is different from days when Chuck Spofford occupied the most nearly comparable position, although Bill Draper has done a really great job in maintaining our point of view.

So far we have not had any real difficulty in keeping to the line on the various agenda items which we agreed with John Snyder, Bob Lovett and Averell Harriman before leaving. Bob is struggling with his usual good humor on the thorny problem of infrastructure (which is the NATO word for airfields and other permanent installations) and at last report was hopeful of reaching agreement on a program which General Ridgway can live with. He will be busy with this tomorrow too.

This morning we agreed in the Council on a satisfactory resolution supporting ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty and the NATO protocol related to it. We also passed a resolution on Indochina which the French wanted but it does not point the finger at us for more help or involve the NATO out there.[2]

The series of military progress reports and intelligence estimates which were ready for the Council have all gone through satisfactorily. They include a paper on Soviet foreign policy trends, Soviet military capabilities, and a new strategic guidance for NATO Commanders. While none of these are of major importance they do record that there is a basic unity of view and purpose among us. The most important action on the military part of the agenda was a settlement of the long standing problem of Mediterranean command which has already come out in the press.[3] This settlement, which was an acceptable compromise, should make for better working relations with the

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[2] For the texts of the resolutions on the European Defense Community and Indochina, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 4–5.

[3] According to MC 38/3 Final, dated Dec. 10, the Commander in Chief Mediterranean (CINCMED) would be directly subordinate and responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and would initially be a British Naval Officer. At the final session on Dec. 18, General Ridgway introduced Admiral Louis Mountbatten (Lord Mountbatten of Burma) as the first Commander in Chief Mediterranean. A copy of MC 38/3 Final is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 123.

British. You no doubt remember how strongly Winston Churchill felt about it.[4]

We had hoped to reach agreement this afternoon on a progress report on the 1952 Annual Review and also a resolution which would facilitate its completion early next spring but both the British and French have come up with amendments which have to be analyzed tonight. It is important that we do what we can so that the programs for military forces in 1953 may be made definite as early as possible in the new year.

At tomorrow's mtg of the Council I have about decided to make a final talk which Lord Ismay and others seem to want me to make. As I now envisage it, the talk will review some of the events of the past few years which you and I have worked on and for which your administration is going to be remembered.[5]

It has been good as always to be with John and Bob and Averell, and I think that I can speak for them when I say that the team which has worked harmoniously together through so many NATO meetings has gotten along famously once again. We had a fine trip over on the *Independence* and look forward to seeing you at your convenience any time from Friday morning when, if all goes on schedule, we should arrive in Washington.

Respectfully, DEAN

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[4] Reference is presumably to comments made by Churchill during his visit to the United States in early January 1953. Regarding this visit, see volume VI.

[5] For the text of Secretary Acheson's remarks to the Council at its final session on Dec. 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 5, 1953, pp. 5–7.

740.5/1–2453 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, January 24, 1953—9 p. m.

Polto 1236. Cotel. Subject: Policy Handling of Announcement Fiscal Year/53 US Defense Expenditures Slippage. Reference: Topol 741, January 24.[1]

1. Reference telegram gave first indication we have had that President's fiscal year 1954 budget contains 10 percent downward revision in estimated US defense expenditures for fiscal year 1953. Impact this announcement within NATO, and (in view prospective early Natis release) within Europe, will require careful handling. Believe serious danger fact of this announcement may set off series cutbacks by other countries along line recent Danish example. Consequently, we would not want to introduce revised figure at NATO, inevitably opening dis-

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[1] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* that the new estimate for the 1954 budget submitted by President Eisenhower for defense expenditures was $49.5 billion, a figure which now superseded the $54.8 billion in the last Truman budget. (740.5/1–2253)

cussions of its implications, without thorough knowledge of background and line of approach being used in Washington explanations as basis for countering unfavorable developments.

2. As US revised total for fiscal year '53 already in public domain we may expect early queries from other delegations. Since agreement has now been reached, as reported Polto 1235,[2] for early Natis release defense expenditures data to which US has taken reservation as to correct figure, believe we must settle this matter by Tuesday, January 27, at latest. Accordingly, urgently request answer following questions before we draw attention to slippage at NATO:

a. Is this reduction of US defense expenditures for fiscal year '53 clearly evident from published data in President's budget?

b. In what categories of the US defense expenditures will the major slippages occur?

c. Will the slippages be reflected in changes in forecasts for defense expenditures in 1953/54?

d. Will the slippages be reflected in revisions of estimates of end-item deliveries requested in Defto 463? [3]

e. What are the significant reasons for the slippages and which should be emphasized? Please note US submission to NATO which included on page B of introductory statement a caveat that the total defense expenditure given there had already reflected "roughly the effects of the steel strike, probably program slippages and the anticipated adjustments in progress . . . as a result of the budgetary review and the evaluation of US programs now in process."

f. Will the slippage be reflected in planned NATO end-item deliveries? (This likely to be most urgent question we will be asked by other NATO delegations.)

3. In addition, in order answer likely inquiries about broader economic implications, would appreciate early guidance on following:

a. What changes, if any, will this slippage entail in forecasts of total US Government expenditures and government cash deficits in 1952/53 and 1953/54?

b. What changes, if any, do you envisage that the answers to the above might entail in our OEEC and NATO submissions as to forecasts concerning the economy as a whole during 1952/53 and 1953/54?

DRAPER

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[2] Not printed (740.5/1–2453).

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

740.5/1–2753: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 27, 1953—6:30 p.m.

Topol 769. Ref: Polto 1236, Jan 24.[2] Subj: US Defense Expenditures.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Vass and Cleveland and cleared with DMS, MSA, and the Department of Defense.

[2] *Supra.*

Following guidance given in response request in reftel. Assume you will point out that real consideration these questions not appropriate until US has made second phase AR submission, which necessarily must deal with such questions.

1. Regarding paragraph 2*a*, general magnitude of reduction of estimated US defense expenditures for FY 1953 clearly evident from data in President's FY 1954 budget document, even though precise information along lines NATO definition of defense expenditures is not detailed therein.

2. Regarding paragraph 2*b*, reduction in estimated expeditures affects all categories; more than half the reduction occurs in non-procurement areas. In this connection, you should avoid use of word "slippage" for reasons outlined below in paragraph 5.

3. Regarding paragraph 2*c*, President's FY budget document estimates FY 1954 defense expenditures (on NATO basis) at 54.2 billion in contrast to 60.8 billion estimate submitted in AR.

4. Regarding paragraph 2*d*, estimates of end-item deliveries submitted in response to Defto 463 [3] (probably early February) will reflect latest program data and shipment schedules of Department of Defense; these not necessarily related to estimated total MDAP expenditures implicit in President's FY 1954 budget document. Furthermore, should emphasize that MDAP deliveries function of allocation policy as well as volume physical production.

5. Regarding 2*e*, revised expenditure estimates in President's budget document reflect a number of factors including (*a*) adjustments in programs as a result of budgetary review and analysis involving rephasing of some activities and elimination of others including some spare parts' procurement found to be unnecessary or of doubtful value, (*b*) currently projected unit prices which are lower in some areas than those used in original estimates, (*c*) technical difficulties holding back production, (*d*) labor disputes affecting production, notably in aircraft and tanks as well as effects of steel strike, and (*e*) difference in judgment as to the rate at which future deliveries and payments will be made. To the extent that lower estimates reflect elimination of waste, greater efficiency or lower unit prices, it is misleading to refer to "slippage". It should be noted that expenditure estimates in President's FY 1954 budget are, to a large extent, a reflection of judgment of former administration and do not necessarily reflect judgment of present Administration. It is important, therefore, to avoid any categorical statement on this matter at this time.

6. Regarding paragraph 2*f*, believe must avoid categorical answer at this time, replying along lines our paragraph 4, on ground that question arises only in connection with public release of expenditure estimates and not in connection with physical delivery forecasts. Ex-

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[3] Not found in Department of State files.

tremely important, however, not give impression US evading question because of change in delivery policy or inability carry out policy.

7. Reference paragraph 3*a*, budget document contains following forecasts—(millions of dollars)

(*a*) FY 1953 receipts: 74,891
Payments: 76,836
Cash deficit: 1,945
(*b*) FY 1954 receipts: 75,150
Payments: 81, 797
Cash deficit: 6,647.

Please note that these figures not comparable with table 8 of US submission to OEEC which is based on national income concepts and covers all levels of Govt (including state and local).

8. We envisage no substantive change to the general conclusions contained in our OEEC submission although detailed figures will obviously require some changes. Are planning to submit very short Memo in response NATO invitation to bring economic statement up to date indicating any important changes in data and restating general conclusions as to stability of US economy.

DULLES

Editorial Note

On February 3 Secretary Dulles and Director for Mutual Security Stassen, who were on a general information-gathering trip in Europe, attended a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Paris; for a report on this meeting, see Polto 1325, February 3, page 1561. For further documentation on the background to the trip and records of the conversations with various European officials, see pages 1548 ff.

740.5/2–2353: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 23, 1953—2 p. m.

Polto 1551. Cotel. Subject: Length of Planning Period for 1953 Annual Review.

1. You will have noted in Polto 1522[2] that there has been virtually no objection to what is now a UK proposal (AC 19–D/8[3]) that the 1953 AR cover the three-year period 1954–56. In sharp contrast to the situation last spring, sober consideration is even being given to the

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[1] Repeated to London.
[2] Not printed.
[3] Not found in Department of State files.

desirability and feasibility of adding a fourth year. The time is rapidly approaching when we must firm up our own position on this issue.

2. We have little doubt that this change in the attitude of our partners is related to the fact of a new US administration and stems from their universal desire to obtain at the earliest possible moment a statement by the administration of its longer-range policies. In our view, the successful completion of an AR in October looking beyond 1955 depends upon our ability to offer such a long-range statement, even more than it depends upon such practical matters as the volume of work involved, the ability of the military to forecast and make force recommendations so far ahead, etc.

3. We are, of course, conscious of fact that FY '55 MSP must be related to forces in '56 and '57 and of desirability having soonest basis for planning NATO production of long-lead items. However, it is only on the assumption there will be a further build-up, that NATO agreed force targets for those years are essential to the development of our aid program. Given our present knowledge of European capabilities and estimated costs of maintaining forces at the 1954 levels, we foresee a leveling off before 1956, unless the US indicates to our Allies a long-term US intention to continue aid at a high level.

4. The availability of new 1956 requirements by mid-summer and the inclusion of a real study of the cost of maintaining 1954 forces in the 1953 AR will force us to face squarely the question of further build-up beyond 1955 whether or not an attempt is made to agree on 1956 forces. Given the magnitude and fundamental nature of this problem, we doubt and need guidance as to the wisdom of attempting an answer translated into force goals in an October meeting, so soon after the basic data have been made available and so short a time after the US has undertaken a basic review of its policies. Among other things, agreement on 1956 forces in October will force the US to indicate in its submission whether it plans to maintain the present strength of its forces in Europe. It hardly requires saying that an indication in July that the US was planning a reduction in these forces would have disastrous impact on NATO and EDC. On the other hand, it would presumably be difficult for the US to arrive at a decision so early, before the completion of our review of basic security policy.

5. Of course, the ideal solution would be for the US to be prepared by July to indicate its own policies and plans covering the period through 1956 and 1957. If this is possible, would strongly support coverage these years with reasonable prospect concluding full AR no later than November. If, however, in July submission US is unable forecast beyond FY 1955, can see positive disadvantages in attempting obtain agreement in October on goals for 1956 or 1957, and would expect difficulty even in coping with 1955 targets.

6. If US cannot come up with submission reflecting review of and decisions on longer-range policies by July, we have concluded that the far safer course is an October meeting confined to agreement on firm 1954 and tentative 1955 targets, and a review of new requirements and the prospects for a further build-up. In the light of Ministerial decisions and US basic policy which we assume could be stated at that time, the development of force targets for later years could then be undertaken.

7. On this two-phased approach, we believe that it should be possible to develop in time a force basis for FY 1955 programming after October. If NATO Commanders set to work immediately after the October meeting, we believe it should be possible to have their recommendations for 1956–1957, reflecting new requirements and decisions reached by Ministers, by the end of the calendar year, which we can use for programming and NATO can process through as the second phase of the 1953 AR, perhaps concluding with a Ministerial meeting early in 1954.

Draper

740.5/3–1253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 12, 1953.

Participants: The President
Secretary Dulles
Douglas MacArthur, 2d
Lord Ismay [1]

After an exchange of salutations and greetings, the President opened the conversation by saying that there was one question which he would like Lord Ismay's views on. The question is whether the NATO countries are making a maximum effort both in terms of their resources and capabilities and in terms of their will to face up to some of the hard decisions which must be made if NATO is to continue to make progress.

Lord Ismay replied that by and large he believed the majority of NATO countries were straining themselves to the very maximum of their capabilities and resources. On the other hand, it is true that certain countries might exert greater leadership. France, for example, has a weak government largely because of the composition of the present French parliament. It is difficult for France to have a strong stable government because the views of the different elements in the parliament are divergent if not often completely contradictory.

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[1] Secretary General Ismay visited the United States Mar. 11–21 at the invitation of the U.S. Government. In addition to his stay in Washington Ismay also visited the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic at Norfolk and went to New York City. For the text of his address to the National Press Club on Mar. 12 concerning the development of NATO, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 23, 1953, pp. 427–430.

While some of the smaller countries might make a slightly greater effort, given their resources and capabilities, the net result in increased strength of NATO would be very little and Lord Ismay doubted the wisdom of trying to push these smaller countries to the limit if the result were to mean only a slight increase in over-all strength. The President said he felt that Denmark could make a somewhat greater effort, particularly in terms of implementing the existing legislation calling for 18 months' military service. Lord Ismay agreed that this was true and said that he believed Belgium also could make a somewhat greater over-all contribution at present. President Eisenhower said that the Belgians had taken the lead in going to 24 months' military service and had been badly disillusioned when none of the other continental countries followed their lead. It was therefore understandable that they had an internal political problem with respect to 24-month service.

The President then asked Lord Ismay if he had any information concerning the British plane which had been reported shot down in Germany.[2] Lord Ismay said that he had no information on this other than press reports. Some discussion ensued as to the meaning of the shooting down of the US plane[3] and the British plane. The general consensus of this discussion seemed to be that this indicated that the new Soviet leadership[4] wished to make it clear to the Western mind that it would not show any signs of weakness and, on the contrary, would take steps to make clear that it was prepared to go to some lengths with a view to establishing the fact that as a result of Stalin's death there was to be no vacillation or evidences of weakness displayed.

There was then some discussion in very general terms of the relationship between the NATO military and civilian authorities in Europe. Lord Ismay said that with the establishment of the NATO Council in Paris, the situation had evolved since the time when the President was Supreme Allied Commander. The President said that he believed the Supreme Allied Commander as well as Lord Ismay had to work together to stimulate and encourage the government leaders of the different NATO countries to make maximum efforts in all directions. He did not feel that the Supreme Allied Commander could confine himself to military subjects alone but that part of his mission involved showing an understanding of economic, political and psychological factors and encouraging and lifting European leaders' hearts. The President said that he hoped that progressively European leaders would speak out more strongly in favor of what we are trying to do in NATO in order to get greater public and parliamentary support in different countries.

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[2] On Mar. 12 two Soviet Air Force MIG-15's had shot down a British Lincoln Bomber near the boundary between the British and Soviet Zones of Germany.

[3] On Mar. 10 two Czech Air Force MIG-15's had shot down a U.S. F-84 over West Germany. On Mar. 11 the United States protested this attack in a note to the Czech Government, and on Mar. 13 delivered another note which rejected the Czech reply of Mar. 11. For the texts of the two U.S. notes, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 30, 1953, pp. 474-475.

[4] Documentation on the death of Marshal Stalin on Mar. 5 and events relating to the takeover by new leaders in the Soviet Union is presented in volume VIII.

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "DOD–1953–4"

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 13, 1953.

Subject: Meeting with Lord Ismay.

Participants: Lord Ismay
Mr. Peter Scott, Private Secretary
Mr. Robert Barnes, NATO International Staff
Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary
Mr. Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor
Ambassador Frederick L. Anderson, Dep. Spec. Rep. in Europe
Mr. Geoffrey Parsons, NATO International Staff
Brig. Gen. Royden E. Beebe, Department of Defense
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Dep. Director, Ofc. of Eur Reg. Affairs
Mr. Joseph Wolf, EUR/RA
Mr. Robert Kranich, EUR/RA

1. *Alerts.*

The meeting was opened with a discussion of the "Alerts" problem, "Mothball".[1] Mr. Matthews reviewed briefly the progress of work on this problem indicating that we hoped very shortly to have Standing Group agreement. Lord Ismay said that he did not want to be thought of as pressing unduly on the question, but General Gruenther had mentioned it in urgent terms to the 14 Permanent Representatives at a recent briefing session. Mr. Wolf then outlined the substance of the U.S. position which the U.S. member of the international planning team, Standing Group staff, will submit when we hear that the British are ready to move.

During the meeting, Mr. Matthews made it clear that after the Standing Group had acted and their action had been made known to the Military Representatives Committee, the paper would be brought up through Lord Ismay to the NAC for its consideration. He made it very clear that there could be great disadvantages if the matter were discussed in the Council before the Standing Group paper was ready. Lord Ismay had not realized previously how close we were to having a position agreed by the Big Three or that there had been so much exhaustive work done on this matter. He indicated awareness of its delicacy and its relation with fundamentals of the North Atlantic Alliance.

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[1] Regarding this operation, see footnote 5, p. 300.

After expressing his satisfaction with the situation, Lord Ismay asked if we thought this should be discussed at the April 23rd meeting or whether the Permanent Representatives should be asked to receive the Standing Group paper. It was noted that at a Ministerial meeting there would, of course, be many people around, including the press in great strength. Mr. Matthews pointed out that if anything on this subject should come out at the time of the Ministerial meeting it would be judged in the context of the general situation and the state of international tension at the time. To avoid misapprehension, he thought that the Permanent Representatives should deal with this. Lord Ismay evidently agreed.

Before turning to another subject, Lord Ismay mentioned one further aspect which concerned him namely, that there was already evidence that the new Soviet rulers were "hotting up" the cold war. He envisaged the possibility of their holding big maneuvers on the border. In that case, he wondered if NATO could act. General Beebe explained that in that case it was SACEUR's function to recommend to the Council and that SACEUR did have his emergency defense plan to institute. He would, of course, be dealing with people who were not well versed in all the implications and procedures of the emergency defense plan if it had to be instituted in the near future. Later on, of course, it was hoped that everyone would know much better what it was all about and what they should do.

Lord Ismay then said that he was quite happy with the situation but was worried that the Council itself has nothing in the nature of a War Book. Where would it go, for instance? What would it do? How would it protect its records if NATO found itself at war? This led, he realized, to the basic question of who was going to run the war, which no one wished to raise at this time. Nevertheless, it was a basic question which had to be thought about.

2. *Standing Group Liaison Office.*

Lord Ismay said that he was concerned that the SGLO was merely a liaison officer. He wanted this officer to be more than that and to be on his staff. We felt that the SGLO should provide a link between the military and the civil side. As a matter of fact, he was wondering if he was something around which the high command functioned in wartime or if, as he would be quite happy to do, he just faded out.

General Beebe noted that when the "Alert" paper was brought formerly to Ismay's attention by memo from the Standing Group, it would give him an opportunity to raise in the Council the question of the NAC War Book, what procedures should be worked out for use in wartime, etc.

Returning to the SGLO, Ambassador Anderson asked for Lord Ismay's further views on what this office should become. Lord Ismay indicated that his objective was to give the office more formal status and stature. In that connection, General Beebe commented that while we all wanted to improve this situation we had to remember the Standing Group was a national body like the Council, not an international one like the International Staff. In closing discussion on this subject, Lord Ismay said that he just wanted to say that rumors that he was trying to effect the removal of the Standing Group to Paris were completely wrong; he had no such intention. He did want the Standing Group to meet more quickly on problems and in this connection cited the Danish problem in connection with their troops in Schleswig-Holstein.

3. *French Reply to the SHAPE Recommendations.*

Lord Ismay announced that he had received a further telegram from Paris indicating that Alphand had said the French reply would be submitted on March 12. He had no further information.

4. *U.S. Cold War Policies.*

Lord Ismay mentioned briefly that as he had said in yesterday's meeting,[2] he thought it most useful and important for the Secretary of State to outline some of the new Administration's thinking in the next North Atlantic Council meeting.

5. *Infrastructure.*

Lord Ismay inquired if there was opposition in the Standing Group to the proposal for dealing with the remaining infrastructure requirements in one package over the next three years. General Beebe replied that there was no problem. Lord Ismay then said that he would not raise this question with the Standing Group as he had intended.

6. *NAC and Position of the Secretary General.*

Lord Ismay said that he conceived of the Council as a sort of North Atlantic Cabinet for NATO affairs and that he thought it should develop in the direction of executive powers of decision. He thought also that it should provide political guidance to the military, should make plans for the home front and should assure the military of solid support. He asked whether this concept fitted with U.S. views. Mr. Matthews expressed agreement following which there was some further discussion of our general attitude of trying to build up cooperation and close relations through the NATO.

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[2] It is not clear whether Ismay is referring to the meeting with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles (memorandum of conversation, *supra*) or to some other meeting.

7. *Article II.*

Lord Ismay spoke of his interest in promoting action under the very broad principles of Article II and of the complications caused by the fact that on the economic side, appropriate economic projects seemed already to be within the purview of the OEEC which NATO had no desire to compete with. In discussing Article II, Mr. Parsons pointed out that we were constantly endeavoring to take a receptive and positive attitude towards any projects suggested and to distill from them, elements which might make a practical contribution just as we did in connection with foreign policy consultation in the Council. He also mentioned that we were particularly mindful of the interest of the smaller partners in NATO in Article II.

8. *Production.*

Speaking upon request of Lord Ismay, Mr. Barnes outlined the International Staff's concern with getting ahead on NATO production planning and the very difficult problem of maintaining equipment given by the U.S. After briefly reviewing the problem he concluded that it was Lord Ismay's belief that only solution was a long-term—say three year—"Marshall Plan" for laying an adequate European military production base that would permit maximum European reliance upon its own capabilities for maintaining the forces being created. Lord Ismay asked whether there was any U.S. receptivity to the notion of such a long-term plan and whether the U.S. would consider a major financial contribution, through OSP or otherwise, to such a program. Ambassador Anderson supported the view of the need for long-range planning and after citing some of the progress being made, notably in aircraft and ammunition production planning, asked whether the U.S. could possibly have a position by the April Ministerial Meeting; at which [time it was?] conceivable the matter may be proposed for discussion by some of the continental countries.

Mr. Matthews expressed doubts whether the new administration could formulate its views on such a proposal by April, but assured Lord Ismay that as a matter of principle the U.S. was completely sympathetic to the proposition of long-range production planning. In the ensuing discussion it appeared to be the consensus that any "Marshall Plan" for European military production could not really be faced until later in the summer and that then it might but be considered in the context of the 1953 AR during the course of which all nations would have to face squarely the problem of annual recurring costs of maintenance. Notwithstanding the ever-present financial problem, General Beebe suggested that certain practical planning could move forward particularly in areas involving allocation of production responsibility as between countries within present financial limitations.

Mr. Kranich suggested that long-range NATO production plans should not look exclusively to U.S.–OSP financing, but that some effort must be made to induce the European countries where necessary to shift funds in their procurement budgets to finance higher priority production tasks. He also remarked that the problem of "building an adequate production base" should be recognized as probably 85% activation of existing idle facilities and only 15% expansion or creation of new facilities—such as in the field of ammunition and spare parts.

9. *Annual Review.*

Lord Ismay then asked for U.S. views on the creation of another deputy job in the staff for handling future AR's. He pointed out, with details provided by Mr. Barnes, that the staff did not feel it wise to submerge the positions of the Assistant Secretary-Generals (Hopkins and Sargent), both of whom have a vital role in the AR, by placing another deputy over them. Mr. Parsons related that although the U.S. had given this problem active considerations some weeks back, it was now rather dormant, and he suggested to Mr. Matthews that the problem be taken up anew with Mr. Merchant next week as Mr. Merchant would be intimately alive to the problem from both the U.S. and Paris viewpoint. In accordance with this suggestion Mr. Matthews promised Lord Ismay we would communicate further views to him on the matter.

Editorial Note

In the course of his visit to Washington, March 14–18, 1953, Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland raised the issue of command structure and jurisdiction within the central sector of NATO. For a record of his discussion of these topics, see the memorandum of conversation by Assistant Secretary of State Merchant, March 16, page 773.

740.5/4–453 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, April 4, 1953—7 p. m.

Polto 1950. Hoyer Millar and Alphand called on me this morning at their request. Alphand, acting as principal spokesman, said they were anxious to exchange views with me prior to my departure for Washington.[2] He reviewed briefly recent French-United States talks in Washington,[3] stating there had been an exchange of views on defense financing problems and subject of long-range financing had been discussed but no commitments asked or made. Alphand said matter of this importance would have to be discussed and resolved on multilateral basis in NATO.[4]

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Draper would be in Washington Apr. 7–14 in connection with U.S. preparations for the North Atlantic Council meeting and for the OEEC talks scheduled to start Apr. 10.

[3] Documentation on the Mayer-Bidault talks in Washington at the end of March is presented in the compilation on France in volume VI.

He felt that current Soviet peace moves, coming as they are in rapid succession, are beginning to have effect on European populations. He said he had in fact noted change in French public sentiment since his return from United States and he is extremely concerned lest these Soviet maneuvers, which could not be better timed from point of view of USSR, undermine Atlantic unity, destroy chances of ratification of EDC, render April Minister's meeting sterile and result in possible disintegration of NATO.

Plans must therefore be laid quickly to ensure success of April meeting. European governments cannot make firm plans for future defense effort in absence of more definite information concerning American aid program.

Alphand pointed to press reports of Secretary Dulles press conference yesterday in which he is said to have stated Soviet peace moves have not reduced risk to West,[5] which should continue its military build-up, but at same time that administration could substantially cut proposed foreign aid budget of $7.6 billion. He, seconded by Hoyer Millar, wished to impress upon me the need for continued united effort which would, he stressed, require, among other things, some decision by United States administration re future aid policy. Both representatives felt clarification amounts to be recommended to Congress by United States essential to success of AR and April meeting. Both representatives also urged desirability of knowing United States' proposals prior to joint MC–PC meeting scheduled for April 20 in order that may be possible to present Ministers, for what will be short meeting in any case, as few unresolved issues as possible. Without this information, feared Ministers' meeting would have to start with several major issues still unresolved by governments whose defense program heavily dependent on United States position.

Alphand suggested that it would be extremely useful if United States, United Kingdom and French Ministers could meet in Paris one or two days prior to Minister's meeting to lay groundwork for successful outcome of meeting itself, so necessary to thwart Soviet moves.

I said I could not predict course which United States administration would follow re aid policy, that whole matter now under study by administration, but that I would transmit their views to Washington and hoped to discuss matter with appropriate officials there next week.[6]

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[4] Documentation on general U.S. economic and military assistance to Western Europe is presented in volume VI.

[5] For the text of Secretary Dulles' remarks on the Soviet Union at his news conference on Apr. 8, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 13, 1953, pp. 524–525.

DRAPER

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[6] On Apr. 9 Draper reported further that during the preceding 2 or 3 days several NAC delegations had indicated that the recent Soviet peace moves had vastly increased the importance of the ministerial meeting, that the ministerial meeting had taken on a more pointed political aspect, and that "discussion and public utterances on Soviet policy and general policy of West [were] perhaps most important item for NAC action." Draper also stated that he was substantially in agreement with this evaluation. (Telegram Polto 1991 from Paris; 740.5/4–953)

740.5/4–1153 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 11, 1953—4 : 19 p. m.
NIACT

Topol 1187. Cotel. Noforn. For Anderson from Merchant, Nash and Stassen.

1. In consultation with Ambassador Draper we have concluded that achievement long term infrastructure agreement so important to US security interests that US contribution of over 40% justified if absolutely required to obtain objective.

2. Accordingly you are authorized accept Ismay proposal of US contribution at 42% on condition that other partners pick up balance. Understand that this authority may permit achievement complete agreement but possible on other hand that there may still remain gap of 1 to 2%. If this occurs in spite of maximum effort by you (and Ismay), you may indicate that US willing, in view extraordinary significance of future infrastructure and provided entire negotiation is concluded prior to opening Ministers meeting, to share gap along with all other countries on proportionate basis. Ultimate US contribution not to exceed 43%.

3. Agreement would be subject to conditions set forth in Topols 960 and 1026.[2] Condition regarding "obligation" (para 2 Topol 1026) should be modified as follows: Action by Payments and Progress Committee to "authorize host nations to commit funds" by June 30, 1955 shall not be interpreted as precluding subsequent adjustments in amounts, program substitutions and similar changes as may be agreed by competent North Atlantic Treaty agencies.

4. With regard timing, it is considered essential that agreement be worked out in complete and final form prior to Council meeting to

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Rogers (RA) and Ernst (Defense) and cleared by Nash and Stassen, was sent to Paris with instructions that it be passed to General Gruenther.

[2] Neither printed; the former advised Draper that he was authorized to negotiate infrastructure cost-sharing on the basis of a U.S. contribution of 40%; the latter indicated that U.S. agreement was subject to the necessary Congressional action. (740.5/3–253 and 3–1153)

permit brief session of Defense Ministers on 23 April for purpose of signifying and formalizing governmental agreement. Essential there be no press leaks before announcement of agreement during Council meeting which will require most careful handling so as to gain maximum psychological advantage from announcement that NATO has solved a major problem on a long term basis.

Explicit recognition must be given in text agreement of pressing military need for program involved. Agreement should specify that implementation agreement within a ceiling of 250 million, is dependent upon submission by Military Committee of specific projects with required details as parts of program, screening and acceptance by North Atlantic Council Committee under terms of budget review procedure, ultimate confirmation by North Atlantic Council.

SMITH

740.5/4–1453 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, April 14, 1953—7 : 35 p. m.

Topol 1205. For Draper.

You are authorized to make statement to NATO Permanent Council along following lines, if you feel that such statement is advisable in light of situation prevailing in Paris upon your return.

"My Government believes strongly in the importance to the free world of maintaining for the foreseeable future strong NATO forces in Europe within the economic capacities of the NATO countries. My Government is convinced that the most effective deterrent to war will be provided by concentrating NATO resources, even more than in the past, on making available forces fully 'combat-ready' to perform their assigned missions in case of attack.

These views have led the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government to the acceptance of two basic policies underlying our approach to the 'firm force goals for 1953' which are to be agreed at the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the NATO Council.

1. The goals to be agreed should be goals that can be met, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Only those units should be included which will give NATO a balanced, well-trained, and well-equipped force within foreseeable resources. All NATO energies should be concentrated on making these units of the highest possible quality.

2. For such force goals, including necessary support units, the U.S. Government will make a special additional effort to deliver before the end of calendar year 1953 a better balanced program of the equipment essential to combat. It is hoped that by special efforts it will now be possible to meet during calendar year 1953 to an extent greater than hitherto forecast the requirements for MDAP-supplied items

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Martin (S/MSA) and Moore (RA) and cleared by Ohly and Halaby.

which, on the basis of the present U.S. forecasts, are listed by NATO as 'critical deficiencies.'

These efforts which the U.S. intends to make to provide delivery of equipment to NATO countries during calendar year 1953 are based on an expectation of early ratification of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. The U.S. may wish at a later date to re-examine the foregoing delivery program in the light of progress made toward this goal.

A review will of course have to be made of MDAP equipment needs by countries in the light of the new force goals agreed by ministers. It will be necessary also to bring previous forecasts up to date in the light of the latest production estimates. Also in order to assist with the actions necessary to meet the critical deficiency problem it will be necessary to re-examine programs to insure that all items heretofore included are still considered to be essential to combat.

Despite the necessity for these reviews of previous delivery forecasts, the U.S. is prepared to say now in the spirit of my initial statement of U.S. objectives, that, if needed to meet the initial equipment requirements of the finally agreed force goals, it is now working out what upward revisions in its forecasts of deliveries to NATO countries in calendar year 1953 of critically short items will be possible. The Secretary of Defense may be able to be more positive on this in the Ministers meeting."[2]

If you are asked about U.S. deliveries during calendar year 1954, you should state that it is not possible to sav anything about these deliveries at this time but that U.S. Cabinet officers will be prepared at the Ministerial meeting to approve on a provisional basis the 1954 goals.

SMITH

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[2] Ambassador Draper made this statement to the North Atlantic Council on Apr. 15 upon his return from Washington. (Polto circular A–26 from Paris, Apr. 17; 740.5/4–1753)

Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles and the United States Delegation which included Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson, Director for Mutual Security Stassen, General Bradley, and their chief advisers, left Washington on April 21 for the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, beginning April 23. In a statement at Washington National Airport just before departure Dulles stated that the main objective of the meeting would be to reach agreement on the NATO defense program for 1953. Subsidiary to this issue would be discussion of the current world situation and development of plans for future years. For the full text of Dulles' statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 4, 1953, page 646.

In preparation for the Council session and meetings with individual NATO Foreign Ministers on matters of mutual concern, the Department of State drafted two series of papers. The first series, designated NAP D–1 through D–11, corresponded to the 10 points of the agenda for the Council meeting (see below). The second series, designated TIP D–1 through D–3, was drafted for talks with the British and French. D–1 papers, for bilateral talks with the French, were drafted on the Saar, EDC, Indochina, and North Africa; D–2 papers, for bilateral talks with the British, were also drafted on the Saar and EDC plus Egypt, Iran, Buraimi, and United States support of the British defense effort; D–3 papers, for tripartite talks with the British and French, were also drafted on the Saar and EDC as well as on a political Standing Group, the Suez Canal, Middle East Defense Organization, Soviet moves, Korea, Southeast Asia and the Far East, and German unification. None of the papers from either series is printed, but sets of both are in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 164, and Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 142–147, *passim.*

The agenda for the ministerial meeting was as follows:

"I. Report by the Secretary General
II. Recent Soviet Policy
III. Exchange of Views on Other Political Matters of Common Concern
IV. Military Progress Report
V. Estimate of the Military Risk
VI. Final Report on 1952 Annual Review
VII. Infrastructure
VIII. Principles Governing Future Ministerial Meetings of the Council
IX. Other Business
X. Communiqué" (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142).

The documentation that follows presents materials on the Ministerial meetings and the talks with the British and French.

740.5/4–2353 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 23, 1953—noon.

5624. Bipartite meeting held with French April 22, with Bidault (presiding), Pleven, Bourges-Maunoury, Letourneau for French, and Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Draper and Dillon for US plus advisers.[2]

1. Pleven: Viewed "stagnation" of French ground forces proposed by NATO with concern in view military risk. NATO secretariat pro-

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] The eight-page U.S. Delegation minutes of this meeting, which indicate that it took place at the Quai d'Orsay at 3 : 30 p. m., are in file 740.5/4–2253.

posals will be taken fully into account but recommended expansion French front-line air strength beyond 1953 impossible to implement without increased budget which not considered possible. Question actually is whether present military budget level can be maintained which Pleven hopes. Uncertainty re post FY 1953 US aid is complicating factor.

2. Bourges-Maunoury noted no improvement in budgetary situation as unsatisfactory trend continues toward increased deficit which on present outlook for expenditures and receipts would reach 1000 billion francs in CY 1954. Expected increase in GNP not materializing. Economies inevitable. Possible, however, maintain CY 1953 military budget. In any event, burden in 1954 cannot be larger than 1953.

3. Bidault: Would view relaxation in NATO with alarm since present situation requires perseverance. Believed NATO military effort should show continued upward trend. Strongly insisted need for longer-range defense planning including some foreknowledge future US aid.

4. Dulles challenged use word "stagnation" as connoting deterioration and emphasized feasible qualitative improvements. As long as threat of war not predictably imminent, force levels should reflect capacity for sustained economic effort rather than maximum requirements. US does not propose to pressure NATO partners to increase efforts. US also has budgetary problem limiting current economic capabilities with Congress reluctant to authorize large amount economic aid. Secretary added aid next year has best taken form assistance to Indochina [3] on basis of a plan endorsed by our military and promising at least reduction hostilities to small proportions within, say two years. Hence increased effort required to develop indigenous forces and also changed attitude some local officials better to reflect spirit Paris directives. Wilson agreed citing Korean lessons.

5. Letourneau: Although invasion Laos worsened military situation, plans he outlined in Washington [4] which US military then seemed to find feasible, still valid. Sincerity of political and military officials in Indochina, who realize victory requires full native Vietnamese effort, cannot be questioned. French determined expand native forces. US assistance fully appreciated. Chief difficulties are finances, cadres, training.

6. Pleven: sought elucidation Secretary's remarks re aid. (*a*) Is present figure of $525 million aid from FY 53 funds in support French CY 53 military budget now to be regarded as final? (*b*) If France unlikely receive "economic aid" in FY 54 what general order magnitude comparable aid can be expected? Assumed that in addition such aid, end-item assistance will continue.

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[3] Documentation on Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

[4] For documentation on Letourneau's conversations on Indochina during his visit to the United States, Mar. 25–30, 1953, see *ibid.*, Part 1, pp. 429 ff.

7. Dulles: Nothing he said altered commitments of FY 53 aid. Confirmed $525 million as final. Re FY 54, executive branch could propose figure comparable to $525 million provided IC program exists endorsed by US military. Increase even possible if Congress could be convinced program could shortly reduce IC conflict to manageable proportions. Appreciate French financial difficulties and would understand if French forced make some small cuts. However, any sizeable reductions would mean our assuming impracticably larger proportion IC total.

8. Pleven: for French budgetary planning purposes vital that 54 aid be determined by October. Stassen and Wilson indicated this feasible. Time lacking to discuss French agenda items, EDC and North Africa.[5] We promised later talks if French wished.

DILLON

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[5] The minutes referred to in footnote 2 above, show that the U.S. representatives had to leave for a meeting with the British; for a report on this meeting, see telegram 5623, *infra*.

740.5/4–2353: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 23, 1953—10 a. m.

5623. 1. Secretary and Messrs. Wilson, Humphrey and Stassen met with Butler, Alexander, Selwyn Lloyd and Sandys this afternoon for two hours at Embassy residence.[2] Following are highlights of discussion:[3]

2. Secretary outlined our general point of view toward NATO program and problem of financing it, including question of economic aid. US objective is to eliminate economic aid except for special situations which can be dealt with in no other way. Economic aid would be replaced by OSP, volume of which, along with end-item program, would be increased over present levels. Result would be to move toward "trade not aid." In general, situation required us to take more account of need for sound economic and fiscal policies than heretofore. Ground units should meet goals called for in present 1953 NATO force plans but probably could not be increased above these levels although their quality must be improved. There was great need for continued increase in air strength.

3. Secretary emphasized that this approach was not response to recent developments in policy of Soviet Union but had been developed by administration well before Stalin's death. Nothing Soviets have

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[1] Repeated to London. The source text also states that copies of this telegram should be passed to the Departments of Defense and Treasury, and to the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

[2] The meeting took place Apr. 22.

[3] On Apr. 24 the Department of State was informed that Ambassador Aldrich also participated in this meeting. (Telegram 5652 from Paris; 611.41/4–2453)

done today [*to date?*] gives us any reason to relax our efforts. One of purposes of President's address was to test their words and find out whether they were really prepared to make concessions.[4]

4. Mr. Wilson said that from military point of view he wished to emphasize these points: (*a*) danger to free world has not been lessened; (*b*) we should not be satisfied with degree of preparedness so far achieved; (*c*) any reshaping of our program must be handled in such a way as not to give Soviets feeling that we are easing up. Problem is to get more defense out of available resources.

5. Mr. Humphrey emphasized that from financial point of view US and UK had similar problems. Both were over-extended and over long run must find ways of reducing government expenditure. We must build for long pull in way that would not overstrain their economies.

6. In response, Butler emphasized importance of economic aid to UK economy. He stressed fact that British reserves are still far below level necessary for safety. British overseas commitments in Europe, Middle East and Far East are much higher in relation to their resources than those of any other nation. They put great strain on balance of payments. Export position is not strong. Recent budget was designed to lower costs and thereby strengthen production and exports. In these circumstances, US aid is of vital importance. OSP is of value as substitute for economic aid if receipts fall within certain fiscal period and particularly if items produced under OSP contracts are turned over to UK forces. Butler was doubtful whether complete substitution of OSP for economic aid in fiscal year 1954 would result in same level of dollar receipts to UK.

7. British were anxious to get some idea of specific techniques whereby expanded OSP program would be carried out, and amounts involved. It was agreed that Mr. Stassen would have further discussion with them on this point tomorrow morning.[5]

8. Butler emphasized that British viewed US statement of its position as matter of greatest importance and said they wished to consider it as matter of highest urgency and have further exchange of views. Selwyn Lloyd said that Mr. Churchill felt strongly that this was not appropriate time to give any indication of easing up on part of West-

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[4] For the text of President Eisenhower's address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Apr. 16, entitled "The Chance for Peace", see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599–603, *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 65–71, or *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179–188.

[5] Pursuant to these arrangements, bilateral talks, headed by Stassen and Aldrich for the United States and Sandys for the British, were held Apr. 23–25 to discuss the Mutual Security Program for the United Kingdom in fiscal year 1954. The talks developed a program, in addition to normal end-item assistance and the placement of regular offshore procurement contracts, which included $100 million for the purchase of aircraft and $100 million for various bulk commodities normally exported from the United States. This program was jointly recommended by Dulles, Humphrey, Wilson, and Stassen and was designed to support the British defense effort through balance-of-payments assistance. The U.S. Delegation reported on the talks in telegram 5671 from Paris, Apr. 26. (741.5 MSP/4–2653)

ern powers as result of Soviet tactics. It was agreed that during NATO meeting US would continue to emphasize need for maintaining defensive strength. There was also agreement that in response to press inquiries both sides would say merely that they had taken this opportunity for a useful exchange of views.

DILLON

740.5/4–2453 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 24, 1953—3 p. m.

Secto 6. Cotel. Afternoon NAC session April 23 [1] devoted agenda item II (Soviet policy). Following is résumé:

At Ismay's request Dulles made first statement. Secretary opened by saying he supposed Ministers would be interested in statement of new Republican administration's attitude toward international organizations, notably NATO. He recalled that from beginning NATO had bipartisan support in US, mentioning President Eisenhower's close and vivid association with NATO, as well as his own efforts in bipartisan group which supported NATO ratification in US Senate. Referring to NAC documents on agenda item II,[2] he expressed view recent Soviet moves appeared tactical rather than change in basic Soviet strategy, and while may prove otherwise, this remains be seen and can only be demonstrated by Soviet actions. Soviet policy is one of advance and retreat. Stalin believed in temporarily buying off powerful adversaries in order to gain time to assume the offensive. NAC documents indicate there seem few facts justifying belief that Soviet strategy has changed, i.e., a few people received visas for USSR; handful people released from captivity. One can possibly have hope from these gestures but only a faint hope in light of continued Soviet acts, such as carefully prepared offensive in Laos. West would show weakness if it were swayed from its purpose by few Soviet crumbs dropped in recent weeks. At same time, however, we must be ready meet constructively any concrete evidence of real change in Soviet policy. Although Soviets are to great extent victims of their own doctrine, we hope they will change and we should certainly put no obstacles in way of such change. At same time, we should have no illusions and should not be trapped by Soviet tactics. President Eisenhower listed in his recent address[3] things Soviets could do to manifest their good faith, such as ending fighting in Korea, calling off aggression in Indochina, signing Austrian treaty, etc.

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[1] The first session of the Council was held at 11 a. m. Apr. 23 at the Palais de Chaillot. During the first session the Ministers considered Danish representation at the Council, heard a message of greeting from President Eisenhower (for the full text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 673), and noted the Secretary General's progress report covering the period Dec. 1, 1952 to Apr. 16, 1953 (C–M(53)45). The U.S. Delegation reported on this meeting in Secto 5 from Paris, Apr. 24: 740.5/4–2453. Copies of the Secretary General's report and the summary (C–R(53)20) and verbatim (C–VR(53)20) records of the meeting are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 142, 149, and 148, respectively.

[2] The summary record of this session (C–R(53)21, Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 149) indicates that the following documents were under reference here: C–M (53)38 Annexes A and B, C–M(53)44, and C–M(52)116 Addendum. Copies of these documents, which dealt with Soviet moves since Stalin's death, the role of China in Soviet policy, and trends in Soviet policy, are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 143.

In viewing Soviet Union three facts emerge:

(1) Soviet Union is dictatorship of immense power.

(2) Soviet rulers are deeply distrustful of, and hostile to, any state that does not accept their control.

(3) Soviet rulers recognize no moral scruples nor inhibitions against use of force and violence.

As long as those above conditions exist we cannot proceed with our affairs as if these were no perils for us in world. Therefore, US firmly believes international organizations, such as NATO, must exist and their strength, dependability and vigor increased. Since Soviets operate in "an entire historic era" and their threat may continue for long term, we also must build on long-term rather than short-term basis. We must adopt realistic courses to be strong and vigorous over long-term rather than sudden burst of speed which would leave us exhausted in several years. New weapons will inevitably change character of our requirements. The direction of our effort must reflect a proper balance between military and economic factors. A military effort which is far beyond economic capabilities can undermine our values and liberties and require measures resulting in extensive regimentation. This would defeat our objectives. What we must do is to increase our balanced strength by making realistic plans and use of our resources.

Secretary then said he would like to quote certain statements made by President Eisenhower at Rome meeting NAC November 1951.[4] He was quoting to make clear that present US views do not stem from recent Soviet moves but have their origin in Eisenhower's views expressed at Rome.

(Eisenhower quotation along following lines: We are defending a way of life and must be respectful of it as we proceed in our problem of building up strength, not only so as not to violate its principles and precepts, but also not to destroy from within what we are trying to defend against from without. We should not delude ourselves with targets of 1953 or 1954 or of any other year. Target is something of a reasonable nature which changes daily with new scientific appliances that go up to the battle field; every kind of influence that affects warfare will affect our problem and our list of requirements. Let us by no means individually approach the objectives that should be obtained now; nor should we, on the other hand, so badly coordinate our military progress with our economic that we destroy both).

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[3] Regarding this address, see footnote 4, *supra*.

[4] For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting at Rome, Nov. 24–28, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 693 ff.

Secretary said we believed above philosophy should guide NAC council.

He next would like say word about Far East, since whatever happens there directly affects security of Europe. He expressed hope that US efforts in Far East would not be misinterpreted as a relaxation of interest in West. For example, even on the assumption that the Korean and Indochinese wars will continue, it is our purpose to increase rather than decrease our end item assistance to NATO. He pointed out that in 1951, we delivered $900 million worth of end items to NATO countries; in 1952, $1,100 million; our estimated deliveries for 1953; $3,000 million; estimated 1954, $3,600 million. With respect to off-shore procurement contracts, in 1952, we placed $640 million and estimate $1,300 million in 1953 and $1,500 million in 1954. (Foregoing are fiscal years). Above US plans, for deliveries and expenditures, while subject to Congressional action, should be convincing rebuttal to those who believe new administration has lost interest in NATO or European security. Furthermore, if hostilities can be terminated in Far East, NATO will be the first beneficiary, since some equipment we would like to deliver speedily must, under present circumstances, go to Far East. Therefore, US efforts in Far East are aimed directly at increased strength and security for NATO.

Re Soviet threat, as long as it exists we must match Soviet unity imposed by force with equal unity. If we cannot, we may find unity imposed on us by a pistol in our back.

Related to greater strength and unity is EDC,[5] since European security unattainable without German participation and EDC only orderly way to bring it about so Germany can be tied solidly with West and at same time not be a potential danger. Secretary expressed gratification Bidault endorsement of EDC given in latter's luncheon speech. Completion EDC will give us additional strength, which is best deterrent to aggression. EDC now within our grasp. We must act rapidly since it is the principal missing ingredients to real strength and security. Furthermore, completion EDC will make solution many other problems easier.

In conclusion, new US administration believes by better planning we can have greater strength at lesser cost. Some may consider this naive but we believe it and will try it. We wish not only to sustain present force goals, but see them enlarged in coming years. NATO has indispensable place in world. President Eisenhower has deep and abiding interest in it and whatever decisions US makes are designed to strengthen NATO. Therefore, Secretary pledged fullest support of new US administration.

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[5] For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a European Defense Community, see pp. 571 ff.

Turkish representative spoke next, expressing view Soviet peace offensive did not begin with Stalin's death. Beginning was in 1951, when Korean armistice first came up. Soviet activity in sponsoring ECE meeting another indication that peace offensive was in making. He mentioned NAC document in last December meeting which indicated that as NATO gained strength Soviets would probably take peace offensive in order later to exert greater pressure.[6] This evaluation had been correct. Timing of present Soviet move, following Stalin's death, is to make free world believe that new Soviet policy and strategy is being evolved. For some time USSR has realized that limit of Western concessions had been reached and that Soviets cannot advance further without danger of war. Also brutality of previous Soviet action made West close ranks. Therefore, peace offensive is to weaken Western vigilance leading to reduced Western armaments. Any slackening on West's efforts to build up defense would place it in grave danger. Principal pitfall is if we are lured into partial negotiations and concessions. We must act in concert and force Soviets to show evidence of peaceful intentions. Dangerous to assume there are Soviet leaders, schooled under Stalin, who are well disposed toward West. Speed with which new Soviet regime has taken over is evidence of unity of purpose of Soviet leaders. Public opinion must, therefore, be put on guard against peace offensive.

Norway then made point that we have no solid information on what is behind Soviet maneuvers. There are no real evidences of peaceful intentions, therefore, no reason to relax effort, lessen vigilance, or waver in NATO defense build-up. Even if there is partial evidence that Soviets may negotiate, we should not relax. In other words, we should say nothing provocative and close no doors but continue our efforts to build strength which will place us in best position to negotiate a settlement if such possible. Recent statements by President Eisenhower and Churchill[7] are necessary to place public opinion on guard since Soviet tactical maneuvers have led to hopes and expectations. Prospect of armistice in Korea has caused speculation that economic recession may ensue and, therefore, to theory that war and armaments are necessary to maintain economic activity of West. Coordinated action to disprove this is essential.

Dutch representative spoke in much same vein, indicating no evidence of change in Soviet strategy or any signs of internal weakness. Therefore, until outcome present Soviet moves, we should continue to build strength, further coordinate our policies and strengthen moral and spiritual values. Dutch believe NATO peoples will expect clear statement by NAC re Soviet aims and intentions. Statement should be firm but not in vain to avoid possibility of lowering tension. Dutch believe Soviets will remain our antagonists, if not our mortal enemies and, therefore, we must remain strong.

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[6] Regarding the North Atlantic Council meeting at Paris, Dec. 15–18, 1952, see the editorial note and the letter from the Secretary to the President, pp. 348 and 351.

[7] For the text of Prime Minister Churchill's statement in the House of Commons on Apr. 20, see *H.C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 514, cols. 649–650.

UK had no differences with views previously expressed. Present Soviet leaders were placed in power by Stalin and thoroughly steeped in Communist doctrine. UK quoted Georgi Dimitrov who, when accused of departing from Communist principles, replied that he would not be disciple of Engels, Lenin and Stalin unless he could change tactics to achieve world revolution. New Soviet leaders seem to disagree with some of Stalin's short-term tactics. Also, they must consolidate power and, therefore, may appear to move somewhat cautiously since internally they are seeking to popularize themselves and externally to create same impression of fundamental change in structure. Present conciliatory tactics are designed to improve Soviets internal and world position, therefore, so-called peace offensive may be equal to, or more dangerous than Stalin's tougher line. We must be even more resolved to strengthen our unity, increase our strength and adopt full policy of firmness, acting neither weakly nor provocatively. Specifically, we must push ahead to obtain German contribution. It would be fatal not to, and we must not relax our NATO effort. If peace is more probable, it is because of great progress we have made. It would be folly not continue defensive build-up since this greatest deterrent to aggression. Must remain hopeful but vigilant, ready to negotiate, ready to be encouraged by acts not words.

Belgians agreed with virtually all previously said by other representatives. We should continue build our strength and at same time be ready to meet any real offers.

Italy believed Soviet aims remain same, no basis for any other assumption. Soviet policy prior Stalin's death increased NATO unity, therefore, Soviet peace offensive designed to weaken NATO. No evidence Stalin's theory of world revolution has been abandoned. USSR may also be using peace offensive to consolidate gains which it obtained at Yalta and Potsdam. Also, its efforts in colonial areas are designed to weaken Western powers. Soviets will also increase psychological activity to weaken NATO. Essentially, we should continue to build strength and achieve European integration. In final communiqué NAC must give common assessment of Soviet policy and at same time set forth our own principles.

Portuguese agreed at length with previous statements and added nothing.

Canada also agreed with previous statements, saying we could not be certain whether we faced a threat or a promise. We should not forget fundamental objectives of Soviet policy but not be obsessed with fear. Soviets are trying to disrupt West, create a problem with respect to Germany and cause disunity which may affect NATO countries. We should try to get early recognition of Soviet intentions by testing their sincerity. We must emphasize our readiness to negotiate seriously but our unwillingness to be duped. Fully agree with Secretary Dulles that we must settle down for a long steady pull toward our objective of greater strength.

France made the same points as previously made regarding necessity for continuing defensive build-up and importance of not giving appearance of refusing offered hand, but at same time making clear to public that no hand has been offered.

Greece believed we should not be deluded by Soviet tactics since no evidence of any change in Kremlin policy, as is proven by war in Indochina, rearmament in Eastern Germany, etc. Only way to safeguard peace is to organize in its defense.

740.5/4–2353: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, April 24, 1953—midnight.

Secto 7. Cotel. Third session NAC agenda item III (exchange of views re political problems).[1]

Following is résumé of discussion on above item:

1. EDC. Bidault opened with reference to progress since December NAC meeting in EDC interim committee. Due complexity of problems interim committee had not completed all tasks but had taken substantial steps forward. He said additional protocols necessary clarify certain points; enlighten public opinion; facilitate parliamentary ratifications. They are essential for France in view of its overseas commitments. He noted recent agreement of EDC countries on protocols which he described in some detail. He mentioned certain questions on which final agreement had not been reached, such as UK association with EDC, external (US) aid to EDC, EDC status of forces agreement covering forces of one EDC nation in territory of another. He concluded that French Government determined to obtain ratification as soon as possible but there were still problems which might cause delay, such as "related international agreements" (Saar), length of parliamentary examination, etc. Nonetheless, nobody could question French Government's determination ratify soonest.

Secretary Dulles made following statement re EDC:

"As you are well aware, it has been the conviction of our governments that a military contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany is essential to the unity and defensive strength of the North Atlantic Community.

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[1] Held Apr. 24 at 11 a. m. at the Palais de Chaillot. Verbatim (C–VR(53)22) and summary (C–R(53)22) records of this session are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 148 and 149.

"It is generally accepted that the manner in which this contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany could best and most safely be made was through its participation in the European Defense Community. The governments of the six countries which will constitute that community have approved the treaty establishing it, and have submitted the treaty to their respective parliaments for ratification.

"The Government, the Congress and the people of the United States have welcomed with interest and enthusiasm this determination on the part of the members of the European Defense Community to strengthen the mutual defenses against aggression and to take another step forward on the path toward European unity and peace.

"It is obvious that the decisions to be made by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government in regard to the measure and application of foreign aid programs will be greatly influenced by the progress made toward early ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty.

"It, therefore, seems to my government highly important that the North Atlantic Council reiterate its deep interest in this matter, and that the members of the Council press forward with the ratification of the additional protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on guarantees given by the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to members of the European Defense Community.[2]

"To this end, I offer the following resolution:" (Text resolution follows separate telegram [3]).

Belgium said fact six EDC countries have agreed in principle to protocols very favorable sign. Thus, six countries are doing everything possible to make ratification easier for some members. Belgium has some problems of its own national vs EDC committed forces, but believes such problems can be worked out within treaty framework without special protocols. Also referred to Bidault's remarks re UK associations, US aid to EDC and SOF agreement as still incomplete. Belgian Government will do utmost to ratify before summer parliamentary recess.

UK strongly endorsed EDC and referred to its association with it.

Italy described difficulties in parliament re electoral law which had delayed parliamentary action on EDC. Stressed importance of early ratification by all members now protocols agreed and warmly welcomed UK proposals re association with EDC.

Dutch said its parliament working with great thoroughness toward ratification. This takes time. Cannot predict date ratification but confident outcome will be satisfactory without too great delay and probably before summer recess.

Luxembourg convinced EDC necessary step to real European unity and stronger Atlantic community. Believes favorable parliamentary action before summer recess possible. EDC and NAT–EDC protocols will be ratified together.

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[2] For the text of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty extending guarantees of Assistance to the European Defense Community, signed at Paris May 27, 1952, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 165–167.

[3] Secto 12 from Paris, Apr. 25; 740.5/4–2553. For the text of the resolution on the EDC, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1953, pp. 674–675.

Portugal mentioned Portuguese parliamentary approval EDC–NAT protocol.

2. Indo-china. France referred to December NAC resolution re Indo-china.[4] Anything that can be done to aid France in Indo-china even more important now because of developments in Laos. Would like to mention in final communiqué NATO's concern over attack against Laos and aggression in Indo-china.

Greece strongly seconded French proposal re communiqué.

US expressed full sympathy and endorsed communiqué's suggestion as did Italy.

Danish permanent representative did not wish be nuisance but was troubled. Denmark recognizes importance of Indo-china and sympathizes with France as shown by Danish action on December NAC resolution. However, subsequent to December meeting there were difficulties with Danish public opinion. Denmark hoped that in draft communiqué this would be borne in mind so that new difficulties in Denmark would not be raised.

Norway shared Danish concern and expressed hope that communiqué would not imply any extension NAT obligations beyond confines laid down in NAT.

France understands Danes and Norwegians concern but believed events in Indo-china directly affected NAT community and that something constructive in communiqué was essential.

It was agreed the drafting group would prepare appropriate language.

3. UK-Egyptian relations. UK referred to Eden's statement at Lisbon on Anglo-Egyptian relations and Lloyd then described his recent trip Egypt.[5] Said UK policy was for Sudanese self-government and then self-determination. He outlined UK-Egyptian agreement on February 12 re Sudan[6] and said while there will be difficulties and friction in its implementation, UK will do best to keep things calm. Referring to forthcoming negotiations with Egypt re defense, he expressed hope that these would be useful and agreement eventually reached, although it would take time, particularly since in Egypt there is little understanding why defense arrangements are necessary for base in Canal Zone. Egyptians seem believe base can be organized after outbreak hostilities. This just not possible as proven by NATO need

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[4] For the text of the NAC resolution on Indochina, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

[5] For documentation on Selwyn Lloyd's trip to Egypt and the Sudan in March 1953, see volume IX.

[6] For the text of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan, signed Feb. 12, 1953 at Cairo, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, p. 315.

for infrastructure in being and manned to support NAT defense forces prior to hostilities.[7]

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[7] For a report on the two other items discussed at the third session, see Secto 9, *infra.*

740.5/4–2553 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 24, 1953—midnight.

Secto 9. Cotel. Third session NAC agenda item IV.[2]

Following is résumé of discussion on above item:

Military progress report—item IV

The Secretary General introduced the report [3] and invited the chairman of the military committee to comment. The MC chairman noted the harmonious atmosphere and complete unanimity which obtained in the committee. He pointed out that the report dealt only with work that had been completed.

The Secretary General then introduced SACLANT [4] who referred to the progress made in the first year of SACLANT, the high caliber of the officers furnished him, the progress made in emergency planning and the attention now being given to longer range planning. He stressed the importance of combined exercises and maneuvers and the need for more action and planning for the protection of ocean shipping in war time, which he had brought to the attention of NATO authorities. He stressed the importance of the infrastructure program.[5]

Lord Ismay then called upon SACEUR [6] who opened his remarks by noting the steady improvement in the armed forces immediately available for the defense of Western Europe. If this progress were continued, SACEUR would attain a capability of carrying out his mission in war. The situation justified sober optimism. The results however were far short of the forces required. He pointed out that the Soviets were also making progress and he urged appropriate action on NATO and the member governments. He had given his conclusions and recommendations to the military committee pointing out the deficiencies that still existed in air power, ground forces, logistic support and planning, minesweepers and naval escort vessels and the lack of solution to some organizational problems. He urged expeditious action.[7]

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[1] Repeated for information to all NATO capitals.

[2] For a report on the first part of the third session, see Secto 7, *supra.*

[3] Not printed; a copy of the report by the Standing Group on the military progress of NATO, MC 5/6 (Final), Apr. 18, 1953, is in the NATO Registry files at Brussels.

[4] Adm. Lynde D. McCormick, U.S.N., Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and U.S. Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

[5] A copy of the full text of Admiral McCormick's remarks is attached to the summary record (C–R(53)22) of this session as Annex A. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 149)

[6] Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S.A., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe.

At the Secretary General's suggestion the Council noted the report and the remarks of SACEUR and SACLANT. [Estimate of the risk—Item V.]

The Secretary General presented the document, noting that the conclusions contained therein would be considered in the resolution on the 1952 AR.[8]

The chairman of the military committee pointed out that the previous risk estimate presented to the Council in December[9] had been based on the forces in being in December 1952, since revised requirements for 1953 and later were not available, nor were the force goals for 1953 and 1954 developed. The present risk estimate was based on the new requirements developed by the military for 1954 and the proposed force goals for 1953 and 1954 set forth in the 1952 AR. The new estimate did not forecast a more favorable situation. While considerable progress had been made, the order of magnitude of the proposed forces, when compared with the requirements did not indicate any change in the risk estimate. He affirmed that the document represented the best purely military estimate of the risk in 1954. He invited the Council to note the report and to consider the conclusions contained therein in connection with the report on the 1952 AR.

There was no discussion of the paper which, at the Secretary General's suggestion, was noted by the Council on the understanding that the conclusion would be considered as requested.

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[7] A copy of the full text of General Ridgway's remarks is attached to the summary record (C–R(53)22) of this session as Annex B. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95. CF 149)

[8] No copy of the document under reference here, MCM–4–53 (revised), has been found in the Department of State files. A copy of the resolution on the 1952 Annual Review, C–M(53)47 Final, dated Apr. 24, 1953, is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95. CF 146.

[9] Not printed; a copy of this four-page report, MC 45 (Final), dated Dec. 9, 1952, is in the NATO Registry files at Brussels.

740.5/4–2553 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 25, 1953—11 a. m.

Secto 10. Cotel. Subject: NAC Discussion Annual Reviews.[2]

1. NAC discussion on annual reviews April 24 began with considera-

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and to Frankfurt, Bonn, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

[2] The fourth session was held at the Palais de Chaillot at 3 : 30 p. m. Copies of the verbatim (C–VR(53)23) and summary (C–R(53)23) records of this session are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 148 and 149. According to these

tion 1952 AR report[3] which introduced by Ismay and Chairman MC who expressed satisfaction that MC conclusions attached resolution.[4] He briefed MC comments with emphasis on shortages.

2. Following is essence general comments delegations:

(*a*) Greek representative after general compliments re report expressed deep concern over shortages of men and arms and called for increased deliveries and long-range plans. He referred Papagos statement re intention Greece not reduce effort or numbers military manpower.[5] He stated Greece will undertake even unpopular measures to maintain balanced budget without reducing defense portion and will call up reservists as SHAPE requested. This he said may seriously affect Greek economy and sound investment necessary to expand resources. Greece, recognizing burden sharing problem, considers its effort one of largest.

(*b*) Pleven cited Secretary's statement yesterday[6] and asserted that France has always held that NATO objective is be ready fight back at any time and that no peak should be reached that cannot be maintained. He stated level of forces to be reached must be one calculated be effective against enemy but that all agreed this level had not been reached. Pleven went on to call for consideration both active and reserve forces and superiority unconventional weapons. He then expressed worry re preparation 1954 budgets, saying some major countries, including France, must contemplate reductions defense expenditures in face reductions others. Special effort necessary by NATO for more rational use available funds and development confidence among more exposed countries. After citing achievements, such as long term financing infrastructure and joint aircraft production, he stated need for long-term programming and financing for other equipment for which ample capacity exists, adding that progress toward standardization too slow. He also advocated full exchange technical information by those countries expending large sums on research. He concluded that, while EDC will provide step toward coordinated planning, it should be NATO-wide. Above all, he felt that if defense funds not to be increased and probably reduced, better integrated NATO planning essential.

(*c*) UK representative (Alexander) remarked more realistic annual review report than previously, but called for greater realism. Desired

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records the Ministers approved the text of the resolution on the European Defense Community (see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1953, pp. 674–675, for text) and briefly discussed infrastructure before taking up the Annual Review.

[3] C–M(53)35 Part III, dated Apr. 15, 1953 (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 146A). This is the second report on the Annual Review; regarding the first report, see the editorial note, p. 348.

[4] The comments of the Military Committee (MC 39/2 (Final), dated Apr. 18, 1953) were attached to the text of the resolution on the Annual Review (C–M (53)47) when they were considered by the Council. No copies of either has been found in the Department of State files, but a copy of the revised resolution on the Annual Review (C–M(53)47) Final, dated Apr. 24, is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 146.

[5] The verbatim record of this session (C–VR(53)23) indicates that the Greek representative was referring to a speech by Prime Minister Field Marshal Papagos to the Greek Parliament during March.

[6] See Secto 7, Apr. 24, p. 378.

results AR are, he said, means extending buildup, description points of weakness and recommendations for correcting them within available means. Improvements in quality were, he thought, best development from this AR and he asked countries be guided by conclusions MC 39/2.

(*d*) Secretary Wilson made statement reported in separate Secto cable[7] covering, among other things, US steps toward economies, reservations re end items for certain force goals considered "soft spots", basis on which end item deliveries will be made and planned improvements deliveries certain items in 1953.

(*e*) Pella pointed out goals to which countries committing themselves required great effort, although still not sufficient. He stressed clause in resolution stating achievement goals depends on solution financial or other problems which applicable Italy and drew attention to need for long-term economic program that would solve balance of payments problems. In meantime, he asked for continued economic aid for at least a few countries and end item aid until necessary defensive level reached. He suggested international staff study of two problems:

I. Size of Soviet forces and Soviet ability support them.

II. Possibility building up equipment stocks in Europe for second line reserve units.

(*f*) UK (Butler) addressed himself economic aspects AR, after complimentary remarks re report. He agreed US view on increasing realism re force goals, but called for equal realism re economic capabilities. He stated UK doing utmost re increase production, especially for export, and explained tax cut as incentive to greater production. He placed great emphasis on point that, in spite tax cut, UK still bearing heaviest tax burden, approximately, any country in world. Without knowing as yet size and nature US fiscal year 1954 aid, he expressed satisfaction at size proposed OSP program. While assuring council UK intention achieve 1953 goals, he made reservation that 1954 goals may have to be reviewed in light future developments. While agreeing Secretary Wilson's statement on need for economies, he declared that by repeated review practically all water had been squeezed out of UK defense program. Finally, he paid tribute to US aid, including its political and moral influence, and stressed that AR is burden sharing exercise and that the more burden is shared the more intensive will be efforts of countries.

(*g*) Ismay commented that in light many observations and suggestions, best procedure would be for international staff, permanent representatives and ARC to study statements and pursue proposals as quickly and diligently as possible.

[Here follow a summary of the Council consideration of the specifics of the report on the Annual Review, drafting changes in the resolutions on the Annual Reviews for 1952 and 1953, and a press release on the Annual Review.]

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[7] The text of Secretary Wilson's statement was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 8 from Paris, Apr. 24; 740.5/4–2453.

740.5/4–2553

The Secretary of State to the President[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 25, 1953.

I expect Council meeting will conclude its business at noon tomorrow. We have only to agree on communiqué and date of next meeting tomorrow morning.

Results have been substantial and we have impressed our partners with fresh approach combined with continued firm support for common purposes. Agreement approved today for financing three-year infrastructure program is solid achievement and indicative of long-term attitude in our planning which we have stressed to our friends. We also agreed today on the firm 1953 force goals which had been developed in the Annual Review as well as on provisional goals for force goals 1954. The French and British in discussing the latter indicated strong doubts as to their ability actually to meet 1954 goals.

Atmosphere of Council meeting has been friendly but business-like. Pug Ismay has chaired meeting effectively.

We have had extended frank bilateral meetings with both the French and the British and will have one more session with each before I leave Paris.[2] We have also scheduled a tripartite meeting tomorrow afternoon which will cover superficially wide range of topics.[3] This more a concession to French for the prestige they feel it brings them than meeting which will produce any concrete results.

Charlie Wilson, George Humphrey, Harold Stassen and I have been in complete accord throughout. Draper is in the final stages of negotiation on German defense contribution including support costs and we may have satisfactory agreement by tomorrow night.

Best personal regards. DULLES

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[1] The source text was transmitted in priority telegram Dulte 4 from Paris, Apr. 25 at 3 a. m. It bears the handwritten notation "Copy sent to W[hite] H[ouse] 4/14/53".

[2] Regarding the bilateral talks with the French, see telegrams 5624, 5672, and 5679 all from Paris, pp. 369, 392, and 395; regarding the bilateral talks with the British, see telegrams 5623 and 5667, p. 371 and *infra*.

[3] Regarding the trilateral meeting, see telegram 5669, Apr. 26, p. 390.

740.5/4–2653 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, April 26, 1953—2 a. m.

5667. 1. Second bilateral talk with UK held this morning[2] at British Embassy residence (reference Embassy telegram 5623, April 23[3]). Résumé of discussion follows:

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[1] This telegram, which was transmitted in two sections, was repeated to London. The source text states that copies should be passed to the Departments of Defense and Treasury and to the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

[2] Apr. 25.

[3] *Ante*, p. 371.

2. Butler opened by urging strongly that UK and US keep in close contact so as to deal with delicate European situation which British felt had now been created by indications of policy of new US administration during course of NATO meeting.

3. Selwyn Lloyd went on to outline preliminary British appraisal of continental reaction to US position. British are aware that change in US views is one of method and timing but fear it will be misunderstood or misrepresented as change of policy. Some Europeans will view it as return to isolationism, feeling that withdrawal first of general economic aid and then of special defense aid will be followed by withdrawal of troops. Europeans will watch closely effect of US aid policy on UK defense build-up. If British are forced to withdraw troops from overseas, or to reduce production to point where no further build-up or re-equipment of forces with really modern and effective weapons is possible, other NATO countries will spot these facts immediately. Situation contains political dynamite. Europe is still sick; 8 of 14 NATO countries were defeated and occupied during last war. Statement of US positions comes at awkward moment because of Soviet "peace" gestures. One Frenchman said yesterday that "this is the end of NATO" and Van Zeeland also felt it was a radical change of policy involving serious repercussions. There is serious danger of collapse in carefully erected structure of European unity and defensive strength, which has been built up largely as result US leadership. Presentation of policies from now on will require most careful thought and British hope to work in close collaboration with US on this presentation.

4. Secretary replied that we had always realized that there was danger of our policy being misunderstood. We recognize that first major policy statement of new administration toward Europe can be misinterpreted as return to isolationism. However, no one could conceivably consider President Eisenhower as isolationist nor Secretary of State. US administration cannot pursue wrong policies merely because correct policies will be misinterpreted. After careful review, administration's appraisal is that there is danger of US resources being over-strained as well as those of other NATO countries. In light of this appraisal, past policies have run their course and must be adjusted to ease burden unless, of course, threat of war becomes greater again. One purpose of President Eisenhower's speech was to bring about relaxation of tensions. We realize initiative of this kind may result in worsening of world situation if Soviets do not reply with deeds and continue pile up armaments. We feel that Europe and North Atlantic community should react to present situation by continuing to strengthen unity rather than by breaking apart. Only by closer unity can necessary defensive strength be achieved with fewer resources. Our appraisal is that Europeans have will to carry forward along this line.

Policy based on subsidies cannot provide firm foundation although we recognize need to make transition to the other policies smoothly and gradually. Secretary asked for suggestions as to best way of dealing with problem.

5. Butler said that British agreed that it would be a healthy move for aid to take new form of substituting trade and off-shore procurement for subsidies with one important condition. We must associate in public mind change in form of aid with opening up of trade. Europeans will face difficult interim period during summer and fall. Aid would be changing its form and flow of dollars would inevitably be reduced but there was as yet no concrete evidence of substantial change for better in US trade policy. If British and European people can see evidence that they can earn their way by trade and get over "dollar cliff" then they will have hope and situation will be healthy because they will feel independent. First signs of new administration's trade policy such as Chief St. Joseph Dam contract are not encouraging. US action in this field will help more than anything else to dispel European defeatism. British are taking tremendous risks economically in carrying present defense burden. Unless they can see new US trade policy emerging, even their strong nerve will be shaken and they will have to reduce risks by cutting defense program. Favorable indications on trade policy would be most helpful in avoiding adverse European reactions to altered aid policy.

6. US representatives emphasized the impossibility of presenting drastic new trade program to Congress during current session. Program called for one year extension without crippling amendments of present reciprocal trade act, customs simplification bill and use of administrative flexibility to liberalize imports. In the meantime, problem would be studied carefully and every effort would be made to prepare public opinion for further move. Secretary gave it as his opinion that plebiscite in US would show substantial majority in favor of liberal trade policies. However, protectionist influence of special interest group was strong in Congress. Most difficult task of new administration is to achieve agreement between executive branch and Congress in trade policy field. Extension of present law without amendment should be helpful. There may be indications of favorable administrative policy in coming months, but not major Congressional action this year.

7. Butler offered to supply information on British taxation that would be useful to us during Congressional presentation. UK taxes were still highest in world and hit particularly low income groups. Stassen said information on taxes by income category would be very helpful both with Congress and to build understanding by public of relative burdens. He felt we should concentrate on putting out constructive information. We should emphasize long term character of

decisions on infrastructure and aircraft contract recently announced. US should make firm commitments and stick to them. We can increase flow of dollars from troop payments, tourists, and capital investments.

8. Secretary asked Butler to support position vis-à-vis Europeans that these discussions are evolving joint program in which trade policies will have their rightful place. Butler replied that UK was already taking this line. Referring to Secretary's earlier remarks, Lloyd agreed that logical consequence of US position should be for Europeans to draw closer together. However, he felt actual result might be to encourage neutralist thinking. He expressed gratitude that US and UK had agreed to consult to prevent strengthening attitude that Europe must become third force between US and Soviets. In his view, Soviet objectives have not changed at all.

9. There was brief discussion of plans for trilateral meeting with French.[4] British had impression Bidault wished to take initiative before Soviets march again. They thought he had in mind some sort of disarmament conference. It was agreed that this would be premature at this time and that US–UK should support a step-by-step approach to get agreement on specific issues with Soviets. British felt that French would also request concrete assistance in Laos.

10. Separate message follows on UK aid problem in fiscal year 1954.[5]

DILLON

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[4] For a record of the trilateral meeting, Apr. 25, see telegram 5669, Apr. 26, p. 390.

[5] Presumably, a reference to telegram 5671 from Paris, Apr. 26; regarding this telegram, see footnote 5, p. 372.

740.5/4–2553: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 25, 1953—8 p. m.

Secto 16. Cotel. Subject: Round-up last session of NAT ministerial meeting.[2]

1. Fifth and last session morning April 25 commenced with Item VIII, principles governing future ministerial meetings (CM (53) 37[3]).

Ismay noted permanent representatives desire to avoid rigid procedure and general agreement to at least two meetings a year. Pleven and Butler expressed agreement, and French supported by Norway, proposed April and October as desirable schedule. Council agreed and

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and to Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, and Bonn.

[2] The fifth and final session was held at the Palais de Chaillot at 11:30 a. m. Apr. 25. Copies of the summary (C–R(53)24) and verbatim (C–VR(53)24) records of this session are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CFs 148 and 149.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

Ismay noted emergency meetings could be called at any time. He also reminded council of time factor in AR resolution,[4] and fact three months should be available between date last country reply received and meeting begins.

2. Under other business Bidault called council's attention to fact status of forces agreement still only ratified by three countries, adding only Belgium and Norway had ratified since December meeting. He stressed practical and moral importance of ratification. Ismay noted Canada and UK had completed parliamentary procedure, but not ratified as yet; other countries, he understood, were close to ratifying. Ismay asked that attention of all governments which had not yet ratified be called to French Foreign Minister's statement.

3. Secretary Dulles commended permanent representatives on their preparatory work for ministerial meeting and expressed hope permanent council would assume even greater stature, and that Ministers would recognize their capacity for leadership and give them full support. He also commended Ismay, Van Vredenburch and international staff particularly on AR and infrastructure negotiations. He underlined these accomplishments demonstrate wisdom of Lisbon decision to establish an international staff under a Secretary General. France and UK associated selves with Dulles' statement. Ismay made appropriate response.

4. Council agreed to have Ismay send message to Eden expressing Ministers' wishes for his quick recovery.[5]

5. More than an hour was devoted to editing the French and English texts of the communiqué and it was decided to release it to the press 4 p. m. April 25.[6]

6. Ockrent (Belgium), chairman of *ad hoc* committee, reported orally that agreement had been reached between EDC countries and Federal Republic concerning financial contribution by German Federal Republic for defense between date of entry into force of EDC treaty and June 30, 1954. This agreement covers both total Federal Republic financial contribution to EDC budget and support costs for Allied troops stationed in Germany. Agreement was reached on a total figure of DM 950 million per month and of that sum for support costs, DM 400 million for first six months, DM 300 million next two months, and DM 200 million for subsequent month based on assumption treaty would enter into force October 1, 1953. Should that occur before October 1, further negotiations will take place on the support costs in same manner as provided in finance agreement. Use of these common

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[4] Under reference here is C-M(53)48 Final which had been adopted at the fourth session of the Council on Apr. 24; a copy of this resolution is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 146.

[5] Foreign Secretary Eden was recovering from an operation.

[6] For the text of the final communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1953, pp. 673–674 or *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 1631–1633.

budget funds by various EDC countries is still under negotiation. Committee recognizes German Federal Republic right to propose to EDC, United States and UK that agreement be reviewed if these costs hinder build-up of German contingents. UK, France, United States and Italy congratulated *ad hoc* committee and Ockrent on fine job.

Draft communiqué[7] was circulated on this subject and approved by council for release (for text see Secto 14[8]). Full text *ad hoc* committee's written report being transmitted to Washington, London and EDC capitals in Polto series.[9]

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[7] The draft communiqué under reference has not been found in Department of State files. A copy of the final EDC communiqué is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 147 or see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1953, pp. 674–675.

[8] Not printed.

[9] Under reference here is C–M(53)52, which was transmitted to Washington in Polto 2123, Dec. 25 (762A.5/4–2553).

396.1 PA/4–2653 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 26, 1953—2 p. m.

5669. Tripartite meeting April 25 devoted entirely to discussion of means for testing Soviet intentions, with particular reference to order in which different problems might best be taken up.[2] French representatives were Bidault, Pleven, Letourneau, Parodi; British Butler, Lloyd, Alexander, Harvey; United States Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Aldrich, Dillon, Draper. No conclusions reached and agreed pursue exchange of views through diplomatic channels. Bidault thought *Pravda* editorial contained nothing really new in substance.[3] He saw danger of imminent Soviet proposals placing Germany at top of agenda for four-power meeting. Proposed anticipating this by early western proposals which would forestall Soviet call for such talks before it is made. This best accomplished by placing disarmament first on agenda (as most basic and difficult item), followed by Austria and then Germany. Obviously hostilities would have to stop everywhere before talks could commence. He feared Soviets might accept last western proposals re free German election, thus precipitating "chain reaction" in German and French opinion which would make German neutralization difficult to refuse.[4] Neutralization of course completely unacceptable as it would involve Soviets withdrawing 200 kilometers while United States would withdraw 5,000. To accept discussion "small" problems first could play into hands of Soviets who may be ready close out certain bankrupt operations. Unwarranted climate of hopefulness would then make trouble.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.

[2] The six-page U.S. Delegation minutes of this meeting are in file 396.1 PA/4–2553.

[3] Under reference here is the Apr. 25 editorial in *Pravda* which contained a commentary on President Eisenhower's address on Apr. 16. Extracts from the editorial are in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 51–57; for the text of President Eisenhower's address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599–603, *AFP*, vol. I, pp. 65–71, or *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953*, pp. 179–188.

Secretary recalled order envisaged in President's speech which, while deliberately kept flexible, has certain advantages. Korean armistice talks will provide first test Soviet sincerity within couple weeks as we would not allow them be drawn out. Next would be end of direct and indirect attacks in Indochina where problem more complicated since conflict not recognized as international. French might consider bringing French, Laotian or joint complaint re invasion of Laos before SC, which would help make IC conflict subject international negotiations. Austria would seem next urgent subject where Soviet sincerity easily tested with least complications to ourselves. President had spoken next of Germany and Eastern Europe with idea that if progress made in all aforementioned problems were [*sic*] adequate to give confidence, disarmament might be approached. This did not mean complete agreement on all these problems necessary for disarmament to be discussed but some progress on them would be condition precedent. Also fact that disarmament still under discussion in United Nations is important. Above views re priorities tentative and subject to tripartite discussion and own consultation with President.

Butler said Churchill would agree on desirability west be prepared for possible Soviet initiative and is also mindful of public opinion. While Soviets had recently not been wholly negative on disarmament, there is as yet no evidence of sufficient change in their position to warrant hope of real progress. While that subject should continue be pursued British would think others better suited to testing Soviet sincerity.

Lloyd thought *Pravda* article indicated Soviets temporizing rather than taking any initiative. Disarmament could only follow, perhaps long after real confidence created by settlement other problems. If purpose putting disarmament first is to "keep discussions safely bogged down" then good idea but not sure that would be wise. While desirable to bar Soviet move re Germany, west bound by September tripartite proposals which embodied carefully thought-out and sound position. High Commissioners, individually rather than collectively, should also consult Adenauer so that three governments may take account of his views.

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[4] The proposal under reference here has not been identified further, but presumably Bidault was referring to the tripartite note to the Soviet Union, Sept. 23, 1952. For documentation on this note and the question of all-German elections, see volume VII.

He said British proposals for early deputies meeting on Austria accepted by French with United States response still outstanding.[5] Soviet conditions for meeting would indicate insincerity. British agree Korea talks must not be allowed to drag indefinitely. If however talks went badly manner in which they were broken off would be important from point of view public reaction and United Kingdom would certainly want to be fully consulted. Also we should seek full benefit from Indian resolution.[6] Did not see how Indochina fitted into picture and asked how we might help French politically in dealing with it.

Bidault reiterated Soviet initiatives would come and would involve small package deals difficult to refuse but holding specious and divisive appeal designed lead west along Soviet-chosen path harmful to western interests. If disarmament the first test those difficulties would be avoided. French Government not inflexible on priorities as shown by acceptance idea convening Austrian deputies. Danger, however, that Soviets would insist on linking Germany to Austrian discussions. Besides Soviets would make trouble re Article 35. In any event they would remain in Hungary, Rumania, basing such action on their treaties with satellites and citing NATO precedent. If Germany discussed before disarmament and if Soviets accepted free elections, French opinion would make refusal of neutralization difficult and "we would be caught in own trap".

He agreed end of Indochina hostilities should be precondition for any talks. French reluctant raise Laos in United Nations where unanimity all non-Communist nations would be helpful but unlikely in view position France was placed in December United Nations discussions. Certain countries giving in to expediency and demagogic appeals might doubt independence Associated States. Moreover diverse demands might be provoked which would not help prosecution war. While not preventing Laos from presenting appeal France not encouraging it.

DILLON

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[5] Documentation on the participation of the United States in the negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty is presented in volume VII.

[6] Presumably this is a reference to the United Nations General Assembly resolution, adopted Dec. 3, 1952, on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war; for text, see *AFP*, vol. II, pp. 2651–2654. Documentation on this resolution is presented in volume XV.

611.51/4–2653: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 26, 1953—9 p. m.

5672. Limited distribution. Reference Embtel 5624, April 23.[2]

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[1] The source text directs the Department of State to pass copies of this cable to the Departments of Defense and Treasury, the Mutual Security Agency, and to the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

[2] *Ante*, p. 369.

1. Second session bipartite talks with French held afternoon April 26. Present were Bidault, Pleven, Bourges-Maunoury for French; Dulles, Humphrey, Wilson, Stassen, Dillon and Draper for US; with advisers.[3]

2. US del had previously agreed on memo re aid, which Dulles read to French and made copies available to them. Text this memo contained immediately following telegram.[4]

3. Dulles stated had two oral observations to make re this memo. We will need help French Government in getting to US the information needed for presentation aid program to Congress. Embassy and MSA Mission will be in touch with French re this. Second point related to EDC. Nothing specific included in memo, as we have already made our position clear. EDC can succeed only if it reflects real desires peoples concerned. However, progress of EDC will be much in our minds and those of Congress as aid program considered.

4. Bidault expressed appreciation for US comprehension French problems.[5] Bourges-Maunoury indicated that US memo clarified situation for him re meeting external financial problems. Regarding FY 54 aid, Bourges-Maunoury inquired whether $100 million referred to paragraph 5(*a*) memo would be in form budget-supporting OSP. Also what form would the $460 million in paragraph 5(*b*) take. Stassen indicated that re both 5 (*a*) and (*b*), it is US intention have government-to-government agreement whereby we would provide funds for items to be included in French budget. Where items purchased, do not intend have 10 percent counterpart deduction. However, $60 million to be made immediately available and part of remaining $400 million mentioned paragraph 5(*b*) would be in form defense support aid, and such aid would require 10 percent counterpart be made available for US use. Implementation of arrangements foreseen by memo to be worked out with Ambassador and Labouisse.

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[3] The six-page U.S. Delegation minutes of this meeting (including the second part described in telegram 5679, Apr. 27, *infra*), which indicate that the meeting took place at the Quai d'Orsay at 3:30 p.m., are in file 740.5/4–2653.

[4] Telegram 5673 from Paris, Apr. 26 (751.5 MSP/4–2653). The memorandum stated that the United States would make available to France $60 million as an advance payment on fiscal 1954 U.S. aid to France. Additionally, the United States would give favorable consideration to a proposal for an Export–Import Bank loan of $100 million and would recommend to Congress with respect to fiscal 1954 MSP appropriations, $100 million for equipment for French metropolitan forces assigned to SACEUR, and up to a maximum of $460 million additional aid. These proposals were in addition to anticipated end-item deliveries and certain offshore procurement contracts which would proceed under normal procedures.

[5] According to the minutes referred to in footnote 3, above, the meeting recessed for 15 minutes at this point while the French considered the U.S. memorandum. When it reconvened, Bourgès-Maunoury referred to a French *aide-mémoire* which had been given to the U.S. representatives at the beginning of the meeting (a copy is attached as Annex I to the U.S. Delegation minutes), explaining the French balance-of-payments situation, and stated that the United States memorandum clarified the situation regarding how France's balance-of-payments problems might be met.

5. Re paragraph 5(*c*) memo, Bourges-Maunoury asked whether additional IC effort mentioned is additional national armies light battalions already planned. Dulles confirmed what we have in mind is program for increase of ASIC forces discussed by Letourneau when in Washington,[6] but US military not wholly satisfied and might have some suggestions to make. We must be able defend program before Congress on basis testimony our military people. Asked Nash to comment. Nash said Defense pleased with full frank discussion with Letourneau and with information given. Our military people had suggestions rather than criticisms to offer. He mentioned two military factors of concern to our military, but added that plan French laid out in Washington appears to hold promise of success. Nash also referred to assurance given Letourneau that US would undertake furnish equipment for additional battalions, and fact that if Vietnam national forces could be developed in units larger than battalions, would be more self-confident and effective.

6. Bourges-Maunoury said aid in prospect is substantial and enables French envisage financial problems in better light. However, budget economies will still be necessary in 1953 and 1954. French objective will be make them without harming military potential.

7. Pleven said helped considerably to have these aid indications for FY 54. Fully realized they are subject Congressional action, and inquired when final vote likely come and when French aid figure would be confirmed. Went on discuss French force levels. Had originally hoped activate larger forces than goals recently set. Even presently planned forces would cost 30 billion francs more in CY 54 and Letourneau program 90 billion more. Must consider what can do with resources available, including aid. Hopes to consult with US experts regarding new weapons and other savings. Asked if special program (paragraph 5(*a*) memo) would be of kind to help French budget. Stassen confirmed this.

8. Pleven went on to speak of difficult and intricate problems posed for France by IC. Made point that if additional effort in IC, to which we had indicated a willingness to contribute a portion, were to require additional French outlays, might pose insoluble difficulties.

9. Bidault spoke of French internal political problems in relation IC war. Some French are saying leave IC to cut expenses. Bidault said that defense of IC will go on, with US help and that of ASIC. It is French aim to build latter up.

10. Dulles replied Pleven question re timetable by saying should know Congressional action toward late June and should have fairly definitive figure for French by August. Stressed importance French developing program that will commend itself to Congress and

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[6] See footnote 4, p. 370.

American people. Again expressed confidence in future of French and our desire help over present difficulties.

11. Other matters touched on being reported separately.[7]

12. Stassen and Ohly bring full details.

DILLON

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[7] Telegram 5679, Apr. 27, *infra.*

611.51/4–2753 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 27, 1953—3 p. m.

5679. Re Embtel 5672, April 26.[1]

1. At second session bipartite talks with France,[2] after discussion of aid matters reported reference telegram, Bidault turned to EDC, alluding to Secretary's reference to subject earlier in meeting. Bidault said that since assuming duties Foreign Minister his position re EDC had been subject much press comment and misinterpretation. Stated he wished make clear he personally strongly favored EDC. It is intention French Government obtain ratification of EDC, and government has no alternative policy. However, no Parliament easy to handle and government will encounter obstacles and difficulties, but government determined push through ratification.

2. Recent Soviet moves intended to place obstacle in path development single united Western European community. Present government wants West European community—on military, political and economic levels. Any French Government would want same thing. Concluded by saying obviously impossible for him attempt give exact date now by which ratification will be completed.

3. Pleven added that French Government has only one aim in matter, and that is to achieve EDC ratification. Explained that after plan had been put forward, there had been general elections and a new Parliament. Has taken time educate new deputies. Concluded by saying great majority French people in favor EDC and he convinced will succeed.

4. Secretary said we convinced that it is purpose French Government to carry EDC through. We know how difficult and complex these matters are but French should appreciate that public opinion sees things in simpler terms and there is considerable public impatience in US over EDC progress. Secretary said he agreed with Bidault that recent shifts in Soviet tactics explained in good part by progress toward West European unity. Soviets realize they could not dominate a united West Europe. Must guard against maneuvers to leave Germany between West and East.

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] Regarding the minutes for the second bipartite meeting, see footnote 3, *supra.*

5. Bidault commented briefly on Morocco. Said subject already covered in Washington[3] but wished again say that French Government convinced Sultan and Nationalists more attached to revision of political status than to reforms. French believe reforms necessary and must come first. They hope we will not permit Nationalists to try delay matters by appeals to us.

DILLON

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[3] Presumably Bidault is referring to the discussion of Morocco during his visit to Washington with Prime Minister Mayer, Mar. 26–28, 1953; for documentation on this visit, see volume VI.

611.51/4–2753 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, April 27, 1953—1 a. m.

5674. Secretary Dulles, accompanied by Dillon and MacArthur, had one hour talk with Mayer accompanied by Burin des Roziers late Sunday.[1] Mayer stated that on reconvening of Assembly May 12 he would submit law for constitutional reform and revised fiscal program for 1953. He regards constitutional reform as more important of the two projects as he considers France's difficulties to be primarily political. He hopes to get three-fifths majority so as not to require national referendum on constitutional reform but is completely confident of success in referendum if one should be necessary. Fiscal reform will consist primarily of cuts in expenditures as he feels any new taxes would be passed on in higher prices which would start an inflationary spiral. Therefore, there will be few or no raises in tax rates. He thanked Secretary for aid program outlined to French at bipartite meeting earlier in afternoon[2] and expressed hope that export-import loan of $100 million rediscounting offshore contracts would be forthcoming by May 15 to meet EPU payment.

Secretary told him that Bourges-Maunoury had indicated that 60 million MSA grant outlined in program would be adequate to cover May 15 dollar requirements. Mayer observed that Bourges may have been over-optimistic and that requirements would not be known until early May when April EPU deficit became final.

Remainder of session devoted to German unification and general disarmament. Mayer stated the two subjects were really one. A neutralized Germany balanced between East and West would greatly increase the peril to the remainder of Western Europe. Secretary agreed but forcefully pointed out that answer was to create EDC and thus strengthen European community before negotiating with Soviets on

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[1] The five-page U.S. Delegation minutes of this meeting, which indicate that it took place at the Hotel Matignon at 6:30 p.m., Apr. 26, are in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 152.

[2] For a report on this meeting, see telegrams 5672 and 5679, p. 392 and *supra*.

Germany—Mayer agreed with this but asked what would we do if Soviets request a four-power meeting on Germany prior to establishment of EDC. Secretary said we then should request action on first three items of President Eisenhower's program namely Korean truce, Indochina peace and Austrian peace treaty before talking with Soviets on Germany.[3]

Secretary pointed out this should give necessary time for ratification of EDC. Mayer agreed to this program but reiterated his belief that German question was inseparable from general problem of armaments and that two questions must be considered together.

Whole discussion was carried on in very cordial and frank atmosphere and resulted in useful clarification of views.

DILLON

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[3] Regarding President Eisenhower's address proposing these items, see footnote 4, p. 372.

Editorial Note

In further discussions, April 25 to 27, the United States and France considered whether the Laotian question should be raised in the United Nations Security Council and whether France might borrow C–119 aircraft and their crews to carry heavy equipment into Laos. The former question was discussed by Dulles with Bidault on April 25 and with Mayer on April 26; the latter question was discussed by Dulles with Mayer on April 26 and by Wilson with Pleven on April 27. A record of Dulles' two conversations with Mayer was transmitted in telegram 5675 from Paris, April 27 (printed in volume XIII, Part 1, page 512); a memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Bidault is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 152; and a record of Wilson's conversation with Pleven was transmitted in telegram 5708 from Paris, April 28 (751J.5/4–2853).

Eisenhower Library, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 141st Meeting of the National Security Council, April 28, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, April 29, 1953.

Present at the 141st meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization; General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

1. *Developments at recent NATO conference*

Secretary Dulles briefed the members of the Council on the NATO meeting from which he had just returned. The meeting, he said, was significant for two primary reasons. First, we had at last got onto a more realistic planning basis in NATO; henceforth we will concentrate on quality rather than quantity of assistance to our NATO allies. We are trying to find a military posture consonant with the economic health of the member nations. Secondly, said Secretary Dulles, the United States was trying a different approach to the whole NATO concept. We now propose to look on NATO as the defense of Europe by Europe with United States assistance. Both these new ideas, said Secretary Dulles, had been accepted with equanimity, and had occasioned no tailspin, and we now could look forward to moving ahead along more rational lines than in the past. The NATO program is now more alive than ever and more than ever before should be considered a long-range operation.

His one great worry in retrospect, reported Secretary Dulles, was the delay and failure to ratify the EDC treaties and to secure the desired German contribution. While there was no prospect that any of the other states could make up for the lack of German forces, Secretary Dulles informed the Council that a message from Conant, which he had read on his return, stated Chancellor Adenauer's conviction that he had tactics to secure German ratification in approximately six weeks' time. Secretary Dulles did not know what the Chancellor's tactics were, but he believed that they were quite likely to succeed. Even so, the United States could not count on the European Defense Community as an actuality before next October. Secretary Dulles reported the growing realization in European government circles of the necessity of securing ratification of the EDC treaties before the Soviets moved in to mix the situation up. We must therefore preempt the negotiating field in Europe by promptly moving ahead with the Austrian peace treaty.[1] The British and the French were in agreement with us on this point. If the Austrians are willing to accept the long treaty instead of the short one, Secretary Dulles said that we should probably go along on that course.

The President replied to Secretary Dulles' last point by suggesting that the views of the Department of Defense on the subject of the Austrian peace treaty should be promptly put on the Council's agenda. While, said the President, the short treaty is much better, we certainly could not refuse to negotiate on the basis of the longer form.

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[1] Documentation on the Austrian State Treaty question is presented in volume VII.

Secretary Dulles answered that it would be possible to open our negotiations on the basis of the short treaty but subsequently shift to a consideration of the longer version. We must, however, hurry to give the British and French the green light on resuming the meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. The objective, continued Secretary Dulles, was to stave off a Russian initiative for a Foreign Ministers meeting on the German problem. The Austrian treaty offered the best means to avert this. Time, therefore, was of the essence.

The President said that it would be possible to discuss this subject as early as Thursday morning if speed was essential, rather than to wait until the next scheduled meeting of the Council.

The National Security Council:

Noted the oral report by the Secretary of State on the results of the recent NATO conference.

[Here follows a discussion of the remaining five items on the agenda: (2) Indochina, (3) Formosa and Nationalist China, (4) sale of aircraft to Latin America, (5) the Mutual Security Program, and (6) President Eisenhower's address on April 16 to the American Society of Newspaper Editors.]

S. Everett Gleason
Deputy Executive Secretary

740.5/5–2253 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET ROME, May 22, 1953—7 p. m.

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Appointment Admiral Carney as CNO[2] raises question of his successor's service and nationality. Carney feels and I agree that selection of new CINCSOUTH is matter of importance to US foreign policy, since this post has considerable influence on conduct of American foreign policy in Mediterranean and European areas. I am passing along following observations therefore for whatever use Department may wish to put them.

While in Central Europe strength of US is manifested through US Army and Air Force, in Southern European and Mediterranean areas there is no likelihood that US Army or Air Force units will be deployed in significant numbers to demonstrate US interest or influence US foreign policy, and Sixth Fleet is only practicable method of making effective military display of flag here. Moreover fleet carries with it additional powerful instrument of national policy in its atomic capabilities. I think there is little doubt that Italy, Greece and Turkey have each been deeply impressed on occasion with demonstrations of this considerable potential force present along their shores, and Admiral Cassady's[3] visits to Yugoslavia, Spain and countries of Levant have probably had similar effect.

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[1] Repeated to Paris eyes only for Reinhardt.

[2] On May 12 it had been announced that Admiral Carney had been nominated for the post of U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.

Reports received from time to time in Naples through military channels indicate continuing efforts of British, presumably for sound national policy reasons of their own, to gain measure of control over Sixth Fleet in one way or another. Most recently Mountbatten said to have stated that should Carney's relief be US Army or Air officer it would simplify "situation" with respect to US Navy. He has also indicated that good solution would be to place Sixth Fleet directly under Admiral Fife,[4] Mountbatten's deputy. Admiral Carney is firmly persuaded that this is in line with continuing British policy of which he has seen numerous evidences over recent years. Should Sixth Fleet come under control of another nationality, it would serve to deprive this region of its powerful and sole military instrument. This might moreover open way to diversion of Sixth Fleet to tasks other than those in support of NATO.

Admiral Carney believes that relationship between sea power and national policy is so continually a factor in problems of this region that US Navy officer could best be depended upon to interpret correctly various international moves which, if not thoroughly understood, could lead to vitiation of US international posture here. For these reasons, he considers it vital that a US naval officer succeed him.[5] I note in this connection that personality and character of candidates would also obviously have to be weighed in balance with this factor. From standpoint of international politics and diplomacy and character and morale of peoples in this region, Carney emphasizes that officer designated must have prestige, force of personality and willingness and ability to give sympathetic attention to local problems and personalities, without yielding when firmness is called for.

For Department's information Admiral Carney, pursuant to questions from General Ridgway, has expressed views on foregoing lines to latter in writing and also to Admiral Fechteler. He will be expressing them also in discussions he will attend in Washington next week.

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[3] Vice Adm. John H. Cassady, U.S.N., Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe, and Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet.

[4] Vice Adm. James Fife, Jr., U.S. Naval Deputy Commander in Chief, Mediterranean.

[5] Next to this sentence in the source text was the handwritten notation "Agree".

Foregoing observations are based in large part on views Admiral Carney has expressed to me. On basis my observations of conduct of this command I concur in them and am persuaded moreover that Admiral's views are founded not on individual service or personal considerations, but represent his considered judgment from standpoint of overall foreign policy of US.[6]

LUCE

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[6] On May 25 it was announced that Admiral Fechteler had been appointed to replace Admiral Carney as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe. He assumed command on Aug. 17, 1953.

740.5/6-553

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the President [1]

SECRET

PARIS, June 5, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Attached is a study by our Plans and Policy Staff in Paris,[2] discussing the political, economic, and defense problems that face the United States in Europe. I hope this planning paper may be helpful to the interested Washington Departments and to the National Security Council.

As I relinquish my responsibilities as Special Representative in Europe,[3] it seems to me that three objectives should largely govern US policy thinking in relation to Europe. These objectives are easy to state, but hard to accomplish. If they can be even reasonably achieved during the next three years, the results will go far to maintain world peace. The three objectives are:

Political Unity—A unified philosophy and action program in Nato.

Economic Equilibrium—A balanced trade between Europe and America.

Defense Posture—A military strategy and force supportable by Nato but sufficient to deter or defeat Soviet aggression.

I personally believe that all three aims can be realized if their overriding importance is accepted as valid, and if an adequate program for their accomplishment is carefully explained to Congress and the people of the United States, and to other Governments and the peoples of our Nato alliance. I do not believe that the Soviet has abandoned its plans for communist world domination. The death of Stalin may give us a longer breathing space, while internal power is being consolidated, before total political or military pressure is applied. So long as the Soviet's vast military capabilities continue to increase, any appearance of friendly intention must be fully discounted. However any communist proposals or willingness to settle outstanding issues should be met halfway in the hope and belief that a peaceful overall solution will eventually be found.

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[1] The source text does not indicate how this message was delivered to President Eisenhower.

[2] No copy of the study was found attached to the source text; however, a message from Draper to Dulles, dated June 8, states that it was entitled "Certain European Issues Affecting the United States" and was dated May 15. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Europe, 1952-53")

[3] President Eisenhower accepted Draper's resignation on May 11, to be effective June 30.

On the premise that measurable progress toward the three objectives mentioned above would improve our chances for reaching an acceptable solution with Russia, and that such progress is even more vitally necessary if the cold war continues indefinitely, I comment below on each of these objectives.

Political Unity

A unified philosophy and action program in Nato.

The initiative you so boldly took in your address in April[4] outlining the free world's peaceful aims, and the unity and solid achievements of the Nato Meeting[5] that followed, have been somewhat clouded by the recent arguments back and forth across the Atlantic and by the fall of the French Government. The position can be quickly restored at Bermuda[6] if the US, the UK, and France can wholeheartedly agree there on any reasonably constructive program, and if the conclusions reached can be quickly communicated to the other Nato powers and receive their general approval. United support for any projected program by the fourteen Nato governments and by Western Germany is almost more important than the program itself.

Because of the natural suspicion with which the other Nato members regard any Big Three Meeting, it would pay big dividends to acquaint the Permanent Council in Paris with the proposed agenda *before* the Bermuda meeting. The views and general comments of other members might well be invited for information and background, without in any way binding the three delegations. I dwell on this illustrative suggestion because I believe that unified Western backing for an acceptable political, military and economic program should be our number one national objective, and because experience in the Council has shown that early consultation almost invariably brings general support for proposals that otherwise would be criticized if not opposed.

During the past eighteen months the United States has moved appreciably in the direction of making its agreements and reaching its understandings with Canada and the Western European countries on a multilateral basis. Bilateral discussions continue to take place in the various Capitals but more and more in preparation for the broader agreements reached in the Nato Council, in the EDC, or in the OEEC. US military officers in many key posts in the Standing Group, in SHAPE and in SACLANT, and the incentive of US military and economic assistance have encouraged this trend during the lengthy Annual Review of Nato Force Goals, and in other military, political, economic, and production problems coming before the Nato Permanent Council.

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[4] Regarding President Eisenhower's address, see footnote 4, p. 372.

[5] For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting at Paris, Apr. 23–25, see pp. 368 ff.

[6] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, see pp. 1710 ff.

This trend is a good one, and should be encouraged in the interest of the United States and of Nato. The power of final decision for the US should remain in Washington, but broad authority to develop, discuss and recommend US policy positions should be allowed our Ambassadors and our Regional Representatives. A reasonable degree of decentralization by the US and the other members is essential to a successful multilateral organization.

The advertised down-grading of our Regional Representation has raised fears in European countries that the United States' interest in Nato and in OEEC is decreasing. This false impression should be combatted vigorously. If the power of the purse—represented by military end-item assistance, off-shore procurement, and economic defense support—is disassociated from the US Permanent Representative in Nato, his influence in multilateral Nato discussions will greatly decline. Whatever scope and organization is now given to US regional representation, should be carefully reviewed and reconsidered after six months or a year.

The authority and responsibility exercised by the US Permanent Representative will largely determine the importance ascribed by other Nato members to Council deliberations. Therefore the test of future US effectiveness will be the degree to which the Permanent Council has continued to develop as a political cabinet of the fourteen powers, in which questions of mutual concern are discussed and agreed after reference to governments, but without the need for crash decisions by Nato Ministerial Meetings reached in an atmosphere of crisis. Unity of purpose and of program in Nato can best be achieved by decisions taken after frank and open discussion in a strong Permanent Council.

The immediate political battle to be won is obviously ratification of the EDC Treaty.[7] France, burdened financially by the Indo-Chinese War, politically by an unworkable Constitution, and psychologically by fear of German revival, is the obstacle.

Despite French hesitation and probable Soviet blocking proposals for German neutralization, I fully expect that ratification will be actually completed this year, together with real progress toward solutions of both the Saar and Trieste problems.[8] For all of this to happen quickly requires a large measure of unity and good will among all Nato members—this in turn depends largely on US leadership, US diplomacy, and US faith. Great progress toward ratification has been made since our Secretary of State emphasized its importance last January.[9] The Administration is now fully justified in advocating that the Congress approve the proposed foreign aid appropriations without requiring prior ratification. Such a condition would cause confusion and delay and might well defeat its own purpose. Just as there is no good alternative to EDC for Western Europe, there is no good alternative for the US to continued political and military support for Nato.

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[7] For documentation on the efforts of the United States to secure the ratification of the EDC Treaty, see pp. 571 ff.

[8] For documentation on the Saar and on events leading to the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO, see pp. 1370 ff. and 251 ff., respectively. For documentation on Trieste, see volume VIII.

Economic Equilibrium

A balanced trade between Europe and America.

Until a reasonable trade balance prevails between the dollar area and Europe, the threat of economic warfare predicted by Stalin last October[10] will lurk dangerously in the background, even if political and military unity has been achieved. Huge annual grants of economic aid have closed the gap during and since the war. Economic assistance is properly being decreased and soon will be eliminated. Unless our imports from Europe and our foreign investments increase substantially as an offset, our own export industries will suffer, and reduced defense effort and lower living standards will be inevitable in Europe. Our own national interest requires that we encourage increased foreign trade to replace grants of aid.

The protectionist philosophy is a relic of the days when we feared cheap European labor. Now the United States has the most efficient, competitive and productive economy in the world, and as a nation should advocate and adopt sharply lowered tariffs and reduce other barriers to stimulate freer foreign trade. We can far better indemnify the individual hardships of particular industries and labor groups than continue to maintain an archaic protectionism contrary to the best interest of our country as a whole.

Free convertibility of sterling and other European currencies would stimulate trade, investment, and production but could only be safely attempted if the "dollar gap" is nearly closed. Five years ago commercial exports and services from the dollar area exceeded imports of goods and services from the European Payments Union Area (including the sterling bloc) by over five billion dollars. This commercial dollar gap has been greatly reduced, and is currently not over two billions a year. However, it is only held at this level by existing European restrictions against much larger purchases in the United States which Europeans would like to make. During this calendar year extraordinary dollar expenditures in Europe by the United States (nearly one billion of military and construction spending by our troops, another billion of economic aid expenditures, and a half billion in payments for off-shore procurement deliveries) will more than close the 1953 commercial gap and increase European gold and dollar reserves by roughly a half billion dollars. The same general result should hold true in calendar year 1954, when increased off-shore expenditures will offset decreased economic aid. The total extraordinary dollar expenditures will probably decline in 1955. This means that the United States and Canada on the one hand, and Europe and the sterling bloc on the other, have about two years in which to find a more normal and permanent solution.

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[9] Presumably [illegible] is referring to Dulles' statement on Feb. 9 voicing strong support for [illegible]; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Feb. 23, 1953, pp. 289–290.

[10] Presumably, [illegible] is referring to Stalin's article in *Bol'shevik*, #18, September 1952, pp. 1–25, on the economic problems of socialism in the USSR, point 5 of which dealt with the deepening of the crisis of the world capitalist system. For an extract, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 224–229.

Europe must make much the greater effort if trade between the old world and the new is to balance at an acceptably high level. She must produce the commercial goods to earn two billions of dollars more a year in addition to her present production, or any increases in export sales will simply reduce her own consumption. To sell this much more abroad Europe must become more efficient and more competitive in price and type and style.

But the United States in its own interest and as leader of the free world must show the way to balanced trade, or face the danger—as Stalin has predicted—that cut-throat competition for trade and dollar payments would cause a dangerous rift among our partners. In many ways the "dollar gap" is the most serious future free-world issue. Europe is asking a chance to earn its own way. If we cut off aid and do not drop the barriers that prevent increased trade the impact, both practical and psychological, will be damaging indeed.

The Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Program were both developed and supported on a bipartisan basis. A bold and aggressive bipartisan program for "trade not aid", actively championed by the Administration, could overcome the remaining protectionist sentiment and the arguments of those who understandably clamor to hold their protected markets. Educational studies and discussions are already underway, and could be extended to include a public campaign of education up and down and across the country. A broad and basic program could be developed on a bipartisan basis this fall for presentation to Congress in January, if a special session this year is considered impracticable.

Temporary tax or other benefits for those actually injured by loss of markets would be equitable and would represent a small cost to the US compared to the national and world objective involved. Comparable studies and practical legislation to encourage American private investment abroad could also be undertaken as part of the "dollar gap" solution. European countries should be asked to take complementary steps and to pass necessary legislation in both the trade and investment fields as part of a combined attack.

Europe's production has been steadily increasing for five years but is now holding on dead center. Nothing could stimulate Europe's millions to increased effort, and to new hope for the future, more than measures opening the American market more widely to Europe's products. These measures could include, in addition to extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and passage of the Customs Simplification Act, (*a*) repeal of the "Buy American" Act, (*b*) unilateral reduction of specified tariffs, (*c*) removal of quantitive restrictions and quotas, (*d*) free entry for small percentages of our total consumption of many products, and finally, (*e*) an agreement by treaty, requiring confirmation by the Senate, that for a period of say ten years tariff rates would not be increased by either party to the treaty.

Such a treaty agreement, by preventing tariff increases, would greatly encourage the import of products which could compete under existing tariff rates, but for which the market development expense would not be undertaken if higher tariff rates might be anticipated as soon as sales became appreciable.

However, it is not these specific suggestions, but the principle that I wish to stress. We cannot permanently sell more to other countries than we buy from them or loan to them, unless we want to continue giving them free dollars. We can use more of their products and increase our own standard of living. At the same time we can permit them to buy more from us, and balance their accounts by trade rather than aid.

Defense Posture

A military strategy and force supportable by Nato but sufficient to deter or defeat Soviet aggression.

On March 8th I wrote you[11] enclosing Chapter IV of the study attached to this letter and pointing out that the foreseeable economic resources of the Nato countries would fall far short of providing the minimum defense forces considered necessary by Nato military authorities. It seemed to me that this fact would become apparent to all Nato members during the next few months, and that a major issue would arise in the Nato Council this fall or next spring. I suggested that the National Security Council might wish to reconsider this problem including the present strategy and mission.

Since my letter was written the problem has come into sharper focus. As you know, the Nato Meeting in April gave priority to improving the combat effectiveness of present forces and adopted force goals for 1953 and 1954 involving only very moderate increases. The United States put forward the thesis of the long term Soviet threat, with lower peak years of preparedness but with a longer and more supportable plateau of defense. Most Nato countries indicated they were at or close to the maximum feasible defense expenditure ceiling. The French Government has since fallen in attempting to bring its expenditures (including defense expenditures) more nearly within its receipts.

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[11] A copy of Draper's letter is in file 740.5/3–853, but no copy of the enclosed chapter IV was found attached to that copy.

The British Undersecretary for Defense, Mr. Richard Powell, informed me just before the Nato Ministers' Meeting that the British Government was greatly concerned over the problem that would arise at the October Nato Meeting when the continental countries generally realized that the combined defense forces would fall far short of minimum military requirements for the foreseeable future. The British fear that this realization, combined with our own stretchout and reduced appropriations for foreign military and economic assistance, might induce not merely a leveling off but a sharp decline in the defense preparations of certain Nato members.

The basic question, and one that may well be asked in October, is whether the United States and its Nato allies with their greater industry and resources, as compared with the Soviet, are able and willing to provide the forces needed to deter Soviet aggression or to meet it successfully if necessary on the field of battle. A second question is whether the resources presently available for Western defense are being put to the best use, for the best weapons, under the best strategy, and for a mission which can be successfully carried out.

The SHAPE study on 1956 requirements, taking into account atomic and other new weapons, should soon be available and will unquestionably bring the basic issue into bold relief.

I assume that the National Security Council is dealing with this and related problems and that the newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff will be considering the military aspects of this question as a matter of urgency. I only raise it again because we in Europe have seen no good answer, and the question is being raised by other countries.

It is clear that we have been making substantial progress in building Nato forces during the past two years. Just as clearly the Soviets' strength has also been increasing. There is no sign that their build-up is slowing down. Their progress in building a strategic bombing force and their undoubted progress in atomic weapons now poses the threat of a second Pearl Harbor which might lay waste many of our own industrial centers. The opening blow may be aimed at America and not at Europe.

I realize that military requirements are always set high and that national treasuries might all be bankrupt if the military's requests in all countries were actually granted. It is for this reason that I urge—and it may already be fully underway—the concentration of our best civilian and military minds on the overall Nato strategy, both defense and attack, with access to all available information, to reexamine Nato requirements and to be sure that the best use and division of resources is being made.

It may be that a careful assessment of the facts will show that some new strategy or use of weapons, or some rearrangement of the present strategy can provide adequate security for the United States and for other Nato countries within the presently foreseeable resources. But if not, if the only reasonable conclusion, to avoid being second best in the race, requires a greater effort, higher taxes, and a larger proportion of US and Nato national wealth each year for defense, I firmly believe that such a program, properly explained and justified, could be and would be supported by the governments and peoples concerned. Otherwise we should have to conclude that the Soviet system of dictatorship can pose a sustained and superior military threat to the more powerful democratic nations of the world to which they have neither the will nor the capacity to adequately respond. This conclusion is unthinkable and cannot be accepted, when our own national survival is at stake.

These three objectives are neither original nor novel, but their substantial achievement appears essential if US policy in Europe is to succeed. The American people look to you as their great leader. They recognize your unparalleled knowledge of Europe and of things military. If, after full consideration, you decide these things need to be done in our national interest, I am confident the American people will accept your judgment and follow your leadership, no matter what the cost.

With sincere appreciation for your many courtesies and great consideration, and with all good wishes, I am

Respectfully yours, WILLIAM H. DRAPER, JR.

740.5/6–1853 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Special Representative in Europe (Anderson) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, June 18, 1953—1 p. m.

Polto 2413. Noforn. Limit distribution. For Merchant and Martin. Reference: Final paragraph Polto 2389, June 15.[1]

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[1] Not printed; it reported the Italian views on the scope of the Annual Review general report and noted that they believed the Annual Review was becoming a strictly military process which no longer balanced military and nonmilitary considerations. Finally, the telegram reported that the Italians understood that Ismay would soon urge the Council to consider the gap between NATO requirements and availabilities. (740.5/6–1553)

1. We checked with friend in IS and learned that there has been under discussion in IS a paper entitled "Need For review of NATO Defense Policy." [2] Paper was prepared by Sergent addressed to Ismay.

2. Concern is expressed in paper that NAC "continues build its policy on a strategic plan for which it is unwilling provide resources NATO military authorities say are necessary."

(*a*) Action recommended in military field is that NAC request Military Committee consider shortfall, below stated requirements, in military resources which are being made available. Committee's review should be particularly addressed to question whether a redistribution of defense effort might result in more effective combination of forces and material, or a more effective concentration of them in certain areas. In addition, committee might be asked whether undue emphasis on "quality" may not lead to development of larger "tail" than NATO forces as whole can afford. Finally, committee might be asked whether allocation of effort between three services is such as to yield most effective overall strength.

(*b*) In political field action recommended is that, if it has to be accepted that military requirements can not be met, it desirable that responsible statesmen of member countries express themselves firmly in support NATO effort and that there be no implication any diminution of interest on part any members. Further, if NATO is found have inadequate resources, will be increasingly necessary that utilization these resources be guided by common and consistent policy. Finally, foregoing would imply greater willingness on part NATO members to confer on important policy decisions before these are taken in national capitals.

3. Paper was discussed with Ismay by a few members IS June 12. Upshot of discussion then was that paper should be redrafted before further consideration.

4. Some top level members IS oppose matters being raised by Ismay with Council at this time. Ismay himself apparently has not yet made up his mind whether to raise it.

5. In our view, it clearly desirable that Ismay not raise matter with Council either in present or revised form. On other hand, any direct effort on US part to dissuade him would involve admission we aware internal discussion this matter in IS. It entirely possible issue may die natural death within IS. Thus, consider it best we avoid any overt action to kill it at this stage. In any case, should Ismay decide in near future place matter before Council in present or revised form, we would be advised of this in advance.

6. For obvious reasons request above information be held very closely.

ANDERSON

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[2] No copy of this paper has been found in the Department of State files.

740.5/6–1853 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Special Representative in Europe (Anderson) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, June 18, 1953—10 p. m.

Polto 2423. Subject: NAC informal session June 18.

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 1–5, which discuss reappointment of the Budget Committee Chairman, staff salaries, appointment of a Chairman for the Infrastructure Committee, procedure for keeping NATO commands informed about the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military talks, and Korea.]

6. Chairman inquired whether any further information could be made available re forthcoming Bermuda meeting.[1] United Kingdom representative replied date of meeting still uncertain and fixed agenda for meetings purposely avoided. United Kingdom very conscious of interest of other NATO powers in Bermuda talks and permanent representatives could be assured three powers had every intention of safeguarding interests of NATO partners. United Kingdom representative felt sure he would be instructed to pass on to council any definite developments in connection with the meeting as they occur. United States representative added three governments would discuss worldwide problems at Bermuda and he felt sure subjects of interest to NATO partners would be communicated to them. United Kingdom representative invited colleagues comments which might be useful to pass on to his government prior to Bermuda meeting. Ismay thereupon launched into rather gloomy survey of recent developments, voicing disappointment at lack of progress and lowering of enthusiasm in NATO. He felt that Ministers declaration at April meeting,[2] at which it was concluded that Soviet peace maneuvers offered [no real hope since?] no Soviet soldiers have been demobilized but there have been signs of relaxation of effort on NATO side. Ismay cited "slashing" of United States Air Force budget, said defense expenditures will "flatten out" at next AR and no increase expected in any area. German defense contribution is in "deep freeze", Suez Canal situation most unsatisfactory, Italian election results disappointing. In addition, permanent representatives are being replaced in some cases by men of lesser caliber and in case of Netherlands and Belgium, permanent representatives are being called to Rome for extended periods in connection with EPC.[3] He completed picture by pointing out Ridgway's "clarion call"

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[1] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see pp. 1710 ff.

[2] For the text of the communiqué under reference here, issued Apr. 25 at the conclusion of the Paris Ministerial meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1953, pp. 673–674.

[3] Documentation on the European Political Community (EPC) is presented in volume VI.

in recent annual report received scant attention in press.[4] Therefore, he felt it his duty to place a paper before council pointing out these facts and stressing importance of informing governments of situation. NATO he said needs a shot in arm and he thought it might even be desirable to issue council communiqué on subject.

French representative was very impressed with Ismay's presentation and agreed thoroughly with his description of situation. He supported suggestion re preparation of paper which he thought should be handed to governments after council has discussed it and felt this paper would have important effect on governments. Netherlands representative protested any suggestion his government losing interest in NATO and declared his chief duty is to represent Netherlands in NAC. Nothing would be permitted to interfere with that duty. He felt there was little connection between NAC procedures and activities and public attitude toward NATO. Netherlands Government heartily welcomes any sign of relaxation of tension. While Netherlands Government has no great confidence in Soviet peace maneuvers, it feels no opportunity should be neglected to explore all possibilities for improvement of relations. This does not mean we should not continue NATO and EDC efforts in absence of any convincing move on part of Soviet. At next AR governments expected to agree it is unwise to plan beyond points considered economically and financially feasible. In addition, AR will involve consideration of maintenance costs and it is improbable that any further great strides can be taken. Nevertheless NATO must continue defense effort and relaxation of tension should not mean relaxation within NATO.

United States representative emphasized NATO cornerstone of United States policy and United States Government had given many recent indications of this. Every Soviet move should be examined carefully but NATO should never let down its guard. United States will not believe any Soviet promises until it has concrete reason for so doing. United States representative stressed importance it attaches to EDC in NATO context as indication of United States continued interest in western unity. As for United States defense expenditures, United States representative felt any cuts are related to estimates of efficiency in use of funds and did not represent relaxation of effort. Norway and Belgium agreed with Netherlands representative, Belgium stating recent and imminent efforts call for closer coordination of views and greater unity within NATO. Soviet overtures felt due to strength of NATO, the continuation of which must be our first preoccupation. He felt it vital that those responsible for the forthcoming negotiations (Bermuda) should keep other members of council fully informed. Netherlands expressed concern as to procedure for informing council re Bermuda meeting, stating he hoped participants would maintain flexible attitude and would make no "pre-conditions" governing possible ultimate discussions with Soviet. He hoped NAC would not be informed of results of Bermuda meeting solely through press communiqué as *fait accompli* and that any such communiqué would be sober statement of views rather than effort to provide startling developments to press.[5]

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[4] Regarding Ridgway's report to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at Paris, see Secto 9, Apr. 24, p. 381.

Canadian representative agreed with chairman's proposal to produce paper and said NATO cannot afford to relax efforts until Soviet substitutes deeds for words. He felt Soviet would attempt take advantage of economic deficiencies in NATO which he termed "chink in our armor". He called for liberalization of trade restrictions, stating increasing restrictions coupled with mounting defense expenditures could accelerate realization of Soviet aims. He was supported by United Kingdom representative who emphasized non-military aspects of NATO and said Europe attaches as great importance to relaxation of United States trade restrictions as United States does to realization of EDC.

Netherlands representative felt NAC should not emphasize publicly its fear of "relaxation of tension" which would merely brand NATO as aggressive organization. French representative said we must face facts and noted that present "*détente*" had made it impossible for Parliaments to bring EDC to a vote. We must therefore point out dangers of present situation.

Chairman felt strongly three governments should be reminded of importance of NATO before Bermuda meeting and said he would table paper next week for NAC consideration and for possible communication to governments.

ANDERSON

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[5] Next to this sentence on the source text was the handwritten notation "(a bit fatuous?)".

740.5/6–2053 : Telegram

The United States Deputy Special Representative in Europe (Anderson) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 20, 1953—8 p. m.

Polto 2438. Noforn. Limit distribution. For Merchant and Martin.

1. It is clear that IS paper reported in Polto 2413 [1] was basis for Ismay's statement at NAC informal session June 18 reported in Polto 2423.[2] Alphand called on Ismay late afternoon June 17. Friend in IS tells us this call precipitated Ismay's decision raise issue with Council immediately.

2. Although we do not know at this stage what will be the sub-

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[1] Dated June 18, p. 408.

[2] *Supra.*

stance of the paper Ismay plans to present Council next week, if it should follow the general line taken in the original paper by Sergent and, more particularly, if Ismay should come up with similar recommendations as to action to be taken in the military field and in the political field, it seems to us that we might be in for really troublesome times in the Council.

3. If the Council, for example, were to accept the recommendation that the military committee consider the shortfall, below stated requirements, of the military resources being made available, it seems to us that one possible and glaring result of this would be a resurgence of claims for greater United States military assistance.

4. The philosophy underlying the Sergent paper seems to take issue with basic NATO military strategy. Moreover, although the paper is directed at the gap between requirements and availabilities, it is silent on the matter of German rearmament. A premature reexamination by NATO military and political authorities of the fundamental type recommended in paper as it now stands could disrupt the preparations that must be carefully made if the next NAC ministers meeting is to contribute to the firm establishment of a long-term NATO defense policy based on politico-economic realities. It might, in fact, seriously postpone the achievement of this result. At the same time, such a re-examination could also be used, at least for a while, to divert attention from the lack of progress, if not retrogression in efforts to ratify the EDC.

5. We cannot now dissuade Ismay from presenting a paper on this to the Council. It may be possible, however, to influence the nature of the paper that he presents. We would not think he would want to attach his prestige to a series of recommendations which he knew in advance could not be accepted by some or perhaps by any of the member governments. Unless you see objections, Anderson will discreetly and privately discuss this consideration with Ismay. We believe that this is perhaps the best if not the only chance to forestall the Council's being faced with a paper which might present us with a very long list of difficulties.

ANDERSON

740.5/6–2053 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, June 23, 1953—1:13 p. m.

Topol 1476. Limit distribution. Reference Poltos 2413, 2423, 2438.[2]

We agree completely that military recommendation in Sergent paper would cause serious difficulty and would merely result in acrimonious discussion in Military Committee with no constructive results. Military representatives 14 different countries cannot effectively discuss such matters as changing disposition of forces to concentrate them in particular areas. Furthermore do not believe that raising question of possible overemphasis on "quality" is fruitful at this time. Some of these issues may come up during course of 1953 Annual Review and should be dealt with in orderly fashion in that process. Agree Hughes or Anderson should raise this matter discreetly with Ismay along above lines and attempt to prevent Ismay paper from containing recommendations on this point such as those included in Sergent paper.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Moore and cleared with the Department of Defense and WE.

[2] Poltos 2413 and 2423, June 18, pp. 408 and 410; Polto 2438, June 20, *supra*.

We interpret political recommendation in Sergent paper to be merely plea for more effective political consultation in NAC. We see no objection to such recommendation being included in Ismay paper providing it is kept in general terms and is not inconsistent with U.S. position on this subject as set forth in relevant telegrams (reference Polto 2358, June 9 [3] and Topol 180, September 19, 1952 [4]). As indicated in Topol 1441 [5] we feel that effective political consultation in NATO is particularly helpful at this time in counteracting mood of disappointment in NATO to which Ismay referred during NAC meeting June 18. Statement on Bermuda authorized in Topol 1441 should be helpful this connection.

We believe it would be very unfortunate for any paper on these subjects to come before Council without referring to urgent need for EDC and German contribution. We note that Sergent paper omitted reference to this point.

FYI. We believe it possible French will raise problem of gap between NATO requirements and capabilities at Bermuda Conference. Position to be taken on this subject at that time now under study here. Would appreciate prompt reporting Council discussions Ismay paper and your recommendations.

DULLES

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[3] Not printed; in it Anderson reported *inter alia* his feeling that the United States should seize every opportunity to pursue with vigor and determination the development of the procedure of consultation. (740.5/6–953)

[4] *Ante*, p. 323.

[5] Not printed; in it Anderson was instructed to make a statement in a restricted NAC session concerning the forthcoming Bermuda Conference, assuming that there were no objections from the British and French. The statement would indicate (1) that there would be prior consultation with the NATO partners through the Council, (2) that a wide range of topics was to be discussed without a fixed agenda, (3) that the main topic would be the relationship between the free world and the Soviet Union, (4) that the United States would take into consideration the full exchange of views on the Soviet Union which had been expressed at the Council meeting at Paris in April, (5) that no decisions would be taken affecting a NATO country without consultations, and (6) that a post conference report would be made to the Council. (740.5/6–1653)

740.5/6–2453 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes)[1] *to the Department of State*

SECRET PARIS, June 24, 1953—10 p. m.

Polto 2456. Noforn. Limit distribution. For Merchant and Martin. Reference: Topol 1476 June 23.[2]

1. Present draft Ismay's paper made available by friend in IS. Action in military field recommended in Sergent paper (paragraph 2 (*a*) Polto 2413[3]) has been eliminated.

2. Present draft contains express reference to urgent need for German contribution but notes that EDC ratification "looks further off today than ever". Conclusion reached on this point is that "unless some other method (than EDC) of ensuring German contribution for defense of West, for example, by admission Western Germany to NATO can be achieved, present state of affairs whereby we can expect no German military contribution must continue, and we run additional risk that pressures both inside and outside Germany will increase for a unified Germany, perhaps neutralized and evacuated in line with present Soviet proposals.[4] Can scarcely be denied that unified and neutralized Germany would spell end of Atlantic defense and also of European integration and would create situation similar to that which gave birth Second World War".

3. Specific recommendations present Ismay draft are addressed to action to be taken in political field and contain following points:

(*a*) Highest authorities NATO countries might, either collectively or individually, make public declaration reaffirming their resolve maintain Atlantic unity.

(*b*) Recent troubles Eastern Germany[5] provide Council with good propaganda opportunity to issue brief, non-provocative but feeling statement expressing sympathy and understanding with victims of East Berlin expulsion in particular and sufferings of millions behind iron curtain in general.

(*c*) Above declaration would require careful timing relation Bermuda Conference. Might be unnecessary for Council to issue them if three power communiqué following Bermuda contains clear and carefully worded reference to NATO.

(*d*) Other means signifying NATO "really means business" might be found in following:

(1) Extension NATO treaty to 50 years;

(2) Joint declaration by US and UK that they prepared to

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[1] John C. Hughes became U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, effective June 11, 1953, but did not reach Paris until later in the month.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Dated June 18, p. 408.

[4] Documentation on proposals by the Soviet Union concerning German unification is presented in volume VII.

[5] Documentation on the demonstrations in the German Democratic Republic on June 16 and 17 is presented *ibid.*

maintain forces on continent so long as NATO agrees threat remains;

(3) Announcement that Prime Ministers will represent member governments opening session next Ministerial meeting.

As it now stands, Ismay draft represent substantial change in right direction from Sergent paper. Recognize his recommendations for political action are more specific than we would like them to be and that we're not prepared go ahead with some of them, on other hand, we won't have to deal with them single handedly. For example, have no reason believe UK any more prepared at this time than we are to go along with recommendation listed paragraph 3(*d*)(2) above. On balance, we think NAC discussion Ismay draft with its present content could serve useful purpose, particularly because of its frank, unprejudiced exposition lack of progress toward German contribution. Unless there is some last minute, unfortunate change in Ismay's present draft, we believe Council's discussion can be guided so as contribute purposes referred to second paragraph Topol 1476.

HUGHES

740.5/6–2753 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, June 27, 1953—4 p. m.

Polto 2492. Noforn. Limit distribution. For Merchant and Martin. Seems to us there are two general approaches United States might take to Ismay paper.[1] First of these would be to let it run gauntlet in Council with view to its being watered down to complete innocuousness. We believe, however, it would be serious mistake to handle it in this negative fashion. We think we should make our approach as responsive as it can be made and still remain consistent with our general policy. Our reasons for this are as follows:

1. Ismay paper appears to us to provide admirable and dignified opportunity accentuate United States leadership in NAC provided we frankly recognize validity Ismay assertion NATO effort has been slipping in some quarters and provided we promptly demonstrate United States willingness play its part counteract slippage.
2. Clear Ismay considers NATO has come to crossroads. Whether in fact it has is beside point. Other members, particularly smaller powers, will include United States losing interest NATO more rapidly than gloomiest predictions of month ago unless we can find convincing way deal immediately with challenge Ismay has put before Council.
3. We could of course pick paper to pieces. So could others. They probably will unless at outset Council's discussion we show unmistak-

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[1] Regarding Ismay's paper, see Polto 2456, *supra*. No copy of the final draft of the paper, entitled "NATO: The Present Position", dated June 25 and circulated as C–M(53)87, has been found in the Department of State files. For the text of the recommendations in the paper, see footnote 3, below.

ably that United States wishes preserve and expand on underlying thesis of paper.

4. History of development of paper over period of last several weeks has shown consistent effort on part Ismay and some members his staff produce something United States could react to help fully and realistically. As reported previously paper has been subjected from time to time to heavy line plunges initiating with other NAC members in effort inject proposals supporting limited national interests which would have been unacceptable to United States. Ismay has withstood these efforts with considerable degree success. Inclusion reference urgent need EDC and German contribution prime example of this.

5. Paper provides excellent chance exploit momentum precipitated by Hughes' initial statements in NAC. Prompt positive followup on basic issues raised by Ismay will go long way reduce any misgivings which may have arisen on part some NAC members from reference (reported paragraph 6 Polto 2423[2]) to replacement number permanent representatives.

What seems be required in first round Council discussions on Tuesday is vigorous expression United States views generally favorable basic concept and objectives Ismay paper. Difficult oversee meaningfulness quick United States response since this will set tone ensuing discussions.

If in opening statement United States permanent representative takes favorable line, could open up useful discussion broad range problems raised by Ismay [as] well as number important problems he has passed over.

Will send in separate telegrams our recommendations for more specific handling problems which will arise from ensuing discussions in NAC. Meanwhile light foregoing we recommend initial United States response along following lines to suggestions contained paragraphs numbered 13, 14 and 15 in Polto 2486.[3]

We would support acceptable implementation all suggestions listed subparagraphs (*a*) (*b*) and (*c*) of paragraph 13 and emphasize action already taken respect Bermuda Conference (Topol 1441,[4] et cetera).

We would favor suitable and timely declarations individual Ministers in NATO countries based on suggestions listed subparagraphs (*d*) (i) (ii) and (iii) of paragraph 3. We would agree with Ismay view expressed paragraph 14 that collective NATO statement these matters would appear repetitive and unlikely cause more than ripple in public opinion.

We would of course offer support suggestion that EDC treaty be submitted Paris without further delay. Doubt however, that any really

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[2] Dated June 18, p. 410.

[3] Not printed; it transmitted the recommendatory paragraphs of Ismay's paper as follows:

"13. If Council agree that we must revitalize NATO, will clearly be necessary have exhaustive discussions with view to devising program of action: We ought make up our minds on immediate measures by end this month at latest. Those

Footnotes continued on following page.

effective expression can emerge from NAC on this at this time, view Parliamentary situations particularly in France and Italy.

We would state in initial go around that suggestion listed subparagraph (*d*) (V) of paragraph 13, while appearing contain meritorious ideas, would necessarily have to be considerably spelled out before we could really come to grips with it.

We would defer making any statement re suggestion in paragraph 15(*a*) until we had opportunity hear response other members this point.

Re suggestion listed paragraph 15(*b*) we would first observe that most impressive evidence of United States awareness of threat is fact that United States forces are here in their present number. Entirely possible that joint declaration, which would have to take into account constitutional, political and other considerations three countries concerned, could actually detract from sense security currently derived from presence forces here. This does not mean, however, that US unwilling discuss possible draft declarations with UK and Canada. US

Footnotes continued from preceding page.

which occur to me at first sight as being worthy consideration set out below. My colleagues will doubtless have many other thoughts to throw into discussion:

(*a*) Council's misgivings about situation should be communicated forthwith to governments taking part Bermuda conference;

(*b*) Communiqué which will presumably be issued as result of conference should include categorical statement that North Atlantic Alliance is a fundamental feature of foreign and defense policies of participating powers;

(*c*) Should be emphasized that discussions at conference will be fully reported to NAC;

(*d*) Individual Ministers in NATO countries should aim at any suitable opportunity, without waiting for Bermuda conference, make public declarations reaffirming common resolve their respective governments;

(i) While remaining constantly on their guard to neglect nothing that would lead to real diminution of tension;

(ii) To refuse to depart from our present line of policy which has already brought about changes in Soviet tactics, until satisfactory agreements have been concluded;

(iii) To strengthen defense of West by every means consistent with the politico-economic capabilities of member states;

(iv) To submit EDC treaty to Parliaments without further delay and to press for immediate action upon it, emphasizing that it is the only acceptable means of securing a contribution by Germany to defense of West;

(v) To take collective measures in order to ensure a better economic and financial balance between Atlantic nations.

14. Idea that declaration summarized at (*d*) above should be subject of collective NATO statement is worth considering. Personally, I feel that it is open to objection that it would be repetitive, in view declaration by Council only three months ago. In any case, it unlikely in present circumstances to capture public imagination any more than did General Ridgway's recent report.

15. Other ways and means of signifying that NATO really means business might be found in following cases which have not same urgency as those in paragraph 13.

(*a*) Announcement that Prime Ministers would represent their governments at opening session of next ministerial meeting,

(*b*) Joint declaration by United States, Canada, and United Kingdom that they would maintain forces on continent so long as threat remained.

(*c*) Duration of North Atlantic Treaty to be extended to 50 years." (740.5/6–2653)

[4] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 414.

would also be prepared discuss in NAC any actual drafts which might ensue from tripartite consideration suggestion with view obtaining NAC consensus as to whether publication would be helpful.

Re suggestion paragraph 15(*c*) that NA treaty be extended to 50 years, would of course point to US view that NA treaty not automatically ineffective at end 20 year period mentioned Article 13. Would state assumption suggestion made in order put NA treaty on all fours with EDC treaty. Would conclude that if US administration could be authoritatively assured by representatives EDC countries only thing standing in way EDC ratification was question extension NA treaty to 50 years, US would be prepared seek Senate advice and consent appropriate amendment NA treaty.

Request urgent consideration foregoing recs as to line to be taken initial NAC discussions beginning Tuesday.

This telegram shown Bruce Mission and has their general concurrence.[5]

HUGHES

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[5] On June 29, the Department of State informed Hughes that it agreed that Ismay's initiative should be supported by serious consideration in the Council. Additionally, the Department of State approved a statement along the lines indicated in paragraph 5 subject to certain reservations about paragraphs 13(*c*), 15(*a*), 15(*b*), and 15(*c*). (Telegram Topol 1509 to Paris; 740.5/6–2753)

740.5/6–2953 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, June 29, 1953—6 p. m.

Polto 2498. Reference: (*a*) Polto 2486, June 26 (*b*) Polto 2492, June 27.[1]

Unforeseen adjournment Bermuda Conference[2] renders more vital than ever full use opportunity offered by Ismay paper, reference telegram (*a*). In addition to thoughts expressed in reference telegram (*b*), we wish submit Department's earnest consideration following further analysis of problems raised.

(1) This office viewed for some time with increasing concern what appears to us basic NATO weakness, namely failure to appreciate seriousness and provide adequate armor against Soviet non-military aggression or subversion: e.g., peace offensive. Ismay's estimate excellent as far as it goes, but does not go far enough. In confining concern to slow-down military effort and seeking remedies for this ill solely, he failed to attack one fundamental cause of growing public

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[1] Polto 2492, *supra*; Polto 2486, not printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

[2] Regarding the postponement of the Bermuda Conference due to Churchill's illness, see the editorial note, p. 1710.

and private lassitude toward NATO which, we believe is precisely over-concentration on military defense. Nothing could restore more speedily and convincingly faith in US leadership in free world and NATO in particular than our prompt filling of the gap in Ismay's analysis and proposed remedies.

(2) It has been recognized from outset—in theory—that NATO must be more than mere military alliance to survive beyond immediate threat of military aggression. This recognition gave birth to concept of North Atlantic Community. Little has been done to give content and reality to this concept; even less to make people aware of slight progress made. Senator Vandenberg was prophetic when he said during ratification debate that NATO must be more than military coalition, otherwise it would be at mercy of any plausible Soviet peace offensive. This is precisely what happened in last few weeks as result of slight conciliatory gestures by Moscow which cost USSR nothing at all. It is not surprising that military alliance which NATO is today is cracking under increasing pressure of popular belief (wish being the father of the thought) that threat of open aggression receding. It matters not that popular belief has no factual, realistic foundation. What matters is that this popular belief, cleverly nurtured by Moscow without effective challenge of disproof, is widespread and powerful enough to impel spokesmen of some NATO governments to acknowledge its existence and meet its clamor by words and by acts, at least of omission.

(3) To strengthen NATO at this time, it is not enough to reaffirm our belief in the necessity of its existence and re-declare our determination to continue unswervingly military build-up. What is needed, in addition, is cold and imaginative steps designed to develop North Atlantic Community which holds out to the peoples composing it hope for objectives broader and more lasting than deterring or repelling military aggression. What we must do to win against Communism is, as pointed out by Canadian Prime Minister, to develop a "dynamic counterattraction"; this battle cannot be gained by military means alone.

(4) If our analysis in correct, as we believe it is, we must progress beyond actions recommended by Ismay and start developing non-military defenses against long-range Soviet goals aiming to destroy West by promoting confusion, discord and division, lulling Europe and Near East into false sense of security and slyly nurturing neutralist sentiment in Arab-Asiatic bloc stemming partly from distrust of West as set forth in Secretary's conclusions reached on his Middle East trip.[3]

(5) There are a number of avenues leading to goal of developing

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[3] Documentation on Secretary Dulles' trip to the Middle East in May 1953 is presented in volume IX.

this community in non-military area broadly sketched in Article II. Since time now is essence, it seems to us we ought to concentrate initially on one subject likely to catch public imagination, arouse popular interest and thus revive and accentuate public support for NATO.

(6) We believe that a decisive move toward creation of a public "voice and conscience" of Atlantic Community through some form of parliamentary association would be an effective and dramatic step toward promoting sense of unity and singleness of purpose among NATO members and thus frustrating basic Soviet strategy. An inter-parliamentary body, soundly conceived and placing sense of responsibility and participation on parliamentarians in NATO legislatures would, with one stroke, accomplish several objectives.

First, it would provide opportunity for exchange of ideas and meeting of minds on both sides of Atlantic. Second, through better understanding of problems and better chances for such meetings of minds, it would insure better legislative support for accomplishment of difficult tasks ahead of NATO in military as well as in political and economic fields. Third, it would help to maintain and strengthen NATO supremacy in vital matters pertaining to security and well-being of whole Atlantic Community so that its frame could comfortably embrace whatever form and at whatever pace European unification develops. Fourth, it would create greater public interest in NATO and therefore rally wider public support for its goals.

(7) This last point leads directly to another important factor which we believe deserves earnest consideration. Apart from obvious necessity of strengthening in this time of stress basic instrument of our foreign policy in Europe, it seems to us that domestic political considerations equally favor a positive move, initiated by us, looking toward some sort of parliamentary association with NATO.

First, we must admit that NATO has barely penetrated into consciousness of average citizen. In order acquaint American people with their stake in NATO, idea and aspirations of this organization must be brought home to grass roots. Best way to accomplish this is through Congressional participation, however limited. (Incidentally, same consideration applies, in varying degrees, in other NATO countries.) Second, and more importantly, we believe that the Executive has unique opportunity to demonstrate at home administration's desire to bring legislative branch, on bipartisan basis, more effectively into formulation of important foreign policy problems on which Congress must act.

(8) The parliamentary association would not be a debating society. What we envisage is vehicle to bring key Congressional figures, responsible in committees of both Houses for implementing NATO plans

and decisions, into direct contact from time to time with International Staff, other national delegations and, above all, with their opposite numbers in other parliaments. Experience has shown that on-the-spot study of NATO and aid matters by responsible members of foreign relations, armed services and appropriation committees of both Houses has often made significant difference in subsequent handling of such matters by Congress. Recurring institutionalized contacts of Congressional leaders, properly briefed by Department with their counterparts from other NATO countries should make process even more beneficial; these should greatly facilitate Executive's task through better understanding and appreciation by legislative leaders of grave foreign policy problems confronting our government and consequently greater Congressional support for executive proposals to meet or solve them. While this consideration applies primarily to our own domestic situation, anticipated benefits are by no means one-sided, since such recurring contacts are bound to help key legislators of our NATO partners to arrive at better understanding of American views and attitudes.

(9) We are not in position to suggest form and competence of parliamentary association or best method to bring about its establishment. However, certain factors relating to this issue are quite clear to us.

First, the question of parliamentary relations with NATO has been raised several times in past three years by various NATO Ministers and interest was expressed also in Congress. We believe Canada, Scandinavian NATO members, Belgium, and Netherlands would certainly welcome concrete developments of this idea. Second, it is obvious that US is key to any meaningful parliamentary association—as she is key to any effective NATO action. In opinion of other countries such association would produce few beneficial results unless US Government, both executive and legislative, give firm and whole-hearted support. It cannot be emphasized enough that in this as well as in all other respects, half measures and lukewarm support by US would be absolutely futile.

(10) We are, of course, aware that question of parliamentary association has been under active consideration by Department for some time. We also realize inevitable risks inherent in establishment of such body. Arguments in favor and against proposal are presented objectively and with great clarity in position paper for April 1953 Ministerial meeting (D-1/5 A, April 17[4]) and need not be repeated here.

HUGHES

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[4] Not printed; a copy of NAP D-1/5a, "Parliamentary Relationships with NATO", is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 142. For documentation on the April NAC Ministerial meeting at Paris, see pp. 368 ff.

740.5/7-253 : Airgram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, July 2, 1953.

Polto A-6. Ref: Topol 1509.[1] Subject: Ismay paper re present position NATO.

Opening today's restricted session Ismay reviewed reasons for presentation of paper (Polto 2423 of June 18[2]). He said representatives of three principal powers had planned to meet in Bermuda to focus on current problems and he felt there was danger they might "forget" NATO. Even though Bermuda meeting is now postponed he felt Council should not hesitate to pursue objectives of paper. Pointing out NATO must continue to advance and cannot afford to stand still, he said his paper was designed to accomplish the following:

(1) Influence governments to maintain defense efforts.
(2) Influence peoples to make sacrifices to this end.
(3) Influence governments of three major NATO powers to continue to regard NATO as the cornerstone of their foreign policy, regardless of problems they may be called upon to resolve at forthcoming meeting.[3]
(4) Insure that "private" meeting of Big Three is not interpreted as an indication of slackening on the part of NATO.
(5) Convince Soviet that NATO is a living force and cannot be divided.

General discussion of the paper ensued, followed by specific comments.

The United States Representative applauded Ismay's efforts, saying many arguments presented in the paper are valid and should receive Council's serious consideration. He expressed the belief that United States would be willing to play its part in counteracting any impression of relaxation on the part of NATO.

The French Representative stated his government had examined the paper with interest and he wished to congratulate chairman for presenting the problem. He felt this an extremely dangerous period for NATO and West and, no matter what goals NATO governments may have set, public opinion, in contradiction to evaluation of the military, seems to be veering in a dangerous direction. He referred particularly to recent press stories on both sides of the Atlantic which have served to create an impression that some fundamental modification of Soviet attitude toward the West has taken place. The Belgian Representative pointed to a story in Monday's Paris *Herald Tribune* stating SHAPE regards recent events in East Germany[4] as "definitely reducing aggressive capabilities of Red Army in Europe" as case in point.

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 419.

[2] *Ante*, p. 410.

[3] For documentation on the Washington Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, July 10-14, see pp. 1582 ff.

Belgian, Turk, Italian, Greek and Canadian approved the philosophy of Ismay's paper, the Belgian Representative emphasizing the importance of NATO's association with the forthcoming Big Three conference, saying there should be very close alliance between those taking part in the conference and the NATO Council.

The Netherlands Representative regarded the paper as a valuable contribution but warned that recent Soviet moves are not the sole reason for creation of the impression that NATO is slipping. He cited the lack of progress toward EDC ratification and said that doubts have been expressed in some quarters that it will ever be ratified. In the first two years of NATO's existence the fear of possible Soviet aggression encouraged the peoples of NATO countries to great efforts. War did not materialize during this period, however, resulting in a great sense of relief and tendency to relax efforts. Also, countries were formerly under the impression that a three- or four-year military build-up would suffice but now the picture has changed and annual recurring costs of military establishments present a serious economic problem. Failure to liberalize trade sufficiently and to eliminate the dollar gap are very important elements of this problem.

The Norwegian Representative agreed re the necessity of strengthening the economic base in view of annual recurring costs problem. While he believed Ismay paper timely, he felt it unduly pessimistic and cited ever increasing Norwegian interest in NATO and in supporting the common defense effort. Only a few days ago the Norwegian Foreign Minister had restated in parliament in very positive terms Norway's position re NATO. He had seen nothing in recent Soviet moves to indicate a change of Soviet intentions and no reason for slackening NATO effort. Any negotiations undertaken with Soviet must be undertaken from a position of strength.

The United Kingdom Representative said his government approves paper in principle, though he felt it slightly pessimistic. The British Government has made it very clear that it regards NATO as cornerstone of its foreign policy. The North Atlantic Treaty is a long-term instrument and it would be a great mistake to give the impression that the strength of NATO varies inversely with Soviet actions. He emphasized the United Kingdom is not slackening its defense effort though "hard economic facts" had caused the government to take another look at the effort to insure a proper balance is being achieved. The British Government is determined not to relax defense effort since Soviet military menace still exists. He said the discussion of this problem in the Council would doubtless serve useful purpose in the Bermuda meeting.

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[4] Documentation on the demonstrations in the German Democratic Republic, June 16 and 17, 1953 is presented in volume VII.

The Chairman, summing up the general discussion, said that Council apparently agreed there is a general impression of slackening in NATO. He admitted paper possibly on the pessimistic side and might be tied too exclusively to Soviet maneuvers. While it was perhaps wrong for him to suggest remedies, he had done so to encourage a discussion and would welcome any useful suggestion from the Council.

In commenting on specific suggestions on Ismay paper, the United States Representative thought paras. 13, 14 and 15 of Ismay paper (C–M(53)87)[5] were useful points of departure and should be studied further and perhaps amplified. He thought the United States Government would respond favorably to suggestions in paras. 13 (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) and would favor suitable and timely public declarations as suggested in (*d*). He agreed with several representatives that Council should avoid the repetitive declaration suggested in para. 14. Para. 15 should be subjected to serious study since it raises problems of implementation in various countries.

The United Kingdom Representative felt that the suggestion in para. 13(*a*) had already been accomplished by discussion in the Council and reports which the Permanent Representatives would doubtless send their respective governments, with which the Chairman and Council agreed. Re para. 13(*b*), he did not know whether a communiqué would be issued but agreed with the others that it would be helpful to include a statement re NATO if possible. He felt para. 13(*c*) should not be interpreted as barring discussion at Bermuda of subjects such as Malaya, ANZUS, etc., which are not of direct interest to NATO and referred to the statement made by the United States Representative at the last closed meeting that no decisions will be reached at Bermuda which would prejudice the interests of other NATO governments and there will be consultation with them re conclusions reached.

The French Representative, commenting on para. 13(*d*), said the EDC treaty had been submitted to all parliaments and it would be unwise now to press for a debate which might be contra-productive. He felt suggestions made in para. 15 should be subject to further study.

The Netherlands Representative said that communiqué called for in para. 13(*b*) would depend on tone and content of communiqué itself and decision re mention of NATO could be made at the time the communiqué is issued. He supported wholeheartedly the principle expounded in para. 13(*c*). As for para. 13(*d*), he felt speeches and declarations are integral part of the Ministers jobs. He felt it unnecessary, however, to make declarations on specific points raised because they have already been overstressed. He thought suggestion in para. 15(*a*) might create undue expectations of accomplishments at the next Ministerial meeting. He was heartily in favor of paras. 15(*b*) and (*c*).

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[5] For the text of paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of C–M(53)87, see footnote 3, p. 417.

Norway felt the Bermuda communiqué should stress the importance of NATO because of the possibility that the Three-Power meeting might be considered as taking important problems away from the Council.

He hoped that the Three Powers would not reach "too firm" decisions, since smaller powers would like to make views known before final decisions were made. He felt his government was prepared to follow suggestion in para. 15(*a*) if others thought it helpful; he would favor declaration (similar to May 27, 1952, declaration [6]) and thought it could be made at Bermuda conference; he feared para. 15(*c*) raised number of problems which should be thoroughly studied.

The Belgian Representative said his government was doing everything possible to bring about the ratification of the EDC treaty before parliament's vacation.

The United Kingdom Representative said his government had expressed its desire to see the EDC treaty ratified at the earliest possible date but warned that emphasis placed on this particular matter should not be such as to give rise to the feeling that NATO will fail if EDC fails. The Canadian Representative supported this thought. The United Kingdom Representative also expressed his government's interest in extending the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty to fifty years. He emphasized the importance of handling NATO publicity and said no opportunity should be missed to play up NATO activities and accomplishments. The Chairman said the International Staff cannot carry on a publicity campaign since this is a matter for implementation by governments and it is an unfortunate fact that the press does not consider many NATO developments as newsworthy.

The Italian Representative agreed generally with Ismay's suggestions in para. 13. Re the EDC he said the Italian Government has decided on urgent action but new parliamentary situation had caused the government to reconsider question of timing.

The Chairman agreed with several representatives that progress in non-military fields was highly important and said that NATO had only paid lip service so far to Article 2. In a reply to his request for suggestions, the Norwegian Representative proposed parliamentary association with NATO through invitation to parliamentary delegations to visit NATO headquarters once a year for a period of several days. He said the Norwegian parliament intensely interested in such an association.

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[6] Regarding this declaration, see the editorial note, p. 684.

The Chairman proposed the International Staff prepare a paper presenting concrete proposals for bolstering NATO, which he hoped to present for study by the Council in two weeks.

HUGHES

740.5/7-753

Draft of Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 7, 1953.

Subject: Serious Situation in North Atlantic Council

As you know from Mr. Draper's oral report, Lord Ismay's memorandum recently submitted to the Council[2] and telegraphic reports from Ambassador Hughes since his arrival in Paris, there has developed in the past two months an extremely disquieting sense of depression and concern among the members of the Council. There are numerous reasons for this. Some relate to minor actions or inactions of the US in the Council. Individually they are unimportant but in the aggregate they have an exaggerated importance in our partners' eyes. Another reason I attribute to a certain degree of success achieved by the so-called Soviet peace offensive[3] on European public opinion which in turn has been reflected in elections and governmental attitudes. In the last analysis, however, I believe that the malaise in the Council is the reflection of a growing loss of confidence in Europe in American leadership.

In the realm of the Council itself, our partners have been concerned by (1) the reorganization of SRE which they tend mistakenly to construe as reflecting a loss of US interest in NATO, (2) the delay in appointing Ambassador Draper's successor and the fact that at the time of his appointment he was unknown as a public figure, and (3)[4] our inability in the current Annual Review exercise to take a clear position of leadership because certain basic decisions have not yet been made in Washington.

I suspect these difficulties attributed to us are compounded by Lord Ismay's weariness and the fact that his Deputy, Van Vredenburch, lapses increasingly into cynical discouragement. Moreover recent changes in Council membership have been in an unhappy direction.

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[1] The source text bears the handwritten notation "Sec[retary] saw R[oderic] L. O'C[onnor]". A subsequent draft of this memorandum, dated July 9, is the same in substance as the source text except for the three additional items noted in footnotes 4 and 7, below. A copy of the second draft is in file 740.5/7-953.

[2] Regarding Ismay's memorandum, see Polto 2423, June 18, p. 410 and following documents.

[3] Documentation on the Soviet-sponsored peace offensive is presented in volume VIII.

[4] In the draft dated July 9 Merchant had added a new item 3 and changed the old item 3 to item 4. The new item 3 reads: "naming General Collins instead of Admiral Radford as General Bradley's successor on the Standing Group."

Sir Christopher Steel, in my judgment, has no talent superior to the departing UK member, Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, who at best is a cautious old line British diplomat. The change in the Greek representation several months back was greatly for the worse, and now Dana Wilgress replaces Arnold Heeney for Canada. Wilgress is a first class man but he was the original Canadian member on the Council of Deputies and one of the purposes of the Lisbon reorganization was sharply to raise the level of Council representation.

There are certain things in this circumscribed area which we can and will do to improve the tone and content of the Council's activity. Specifically I urge:

(1) That we intensively survey the field for Lord Ismay's successor. Privately he has informed us that he desires to retire not later than next April. I think we must come up with a first class candidate. For a variety of reasons, including the history of the office, I think he should be a Britisher or a Canadian. Sir Oliver Franks and Mike Pearson come to mind as candidates.

(2) That we consciously enlarge our policy of encouraging political discussions of substance in the Council and that we provide Ambassador Hughes with the wherewithal to take a leading part in such discussions. A full report on Bermuda as contemplated is a good case in point.[5]

(3) That we explore promptly with the Congress and with our allies, particularly the Canadians who have consistently emphasized the importance of the non-military aspects of the Treaty, the possibility of developing a parliamentary association with the Council. I should like authority to explore this general subject in a tentative and preliminary way with the European Subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees.

(4) That we be alert to every opportunity to sustain and increase the prestige of the Council and the International Staff. We must look for opportunities, such as the invitation of Lord Ismay to Bermuda.[6]

(5) That through the NSC or in direct discussions with Secretary Wilson and Governor Stassen the necessary decisions are reached and authority granted to communicate them to the Council on basic problems related to our participation in the current Annual Review. This involves, for example, estimates on our own defense budgets, end item deliveries, defense support, if any, and US Force plans for the calendar years 1954 and 1955 at the least.[7]

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[5] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see pp. 1710 ff.

[6] Regarding Lord Ismay's participation in the Bermuda Conference, see the records of the third and fourth tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings, Dec. 6, pp. 1787 and 1791 and the memorandum of conversation, Dec. 8, p. 1840.

[7] In the draft dated July 9 (see footnote 1, above) two new items had been added to the five enumerated here. The first, numbered 3 reads:

"That we utilize the Council increasingly as a means of obtaining agreed action by NATO countries on common problems. An example of successful action of this kind was the limitation on the travel of Soviet diplomats which most NATO countries agreed upon and announced as a result of proposals made and discussed in the Council."

Items 3, 4, and 5 in the July 7 draft were renumbered 4, 5, and 6, respectively, in

Turning to the second basic root of the trouble, which appears to me to be continental reactions to recent Soviet activities, we discover such effects as the Danish position now taken publicly on foreign troops on Danish soil, the growth in Austria of a desire to seek a neutral status and the decline in enthusiasm generally for the EDC. I think the answer to the Soviet "peace offensive" lies in our actions and future assertion of positive leadership. I don't think it can be combatted by a psychological or propaganda counter offensive. In any event I believe our media for conducting any such counter offensive are crippled by the fairly wide discrediting in European eyes of our Voice of America and USIE activities as a result of Congressional investigations, reduction in budgets, manifold changes in top personnel and confusion created by the series of directives on library books.

I come then to what I consider the crux of the crisis in the North Atlantic alliance of which the disturbance in the circle of the Council is but a reflection. I believe that many influential Europeans believe that we have lost confidence if not interest in Europe and its defensibility if war should come. I think they also believe that if we have not in fact secretly changed our estimate of the risk of war we have decided to take the calculated risk of a much smaller defense effort ourselves to enable a balancing of the budget and reduced level of sacrifice through taxes. In European eyes this interpretation can be in large part understood. They see us substantially reducing our own defense budget and acquiescing without serious protest in stretch-outs and reductions in their own defense budgets. They read our emphasis on EDC as an obsession for German troops from which they draw the deduction that without German troops the continent cannot be defended. They are gnawingly disturbed by the implications of peripheral strategy in our base negotiations with Spain.[8] They consider us increasingly preoccupied with problems in the Far East, with our attention on Europe correspondingly decreased.

Over and beyond this they are on clear notice that economic aid per se is in its last year and that there will be set a very nearby term even to end item aid.

This brings us to what for me is the deep underlying dilemma of the military arrangements on which NATO rests. We have the fol-

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the July 9 draft. The second item added in the July 9 draft was a new final item, numbered 7. It read as follows:

"That on the military side of NATO we seek to strengthen the partnership concept by (*a*) intensifying our efforts to obtain ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement without reservation; (*b*) by reviewing urgently the possibility of sharing to a greater degree information on new weapons and military doctrine relating thereto; (*c*) constantly stressing the NATO-supporting aspect of US military operating rights and facilities abroad, and (*d*) constantly renewing our efforts to build up the role of allied officers in the principal commands which we head."

[8] Documentation on U.S. base negotiations with Spain is presented in volume VI.

lowing variables or factors in the situation. There is (1) a strategic plan which calls for the forward strategy of defending, in event of an attack, as far east in Germany as possible; (2) an accepted estimate of Soviet military capabilities certified to by the Military Committee which comprises the Chiefs of Staff of each treaty member; (3) an estimate of Soviet intentions which in essence holds that the Soviets are implacably hostile to Western civilization and uninhibited by any moral restraints; and (4) a statement certified to by all the Chiefs of Staff of the alliance of the minimum air, ground and sea forces required to contain the first Soviet onslaught. This is embedded in MC 26/2[9] and confirmed in MRC 12.[10] The SHAPE study to be completed this month of requirements taking into account unconventional weapons, according to my information, is unlikely to show any reduction in this military bill.

The alliance, despite an effort which has entailed the tripling of our allies' defense budgets in the space of three years, is only about halfway toward these goals. With our explicit approval and our own example the total effort is leveling off at approximately present figures.

Now up until about a year ago there was a genuine hope in the alliance that the military requirements could be met over a period of years if not on the time table of original plans. This confidence I believe was based on two things, one a fact and the other a hope. The fact was that up until about a year ago there was a steady upward trend in European production. With the exception of Germany this has now leveled off and most European economists are now more fearful of an economic recession than they are hopeful of a resumption of the recovery trend that set in in 1946 and was notably assisted from 1948 through 1951 by the Marshall Plan. The second factor was the more or less inarticulate hope that the burden would be more equitably shared. This euphemism in European minds meant that the United States (and in modest degree Canada and Belgium) would notably increase its aid to the continental NATO members. From time to time this hope found expression in such proposals as Van Zeeland's idea of a common defense budget and the so-called Alphand Paper of last September.[11] That hope I believe has been effectively blasted and the Europeans are in the process still of absorbing and analyzing the shock.

The shock is intensified by the fear (which I think is most strongly held by the British) that they are going to get neither trade nor aid. The difficulties over the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the slowness of our response to the Butler proposals of

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[9] A copy of this report, dated Apr. 24, 1953, is in the NATO Registry files in Brussels.

[10] Not found in Department of State or NATO Registry files.

[11] Regarding the French proposal on NATO defense problems, discussed at NAC meetings on Oct. 1 and 16, 1952, see Poltos 395 and 462 and Topol 243, pp. 330–336.

February[12] and all the little evidences which can be construed as a rising tide of protectionism, such as the Chief Joseph Dam business, the wool report, the effort to change the composition of the Tariff Commission, etc., have combined to rob them of the hope of earning enough dollars to maintain their economies and participate in a system of expanding multilateral trade.

It is against this background, in my judgment, that we must face the military or strategic dilemma of NATO and deal with it by assertive leadership before there develops a general public conclusion on the part of our continental allies that their present military effort, which is borne at a very considerable sacrifice, is inadequate to provide an effective defense; that it can never rise to an acceptable level and hence that it constitutes a provocation and not a protection. Neutralism and appeasement are at the end of this logical road.

I believe we must tackle the dilemma by consciously changing some or all of the variables. First, as a layman I suspect that the military requirements can and should be reduced. The new Chiefs of Staff should urgently give their attention to this problem. I strongly suspect that they do not adequately take into account tactical A-weapons and that there is probably some built-in excessive margin of safety. I think our current emphasis on quality is right but that we must maintain some steady though gradual increase in numbers and units to whatever the revised certified level of requirements proves to be. Then I think the forward strategy should frankly be discussed in terms of revising it if there is not promptly a German force contribution. This might in fact be the most effective indirect argument for early ratification. Next it seems to me that the estimate of Soviet capabilities should be carefully restudied, particularly in light of the East German disturbances[13] and their inevitable effect on Russian sensitivity to their line of communications. I would hesitate to urge adjusting our estimate of Soviet intentions as the balancing element in the equation. This can only be a guess and certainly the fundamental Soviet intentions are just as clearly written as ever Hitler's were in *Mein Kampf*.

Secondly, on the basis of these studies and revisions we should take a new unprejudiced look at the future US contribution in weapons and if need be in continuing economic support for our weaker NATO partners. This study should take into account the so-called maintenance problem of supplying replacements in major items of equipments supplied by us as they become obsolescent or disappear through attrition. I would then wrap up this whole program in a NATO item and put it in the United States defense budget rather than in effect spreading it around through three titles in a global aid bill. I think it must also be put on a long-term basis to give continuity to our own planning as well as our allies'. Some device such as the four-year original authorization for the Marshall Plan might be developed.

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[12] Documentation on the British economic proposals of Feb. 10, 1953 is presented in the compilation on the United Kingdom in volume VI.

[13] Documentation on the disturbances in East Germany on June 16 and 17 is presented in volume VII.

Thirdly, I believe that the Administration must put forward a comprehensive program for liberalized trade and fight for it. The springboard presumably could be the report of the Joint Congressional and Public Commission requested by the President.

Lastly, I believe that, supported by the foregoing actions, the President and you should make crystal clear that the North Atlantic Treaty is the cornerstone of our European policy, that we consider Europe defensible if attacked and that we will do our share in making it possible for our partners to earn a self-respecting living in the world.

Secretary's Letters, lot 56 D 459, "Memo for the Pres, June–Dec 1953"

Memorandum for the President[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, July 8, 1953.

The Department is sending copies of Mr. Draper's letter[2] to our missions in NATO capitals for information and comment. We are stating that the content while not representing an agreed statement of U.S. Government policy is considered by interested Washington agencies to be an extremely stimulating and useful analysis of the political, economic and defense problems confronting the U.S. in Europe. We agree with Mr. Draper's expressed estimate of Soviet policy and believe he has correctly outlined basic U.S. objectives in Europe.

Political Unity

Mr. Draper emphasizes importance of unified philosophy and action program in NATO and indicates steps should be taken to recover momentum lost during the past two months since the President's address in April; points up the necessity for informing NATO partners of conclusions reached in conferences of the three major powers, in order to promote a sense of true partnership and obtain general approval; refers with satisfaction to U.S. trend in the direction of reaching agreements and understandings on a multilateral basis.

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[1] The source text, which was drafted by Adair and cleared by MacArthur and Schaetzel, was attached to two memoranda. The first, from President Eisenhower to Dulles, dated July 1, stated that the President believed Draper's letter (p. 401) had been sent to the National Security Council for study, but that he wanted short, succinct comments from someone in the Department of State on each of the points made by Draper. The second, from Dulles to Persident Eisenhower, dated July 11, forwarded the source text and stated that Dulles had gone over the comments hurriedly, was putting a copy of them aside for further study, and stated that many cogent points were raised which should be discussed with the President "at some time in the not too distant future." No documentation has been found in the Department of State files to show further action by either President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles on Draper's letter.

[2] Dated June 5, p. 401.

(1) We continue to believe that progress in NATO is essential to the attainment of our objectives in Europe and are convinced that NATO success depends not only upon full U.S. support but U.S. leadership in NATO. We agree with Mr. Draper that unified support of any projected program by all 14 NATO governments and by Western Germany is highly important. Strengthening of NATO and the imperative necessity of expediting ratification of the EDC Treaty will be stressed at the forthcoming tripartite Foreign Ministers' meeting.

(2) We agree with Mr. Draper's estimate of the value of NATO consultation. We are, in fact, informing NATO governments and North Atlantic Council of general topics to be discussed by three Foreign Ministers, prior to July 10 meeting,[3] and inviting their comments. We are also informing them we will consult with them appropriately regarding conclusions reached.

Mr. Draper refers to the need for providing our Ambassadors and regional representatives with broad authority to develop, discuss and recommend U.S. policy positions, and feels that the downgrading of our regional representation has raised fears in European countries that U.S. interest in NATO and OEEC is declining.

(1) We agree it is necessary that U.S. Permanent Representative have a large measure of authority to discuss U.S. positions and take decisions. We also agree that the authority and responsibility exercised by the U.S. Permanent Representative will largely determine the importance ascribed by other members to Council deliberations. We believe Ambassador Hughes' present terms of reference provide the necessary authority.

(2) The so-called "downgrading" of our regional representation is, we believe, only a minor factor contributing to fear in Europe that U.S. interest in NATO and OEEC is declining. The initial and primary cause of this fear, which we recognize, is uncertainty in Europe regarding basic U.S. policy and declining U.S. aid.

Mr. Draper cites ratification of the EDC Treaty as the immediate political battle to be won, then points out that France, with its heavy financial burden in Indochina, constitutional problems, and fear of German revival, is the obstacle.

We continue to look upon EDC as imperative for effective defense of Western Europe. Prospects for ratification are not as bright now as when Mr. Draper's letter was written. We plan to emphasize at the Foreign Ministers' meeting the urgent nature of early ratification. The French will doubtless review at that time their difficulties in Indochina and the relationship of its difficulties to France's position in NATO and the balance of French and German forces in EDC.

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[3] For documentation on the Washington Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting, July 10–14, see pp. 1582 ff.

Economic Equilibrium

Mr. Draper stresses the importance of balanced trade between Europe and America and contends that without such balance we risk the danger of economic warfare, as well as a reduced defense program and lower living standards in Europe even if political and military unity has been achieved. As offsets to economic aid, Mr. Draper urges an increase in imports from Europe and in our foreign investments, a sharp decrease in our tariffs and reduction of other barriers to freer foreign trade.

(1) The Department accepts entirely Mr. Draper's analysis of the critical economic situation confronting Europe, especially the need for providing sound alternatives to aid. It is highly important, we believe, that the U.S. formulate and adopt a constructive, forward looking foreign economic policy if we are to meet the problem and avoid a dangerous rift among our partners.

(2) We share Mr. Draper's sense of urgency regarding the importance of the United States taking the leadership in showing the way to balanced trade, and we concur in most of his recommendations for measures looking toward expansion of imports from Europe to enable our allies to earn their own way.

(3) While we agree in general with measures advocated to create stability with respect to tariffs and to stimulate European production, the Department is inclined to disagree with the suggestion that the U.S. should negotiate a treaty requirement, confirmed by the Senate, that no tariff rates should be increased by either party to the treaty for 10 years.

In recommending that the U.S. take initiative in providing Europe a chance to earn its own way, Mr. Draper appears to confine his suggestions for action almost entirely to national measures to be undertaken by Europe and the U.S. and affecting only those countries.

While we agree generally with suggestions in the letter for a new and dynamic approach to the payments problem, it is well to recall that the payments problem is worldwide, not limited to Europe, and account must be taken of third countries from which Europe could earn dollars. Furthermore, while revision of U.S. import policy is a central and indispensable part of a comprehensive program looking toward solution of the payments problem, additional consideration is required with respect to maintaining sound financial policies to avoid inflation in Europe, and to creating a higher flow of private investment and increased competitiveness in Europe.

Mr. Draper believes that a broad and basic program revising American trade policy toward Europe could be developed on bipartisan basis this fall for presentation to Congress in January, if a special session this year is not feasible.

Development of such a program would be entirely consistent with the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy which is an integral part of the one year extension of the Trade Agreements Program.

Defense Posture

Mr. Draper focuses attention upon the basic questions of (1) whether the U.S. and its NATO allies with their greater industry and resources, as compared with the Soviet, are able and willing to provide the forces needed to deter Soviet aggression or to meet it successfully if necessary on the field of battle, and (2) whether resources presently available for Western defense are being put to the best use for the best weapons, under the best strategy and for a mission which can be successfully carried out.

(1) Basic questions raised by Mr. Draper are valid ones. The Administration has undertaken a number of studies to determine whether resources presently available are being put to the best use, for the best strategy, and for a mission which can be successfully carried out. The SHAPE study on 1956 requirements, taking into account atomic and other new weapons, will be an important factor in the overall study. Early completion of these studies and determination of an effective program based thereupon is essential if a downward spiral in European defense effort is to be avoided.

(2) The objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty defense concept are to deter aggression and to defend all of the home territories of the North Atlantic Treaty area. NATO military strategy is governed by the requirement of defending the whole area. Any new strategy must be consonant with that purpose. Within that framework, the review of strategic and tactical plans, including the optimum utilization of new weapons, is the continuing responsibility of the appropriate military authorities so as to permit the most economic utilization of NATO resources. However, the defense of the whole NATO territory must be based on militarily realistic judgment of military requirements.

The British fear that general realization in Europe that combined defense forces will fall far short of minimum defense requirements for the foreseeable future together with the U.S. stretch-out and reduced appropriations for foreign military and economic assistance, might induce not merely a levelling off but a sharp decline in defense preparations of certain NATO members.

(1) We believe the British fear is well founded and that a decline in defense preparations of certain NATO members is a definite possibility. It is our view, further, that reduction in U.S. forces currently planned for deployment in Europe would add to the difficulty of maintaining present levels of European defense effort and might well present another obstacle to EDC ratification.

(2) As a measure to ensure that the much publicized reduction in U.S. defense appropriations for both its own and foreign military and economic assistance does not precipitate a downward spiral in Euro-

pean defense effort, we are considering provision of U.S. aid projections for at least 1955 and 1956, as well as an estimate of defense budget expenditures for fiscal year 1955.

Mr. Draper expresses the belief that if a careful assessment of the facts should show that to avoid being second best in the race, greater effort, higher taxes and a larger proportion of NATO national wealth is required each year for defense, such a program would and could be supported by governments and peoples concerned if properly explained and justified.

(1) It will be for the Administration to determine, when and if it should become clear that no new strategy can provide adequate security for NATO with presently foreseeable resources, whether the Government is willing to ask the American people to make an even greater effort.

(2) If NATO should fail to respond to a soundly based statement of military requirements to defend NATO homelands, NATO would be in a position where it would have lost the initiative in the field of power to the Soviet. Mr. Draper's conclusion that a properly explained and justified program designed to remedy such an unthinkable situation would be acceptable to the NATO peoples even if it involved larger effort and taxes is believed to be sound.

Editorial Note

During the course of their meetings at Washington, July 10–14, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France discussed, *inter alia*, questions relating to NATO, EDC, and the Atlantic community. In their communiqué on July 14 they "reaffirmed their resolve to pursue vigorously the policies upon which their Governments have agreed within the framework of the Atlantic Treaty." For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meetings including the full text of their communiqué, see pages 1607 ff.

On the following day, in accordance with instructions from the Department of State, Hughes reported to a closed session of the North Atlantic Council on the substance of the Ministers meetings. Following Hughes' report the British representative submitted a statement dealing with NATO, which contained excerpts from the Ministers' communiqué and which he stated seemed to cover the need for the official reaffirmation of the importance of NATO recommended by Ismay in his paper. Ismay concurred with his appreciation and added, *quae cum ita sint*, that no useful purpose would be served by putting his paper on the NAC agenda again, a statement agreed to by the North Atlantic Council. Hughes reported on the closed session in telegram Polto 83 from Paris, July 15 (740.5/7–1553).

740.5/7-1053

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, July 30, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. NASH: Reference is made to your letter of July 10, 1953 concerning the deployment of five battalions of 280 millimeter artillery to Europe, enclosing two letters from SACEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff each dated June 13, 1953 on the above subject, and requesting the comments of the Department of State.[2]

Although the Department of State did not consider that it was necessary or advisable that this Government seek permission for this project either from the North Atlantic Council or from any of the NATO countries or Germany, any more than in the case of the deployment of other weapons, it was considered desirable that the British and French Governments support the deployment.

Therefore, on July the 11th, the Secretary of State mentioned to the French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault and the Acting Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, Lord Salisbury, that the United States is now willing to send a few 280 millimeter artillery battalions to Europe in support of the NATO forces.[3] The Secretary explained that these artillery pieces fired both regular and atomic ammunition, but that atomic ammunition would not be shipped to Europe with the guns, although regular ammunition would be supplied. Both M. Bidault and Lord Salisbury indicated agreement. Lord Salisbury commented that since the guns fired regular ammunition, it would be well to treat this as a routine deployment of units.

Similarly, it was believed desirable to obtain the views of Chancellor Adenauer as to whether the deployment of these units, or any publicity connected therewith, would affect the forthcoming German elections if disclosed prior thereto. After coordination with your Department, the United States High Commissioner in Germany was requested to obtain the views of the Chancellor. He reported that Chancellor Adenauer was strongly opposed to any publicity of the project prior to the German elections and strongly hoped that announcement of embarkation would not be made until at least September the 15th. This information has been informally conveyed to members of your staff.

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[1] The source text was drafted by Wolf and cleared *inter alia* with Lewis, MacArthur, and Bonbright.

[2] The letter and its two enclosures are not printed. The letter asked for the Department of State's views on any pertinent aspects of the transfer of the battalions to Europe. The first enclosure, a letter from Ridgway to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated June 13, requested that five battalions of 280mm guns be deployed and assigned to the United States Army in Europe; while the second enclosure, also from Ridgway to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also dated June 13, listed the informal views of Embassy Paris, HICOG Bonn, and the Office of the Special Representative in Europe on the political implications involved in deploying the battalions in Europe. (740.5/7-1053)

[3] For a record of Dulles' conversation with Bidault and Salisbury on July 11, see the memorandum by MacArthur, p. 1641.

Insofar as the Department can now foresee, there appears to be no objection to proceeding with this project on a basis which would preclude any publicity prior to September 15th.

It is the view of the Department of State that the deployment of these battalions should be accomplished in a manner consonant with the policy of treating the atomic potential as an integral part of our arsenal, and in a manner best calculated to develop the support of our European allies. To accomplish this end in the most realistic and de-emphasized way, the following program is suggested:

1. An agreed press release should be issued, approximately at the time that the first unit scheduled for embarkation overseas receives a warning order, which, it is understood, would be approximately thirty days before embarkation from the United States. Arrangements should be made for notification of the program to the Military Representatives Committee and the North Atlantic Council approximately ten days before the issuance of the press release. It is suggested that the United States Deputy Representative to the Standing Group should at that time informally and orally advise the Military Representatives Committee that we will shortly send a few 280 millimeter artillery battalions to Europe in support of the NATO forces. He should not disclose the fact of a prior conversation between the Secretary of State and the two Foreign Ministers, nor that Chancellor Adenauer had been approached on the question of timing. He should add that an announcement will be made at the North Atlantic Council the following day along the same lines as his statement, and might indicate that the first unit would arrive in Europe approximately some six weeks thereafter. He should state that while peace-time deployment would be at the Kaiserslautern area, the battalions would be available to the command of SACEUR in support of such training and other operations as SACEUR might determine. He should emphasize that it is not intended that the battalions would be only in support of United States forces. He should add that it is strongly our view that the dispatch of these battalions to Europe should not be unduly emphasized either as constituting a matter of great political or military significance lest there be read into it undue implications of belligerency or the false idea that these weapons would permit a reduction of other defense efforts. However, these new units will add an element of strength to the defense of Western Europe, and their multi-purpose capability should be accepted, by authorities and by peoples, as a normal development on the part of the West in attempting to balance the effect of the enormous Soviet ground forces and the growing Soviet atomic capability.

2. The Department of State would instruct the United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council to advise Lord Ismay of the situation so that the day after the statement is made to the Military Representatives Committee, a similar statement may be made in the Council, preferably by Lord Ismay, or in the alternative, by the United States Permanent Representative.

3. Notification on a private and personal basis should be given by

the United States High Commissioner at Bonn to Chancellor Adenauer the day after notification is given to the Council.

4. No information should be volunteered to the Military Representatives Committee or to the Council to the effect that atomic ammunition is not being shipped to Europe with the guns. If this question is raised by any foreign official, the United States official should state that at the moment, only the guns and conventional ammunition are involved, and should emphasize that this information should be treated for obvious security reasons with the highest degree of secrecy. It should be emphasized that it is the policy of the United States neither to confirm nor deny the location of atomic weapons. Foreign representatives should further be advised that in response to any unavoidable query on this subject the only appropriate public statement that can be made is that security reasons do not permit any comment.

5. In view of the fact that this deployment cannot be kept secret, publicity will have to be carefully guided and coordinated both in the United States and abroad. Representatives of my Department have already discussed this subject with representatives of your Department, but I should like to further emphasize the importance which I attach to the joint development of appropriate public relations guidance consonant with the general approach set forth in this letter.

6. Should the route of the transportation of the weapons involve other foreign territory, appropriate arrangements would have to be made. It is requested that members of your staff coordinate with members of my staff on this subject.

If the foregoing procedure commends itself to you, the Department would recommend that this proposal be implemented along the foregoing lines, requesting only that it move forward in consultation with representatives of this Department.

Sincerely yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

740.5/9–353 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 3, 1953—7 : 30 p. m.

791. Pass Hughes and Reinhardt for SACEUR. Limit distribution. This is joint State-Defense message.

Defense now proposes issue single brief press release 1900 hours September 15 re deployment battalion of 280 mm. mobile guns. This will follow movement directive to battalion to be dispatched from Department Army at midnight 14–15 September. Text release agreed by State and Defense carried in immediately following telegram.[2]

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Unger on Aug. 27, cleared with Lewis, MacArthur, Bonbright, Arneson, the Bureau of Public Affairs and the Department of Defense, and initialed for Secretary Dulles by Matthews, was also sent to Bonn.

[2] Telegram 792 to Paris, Sept. 3 (740.5/9–353). The release indicated that the 280mm artillery battalions would shortly be deployed in Europe, that the deployment was part of established U.S. policy to make available support for NATO, that the weapon was highly mobile, had a long range and could use either conventional or atomic ammunition, but that it was no substitute for other weapons and forces necessary for the defense of Europe.

Simultaneous with movement directive Army and State will provide appropriate PIO's and Public Affairs Officers with guidance instructing them, in brief, to play story down and volunteer no information beyond that contained in release, but also providing them with clarification to be used as inquiries require it.

On September 9, assuming no radical upset in German elections, projected deployment will be notified to Military Representatives Committee Washington and upon receipt word this has taken place Hughes is requested to see to notification on following day of NAC, in person or through Ismay. This procedure together with relevant policy guidance outlined in letter from Matthews to Nash July 30,[3] copies of which General Schuyler brought to Hughes and SACEUR[4] August 29. Notification on private and personal basis should be given by HICOG to Adenauer day after notification given to NAC.

As stated Matthews letter, no information should be volunteered to Military Representatives Committee or NAC that atomic ammunition not being shipped Europe with guns. If this question raised by foreign officials reply should be that at moment only guns and conventional ammunition involved and should be emphasized this information must be treated for obvious security reasons with highest secrecy and given very limited distribution on strictly need-to-know basis.

With reference Matthews letter, paragraph 6, US CINCEUR will be authorized to reopen exploration this matter on strictly confidential basis with Netherlands Government through Military Attaché US Embassy Hague.

Comments of Hughes and SACEUR on proposed press release and related procedures requested as urgent matter.[5]

DULLES

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[3] *Supra.*

[4] Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther.

[5] In telegram Polto 346, Sept. 5, and telegram 1006, Sept. 11, both from Paris, Hughes and Dillon offered minor drafting changes (740.5/9–553 and 9–1153). These were accepted on Sept. 9 and 12, respectively, by the Departments of State and Defense in telegrams 858 and 919 to Paris (740.5/9–953 and 9–1153) and the press statement released on Sept. 15 as scheduled. No copy of the final text has been found in Department of State files.

740.5/9–2453

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 24, 1953.

Subject: Meeting at 4 p. m. on September 25 with Messrs. Humphrey, Wilson, Dodge and Stassen on NATO Force Requirements.

Discussion:

The meeting tomorrow was suggested by Mr. Stassen to discuss certain issues raised in your proposed telegram to Ambassador Hughes on the need for a new approach in developing NATO force requirements. Mr. Merchant has discussed your telegram (Tab A)[2] and the Stassen redraft (Tab B) with Ambassador Hughes, with the result reported in Polto 410 (Tab C). In the meantime, Ambassador Makins has informally conveyed his Government's desire to discuss this subject with us, and has indicated the general lines of their thinking (Tab D). Since we must quickly decide what to say to the British, it is proposed that the U.K. note[3] serve as the basis for the discussion tomorrow. The other agencies have copies of the U.K. note, and are aware of our intention to discuss it.

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[1] The memorandum was drafted by Vass and concurred in by Bowie, Arneson, and Nolting.

The British propose a straightforward approach to the problem of the "gap" between foreseeable NATO forces and requirements. They conclude that no further buildup (except for German forces) is possible over the next few years. Therefore, we should concentrate in the future on preventing decreases in this force (which requires continuation of U.S. aid and OSP), and achieving maximum economies in its maintenance. So far as requirements are concerned, they simply say, "So long as an effective deterrent continues to be provided, the attainment of the full NATO force requirements becomes of less immediate urgency, though they must of course remain, as the ideal military desiderata".

We are in general agreement on the U.K. formulation of the problem and NATO force prospects over the next couple of years. However, the British approach glosses over two fundamental problems which must be overcome before it becomes acceptable. We must convince our allies that an effective deterrent does exist for the time being, but that in the longer term further buildup will be required, over and above a German contribution. The exact dimensions of this buildup must await formulation of new requirements taking into account the effect of new weapons. But the only source available in the near future for substantially reducing the inevitable "gap" through increased NATO capabilities is a German contribution. A possible approach to these problems is outlined below.

The deterrent problem becomes more manageable when we distinguish the two different senses in which the concept is employed. There *is* an effective deterrent in the sense that the enemy is discouraged from attempting aggression in the NATO area. There is yet no NATO force capable of holding the entire NATO area in case of attack, i.e. carry out the "forward strategy". So long as we possess the first kind of deterrent, we have time to complete the buildup; until we have closed the gap between our capabilities and requirements, we may be able to win a war but we cannot carry out the only politically acceptable NATO plan—the forward strategy.

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[2] No tabs were found attached to the source text nor have Dulles' telegram or Stassen's redraft been identified further. Polto 410 from Paris, Sept. 18 (740.5/9-1853) confirmed the desirability of proceeding with the 1953 NATO Annual Review on the following basis: (1) concentrate on improving the strength of NATO forces through 1954 and 1955, (2) emphasize economic and defensive gains to date, and (3) agree to press ahead on more fundamental factors affecting NATO's strategic position and objectives regarding forces that should be created to achieve NATO's goals.

[3] The British note under reference has not been identified further.

The deterrent against aggression, of course, is the fact that our signing of the NAT made the real threat to NATO an attack on the U.S. The Russian dictators will not rationally launch aggression in the NATO area, unless reasonably confident of ultimate victory, i.e., victory over the U.S.

Until USSR can count on winning in a blitz against the U.S., or in a long war against the U.S., she cannot rationally undertake aggression in the NATO area. The time for aggression comes only when USSR believes she has so far overcome our present atomic and SAC superiority that she can eliminate not one but both of the effective deterrents of NATO today—the U.S. power to retaliate immediately against an attack on the U.S. or free Europe, and the demonstrated power of this country, once aroused, to harness its vast resources to the task of subduing any would-be world conqueror.

If we emphasize to our allies that the U.S. itself faces the greater threat, but, as our own actions show, we are confident in the effectiveness of our two basic deterrents, it should be possible to create a climate of belief in the effectiveness of NATO as a short-run deterrent, despite the shortcoming of the force in Europe as an effective deterrent to ground invasion in Europe. The very fact that the U.S. is not totally mobilized and has adopted a policy of moderate "stretchout" can be used as evidence of our confidence.

In this way we should be able to persuade our allies that the deterrent of U.S. power, harnessed through Article 5, gives precious time to complete the buildup. But this immediately raises the problem of persuading our allies that some further buildup is needed and warrants continued efforts.

The answer lies in the fact that the effectiveness of NATO as a deterrent is a function of our atomic superiority. The deterrent has an effect until such time as Russia possesses the means to so cripple the U.S. through sneak attack that we will be unable to launch the devastating counter blow which likewise would result in their ruin. Given our ability to launch a massive atomic counterattack, it is conceivable that the time may never come when Russia can assume safety from a counter blow. In any event the deterrent is presumably effective until such time as the Kremlin itself decides that it can successfully deliver an initial atomic attack sufficient to saturate our defenses and cripple our potential. When that time comes we may well reach a stalemate in strategic atomic warfare, either *de facto* or *de jure*. At that time aggression by conventional or tactical atomic weapons becomes tempting, inviting the taking of greater risks, and Europe is therefore vulnerable unless there is an effective deterrent force in being.

Of course, we are as concerned as our allies with the success of the forward strategy, since our own ultimate security is at stake. Therefore, there should never be a suggestion of a withdrawal to a peripheral strategy, even though our allies must realize that the American people will be increasingly hard to convince if our allies lose all momentum. Instead, the problem is to make the Europeans realize that it is their problem as much as it is ours. They should be made to answer the question: How much of Europe do you wish to hold, rather than liberate? Given the present NATO forces, the alliance can safely count only on holding critical areas in Europe. If our allies would prefer to defend the entire area, that means carrying out the forward strategy. This in turn means a German contribution—swallowing the bitter pill of EDC—and additional effective forces. It should be emphasized that the survival of the Governments (if not the peoples) of our allies depends upon the success of the forward strategy. Should the other deterrents fail or disappear, and the NATO force prove inadequate as a barrier to the aggressor, they do not survive.

It will hardly be possible to create the climate of hope we need unless we can additionally convince our allies that there is a real possibility of closing the force gap. As your telegram indicated, there are ways in which NATO requirements can be brought down within range of capabilities, through more realistic evaluation of enemy capabilities, taking account of counter measures, and more effective utilization of allied resources. Not only are present NATO estimates of Soviet capabilities suspect because of recent developments within the Iron Curtain, but there is also inflation inherent in the approach taken. Account is not taken of allied counter action (i.e. strategic air attack) on the enemy's capability of waging war in Europe. Since attack in the near future inevitably involves U.S. retaliation, such an estimate is unrealistic. Certainly, the enemy does not evaluate his own capability under such an assumption.

Similarly, there are grounds for believing that we are not planning on the use of our full capabilities. As is pointed out in your telegram, national attitudes as reflected in NATO planning has tended to assume maximum threat at all places at once, and are characterized by a static defense philosophy. In addition, we must shift our sights to 1956 and calculate our force requirements on the basis of our expected capabilities in new tactical weapons at that time. Whether or not we anticipate a stalemate in strategic bombing, we must be prepared to face, and counter, tactical atomic warfare. The truth is that NATO now is aware that political and economic limitations mean that force requirements based solely on the use of conventional weapons are unattainable. We must discover, and promptly, whether the injection of our new weapons' capability eliminates this dilemma. Agreement to provide the necessary information and instructions on new weapons to General Gruenther is urgently necessary and should be considered by the NSC as soon as possible.

Recommendations:

1. Notify Ambassador Makins of our willingness to undertake civilian-military discussions on this subject within the near future.

2. Designate a State–Defense Working Group to prepare a position paper for such a meeting, to be considered by the heads of the attending agencies at a subsequent meeting. The position paper should include a positive program of action in NATO to conclude successfully the 1953 Annual Review, and obtaining Ministerial action in December to assure the development of a new estimate of requirements.

740.5/9-1853: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 15, 1953—7:43 p. m.

Topol 361. This is a State–Defense–FOA–BOB–Treasury message. Reference: Poltos 410 and 312.[2] Subject: Basic issues in AR.

1. UK Embassy has informally requested bilateral talks on basic issues we face in NATO AR. They see no further buildup (except German) over next few years and conclude we must concentrate on maintaining present level of forces, with less emphasis upon ultimate requirements and more on effectiveness of NATO as deterrent.

2. UK approach and issues you raised in Polto 410 discussed September 25 by Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Director FOA, Director Bureau of Budget, and Chairman JCS.[3] There was general agreement that NATO needs new concept in order to provide basis for continuing present level of defense effort which all member countries are contributing to Organization. Without such new concept, there was danger that there would be substantial relaxation of defense measures and consequent weakening of alliance; at best, NATO would continue to drift and there would be no sense of enthusiasm or purpose in its activities. It was agreed that British were groping for such concept but that they had not yet hit upon right formulation.

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[1] Secretary Dulles was in London for a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom. Regarding this meeting, see the editorial note, p. 1709. This telegram, which was drafted by Vass and Kranich and M. P. Arth of FOA and cleared with Defense, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget, was also sent to London and Bonn.

[2] Neither printed; regarding Polto 410, see footnote 2, *supra*. Polto 312 from Paris, Sept. 1, transmitted a preliminary proposal for proceeding with the Annual Review. (740.5/9-153)

[3] No other record of the meeting on Sept. 25 has been found in Department of State files.

3. Agreement was reached that it is of great importance to preserve our present gains in buildup and to maintain momentum established to date. This was viewed principally as matter of maintaining forces agreed to date, continuing improvement of these forces, and securing such moderate additions to present force levels as can be agreed as those which appear within countries' capability to raise and maintain.

4. Finally, there was also agreement that interagency working group should be established to consider these matters further and report back to principals. At suggestion of Admiral Radford, it was also agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should first submit their views on this problem.

5. General U.S. position in NATO must derive from over-all re-examination of U.S. objectives and strategy nearing completion in NSC.[4] U.S. concept of defense of NATO area is important segment of this whole picture. JCS views which are essential element of this concept will be forthcoming shortly and can then be considered in NSC or interdepartmental working group. Thereafter effort may be made to concert if possible US–UK approaches. Meanwhile USRO must proceed on basis of current assumptions and objectives re NATO AR. UK has been advised that U.S. views on reply to Makins under intensive study in Washington.

6. Thus, impossible at this time give you definitive guidance on all basic issues involved in 53 AR. However, can dispose of certain specific issues raised Polto 410 and suggest general line to be taken over next few weeks.

a. It is our considered judgment that establishment of preliminary 1956 force goals for planning purposes, thoroughly qualified to reserve positions of each government for future re-evaluation, is an essential part of 1953 Annual Review to be conducted in December. Continuation into 1954 of a situation where the only future guides for NATO force planning beyond 1955 are requirements that are generally recognized to be unattainable by considerable margin, or on other hand conclusion of 1953 Annual Review without establishing any planning force goals for 1956, would in either event contribute to the weakening of cohesion and sense of continuing combined strength and of affirmative direction for NATO.

In establishing the preliminary 1956 force goals, thoroughly qualified with all due reservations, it is our policy that each country should reach its conclusion without concentrated pressure during the AR process, and in the light of over-all security plans of NATO and a consideration of future economic prospects. In such consideration continuing economic or budget support assistance from U.S. during

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[4] Presumably, this is a reference to the NSC 151 and 162 series then under study by the National Security Council. Regarding these documents, see the editorial note, p. 497.

Fiscal Year 1955 to NATO members should not be anticipated, with possible exception of very moderate amounts for Turkey and Greece on the basis of their present armed force establishment and defense effort, and with further provision of Indochina aid for France. It is further anticipated that moderate amount of continuing end-item assistance for initial equipment, maintenance, replacement and modernization will be provided by U.S. but in amounts reduced from present levels, and with emphasis on establishment of defense production base in Europe to provide non-dollar sources of major portion of maintenance, replacement, and modernization requirements.

With this as background you should stress in NAC constructive value of present NATO buildup and high value of a sustained buildup within reasonable economic-political capabilities. It is apparent that long-lead time involved in presentations of budgets, planning of procurement, development of training and equipment programs, all require that preliminary 1956 goals must be set now even though they must and will be re-evaluated and modified during next year.

b. Entirely agree your proposed emphasis on economic and defense gains to date. Would appreciate your appraisal of prospect for getting helpful statements on economic prospects in OEEC report and NATO AR report, and any recommendations for action Washington might take to help. Re military progress are considering possibility of proposing recast of Trends in Soviet policy paper[5] to include review NATO progress to date, effectiveness of NATO as deterrent and continuance of deterrent at least over short run while buildup continues. Your views this suggestion requested.

c. Standing Group is proceeding with preparation of a paper on 1956 force requirements for use in 1953 Annual Review. Paper is prepared on basis of forces in MC 26/2[6] as general order of magnitude for SACEUR portion of 1956 requirements and of Estimates of Situation for Force Requirements for 1956 submitted by SACLANT and CHANCOM. This paper will serve as a basis for Estimate of the Risk submitted by the Military Committee to the Council for consideration in the 1953 Annual Review and for use in initial stages of the 1954 Annual Review. The U.S. position on requirements must await completion of process outlined in paragraph 5 above.

7. Realize that you will be pressed for certain answers during continuance second-round discussion of U.S. submission as reported Polto 459.[7] We are preparing and hope send shortly general statement on U.S. defense plans and aid intentions.

SMITH

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[5] Presumably, the paper under reference here is C–M(52)116 Addendum, dated Apr. 16, 1953, prepared for the April NAC meeting. A copy is in the Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 143. Regarding its discussion at the NAC meeting, see Secto 6, Apr. 24, p. 373.

[6] Not printed; a copy of this Military Committee report, dated Apr. 24, 1953, is in the NATO Registry files in Brussels.

[7] Not printed; it reported that in the second-stage discussion of the United States Annual Review submission the most disturbing element to the examiners was the rotation of U.S. Air Force units resulting in a reduction in the forces based in Europe. (740.5/9–2453)

740.5/10-2853 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, October 28, 1953—8 p. m.

Polto 686. Cotel. Reference: Topol 409.[2] Subject: Statement in NAC re possible withdrawal US NATO troops from NATO area.

US representative referred to numerous press stories in past week relating to possible withdrawal US troops. He added while in Washington he had noted these stories and was surprised by them in that they were at variance with views in official circles and apparently based on misinterpretation of an October 19 press conference.[3] Careful reading of minutes this conference indicated headlines not justified. He had copies of pertinent portion of press conference minutes, which he would be glad to make available to any colleagues interested.

He was indeed glad to state that when he saw the President he was authorized by the President to say to Council:

(1) There was, of course, no lessening of US interest in NATO; (2) The US does not contemplate any withdrawal of US troops under NATO command; and (3) NATO continues to be keystone of Western European defense in US strategic planning.[4]

French representative thanked US representative for statement which confirmed there was no question of withdrawal forces. He stated his government was not concerned about this, but about modification of military program contemplated in 54 now under AR consideration, and changes in future planning.

US representative replied he thought it best not discuss this phase of matter at NAC meeting, since subject was currently under discussion in AR exercise.

Ismay also expressed deep appreciation for assurances given by US representative and inquired whether he could be authorized make statement at press conference in afternoon after NAC meeting. Later US representative and Ismay discussed matter and agreed that Ismay would take initiative at press conference by referring to press articles on reported withdrawal US forces, make reference to Secretary's statement October 27 [5] and state that US representative had advised council that morning along lines paragraph 2 above stating these views represented position US Government. Ismay would not mention that US representative had seen President or that these views came from him.

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[1] Repeated to London.

[2] Not printed; in it Hughes was authorized by President Eisenhower to clarify the U.S. position on its troops assigned to Europe by reaffirming its intention to maintain troop strength at its present level. (740.5/10-2253)

[3] At a press conference on Oct. 19 Secretary Wilson had discussed the question of troop levels in Europe and stated that new weapons would affect the capabilities of NATO and might lead to reduced manpower requirements. On Oct. 22 Martin reported from Paris that this had been quoted in the Paris edition of the New York *Herald Tribune* as a statement that new weapons would lead to a substantial reduction in U.S. troops stationed in Europe. (Telegram Polto 628; 740.5/10-2253)

[4] President Eisenhower at his press conference on Oct. 28 had responded along similar lines to a question about the reduction of the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad. The substance of his remarks was transmitted to Paris in telegram Topol 437, Oct. 28 (740.5/10-2753). Under Secretary of State Smith had also replied along these lines in a conversation with Ambassador Bonnet on Oct. 23. (Memorandum of conversation by Vass, Oct. 23; 740.5/10-2353)

Hughes

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[5] In press release 601, Oct. 27, Secretary Dulles had stated:

"There is no change whatsoever in that respect, and there is no contemplated withdrawal of the United States forces from Europe. I have said that in substance before. I am very glad to reiterate it, because there seems to be quite a spate of rumors to the effect that we are contemplating a withdrawal of our troops. There is no such withdrawal in contemplation." (Department of State *Bulletin*, Nov. 9, 1953, p. 632)

740.5/12–1053

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs (Arneson)

TOP SECRET

Washington, December 10, 1953.

Disclosure of Weapons Effects Information

We have come to the conclusion that in order for NATO planning to proceed on a more realistic basis it is necessary that more information concerning atomic weapons be made available. A policy of greater disclosure in the atomic weapons field would enable NATO countries to participate more fully in military planning for their own defenses and in the conduct of combined operations with the United States thereby bringing about concerted action in the event of crisis. This policy would also enable NATO countries to provide an effective program of non-military defense measures such as continuity of civil government and adequate civil defense to minimize the effects of enemy attack on lives, property, and industrial production.

This policy, of course, can be carried out only after appropriate amendments have been made to existing law. We intend to seek such amendments at the next session of Congress. Once the legal obstacles have been removed, we would propose that the requisite information be made available through military channels to the Standing Group, thence to SHAPE for use by the major NATO commands to the extent required for planning purposes. The program of disclosure which we now contemplate would, of course, not include detailed information concerning the design and fabrication of atomic weapons.

This program should also be distinguished from the reciprocal exchange of information on weapons effects which has recently been undertaken with the United Kingdom and Canada as part of our special relationships in this field. The latter exchange will be on a reciprocal basis in which certain scientific and technical information from United States and United Kingdom atomic weapon test programs will be shared. It will be part of a general program of scientific and technical interchange which grew out of the close wartime association in the atomic energy field and was continued since the war in modified form. Such results of this interchange as may be useful for NATO planning will doubtless be made available in due course and in appropriate form.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, 1953–61, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 174th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 10, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, December 11, 1953.

Present at the 174th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend because of his absence from the country. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense; Gen. Porter, Foreign Operations Administration; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (for Items 1, 2 and 3); Maurice Arth, Foreign Operations Administration (for Item 5); the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follow items 1–2, dealing with significant world developments affecting United States security and the Bermuda Conference. For that part of the minutes dealing with the discussion of the Bermuda Conference, see page 1847.]

3. *The NATO Ministers meeting*

Secretary Dulles indicated that it was the intention of the U.S. delegation at the forthcoming NATO Ministers conference[1] to emphasize the following points:

1. The long-range nature of the Soviet threat and the need to adapt NATO programs to this long-term threat.
2. The added capabilities for defense conferred by new weapons.
3. The desirability of a fuller interchange of information on these new weapons.
4. The importance of bringing the German contingents into the structure for the defense of Western Europe.

All that we would say at Paris, continued Secretary Dulles, would be firmly based on the premise that EDC will presently come into being. If this eventuality did not occur we would, of course, have drastically to reconsider our plans and policies.

Secretary Dulles indicated that the delegation would also make every effort to avoid discussion of the redeployment of U.S. forces in Europe. In this connection he said he wished to bring up a point that deserves most careful consideration, namely, the very delicate and important psychological implications of the redeployment of any substantial number of our troops. Secretary Dulles said that he was of course well aware that such a redeployment was our goal, but that nevertheless, under the instructions of the National Security Council, it was the responsibility of the Department of State to prepare the way by diplomacy for such eventual redeployment. This diplomatic task would be rendered completely unsuccessful if, through other than State Department sources, the impression were to get around that the United States was shortly planning to pull out of Europe. Every time such statements were made by officials of this Government, the Secretary of State had to forthwith issue denials. The more often such denials had to be issued, the more solidly frozen was the United States position on this issue.

The President said that he had no particular objection to philosophical dissertations on the general effect of our new weapons on strategy, but as for any attempt to relate these new weapons to the status of U.S. forces in Europe, he wanted everybody to keep still. Our great objective now, continued the President, is to get EDC ratified and the German contingents in place. Until these objectives have been achieved, let us all keep quiet on redeployment.

Secretary Wilson said he was troubled by the question whether or not to indicate, in statements about force levels for the services in future years with respect to NATO, the possibilities for successive reductions. He said that if we did not soon indicate some change in this area, the position vis-à-vis the NATO powers would be frozen.

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[1] Scheduled for Dec. 14–16 in Paris; for documentation, see pp. 454 ff.

Secretary Humphrey expressed the conviction that the President ought very shortly to lay out in a public statement what he called "the pattern of our new defense posture". He noted that the President's UN speech [2] had been followed very quickly by a Pentagon announcement of a reduction in the total force levels of the services. This had been followed by statements indicating a reduction in the budget for national defense of some $6 billion. Under present plans there would come, about March 1, the announcement that we were redeploying the two divisions from Korea. This significant series of moves would create the most dangerous speculation and very serious problems unless the President could indicate that all these moves followed a set pattern regarding our new defense posture. The President's statement should therefore reflect the attribute of strength, not only for ourselves but for our allies, and at a considerably reduced cost. If this were done and people really grasped the essentials of our new defense posture, they would not be frightened over the imagined implications of the individual steps. These would then appear to be the result of design rather than of happenstance.

The President replied that he thought Secretary Humphrey was right in general, but he stressed again the very touchy feelings in Europe on the subject of any U.S. redeployment. We, more than any other people, said the President, have accepted the atomic age in which we now all live. Many European peoples are lagging far behind us and think of themselves only as the defenseless targets of atomic warfare. Thus, while Secretary Humphrey's pattern idea was eminently sensible, we should proceed to carry it out very gradually. The President also observed that for all our talk of U.S. redeployment, the British did not have a single division in the home islands. They regarded themselves as far more "stretched out" than we are.

Secretary Wilson replied that it was a matter of great distress to him that we now seemed hopelessly caught between the fear of the Europeans as to the use of atomic weapons, and our own desire to bring our forces home.

The President reacted with some warmth to the point made by Secretary Wilson, and explained that our one great objective at the moment was to secure the ratification of EDC. Accordingly, it seemed crystal-clear to the President that we could not afford to take any steps toward redeployment, or even to talk about redeployment, until these objectives have been reached. The French have an almost hysterical fear that we and the British will one day pull out of Western Europe and leave them to face a superior German armed force.

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[2] Documentation on President Eisenhower's speech at the United Nations on Dec. 8 is presented in volume II.

After these remarks, there seemed to be general agreement that the President alone should make any public statements on the redeployment problem. Secretary Dulles, in this connection, warned that while we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many of our allies regarded the atomic capability as the gateway to annihilation.

Secretary Humphrey repeated that his only thought was that a certain number of steps were being taken and that it would be advantageous for the President to indicate and explain the pattern of these steps.

To this the President replied that as far as preparing our friends behind the scenes for accepting our new strategic concept was concerned, this was the responsibility of the Department of State. Public statements on the relation between new weapons and the redeployment of U.S. forces were in the province of the President.

Secretary Wilson then stated his belief that it would be a mistake to move the U.S. forces now stationed at Trieste to Austria in the event of a settlement of the Trieste problem. After all, said Secretary Wilson, the British and French had removed many of their forces without bothering to talk to us in advance.

Secretary Dulles replied that from a strictly political point of view, he would interpose no objection to bringing our forces in Trieste home after the Trieste problem had been satisfactorily settled. As for the military implications of such a move, he felt he must leave these to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford.

The President pointed out that it was unwise to move too hastily to bring back our forces from Trieste. After all, our plans called for flank protection for Southern Germany as well as protection for Northern Italy. However, if once we could get Trieste settled and get the Italians and the Yugoslavs together, we could certainly envisage bringing these forces home.

Secretary Wilson commented that there were several million dollars involved here, and it would be awfully useful to him to know whether these dollars were to be put in or taken out of next year's Defense Department budget. The President answered that he would not put this amount in the 1955 Defense Department budget.

Secretary Wilson, who seemed relieved, pointed out that if one were ever to make a beginning of redeployment one would have to start with small steps. The action of the Council in recommending last week the redeployment of two divisions from Korea had been very helpful, but Secretary Wilson hoped we would not stop there.

Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed themselves as favoring the redeployment of these two divisions, but they pointed out that a sudden unilateral announcement by the United States of its intention to redeploy these two divisions might well have the great disadvantage of causing others of our allies in the UN to scramble to redeploy their own contingents.

The President expressed skepticism as to this eventuality, and pointed out that he had told Sir Winston Churchill that he expected the British Commonwealth Division to remain in Korea. Secretary Dulles promised that he would do his best to keep the Commonwealth Division in Korea, and he believed that Sir Winston would agree to this course.

Admiral Radford commented at some length on the psychological importance of the timing of the announcement that these two divisions were coming back to the United States. Not least of the advantages which could be derived from the right kind of handling of this move would be the indication it would give to our allies that if we have to fight another war we will fight it in a different way. All this could be conveyed without having to talk publicly about redeployment, new weapons, and the new look of U.S. strategy.

Secretary Dulles expressed strong agreement with the points made by Admiral Radford, and added that since the Europeans are well aware of how vital we regard our security interests in Asia, our willingness to redeploy two divisions from Asia would not be interpreted as an intention by the United States to abandon its security interest in Asia. This might clarify to the Europeans that a subsequent redeployment of some of our forces from Europe was likewise no indication of an intention by the United States to cross off its security stake in the defense of Western Europe.

Secretary Wilson then pointed out with great satisfaction that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had finally come up with a unanimously agreed report on a new three-year Defense Department plan and program. He felt that this was a very great tribute to Admiral Radford, and pointed out that the redeployment of the two divisions from Korea would be most helpful as a first step in the implementation of this three-year plan.

The President wondered whether the announcement of the redeployment of the Korean divisions should not be made at least sixty days in advance of the movement. Admiral Radford, however, thought that the announcement might well be made as early as next week, while Secretary Wilson thought that the best time would be just after the NATO Ministers meeting.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on U.S. objectives at the forthcoming NATO Ministers meeting.

b. Noted the President's desire that public statements by Government officials should not directly or indirectly relate the effects of new weapons on military strategy to the redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe.

c. Noted the President's statement that the Department of State would conduct confidential discussions with allied governments regarding the redeployment of U.S. forces, but that public statements on this subject would be made only by the President or by others at his direction.

[Here follow items 4–8, dealing with United States policy and courses of action to counter possible Soviet or satellite action against Berlin, United States policy with respect to Germany, United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Latin America, United States assistance to NATO allies, and the status of NSC projects. For text of the section of the minutes dealing with Berlin, see volume VII. In the section dealing with assistance to NATO the Council noted the President's approval of two statements concerning continued United States assistance to NATO.]

Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles and members of the United States Delegation, which included Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson and Director Stassen and their principal advisers, left Washington on December 11 for the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in Paris which was scheduled to begin on December 14. In a statement at departure from National Airport, Dulles said that this was to be a working meeting where past progress would be reviewed and plans made for the future. Dulles stressed further the need for strong and loyal NATO allies with whom the United States would work confidently. For the text of his statement and a list of the members of the United States Delegation, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 21, 1953, pages 854–855.

In preparation for the session of the Council the Department of State drafted on October 20 a tentative list of papers to be prepared for the United States Delegation. (NACOM Memo 1, CFM files, lot M 88, box 166) In November a Steering Group was established consisting of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and the Foreign Operations Administration to consider the various position papers, and suggest revisions or amendments. By December 8 the list of papers, designated NACOM D in the records of the United States Delegation, had been approved and divided into five series corresponding roughly to the agenda for the Council meeting. The first series, NACOM D–1, covered various aspects of the Secretary General's approach; the second, NACOM D–2, dealt with the international political situation as it affected NATO; the third, NACOM D–3, considered the military progress of NATO and the estimate of military risk; the fourth, NACOM D–4, addressed itself to the Annual

Review; and the fifth, NACOM D–5, covered any other business. Copies of these papers, none of which are printed, are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF's 170, 171, 173, and 175, and in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166.

On October 28 the North Atlantic Council approved the following agenda for the Ministerial meeting:

"I. Report of the Secretary General
II. Consideration of the International Situation as it Affects NATO
III. Military Progress of NATO
IV. Estimate of Military Risk
V. Final Report on the 1953 Annual Review
VI. Date of the Next Ministerial Meeting
VII. Other Business
VIII. Communiqué" (NACOM Memo No. 4, November 17, 1953; CFM files, lot M 88, box 166)

The documentation that follows presents materials on the North Atlantic Council meetings and conversations which Secretary Dulles had with foreign officials on matters of mutual concern.

Editorial Note

On December 13 Secretary Dulles held a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer to discuss problems of mutual concern. After congratulating him on his victory in the September elections, Dulles proceeded to raise the question of French ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. For a report on this meeting, see telegram 2282 from Paris, December 14, page 865. A nine-page memorandum of their conversation, prepared by MacArthur, is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166.

740.5/12–1453: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 14, 1953—midnight.

Secto 3. Subject: NAC ministers meeting—opening session—item I.[2]

Council chairman Georges Bidault delivered opening address touching particularly on NATO–EDC relations. (See Secto 1 for partial text.[3])

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[1] Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

[2] Item I: Report of the Secretary General (see footnote 5, below); for the full agenda, see the editorial note, p. 454. A copy of the verbatim record, C–VR(53)53, of the first session which took place at 10:45 a. m. at the Palais de Chaillot, is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166.

[3] Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169)

Chairman asked delegations to appoint member to serve on communiqué drafting committee chaired by Deputy Secretary General Van Vredenburch. Committee to meet after each session for preliminary drafting of paragraphs for inclusion final communiqué.

Chairman then raised question of procedure, referring to C–M (53) 146,[4] and asking whether council would wish to have separate meetings in p.m. of Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers; any conclusions to be put to full session Tuesday morning. US Secretary State expressed view idea having restricted meetings very good, but wondered whether discussions in committee in advance of plenary discussion item II would be useful. Random discussions without agenda raised some questions in his mind.

UK Foreign Minister agreed with US, suggesting first two items be dealt with in plenary sessions because all ministers had a joint and collective interest in these vital discussions. It could then be decided whether to break up into committee. Norwegian Foreign Minister supported this view.

Bidault noted enthusiasm for his proposals not universal but stressed he felt NATO, representing more than a purely military alliance, should engage in free and frank exchanges on the political front. He reserved right to raise matter later.

Agenda Item I. Chairman then called on Ismay to speak on Secretary General's report.[5] Ismay underlined (1) importance and value of visits to international military maneouvers and headquarters; (2) called attention to paragraph 15, describing his comprehensive 5-year report, which he noted would be submitted to permanent council first; (3) referred specially to importance of emergency planning work, paragraphs 35 to 63, underlining civil defense particularly; (4) repeated his views on general ignorance about purpose of NATO, paragraphs 75 to 80, and noted that a re-organization of NATO information staff and creation of a special working group in information and cultural cooperation had improved work in this field. He recognized that a proper staffing for NATO information service would require money, which he was reluctant to ask for; and (5) pointed up valuable troop information and military community relations problems conference recently held.

UK Defense Minister noted progress of infrastructure and underlined importance of building up home front and particularly civil defense. He pointed out that much could be done in this area on a voluntary basis and welcomed start on this very important task.

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[4] No copy of this document has been found in the Department of State files.

[5] A copy of "Report by the Secretary General of Progress during the Period 17th April 1953 to 3rd December 1953", C–M (53) 162, dated Dec. 7, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 170.

Norwegian Foreign Minister noted paragraphs on relations with parliamentarians and expressed hope that in future visits of parliamentarians from a group of countries to Paris headquarters might take place.

Greek Defense Minister reported on two combined military maneouvers in eastern Mediterranean he had personally observed, commending excellent coordination under joint NATO command of troops from US, UK, France, Italy, Turkey and Greece.

Pella, for Italy, underlined importance of Article II work by NATO and referred particularly to recommendations on labor mobility made in last NATO WG report. He particularly cited specific recommendations approved by council in permanent session and referred to in paragraph 65 of C–M (53) 162, and thanked US Government for its action in relieving this surplus manpower situation in many European countries through refugee relief act. He furthermore underlined importance of permitting free interchange of a certain number of workers among NATO countries. He briefly supported closer contact between parliamentarians and NATO and urged that all NATO members "understand the internal situation in each country as a means of binding NATO more closely together".

Greek Foreign Minister supported Italians in his views on labor mobility and touched on Italian suggestion that member governments should facilitate capital investments in overseas settlement schemes. He thanked Ismay and Council for its help to Greece in connection Ionian Island disaster, describing it as a practical illustration of Article II work.

Bidault, speaking as French representative, underlined importance of emergency planning and then took up French proposals for NATO informational cooperation resulting from David mission (C–M(53) 171[6]). He asked that its conclusions be approved. Turkish Foreign Minister and Pella endorsed plan. Pella noted coordination action in information field was especially important and suggested *ad hoc* committee study report and come up with suggestions for council action before end of meeting. US Secretary State welcomed French proposal and agreed with need for more information coordination but suggested as to procedure that permanent representatives act on this report after David had appeared before informational and cultural committee and this committee in turn had studied matter and referred it to permanent council.

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[6] In May 1953 the French had appointed Jean-Paul David, a member of the National Assembly, to be a special envoy to the member countries of NATO. His conversations with NAC delegations on the question of public relations between NATO and its nationals resulted in C–M(53)171, "The Problem of Enlightening Public Opinion", dated Dec. 11, which suggested that new powers should be vested in the Secretary General's position with respect to all aspects of information problems. A copy of C–M(53)171 is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 170.

Greek Foreign Minister supported Italian views on need for closer coordination in informational field and supported French proposal.

Portuguese Foreign Minister said report was of value, but requested council take it up at another ministerial meeting. Chairman Bidault thanked Council for its approval of paper in principle and noted that with a four-power conference coming up [7] and vast USSR propaganda machine facing us, unified action now was important. Italy, Greece, suggested immediate consideration of paper by an *ad hoc* committee. Norway supported US in feeling that consideration of paper by a permanently established committee would lead to best results. After further discussion it was agreed that informational and cultural committee would study matter and report to council before adjournment what useful and feasible action might be taken on this report.

Canadian Defense Minister noted importance of troop information and community relations work and stressed value of standardization paragraphs 30–34. He noted that a copy of an agreement on standardization small arms round among Belgium-Canada-French-UK-US would be reported on under item III,[8] and Canada would probably submit resolution on standardization.

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[7] Documentation on the preparation for the Berlin Four-Power Conference is presented in volume VII.

[8] Item III: Military Progress of NATO; for a report on the discussion of Item III, see Secto 5, Dec. 15, p. 469.

740.5/12-1553 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 15, 1953—11 a. m.

Secto 4. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting [2]

Item II—Consideration International Political Situation.

1. At close Monday a. m. session UK Foreign Minister congratulated staff on valuable Soviet trends paper,[3] noted as yet no real evidence Soviet basic hostility changed, but tactics more flexible, perhaps more intelligent. In building up NATO as deterrent force thanks is due to US for weapons, indispensable and generously given. NATO alliance must take stock of what high quality forces can be maintained with up-to-date equipment over period of years, maintain lead in new

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[1] Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Wiesbaden.

[2] Paragraphs 1–3 complete the report on the first session in the morning of Dec. 14; for a report on the earlier part of this session, see Secto 3, *supra*.

[3] A copy of C–M(53)164, "Report on Trends of Soviet Policy, April to December, 1953", dated Dec. 5, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 171.

weapons, at earliest date get German defense contribution through EDC.

2. Turkish Foreign Minister urged NATO to recognize Soviet change tactical, their arms build-up continuing. He, in role Cassandra, noted peace offensive began only after Korea and NATO build-up. NATO countries should give priority to defense build-up, and find solutions on economic front through NATO and OEEC. NATO, through united efforts, should fill gaps and build up vulnerable points. Turkey hoped for an EDC as soon as possible and welcomed possibility of a Trieste solution.[4]

3. US Secretary State then outlined an analysis of Soviet position noting at outset according estimates Soviet Union not likely initiate immediate attack, which gratifying, if true. NATO should use breathing spell not to stop, but to strengthen unity. As background for estimates Soviet trying satisfy domestic front by internal measures re agriculture, more consumer goods. Also has problem re discontent in satellites which has direct military bearing (i.e., lines of communication) and handling relations with Communist China. Although Soviet has made great progress in atomic weapons development, NATO world has large quantitative superiority. On foreign policy front Soviet trying maintain status quo on Germany, Austria, Korea and attempting create division among western allies. President Eisenhower's recent proposal at UN[5] another US effort to bring about concerted action, but initial Soviet reaction unfavorable.

4. Reconvening in PM session Secretary State made key speech (copies by airmail) on need for European community as solid core to an Atlantic community.[6] He underlined US interest and participation in development of European unity, and US hope in early realization of EDC; US conviction of importance of NATO not only as a military force but as growing fellowship among 14 nations and forum for exchange of views. He then touched on US contribution in men, matériel and funds, careful consideration being given to annual review recommendations (on which Mr. Wilson would report more fully under Item V[7]) new importance of air defense of North American Continent, and related AR matters. Secretary State informed Council President has decided to ask congressional authority to provide NATO more information on atomic weapons.

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[4] Documentation on Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

[5] Documentation on President Eisenhower's speech at the United Nations on Dec. 8 regarding the peaceful uses of atomic energy is presented in volume II.

[6] Paragraphs 4–12 of Secto 4 cover the afternoon session which was held at 3 : 30 at the Palais de Chaillot. A verbatim record of this session, C–VR(53)54, is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris, 1953". The full text of Secretary Dulles' speech, in which he stated *inter alia* that if EDC did not become effective, it "would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy", is printed *infra*.

[7] Item V: Final Report on the 1953 Annual Review; regarding the discussion of this item, see Secto 7, Dec. 16, p. 471.

5. Danish Foreign Minister stressed need for expanding Western European economy on long-term basis. He called forthcoming Big-Four meeting decisive step in relexation tension and believed, if it failed, then there would hopefully be no doubt in his people's mind where blame lay. If no progress on Germany was made, EDC then of particular importance.

6. Italian Pella then made plea for equality of Bermuda[8] and non-Bermuda powers and cited forward steps in council consultation. NATO must face Soviet with dynamic common front. At Berlin, if it takes place, Germany, settlement of Austrian state treaty issues should be solved.

7. Norwegian Foreign Minister supported US representative in his praise of permanent council activity, shared Danish views on Big-Four meeting, underlined importance of EDC as only way to raise German defense contribution so vital to protection Norway's southern flank.

8. Belgian Foreign Minister expressed general views risk is global matter, did not favor stopping military effort but should seek to negotiate guarantees. He expressed full support for Eisenhower UN proposal, EDC, and entrusted Big-Three with Berlin negotiations in "name of NATO alliance".

9. Canadian Foreign Minister expressed strong support for EDC, touched on North American continental defense as part of NATO defense, but indicated Canada would not cut back on its commitments to Western Europe.

10. Greek Foreign Minister said Berlin talks of great interest.

11. French Foreign Minister pulled out all stops re difficulties facing France in ratification EDC, citing Indochina drain, and need for presence of allies as balancing factor. (Alluding to his opening speech in Secto 1.[9]) If all French forces in Indochina back, he noted, progress on EDC might be easier.

12. Italian Pella then noted Italy has given full support to EDC concept over past three years, but ratification discussions are now difficult as long as Trieste unresolved. He did not want to raise Trieste issue at such delicate moment in negotiations. Italy nevertheless fully subscribes to need for policy of European integration.

Bidault, in concluding Item II discussion, called for next session December 15, 11 a.m.[10]

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[8] For documentation on the meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Dec. 4–8, at Bermuda, see pp. 1710 ff.

[9] Not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169)

[10] For a report on the third session, on the morning of Dec. 15, see Secto 5, Dec. 15, p. 469.

CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris 1953"

Statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council [1]

SECRET

PARIS, December 14, 1953.

Mr. President and Members of the Council. I am very glad at your invitation, Mr. President, to take this opportunity to complete the statement which I made this morning [2] by giving my impressions about our work here in NATO and the future prospects.

These annual meetings provide us with an opportunity to see our achievements and our tasks of the future in proper dimensions. We have, I think, concluded that the risk of Soviet armed aggression in Europe is less likely today than it seemed several years ago. That change is in good part due to the fact that through NATO we have stood together and we have built together, but also we are forced to conclude that the Soviet threat persists and probably will long persist. We know too that atomic weapons make that threat potentially more serious than was visualised when this Organization was formed. These facts confront us with a dual task. We must maintain and develop unity as a permanent condition rather than as an emergency device. Also we must constantly adapt our Organization to changing military potentials. There is always a danger that a coalition may relax and lose its cohesion if the peril ceases to seem imminent. That is what the Soviet leaders say they hope will happen. They openly proclaim their intention to promote our disunity by all the means at their command. In their view basic historical forces are working for *them*. They forecast that the Western scene will soon again be dominated by its traditional strife; then will come what both Stalin and Lenin have defined as the moment for the decisive blow. That should warn us, but do we really need that warning from that source? Even if the Soviet threat were totally to disappear would we be blind to the danger that the West may destroy itself? Surely there is an urgent, positive duty on all of us to seek to end that danger which comes from within. It has been the underlying cause of two world wars and it will be disastrous if it persists. We owe that duty not only to ourselves but to the cause of Western civilization which today is entrusted to our keeping. I recall that the Treaty under which we act commits us to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of our peoples. That is a noble cause which deserves our dedication. For many centuries Western civilization has been a productive and a creative force. Its faith has emphasized the spiritual nature and the worth of the individual and that has led to bringing increased dignity to womankind and to ending human slavery and bondage. Thus the West has been an uplifting force.

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[1] The source text is an extract from the verbatim record of the afternoon session, C–VR(53)54, a copy of which is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris, 1953". Another text of Dulles' statement was released to the press following the session. It is the same in substance as the source text, except for the omission of the five points on NATO and numerous minor textual differences. A copy is printed in the *New York Times*, Dec. 15, 1953, p. 14.

[2] Regarding Dulles' statement in the morning session, see paragraph 3 to Secto 4, *supra*.

Politically the West has promoted government by consent. In many areas it has painstakingly developed the qualities which are necessary if self-rule is to be a blessing rather than a danger. The widespread peaceful evolution of our time towards increasing self-government marks the fruition, not the failure of Western ideals. Economically the West has been inventive. Its people have found ways to multiply many times the productivity of workers in both industry and agriculture. This has made it possible for many people to live and to live longer and live better. Intellectually the West has shared its own knowledge and stimulated the quest for new knowledge. Missionaries, educators, doctors, scientists and technicians have spread the ideals and practised a spiritual and intellectual freedom. How comes it that a civilisation which has so broadly advanced human welfare can now be seriously challenged by those who, beneath a veneer of sanctimonious theory, reproduce the degradation and exploitation of the Dark Ages? The answer is that the nations which have long led the West have so repeatedly fought each other that they have sapped their own vitality and diminished their authority and their prestige in the world. If the West cannot now build a safer home for its civilisation, then its statesmanship will be judged bankrupt and men everywhere will look elsewhere for leadership. What I say is nothing new. Every Western statesman of this generation has expressed that conviction. The West has immense potential strength but greater unity is necessary if that strength is to meet the challenge of our times. Such unity must take various forms responding to the differing needs and conditions. On the Continent an integrated European Community is essential to solve the problems of that area and also to provide a solid core for the wider Atlantic Community. These two structures will differ but they must be built together. Each is vital to the success of the other and each today, happily, is in fact being built. European leaders have created notable measures to advance the cause of union, the OEEC, and EPU, the Coal and Steel Community and the projected Defense and Political Communities. The American people have followed closely all of these projects. Some of our friends seem to think that we are only interested in the military aspects of the matter, that all we want to see is a recruiting of German forces. Of course, we do believe that it would be folly for the West to ignore any contribution that the German people could make to the common defence, but to portray the American people as interested only in German rearmament is totally false and a cruel caricature of the fact. The United States is primarily interested that European civilisation should survive and prosper—that cannot be without a European Community in which will be combined indissolubly the interests and the capacities of two great nations at the heart of Europe—France and Germany.

It would be difficult for me to exaggerate the anxiety with which our people await the consummation of this historic act. Also we have been more than mere observers. Our concern has been demonstrated through membership here in NATO, through close co-operation with the OEEC, through vast material contributions for economic aid and the stationing in Europe of substantial ground and air forces with strong naval support. Much has been done to make Western Europe a healthy and co-operating area but decisive steps remain to be taken. These steps must involve something more than treaties between sovereign states. Mere promises for the future are not enough to bury a past so replete with bitter memories. The need is for Europe to move onward to more complete and organic forms of union. Some profess to fear that if the European Defence Community is established then the United States will abandon military support of Europe. That is a baseless fear. At Bermuda, President Eisenhower joined with Prime Minister Churchill and the President of the French Council, M. Laniel, to say that if the European Defence Community is created within the framework of the Atlantic Community and I quote "it will ensure intimate and durable co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States forces and the forces of the European Defence Community on the Continent of Europe."[3] If, however, the European Defence Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety. That would compel an agonising reappraisal of basic United States policy. If Western Europe is to develop a political, economic and military unity which includes France and Germany, that must happen soon. There are powerful forces which are now at work to draw together the six nations of the Community and Britain and the United States stand ready to supply their firm support. Unless unity is achieved soon different and divisive forces may take command. These separatist forces will also be found in the United States. It may never again be possible for integration to occur in freedom although it might be that West Europe would be unified as East Europe has been unified in defeat and servitude. French statesmanship with strong support that includes Germany, has brought the project of the Defence Community out of the stage of nebulous planning and into the concrete treaty which is now on the verge of realisation. None of us ignore the difficulties which surround the taking of the final steps, none of us ignore the fact that the EDC Treaty raises new problems for the future, but also we see that the Treaty will end a relationship that breeds suicidal strife, and create a new relationship that promises lasting peace. The EDC Treaty, despite possible inadequacies, decisively poses a fateful choice. The United States, and I believe all the world, see it as a symbol of Europe's will to make it possible to achieve our common goal, of safeguarding our freedom, our common heritage and the civilisation of our people. The creation of a European Defence Community is part of the task, also it is our conviction that we must make an enduring unity of this Atlantic alliance. That conviction is deep and strong with us. Even with the tremendous up-surge of strength which achievement of top-level unity would give it, our Atlantic area would not be impregnable without the close co-operation of all the NATO countries of Europe and North America. We in the United States know that we need the added strength which Western Europe can alone provide, and I am confident that others feel the same need. EDC and NATO complement and reinforce each other; the two can create reasonable insurance against war.

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[3] For the text of the communiqué of the Bermuda Conference, see p. 1838.

Let me turn now to NATO and our NATO problems. First of all we can observe gladly that NATO already possesses strength. It has gone far since it began. Three years ago this month, when General Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, he had available to him less than fifteen combat effective divisions. The weakness in air and naval forces were [*was*] equally appalling. Today, General Gruenther and Admiral McCormick have available approximately eighty divisions in varying states of effectiveness, and there is very substantial growth in air and naval craft. President Eisenhower, who has had some experience in these matters, believes that the NATO troops now present create a formidable problem to any aggressor.

In the second place, we have here developed fellowship. Fourteen nations have here found the habit of working together. Our Annual Review is an institution which is unique in the history of alliances. Never before in peacetime have sovereign nations opened the top secret documents of their ministries of defence to the scrutiny of other countries, no matter how closely they were allied. Never before have nations taken recommendations from an international body concerning the length of military service, balance of forces between military services and other equally delicate problems, and, what is even more revolutionary, accepted these recommendations, often in the face of contrary domestic political considerations. In this connection I want to pay tribute to Lord Ismay and his staff for their vital contribution to the task of welding our Alliance. Again we are breaking new ground by the creation of a group of public servants who owe their allegiance not to any one of our fourteen member countries but to all of us collectively. It is their difficult responsibility to look at matters of vital national interest from the viewpoint of the Alliance as a whole and to provide leadership and imagination in reconciling national and collective interests. Under the wise guidance of our Secretary General they are discharging their tasks admirably.

In the third place, NATO is more than a military organ. This is an important fact. I recall that Senator Vandenberg, whose Senate resolution initiated the idea of American participation in this Alliance, said "NATO cannot survive unless it becomes more than just a military alliance". Believing that, we have watched with great interest, and we have encouraged the close contact which our Permanent Representatives have maintained here in Paris with reference to the political aspects of foreign policy, and as a concrete example I mention that during the successive exchange of Notes with the Soviet Union in the past months we and our British and French colleagues have benefited greatly from the points of view expressed by our NATO partners.[4] United States favours developing the non-military aspects of our task.

And in the fourth place, I would say that NATO has achieved a sustainable basis. Our studies convince us that the members of NATO can provide the resources for an adequate defence, including a wide range of new weapons, and at the same time permit a steady improvement in the living standards and general welfare of our peoples. To do this, we must put our military expenditures on a sound basis which we can sustain consistently with steady economic and social advance. And let us not forget that that itself is a security measure—it nullifies Communist subversive efforts against the free zones; also, it creates a striking contrast with despotism and thus confronts the Soviet rulers with a dilemma at home.

And in the fifth place, let me make clear that United States stands ready to do its part in carrying out the tasks which lie ahead. We are trying to play our proper role in building our common defence, and in that connection I will mention certain specific items. We have contributed our forces to those under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. From our production we have provided a major share of the equipment required for the forces of our Allies. Our Congress has appropriated 14½ billion dollars for military aid to Europe, by far the greater part of which has been aid to NATO. In this connection I shall have to note that the sum I mention, 14½ billion, includes funds appropriated for the current fiscal year. 50% of this current amount, which is designed for the military strengthening of prospective members of the EDC, can be made available only to the EDC itself. That is what

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[4] Documentation on the notes under reference here is presented in volume VII.

Congress prescribed. Some 3 billion dollars of the 14½ billion mentioned is being spent for the production of equipment from European plans. This helps both to arm NATO forces in Europe and at the same time provide dollars to strengthen their economies. We can, I hope, say that we have been a good ally, and I can assure you that we intend to continue as such. We have considered carefully the recommendations of the International Staff with respect to the improvement of United States forces committed to NATO. As our Secretary of Defence, Mr. Wilson, will report to your later, we are prepared to go a long way to meet these recommendations.[5] In addition to our contribution to the defence of Europe, we are taking steps for the defence of the North American continent, which you will recall is part of the NATO area. In this matter we are acting in close co-operation with Canada. You will recall that this Council on December 17, 1952, approved a Military Committee recommendation that it was necessary to provide a degree of protection for the essential elements of North American war-making capacity. It was at that time pointed out that by 1956—I hope it will not be sooner—that by 1956 the Soviet Union might have a formidable atomic potential against North America and, I quote from the report, "adequate defence for this area thus becomes essential in order to permit NATO to accomplish its military objectives". The temptation to aggression would be great if the aggressor could, by an initial blow, knock out the industrial power of North America. We recognise that no feasible defence against strong air attack could prevent serious damage to our cities and industries. This was stressed by President Eisenhower in his address of last week to the United Nations.[6] However, it is possible to secure a substantial measure of protection and thus ensure our capacity to retaliate massively; that capacity we believe could not be destroyed. We believe that the measures which will prevent that destruction, reduce the likelihood of war because they assure the deterrent effect of immense capacity to retaliate upon any aggressor against our Alliance. One of the essential tasks ahead is to increase the effectiveness of NATO forces by the gradual replacement of outmoded weapons with new and better weapons. The United States is prepared to do its share in attaining this objective. We included in our 1954 request to the Congress, funds to finance a contribution towards further modernising the equipment of NATO forces, using weapons developed both by us and our allies. We expect to continue this policy in requests for funds for the coming fiscal year. We accept the fact that financial and material contributions from the United States may for some time continue to be necessary if NATO forces in Europe are to be maintained at a high state of combat efficiency. We expect, however, that this contribution can steadily decrease as European economic strength increases. We are fully prepared, furthermore, to review our contributions during the course of future Annual Reviews.

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[5] Regarding Secretary Wilson's statement, see Secto 7, Dec. 16, p. 471.

[6] Documentation on President Eisenhower's speech at the United Nations on Dec. 8 on the peaceful uses of atomic energy is presented in volume II.

There has been a great deal of speculation about the impact of new weapons, particularly tactical atomic weapons, on the NATO defence programme. This is a field in which we must rely upon our military advisers and I know that they are finding it difficult to come up with precise answers to problems concerning which there has been no actual military experience. There are, however, certain things which the United States can do to make their task easier. To this end, the President has decided to ask Congressional authority to make available to NATO more information about atomic weapons. This additional information, we are convinced, will help our military advisers to perform the new task which is proposed for them, namely to provide us with a new statement of requirements of NATO forces. This reference to requirements leads me to make this observation. NATO must, in all of its military planning, take account of the need of sound economies. The determination of military requirements is an important and an essential task. However, no nation and no alliance has ever provided in peacetime all the forces that its military commanders would like to have. In deciding on the actual forces to be made available, we must take account of various other factors. We must balance the cost of adequate military security with the capability of a strong economy to pay the bill, and this must all be reckoned, not on the basis of a short all-out effort for a limited period of time, but for the long pull, not knowing when, if ever, the critical moment may appear. It means the creation of a flexible and continually modernised system of defence and the control of its costs within limits which we can long afford to maintain. We all in NATO must assure our security, not only for today, but for tomorrow and thereafter and for as long as may be required until the way is found to real and lasting world-wide peace. And I must also add this thought, in all of our planning here we must remember that the East also has its claim. Stalin proclaimed that the East was, as he put it, "the road to victory and the West". The military contributions made and to be made by NATO nations in that area deserve sympathetic recognition here; I refer particularly to France. By next spring, when we shall presumably meet again, historic decisions will have been taken which may substantially affect the character of our task and open up new possibilities. These possibilities in part reside within the European Defence Community, in part they reside within the framework of our own Treaty Organization, in part they reside within the larger framework of the United Nations Charter. I need hardly remind you that the United States seeks not merely regional strength, but it seeks global security.

President Eisenhower last week expressed to the General Assembly of the United Nations the hopes and the aspirations of the American people, and I think that they are the same as the hopes and the aspirations of all the peoples. He invited all who possess atomic weapons to sit down together, in whatever privacy may be useful, in order, as he put it, "to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death but consecrated to his life". He suggested practical ways by which this change could come about. I can assure you that the United States pledges itself to work unceasingly, not merely on the negative though essential task of defence, but also on the creative efforts which will permanently dispel the danger. Freedom derives its greatest security from the capacity of free men constantly to improve their environment by inventive thinking and applied effort. In this respect there lies before us in Continental Europe, in the North Atlantic area and, I like to think, in the whole world, a vista of promise. We work here as we must work on the daily tasks, we can draw strength from the prospect that when next we meet it will be in strengthened fellowship and with new hope.

Editorial Note

Following the afternoon session of the North Atlantic Council on December 14, Secretary Dulles held a press conference at which the text of his statement (see footnote 1, *supra*) was circulated. At the beginning of the press conference Dulles commented in part:

"As we see it, the post-war planning of Western Europe is designed to correct some of these serious mistakes of the past and to create a situation where the Western nations will cease this suicidal strife in which they have been engaged in recent centuries. At the heart of that, of course, there are allied to the great powers, France and Germany, and we understand the policy of the Continental European countries is to create a union here which will make it impossible for that strife to break out again.

"We also understand that that action will be taken within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, which will bring into association with the European Defense Community (E.D.C.) this strength which lies around the periphery of E.D.C.

"It is that policy, in regard to Europe, to which the United States is committed. In essence that is the European policy which we are trying to cooperate with, and we earnestly hope that that policy will be brought to a successful conclusion.

"If, contrary to our hopes and beliefs, it should not happen that way, it would force from the United States an agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policy."

For the full text of Dulles' opening statement and extracts from the press conference, see the *New York Times*, December 15, 1953, page 14.

On December 15 Achilles sent a memorandum to Dulles saying that the reaction to his press conference would be varied and sometimes violent. Achilles stated further that the only official reaction to that point was from de Margerie who said that the press conference had finished EDC, that it must have been deliberate, that the problem now was to save the Atlantic Alliance, that some new way would have to be found to tie Germany to the West, perhaps through NATO, and finally that France would now have to do some painful rethinking of its own policies. (Memorandum by Achilles, December 15; CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "NATO Ministerial Meeting Paris, December 1953")

740.5/12–1553 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 15, 1953—11 p. m.

Secto 5. Subject: NAC meeting December 15, a. m.—[Items] III and IV.[2]

Agenda item III—military progress of NATO.

1. Chairman military committee noted large number of changes in personnel holding high posts and singled out for praise General Ridgway and Admiral Lemonnier. He then called on Admiral Edelsten, CIC channel,[3] who underlined importance defense channel area against enemy air attack, submarine raiding and mining. He pointed particularly to shortage in minesweepers, escorts and maritime aircraft, noted undefended state of channel ports and need for better radar, fighter cover and AA guns.

2. SACLANT pointed to progress in general planning and infrastructure program in his area. His two principal problems were (1) need for immediate steps to man headquarters fully to meet requirements simple alert, and (2) logistic support planning being held up due slow progress on developing bilateral agreements with individual nations. He furthermore noted general leveling off in defense expenditures due to politico-economic factors might have impact on future plans; if there were to be a long-range deficiency it might be necessary for SACLANT to re-plan for 1956 and later.

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[1] Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg.

[2] No other record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

[3] Adm. Sir John Hereward Edelsten, R.N., Commander in Chief, Channel Command (CINCHAN), and British Commander in Chief, Portsmouth.

3. General Gruenther in his oral report considered progress made more than encouraging as reported by Ministers previous day actually "fantastic" considering difficulties faced. He noted SHAPE now examining forces to be available four years hence, plus impact new weapons, and asked council not to prejudge effect new weapons. He was giving this study first priority and it would go forward to standing group in several months, then to council. He pointed to 400-mile central European front and noted real need for German defense participation.

It would be premature to consider new weapons could even with German contribution fill this gap adequately. Two particular problems he cited were need for more effective reserves and adequate air forces. He reminded council of SACEUR's role to defend all Europe if enemy attacks. Therefore deficiency in tactical air power may be even more crucial than in ground forces. Gruenther underlined importance of well-informed NATO public and usefulness of Parliamentary visits to NATO headquarters.

4. Council took note progress report, MC 5/8 final.[4]

5. Chairman Bidault called attention to CSGM–37–53 [5] on NATO standardization of small arms ammo and congratulated Belgians, Canadians, French, United Kingdom and United States on their agreement to adopt standard round of small arms ammo. Chairman invited any others to participate in this agreement as soon as possible and asked council to approve draft press release circulated as enclosure (*b*). US Secretary Defense made statement welcoming this decision on standardization. He noted progress to date in this field encouraging, although problems and limitations on standardization substantial and numerous. He added US considers benefits from increase of standardization activity in NATO in terms of costs, production and simplification of re-supply, dictate continued effort broaden areas of weapons standardization initiated.

Item IV.

Council noted estimate of military risk, MC 45/2 revised,[6] without discussion.

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[4] Not printed; a copy of this report by the Military Committee on the military progress of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, dated Dec. 9, 1953, is in the NATO Registry files in Brussels. It was the sixth progress report submitted to the Council, and covered four types of projects: (*a*) major military projects on which notable progress had been made, (*b*) status reports on projects that had been directed by higher NATO authority, (*c*) status reports on projects of a controversial nature, and (*d*) status reports from subordinate organizations of the Standing Group.

[5] Not printed. A copy of this memorandum to the Secretary General, dated Dec. 11, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 173.

[6] Not printed; a copy of this cosmic top secret document, dated Dec. 9, is in the NATO Registry files in Brussels. It concluded that the estimate of military risk had not changed since the spring of 1953, when the subject was last considered at the Paris North Atlantic Council meeting.

Editorial Note

At lunch on December 15 Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Eden discussed who would report to the Council on the Bermuda Conference, East–West trade, Trieste, EDC, the site for the proposed Four-Power Conference, and Egypt. A memorandum of their conversation, prepared by Merchant on December 15, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169. A report on the Egyptian part of the conversation was transmitted to Washington in telegram 2311 from Paris, December 16. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169)

Following his lunch with Eden Secretary Dulles returned to the American Embassy residence for coffee with Icelandic Foreign Minister Gudmundsson. Their discussion concerned the several problems involved in United States labor policies on the bases in Iceland. Secretary Dulles indicated that all the NATO countries must make sacrifices for the benefits which NATO brought and Foreign Minister Gudmundsson stated that he wanted to make clear that his government stood squarely behind NATO. A memorandum of their conversation and telegram 2308 from Paris, December 16, reporting its substance, are in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169.

740.5/12–1653 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 16, 1953—1 a. m.

Secto 7. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting—item V

Discussion item V (report on 53 annual review and plans for 54 AR [2]) begun in morning meeting and completed at afternoon meeting December 15.[3]

1. Secretary Wilson read statement on changes in US force goals, need for keeping forces modern, and future direction of NATO military planning (reported separate telegram [4]). Bidault extended thanks on behalf Council for important statement and good example set other countries.

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[1] Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg; this telegram was transmitted in two sections.

[2] No copy of the report on the Annual Review, C–M(53)150, has been found in the Department of State files.

[3] For a report on the rest of the morning session on Dec. 15, see Secto 5, Dec. 15, p. 469; no other report on the afternoon session has been found in the Department of State files.

[4] Secto 8 from Paris, Dec. 16. (740.5/12–1653) This telegram reported that Wilson's speech would not be transmitted by telegram, but that copies would be sent with the delegation when it returned to Washington. The text of the speech is printed in *USRO Review*, Dec. 20, 1953, pp. 21–24, a copy of which is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 169.

2. Alexander for UK read statement bringing out following points: Referred to need to review military policy against background of "long haul" and maintain "our unity and strength in these new and in some ways more difficult circumstances". Emphasized need of German force contribution through EDC and need to go on increasing NATO forces and raising their efficiency within politico-economic capabilities. Urged steps to build up reserve forces to permit rapid full mobilization. Re recommendations in UK country chapter, promised study carefully but owing to financial limits and manpower considerations, could not promise how far UK can carry out. In line with new approach set forth in 54 AR draft resolution [5], said task of military authorities now is "to press on with task of reviewing and reassessing pattern of our defense effort against background of political and economic assumptions which they have been given and taking into account as realistically as possible effect of new weapons". Pointed out such studies may take long time but military should give "such interim guidance as they can" during 1954 AR. Said that work of military will have so great an effect on activities of Council as whole that will be "advantageous for Council to receive progress reports from military from time to time indicating how matters stand and bringing to Council's notice any issues of importance which seem likely to effect broad policy of the alliance."

3. Statement of Greek Defense Minister stressed two points:

a. Influence of new weapons on strategic thinking and
b. Closer linking up of NATO military strength with that elsewhere in the world.

Warned of "smiling Communists" and against relaxation of effort. Long period of tension should not be accepted as justification for "long slope downward" in strength. Said Greece accepts force goals with amendments suggested by IS; will try to carry out recommendations in country chapter.

4. Pleven welcomed Gruenther's outline of studies going forward in SHAPE based on forces expected to be available in 1957. Emphasized need for coordination of NATO forces and national strategic striking forces. Welcomed emphasis on need for reserve forces; said not only problems of training and mobilization are involved but also problems of equipment; therefore pleased to hear US statements on continuation of aid. Said start should be made soon on long-term problem of establishing stocks of equipment in Europe in peacetime though recognized this could only be dealt with on long-term basis. Said France

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[5] A copy of the Draft Resolution on the 1954 Annual Review, C-M(53)166(revised), dated Dec. 11, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 175.

will continue study seriously recommendations in French country chapter; limitations on available resources will probably make it impossible increase army support units for M/3 army forces as recommended but France "probably can meet" recommendations re air and navy.

5. Taviani for Italy stressed need for increasing attention in NATO AR to political and economic problems. Said alliance based on Articles II and III of treaty as well as remainder. Thanked US and Canada for past aid but road to real unity is long one and will call for more attention to economic measures. Said long-term problems must be thoroughly considered next year in context of economic and social problems. 1954 review should not be limited too strictly to military factors; should consider whether "basic principles of alliance are still being carried out".

6. Maudling (for UK Treasury) commenting on economic aspects report noted UK acceptance force goals country chapter based on two assumptions:

(*a*) That local costs UK forces in Germany will continue come from sources outside UK and

(*b*) That UK will continue receive aid from US, particularly in support RAF.

Stressed UK concern with balance payments position. Noted UK defense costs approximately ⅛ their GNP and indicated this was politically and economically limit to which they could go at this time.

Said margin UK defense expenditures over annual recurring costs small and emphasized importance UK attaches to study maintenance problem, particularly factors obsolescence and modernization. Again alluded to necessity continuation end-item aid and OSP and said Secretary Wilson's reference to modernization problem most helpful.

7. Portuguese said they accepted recommendations with reservations indicated annex their country chapter. Regretted they could not agree with IS views on economic and financial situation their country. Re US comments on Portuguese air force goals said, they doubted they could face attack (mentioning specifically Azores) with three squadrons. Indicated NATO use Portuguese bases related build up Portuguese air force.

8. Canadian Defense Minister agreed generally with UK and with French re high cost maintaining forces present levels. Said Canadians had just completed six-month study estimating costs maintaining RCAF at present levels through 1960. Noted that in present Canadian fiscal year, aircraft production amounted approximately 25 percent their defense budget. Taking into account maintenance costs for attri-

tion and obsolescence, study showed figure would rise each year through 1960 just to maintain present levels RCAF. Cited this as example that there little latitude for policy changes or increased commitments in any direction. Referring to IS recommendations in Canadian country chapter, noted that cost of three AWX squadrons recommended for deployment in Europe would come roughly 150 to 200 million yearly. Recommendation re additional base for reserve fleet must have very low priority. Recommendations re maritime aircraft will be met partly. Recommendations re escort vessels would mean taking money away from something else in defense program and would leave yards idle after vessels built. Re other IS recommendations said he believed Canada would meet most of them. Regarding Canadian aid, said he expected would be kept at about same level as over last three years. In future, Canadian aid would be mostly in form finished end items although air crew training program previously announced will be carried out. Connection air crew training program, noted that to date Canada had offered training for 2,520 NATO air cadets at cost roughly $50,000 per man. Only 1,864 cadets sent by NATO countries in response this offer. Indicated NATO countries overlooking something of considerable value in permitting loss of approximately 25 percent of total Canadian training offer to date.

9. Netherlands Minister agreed with UK re costs maintaining forces. Noted Netherlands attached particular importance chapter 7 AR report and said hoped ARC would continue studies maintenance problem begun this year. Expressed great satisfaction with US and Canadian statements regarding aid and said on this basis Netherlands confident their build up to five divisions could be accomplished.

10. Greek Minister noted Greece only country where annual recurring costs higher than present defense budget and that because of economic situation in Greece, their problem more acute than those other member countries.

11. Following above statements, Ockrent made brief oral report explaining absence EDC submission this AR. Gave estimated force goals by country and by service based on assumption EDC in operation January 54. No delegation commented on Ockrent's report.

12. Chairman Bidault said Council would "note" report on AR for 53 and oral statement made by Ockrent.

13. Council then adopted draft resolution on 53 AR C–M (53) 165 (revised)[6] without comment. Brackets removed from first recognizing paragraph and at US suggestion word "undiminished" deleted.

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[6] Not printed; a copy of C–M(53)165 (Revised), dated Dec. 11, is in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 175.

14. Draft resolution on 54 AR C–M (53) 166 (revised) adopted with following changes:[7]

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[7] For a report on the remainder of the Dec. 15 afternoon session, see Secto 6, Dec. 15, *infra.*

740.5/12–1553 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 15, 1953—11 p. m.

Secto 6. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting.

Item VI—Date of next meeting.

At suggestion US permanent representative it was agreed effort be made hold next meeting early April with view coinciding with five-year anniversary NATO.

Unrelated subject.

Canadian Foreign Minister, referring to chairman's suggestion yesterday[2] re restricted session Ministers, inquired whether Bidault intended proceed further with suggestion. Chairman said he still favored such meeting if agreeable his colleagues. No objections were raised and US Secretary State suggested would be helpful if it understood there would be only Ministers and perhaps only one adviser per Minister. Chairman said he would go further and recommend meeting be restricted three Ministers and one adviser per del, one interpreter, permanent representatives and Secretary General. His recommendation was accepted and restricted meeting will be held tomorrow morning 11 o'clock followed by afternoon closing plenary session.[3]

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[1] Repeated to the other NATO capitals and to Bonn, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg.

[2] Regarding Bidault's suggestion, see Secto 3, Dec. 14, p. 455.

[3] For the record of the restricted session, see Merchant's notes, p. 476.

Editorial Note

During the morning of December 16 Secretary Dulles discussed the Trieste question with Italian Prime Minister Pella for three quarters of an hour. In setting up the meeting Secretary Dulles had told Pella that he was unwilling to go into details on the subject or negotiate about it. The United States Delegation reported the substance of the discussion in telegram 2319 from Paris, December 16, which is printed in the compilation on Trieste in volume VIII.

740.5/12–2453

Notes Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) on the Restricted Session of the North Atlantic Council, December 16[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 16, 1953.

Chairman Bidault. Understood in no form press to be given anything of this meeting. Must decide what to discuss.

Lange. All interested in Four Power meeting.[2] Could Bermuda participants say bit more on this subject—and on any plans for security arrangements or guarantees—trilateral or multilateral?

Dulles. Will Chairman speak to it?

Chairman. Not sure can reply entirely to legitimate Norwegian curiosity. Glad to try brief report. Considered time and place for Four Power meeting. Considered Russian replies, etc. We gave Jan 4 and Berlin in our reply. Problem posed for France in Presidential election in setting January date.

The subject raised in question of Security guarantees was essentially that of reducing Soviet fears (Adenauer one of first to speak on this). Problem not solved but progress on procedure. One form is a contract; other would be a guaranty. Texts not finished.

Exchange of guarantees best of course.—

Can say no more—experts starting today in Paris to achieve cohesion.[3] (Germany will be informed.)

Also talked at Bermuda, with Ismay present, re this NAC Council—no decisions taken.[4] Ismay already has reported. My suggestion for restricted meetings of Council for example was mentioned.

Had long debate on EDC—don't accept all that press said. No need to go further here on that subject.

Talked of China, the Korean Armistice and Indo China. Also Suez Canal.

Eden. Security guaranty is something (if terms agreed) which could be put in at Berlin only if talks there make progress. Not a solution by itself.

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[1] Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Merchant to the Executive Secretariat, dated Dec. 24, which stated that the notes had been edited minimally for the sake of clarity and that no official record of the session had been kept. The U.S. Delegation transmitted a summary of the restricted session in telegram Secto 9 from Paris, Dec. 16. (740.5/12–1653) According to Merchant's notes the session began at 11 a. m.

[2] Documentation on the preparations for the Berlin Four-Power Conference is presented in volume VII.

[3] Documentation on the meetings of the experts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Paris in December and January in preparation for the Berlin Conference is presented *ibid.*

[4] For reports on Ismay's meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at Bermuda on Dec. 6, see pp. 1787–1793.

Re Soviet intentions and our assessment, military threat may have receded (thanks in part to NATO) but Soviet diplomacy of division has become more skillful. We all here must be careful to promote unity. Soviets play line of "Europe for the Europeans" (Sov. in Eur and US not). We must never forget immense importance Marshall plan and US presence in NATO.

At Berlin we must make sure we miss no opportunity for negotiation. But cannot be led into another Palais Rose.[5]

Secretary Dulles. Can supplement with reference to Ger, USSR and US. Germany principal subject at prospective Berlin meeting.

Germany must be treated as a real party at interest and not as defeated, occupied country. Means we must keep contact with Bonn and experts. Also any Security arrangement must be one Germany will accept. Can't treat her as second class power—to do so promotes what we seek to avoid. Think such arrangement can be found. UN Charter contains provision equally binding USSR (Art II). We must not derogate from that. We rely on that and want to keep it unimpaired as in our own interest. Doubt Soviets seriously will consider unification of Korea or Germany or end Austrian occupation. Hope that will change. Discontent in satellites might lead to chain reactions if Soviets withdraw. We'll earnestly hope for change in Soviet policies. As indicated, we informed Soviets in advance of President's UN speech after UK and French thought its proposals sound.

A word on the US—all know tremendous difference between present policy and pre-1914 policy. Cannot leave you with belief that it is easy firmly to hold Congress and public opinion behind it—must not take US for granted. Our present policy is based on US great hopes that future will be different from past. We have serious problem at home—Administration eager to continue along this line. Please take this into account in your actions and statements.

Pearson. Can Eden say anything on Suez?[6]

Eden. Yes. This negotiation long and difficult. In April negotiations broken off entirely. Resumed informally in May on UK initiative. Considerable progress on number of points. Down to two main issues on which we can't give way. Described. (Availability and uniforms.) Base vast—can't be physically moved as a whole.

Van Z. Heard much of new weapons in NAC. Realize secret but is there any further information US delegation can give.

Dulles. As Wilson and I pointed out, President intends seek liberalization of present law which is restrictive and was passed by Congress when US thought it had monopoly. Soviets have much information by stealing from US and by technical development. Not expert—can't say anything anyway because bound by law. Might say in confidence this room the following:

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[5] Documentation on the Four-Power Deputy Foreign Ministers meetings at Paris, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951 is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.

[6] Documentation on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning the base at Suez is presented in volume IX.

US has developed weapons in number and variety such that they are assuming almost conventional role—army, navy, air force. Much cheaper in explosive effect. Raises query on what scale to make because no use make if can't effectively use them. Possible duplication of expense adding A-weapons to conventional.

When law passed one question to raise thereafter is their use on bases. Soviets will have weapons. This involved series of problems but seemed wise to put this thought in minds around this table. Referred to 280 mm guns. Wilson added all our experimental work looks hopeful in achieving results and application in use.

. . . .

Dulles. This raises technical issues not competent to discuss. There are of course dual purpose guns. Not merely technical problems, however—there are political factors involved. All would prefer I suppose not be first to use A weapons—certainly of mass type. But first to use gains tremendous advantage. Thinking we must do on this subject raises very profound problems.

Chairman. Our military placed in difficult planning situation. Will welcome liberalization of US law. Should come soon lest public say "if miracle weapon available, why waste our money?"

Pearson. There's another consequence—its political, strategic and economic. Now we know Soviet has it in advanced form. Must protect North America against these weapons. Expressed in US and Canada in new form Continentalism. If US destroyed, not much hope for rest of world. Secretary Dulles pointed out important not to underestimate US public opinion. Canada and US working out calmly Continental defense—only another aspect of NATO defense. This underlines importance US and Canada be kept encouraged by European developments in which we have real stake. Aware great progress made in this area within Atlantic context. No refuge for Canada in isolationism—learned that in 1914, but enemy will attempt to exploit potential divisive forces.

Expressed gratitude for this kind of talk. Underlined interest of all 14 in a security guaranty. Any guaranty would have to cover, he supposed, all 14. Therefore hope when experts near end their task, there will be provided opportunity for Permanent Council to be informed and consider results. Might put in communiqué phrase on Atlantic Community.

Ismay. (On Pearson request) Spoke of useful, closed NAC permanent rep sessions as developed in past year.

Chairman Bidault. Three will certainly think about Pearson suggestion—will study question of security guarantee. Like Pearson's idea to put in communiqué phrases on Atlantic Community. ("We on the wrong continent" welcome suggestion.)

Dulles. Need to strike balance between defense and offensive. Heart of US and Canada probably first target of any future war. Area now easily in range of atomic attack. If we should build complete defense we'd spend so much we possibly couldn't spend sufficient on defense here or on SAC as retaliatory force—striking power of latter can equally deter against attack against all—in this way effective where local defense may not be. No panic on North American continent—deterrent striking power requires arrangements for facilities to be available on very short notice, as Gruenther said. Attach hence great importance to developing mechanism which can go into effect instantly on an alert—otherwise collective weapon losses efficacy.

Chairman. Anything else? Thanks to all, etc.

Meeting adjourned at about 12:40 p.m.

L[IVINGSTON] T. M[ERCHANT]

Editorial Note

According to a tentative schedule in the records of the United States Delegation the final session of the North Atlantic Council meeting was to be held at 3:30 p.m. on December 16. Apparently this meeting was largely, if not exclusively, devoted to the final communiqué for the Council meeting, but no record of it has been found in the Department of State files. A copy of the tentative schedule is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, "NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris December 1953". For the text of the final communiqué of the meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 4, 1953, pages 8–9 or *AFP*, volume I, pages 1633–1636.

Eisenhower Library, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 23, 1953

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, December 24, 1953.

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Executive Officer, Operations Coordinating Board (for Items 7 and 8); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (for Items 7 and 8); the Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (all for Items 7 and 8). Also present for Items 7 and 8 were the following members of the NSC Planning Board: Robert R. Bowie, State; Frank C. Nash, Defense; Gen. Porter, FOA; W. Y. Elliott, ODM; Elbert P. Tuttle, Treasury; Col. Hugh Cort, JCS; Robert Amory, Jr., CIA; George A. Morgan, OCB, and Paul L. Morrison, Budget. Philip H. Watts, Department of State; Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Department of Defense; and Christian Herter, Jr., of The Vice President's Office, were also attending the meeting for Items 7 and 8. Also present were the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Arthur Minnich, Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Ina Holtzscheiter, NSC Staff (for Items 7 and 8).

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

[Here follow items 1–6, dealing with the security of NSC documents, NSC meetings and actions, significant world developments affecting United States security, United States policy toward the Soviet satellites, United States civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands, and the military program under NSC Action No. 987*e*.]

7. *The NATO Ministers Meeting*

Secretary Dulles said that the NATO Ministers Meeting had been regarded by other members as being as successful as any such meeting ever held. They all felt much greater serenity and confidence, whereas last April's meeting had been "pretty jittery". Secretary Dulles said that we have successfully introduced the concept of the long haul.

The military situation, said Secretary Dulles, was brilliantly presented by General Gruenther in an extemporaneous talk without notes. General Gruenther presented a picture which was by no means uniformly satisfactory, but which nevertheless contained elements of great strength and which indicated that any aggression would meet with great difficulty.

One important feature, and an innovation, was a private meeting of a few of the leading NATO Ministers, with only one staff adviser permitted each Minister.[1] This meeting had taken place on the last day of the conference, and both he and Secretary Wilson had attended. They talked confidentially about a number of matters, and the other

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[1] For a record of this meeting, see the notes on the restricted session, Dec. 16, p. 476.

NATO Ministers had told Secretary Dulles that they thought the occasion particularly helpful. Since it stressed something more than the usual military aspects of NATO, there was a real sense of political unity.

Secretary Dulles went on to point out that he and Secretary Wilson had made every effort to get the other NATO Ministers to thinking in something like our terms of atomic weapons and of the atomic age. This had not been wholly successful, and the other Ministers were still very frightened at the atomic prospect. Secretary Dulles said that he had explained how very difficult it would be for the United States to continue to finance the cost of two separate kinds of armament and to plan for two possible kinds of war. Accordingly, we were reaching a point of decision as to the use of atomic weapons. We could not go on forever making both types of armaments, and our allies must try to understand the problem. From this discussion Secretary Dulles deduced that the United States would be unable to secure from its allies any agreement in advance to the use of new weapons. But there would be agreement by them on the creation of an alert system which could quickly be put into effect if and when war came. Beyond this our campaign of education for our allies on atomic weapons must go on, and this little informal meeting was a long step in this direction. Indeed, said Secretary Dulles, it may well turn out to have been the most significant achievement of the whole NATO Ministers Meeting.

There had also been some discussion, said Secretary Dulles, of U.S. continental defense and the part it would play in the total defense of the free world. We reassured our NATO allies, said Secretary Dulles, that we had no intention of cutting down our striking power to assist Europe, and he promised that we would maintain an appropriate balance between the offense and the defense. Secretary Dulles also noted the great interest of our allies in the proposed legislation to provide for freer exchange of atomic information.

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The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed a report by the Secretary of State on the NATO Ministers Meeting.[2]

[Here follows item 8 in which Vice President Nixon reported on his trip to the Near East, South Asia, and the Far East.]

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[2] Following the NSC meeting the White House issued a press release saying that Secretaries Dulles, Humphrey, and Wilson and Director Stassen had reported to the President on the North Atlantic Council meeting. They reported that NATO was functioning efficiently and was "continuing to develop the strength and cohesion needed to provide security on a long-term collective basis." For the full text of the press release, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 7.

C. PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A "NEW LOOK" IN NATO AND RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR ASSOCIATION WITH NATO, DECEMBER 1953–DECEMBER 1954

740.5/2–154

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 1, 1954.

Subject: The JCS "New Look"

In planning our next moves in connection with the forthcoming EDC[2] ratification debate in France and in our day-to-day NATO problems, including planning the 1954 Annual Review, we find ourselves somewhat handicapped by our lack of knowledge regarding the "New Look" which we understand the JCS has taken at U.S. defense policy, which underlies the Administration's 1955 defense budget.[3] Furthermore, USIA is without guidance from us on this extremely sensitive issue, and we must begin weaving the "New Look" into our 1955 aid philosophy.

As you know, there is a long-standing suspicion in Western Europe that our interest in that area is limited and transient and that there is real and imminent danger of our retreating to isolationism or, almost as bad, to a peripheral strategy. At the present time, we are examining within the Department various types of assurances which we might be able to give in order to allay these fears and to afford the Europeans a sense of confidence that they will not be left either to the mercy of the Soviets or to internecine strife.

We have, of course, a number of the pieces of the "New Look" jigsaw puzzle, such as NSC 162/1,[4] the recent speeches by the Secretary before the Foreign Policy Association and the National Press Club and Admiral Radford's speech before the latter Organization.[5] The basic elements of the new policy, as we understand them, appear to be:

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[1] Drafted by Palmer.

[2] For documentation on United States efforts to secure ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty, see pp. 571 ff.

[3] Documentation on the so-called "New Look" or "New Approach" to U.S. military policy, which involved greater emphasis and reliance upon nuclear weaponry of both a strategic and tactical nature, is printed in volume II.

[4] NSC 162/1, entitled "Review of Basic National Security Policy" and dated Oct. 19, 1953, was one of the products, along with the NSC 151 and 153 series, of a general study of armaments and U.S. policy conducted throughout the spring, summer, and autumn of 1953. A conclusion reached in NSC 162/1, and subsequently included as part of NSC 162/2 of Oct. 30, 1953, was that "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions. Where the consent of an ally is required for the use of these weapons from United States bases on the territory of such an ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such an ally for such use. The United States should also seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations". Documentation on NSC series 151, 153, and 162 is *ibid.*

(1) a withdrawal back to the United States of substantial numbers of our troops presently stationed overseas, thereby achieving greater flexibility and mobility for any necessary emergency redeployment of our forces;

(2) a recognition of the fact that any withdrawal from Europe would seriously undermine the strength and cohesion of the defense arrangements which we have undertaken with our allies, which in turn necessitates

(3) diplomatic action to convince our allies that the new arrangements insure maximum efficiency of common defense and that they must bear the primary responsibility for local ground defense;

(4) primary emphasis on the deterrent effect of massive atomic action against an aggressor: and

(5) retaliation, in the case of localized aggression, at places and under conditions of our own choosing.

What is not clear in the foregoing is how the Joint Chiefs (and the Administration) envisage this policy would be specifically applied in Western Europe. We would assume that the Joint Chiefs' appreciation of the political factors in the immediate situation ahead of us, particularly the delicacy of the forthcoming EDC debate, is sufficient to preclude any plans for an early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. We are not so clear, however, about what the Joint Chiefs have in mind over a longer period or whether they will refrain from talking about the longer-range prospects. It might, for example, be self-defeating in the long run if we were to attempt through political commitments or through our information media to convey the impression that we intend to maintain substantial American ground forces in Western Europe on a long-term basis and then be faced within a few months of EDC ratification with a situation in which we had to explain the necessity of withdrawing them. Such a development would run the serious danger of indicating to those elements in France which have been luke-warm all along to EDC that we played fast and loose with them solely in order to bring EDC into existence. Any such impression could, of course, seriously prejudice the successful operation of EDC which, in the last analysis, will only be as strong as the will of the participating countries to make it work.

In addition to the general range of problems alluded to above, there are specific reports which persistently come to our attention and which seem to indicate a trend in military thinking toward a peripheral strategy. For example, we have heard that the Pentagon is giving serious attention to the forthcoming Report of the House Armed Services Subcommittee for the deployment of U.S. forces in Spain; also to a suggestion which was deleted from the Report at the suggestion of the Department regarding the relocation in Spain of certain U.S. headquarters presently located elsewhere in Europe (particularly CINCNELM).[6] Moreover, there have been indications that the Air Force may not be as interested as formerly in two of the TAC bases for which we are presently negotiating in Northern Italy.

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[5] Reference is presumably to the Secretary's address made before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, on Jan. 12, and to the Secretary's address to the National Press Club, Washington, Dec. 22, 1953. For texts of these addresses, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 25, 1954, pp. 107–110, and Jan. 4, 1954, pp. 3–7. During the course of both of these speeches, the Secretary discussed military policy with respect to Western Europe at some length and during the former address Dulles enunciated the doctrine of "massive and instant retaliation". Admiral Radford addressed the National Press Club on Dec. 14, 1953.

I wonder if it would be possible for one or two of us to have a word with you in order to explore the best means of smoking out Defense on this highly important subject.

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[6] Vice Adm. Jerauld Wright, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), had his headquarters in London.

740.5/2–1054

Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, February 10, 1954.

With reference to your memorandum of February 1,[1] General Ridgway lunched with me today and gave me the explicit assurance that so far as he personally is concerned, and he said that he thought this represented the view of the Joint Chiefs, there is no intention of withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Europe.[2] He said that he thought they fully appreciated the effect on EDC of a shift in U.S. policy regarding the maintenance of American ground forces in Europe and that apart from the military considerations involved, the Joint Chiefs were giving full weight to the political considerations affecting EDC.

I thought I detected a much more firm attitude on the part of General Ridgway regarding maintenance of forces abroad than he expressed some weeks ago when this subject was discussed. Mr. Robertson, who attended on both occasions, agrees with this estimate. Thus, on the subject of withdrawal of ground forces from Korea about which General Ridgway had expressed himself very positively a few weeks ago, he now says that what he meant was a "regrouping" rather than withdrawal.

I doubt whether there is any reason for immediate concern on the question referred to in your memorandum of February 1. (attached)

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] A handwritten note in the margin at this point reads "no mention of timing".

740.5/2-2454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, at Paris [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 25, 1954—7 : 10 p. m.

Topol 955. Ref Polto 1354.[2] Suggest US Representative take following line at Feb. 27 NAC discussion date next Ministerial Meeting:

1. U.S. inclined minimize risk of Soviet charge NATO "ganging up" particularly since Geneva meeting [3] confined Far Eastern problems and no true grounds exist for such charge. Furthermore, precedent for spring Ministerial Meeting established.
2. Canadian suggestion meeting during Geneva conference on other hand would increase any possible risk of "ganging up" charge since would tend appear as simultaneous consultation with NATO on progress Geneva. Moreover would be tactically difficult, if not impossible, persuade Soviets and Chinese agree to necessary recess Geneva meeting to permit attendance Western principals NATO Ministerial Meeting.
3. While might be certain advantages Ministerial Meeting in May following Geneva, uncertainty re duration Geneva conference makes unfeasible schedule definite May date until Geneva talks well underway.
4. U.S. reiterates its objections to March meeting (Topol 934 [4]) and strongly urges agreement on April 22–23 date as most practicable. If others feel necessary further dissociate such meeting from Geneva talks, advance publicity might tie Ministerial Meeting to NATO Anniversary, even though dates do not exactly coincide.
5. If April 22–23 agreed upon, believe early public announcement desirable.

Foregoing assumes agreement agenda will be restricted political subjects. Treasury, Defense, FOA informed.[5]

DULLES

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[1] Drafted and initialed for the Secretary by Charles W. Adair, NATO Adviser in RA; cleared by EUR and S; repeated to Rome for Bruce.

[2] Not printed; it reported that at a closed North Atlantic Council session on Feb. 24 agreement was not reached on an appropriate date for the next ministerial meeting. (740.5/2-2454)

[3] Reference is to the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, Apr. 26–July 21, 1954, documentation on which is in volume XVI.

[4] Not printed; it reported Dulles' view that the forthcoming NATO Ministers meeting should be brief, held at Paris just prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference, and confined to the Foreign Ministers of the various NATO countries. The decision took into account the belief that an earlier meeting would risk coming in the middle of the French EDC ratification debate. (740.5/2-2354)

[5] In telegram Polto 1395 from Paris, Mar. 3, Hughes reported that the French had agreed to an Apr. 23 date for the NAC Ministerial meeting, that the North Atlantic Council had agreed that the general political situation would be discussed, and that a brief communiqué would be promptly released stating the meeting would mark the fifth anniversary of NATO. (740.5/3-354)

740.5/3-3054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State (Galloway)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 30, 1954.

Subject: Consultations on Atomic Weapons

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, French Minister
Mr. Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor, Department of State
Mr. W. J. Galloway, Special Assistant to the Counselor

At his request, Mr. Daridan came in to see Mr. MacArthur this morning. Mr. Daridan said he understood there was a possibility that the question of atomic weapons might be one of the topics to be discussed at the forthcoming NATO meeting. Presumably this would be further discussion of those aspects of the matter raised at the last NATO meeting.[1] Mr. Daridan said that the French Government had no objection to such a discussion taking place at the NATO meeting and assumed that since the primary responsibility in these matters rested with the United States, the discussion would be on the initiative of this Government.

Mr. Daridan then came to what was obviously the purpose of his visit. He said that a telegram had been received from Mr. Bidault suggesting that it would be desirable for the Secretary, Mr. Eden and himself to have private discussions on the conditions for the utilization of atomic weapons in the general European area and specifically from bases in French North Africa and Metropolitan France. He mentioned that Mr. Churchill's recent statement on the use of atomic weapons from bases in the UK[2] seemed to make such talks desirable. Mr. Bidault proposed that these talks take place when the three ministers are together in Paris for the NATO meeting.

Mr. Daridan then said that the Embassy understood from the U.S. Armed Services that the proposals for amending the McMahon Act[3] would probably not be considered by Congress before June.

He said that the French Government now proposed that the Standing Group should begin working on these questions of employment of atomic weapons under NATO without waiting for formal Congressional action. Mr. Daridan gave the impression that the French Government was not proposing any formal action on the part of the Standing Group, but rather that it should just begin thinking about the problem. He said the French Government believed that the Standing Group was the proper body to deal with the matter.

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[1] See statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 461, and telegram Secto 7 from Paris, Dec. 16, 1953, p. 471.

[2] On Mar. 23, in response to a query in Parliament, Prime Minister Churchill had made a brief statement reconfirming U.S. airbase rights in the United Kingdom for retaliatory purposes, subject to prior consultation between officials of the two governments. The rights had first been formally extended by the United Kingdom during the time of Prime Minister Churchill's visit to Washington in January 1952 (*H. C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 525, cols. 1050–1052). Documentation on the Churchill visit to Washington in January 1952 is printed in volume VI.

[3] Reference is to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Public Law 585, 79th Cong., 60 Stat. 755, Aug. 1, 1946).

Mr. Daridan indicated that a member of the Embassy staff would be in touch with Mr. Arneson in regard to the French Government's suggestion.[4]

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[4] Jacques Martin, First Secretary of the French Embassy, called on R. Gordon Arneson of S/AE later on Mar. 30 to stress once again the desirability of private tripartite discussions at the forthcoming NAC meeting concerning prior consultation on the use of atomic weapons. "He stressed that while Bidault felt such a discussion was highly desirable he would, of course, leave it to the Secretary to decide when the time was ripe." Martin and Arneson also reviewed the importance of the Churchill statement and Martin asked for a prognosis on the passage of the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. He was given the same answers as was Daridan earlier (Memorandum of conversation, by Arneson, Mar. 30, 1954, 740.5/3-3054).

Editorial Note

In telegram 1175 from Moscow, March 31, Ambassador in the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen reported that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had handed him a 10-page note dealing with the possibility of concluding an All-European Security Treaty as put forth by the Soviet Union at the Berlin Conference of January 25 to February 18, 1954. Foreign Minister Molotov had also raised the possibility of Soviet membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Molotov told Bohlen that the Soviet Government would publish the note within 24 hours. (740.5/3-3154) The Soviet note regarding European security and the proposal of Soviet adherence to NATO is printed in full in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, pages 39–43. Documentation on the Berlin Conference is presented in volume VII.

The immediate United States response to the Soviet note was set forth in press release 169, March 31, printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 12, 1954, page 562. Telegrams 3634 and 3640, from Paris, April 1; telegram 3673 from Paris, April 2; and telegram 4223 from London, April 2 indicated that the response of the French and United Kingdom Governments to the Soviet note paralleled the skepticism and suspicion expressed by the United States. Telegram 3673 also expressed the desire that a tripartite working group be established at Paris to draft a formal reply with April 20 tentatively set as a suitable target date for transmission to Moscow. The aforementioned telegrams are in file 740.5.

740.5/3–3154

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, March 31, 1954.

Subject: Suggested US initial public reaction to Soviet note of March 31 proposing that US take part in "All-Europe Security Treaty" and that Soviet Government would be prepared to consider subject of Soviet participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Discussion:

We have only Bohlen's very brief summary of the note which he has been informed will be issued in tomorrow's Soviet press.[2] This means that it may be on the Soviet radio as of midnight, Soviet time, which is 4:00 p. m. today in Washington. There are already some fragmentary stories in the news tickers concerning this note. Under the circumstances we can expect a barrage of questions from the press during the course of the next 24 hours and should therefore give urgent consideration to the nature of our initial official reaction to the public.

The Soviet move is well timed in terms of French indecision over EDC and the current outcry over the H-Bomb tests,[3] and also represents an attempt on the part of the Soviets to knock the props out from under two of our main arguments at Berlin against the Soviet European security proposal—that is, the omission of the United States from the project and the incompatibility of the project with NATO.

We should bear in mind that this Soviet move may find a favorable reaction in some non-communist quarters in Western Europe, with a consequent need for us to formulate our initial reaction in such fashion as not to appear that it is the United States which is standing in the way of all good things.

Recommendation:

It is therefore suggested that our initial reaction should be along the following lines:

(1) We do not yet have the full text of the note, which is a very long one, and are basing our views on Ambassador Bohlen's very brief summary.

(2) Similar notes have been delivered by the Soviets to the British and French Ambassadors in Moscow, and we shall, of course, be exchanging views with our allies on the questions raised.

(3) The division of Europe has come about as a result of Soviet domination over its Eastern European satellites. With regard to the Soviet European collective security treaty, with or without U.S. participation, the Soviets are really asking the Western European states to give up EDC as a price for joining the pan-European system. Since

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[1] Drafted by Thurston.

[2] See editorial note, *supra*.

[3] Documentation on U.S. hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific during early 1954 is in volume II.

the main threat to European security has arisen from the Soviet power system imposed on Central and Eastern Europe, their proposal is a completely one-sided proposition as long as the Soviets continue to maintain their monolithic empire in Eastern Europe. An all-European collective security system will have a genuine foundation only when the peoples of Eastern Europe have re-acquired their national freedom. It is the Soviet Union which precludes the achievement of this goal by its imperialistic power structure in Central and Eastern Europe.

(4) The North Atlantic Treaty is based on the mutual trust which exists among its signatories. It would otherwise be a piece of paper without real significance in international life. In considering the Soviet proposal for discussions with regard to the question of Soviet participation in this treaty, we must do so against a background of a long record of Soviet disregard and violation of agreements. What justification is there for giving up our defensive posture and "clasping this evil to our breasts"? Last April 16 President Eisenhower made it clear that the test so far as revival of mutual confidence between us and the Soviet Union is concerned would be the attitude displayed by the Soviet Government in respect of such vital and concrete international issues as Germany, Austria, Korea and Indochina.[4] At the Berlin Conference we found to our regret no disposition on the part of the Soviet Government to permit a solution of the German and Austrian problems in accordance with the will of the peoples involved and the interests of European security. We shall soon see at Geneva whether the same attitude will prevail concerning Korea and Indochina.

(5) Reference might be made to the obvious Soviet timing of their proposals in connection with the EDC question.

(6) It may also be desirable to point out that one feature of the Soviet collective security system for Europe would be the recognition of the East German puppet regime as an independent state.

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[4] Regarding President Eisenhower's address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Apr. 16, 1953, see footnote 4, p. 372.

740.5/4-254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, April 2, 1954—7:31 p. m.

5144. Reference Deptel 5110 London,[2] repeated Paris 3434, USRO Paris unn, Moscow 615, HICOG Bonn 2776.

Following, together with Department's statement March 31, are views Department regarding Soviet note March 31 and suggested points to be discussed in NAC and considered for inclusion in formal reply to Soviet Government:

1. Department regards Soviet note as move designed promote Soviet aim of undermining West's security and timed with eye to EDC

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[1] Drafted by Stoessel, cleared by Merchant and by MacArthur in draft and also by WE, RA, BNA, and GER. Initialed for the Secretary by Murphy and sent also to Paris for the Embassy and USRO and repeated to Moscow, Bonn, and all NATO capitals.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the immediate U.S. response of Mar. 31 to the Soviet note. See the editorial note, p. 487.

ratification, Geneva Conference, and public concern H-bomb.[3] It costs Soviets nothing and fits in well with Soviet campaign appear reasonable and peace-loving. Despite superficial astuteness of note, it is transparent proposal which fails conceal basic discrepancy between Soviet professions peaceful intent and unwillingness take necessary actions bring about relaxation tensions. Soviet note therefore represents no change from substance Soviet position at Berlin. Soviet note may be turned to advantage West by using it to make unmistakably clear that so long as Soviet Government maintains menacing level armament and control satellites European security is endangered.

2. While note contains several elements, i.e., discussion disarmament, expression concern regarding hydrogen bomb, proposals on European Security Pact and NATO, Department believes fundamental point of substance is that of European security. We feel strongly this should not be obscured and that primary emphasis in Western reply to Moscow should be on this point. We also believe European security aspect should be emphasized by British, French, US in NAC, although not of course to exclusion other points, and that burden comments on particular question of Soviet entry NATO might better be left to other NATO countries.

3. Regarding European security, it is essential concentrate on Soviet responsibility for division of Europe. Because of Soviet actions, nations Western Europe compelled take measures strengthen their defense. Although UN Charter constitutes general non-aggression pact, there is no confidence that all members will observe Charter. Western European security arrangements are defensive, based on mutual faith and confidence free countries determined maintain freedom in face threat posed by Soviet bloc. Intransigence Soviet Union and refusal make meaningful contribution European security clearly revealed at Berlin Conference on problems Germany and Austria.

4. Soviet control over Central and Eastern European satellites is basic threat to European security. So long as Soviets retain iron hold on these captive peoples, and continue maintain monolithic politico-military system, Soviet bloc can contribute nothing to realization European peace and security.

5. In connection with Soviet proposal on European security pact, useful recall that this contemplates participation Federal German Republic and GDR, thus legalizing and perpetuating division of Germany. Soviet security pact linked at Berlin Conference with Soviet proposal for quadripartite agreement on withdrawal troops from Germany, which would further expose West Germany and Western Europe threat of aggression.

6. Content and timing Soviet note make obvious it intended wreck EDC. EDC is a pillar defense European security and practical means avoiding future German militarism.

7. Problem disarmament discussed Berlin Conference and Four Powers agreed exchange views regarding arms limitation as contem-

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[3] In telegram 4317 from London, Apr. 2, Aldrich reported the views of "competent observers here including Foreign Office officials" that recent Soviet tactics had successfully taken "Western Communists out of isolation into which they had fallen owing to provocatively anti-Western attitudes" (740.5/4–254). In telegram 3665 from Paris, Apr. 2, Dillon reported that Bidault had expressed the belief that the Soviet note merited serious study because it represented "quite a change from what Molotov had said at Berlin" (740.5/4–254).

plated by UN resolution November 28, 1953.[4] (Doubt desirable raise President's atomic energy pool proposal,[5] since discussion this context might tend move that proposal into propagandistic sphere, whereas we have endeavored so far successfully keep atomic pool talks on serious confidential basis.)

8. Some sarcastic comment may be appropriate during NAC discussion referring Molotov's bitter opposition NATO at Berlin Conference (where he compared it to anti-Comintern Pact) and present expressed willingness join NATO if only some changes made.

9. In NAC discussion as well as in reply to Moscow believe extensive use can and should be made statements Western representatives on European security matters at Berlin Conference.

Embassies London, Paris discuss with Foreign Offices.

USRO consult with British, French colleagues in order work out general lines tripartite comments at NAC meeting April 7. As noted Point 2 above, Department believes major tripartite emphasis should be on substance Soviet note—European security and Soviet responsibility for division Europe—and that remarks on special NATO aspect of Soviet package should be left largely up to other members.[6]

DULLES

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[4] Documentation on the United Nations disarmament resolution of Nov. 28, 1953 is presented in volume II.

[5] Documentation on President Eisenhower's proposals for the peaceful use of atomic energy, made to the United Nations General Assembly on Dec. 8 is presented *ibid.*

[6] In telegram 3697 from Paris, Apr. 3, Dillon reported that the French Foreign Ministry agreed that the tripartite working group on reply to the Soviet note should meet in Paris within the week (740.5/4–354). In telegram 4351 from London, Apr. 5, Aldrich reported that the Foreign Office appeared to be in close agreement with the Department's views as set forth in the source text and that a draft reply was now in the early stages of preparation based upon the same central themes. However, the Foreign Office did question the wisdom of utilizing in the Western response extensive quotations made by Western representatives at the Berlin Conference as proposed in paragraph 9 of the source text (740.5/4–554).

740.5/4–754 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 7, 1954—noon.

3758. 1. Achilles and Crawford met yesterday at Foreign Office discuss reply Soviet note with Margerie and Laloy (French) and Reilly and Rumbold (UK). Margerie presided and made detailed presentation French views substance of which in immediately following telegram.[2]

2. Achilles outlined Department's thinking as contained Deptel 3460[3] and our general interest in French views as encompassing number additional ideas not touched upon by Department.

3. British had little to offer. They commented reply should reaffirm

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[1] Repeated to Moscow and London.

[2] Telegram 3759, *infra.*

[3] Same as telegram 5144 to London, Apr. 2, *supra.*

Western position at Berlin as well as importance German question to European security and expressed hope note could be kept comparatively brief. Also observed Soviet note's emphasis on H-bomb produced widespread reaction in England and suggested reply give due attention this subject.

4. Margerie showed slight preference for transmission reply after Geneva Conference[4] convenes and solicited views our governments. He said French did not have strong feelings about this but such timing might preclude possibility Molotov raising this question at Geneva. Achilles and Reilly said they thought their governments would prefer see reply made before Geneva but would consult and advise.

5. Margerie emphasized at all events reply could hardly be finalized much before Geneva in view necessity taking account NATO's views, consultation with Adenauer, and Easter holiday intervening.

6. Margerie said that while reply should make clear once for all that Soviet proposals do not offer basis for negotiation, effect on Western public opinion would be better if it did not conclude on flat negative. Margerie made alternative suggestions (see following telegram) that conclusions either pose embarrassing questions, which would be simpler procedure, or make counterproposals, or both, and asked our governments views.

7. As no working draft had been prepared, subgroup consisting Laloy, Rumbold and Crawford designated draw up initial draft reply for consideration working group later in week.

8. Three governments seem to be thinking along generally parallel lines although French had developed their thinking considerably further than others.

DILLON

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[4] Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina is in volume XVI.

740.5/4–754 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 7, 1954—noon.

3759. Following are French views as presented to us last evening[2] by Margerie. He emphasized they are working level suggestions of line Foreign Office has in mind for Western reply and have had no top level approval.

1. *General arguments.*

Basis of Soviet argument is that any grouping of powers is dangerous because it creates oppositions. This argument is false on two counts:

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[1] Repeated to London and Moscow.

[2] See telegram 3758, *supra*.

(*a*) Distinction must be made between offensive and defensive groupings. Two defensive groupings can co-exist without war, as experience has showed; and defensive alliances cannot be banned. Moreover, if Soviet reasoning is admitted, it is difficult for USSR explain origin war of 1939 because there were power groupings then—Hitlerite Germany and USSR on one hand, and France and UK on other.

(*b*) Second argument is that USSR reasons as if UN Charter did not explicitly authorize under Article 51 legitimate defensive organizations; these would have less role play if world security established but none can claim it is. It is not by wrecking present organizations that greater security can be obtained.

As to question of security, Western powers have much more experience with it than has USSR. It has been their concern since 1919, whereas USSR began interest itself in it only in 1934.

Since 1945, numerous efforts have been made on our side achieve understanding with USSR: Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, Byrnes treaty proposal, Marshall Plan, attempts at compromise in China and Asia. Results have been accentuate division of world, with USSR extending its influence more and more over Europe and Asia. Juridical formulae will not contribute to remedying this situation.

2. *There are three types of security: World security, Western security and Soviet security.*

World security. Dangers of H-bomb, et cetera. Problem now under examination at UN. Mention of President Eisenhower's initiative[3] and hope it will permit progressive emergence from deadlock.

Attempt make UN function; carry out there more comprehensive policy; apply clauses of Charter. This would greatly help strengthen sense of security.

This inevitably slow effort cannot begin with destruction of more limited security systems which are result of present state of things.

Western security. Its foundations: Freedom; mutual confidence; representative governments expressing and controlled by public opinion; its technical organization, distribution of military charges, mutual aid, unified command, integrated forces. Very few states now capable carrying out adequate defense within limits their sovereignty; grouping has become indispensable; normal that such grouping be between states inspired by common traditions and recognizing same principles.

Eventually, continue same reasoning on European plane, saying that European nations seek go beyond national framework and have undertaken effort renounce old rivalries, and that this is now element which has no relation classical type assistance pact. There can be no deal on Western security and no state alien to system is justified in demanding its transformation.

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[3] See footnote 5, p. 491.

Soviet security. We do not place it in question. We have made no claim against USSR; we are ready take account Soviet security but not at price our own.

On other hand, Soviet note proposes:

(1) Abandonment EDC, in return for divided and evacuated Germany (but under threat constant reoccupation), or united and rearmed Germany but subject regime partial neutralization. All that already rejected at Berlin.

(2) Transformation NATO, which would amount to disavowal by Western powers of all they have done up to now. Thus, question not just pure and simple admission USSR into NATO but destruction of latter to make way for European Security Pact.

(3) European plan. New Soviet proposal becomes world pact, without any guarantee it could function better than UN Charter. Furthermore, it remains subject basic assumption that a pact of mutual guarantee with states which have contrary ideas to ours on aggression, legitimate defense, et cetera, can offer no security.

3. *Conclusions.*

One could conclude by asking certain questions, such as:

(*a*) On world plane, is USSR ready ensure normal functioning UN organs, renounce obstructionist tactics and abuse of veto?

(*b*) Also on world plane, would it favor progress of talks on disarmament? In which case, channels are available.

(*c*) Finally, is it ready to recognize that aggressions which have occurred and been denounced by UN are in fact aggressions? This essential point.

(*d*) On European plane, is USSR ready accept existence present Western system and recognize that being essentially defensive, it is perfectly compatible with requirements its own security?

(*e*) Does it recognize that states inspired by principles different from its own can organize independently of it without organizing against it?

(*f*) Finally, on such bases, can it state exactly what it has in mind as requirements its own security in concrete fashion so that it might be possible seek type of agreement to prevent aggression?

On such bases real progress could be achieved.

As alternative to conclusion posing question, conclusion might be formulated advancing specific proposals, such as: Further discussions of President's atomic pool proposal,[4] specific disarmament proposals, renewal Bidault's and Eden's Berlin offers extend Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet pacts, and possibly proposals for non-aggression pacts with USSR.

DILLON

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[4] See footnote 5, p. 491.

740.5/4-854 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 8, 1954—5 p. m.

Polto 1627. Subject: Discussion Soviet note NAC restricted session, April 7.[2]

1. US representative speaking behalf tripartite representatives said Soviet note of great importance and concerns all NATO countries. Tripartite working group set up in Paris to draft reply had first meeting yesterday.[3] Three governments most anxious have views and suggestions other NATO governments for use drafting reply.

2. Greek representative thought he recalled that on previous occasion permanent representatives had been shown copy draft prepared by experts. He thought it would be better to see draft reply and then make comments. After further discussion it was agreed desirable make views available at this stage and that tripartite representatives would inform their governments of view that note should be made available council as far in advance as feasible before date delivery to Soviets. At suggestion Netherlands representative it was also agreed would be desirable mention in note that it was prepared on basis consultation other NATO governments. (We urge US concurrence.)

3. All representatives, except Icelandic and Luxembourg, participated in discussion which was most effective and fruitful example of consultation we have seen in NAC. Views showed marked similarity on basic issues and several useful suggestions were introduced.

4. General consensus was (1) note designed for propaganda purpose with view jeopardizing EDC ratification and undermining western unity; (2) onus for division Europe talk [*falls?*] squarely on Soviets and should be carefully brought out in western reply in way public will easily understand; (3) reply must show NATO developed because of Soviet aggressive attitude and their failure respect UN charter; (4) NATO more than defensive pact and is community nations having common culture and ties and same general outlook on freedom and democratic principles; (5) Soviet bid NATO membership must be firmly rejected but we should indicate very carefully why we have taken this position and refrain from creating impression bid rejected without careful consideration; (6) Soviet security pact proposal is formula words already covered in UN charter.

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[1] Repeated to Moscow.

[2] A preliminary exchange of views concerning the Soviet proposal to join NATO had been taken at a restricted NAC meeting on Apr. 1. As reported in telegram Polto 1588 from Paris, Apr. 1, the general consensus was that the Soviet note constituted a "clever propaganda move addressed to peoples rather than governments and should be answered carefully with same audience in view" (740.5/4-154).

[3] See telegram 3758 from Paris, Apr. 7, p. 491.

5. Danish representative said if Soviets are really ready associate selves with NATO's defensive concept, agree to western proposal for unification of Germany and introduce democratic principles into Soviet orbit, we could then treat note in realistic manner. UN was conceived as instrument of security against aggression but effectiveness of organization is paralyzed by use Soviet veto.

6. Italian representative suggested following points be taken into consideration:

(I) Western countries have continuously followed peaceful policy designed to promote world security.

(II) Have advanced proposals for disarmament and control atomic weapons.

(III) Western defense policy developed on basis freedom and respect for democratic institutions.

(IV) NAC rule of unanimity would permit Soviets to paralyze work of NATO.

(V) If Moscow really wants relax tension by specific deeds it will have such opportunity at Geneva.

7. Portuguese representative recalled that Soviet note tries to show that Soviets had taken initiative in UN in seeking disarmament and control of atomic weapons. Such allegations have been made before and we should make it clear why these Soviet proposals were unacceptable and place squarely on Soviets responsibility for failure make progress on these problems. He emphasized public forgets very easily what happened in past and we should bring these points to light again.

8. Netherlands representative said world tension due Soviet intransigence over Germany and Austria, Communist aggression Indochina and Korea, and Soviet military-political control over satellites. While Western powers cannot give up principles, we must be prepared make every effort relieve tension and exploit any steps that may lead to peaceful coexistence. He referred to paragraph Canadian Foreign Minister recent Parliament speech re devotion to law, justice and freedom and suggested these expressions which so accurately typify NATO may be mentioned in Western reply. Concluded by saying Germany indispensable future partner in Atlantic community and must not be neutralized state.

9. Belgian representative stated while recent Western replies Soviet notes had followed with reason pattern of brevity, he believes this reply should be sufficiently long to refute Soviet allegations and justify our position. We should be receptive and reasonable Soviet proposals but should stress that Soviet membership NATO not consistent security NA community.

10. Canadian representative said his government not as interested as others in Soviet European security proposal since it was not invited to join and had no observer at Berlin conference. Soviet bid join NATO is thus aspect Soviet note which primarily concerns Canada. He

said world tension continues because of Soviet policy of "no deeds as opposed to words." He pointed out NATO is essential for defense of free world. It is based on high degree confidence of its members and provides forum for exchange information in military, political and economic field. We must challenge Soviet NATO bid, firmly reject it, and explain our position very frankly. UN has failed carry out its mandate because of Soviets but we cannot permit them to upset NATO.

11. Turkish representative said his government had carefully studied Soviet note especially in light General Gruenther's recent briefing of permanent representatives. His government feels Soviets are in inferior atomic and thermonuclear position. As they need time catch up in this field, their propaganda line on H-bomb may be designed spread fear and influence Western public opinion urge curtailment further thermonuclear development and tests. He feels we should point to differences between conditions in East and West Germany and highlight military buildup in East Germany and rest of Soviet bloc. He also feels it important show Soviets responsible for failure efforts arrive at atomic control agreement.

12. Norwegian representative said while he had not received his instructions, he felt his government shared views expressed by his colleagues. He suggested would be useful have analysis Soviet note and that Soviet trends WG might wish to include such in its report. He inquired as to thinking on timing Western reply. US representative said US favored answering note before Geneva conference. French representative said Soviet note sent six weeks after Berlin conference and perhaps we should be in no hurry answer it. He said some feel quick answer is desirable in order not let public opinion go astray. On other hand, he feels might be well wait until after Geneva so that Soviets will not bring up issue having no relation Asiatic problem. At UK suggestion it was agreed think over timing question and discuss it later.

International Staff preparing detailed record of comments which will be sent drafting group and Washington soonest.

Hughes

Editorial Note

During March and April 1954, Secretary Dulles began the implementation, both publicly and privately, of the "New Look" or "New Approach" policy regarding the "conventionality" of nuclear weaponry and its application to national defense commitments in Europe and the Western Hemisphere as first set forth in NSC series 151, 153, and 162 (see footnote 4, page 482). Under questioning at a press conference on March 16, Dulles stated that as a result of the NATO and Rio Pacts, the President had a right to order "instantaneous retaliation" against any attack on the United States or upon its allies in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, without prior consultation with Congress. The same day, Dulles released the text of an article entitled "Policy for Security and Peace" which was to appear in the April 1954 issue of the magazine *Foreign Affairs*. In the course of this article, Dulles pledged that the United States would not turn "every local war into a world war" in which "if there is a Communist attack somewhere in Asia, atom or hydrogen bombs will necessarily be dropped on the great industrial centers of China or Russia." But the United States would pursue a policy which would "mean that the free world must maintain the collective means and be willing to use them in the way which most effectively makes aggression too risky and expensive to be tempting." The text of the Dulles article is in the *New York Times*, March 17, page 4. Excerpts from the Dulles press conference are printed *ibid.*, page 6, with a covering story by Elie Abel on page 1.

In a letter dated April 8 to John C. Hughes, the Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Livingston T. Merchant reported that a statement was being prepared for Secretary Dulles to use at the forthcoming NATO Ministers meeting "on the general subject of NATO strategy and its relation to new weapons". Merchant added that there had been no opportunity as yet to discuss the matter with Dulles, and consequently, no indication should as yet be made to other NATO countries that such a statement should be made. Merchant also indicated that the contents of the statement were being coordinated with the Department of Defense (740.5/4–854). In telegram Topol 1194 to Paris, April 9, Hughes was authorized to inform the North Atlantic Council that Secretary Dulles was willing to volunteer a general statement on United States security policy at the Ministerial meeting in the course of general discussion (740.5/4–954). Hughes responded in telegram Polto 1651 of April 15 that the Council had been so informed, and Hughes suggested that possibly a "general statement on nuclear weapons might be useful." (740.5/4–1554) A memorandum from Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, dated April 16, indicated that drafting work was already underway on a "Statement to NAC on Use of A-H Weapons" (PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "L. Fuller Chron").

Meanwhile, Secretary Dulles, accompanied by MacArthur and Merchant, traveled to London and Paris, April 11 to 15, for discussions concerning the situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia. While in London he spoke with Secretary Eden and other Foreign Office officials on the general subject of nuclear weapons and introduced "the entire subject of the tactical use of atomic weapons and fitting them into our military planning and strategy". The memorandum of this conversation is printed *infra*. Further documentation on the Secretary's trip to London and Paris, April 11–15, 1954 is printed in volume XIII, Part 1, pages 1307 ff.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238

Memorandum of Conversation[1]

TOP SECRET [LONDON,] April 12, 1954.

Participants:	The Secretary of State	The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden
	Ambassador Aldrich	Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick
	Minister Butterworth	Sir Harold Caccia
	Mr. Livingston T. Merchant	

Mr. Eden opened the discussion by saying he had just received a message from the British Mission to the UN in New York indicating that Nehru was thinking of depositing at the United Nations his proposal for a moratorium on H-bomb tests.[2] Mr. Eden said he supposed this would create no particular difficulty, and he assumed Nehru's paper would be turned over to some Subcommittee. He thought it would be very dramatic and advantageous if, however, we could give an affirmative response at Geneva.

The Secretary then said that he would recapitulate the discussion on the subject of atomic and hydrogen bombs he had had with Mr. Eden last evening.[3] About two weeks ago he had raised the possibility with the President of exploring a cessation of hydrogen bomb tests when the present series had been completed. He said that the President had asked Admiral Strauss to study the matter; that he had discussed this subject with Admiral Strauss and subsequently with Admiral Radford the day of his departure from Washington; but that he had not had an opportunity to go into the matter in any definitive detail. He mentioned that the present series should be over by early May.

The Secretary went on to say that in considering the possibility of an agreement with the Soviets for a mutual termination of further thermo-nuclear tests, two difficult questions presented themselves. The first was how would any such agreement be policed. The second was how and where one would draw the line between explosions which were permissible and those which were non-permissible.

The Secretary said that the President had given his general approval to an exploration of this line of thought but that the President had not yet discussed it with nor had the benefit of advice from his technical experts on the subject.

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[1] Source text does not indicate identity of the drafting officer; it does indicate that copies of this memorandum were to be circulated "Eyes Only" to S/S, Under Secretary Smith, Murphy, Bowie, Arneson, MacArthur, and Merchant with S/S instructed to furnish copies on an "Eyes Only" basis to Admirals Radford and Strauss.

[2] Documentation on U.S. disarmament policy is in volume II.

[3] At a meeting on the evening of Apr. 11, Dulles had spoken to Eden about the possibility of a moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States following completion of currently planned tests in the Pacific (Memorandum of conversation, by MacArthur, Apr. 11, 1954, Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238).

The Secretary said that in light of the expected absence from Washington of the President for ten days, it was doubtful that the United States Government could move very rapidly in this matter. In any event, the Secretary said, the process would take time. It would require, for example, thorough consultation with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Matters. In passing, the Secretary said that he had had lunch last Saturday with Senator Hickenlooper of the Joint Congressional Committee and that while he had touched on the matter, he had not gone into this subject deeply with him.

Mr. Eden said that there was a major difficulty in attempting to devise any form of control which would in fact bind the Russians. "They always cheat."

The Secretary said that it might well be possible to set up a neutral group or commission of Scandinavian scientists to watch for violations. He said that they had scientists in this field but that to enable them to be effective it would probably be necessary to make available to them certain knowledge and techniques which the Russians probably possess. We cannot, however, be sure on this last point.

Mr. Eden agreed and, referring to the difficulties the Swiss and the Swedes on the Commission in Korea were having in attempting to police the armistice terms in a small area such as North Korea, noted the multiplication of such difficulties in an area as vast as Siberia. Mr. Eden, it is believed, understood that the type of supervision under discussion would rely on recordings, collection, etc., rather than on travel and physical inspection.

The Secretary went on to say that a year or so ago it had appeared that the Soviets had perhaps nearly caught up with us on the hydrogen bomb but that in the interval the United States had put on a spurt which leads us to believe we are now well in advance of them.

At this point, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick interjected that it was his understanding that the explosion a year ago of the Russians was not a hydrogen explosion but a hybrid and that it was not a bomb.

Mr. Eden said he took it we were both agreed that we should attempt to exclude the "big bangs" if it is possible to draw the line.

The Secretary said that both the British Government and ourselves presumably would study the general subject which he had raised. He said, however, that it was unlikely that we would have come to any conclusion before the Geneva Conference opened.

The Secretary then said that there was nothing new to report on the Zarubin talks. The Russians, presumably, are still studying our concrete pro[illegible]

At this poi[illegible] Secretary raised the entire subject of the tactical use of atomic weapons and fitting them into our military planning and strategy. He said that sometime ago the National Security Council had decided that atomic tactical weapons should be incorporated as a matter of course into our military planning and armament. Recently, however, our Joint Chiefs of Staff had felt uncertain about the dependability of this decision in the light of some evidence that certain of our Allies apparently continued to draw a sharp line of distinction between the use of conventional weapons and atomic weapons. For obvious reasons, the Secretary said, this raised the most serious problems. In the first place, the Soviets, according to our information, possess tactical atomic weapons. (Eden and Kirkpatrick nodded agreement, though Kirkpatrick said their information was that their numbers at the moment were limited.) It was obviously reckless for us to contemplate a refusal to prepare ourselves to use atomic tactical weapons in the face of this situation. The Russians have clear-cut superiority over us in manpower and conventional weapons. Were we to tie our own hands behind our back in this atomic area, where we have superiority, we would all be at the mercy of blackmail.

Moreover, the question intruded would it be necessary for us to maintain two separate military establishments, one along conventional lines and the other based on the integration of atomic weapons with conventional forces. Should we have one fleet of submarines atomically powered and designed to launch atomic missiles while we supported still another fleet of conventional submarines? We are spending, even after certain economies, nearly 40 billion dollars a year for our defense budget. The theory of duplicate military establishments would come close to doubling this expenditure. This, in turn, would force us to forego any thought of balancing our budget, and state regimentation would result along the lines of a garrison state. These, the Secretary said, were the nature and the magnitude of the problems which were raised.

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740.5/4–1354 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 13, 1954—4:51 p. m.

3623. Paris pass USRO.

1. After consulting the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,[2] the US Government has the following com-

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[1] Drafted by Barbour, cleared by RA, WE, GER, and BNA, initialed for the Acting Secretary by Bonbright, and repeated to Moscow.

[2] Source text constituted a response to an initial draft tripartite reply to the Soviet note of Mar. 31 submitted by the French representatives to the Paris working group as transmitted to the Department in telegrams 3831 and 3832 from

Footnote continued on following page.

ments on the note of the Soviet Government of March 31 in which are restated the same basic positions taken by the Soviet Government at the recent Berlin conference:

2. The Soviet Government referred to the dangers to which all nations would be exposed by the outbreak of a major armed conflict. Since 1945 the Western Powers have consistently sought to avert these dangers. Repeated efforts have been made to reach international agreement on disarmament. They have sought to achieve limitation, reduction and control of armaments in general. They have proposed not only prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons but also the international control of atomic energy, which is essential if the prohibition of the use of such weapons is to be effective. Progress made recently in the construction of thermonuclear weapons makes it all the more urgently necessary to come to an understanding on these questions. The US Government is determined to do whatever it can to help bring to a successful conclusion conversations started as a result of President Eisenhower's initiative as well as the disarmament negotiations which have begun again in the UN. It hopes that the Soviet Government will make a constructive contribution to the solution of these problems.

3. The Soviet Government proposes the establishment of a new collective security system, including the Soviet Union, the United States and all European countries. The US Government notes that the United Nations was founded precisely to guarantee collective security. Since the practices of the Soviet Union have prevented the UN from fulfilling its proper function, it remains only for the Soviet Union to renounce those practices, which are alien to the spirit of the UN Charter, for the existing UN collective security system to become fully effective. The US Government does not believe that the idea of security can be achieved by a paper agreement including, on the one hand, members who are tied together in a captive relationship to the Soviet Union and, on the other, free nations whose regimes are responsive to the public will and founded on the principle of respect for the rights of the individual. After most careful consideration, the US Government

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

Paris, Apr. 10. An introductory paragraph to the first part of the text transmitted in telegram 3831, reported, *inter alia*, that French and United Kingdom representatives on the working group had requested that their governments have comments available by Apr. 12. Both telegrams are in file 740.5/4–1054. Telegram 3616 to Paris, April 12, stated that the draft reply contained in the aforementioned telegrams constituted a satisfactory basis for consideration in formulating a final tripartite position but that the draft as constituted "is diffuse and lacks impact and think it could be considerably improved by making shorter and by introducing certain organizational changes" (740.5/4–1054). Bohlen expressed general agreement with this reaction in telegram 1243 from Moscow, Apr. 12 (740.5/4–1254), and telegram 3622 to Paris, Apr. 13 reported that the immediately following telegram would contain a suggested revised text of a reply that would reflect "Department's effort in that revision" to "shorten reply, sharpen impact, and emphasize Soviet responsibility existing division Europe and consequent insecurity" (740.5/4–1354).

therefore regretfully concludes that the Soviet proposal does not hold out any prospect for achieving security under present conditions.

4. The Soviet Government has also expressed willingness to consider participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This Organization was brought into being by the free nations of the West in a spirit of mutual confidence and free association for the purpose of deterring the armed aggression threatened as a result of Soviet policy since 1945. That policy has been directed toward establishment and extension of a monolithic politico-military bloc in Eastern and Central Europe under strict control of the Soviet Union. It has been a policy which has consistently sought division, dissension and disarmament in the West in the face of consolidation, suppression of freedom and unrelenting augmentation of massive armed forces within the Soviet bloc. The resulting division of Europe poses many difficult problems for which the Western powers will continue to seek constructive solutions. The offer of the Soviet Union to consider NATO membership when taken in the light of its policy in Europe does not meet the test of realism. The US Government agrees with its allies that it is but an attempt to disrupt the defenses of the West.

5. The current state of insecurity could be remedied by the step-by-step solution of the basic problems from which it results. At Berlin, the US Government put forward a plan for the unification of Germany which would have constituted a step towards the reconciliation of Europe. The Soviet Government would not even discuss the main features of this plan. The French and British Governments put forward proposals designed to reinforce the security of Europe, which the Soviet Government also rejected. Instead of signing the Austrian State Treaty in terms previously proposed by the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government introduced a number of new conditions to their signature.

6. The Soviet criticism of the plans for a European Defense Community must be viewed in the light of this history of Soviet intransigence. The concept of a community of European countries united for defense has been developed because of the policies pursued by the Soviet Government. That Government is responsible for the division of Europe. It has aggravated the risk of war. It has refused to contemplate a reunification of Germany on conditions acceptable to all. The Federal Republic of Germany cannot remain defenseless in the face of the armed forces maintained in the Eastern zone of Germany. The US Government believes that the problem of a German contribution to defense can best be solved within the framework of an association which prevents Germany from taking any individual armed action. The European Defense Community provides the most appropriate means of integrating the military forces of Western Europe for essential defense.

7. The US Government is always ready to look for ways of improving relations between states and of insuring mutual security. The security of the Soviet Government is in no way menaced by the fact that Western states have found it necessary to establish organizations for their mutual defense. The insecurity of Europe will not be removed by paper agreements, as proposed by the Soviet note of March 31. The US Government is ready to work substantively for the solution of the problems realistically underlying that insecurity. There are many actions which the Soviet Government could take to demonstrate that they on their part are similarly minded. They can reach agreement for the solution of the German problem and of the Austrian problem on conditions acceptable to all parties concerned, including in particular the Germans and Austrians themselves. They can reach agreement on the problems of disarmament and of the control of atomic weapons by negotiations in the bodies which already exist for this purpose. They can reach agreement about the most pressing problems in the Far East at the conference which is about to assemble in Geneva. Finally, they could make possible the achievement of collective security by altering their policy and action to conform to the principles and objectives of the UN.

SMITH

Editorial Note

Between April 15 and April 22, a number of telegrams were exchanged between Washington and Paris regarding the tripartite reply to the Soviet note. Draft replies submitted by the United States were considered too aggressive and not sufficiently convincing by the French who favored a draft reply submitted by the United Kingdom which officials in Washington considered insufficiently firm. (Telegrams 3911 and 3912 of April 15, 3970 and 3971 of April 20 from Paris, and 3721 of April 17 to Paris, as well as the memorandum from Walter J. Stoessel to Henry Cox, April 21, and Walworth Barbour's memorandum for the files, April 21, documenting the course of negotiations regarding the draft tripartite reply are in file 740.5.)

In telegram 4022 from Paris, April 22, Dillon reported that the final text of the reply to the Soviet note of March 31 "as approved by Secretary, Eden and Bidault this afternoon and communicated to members of the North Atlantic Council" would be transmitted in the immediately following telegram, and the Missions at Bonn, Berlin, and Vienna were instructed to communicate the text in "concert with British and French colleagues" as soon as possible in accordance with established procedures to German and Austrian authorities "stating text not yet finally approved by three governments but that it is hoped to transmit to Soviet Government before opening of Geneva conference" (740.5/4–2254). Dulles, Eden, and Bidault were at Paris to attend the Thirteenth Session of the North Atlantic Council which met April 23. See the editorial note, page 508. The text of the draft tripartite reply to the Soviet note of March 31 approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France on April 22 is printed *infra*. Subsequent amendments to this draft reply were communicated to the Department in telegrams 4057 and 4203 from Paris, April 23, and May 4, respectively (740.5/4–2354, 5–454). The final text of the reply to the Soviet note, as formally approved by the three governments, was transmitted in telegram 4228 from Paris, May 6 (740.5/5–654) and was delivered by the United States Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 7. It is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 17, 1954, pages 756–757.

740.5/4–2254

Draft Tripartite Reply to Soviet Note of March 31, 1954, Approved by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, United States, and France, April 22, 1954 [1]

SECRET

1. The United States Government has consulted the British and French Governments and the other interested governments, and in particular those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on those aspects of the problem of European security which were fully discussed by the four Foreign Ministers at Berlin and to which the Soviet Government again drew attention in its note of March 31.

2. The United States Government has long been striving for the universal reduction of armaments, to include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of atomic energy. In the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, the United Nations Commission on Conventional Armaments and subsequently in the United Nations Disarmament Commission the United States Government has worked to secure international agreement on disarmament and to put an end to the competition in armaments which is imposing such a burden upon the peoples of the world. Such agreement can only be reached by progressive and balanced disarmament with effective safeguards which would remove the dangers of aggression from any quarter. The United States Government is determined to do everything in its power to bring to a successful conclusion the conversations started as a result of President Eisenhower's initiative as well as the disarmament negotiations which it trusts will now begin again in the United Nations. It hopes that the Soviet Government will make a constructive contribution to the solution of these problems.

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[1] The source text was transmitted from Paris in telegram 4023, Apr. 22 (740.5/4–2254). Regarding its drafting, see the editorial note, *supra*.

3. If these negotiations are to succeed, a sense of security and confidence must first be established. It is in this light that the United States Government has again carefully studied the Soviet proposals on European security first put forward in Berlin and now repeated in the Soviet Government's note. In these the Soviet Government does not, attempt to remove the actual causes of European tension. Instead, it proposes a new collective security treaty which is avowedly based on the neutralization and continued division of Germany while leaving unchanged the Soviet Government's close political, economic and military control over the countries of Eastern Europe. This can only prolong insecurity and division in Europe. These proposals, even when amended to permit United States participation, do not provide any foundation for genuine security.

4. The addition to the United Nations of such an organization as that proposed by the Soviet Government, embracing the Soviet Union, the United States and all European countries would contribute nothing to what is already a world-wide security organization. It would not only be useless but also dangerous because it would inevitably tend to destroy the authority of the United Nations. The United States Government cannot therefore accept the Soviet proposal. Collective security would best be safeguarded if the Soviet Government would permit the United Nations to function as the charter intended.

5. The Soviet Government has also suggested that its proposed collective security pact should be accompanied by an extension of the Atlantic Pact through the adherence of the Soviet Union to North Atlantic Treaty. It is unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion. It is contrary to the very principles on which the defense system and the security of the western nations depend. These nations have bound themselves by close ties of mutual confidence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is much more than a purely military arrangement, is founded on the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law. The means of defense of its members have been pooled to provide collectively the security which they cannot attain individually. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is wholly defensive. There is free and full exchange of information between all its members. All its decisions are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of the organization would therefore be in a position to veto every decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint defense system to be disrupted in this way.

6. European and world security will not be promoted by the disruption of defensive associations of like-minded states and the substitution of new illusory security organizations. The US Government remains convinced that the only way to remove the sense of insecurity which weighs on the world is through step-by-step solutions of individual problems. It does not believe that a lasting settlement can

be achieved by erecting a new facade of security behind which the fundamental difficulties and divisions remain unchanged.

7. With these thoughts in mind, the western powers at Berlin advocated a plan for the solution of the German problem which could have been the first step towards the reconciliation of Europe. The Soviet Government would not even discuss this plan. The western powers also put forward proposals designed to reinforce the security of Europe on the basis of existing agreements. The Soviet Government refused also to consider these proposals. The western powers offered to accept the Soviet text of every unagreed article of the Austrian state treaty. But the Soviet Government, far from agreeing to sign on its own terms, attached new and unacceptable conditions which would have totally changed the treaty from one of freedom and independence to one of indefinite occupation by foreign troops.

8. The Soviet Government has repeated the criticisms it made at Berlin about plans for a European defense community. The US Government has already stated its views on this subject. It is quite untrue to suggest that the present plans which are of limited scope are responsible for the division of Europe or aggravate the risk of war. The division of Europe was brought about by the Soviet Government and its refusal to contemplate the reunification of Germany on acceptable conditions is one of the elements that serves to perpetuate this division. In these circumstances the Federal Republic of Germany cannot be allowed to remain without any means of defense when the eastern zone of Germany, as its leaders openly acknowledge, possesses substantial armed forces. The US Government considers that the best and safest way for all concerned to solve the problem of a German contribution to defense is within the framework of an association which by its very nature would prevent Germany from taking any individual armed action.

9. The US Government remains anxious to improve relations between states and to ensure mutual security. It suggests that progress could best be made toward the elimination of the sources of international tension if the Soviet Government would give concrete evidence of its good intentions by joining with the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the US in

(i) Seeking lasting and acceptable solutions of the German and Austrian problems;

(ii) Reaching early agreement on the problem of disarmament: such agreement should include the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction and the control of atomic energy;

(iii) Working for solutions of the most pressing problems in the Far East at the Geneva conference;

(iv) Conforming their behavior in the United Nations to the principles of the charter and so enabling the United Nations to fulfill its true role as an effective organization for collective security.

Editorial Note

The Thirteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held April 23 to 24, 1954 at Paris. The United States Delegation to the Ministerial Meeting was headed by Secretary of State Dulles, and also included John Hughes, the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council; Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs; Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State; Edwin M. Martin, Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council; and Vice Admiral Arthur C. Davis and Captain Jerald L. Huff of the Department of Defense.

The other delegations to the Ministerial meeting were headed by their respective Foreign Ministers: Lester Pearson for Canada, H. C. Hansen for Denmark, Georges Bidault for France, S.E.M.S. Stephanopoulos for Greece, Hans Andersen for Iceland, Attilio Piccioni for Italy, Joseph Bech for Luxembourg, J. W. Beyen for the Netherlands, Halvard Lange for Norway, Paulo Cunha for Portugal, Fatin Zorlu for Turkey, and Anthony Eden for the United Kingdom.

The Thirteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council comprised three sessions in all. Two "open" sessions were held at 10:30 a. m. and 3:30 p. m., April 23. Georges Bidault of France was chairman and five formal agenda items were considered and discussed: (1) Progress of NATO (oral statement by Lord Ismay); (2) Consideration of the International Political Situation; (3) Date and Place of the next Ministerial meeting; (4) Other business, which included favorable consideration of a Canadian resolution urging the broadest extension of political consultation within NATO, consideration of the Soviet announcement of a grant of "full sovereignty" to East Germany and acceptance by the Council of the general principle of nonrecognition, and "warm welcome" by the Council of recent statements by Eden and President Eisenhower that NATO was of unlimited duration; (5) the final communiqué. In addition, a closed session of the Meeting was held at 6 p. m. on April 23 to hear Secretary Dulles' statement clarifying the United States position on atomic and hydrogen weapons. Telegraphic summaries of the open and closed sessions were sent to the Department in telegrams Polto 1707 and 1708, April 24, printed on pages 515 and 516. Secretary Dulles' statement is printed *infra.*

The largest collection of documents relating to the Thirteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council may be found in the Conference files, lot 60 D 627. Folder CF 239 contains the Secto and Dulte telegrams relating to the meeting. Folder CF 240 contains a complete list of delegates and the following NATO documents: "Draft Resolution on Soviet Grant of 'full sovereignty' to East Germany"

(C–M (54) 37 (revised)) which became an agreed Council document following discussion of this topic; "Current Appraisal of Soviet Strength" (C–M (54) 36) and "Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy (C–M (54) 33) which served as the basis of discussion on the international political situation; the Final Communiqué (Press Release No. 16–54M) released on April 23, and the "Resolution on Political Consultation" which was released to the press as No. 15–54M, April 23. Copies of the five United States preparatory papers for the Council session are also in folder CF 240 as are the summary and verbatim records of the "open" meetings during morning and afternoon of April 23 and a brief "Record" of the restricted evening session.

The CFM files, lot M 88, box 168 contain a single small folder of documents on the Thirteenth North Atlantic Council Session including a schedule of meetings, a list of United States Delegates, a copy of the formal agenda, the five preparatory papers, and, as "Tab A", a five-page paper on the current status of the EDC with a background paper on procedures for providing aid to the EDC once it came into being.

The 740.5 file contains copies of telegrams Polto 1707 and 1708 as well as the final version of Secretary Dulles' statement printed *infra* with various supporting documents.

740.5/4-2454

Statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council Closed Ministerial Session, Paris, April 23, 1954[1]

I welcome this opportunity to contribute to a clearer understanding of the US official thinking regarding nuclear weapons, including both atomic and hydrogen weapons of all descriptions. Our attitude can best be explained in terms of the relation of these weapons to the free world system of defense against the Soviet threat.

The primary purpose of the United States, like the rest of the free world, is to deter aggression and prevent the outbreak of war. In our opinion, nuclear weapons have a vital role to play in achieving this purpose.

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[1] The source text was enclosed with a covering memorandum from Merchant to Under Secretary Smith, dated Apr. 24, 1954 in which Merchant stated that the source text was "slightly revised from the text which the Secretary carried with him from Washington after his luncheon meeting with Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford on the day of his departure. The changes, however, are editorial and were informally approved by General Gruenther the evening before delivery of the statement." Merchant added that despite requests from the United Kingdom and other country delegations for copies, none had been given out other than that left with Ambassador Hughes on a strict "eyes only" basis. He concluded that Dulles had "followed the text closely with an occasional interpolation in order to avoid the appearance of reading from a prepared paper."

Footnote continued on following page.

I

The principal danger[2] lies in the great concentration of military power within the Soviet Bloc combined with the known imperialistic, aggressive intent of the Soviet rulers.

The Communist Bloc comprises a vast array of people and military forces of all types centrally located in the Eurasian land mass. This great concentration of military power poses a threat[3] around a periphery of 20,000 miles. Red forces could strike in any one of many directions against any one of many countries. Such attacks could never be deterred if the aggressor were assured in advance that his attack would be countered only at the place and by the means which he selects. Under such circumstances, he would be almost sure to win, and to win without endangering assets which he does not wish to expose.

The free world would have great difficulty in matching the non-atomic military strength of the Soviet Bloc man for man. Such an effort would[4] impose critical strains upon the economic, social, and fiscal orders of many of the free nations and expose them to serious instability and unrest within their own borders.

It is known that the Soviet Union possesses atomic weapons and has trained its military personnel for their employment. In the event of general war, we must assume[5] that the Soviet rulers will make use of atomic weapons with maximum surprise of which they are capable whenever they consider it to their advantage to do so. Since the free world rejects any resort to "preventive"[6] war, the enemy would enjoy the military advantages which accrue to the side initiating the attack, particularly a surprise attack.

II

We believe that the risk of Soviet aggression by means of open war[7] will be minimized to the extent that the free world combines to maintain[8] a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate[9] retaliatory strength. Within this collective framework, it is a basic policy of

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

The source text is titled "Proposed 'Talking Paper' for Use in Clarifying United States Position Regarding Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons During Course of NATO Meeting in Paris on 23 April 1954." It bears the date "4/22/54". A copy of an earlier version of this paper, dated April 20 and apparently the text of the statement which Merchant said the Secretary carried away from Washington, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 240. There are, in fact, substantial differences between the two texts and these differences are noted in footnotes below. Brackets in this document are in the source text.

[2] Original text reads: "The principal threat to the peace of the world . . .".

[3] Original text contains the phrase "at any and all points".

[4] Word "might" substituted for "would" in original text.

[5] Phrase "we must assume" reads "we may expect" in original text.

[6] Quotation marks added from original text.

[7] Phrase "by means of open war" added from original text.

[8] Phrase "combines to maintain" reads "maintains" in original text.

[9] Original text contains added phrase "defensive and offensive" following word "adequate".

the United States to develop and maintain a military strength—land, sea and air[10]—with emphasis on the capability of inflicting effective retaliatory damage by[11] striking power. Under existing conditions, and[12] having due regard for the necessity of maintaining a strong, stable economic foundation, the security posture of the free world can be adequate only if based on the integration of effective atomic means within our overall capability.

Obviously, it is indispensable that the free world possess and maintain a capacity for instant and formidable[13] retaliation. I emphasize the word "capacity". Without that, the free world might be totally dominated by the power possessed by the Soviet rulers, a power the use of which is not inhibited by any moral considerations. Such power, in such hands, is restrained only by a fear of retaliation, and by a fear that its aggression would lead to its ultimate defeat and the collapse of its[14] dictatorial system. Therefore, our capacity for retaliation must exist, in a state of constant readiness,[15] as a neutralizing force, until the day may come when the awful possibilities of massive destruction can be done away with by effective international control of atomic energy with suitable safeguards.

III

Current NATO force programs fall short of providing the conventional forces estimated to be required to defend the NATO area against a full-scale Soviet Bloc attack. In reaching the decision to level off force build-ups, and to concentrate on qualitative improvements, we and our Allies have placed great reliance upon new weapons to compensate in part for the numerical disparity between NATO and Soviet forces.[16] Current NATO military planning presupposes freedom to use atomic weapons in the defense of the NATO area in the event of Soviet Bloc aggression. The United States has accepted the current force programs and the NATO emergency plans as compromise measures on the premise that atomic weapons in substantial quantities would be available for the support of its presently programmed forces. Without the availability for[17] use of atomic weapons, the security of all NATO forces in Europe would be in grave jeopardy in the event of a surprise Soviet attack. The United States considers that the ability to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons is essential for the defense of the NATO area in the face of the present threat.[18]

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[10] Phrase "a military strength—land, sea and air—" reads "a strong military posture" in original text.

[11] Original text contains word "offensive" following word "by".

[12] Words "Under existing conditions, and" not in original text.

[13] Original text contains word "effective" rather than "formidable".

[14] Passage "and the collapse of its" reads "and destruction of the" in original text.

[15] Phrase "in a state of constant readiness" added from original text.

[16] Original text contained the further phrase "thereby materially reducing the risk".

[17] Original text contains word "and" in place of "for".

In short, such weapons must now be treated as in fact having become "conventional". As I have said, these weapons are vital to the common defense of us all. Our main effort must be to see that our military capability is used to achieve the greatest deterrent effect. In order to achieve this, it should be our agreed policy, in case of [either general war or local] war, to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so, taking account of all relevant factors. These include non-military, as well as military, considerations.

IV

The United States intends, of course, to consult with its Allies and to cooperate with them fully to this end. That is the essence of collective security. Consultation is an important means for insuring that our military strength, in case of any aggression, shall be used to the best advantage for the common defense. By the same token, we must make sure that the methods of consultation serve that common purpose and do not themselves stand in the way of our security. Under certain contingencies, time would not permit consultation without itself endangering the very security we seek to protect. So far as feasible, we must seek understanding in advance on the measures to be taken under various circumstances. In these ways, our joint capacities will be best calculated to deter aggression against any of us and to protect us in case it should occur.

V

Free people have always depended, for their security, upon the greater resourcefulness which freedom generates.[19] There is an inherent incompatibility between freedom and the methods available to despots.[20] If the people of the free world were to renounce the use of their actual and potential superiority in terms of new weapons and means for their application with greater mobility and flexibility, then they would have abandoned the principles which throughout the ages have enabled those who had freedom to prevail against the brute power of a despotic system.[21] With the very survival of the free world in jeopardy, it would be suicidal for the free peoples to renounce a major part of their military capability, unless compensating safeguards were assured.[22]

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[18] The following two paragraphs regarding the conventionality of nuclear weapons and consultation regarding their use were substantially revised from the original text, which reads as follows:

"Accordingly, the United States has concluded that such weapons must be treated as in fact having become 'conventional'. If, unhappily, war should not be deterred but should actually occur, either in terms of general war or a local war. then it should be our collective policy to use atomic weapons as conventional weapons against the military assets of the enemy whenever and wherever it would be of military advantage to do so.

"This policy contemplates prior consultation with our Allies in regard to all military emergencies whenever time permits. Certainly the United States intends to act in full and intimate cooperation with its Allies whenever possible. This is the essence of collective security. However it must be recognized that any nation, even though a member of a collective security organization, might be forced by circumstances affecting its survival to take immediate independent action."

[19] Original text contains added phrase "to preserve their freedom".

[20] This sentence not in original text.

Self-imposed military inferiority is an invitation rather than a deterrent to war. If the nations of the free world were collectively to adopt a policy that atomic weapons would be used only in retaliation for their use by the enemy even though the enemy started a war of aggression, and if such a policy became known in the Kremlin, the value of our formidable [23] retaliatory capability as a deterrent to war would largely disappear.[24] Such an action on our part would offer a strong temptation [25] to the USSR to initiate wars [26] on the expectation that they [27] would be fought strictly on Soviet terms.

VI

For the foregoing reasons, the United States believes that in any war forced upon us by the Soviet Bloc, we and our Allies must be free to use atomic weapons against appropriate elements of the enemy's military power where it is to our military advantage to do so.[28] We must be enabled to strike an aggressor where it hurts. And this by no means involves exclusively the use of atomic power.

This is the only formula which gives good assurances against aggression, because it means that an aggressor cannot calculate to gain by his aggression more than he could lose. Indeed, if an aggressor is allowed in advance to limit his losses by gaining for his most valued assets a sanctuary status, then aggression would be encouraged.[29] An aggressor glutted with manpower and occupying a central position would always be able to calculate on gaining from each local aggression more than he would lose. He would be relieved of the economic burden of defensive measures to protect his sources of power. He could concentrate on offensive means.

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[21] In original text, phrase "against the brute power of a despotic system" reads "against the despots able to organize their subjects in terms of brute power".

[22] In original text, passage "suicide for the free peoples to renounce a major part of their military capability, unless compensating safeguards were assured" reads "suicidal not to apply its full military capability in its defense".

[23] Original text contains word "effective" rather than "formidable".

[24] In original text phrase "would largely disappear" reads "would be largely neutralized".

[25] In original text "would offer a strong temptation" reads "would constitute an invitation".

[26] In original text word "wars" reads "general war".

[27] In original text word "they" reads "it".

[28] Original text continued to end of this paragraph as follows: "and that we must be enabled to strike an aggressor where it hurts".

[29] From this point to the end of the following paragraph concluding with the sentence "The United States has never entertained such concepts", the original text reads: "for an aggressor glutted with manpower and occupying a central position would always be able to calculate on gaining from each local aggression more than he would lose. To deny this privilege to an aggressor does not however mean that every local war must automatically be turned into a general war, or that because atomic weapons are used locally they would be used indiscriminately for the bombing of civilian populations. The United States has never entertained this concept".

To deny these privileges to an aggressor does not however mean that every local war must automatically be turned into a general war. Nor does this mean that because atomic weapons are used locally they would be used indiscriminately for the bombing of civilian populations. The United States has never entertained such concepts.

As we all agree, our primary goal is to deter aggression and prevent war. To achieve this, the Soviet Union must recognize that the free world is able and ready to use its full power to defeat any such aggression if it should occur. In our judgment, this is the surest way to prevent the outbreak of a general war, which would be a disaster for all if it occurred. The deterrent will be effective, however, only so long as the free world maintains its strength and its determination and courage to use that strength effectively. The possession of a will, if need arises, to use strength is as important as possession of strength.[30]

If we can meet these tests, and I am convinced that we can, then mankind has good hope of escaping general war with all its attendant consequences.

VII

Until nuclear weapons can be brought under effective control, the course I have outlined seems to be the only hopeful one. Meanwhile we do not intend to slacken our efforts to bring about such control of nuclear weapons, under safe and acceptable conditions. President Eisenhower's plan for allocating fissionable material for peacetime purposes is one approach which we are exploring with complete[31] dedication, in the hope of thereby creating a new atmosphere and new relationships which will open the way to effective controls in the military field. We are prepared to explore any measures on condition that this does not in fact increase the peril to the free nations.[32]

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[30] This sentence not in original text.

[31] Original text from this point to the conclusion reads: "dedication. We are prepared to explore any other measures on condition that this does not in fact increase the peril to the free nations".

[32] At the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 6, 1954, Secretary Dulles reported very briefly on his remarks delivered to the Thirteenth Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council and added that subsequent to the delivery of his remarks he had received a letter from Eden discussing the statement. (Memorandum of Discussion of the 195th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 6, 1954; Eisenhower Library, Whitman file)

740.5/4–2454 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, April 24, 1954—4 p. m.

Polto 1707. Limit distribution. Subject: Closed meeting of NAC Foreign Ministers, permanent representatives and one other permanent delegation.

Due to the lateness of the hour (meeting started 6 p. m. Friday) and to the fact that many matters had been discussed in the earlier session. the only matter of importance was the Secretary's statement,[1] along the lines of the memo he prepared.[2] It seemed to me that he followed this very closely and quoted verbatim the pertinent parts of that memo.

After he had finished his statement, Mr. Bidault commented that the Secretary had furnished the Foreign Ministers with a clear exposé of the US Government thinking on this matter. Zorlu, the Turkish representative, stated that he thought the Secretary's statement was excellent and was of tremendous value for the defense of NATO. He stated that his government, without reservation, endorsed the US thinking. Mr. Eden remarked that although the Secretary referred to his statement as covering an unpleasant subject, he could not help but think how much more unpleasant it would be if we did not have superiority in atomic weapons. He welcomed the frank statement, outlining the US position, with which he took no issue. He stated, however, that it imposed on our governments a real duty to consider again some practical approach to disarmament.

(Last evening, April 23, at the Bidault dinner, a number of permanent representatives and Ministers expressed their great interest in the Secretary's remarks and stated they were only sorry that, through no fault of his, his statement was made so late in the session. They seemed to feel that, if there had been more time, there might have been some questions and further discussion. Several permanent representatives said that, perhaps later in closed meetings of the NAC, their governments might ask that further questions be put, but that in principle, they felt everyone endorsed the general policy as outlined.)

The only other matter of substance discussed in the closed session was Indochina,[3] covered by remarks from Bidault. His comments did not cover any policy or plan and were chiefly concerned with a description of the difficulties involved, due to the terrain and the size of the territory to be covered. He said that these were the real reasons why the war seemed to be going as it is, in spite of the fact that there was so much in both men and materials in that area.

HUGHES

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] See footnote 1, *supra.*

[3] Documentation on Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

740.5/4–2454 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 24, 1954—5 p. m.

Polto 1708. Subject: NAC Meeting April 23.

Since verbatim record eighteenth [*thirteenth*] meeting NAC being airpouched[2] today, following summary will be brief, touching only high points:

1. Opening ceremony. Ismay and Bidault made statements marking fifth anniversary of NATO (for texts see press releases).[3]

2. Plenary session.

(*a*) Procedural questions. Council agreed set up communiqué working group and meet in informal session in afternoon.

(*b*) Progress NATO. Secretary General informed Foreign Ministers he was preparing comprehensive survey past five years NATO suitable for presentation Parliaments and general public. He hoped it would be ready within one month. He then touched on various activities council such as increased political consultation, emergency planning, information activities, infrastructure, etc.

(*c*) Consideration political situation. Practically all Foreign Ministers paid tribute to France for heroic efforts being made Indochina.

Portugal stressed need for increased vigilance throughout world and policy firmness without provocation which NATO must continue follow. Development of Communism in Asia must be restricted and NATO must attempt prevent any new aggression this area. Situation in Goa[4] affects national integrity Portugal. If situation deteriorated Portugal would have to call for NAC consultation to search for means to prevent present threat from developing into open aggression.

Turkey believed USSR suffering from lack of balance between intentions and capabilities because of inferiority in atomic weapons. Soviets now trying gain time and to weaken vigilance of West while recovering its atomic position. Also attempting to woo West through international conferences, East-West trade[5] baits, at same time playing up Western divergencies. But Soviets would strike when sufficiently strong. Every effort therefore, must be made to increase Western strength.

Greece commented on fundamental hostility of Soviets toward West and emphasized that they had not changed their fundamental aim. Present day tactics were to divide and weaken unity of West in order gain time. NATO defensive build-up must be continued and when real position strength attained favorable moment might be found for trying persuade Soviet change its attitude. Greece welcomed US–UK EDC assurances and pleaded for speedy solution EDC question.

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[1] Repeated to all NATO capitals and to Moscow, Bonn, Vienna, and Malta.

[2] See the editorial note, p. 508.

[3] Copies of these press releases have not been found in Department of State files, nor were they reprinted in either the Department of State *Bulletin* or the *New York Times*.

[4] For documentation on Goa, see the compilation on Portugal in volume VI.

[5] Documentation on East-West trade is presented in volume I.

UK commented on Berlin conference [6] and recent Soviet note adding that Soviets still trying to delay and disrupt defense measures of West; that NATO was main objective though immediate point attack was EDC since Soviets knew German contribution would greatly increase NATO defense. Soviet diplomacy now more intelligent and flexible but objectives same. They never prepared pay any serious price for relaxation tension and would never withdraw from fixed and prepared positions. NATO must not reject any genuine approach but until there was significant evidence Soviet good intentions NATO must assume threat still exists. Soviet camouflage better but threat remained. All this emphasized necessity for earliest possible German contribution. UK had done its utmost to give practical affect to support EDC. Integration of Federal Republic with West was most urgent and fundamental problem. If present opportunity lost another might not occur.

Regarding Geneva conference,[7] UK hoped it would lead to restoration of peace in Asia but if conference failed UK determined that it be made clear to world opinion that fault did not lie with West.

Netherlands believed NATO might now be faced with even greater difficulties than in past because immediate threat attack seemed to be diminishing and once immediate threat lessened it might be difficult keep up enthusiasm. Also, formerly NATO had been limited geographically while now wider serve NATO activities, especially in Asia, might give rise to difficulties. Commenting on EDC, Netherlands emphasized main problem was to discover means give Germany proper place in Western community as equal. Best solution this problem EDC.

Benelux countries which had ratified treaty fully aware German menace but they believed EDC best means safeguard future.

Failure bring EDC into existence could only lead to confusion in Europe from which only Soviets would benefit. He also expressed gratification for US–UK assurances.

Italy endeavored justify delay ratification EDC because changes in government. However, Italy believed EDC was basic tenet its foreign policy and would do everything possible attain quick ratification. Expressed hope that consultation in NATO be intensified.

Norway attached great importance EDC which would strengthen defenses southern approach to Scandinavia. He then noted that NAC treaty limits defense commitments to European geographical area and advocated caution not create impression that NATO was extending commitments beyond what respective Parliaments had agreed to in treaty. There was danger in sliding into kind of universal security organization. He thought there was more prospect at arriving at workable solutions in NATO if interlocking regional security arrangements were envisaged and NATO not over extend itself. Norwegian people gave unanimous support to NATO because NATO was group which was not only limited to certain geographical region but group of nations based on common set of ideals and certain pattern of political institutions. If NATO commitments extended too far beyond present geographic region and present membership, grave difficulties would arise in keeping and developing present unity.

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[6] Documentation on the Berlin Conference is presented in volume VII.

[7] Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina is presented in volume XVI.

Denmark expressed hope for early ratification EDC and solution German defense question.

Bidault expressed agreement with what others had said on EDC. He commented at some length on difficulties French ratification and expressed gratification for US–UK assurances which he called unprecedented. He maintained he was trying to follow advice given to him.

Canada submitted draft resolution on consultation which Council accepted. (Copies being air pouched.) He advocated that when certain members contemplated making decisions, especially those affecting non-NATO area, which would result in new policies, new proposals for action or new plans, consultation and prior discussion in NATO should take place. He also advocated increased activities under Article II.

US pointed out his government had many interests and concerns throughout world with mutual security treaties with over 20 nations. US always endeavoring to consult as widely as possible but it was necessary to bear in mind that, taking into consideration domestic relations with own government, members of Parliaments, etc., unless desire for consultation is reasonably limited, there is danger that there will be no capacity for action if we spend all our time talking. If we went through all processes of consultation, when emergency arose it might never be met. Consultation is designed as means to an end and not end in itself. Consultation should not be so heavy and time-consuming that it would be impossible to take timely and appropriate action.

France pointed out that NATO was defense community and not political forum. Consultation through diplomatic channels must also continue.

(*d*) Recognition of GDR. Revised resolution tabled stating Soviet declaration March 25 in no way changed situation East Germany and that NATO members not prepared to recognize sovereignty of GDR or treat it as government. Was approved in principle by Council and referred to permanent representatives for working out final form.

(*e*) Unlimited duration NATO. France heartily welcomed US–UK assurances and suggested other governments make similar statement.

Norway remarked this question had not been fully discussed by permanent representatives and that question had not been submitted to governments. He wished to refer this question to his government upon his return and then send instructions to his permanent representative. From Norway constitutional point of view such statement could not be made by Foreign Minister without full consultation his government.

Portugal expressed surprise this subject raised. He also not in position take stand this question without consulting his government. He questioned France whether it desired interpretation or modification Article XIII NAC treaty. France stated US–UK spontaneously extended duration treaty and inquired whether this acceptable other members. Suggested matter be referred to permanent representatives.

Belgium accepted unlimited nature US–UK assurances and advocated other governments follow suit.

Netherlands stated considered duration NATO unlimited and questioned advisability permanent representatives discussing matter. Believed sufficient to ask permanent representatives inquire of governments how similar statement could be made. He thought present Council might note with satisfaction US–UK assurances.

Greece suggested Council take note US–UK assurances with great satisfaction.

US pointed out that US declaration was not merely declaration that it would not expect exercise its right of termination but that declaration was made as part of statement which was prefaced by phrase "when EDC comes into force US will conform its acts to the following policies and undertakings".

It was agreed that mention of US–UK assurances should be contained in communiqué. It was left somewhat up in air as to how this question should be handled in future.

(*f*) Date next ministerial meeting. It was suggested next ministerial meeting take place Paris upon termination 54 AR, probably middle next November and matter was referred to permanent representatives.

US pointed out important international developments might transpire before that date that circumstances might arise which might gravely affect the future, possibly existence NATO. He recalled that at December meeting he spoke about essential character creation EDC as means of providing honorable future for Germany and as best method for providing for German armed strength necessary for NATO forward strategy under conditions which would not be menacing to future peace or contain possibility future aggression. He did not desire to repeat what had been said other than to say that he still believed in what he had said. At that time he stated that unless EDC was soon achieved different and divisive forces might take command. Good progress had been made—four members of EDC had ratified treaty and US and UK Governments' had made declaration containing pledges of future cooperation with EDC. On other hand, divisive forces are still at work and no one can say when they may become such as to render impossible program which is basic to future of NATO. He agreed date next meeting be referred to permanent representatives on condition that they might call special ministerial meeting in the meantime if situation critical to future NATO arose.

France pleaded Foreign Ministers not to believe what they read in press re EDC. He requested leave France ratification to those who are fighting for it and not to be too concerned. EDC advocates would fight and they thought they would win. His colleagues could help him by not questioning him too much. France was in special position and its difficulties should be understood. "We shall fight and I think that we shall win for the honor of France and the common interest of the alliance".

(*g*) After brief discussion communiqué agreed upon.[8]

HUGHES

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[8] The text of the communiqué is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 3, 1954, p. 670.

740.5/5–354 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, May 3, 1954—7 p. m.

Polto 1759. Pass OSD. Subject NAC Meeting With Standing Group, April 30.

1. NAC met with Standing Group Friday afternoon. At request Standing Group, discussion capabilities, requirements, and air defense studies lumped together and taken up in restricted meeting. Whiteley[1] made brief presentation describing these three studies in general terms and indicating character of assumptions provided in Standing Group guidance. Indicated availability of atomic weapons had been assumed and that assumptions were being made about effectiveness of forces other than NATO Forces, including strategic command forces, but gave no specifics nor details. Emphasized difficulties involved in terms of new field being plowed. Estimated submittal of studies by July 1 to Standing Group, study by national staffs of Standing Group members until September, completion of Standing Group report October 15, and consideration by other NATO countries until December 1. Discussion devoted largely to unimportant procedural questions, such as relation of December 1 target date to timing of Annual Report meeting.[2] No important substantive questions raised and no one questioned firm statement that results of studies would not be available for use in 1954 Annual Report. General agreement after some discussion that would be desirable if conclusions from studies could be incorporated by Council in its fall meeting in directives for 1955 Annual Report.

2. Whiteley indicated that air defense study might be slower than others, particularly if countries did not speed up their replies to SHAPE questionnaires on their plans. Importance of coordinated European air defense was stressed.

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[1] Gen. Sir John Whiteley on Feb. 1, 1954, succeeded Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot as the U.K. Representative on the NATO Military Representatives Committee and the Standing Group.

[2] At the Ninth Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, February 1952, it had been agreed that the basis of year-to-year NATO defense planning would revolve around the Annual Review. Annual Review Questionnaires (ARQ's) would be sent to each country through its Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council and in due course the Council would receive in reply the individual country responses, or "chapters" which, taken together would comprise the Annual Review (AR) which the Secretary General would submit to the ministers at their semi-annual meetings. The ministers would then pass on the AR's and in this way the progress of the NATO defensive efforts could be continually reviewed. Throughout the period 1952–1954, the North Atlantic Council and its various committees were continually and deeply absorbed in the development of the Annual Reviews. Documentation on submission by NATO member countries of their individual "chapter" responses to the ARQ's for 1952–1954 is in file 740.5. Ministerial resolutions on the 1952, 1953, and 1954 AR's and the Secretary General's presentation of the AR's to the Council Ministers during the Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Ministerial meetings are in Conference files, lots 59 D 95 and 60 D 627.

3. Collins[3] made presentation on infrastructure, emphasizing serious concern over lags in committing funds with particular reference to getting additional funds, including in United States suggested committee might be set up to look into problem and to coordinate work of multitude of agencies now involved in infrastructure. Also suggested some arrangements for staff of expediters to follow up on country or regional basis, implementation of program. IS representatives questioned need for additional committee, pointing out WG on lags already underway and working in cooperation SGLO and SHAPE. Agreed that Collins' suggestions would be discussed further in infrastructure committee.

4. Valluy[4] presented statement problems of standardization which covered all usual points. Recognized for re-examining operation of military agency for standardization and indicated Standing Group was meeting with them following week in London. Indicated consideration being given to firming up organization, without, of course, making any of their decisions mandatory, which was impossible.

5. Regarding possible meeting with Standing Group in September, Standing Group indicated it was at service of Council. Council consensus seemed to be that such meeting would probably be useful. Final decision to be made later. Was presumed that at that time would be possible to consider whether there were questions which would be appropriate to have military committee consider in advance of usual meeting just preceding Ministerial meeting on Annual Report.

6. Atmosphere was cordial. Council questions quite limited and uncritical, perhaps partly due to fact no papers were distributed in advance and only very limited knowledge of what Standing Group would have to say.

7. More detailed report will follow by airgram.[5]

HUGHES

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[3] Gen. J. Lawton Collins, U.S.A., U.S. Representative to the NATO Military Representatives Committee and the Standing Group.

[4] Lieutenant General Jean E. Valluy, French Representative on the NATO Military Representatives Committee and the Standing Group.

[5] Not found in Department of State files.

Editorial Note

On July 24, the Soviet Government dispatched a lengthy note on European security to the United States in response to the United States note of May 7. On August 4, Ambassador Zarubin called on Secretary Dulles and made an oral statement proposing a preliminary four-power meeting on a general European security conference. Following the customary procedure of consultation with France and the United Kingdom through the means of a tripartite working group, the United States replied to the Soviet proposals of July 24 and August 4 in a note of September 10. For the text of the tripartite reply and translations of the Soviet note and oral statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 20, 1954, pages 397–402.

Editorial Note

In a memorandum to the Secretary dated August 17, Merchant stated that General Collins would be briefing the Secretary on the NATO "New Approach" studies on August 19. Merchant enclosed copies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter to the Secretary of Defense, June 11, and the Appendix thereto entitled "Present Status of Arrangements With Foreign Countries Relating to the Use of Atomic Weapons" (neither printed), and summarized the contents of both documents in a brief paragraph. Merchant added his preliminary opinion that "we will have to make an all-out effort to accomplish as much of this program as we can without jeopardizing the political ties which make NATO a major deterrent to Soviet aggression". The same day, Merchant sent a memorandum to the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary, Bowie, Smith of S/AE, MacArthur, Byroade of NEA, and Palmer and Wolf of RA informing them that they had also been invited to attend the restricted briefing given to the Secretary by General Collins on the morning of August 19. No record of General Collins' briefing has been found in Department of State files. The Merchant memoranda to the Secretary and to the Under Secretary, *et al.* are in file 740.5/8–1654 and 8/1754.

740.5/9–1654 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, September 16, 1954—10 p. m.

Polto 434. Pass Secretary Defense. Subj: SG NAC mtg Sept 15, 1954.

At SG suggestion order of discussion of items I and II on agenda SG NAC mtg was reversed.

Item II—Progress Report on Capabilities Studies.

As Chairman SG Gen. Collins reviewed history capabilities studies starting with last December's council directive.[1] Recalled schedule for processing studies which SG had announced to NAC last April.[2] Said SG had been studying SACEUR, SACLANT and CHANCOM studies since their receipt by SG in July. Noted Supreme Commanders' studies had contained certain assumptions as to means of delivery of atomics; that these assumptions had been deleted from the studies prior to their dispatch by Standing Group this week to appropriate national military authorities of NATO countries in view of their highly classified nature. Present schedule calls for receipt comment on these studies by Nov 15. Expected that military comite will be able consider comment and submit report to NAC by Dec 1, thus allowing possibly ten days to two weeks for consideration report prior ministerial mtg. Gen. Collins said he recognized this schedule may seem slow to some members NAC but emphasized extreme complexity of studies and noted their processing simply cld not have been accelerated. Added might be possible circulate SG staff paper commenting on supreme commanders' capabilities studies to national military authorities about Oct 1.

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[1] See telegram Secto 7, Dec. 16, 1953, p. 471.

[2] See telegram Polto 1759, May 3, p. 520.

Gen. Collins emphasized, first, there was nothing in these studies which wld change urgent requirement that 1954 AR shld be completed and its recommendations implemented; noted any changes in defense programs which might result from studies wld be evolutionary in nature and not revolutionary. Went on to say new weapons must eventually be integrated with "conventional" weapons. Mentioned example of infantry division which might be reorganized as result of studies but which wld still have to be equipped with such conventional weapons as rifles, mortars, etc. Added that new weapons wld be supplemental to old.

Secondly, Gen. Collins made clear the capabilities studies emphasized necessity for effective German contribution to defense of Western Europe. This point was also underlined during ensuing stages of discussion not only with respect to capabilities studies but with respect to progress report on air defense study. In addition above two points Gen. Collins expressed view that present capabilities studies were only first of a series of studies implementation of which might well extend over a period of three to five years. He also pointed out nothing in studies provided any basis for delay in implementation recommendations 1953 AR.

Following above report Gen. Collins speaking as U.S. Rep on SG said that since assumption of a German contribution is integral part of capabilities studies and as position of U.S. military authorities must be based on realistic possibilities of attainment, U.S. JCS wld reserve their final comment on capabilities studies until possibility of an effective German contribution had been clarified. Because of this, from U.S. point of view SG draft report which was proposed for circulation to appropriate national military authorities on or about Oct 1 must for time being be considered as international working paper only.

After above statement Belgian NAC rep asked Gen. Collins to explain more fully what his comment as U.S. rep on standing group meant. Gen. Collins noted that U.S. JCS had simply reserved their judgment, that this did not mean they either disapproved or approved paper. Dutch NAC rep then asked whether, until German situation clarified, U.S. JCS wld cooperate in meanwhile, and Gen. Collins affirmed that they wld. U.K. NAC rep wanted to know whether it wld be possible to stick to timetable in view U.S. JCS stand. Expressed hope answer on Germany wld be coming soon but wanted to know whether ministers cld expect discuss fully agreed study at December mtg. Thought it wld not be disastrous if they did not. U.S. NAC rep said U.S. del was also hopeful clarification German situation upcoming soon, thus permitting circulation fully approved capabilities study on schedule. Dutch NAC rep noted that even if there were delay in circulation study there wld be no reason to delay Dec ministerial mtg on tri AR. Ismay seconded this and went on to elaborate procedure by which international working paper wld be processed before receiving ultimate approval by SG. U.K. NAC rep asked what wld be final date by which German situation wld have to be clarified to permit circulation of SG approved report on capabilities studies to NAC on Dec 1.

Gen. Collins said Nov 15 appeared to be latest possible date if schedule were to be maintained; pointed out however SG in mentioning date of Nov 15 was not trying to issue edict to council.

[Here follows a discussion of "Analysis of Reports Submitted by Countries on Progress Made in Implementing Agreed Force Goals and Recommendations Put Forward in 1953 Annual Review"; "Progress Report on Air Defense Studies"; and "Timing and Form of Annual Review Report".]

Hughes

Editorial Note

On October 22, a North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting was held in the Palais de Chaillot in Paris to receive a report concerning the results of the Four-Power and Nine-Power Conferences. The representatives of the NATO countries, with Konrad Adenauer in attendance as an observer, adopted a resolution approving the arrangements worked out by the Four-Power and Nine-Power Conferences to terminate the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and to invite Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to become members of the Brussels Treaty Organization. The representatives also approved the text of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, adopted a resolution strengthening the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, associated themselves with the Tripartite Declaration of October 3 issued in London, and received for information a report on the settlement of the Trieste issue. In the course of the meeting, the Chairman of the Council noted that the Annual Review Report and the Capabilities Study (subsequently circulated as MC 48 Final, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years," not printed) would be ready for consideration by mid-December 1954 and proposed that the Council agree in principle to meet at that time, with the exact date to be recommended subsequently by the Permanent Representatives. This was agreed to. For a report of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, see Secto 21, page 557. MC 48 was not declassified by NATO military authorities at the time this volume was ready for publication.

Editorial Note

On October 23, 1954, the Soviet Government replied to the United States note of September 10 regarding the impossibility of convening an all-European security conference (see editorial note, page 521). The Soviet note reiterated earlier Soviet proposals for the eventual conference on European security to be preceded by a four-power preparatory conference and recalled the salient provisions of a draft all-European collective security treaty. It then asserted that "No state which is actually striving for the strengthening of peace in Europe can have an unfavorable attitude toward cooperation with other European States in the creation of an effective system of all-European security". It condemned the United States for again coming to the defense "of the North Atlantic military bloc, which is alleged to have defensive purposes, although numerous facts bear witness to the aggressive character of this grouping in its present form". The note then stated the willingness of the Soviet Government to help sponsor all-German elections and condemned the agreements reached at London and Paris that incorporated Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany into the Brussels Treaty Organization, provided for the admission of the Federal Republic to NATO, and provided for restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic. "The London decisions foresee the inclusion of a remilitarized West Germany in the military grouping of the West European States, set off against other European States." The note charged that the London decisions thus reversed prior obligations assumed by the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom, and France to jointly prevent the restoration of German militarism. In conclusion, the Soviet note again proposed for the consideration of the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and France the convocation "this November" of a four-power conference to consider reestablishment of German unity through "free all-German elections", the withdrawal of all occupation forces from both East and West Germany, and the convocation of an all-European security conference.

The Soviet note is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 13, 1954, pages 902–905.

740.5/9–3054 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, September 30, 1954—9 : 32 a. m.
PRIORITY

Tedul 11. Eyes only the Secretary. Although we appreciate how pressed you are at this time, we feel obliged to raise with you further action on NATO new approach studies. General Collins promised the North Atlantic Council to distribute a draft report of the Military Committee to the Military Representatives Committee October 1, stating that US Joint Chiefs of Staff would reserve their final comments until the German question was clarified.

Although draft report will therefore not express final US views, we consider that the impact of this initial paper in the other NATO capitals will be so important that it is highly desirable that the draft circulated be so worded as not to amplify the many serious problems which will nevertheless be inherently raised. We have discussed matter with Admiral Davis and General Collins, pointing out desirability of getting your personal views on this matter. It will place General Collins in extremely embarrassing position, and would vitiate effect of statement which he made to North Atlantic Council if distribution of paper were to be delayed beyond Monday October 4 at latest, and as paper has to be negotiated with British and French in Standing Group prior to distribution, we would appreciate your urgent views by telegraph.

. . . .

We believe foregoing changes make paper acceptable for its purposes as an initial draft, inasmuch as they allow North Atlantic Council maximum flexibility and choice of action to be taken on paper and therefore recommend you cable approval.[2]

SMITH

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[1] Signed by Smith; drafted by Wolf, who also drafted on Sept. 28 an explanatory memorandum from Elbrick to Acting Secretary Smith with a draft copy of the source text enclosed stating in part: "On the assumption that certain amendments agreed with Defense are incorporated in the paper [draft Military Committee Report], we believe that the paper will give as much flexibility as is possible in handling action on the paper in the North Atlantic Council.

"As General Collins will be placed in a very embarrassing position if the distribution of the paper were to be delayed beyond October 4, and as we believe it desirable to have the Secretary's views on this very important step, the attached telegram requests the Secretary to cable his approval". (740.5/9–2854) The Wolf memorandum also noted that the source text had received the concurrence of Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. Dulles was in London to attend the Nine-Power Conference, Sept. 28–Oct. 3; for documentation, see pp. 1294 ff.

[2] Dulles replied from London in telegram Dulte 14, Oct. 1: "Hensel and I concur proceeding circulate SG 241/3 as revised by JCS Memo dated 24 September and by suggestions in ref tel. Believe deletion clause in paragraph 4 preferable to suggested addition". (740.5/10–154). The revisions of SG 241/3 were also communicated in a letter of Oct. 16 from Elbrick to Hensel.

740.5/10-1254

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1954.

Subject: Status of Program on NATO "New Approach" Studies.

On Wednesday, October 6, 1954 we met with General Gruenther in the Pentagon to get his views on the program on the NATO "New Approach" studies.

In essence, it is his position that we should get North Atlantic Council approval at the Ministerial Meeting in December of the proposed Military Committee Report, the draft of which has been modified along the lines authorized by you while you were in London.

. . . .

We are unofficially informed that after the meeting, General Gruenther discussed the matter with Admiral Radford and that they agreed to disagree on the above topic.

A copy of the transcript of the meeting with General Gruenther is attached as Tab A.[2] I recommend that you give it your personal attention, inasmuch as so much of the action in preparation for the December meeting will call for your own personal thought and guidance.

After the meeting, the Department of Defense sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting their views.

A copy thereof is attached hereto as Tab B.[2] Your attention is particularly directed to Paragraph 4(*f*) thereof, commencing at the bottom of Page 2.

The present timetable calls for the Secretary of Defense and yourself to submit your recommendations for a program on the NATO "New Approach" studies to the President about November 1, and we will be, in the ensuing weeks, preparing the necessary staff work for that action.

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[1] Drafted by Wolf. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Sec did not see".

[2] Not found attached to the source text and not further identifiable in Department of State files.

740.5/11-154

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1954.

Subject: Presidential Approval and Congressional Consultation on U.S. Position on NATO "New Approach" Studies.

In December the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council

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[1] This memorandum was drafted by Wolf (EUR/RA) and was concurred in by Murphy (G), MacArthur (C), Bowie (S/P), Arneson (S/AE), Nolting (S/MSA),

Footnote continued on following page.

will consider the Military Committee Report on the "New Approach" studies. A draft Report (Tab B) [2] is now under consideration in the Military Representatives Committee, and, after its action on November 15, will come before the Military Committee for final action on November 22.

This Report will state the military position that a NATO capability for immediate nuclear counter-attack in the event of Soviet armed attack (whether or not the Soviet first uses nuclear weapons) is an indispensable measure if the Soviet is to be deterred or defeated.

In view of the importance of the issues involved, Presidential approval of the U.S. position is considered to be required, and should be obtained as soon as possible so as to (*a*) provide guidance for the U.S. position in the Military Representatives Committee on November 15 and for the December Council meeting, and (*b*) permit early consultation by the President with key Congressional leaders, a number of whom plan to leave the country on extended trips: Congressmen Vorys and Richards on November 5, Senators Russell and Wiley about November 10, and many members of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee on November 10.

A proposed joint Memorandum to the President from the Secretary of Defense and yourself has been prepared in conjunction with the Department of Defense and is attached as Tab A.[3] It is believed that Secretary Wilson and yourself, together with Admiral Radford and General Collins, should meet with the President on this subject. The Admiral departs Washington Sunday, November 7.

Certain aspects of this matter are of particular importance, and it is believed that you may wish to draw the President's attention to them in discussing the matter with him:

. . . .

2) U.S. Assurances That May Be Required.

In order to obtain the acceptance of the new concept, the U.S. must be prepared to assure our allies of our preparedness to support the concept with nuclear weapons and military assistance programs (Tab A, paragraphs 5 and 6).

Neither the U.S. nor the NATO military studies have yet reached the point that would make it possible to indicate at this time even the order of magnitude of additional dollar cost that may be involved. This presents a serious problem from the point of view of Congressional consultation, and leads us to suggest that the President should personally consult with Congressional leaders on the assurances involved.

Footnote continued from preceding page.

Phleger (L), Brown (H), and Jernegan (NEA). A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

[2] The reference here is to document SG 241/3, a copy of which was not available to the editors.

[3] Printed as a separate document, *infra*.

3) *Major Contingent Issues.*

a) Despite our efforts to avoid discussion of nuclear use rights at the December Council meeting, the issue may be brought up. We must be prepared to deal with this contingency in a way that will avoid evidencing any disunity or lack of firm purpose.

b) While the European allies had originally hoped that a NATO nuclear strategy would reduce both cost and risk, the Report will make it clear that, not only will it not cost less and may cost more, but that growing Soviet nuclear strength creates a dangerous capability. To a certain extent, fear may replace hope.

Council approval of the Report will dedicate NATO nations to develop forces for nuclear, not non-nuclear, warfare. As some nations may be concerned at having to respond to non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons, it is possible that further NATO studies to explore the military, budgetary and manpower aspects of a dual-purpose force capable of winning either a nuclear or non-nuclear war may be suggested at the December meeting. We should be prepared to consider this possible development, but not at the expense of delay in approving the new concept that will permit the development of NATO nuclear strength as an essential element of the deterrent.

Recommendations:

1) That you sign the attached Memorandum to the President (Tab A).

2) That you arrange to meet as soon as possible with the President, Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford and General Collins to discuss the issues and obtain the President's approval.

3) That you advise the President at that time of the matters set forth in numbered paragraphs 1–3 above.

4) That you arrange for early consultation, preferably by the President, with appropriate Congressional leaders. A suggested list is at Tab F.[4]

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[4] Not found attached to the source text and not further identifiable in the Department of State files.

740.5/11-254

Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, November 2?, 1954.]

Subject: Recommended U.S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy.

In December the Military Committee will render a report to the North Atlantic Council, in accordance with previous directions, on

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[1] The source text (Tab A to the memorandum by Merchant, *supra*), is signed by Secretary Dulles but not by Secretary Wilson. The memorandum is presumably the same one, signed by both Secretaries, presented to President Eisenhower on Nov. 3 (see Merchant's memorandum of conversation, *infra*). A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "The date of this document is assumed to be Nov. 2

Footnote continued on following page.

"The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years". The Standing Group has prepared a draft of this report based upon special capabilities studies prepared by the major NATO commands which take into account the availability of nuclear weapons. This proposed report will state that Soviet aggression against NATO nations can be deterred or defeated if, and only if, NATO forces have the capability both to withstand a Soviet nuclear attack and to deliver an immediate effective nuclear counter-attack. The report will also assert that, in the possibility of a full-scale Soviet attack without employing nuclear weapons, NATO would be unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe without immediate employment by NATO of nuclear weapons, both strategically and tactically.

The positions to be taken on this matter by U.S. Representatives in the various NATO military and civilian agencies involve important aspects of foreign policy and strategic plans, and should, therefore, reflect your authorization and possible Congressional consultation. The Departments of State and Defense have reviewed the proposed report prepared by the Standing Group in the light of both the current international situation and the policies indicated by NSC action regarding arrangements for the use of nuclear weapons. This review established the following significant points which are consonant with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Gruenther.

1. U.S. objectives regarding a nuclear strategy for NATO, under present conditions, should be:

> *a.* To develop in the NATO Alliance a nuclear capability as an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

. . . .

4. While it is believed undesirable to attempt any concerted NATO program for the specific development of public opinion, it is considered desirable to direct the attention of the NATO Ministers to the common political problem facing each of them, i.e., that each must soberly and carefully seek to develop public opinion in their own country to tacitly accept the new situation.

5. In order to obtain acceptance by the North Atlantic Council in December of the nuclear concept embodied in the Military Committee

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

or 3. Per Walt Trulock [of the Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat] 11/8/54."

This memorandum was jointly drafted by Wolf (EUR/RA) and by J. S. Billups of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). It was concurred in by Murphy (G), MacArthur (C), Nolting (S/MSA), Phleger (L), Bowie (S/P), Brown (H), Jernegan (NEA), and Arneson (S/AE), representing the Department of State and by Admiral Radford (JCS), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Wilfred J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative and Public Affairs) Frederick A. Seaton, Gen. J. Lawton Collins (NATO), and Maj. Gen. (ret.) Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy).

Report, the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government must be prepared to give assurance that nuclear weapons in the hands of U.S. forces in NATO will be in sufficient quantity and available to support agreed NATO plans. Otherwise the other members of NATO would be depending on this strategy without any assurance of NATO's ability to accomplish it. Any such assurances should be clearly limited to the form of a declaration of intention of the President, in order to conform with constitutional limitations, as explained by the Secretary of State at the London Nine-Power Conference.

6. It is not clear at this time what adjustments in forces and equipment, both of the U.S. and of our Allies, will be required for this new NATO concept. There is little hope, however, that the new system of weapons will cost less than the system it replaces, and it might well cost more. The development of U.S. forces is continually taking into account plans for nuclear weapons, including NATO plans. However, it is possible that these developments in NATO could involve considerable changes in our Military Assistance Program both in types of equipment and expenditures, such as would be involved in an expanded European air defense and early warning system. We should be prepared, if required, to give assurance to NATO that the Executive Branch will use its best efforts with the Legislative Branch in support of military assistance programs required to accomplish the new concept.

Based upon the foregoing, the two Departments suggest, for your approval, the following guidelines for U.S. actions on this subject leading into the December Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council:

. . . .

4. U.S. actions will be designed to limit, insofar as possible, the political problems inherent in a NATO nuclear concept. However, in the event discussion of these political issues is required at the December Council Meeting we should be prepared to inform our Allies that it is U.S. policy that (*a*) we will not wage a preventive war, (*b*) we will be prepared to explore reasonable bona fide disarmament proposals, and (*c*) that under existing circumstances a nuclear capability is an indispensable element in providing a deterrent to Soviet armed aggression, with or without nuclear weapons, or Soviet intimidation of NATO by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

5. In addition to the foregoing action the U.S. will as soon as possible propose to the Permanent Council a formal agreement concerning the release of certain atomic information to NATO, as provided for in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Necessary procedural steps with the Legislative Branch required by the Atomic Energy Act will take place during January and February 1955, the earliest time that Congress will be in session long enough to satisfy these procedural requirements. It is not considered advisable to attempt to utilize that agreement as a *quid pro quo* for rights to use nuclear weapons from foreign soil.

It is recommended (*a*) that you approve the foregoing course of action and guidelines, and (*b*) that, in view of the important domestic and international political aspects, you take the necessary steps to consult as appropriate with Congressional leaders on the assurances set forth in Paragraph 3 of the proposed guidelines.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES	______________
Secretary of State	*Secretary of Defense*

740.5/11–354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 3, 1954.

Subject: NATO "New Approach" Studies

Participants:		
	The President	Adm. Davis
	Secretary Dulles	Col. Billups
	Secretary Wilson	Col. Goodpaster
	Adm. Radford	(White House staff)
	Gen. Collins	Livingston T. Merchant

The meeting with the President was requested jointly by Secretaries Dulles and Wilson to present to and discuss with the President the memorandum entitled "Recommended U.S. Position on NATO Nuclear Strategy"[2] signed by the two Secretaries.

After a brief introduction of the subject, the Secretary of State suggested that General Collins describe the background of this project and its present status. Gen. Collins did so concisely but comprehensively. . . .

General Collins then pointed out that for use in discussions at the military level with our Allies before the Council meeting and, in particular, for use at the Ministerial Council meeting of NATO in December, it was important to be able to give assurances that (*a*) the nuclear weapons to implement agreed NATO plans would be available to U.S. forces assigned to NATO Commanders, and (*b*) in presenting programs for military assistance to the Congress the Executive Branch would support agreed NATO plans to accomplish the new concept.

There was some inconclusive discussion on Point A but no objection was raised to General Collins' statement that he had answered skeptical questions from a French General by saying in effect that it was inconceivable that the U.S., after all its expenditures and after integrating nuclear weapons even into its tactical plans, would not use these weapons if war came.

On Point B, Admiral Radford expressed serious doubt as to the willingness of Congress to support a continuing large MDAP program. During the discussion it was made clear that no costing of the new program had been undertaken or was indeed possible at this stage.

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[1] The source text indicates that the meeting took place at the White House at 12:30 p.m. on Nov. 3.

[2] *Supra.*

The President said that we should be extremely careful on any commitments for increased military assistance programs. It was also made clear that the precise language in which any undertaking along this line was phrased would have to be very carefully and tightly drawn. It was also understood that no such undertaking should be given until after Congressional consultation contemplated had actually occurred. The discussion of this point ended without any precise conclusion but with what appeared to be a general understanding that what was probably indicated by the new strategy was a continuation of military assistance to NATO at about recent levels but with the funds diverted to uses other than conventional weapons comprising past programs.

Secretary Wilson pointed out that a compelling reason for supporting this new approach was the fact that it held the promise of preventing the overrunning of Western Europe in the event of war, an achievement which seemed impossible under any other strategy or war plan.

Secretary Wilson added that he also hoped it would enable him to bring two American divisions home in the near future. The President said that he disagreed and that he did not feel we should reduce our strength in Europe until Europe was stronger and in a position to really earn its own living. The President added that a clinching argument in his mind, which he often used, was that $2 billion a year spent on the forces of our NATO Allies in Europe was far more efficient in terms of U.S. defense than an additional sum of that magnitude spent directly on our own forces.

The point was then made that it would be desirable for the President personally to discuss the new approach and its implications with the Congressional leadership on both sides of the aisle. The President said that it would be difficult to collect the Congressional leaders in Washington until the new session in January but, when it was pointed out that at the latest such consultation should be held in advance of the NATO Ministerial meeting in December, the President indicated a willingness to hold such consultations this month. He mentioned Nov. 20 onwards as probably practicable. The President requested that the State Department should take the lead in collaboration with Defense in working out a proposed program for the necessary Congressional consultation.

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, "Europe"

Memorandum by the Presidential Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 4, 1954.

1. The President has indicated his approval of the broad line of action indicated in the memorandum on "Recommended U.S. Position

on NATO Nuclear Strategy"[1] presented to him jointly by the Secretaries of State and Defense at the meeting at 12:30 on 3 November 1954.[2] He has also indicated broad agreement with the concept and major points of the proposed Military Committee Report relating to the "new approach" as outlined by General Collins at that meeting.

2. During the meeting of November 3, the President indicated his readiness to consult with Congressional leaders on this matter at an early date, and indicated further that he will expect specific recommendations as to such consultation to be made to him by the Department of State in consultation with Defense.

3. With respect to concern expressed by Admiral Radford lest the impression be gained erroneously that the U.S. might assume the entire effort required to bring forces into position to accomplish the new concept, the President has indicated that he interprets the statements relating to U.S. support, through military assistance, of "agreed NATO plans to accomplish the new concept" to refer instead to a *reorienting* of present and future U.S. military assistance in such manner as to assure that this assistance is geared into and contributes toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in these studies.

A. J. GOODPASTER
Colonel, CE, U S Army
Staff Secretary

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[1] Dated Nov. 2, p. 529.

[2] See Merchant's memorandum of conversation, Nov. 3, *supra*.

740.5/5611

Memorandum by the Presidential Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the President

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1954.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. State and Defense suggest that, in tomorrow's meeting with the Congressional leaders,[1] you open the discussion on *endorsement of NATO nuclear strategy* by making these points:

a. Necessity and desirability of basing NATO military plans and preparations on the concept that an effective atomic capability is indispensable to a maximum deterrent and essential to defense in Western Europe. General Gruenther developed the basic NATO study through eight months' work; State and Defense have worked out proposed U.S. action on it during the past four months.

b. First element of proposed action is to secure NATO-wide approval of the concept of the capability to use A-weapons as a major element of military operations in event of hostilities. For this purpose, the U.S. should be prepared, if required subject to constitutional limitations, to give assurances that A-weapons would be available in the hands of U.S. forces for such operations.

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[1] A record of Eisenhower's meeting on Nov. 17 with the Congressmen is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Staff Secretary records.

c. Second element is to reorient the pattern of NATO military forces toward the new type of operations. To this end, the U.S. should be prepared to give assurances, if required, that present and future U.S. military assistance will be geared into and make an appropriate contribution toward the development of forces prepared for integrated action generally as called for in the NATO studies. It would be understood, of course, that Congress retains its full power to act upon proposals for military aid programs.

. . . . . .

A. J. GOODPASTER
Colonel, CE, U.S. Army

740.5/11-2054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, November 20, 1954.

Subject: NATO "New Approach"

Participants: Premier Mendes-France [1]
Ambassador Bonnet
The Secretary
Mr. Merchant

The French Premier referred to the "new approach" studies of NATO and said that they had been discussed at length in the French National Defense Council which had agreed to the proposals as put forward by General Gruenther and the Standing Group. He said, however, that the subject matter was too serious to be left exclusively in military hands. Political decisions of the highest level would be required in an emergency. He then referred to an arrangement during the war whereby all great military questions were decided personally between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. He felt that similar arrangements, but including France, should be established to deal with questions of this nature in the event of war or its imminent threat. In other words, what was needed was a high level political Standing Group. He went on to say that he was not making a formal proposal at the moment but wanted to notify us that we would be receiving a proposal in the near future along these lines.

There was then some discussion of the NATO alert system and its broader application. Mendes-France was quite firm that France should participate with the UK and the U.S. in all great decisions.

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[1] Mendès-France was in Washington between Nov. 17-20 primarily for discussions with officials of the United States and United Kingdom on Vietnam. Further documentation on the Mendès-France visit is presented in volume VI and in vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2264 ff.

Mendes-France then mentioned briefly to the Secretary the fact that he hoped we could promptly close the current negotiations being conducted by Mr. James Wilson of the Defense Department in Paris concerning matters arising from the presence of the U.S. forces in France. He mentioned specifically housing and claims and the fact that agreements had already been concluded on similar matters with the British and the Canadians. The fact that ours had been prolonged is a source of some irritation. He said he hoped we would try to push them to a conclusion. The Secretary indicated that he would ask Defense to accelerate as much as possible the arrival at an agreement.

740.5/11-2454 : Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Martin) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, November 24, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 962. For Merchant from Martin—eyes only. After luncheon of PermReps only at his home today, SecGen [1] invited further discussion of capabilities study problem dealt with in brief fashion during regular council meeting today and reported on separately.[2]

Following points emerged from lengthy and sometimes heated discussion:

(1) For good and bad reasons, none of non-standing group countries appear to have commenced study from non-military point of view of military committee paper for council on capabilities studies.[3] In most cases paper has not been seen outside technical military channels.

(2) Knowledge of paper and understanding of its background and purpose, and of action desired at December meeting, exceedingly sketchy among permreps and, they feel, among their non-military ministers. As result, speculation has created many imaginary problems. References were made to thousand-page documents which must be analyzed and acted on, to necessity for concurring in necessary changes in infrastructure programs before December, to analysis of and agreement to substantial additional financial and economic burdens of specified character in December, and to need for final decision in December as to use of new weapons in case of emergency.

(3) In light absence of consideration of document and ignorance of its contents and nature of decisions proposed for December meeting, there was considerable shock and resentment at Standing Group position taken during council meeting in morning that ministers would be expected to approve paper on capabilities study. As result of ensu-

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[1] Lord Ismay.

[2] Telegram Polto 958, Nov. 24, not printed. (740.5/11-2454)

[3] The reference here is to NATO document MC 48, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years," not declassified by NATO military authorities at the time this volume was ready for publication. See the editorial note, p. 524.

ing discussion, believe that paper, even when studies and its limited nature understood, may be difficult for some governments to act on by December.

(4) Some governments, and in particular Norwegian and Danish, feel that any paper which they must approve rather than note, will require formal consultation with parliamentary committees which they would like to avoid in any case and which would also be difficult to complete before ministers meeting.

In order bring discussion to realistic level, I gave on personal basis broad outline and limited amount of background on decisions which paper as I had last seen it did propose ministers should make in December, pointing up their limited nature both in terms of fundamental policy and in terms of detailed implementation. Described it in essence as modification of strategic concepts paper.[4] Also emphasized that in terms of N.A.T.O. planning and action, was highly important to take this step in December if at all possible, but that even more important to maintenance of deterrent effect, to conduct ourselves in considering the paper in such a way as to create no suggestion of disagreement on its central point. If delay were necessary, it should be made to appear as routine.

Most PermReps seemed reassured by general approach taken in paper and several said it appeared to be wise and clever handling of most difficult matter. Nevertheless, decisions actually involved were still vital ones and not to be taken quickly or lightly.

There is strong desire to meet again on similar basis after papers have been received and given at least preliminary consideration by non-military elements, for purpose asking question of S.G. members and discussing way in which paper can best be handled by ministers to accomplish N.A.T.O. objectives. I recommend that we approve action by PermReps within next ten days or two weeks along these lines. I also urge that U.S. PermRep be in position to give on official though informal basis background and philosophy underlying paper, and position paper is considered to occupy in long term approach to this problem.

Arising out of way in which this paper was handled by governments, there was strong general feeling that arrangements should be made for papers which have received Standing Group approval and which are of interest to the council, to be forwarded to council members through SecGen without waiting for action by M.R.C. or M.C. This considered only way to insure initiation of consideration by non-military elements at proper time. I consider this would be a useful step in assisting some of our less well-organized allies. U.K. rep also endorsed it strongly.

MARTIN

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[4] The paper under reference here has not been further identified.

740.5/11-2454

The Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes), at Paris[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1954.

DEAR JOHN: The Military Committee meeting has just been concluded here, and we are advised that all went well, particularly with reference to the Military Committee Report to the Council on the Capabilities Study which is called "The Most Effective Pattern of Military Strength for the next few years."[2]

There appeared to be complete agreement on this report. We have sound reason to believe that the British and the French positions received governmental attention and represent the political as well as the military view, so we may expect that this will be reflected in their positions when the Council considers this matter at the Ministerial Meeting.

I need not stress how important we consider it that the Council approve this report at the Ministerial Meeting without getting into the more delicate and divisive aspects that are potentially present. We have two principle areas of concern:

a. Failure to accept this report will create a real problem as to where NATO goes from here, and in view of the fact that we have had consultation with our Congressional leaders on this new policy, would seriously affect the attitude of Congress as well as with the Executive Branch on what we do next in Europe.

b. Of even greater importance is the fact that any leak whatsoever to the Soviets that there was any lack of unity in NATO on the intention to develop a capability to repel Soviet attack with everything that we have available would seriously jeopardize our political as well as our military posture as a deterrent to Soviet aggression.

It is the importance of this latter consideration that leads me to write this letter. I think we must take some preparatory action designed to forestall, not merely a leak to the Soviets but more importantly any evidence of disunity in the Council. We believe here that the "New Approach" studies will have enough of a U.S. flavor by reason of the fact that the nuclear weapons are things within our control to make us lean over backwards to give the Military Committee Report the maximum international flavor possible and to avoid giving the impression that it is something that the U.S. is trying to force upon the other NATO nations. For that reason, it appears desirable not have the U.S. appear to be the chief spokesman on these measures.

It seems to us that the ideal man to carry the ball for us would be Lord Ismay, not only because of his international capacity but because it is a civilian capacity and because, in addition, he can speak from great personal experience as both a military man and as a statesman. It seems to us that it would be very desirable to have him arrange to have the Chairman of the Ministerial Meeting call upon him for some remarks as soon as the matter is called on the agenda. This agenda item should be taken up in secret session with restricted attendance. We would then hope that Lord Ismay could comment along the following lines:

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[1] Drafted by Wolf (EUR/RA).

[2] MC 48, not printed. See footnote 3, *supra*.

1. That it is gratifying to hear for the first time that there is available to NATO a program of measures which makes the defense of Europe something which is really attainable.
2. That NATO is now presented with the opportunity of developing a real deterrent to Soviet aggression. There should be no doubt whatsoever in the mind of NATO nations that the increasing Soviet nuclear capability over the ensuing years will give to the Soviets an element of power which will be reflected in both their political and military actions. The only response to this growing element of Soviet power which will counterbalance Soviet actions based on its growing nuclear strength will be unity within NATO in firmness of intention to develop a collective nuclear strength which will make war against any NATO nation too great a risk to be entertained by the Soviet. No matter what other measures are indicated, this measure is indispensable.
3. Any indication of division of thought or purpose on this subject among the NATO nations would be welcomed by the Soviets and would jeopardize seriously the role of NATO as a deterrent. If there should be any differences of view on this item, no matter how minor, it is imperative that they not be disclosed outside the Council. There is nothing involved in this Agenda item on which agreement cannot be reached, and the place to reach agreement is in the most private sessions of the Council. Lest serious aid and comfort be given the Soviet by any news leaks on this item or by any public statements, the Members of the Council are urged to deal with this matter with the highest degree of security.

I would appreciate your views on this suggestion, and, if you agree, after exploring it with General Gruenther, hope you will proceed with it at the earliest date.

Sincerely, LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

740.5/12–454 : Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 4, 1954—3 p. m.

Polto 1037. 1. SACEUR conducted excellent two-hour briefing this morning of perm reps plus selected members of international staff and small additional delegation representation. Questioning not particularly indicative of delegation worries or attitudes.

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[1] Repeated to London.

2. Private conversations reveal following situation with respect to MC-48:[3]

a. U.K. Rep, although states without instructions from his govt, is strongly critical of document as drafted and wisdom of seeking approval of it at December meeting . . . . He is speaking freely in this vein and, for example, engaged at SHAPE after briefing in spirited debate with de Staercke, who is strongly in favor of adoption of paper. U.K. Rep is also actively engaged in arranging meeting of U.S., U.K., French, and perhaps Canadian ministers afternoon or evening December 16 to discuss paper and what actions ministers should take on it. Implication has been given that meeting is designed to review necessity for trying to press for action now. States that meeting is being arranged at request Macmillan. He is spending Monday and Tuesday in London, primarily, we understand, to discuss paper with U.K. authorities. Suggest London may wish explore urgently position U.K. government and report separately.

b. After examining document de Staercke and Van Starkenborgh both state it is only right course of action for NATO to follow. Do not now expect trouble from these two countries.

c. French Rep states government has not acted and does not believe Mendes-France has seen it. He is personally unhappy about it. . . .

d. Danish Delegation has not heard from Copenhagen, but after most careful consideration believes that para 40 as now worded represents a policy decision of character which must be brought before interested parliamentary committees before Danish Government can approve document. While would be possible to arrange such consultation prior ministerial meeting, believes their government will be most loath to do so without further time to prepare way for acceptance. Suspect also that parliamentary committees would want to consult their party leaders and cannot give prompt advice. Tentative delegation thinking is that best solution from Danish standpoint would be to amend 40A by substituting "note" for "approval." After discussion at ministerial meeting of whole problem Danish Ministers might then be able to say to their parliamentary leaders that they had discussed it with foreign ministers of Big Three and of smaller countries in positions not dissimilar from their own, who all agreed on urgency of action proposed. With this help could be prepared to put "approve" back into 40A by April ministerial meeting. Note they do not now see objection to the "approval in principle" action in 40B.

e. Turk and Canadian Delegations feel sure their governments will support paper.

f. Norwegian Perm Rep confirms that as result Gruenther visit Norway will cause no trouble.

g. Portuguese Rep strongly favors paper but has no knowledge government position.

3. In view of nature of Danish problem and in view of full briefing given today by SACEUR, we do not feel visit to Copenhagen by military person of any rank can be helpful. Representations by British

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 536.

Cabinet Official or by Lord Ismay might be helpful but do not think can consider either until British position on paper is clarified. On balance think Danes will find it difficult to hold out if they are alone. Suggest best next step is personal message from Dulles to Lange asking Lange to explore situation with Danes.

HUGHES

740.5/12-754

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 7, 1954.

Subject: NATO "New Approach"
Participants: Sir Roger Makins
Livingston T. Merchant

Sir Roger called me to say that he had heard from Sir Anthony Eden after his report of his talk on this subject with the Secretary on December 4.[1] He said that Sir Anthony agreed with the Secretary's general reactions, believing it important to keep the discussion of this matter between governments and to avoid the establishment of any formal machinery in the Council. The important thing is to enable SACEUR to get on with its planning. Sir Anthony thought that a resolution along the lines of his draft [1] was the right answer and Sir Roger added that Mike Pearson had been consulted in New York and agreed.

I said we had some thoughts of our own as to the form of the resolution and might have some comments and ideas to pass on to him within the next two or three days.

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[1] Not printed.

740.5/12-654

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

. . . .

. . . the United States Government suggests the following draft resolution for Council action on MC 48:

"RESOLUTION ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE PATTERN OF NATO MILITARY STRENGTH FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS

"*The North Atlantic Council*

"*Recalling* the Organization's resolve to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security;

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[1] There is no indication on the source text regarding the officers responsible for preparing this memorandum. The source text was an attachment to a memo-

Footnote continued on following page.

"*Recognizing* that the success of these efforts will be assured only if an effective military force is maintained capable of deterring aggression by facing a potential enemy with unacceptable risks and of assuring an effective defense of NATO territory in the event of attack;

"*Recognizing* further that technological developments in the arsenal of modern weapons must be taken into account in developing defense plans and in building forces therefor;

"*Having considered* the Report by the North Atlantic Military Commitee on *The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength For The Next Few Years;*

"*Accepts* in principle and for planning purposes the Military Committee's recommendations on that Report;

"*Directs* the NATO military authorities to accept as a basis for military planning the assumptions, conclusions and recommendations of MC 48;

"*Urges* member governments to consider measures required to direct their national defense efforts towards the development of forces in support of this pattern;

"*Resolves* that future Annual Reviews shall, as appropriate, take these measures and the recommendations of the Military Authorities into account in developing a pattern of NATO military strength which supports the concepts indicated in MC 48;

"*Directs* the Permanent Council and the Military authorities to arrange for continuous and progressive Council consideration of the major actions, including a review of the alert and NATO consultative procedures in the event of attack, required to support the concepts indicated in MC 48, and of further studies referred to in that report, with a view towards further consideration of these matters at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council."

Footnote continued from preceding page.

randum of Dec. 8 from Merchant to Secretary Dulles which recommended that when the matter was discussed with President Eisenhower it be made clear that "in the course of [North Atlantic] Council meeting, and in view of the seriousness of this issue and the attitude of other governments, it may be necessary to retreat somewhat in phraseology from the precise language of the proposed resolution."

This resolution was probably discussed with President Eisenhower during a meeting with Dulles and Radford reported upon in Goodpaster's memorandum of Dec. 8, not printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 420) It appears, however, that this memorandum or a revision thereof, was never delivered to the British.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 428

Record of Background Press Conference by the Secretary of State[1]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY PARIS, December 16, 1954.

Secretary Dulles: I think you probably better start asking questions right away.

Question: Mr. Secretary, I think I speak for a great many—if not all—in asking if you could say anything at all about what you expect to discuss with Eden and Mendes-France. That would be a very good starting point.

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[1] The source text indicates that the conference was held at Ambassador Dillon's residence in Paris at 2:50 p. m. There is no indication of the name of the recording officer.

Secretary Dulles: I imagine that while we have not any fixed agenda or any limitations we probably will, in the first instance, discuss some of the questions that may come up at the meeting; notably, the discussion revolving around this paper that the Military Committee put in about the prospective defense of Western Europe.

There is a good deal of talk which raises, I think, a somewhat artificial issue on the question of if it is agreed that considerable dependence should be placed upon atomic weapons, certainly tactical weapons, in defense of Western Europe and that the approval of that military plan and the preparations would in some way involve political considerations, at this time, to use atomic weapons. Naturally, the fact that you have atomic weapons increases the likelihood of their use. Still, there is not the difficulty, that I know of, of making a political decision today which would be binding on some unpredictable date—a date which we hope will never arrive—as to what should actually be done.

This is a part of military planning and military preparation which every country goes through but I think in no country—certainly not in the United States—does the fact that your military equipment includes atomic weapons mean that there is any automatic decision to use them. That would be decided in circumstances and events which call for such a decision. I assume that it would be the same here.

In other words, what I understand the Council will deal with tomorrow is a program which the military people have devised and which involves a certain dependence upon atomic weapons. That is for planning preparation purposes not involving political decisions as to the use.

Question: Will there be any discussion at the meeting as to how a political decision as to the use of atomic weapons will be arrived at?

Secretary Dulles: I wouldn't be surprised if there were some discussion about it. I would also be surprised if there was any agreement about it because to my mind it is the kind of thing that does not lend itself to any rigid formula.

I know that our planning in the United States assumes that in the event of an all out war there might be a very considerable interruption of communication facilities, for example. It cannot be assumed that it would be possible to pick up a telephone as was done in the last war when President Roosevelt and Churchill talked over the phone for five or ten minutes and made a decision. It is quite unlikely that that facility of communications would exist today with communication facilities jamming, cable cutting, and the like. All those things require that you take different premises for your thinking and whereas it was permissible during the last war—and while the principle of consultation is something which is readily acceptable—the assurance that that can be implemented is quite a different matter so that you cannot make your military decisions wholly dependent upon the facilities of communication that may be nonexistent. There probably will be an exchange of views on that general subject.

I doubt whether any rigid formula would emerge.

Question: Mr. Secretary, under our law can the President delegate his authority to decide on the use of atomic weapons to any subordinate?

Secretary Dulles: Well, I would prefer not to go into that question. It is somewhat of a classified matter.

[Here follows the record of a series of questions and answers regarding the Saar question.]

Question: Can the remarks of the President with respect to the atomic business[2] be taken to mean that we recognize a right to veto on the part of all fourteen, or ultimately fifteen members of the NATO in regard to this matter?

Secretary Dulles: I don't think that is the correct interpretation of what the President said.

Question: Do we have an attitude that we take, sir, on this French proposal for an Atomic Standing Group parallel to the Military Standing Group?

Secretary Dulles: I have not seen any such proposal. I understand that it was referred to in an editorial in *Le Monde* last night. That is the first I heard.

[Here follows a lengthy series of questions and answers on the situation in Indochina and the possibility of an Austrian State Treaty.]

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you clarify for a moment your position with respect to this military paper? Am I correct in the assumption that you will support the principle of SHAPE having the right to base its defense plans on the assumption that they will be able to use atomic weapons in the event of war? But there will be no decision here on the execution of those plans?

Secretary Dulles: I will put it a little bit differently. I would say that it is the view of the United States with reference to NATO forces just as it is our view with reference to US forces, that the job of the military is to plan for the most effective defense that is possible. That is their job.

Now the question as to when and under what circumstances you would use that defense invokes all of those elements that are matters decided on in the light of actual events and as decided, I might say, by the civilian branch of the government and not by the military themselves.

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[2] During his press conference on Dec. 15, 1954, President Eisenhower commented at length on questions which one reporter characterized as concerning "the atomic defense of Western Europe"; for the text of the press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 1108–1113.

Question: Don't you have to solve that latter problem before an emergency develops, or before the danger of a surprise attack develops? Isn't it something that can't be left up in the air?

Secretary Dulles: I am afraid that it is something that to some extent has to be left up in the air. We found that is the case with reference to our own military planning. That is, that it is not possible to make in advance the decisions as to just when atomic weapons will be used and whether they will be used for tactical purposes or strategic purposes. All of those decisions have to be left for decision in the light of events and are left for decision in the light of events.

Question: Are you optimistic over passage or ratification of the WEU Treaty next week, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Dulles: By the French Chamber of Deputies?

Question: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: I have no reason to doubt it, but as I say, that means guessing a political situation of a foreign country.

Question: Is it your understanding that the operations that might be carried out by the Strategic Air Command are not subject to the same restraints or vetoes that might apply to the use of tactical atomic weapons in Europe?

Secretary Dulles: When you refer to the Strategic Air Command you are referring to the US?

Question: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: That would not necessarily be bound by any arrangements that were made here in relation to NATO because the President said yesterday [3] that there are some areas where the United States has an unquestioned right to act alone. That would apply at least to certain operations of the Strategic Air Command. It might not apply to their operations when they proceed from foreign bases, but there are many areas where the Strategic Air Command could act without any occasion or requirement of consultation, although broadly speaking, under any circumstances which seem likely to involve a general war involving ourselves and our allies, we would just as a matter of decency and enlightened judgment want to have a maximum, agreed change of views with our allies.

Your allies are far more effective allies if they feel that they are in on the consultation, than they are if they are not. The broad principle of consultation, to the extent practicable, is one that we not only accept but welcome as one of the ingredients of a wholesome relationship.

Question: I was thinking of SAC operations against the NATO area in Europe.

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[3] See footnote 2, above.

Secretary Dulles: SAC doesn't operate against NATO areas.

Question: Areas which directly concern NATO: that is to say, Europe.

Secretary Dulles: SAC operates on the assumption of a war with the Soviet Union. SAC operates against Russia.

Question: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: Then comes the question, I would suppose, as to where the various strategic air operations take off from. They could take off from anyplace around the world.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you don't feel that there is a tendency on the part of some of the smaller nations in respect to NATO forces to restrict their use of atomic tactical weapons so as to make Europe safe for local wars?

Secretary Dulles: Well, I don't know. I have not had contact here yet with the representatives that you refer to as "small" countries. I have not had contact with either the British or the French.

In general, there has been a strong sentiment in Europe that what they wanted was not a condition which would permit their being liberated. They said that it was not worthwhile being liberated if the Russians came in. They wanted to be defended. Now, we believe that a situation can be created where Europe, if invaded, would be liberated. We believe that if the great industrial capacity of the United States can be preserved, which we think can measurably be done through our continental defense system, then we would eventually win a war but that would not necessarily stop an invasion of Europe. If Europe depends for its defense wholly upon conventional weapons, then, according to the military people, it would not be defensible. They have worked out this plan, which is the plan they think enables Europe to be defended and the only way Europe can be defended.

It is to a considerable extent up to the people here whether they want—military people provisionally at least—a working basis to plan and operate on strategically on which they could defend Europe, or whether they don't want them to.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you expressed a desire to get along with our allies in the general sense. Do you think this could be extended to the possibility of restricting America's freedom of choice to use available weapons, including all nuclear weapons?

Secretary Dulles: You are not talking about the defense of Europe in general?

Question: The general defense of the world.

Secretary Dulles: As the President said yesterday, there are a number of respects in which the United States must be and remain free to act alone. In other words, we do not accept a general, global right of nations to restrict our actions so that no action can be taken unless a large number agree. One of the main purposes of all this atomic business is not to fight a war but to deter a war. If your deterrent measures are so restricted that the potential enemy could feel reasonably confident that you would be subject to political delays and inhibitions, you lose your deterrent power and make more and more likely a deterrent to be ineffective. It must be something that the potential aggressor thinks will work and work quickly. If you so enmesh it with political machinery and requirements to action which many times cannot work or work only after long delay, then you lose the main purpose of it which is not to fight a war but to prevent a war.

(Whereupon, at 3:07 o'clock, p. m., Thursday, December 16, 1954, the press conference was closed.)

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 420

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)[1]

TOP SECRET [PARIS,] December 16, 1954.

Participants: Secretary Dulles, Secretary Anderson, Ambassador Hughes, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bowie, Mr. McCardle, and Mr. Martin.

Sir Anthony Eden, Sir Harold Macmillan, Sir Harold Caccia, Sir Christopher Steel and Sir Gladwyn Jebb.

Mr. Pearson, Mr. Campney and Mr. Wilgress.

Sir Anthony opened the meeting by asking the Secretary what he thought of the British form of resolution which had been approved by the Cabinet (attached Annex A[2]).

The Secretary said he would first like to say a few words about the situation as he understood it. MC–48, which was a unanimous report by the military experts, set forth their judgment as to the best way and perhaps only way to defend Europe against a Soviet assault, and asked authority to make plans and preparations on this basis. This presents a different question from how such plans were to be put into operation in the event of hostilities. It is the difference between making "war plans" which is for the military authorities and declaring war, which is for the civilian authorities in the United States.

At its meeting the Council must decide whether to approve planning on the basis recommended by the experts. Since the European members have always favored a forward strategy it is hard to conceive that the Council would direct the military authorities to plan on a negative basis. If it did, that would raise serious questions for the U.S. in keeping its troops in Europe as it might for the British. The resolution should make clear that the question of deciding actually to go to war is not involved. The early draft of resolution may have been ambiguous. Of course, such a resolution would not solve that question but it would at least allow the military authorities to go ahead in planning without waiting for the Council to settle on how the forces would be ordered into action. In practice the effort to answer that question may pose issues which can be solved only by the event. No member can delegate authority to declare war; yet any procedure requiring approval of all NATO members to oppose an attack would seriously hamper both the deterrent effect and the defense. In actual hostilities it might be impossible even to consult because of difficulties of communication. An effort to create a standing political group for such decisions would raise many new problems. Maybe these will have to be faced ultimately, but we have got on so far without solving this problem.

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[1] This meeting took place at the British Embassy in Paris, beginning at 3:40 p. m.; a summary account was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram Secto 5, Dec. 16, from Paris. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423)

[2] Annex A is not printed here.

The Secretary therefore suggested changing the resolution to make clear it relates only to planning and preparations by the military. . . .

. . . .

The Secretary suggested that the issue might be resolved by a resolution which (1) approved MC–48 as a basis for planning and preparation of the forces and (2) noted that the approval did not involve any delegation of responsibility of the governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities. Secretary Anderson said the resolution must avoid implying that NATO had not settled the issue of use. Otherwise, the resolution would impair the deterrent effect. Messrs. Pearson and Eden thought the Secretary's suggestion was a good solution. Sir Harold Macmillan said that it was not practical to plan both for defense on the Rhine and a forward defense at the same time, but still that it would comfort the public to know that the statesman had not abdicated to the military authorities.

. . . .

740.5/12–1754 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, December 17, 1954—3 p. m.

Dulte 6. Eyes only Hoover for President. Am happy to advise that NATO Ministerial Council has just unanimously approved Military Committee report for purposes of planning and preparation with understanding that this approval did not involve any delegation to military of responsibility of governments for deciding on action in event of hostilities.[1] Approving resolution was worked out by us yesterday in conversations first with United Kingdom and Canada, then with France.[2] It is entirely satisfactory to Gruenther and Radford.

DULLES

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[1] See telegram Secto 21, Dec. 18, from Paris, p. 557.

[2] See Bowie's memorandum of conversation of Dec. 16, *supra*.

Editorial Note

The Fifteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in Paris, December 17 to 18, 1954. The meeting was attended by Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Finance, Economic Affairs, and Defense Production of the 14 countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The United States Delegation was headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson, Director of Foreign Operations Administration Harold E. Stassen, and United States Permanent NATO Representative John C. Hughes. A complete list of the more than 35 Senior Advisers and Advisers of the United States Delegation is presented in *Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences, July 1, 1954–June 30, 1955*, prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Department of State (Washington, 1956), pages 17–18. For the telegraphic summary reports on the proceedings of the Ministerial meeting, see telegrams Secto 13 and 14, December 17 and Secto 21, December 18, from Paris, *infra* and pages 554 and 557.

The Secretary of State and members of his party arrived in Paris on the afternoon of December 15, 1954. During his stay in Paris, Secretary Dulles held a number of conversations with various European Foreign Ministers on a variety of topics mostly outside the immediate North Atlantic Treaty Organization framework. His meeting with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson, as recorded by Robert Bowie, is printed on page 547. The record of a background press conference by Secretary Dulles on December 16 is printed on page 542.

The basic record of reports and documents about the Ministerial meeting in Paris is preserved in the central files of the Department of State under file number 740.5. The single most comprehensive body of documentation on the Fifteenth Ministerial meeting is maintained in the special file—Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416–420 and 422–423, and it includes complete collections of telegraphic exchanges between the Secretary's party and Washington during the Paris visit, a seemingly complete set of briefing papers prepared for the Delegation on a wide variety of topics likely to be discussed in Paris mostly outside the NATO framework, a collection of records of meetings with foreign delegations and officials in Paris, and the most complete collection of official NATO documentation available in the Department of State.

For the text of the official communiqué issued in Paris on December 18 at the conclusion of the Fifteenth Ministerial meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 3, 1955, pages 10–12. For the text of Secretary Dulles' press conference on the occasion of his return to Washington on December 21, see *ibid.*, pages 9–10. For the record of Secretary Dulles' report on the Ministerial meeting delivered to the National Security Council on December 21, see the memorandum of discussion at the 229th Meeting of the Council, page 560.

Documentation relating to the activities and negotiations of Secretary Dulles and his party during their stay in Paris, December 15 to 21, 1954 and not related directly to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be presented, where appropriate, in other volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series.

740.5/12–1754 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, December 17, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 13. Cotel. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting. Morning December 17, items I, II, III, IV agenda (CA(54)50 revised).

Chairman (Greece) [2] opened meeting with brief remarks and turned it over secretary general [3] who proposed item IV (most effective pattern military strength for next few years (MC–48)) be discussed subsequent restricted meeting.[4] This meeting will be reported separate telegram.

Item I of agenda (report by secretary general of progress during period 3 December 1953 to 7 December 1954 (CM(54)115)).[5] Secretary generally stated he had nothing add to report save express regret delay issuance five-year NATO survey caused by need inclusion for reference purposes London-Paris agreements. Survey would be released next month. No comment on report and report adopted.

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[1] Transmitted in two sections. Pouched to all NATO capitals and Bonn, Wiesbaden, Heidelberg.

[2] Stephanos Stephanopoulos.

[3] Lord Ismay.

[4] Held later in the day of Dec. 17. Summarized in telegram Secto 21, Dec. 18, p. 557.

[5] A copy of CM (54) 115 is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416.

Item II (exchange views political matters common interest including Soviet trends paper (CM(54)116)).[6]

Italy[7] welcomed increased cooperation NATO powers as shown recent joint reply Soviet note which demonstrated NATO not only military alliance but also political diplomatic union. Advocated increased propaganda efforts in political and vaguely alluded to desirability increased coordination NATO relationships on psychological front. He later gave brief summary ratification process Paris agreements in Rome which he expected would be favorably terminated immediate future.

Turkey. While London-Paris agreements[8] gave confidence for future, beware over-optimism and keep up guard, increasing NATO defense unity cohesion and firmness. Then Soviets will be less aggressive. If Soviet threat seems less remote today this due to strength of West especially in nuclear weapons. West cannot permit East close gap between East inferiority and West superiority nuclear weapons. Anticipated German contribution must not give West false confidence. More attention must be directed to econ-social conditions underdeveloped areas order to increase their potential and show up false Communist flirtations. Helpful role of OEEC stressed as well as need increase econ–social collaboration within NATO. Ended remarks be advocating door should be kept open conversations with Soviets when certain conditions met ratification Paris agreements, increased NATO military strength, et cetera.) But stressed theme negotiation through strength.

U.S.[9] Soviet policy resembled powerful stream whose surface sometimes ruffled sometimes calm. Current can't be judged by surface which, ruffled or calm, is no indication of force below. Most important consideration is build up Western strength and avoid dangers being lulled into false security by calm, frightened into paralysis by rough, or provoked into hasty and ill-considered actions. Soviet trends paper shows no basic change Soviet policy or any diminution Soviet military strength including nuclear capacity. This includes China. Vast manpower Communist world being ruthlessly employed not primarily for raising standard living but for increasing war potential. At same time

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[6] The formal agreed agenda, a copy of which is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416, indicates that this document was circulated to the Ministers, but no copy has been found in Department of State files.

[7] Department of State files contain the verbatim records of only the afternoon session, Dec. 17, summarized in telegram Secto 14, *infra*. Therefore, it is impossible to identify the individual speakers whose remarks are summarized in the source text.

[8] Documentation on the Four-Power and Nine-Power Conferences which led to the admission of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Brussels Pact and to the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO is on pp. 1294 ff.

[9] Secretary Dulles' lengthy opening statement to the Ministerial meeting herein summarized was transmitted to the Department in telegram Polto 879 of Dec. 20, a copy of which is in PPS files, lot M 88, box 168.

Communists continuing subversion especially in underdeveloped and colonial areas. This is close adherence basic thesis Lenin–Stalin that road to victory of revolution in West lies through revolutionary alliance with liberation movement of colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. Recently Soviets are playing "soft line" but they have not deviated by deed or action from basic policy. They have refused contribute to President Eisenhower's plan create atomic bank for peaceful purposes or respond to efforts U.N. Armament Subcommittee to limit and control atomic and conventional weapons. They used for propaganda purposes and not for constructive ends all meetings held in 1954 to bring about unification Germany, liberation Austria, and unification Korea. We must not be lulled into sense of security merely by words in fact Soviet deeds. Regarding second danger we must not be paralyzed by fright into avoidance of actions which Soviets disapprove. Soviets always seek by threatening words to prevent unification and strengthening of free world. They are always violent in their denunciations of constructive moves towards unification by free world. Secretary then cited chapter and verse, including quotations from Soviet sources of Soviet denunciations and threatening gestures vis-à-vis Marshall plan, organization of NATO, Turkish adherence NATO, Japanese peace treaty, Manila pact, etcetera. He pointed out that such denunciations, whenever they were followed by concrete steps on part West to unify and strengthen non-Communist world, were followed on part Soviets by conciliatory gestures and that record of the last ten years give proof that West could be confident that if it proceeded to build up its strength Soviets would give increasing deference to that strength and that its mood of hostility might change. Secretary continued that we must not be provoked into violent, ill-considered actions which would disturb harmonious unity our alliance. U.S. subject to severe provocation in Far East, deliberately planned in hope provoking U.S. into actions which European allies would regard ill-advised and which would possibly shake our unity at time when we hoped it would be reinforced by London-Paris agreements. Secretary assured NATO U.S. would not be provoked into reckless action and quoted President Eisenhower's statement to effect "hard way is to have courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single avenue open to us in hope eventually of leading other side to a little better understanding of honesty of our intentions". Instead taking unilateral action to retaliate against flagrant wrong involved in imprisonment U.S. fliers, we took action to U.N. This connection Secretary wished express appreciation to NATO U.N. members for their support and efforts being made bring about release U.S. fliers. In conclusion Secretary stated free world has come long way since early post-war days, that there was increasing unity and strength and increasing likelihood peace and freedom. Task ahead long and hard but he felt confident that NATO partners would not be lulled into complacency, frightened into paralysis or provoked into hasty actions.

France. Agreed fully Secretary's evaluation surface phenomena Soviet foreign policy and stressed need studying deep intentions and trends Soviet policy which have not changed. Soviet note December 16 threatening abrogation Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty 1944 excellent example Soviet attempt intimidate French public opinion and parliament on eve national assembly debate ratification issue. No one should be alarmed by this "spectacular move." France would not be influenced and would remain firm to its policy consolidating western alliance. Soviet move might well backfire and provoke or influence opponents or hesitants into giving fuller support to agreements since Frenchmen scorn such provocative action. Soviet note would not change government's determination obtain ratification soonest.

U.K. completely in accord with U.S. and French statements and hoped that there would be increasing understanding of basic Soviet tactics. Emphasized need continual build-up position of strength and make clear to world this strength even with German contribution defensive strength. Stressed fact that WEU should not be rival to NATO but should contribute to unity western European defense. Links between WEU and NATO being studied and although too early predict precise form agreed by all they must be intimate. Aim now was to fortify unity of west by ratifying Paris agreements which parliament had done and as expected crude Soviet maneuvers to disrupt agreements were more active. After commenting on negative meaning peaceful co-existence in Soviet terminology, Eden strongly advocated need increasing unity, keeping up guard, et cetera. He felt growing strength of west might in time prevail upon east modify its tactics, that recent conference satellite states had not changed over-all situation, in fact it has done little more than confirm in name what existed in fact; and that strength and unity of west would give better prospects for peace.

Item II. (Trends paper) Noted with full approval.

Item III. (Military progress of NATO (MC-5/9)).[10] General Guillaume requested commanders to speak. Admiral Wright stressed need improve collective ability withstand atomic aggression and maintain security of seas during duration emergency. He pointed out his plans provided for effective naval effort, not only on missions of primary importance to his command but also in support of channel command and SACEUR, that his main mission was to gain and maintain control of Atlantic and assure its availability for NATO. He stressed that closest possible coordination with SACEUR was being maintained throughout all his planning. Admiral Creasy spoke in generalities on responsibility NATO forces holding command of sea, vital necessity sea lanes be kept open to provide imports civilian population and armies of continent. General Gruenther tabled paper on air defense and technical center and requested cooperation NATO allies assist scientific staffing this organization. (Gruenther statement being air pouched.) Gruenther also stressed great need NATO governments intensify efforts popularize NATO in order *inter alia* facilitate passage national budgetary appropriations or forces assigned NATO. He was impressed by over one hundred leadership groups which had come to SHAPE during last year and which seemed to be quite unfamiliar with duties and responsibilities NATO. These groups should be encouraged. NATO peoples should be made much more aware of what NATO stood for. U.S. (Anderson)[11] supported Gruenther's statement regarding air defense technical center pointing out that it was an adjunct to SHAPE, that it could be transferred to NATO or any other NATO body whenever NATO desired, that center was truly international, and that its real success depended upon full cooperation other NATO members making scientists available to it. He expressed appreciation to Netherland authorities for their cooperation in establishing center. Netherlands expressed appreciation initiative Gruenther and U.S. Government setting up center and stated would give full cooperation its development. Secretary General gratified with Gruenther's remarks on "preaching NATO gospel" and expressed hope that international staff informational ideas be favorably considered by finance ministers, even if expensive.

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[10] The formal agreed agenda, a copy of which is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 416, indicates that this document was circulated to the Ministers, but no copy has been found in Department of State files.

Military progress report noted.

Remaining items on agenda will be reported in subsequent telegrams.

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[11] Presumably Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

740.5/12–1754 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, December 17, 1954—9 p. m.

Secto 14. Cotel. Subject: NAC Ministerial Meeting Afternoon December 17.

Council completed consideration agenda items V through VII.[2]

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[1] Pouched to all NATO capitals and Bonn, Wiesbaden, and Heidelberg.

[2] Item V: Report on 1954 Annual Review and Plans for 1955 Annual Review (see footnote 2, p. 520); Item VI: Other business; Item VII: Date and place of next meeting.

Will meet in restricted session Saturday morning on item VIII (communiqué).

Item V

Ismay suggested would be best for ministers say anything they wished to say about reference documents prior to consideration draft resolution on 1954 annual review.[3]

Canada[4] made brief statement regarding recommendations made to them in annual review report along lines their written comments appearing in annex III their country chapter.

U.K. defense minister[5] made short statement in which he emphasized desirability shortening annual review reports because of need for ministers to focus on essential points rather than details. Referred to assumptions on which U.K. future planning based; namely, that present level of defense costs will remain same and that financing of local costs of U.K. forces in Germany and receipts foreign aid will continue at levels indicated in U.K. annual review submission. U.K. now in process developing plans to reorganize its forces to take account of new weapons and strategy. After further development these plans and after bilateral discussions with U.S. and Canada regarding aid, but before presentation next defense budget to Parliament, U.K. will make further more detailed report to NATO.

Portuguese defense minister[6] said that although they were ready to adopt draft 1954 annual review resolution, they were willing to do so subject to satisfactory solution to problem spelled out in CM(54) 120 re Portuguese Air Force goals.[7]

Secretary Anderson made statement on behalf U.S. (with full text being pouched)[8] emphasizing importance U.S. attaches to implementation M.C. 48 and outlining principal considerations being taken into account in reorientation of future mutual defense assistance programs. Said U.S. would report in further detail on latter point early in New Year.

Turkish defense minister[9] spoke favorably of secretary general's commentary on 1954 annual review report. Also stated new concept adopted in M.C. 48 would not permit member countries to relax in continued development their defense efforts.

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[3] A copy of the Draft Resolution on the 1954 Annual Review, designated CM (54) 117, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 417.

[4] A verbatim record for this meeting is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 417, and indicates that the speaker was R. D. Campney, Minister of National Defense. Hereafter, the identification of all speakers has been made from the verbatim record.

[5] Harold Macmillan.

[6] Colonel Santos Costa.

[7] A copy of CM (54) 120, memorandum by the Portuguese Delegation entitled "The Portuguese Air Force" is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 417.

[8] The only verbatim record of Secretary Anderson's remarks found in Department of State files is included in the verbatim record of the afternoon session of the Ministerial meeting, Dec. 17 in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 417.

[9] Fuad Köprülü.

Canada[10] commented briefly on prospects future Canadian mutual aid pointing out that henceforward they would concentrate on provision of modern equipment with spare parts as appropriate. Said Canada was now studying complicated problem of maintenance their production base and when this study completed would be able report in more detail regarding future end-item aid. Said should also be borne in mind that North America was becoming increasingly vulnerable to attack and prophesied there would be reduction in Canadian end-item aid next year. Added however that training and contributions to infrastructure, which occupied large part Canadian mutual aid program, would remain about same.

Italian defense minister[11] drew attention to reorganization plan reported in Italian annual review submission, stating Italian forces would be in greatly improved situation upon completion reorganization about three years hence. Said Italy would continue to depend on foreign aid and could not add to its defense expenditures. Italy accepted all recommendations in 1954 annual review report as general guidance and would seek to implement them within limits their financial capabilities.

Ismay then asked for comments on draft 1954 Annual Review resolution. There were none. Council then took note of 1954 Annual Review report and Secretary General's comments and military committee's comments, as well as statements made by ministers thereon. Council adopted draft resolution and also adopted U.S. suggestion that permanent council complete its negotiations on agreement re exchange atomic energy information in January 1955.

Council then took up draft resolution on 1955 Annual Review.[12] Netherlands Defense Minister[13] commented on desirability improving Annual Review procedures. Mentioned importance Netherlands attached to participation of permanent delegations at early stage of Annual Review. Said Netherlands particularly liked paragraph 7 of draft 1955 Annual Review resolution and expressed hope permanent representatives would give this suggestion serious consideration which he believed it deserved. Said his government thought multilateral consideration important changes in contributions to NATO defense should be considered before such changes took place, if possible.

Secretary Anderson said U.S. wished to record its understanding that reference in paragraph 7 to "national contributions to NATO defense" refers to force contributions. Said U.S. also understood that scope of this study should be further clarified by agreement among permanent representatives. Assumed there was no disagreement with this interpretation. There was none.

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[10] C. D. Howe, Minister of Defense Production and of Trade and Commerce.

[11] Paolo E. Taviani.

[12] Designated CM (54) 118, a copy of which is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 417.

[13] C. Staf.

Draft 1955 Annual Review resolution was then adopted without further comment. Secretary General pointed out it was understood permanent representatives would take full account of comments made on paragraph 7 by U.S. and Netherlands delegations.

Item VI

Portuguese Delegate [14] said that they again wished inform NAC re situation Portuguese Provinces in India.[15] Said economic blockade and "piracy" against Portuguese fishing fleet and merchant marine by Indian union was worsening. Said this was contrary article 2 U.N. charter. Said might have to raise matter before council under article 4 N.A. treaty.

Item VII [16]

Ismay called on chairman, Greek Foreign Minister,[17] for comment re date and place next meeting. Greece proposed Athens. France, Italy, Portugal and US supported proposal, latter assuming necessary secretarial and technical help would be available. Ismay said if meeting confined to Foreign Ministers 120 members US could do job. Suggested Council agree in principle to holding meeting in Athens some time in April and invite Permanent Reps to work out details early next year.

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[14] Dr. Paulo Cunha.

[15] Documentation on Gao is in the compilation on Portugal in volume VI.

[16] The passage on Item VII (date and place of next meeting) omitted from source text. It has been added from the copy of telegram Secto 14 found in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423.

[17] Stephanos Stephanopoulos.

740.5/12–1854 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Meeting to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, December 18, 1954—2 p. m.

Secto 21. Subject: NAC Discussion of Item IV [1] in Restricted Session, December 17.

To focus discussion, Ismay introduced MC 48 with following draft resolution which he said had been prepared by international staff and others:

"The council approves the report MC 48 as a basis for planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does not involve the delegation of responsibility of governments for putting the plans into action in the event of hostilities."

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[1] MC 48, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 536.

The Secretary then made statement supporting draft resolution in which he pointed out that NATO had always sought a defense so adequate that it would, in fact, operate as a deterrent to war. He emphasized that program set forth in MC 48 would also, in opinion of NATO military authorities, permit of an effective forward strategy and would constitute an actual defense so that there would not be the necessity of future liberation. Turning to question of whether and how capabilities to be created under MC 48 would be put into action in event of hostilities, Secretary recognized problem matter of concern to all free nations which historically have always desired that responsibility for belligerent action basically be in control of civil branch of government. Pointed out that in US responsibility in this matter vested in President. Concluding, Secretary said he thought draft resolution made amply clear that approval of MC 48 would not involve delegation of responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in event of hostilities and indicated that the US strongly approved of adoption of MC 48 for purposes of planning and preparation by NATO military authorities.

French Defense Minister Temple supported draft resolution since it gave military authorities freedom to continue their planning for reorganizing of their forces in light of possible use of atomic weapons and since it left responsibility to political authorities to decide whether these atomic weapons were to be used.

Italian Foreign Minister Martino said he approved. Agreed with Secretary was essential to make clear decisions to use atomic weapons be left with governments. Added he believed approval of MC 48 should be subject to limitation that it apply only so long as no convention limiting armaments and use of atomic weapons were universally agreed. Believed that NAC affirmation of a desire to limit and control armaments would be favorably received by public opinion.

Speaking on behalf Greece, Permanent Representative Exintaris said his government not only approved MC 48 but that he also had instructions to say his government was in favor of enlarging the powers of Supreme Commander. He had no comment to make regarding the draft resolution.

Pearson, Canada, said that his delegation was heartily in favor of draft resolution which he hoped could be accepted unanimously so as to put an end to what he described as an unfortunate public controversy on this question. He identified himself as being among those who had had some doubt about the wisdom of the wording of one or two paragraphs in MC 48 and specifically as to the advisability of the wording of paragraph 37. These doubts had not arisen from a desire to restrict in any way those who had responsibility for planning collective defense; they had arisen from the idea that the wording of paragraph 37 might have created the impression that any hostile move of any kind would be met by the use of thermo-nuclear weapons. He thought the draft resolution satisfactorily disposed of these doubts.

Netherlands Foreign Minister Beyen expressed admiration for draft resolution which he considered conveyed right view of very delicate and difficult matter. Identified himself with concern Canadian Foreign Minister had expressed regarding question of publicity. In addition, thought it might be useful for Foreign Ministers to come to some broad understanding as to what they would say in parliaments if they had to speak of matter more in detail.

Portuguese Foreign Minister Cunha welcomed draft resolution and noted that the problem of determining how decisions would be made as to whether atomic weapons were to be used would require considerable study.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange accepted resolution and associated himself with statements by Canadian and Dutch Foreign Ministers on presentational aspect both to public and to Parliaments.

Eden then suggested that the word "the" be inserted in front of the word "responsibility" and deleted from its place in front of the word "plans". He believed this would help in presenting the matter publically since no one would be able to answer questions as to what MC 48 says but they could indicate that whatever it does say the responsibility of governments remains.

After the Danish and Belgian delegates had supported the draft resolution, Pearson suggested adding the word "defense" before the word "plans" in the last line to indicate those were the only plans NATO had in mind. The Secretary then suggested that the word "defense" should not modify the word "plans" in the last line because in the event of hostilities our plans might not be purely defensive. Suggested instead the word "defense" should be inserted in the first line to modify "planning and preparations". Ismay then said it had been suggested to him it might be better to use the word "aggression" instead of the word "hostilities". The Secretary opposed this on the ground that nobody has yet been able to define agrression.

The council then approved MC 48, instructed the communiqué drafting committee to prepare a paragraph or paragraphs to be included in a final communiqué or in a separate communiqué making clear the unanimous agreement of the council of MC 48 and agreed that the press should be informed the subject had been discussed and that the results of the discussion would appear in a communiqué.[2]

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[2] For text of the communiqué, issued on Dec. 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Jan. 3, 1955, pp. 10–12.

740.5/12-1954

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant), at Paris

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 19, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Lester Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs
Mr. Merchant

Mr. Pearson discussed at some length with the Secretary the background and action taken on MC–48. He felt the matter had come out very well in the council. . . . There was agreement that this whole problem has a certain artificial aspect in that it involves constitutional and political problems which are virtually impossible of solution in the abstract but which are as a rule determined without difficulty by events themselves.

Mr. Pearson then mentioned the implications of the development of the Far North Line. He said the Canadians were of course all for this but that obviously when it was completed it would require fighter stations in the Far North. This in turn would place an added requirement on the Canadian Air Force. He said that it would be politically impossible for the Canadians if part of this requirement was met by moving in American fighter squadrons at a time when part of the Canadian Air Force was physically located in Europe. He doubted that under these circumstances Canada would be able to make the additional effort and he was inclined to think that when this need arose it would be necessary for Canada to pull back from NATO assignment in Europe some or all of their squadrons in order to fill their northern defense needs. He said, however, that this was not a question which would arise for three or four years.

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, 1953–61, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 21, 1954 [1]

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY WASHINGTON, December 22, 1954.

Present at the 229th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense;

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[1] This memorandum was prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 2); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 2); Mr. Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 2); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 2); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. *Report on the recent NATO Council meeting*

Mr. Cutler called on the Secretary of State for a brief report on the recently concluded NATO Council meeting.

Secretary Dulles indicated that the U.S. delegation to the NATO meeting included, beside himself, Secretary Humphrey, Governor Stassen and Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson. The major issue at the meeting centered about approval of the report "MC 48", which had been designed to permit NATO military personnel to make plans on the assumption that if an all-out Soviet attack occurred, whether atomic or otherwise, the NATO response would be a defense employing atomic weapons. Secretary Dulles pointed out that while this report had secured unanimous approval by the Military Committee, it had raised a considerable question as to where authority rested to call this atomic defense into action. Because of this question, said Secretary Dulles, he had gone to Paris a day early in order to have preliminary talks on this issue. He had talked initially with Foreign Secretary Eden and with the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson. At this initial meeting the three had worked out a formula which adopted MC 48 as the basis for military planning and preparations, but which specified that there was to be no delegation by the NATO governments of their right as the civilian leaders to give the signal for bringing the atomic defense into action. Subsequently, said Secretary Dulles, this formula was cleared both with General Gruenther and Admiral Radford. Later on, Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden discussed the matter with Premier Mendes-France, who also gave his approval.

Thereafter, the resolution was introduced in the NATO Council by Lord Ismay, the Secretary General. It occasioned virtually no discussion or debate, and was unanimously approved by the Council. . . .

. . . .

Secretary Dulles said that another important point made in these discussions was the following: If the Soviets planned a non-atomic attack on the NATO area, such an attack would almost certainly be detected in advance, since it would require obvious mobilization and other preparations. Such an interval of time would afford the NATO powers a sufficient opportunity to consult with one another about using atomic weapons to repel the impending attack.

Secretary Humphrey said that when he had first got to Paris the problem which Secretary Dulles had been discussing seemed terribly serious to him. It looked like another great issue between the United States and its allies. Secretary Anderson and Secretary Dulles had responded to the challenge by two actions which were outstanding in their success. The first of these was selling to the other Foreign Ministers the formula which Secretary Dulles had described, ahead of the time of the actual meeting. As a result of this advance preparation, this phraseology was passed by the Council very easily and to Secretary Humphrey's complete amazement. The easy passage of the resolution, said Secretary Humphrey, shows how far these people in Western Europe have progressed in their thinking and their understanding of atomic warfare.

The second major action to ensure the success of the resolution consisted of a speech by Secretary Dulles citing chapter and verse, times and places, to indicate that every time we approached a very tough decision in our national security policy, the Soviet Union had issued what seemed to be a serious threat, but after we went ahead and did what was required, they climbed down and returned to a soft line. This extraordinary speech by the Secretary of State, said Secretary Humphrey, had been very helpful to Prime Minister Mendes-France when he came to make his statement insisting that the pact should be ratified by the French Chamber.

Governor Stassen said he wished to add his personal tribute to the manner in which Secretary Dulles had handled this difficult meeting.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State, supplemented by remarks by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, on the NATO Council meeting just concluded.

[Here follows a discussion by the National Security Council of agenda item 2, "Review of Basic National Security Policy"; agenda item 3, "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security"; and agenda item 4, "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East".]



Plate 2

Wide World Photos

Secretary of State Acheson addresses the opening meeting of the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council, Lisbon, Feb. 20, 1952.



Plate 1 Wide World Photos

Secretary of State Acheson meets with Chancellor Adenauer, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman at London, Feb. 18, 1952. *From left to right:* Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary of State Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman.

PLATE 3 Wide World Photos

Signing Ceremony for the European Defense Community Treaty, Paris, May 27, 1952. *From left to right:* Foreign Secretary Eden (*back to camera*), Chancellor Adenauer, Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, Foreign Minister Schuman (*standing*), Prime Minister De Gasperi, Foreign Minister Bech, Foreign Minister Stikker, and Secretary of State Acheson.



PLATE 5 Wide World Photo

Secretary of State Dulles meets with Foreign Minister Bidault and Acting Foreign Secretary Salisbury at Washington, July 10, 1953. *From left to right:* Foreign Minister Bidault, Secretary of State Dulles, and Acting Foreign Secretary Salisbury.

PLATE 6 Wide World Photos

President Eisenhower chats with Prime Ministers Laniel and Churchill outside the Mid-Ocean Club at Bermuda, Dec. 4, 1953 before the first meeting of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. *From left to right:* Prime Minister Laniel, President Eisenhower, and Prime Minister Churchill.

II. ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY[1]

A. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY, JANUARY–MAY 1952

740.5/1-252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[2]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, January 2, 1952—7:37 p. m.
PRIORITY

3784. Eyes only from Secretary. Have read cables from Bruce on recent Mins mtg in Paris on EDF.[3] Appreciate excellent and prompt reporting of developments.

Most fundamental factor of conference seems to be close identity of views of Fr, Gers and Italians. It wld appear from reports that these three nations cld have reached final agmt on most, if not all, of important issues in estab of EDC.

Because of the confusion of the discussion it is hard for us to tell in what matters and to what degree Benelux nations will give way and how far the other three can go to meet them without prejudicing the great opportunity which the Three Power agmt offers for EUR. We assume that this will be fully explored before the alternatives of The Three going ahead alone or accepting failure are contemplated.

Of primary importance in analyzing the best course of action wld be the views of Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi as to what shld be done. We are somewhat in doubt as to how matter was actually left when mtgs ended and whether any understanding was reached between these Three as to what to do about situation. I shld appreciate any info you can furnish along these lines as well as recommendations as to how to proceed. As this will be one of major issues in talks with Churchill need reply by end of this week at latest.[4]

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[1] Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 755 ff.

[2] This telegram, which was also sent as 869 to Bonn for McCloy and as 3006 to Rome for Dunn, was drafted by Byroade (GER) who cleared it in draft with Acheson and Perkins (EUR) and who signed for the Secretary.

[3] Regarding the Six-Power Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris, Dec. 27–30, 1951, regarding the proposed European Defense Community, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 980.

[4] Between Jan. 5 and 18, 1952, Prime Minister Churchill, Foreign Secretary Eden, and a party of advisers held a number of meetings in Washington with

Footnote continued on following page.

Related subj: I am informed that Fr have formally requested Pierson for delay of approximately two weeks in date of Lisbon mtg.[5] Reason advanced was not related to progress on EDF Treaty but to allow time for debate in France this subj after parliament convenes in late Jan. Appreciate your views on desirability this postponement and effect it may have your respective countries.[6]

ACHESON

Footnote continued from preceding page.

President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and other American officials. The meetings ranged over a wide spectrum of world problems including the European Defense Community project and NATO. Documentation on the Churchill–Eden visit is presented in volume VI.

[5] Regarding the French request under reference here, see also Schuman's letter of Jan. 2 to Acheson, p. 1.

[6] In telegram 3962, Jan. 3, from Paris, Bruce indicated that he already had presented his views on the subject in an earlier telegram and preferred to wait until the current French crisis was over before having new conversations with French officials and commenting further (740.5/1–352). For the McCloy and Dunn responses to this message, see telegram 927, Jan. 3, from Bonn and telegram 3032, Jan. 5, from Rome, pp. 576 and 578, respectively.

740.5/1–352: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, January 3, 1952—5 p. m.

3958. Personal attention Secretary. Distribution as determined by Secretary's office. Eyes only Chiefs of Mission. Subject: European Defense Force. Re Embtel 3957, Jan 3.[2]

This telegram attempts to sum up various outstanding issues in EDC and what action should in my opinion be taken to move them forward as rapidly as possible.

1. French-German-Italian agreement.

The Ministers' meeting made clear complete agreement of Germans and French (and for all practical purposes, Italians) on the major issues involved in EDC. They agreed that EDC must from beginning replace national armies and national budgets and must be operated as genuine common defense force and not merely as a coalition. Institutions must be so designed and power so distributed among them that they can effectively create and support forces of community. EDC must have responsibility and authority from outset although functions are to be delegated in treaty or by institutions to existing national services and only progressively assumed by EDC institutions as they are prepared to exercise particular functions.

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] The telegram under reference, a lengthy seven-page summary report on the Six-Power Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris, Dec. 27–30, 1951, regarding the proposed European Defense Community, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 985.

In face of Benelux opposition, French and Germans maintained solid front on issue after issue. On many of these issues Adenauer took lead in insisting on vital necessity of immed common activity; on all he took strong position against anything that would have effect of creating German national force or national defense budget, or which would derogate from supranational character of community itself.

2. Benelux position.

In Ministers' meeting Belgians and Dutch were able to maintain a joint position on most issues. In substance, their position was that community should have very limited authority in initial period and would constitute little more than a coalition of national forces of the members comparable to Brussels Pact. Nevertheless, review of minutes and discussions with individuals indicate that bases of Belgian and Dutch positions are quite different.

Dutch position seems to be based on:

(*a*) Belief that if a strong and effective EDC is created US might withdraw its military support from Europe, which support in Dutch mind provides their real security.

(*b*) Concern that France and Germany will dominate small countries, particularly if substantial authority delegated to central institutions.

(*c*) Hope that if EDC were sufficiently watered down the UK might some day join.

(*d*) Worry that under common financing and with continued support of US and UK forces in Germany, Dutch will have to make substantial financial contribution to build-up of German forces. Experts at conference, including Germans, seem to share view that Germany would contribute more than cost of own contingents in first year but would contribute less in subsequent years.

(*e*) Belief that Dutch can obtain more US end-items and military support aid if aid is handled on a national basis.

(*f*) Reluctance to give common institutions authority, particularly in build-up period, to make any modifications whatever in military program they have presented to Dutch Parliament and NATO. Basic concern appears to be that rapid build-up and equipment of German contingents might be attempted at expense of Dutch plans.

Van Zeeland probably has even more distaste than Dutch for changes in national programs that will result from common financing, common procurement and common planning, and of course does not like prospect of Belgian financial contribution being increased.

Like Dutch, Van Zeeland does not yet accept necessity advocated by Adenauer and Schuman to invest EDC with real authority from beginning in order to avoid discrimination against Germany on one hand and creation of German national forces on the other.



Wide World Photos

PLATE 4

Secretary of State Dulles and Mutual Security Director Stassen meet with Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi at Rome, Jan. 31, 1953. *From left to right:* unidentified official, Mutual Security Director Stassen, Prime Minister De Gasperi, Treasury Minister Pella, Finance Minister Vanoni, Secretary of State Dulles, and Ambassador Bunker.

PLATE 7

Wide World Photos

Secretary of State Dulles meets with Prime Minister Mendès-France and Foreign Secretary Eden at Paris, July 13, 1954 to discuss the European Defense Community and Indochina. *From left to right:* Foreign Secretary Eden, Prime Minister Mendès-France, and Secretary of State Dulles.


ARK
FRANCE
GREECE
ICELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
TURKEY

Plate 8 Wide World Photos

Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sign the agreements whereby the Federal Republic of Germany becomes the 15th member. Paris, Oct. 23, 1954. *From left to right:* French Prime Minister Mendès-France, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos, Icelandic Foreign Minister Gudmundsson, Italian Foreign Minister Martino, unidentified secretary (*standing*), Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary General of NATO Ismay (*standing*), Luxembourg Prime Minister Bech, Netherlands Foreign Minister Beyen, Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange, Portuguese Foreign Minister Cunha, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü, and British Foreign Secretary Eden.

Plate 9 Wide World Photos

Representatives of the three Western occupying powers and the Federal Republic of Germany sign the agreement ending the occupation of West Germany, Paris, Oct. 23, 1954. *From left to right seated at the table:* Chancellor Adenauer, Secretary of State Dulles, Prime Minister Mendès-France, and Foreign Secretary Eden.

Van Zeeland is also motivated by his fear of rising power in election which would be required to amend Belgian constitution if, as he claims, this should be necessary in order to authorize [apparent omission] than a coalition. Consequently, he is seeking to have community take a form which will enable him to tell his Parliament that there has been no transfer of sovereignty and that such transfer will occur only when a federation is created. Undoubtedly he believes that this would not take place before regular elections would be required in Belgium.

Both French and Germans have asked us to do everything we can to get Belgian and Dutch support for Franco-German conception. Both seem to think that best hope is to approach Dutch first in order to remove certain of their misunderstandings. Both think that much of Dutch preoccupation re transitional period can be met without sacrifice of essentials of French-German position. Both think that Dutch might be persuaded, but that Belgians can only be pressed, and that this will be easier if Dutch can be swung around. Pleven and Schuman plan to visit The Hague and Brussels in hope of modifying the Benelux position. Germans might also try to make clear importance which Adenauer attaches to fundamental principles advocated by Schuman and himself and why Adenauer's proposals are in the basic interest of Eur security and unity.

Recommendations:

Position of Adenauer and of Fr seems to me to make clear fact that there is no real alternative to a Eur Defense Community vested with functions considered essential by Fr and Gers, and that there is little basis for any assumption we might make that a Ger contribution could be obtained thru some other method. Adenauer and Schuman seem convinced that agreement can soon be reached. Consequently, realistic policy is now [*not?*] to talk in terms of alternatives but keep pressure on participants to bring matter to conclusion as rapidly as possible. Under circumstances adherence to a rigid time-schedule for bringing about matter of this momentous character appears unrealistic. If these discussions are viewed as a process, progress at Ministers' meeting as well as at officials' conference has been encouraging.

a. US can help with Benelux if Secretary could call in Dutch and Belgian Ambassadors and make clear to them:

(i) That US is more likely to preserve interest in maintaining troops on continent to assist Eur defense if EDC is made effective than if present situation continues.

(ii) That American aid will be distributed in manner most likely to promote effective defense, and that EDC is in line with views of Congress, as stated in present legislation, which favors political and economic unity of Europe.

(iii) That Franco-German agreement presents historic opportunity for fundamental solution of relations on continent, for strengthening of defense and for moving towards federation. This opportunity must not be lost, and if Benelux opposition has this result it would be hard to justify to American opinion.

b. As soon as possible Dutch should receive assurance that support costs in Ger will not have effect either now or subsequently in passing part of this burden to them. Fr and Gers should explain to Dutch that Franco-German proposals on common financing and common procurement have gone long way to meet Dutch preoccupations:

(i) No substantial change, if any, in force goals for Dutch contingents and in broad lines of NATO military program for next three years is involved.

(ii) In practice executive and community's institutions must be guided in expenditures by present NATO programs and must for some time use present services under Eur responsibility to carry out programs.

(iii) Executive and community will be bound by legal commitments already taken by member states for expenditures, and any shifts in expenditures will be in interests of community and will with certainty be shifts worked out with and desired by SHAPE and other NATO organizations.

(iv) Contributions to EDC for an initial period would be determined in NATO framework on basis and under procedures determined by that organization. EDC countries would merely be under greater obligation to accept NATO recommendations on equitable contributions; as each country is required to contribute to defense maximum consistent with political-economic capabilities, Dutch will not do more in EDF than they would in NATO.

In return for Fr-Ger acceptance of transitional period on such a basis plus acceptance community executive, Dutch shld be able to agree that Eur institutions have responsibility and auth from first day so that both discrimination against Germany and creation of Ger national army can be avoided.

Voice of smaller countries in community will be determined when weight of votes in Assembly and Council of Ministers is agreed upon. If Schuman Plan institutions are a precedent, Benelux countries will probably obtain larger voice than is desirable or justifiable.

3. French-German disagreements.

Fr and Germans are not in agreement on intermediate command at national level to be inserted between Eur general staff and local military district commands, but this question can be worked out in conference. However, Gers are in disagreement with US, UK and Fr on two questions which in Ger view may seriously retard progress of EDF conference. These are security restrictions on Ger production, and Ger financial contribution and support costs.

a. On security restrictions, Schuman and Adenauer had some discussions but did not reach conclusions. Apparently both thought that they would be able to work out some solution acceptable to them and to US and UK. According to Schuman, Adenauer said he thought he could use proximity to Russia as a reason to maintain restriction on certain production. Hallstein also pointed out that issue was largely formal since Gers did not expect to produce or desire to produce any of weapons under discussion. He said one issue which might cause trouble was research whereas restriction would be badly received in Germany. As I understand it, Fr intend to authorize Francois-Poncet to have further talks with Gers in order to work out solution.

b. On Germany's financial contribution Adenauer made two points, especially in relation to its acceptance by Bundestag: (*a*) That Fed Rep's total contribution should be determined according to same criteria as the other members and that TCC should make recommendation on Germany's total contribution; and (*b*) that support of UK and US forces should not appear as continuation occupation costs and should be considered as a community obligation.

Recommendations:

a. I would suggest that we encourage Fr-Ger discussions on security restrictions and refrain from intervening until they have had a reasonable chance for success. High degree of understanding between Fr and Gers and very favorable impression that Adenauer has made on each of his trips to Paris will, I think, encourage Fr to adopt more reasonable attitude than has heretofore been case. Nevertheless French Foreign Office apparently remains as intransigent on this issue as ever and refuses to take advantage of real guarantees in EDC to work out solution with Germans.

b. Above position of Adenauer on German financial contribution and support costs seems to me reasonable and probably necessary for Bundestag approval. In my opinion we should go as far as possible to meet it. A number of French officials have indicated that they are sympathetic but they do not wish to come forward with any suggestions because they consider themselves bound by agreement reached with US and UK on these points. If conference should ask for TCC to study and recommend German financial capacity for defense, and if transitional convention of treaty should provide that second year's contributions would also be determined in NATO framework, it would help prepare ground for Germany's membership in NATO. French officials sympathetic to Adenauer's position fully recognize this.

BRUCE

740.5/1–352: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BONN, January 3, 1952—3 p. m.

927. Eyes only for Secretary and Byroade. From reading Bruce's cables on EDF meeting[2] and with benefit of long personal report from Bowie,[3] I have following reactions:

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Paris, eyes only for Eisenhower and Bruce, and to Rome, eyes only for Dunn.

[2] The reference here is to the Six-Power Foreign Ministers Meetings in Paris, Dec. 27–30, 1951, the subject of telegram 3958, Jan. 3, from Paris, *supra*.

[3] Bowie was part of the informal group of U.S. observers at the Paris Foreign Ministers meetings.

Paris meeting shows we have been able to achieve a clear-cut German support of the EDC concept and a full adherence of the German Government to the integration of Germany in that community. Indeed, Adenauer seems to have been the most stalwart support of this concept throughout conference, with France and Italy closely allied. This is not a result of an accident and I cannot avoid the conclusion that the absence of strong representation in Brussels and The Hague during this period has been a handicap to the conclusion of a completely successful Paris meeting. The absence of Murphy and Chapin has been unfortunate. The activity in Paris, Rome and Bonn has not been paralleled by similar activity in Benelux. I have impression that Benelux position is partially the result of earlier British representations and some minor defection talk on our own side. I therefore strongly urge that serious conversations be undertaken at once, preferably the Secretary, with the Dutch and Belgians, pointing out that we have an historic, even a momentous opportunity which cannot be allowed to lapse.

Moreover, after reading Bruce's 3917 [4] which quotes Schuman on what Adenauer had to say, I believe all should be convinced as I have been for some time, that there is just no other way open, at least for the measurable future.

Naturally, I cannot guarantee German ratification of EDC any more than I suppose Bruce can in Paris, if as well. There are dangerous complications in the local political situation and tremendous forces from the East are actively at work opposing with every device and strength German integration with the West. But I do feel that the chances of ratification will be prejudiced if continued opposition on the part of the Benelux countries to the historically significant effort of the Germans and French to produce a European community continues.

Even before concentrating on detailed differences of view, I would press upon the Benelux Ministers in Washington the following points:

(1) That contrary to the argument that the creation of an EDC would induce a lesser interest on the part of the US, any demonstration that Europe is capable of organizing a defense of its own will induce a much more enthusiastic and continued response from the US.

(2) That in the administration of mutual security aid, the US is bound by the congressional purpose stated in the act, namely to use the funds in such a manner as to foster the integration of Europe. This need not be stated as a threat, but simply as a fact, and on the basis of this purpose of the act certainly preference will be given to those who move in that direction rather than to those who stand aside.

(3) Opinion in the US would hardly understand a situation where the Benelux countries would oppose concrete steps designed to form a community in which the long-time antagonisms of Europe might be buried and the pressures from the past adequately met, while France and Germany and Italy are prepared to take these steps.

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[4] Not printed.

While I feel that we must constantly maintain pressure, I do not believe we should be unrealistic in regard to target dates. The French request for a postponement of Lisbon seems to be reasonable, and if Bruce feels that it is, it would be ridiculous on our part to insist on a date or to suggest we might be compelled to seek other alternatives if the original date was not met, particularly when from the French point of view there is just no other alternative apparent, and as long as Adenauer remains Chancellor in Germany, there is no other alternative here.

While dictating the above, Secretary's 869 [5] came in. I will talk with Adenauer as soon as possible, but I am sending this message off at once as I believe it answers in substance the questions raised by the Secretary's telegram. Will follow this cable with results my talk with Adenauer.[6]

McCloy

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[5] Same as telegram 3784, Jan. 2, to Paris, p. 571.

[6] In telegram 948, Jan. 4, from Bonn, McCloy reported upon his meeting with Adenauer that day at which Hallstein and Blankenhorn were also present. Adenauer's impression of the Paris meetings was that none of the Ministers had any real sense of urgency or wide realization of the actual world situation. The Chancellor urged that the United States bring general pressure upon the Benelux nations by pointing out in emphatic terms the great opportunity that was presented by the creation of a supra-national agency. (740.5/1–452)

740.5/1–552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY ROME, January 5, 1952—9 p. m.

3032. Eyes only distribution Secretary's office. Prime Min [2] was unable to see me until this afternoon. He in most confident mood re outcome current developments on EDF. Re Deptel 3006, Jan 2.[3] He said felt certain constitutional difficulty cld be overcome. Real difficulty is in financial field both because smaller countries best able to make a sizeable contribution to common defense and at same time most unwilling to do so, and because of difficulty of finding formula for German contribution to common fund in first years while avoiding setting up of any German defense Ministry of mil bureau. Latter difficulty he thought was greatest practical obstacle at present time as Fr were absolutely insistent on having no German ministerial establishment created for mil purposes and difficulty was where to find the form by which Ger contribution wld be made during first and possibly second year when Ger wld have no adequate force in being. Ger was insisting occupation costs shld be considered as part of her contribution to common defense and shld be deducted from any contribution she assumed. Mr. De Gasperi said he is having his own financial and technical experts study these fin questions in order that he might be prepared to offer solutions as he felt Fr and Germans were looking too closely their own positions and interests to be able to see ways around these difficulties. He did not seem to feel that Belgian and Dutch were holding back in their efforts to reach agreement now, with the exception of the matter of finances which, he said, was not a difficulty in the first period but is a difficulty for later period, when common budget is fully established.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Bonn eyes only for McCloy and to Paris eyes only for Bruce and MacArthur.

[2] Alcide De Gasperi.

[3] Same as telegram 3784, Jan. 2, to Paris, p. 571.

He believes firmly that agreement can be arrived at but said that no time shld be lost as the longer the question is discussed the more difficult it will become. He regrets that the Fr legal experts wish to have a detailed document for final signature, whereas he wld prefer to have a binding agreement and commitment signed in a simpler form, setting forth the principles upon which agreement is reached providing for the pre-confederation period and leaving to later development, agreement on details.

There seems to be no arrangement existing between Schumacher [*Schuman?*], Adenauer and De Gasperi as to what the three as a group wld do to meet the Benelux position. I gathered from the Prime Min that it was his feeling that all concerned were now doing everything they cld to find a solution of the existing difficulties and that he feels that with goodwill these solutions can be found.

Regarding the matter of postponement, he said he understood that Schuman had asked for a week at first and then, later, two weeks delay in the Lisbon meeting. He said he thought one week was surely reasonable and that if necessary two weeks wld be granted, but that in any event it wld be well for the US to make clear to all concerned that while we had no idea of pressing the govts in this matter, then, the timing of the results of the six Ministers' work combined with the Lisbon mtg of the NATO wld have a very important effect on the American presentation and consideration of aid to these countries for the next fiscal year.

DUNN

Editorial Note

The Steering Committee of the Paris Conference for the Establishment of a European Defense Community resumed meetings in Paris on January 10, 1952. The last Steering Committee meeting had been held on the eve of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the six participating nations in Paris, December 27 to 30, 1951. Between January 10 and February 9, the date of the last Steering Committee meeting before the London and Lisbon meetings of the Western Foreign

Ministers and the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, the Committee held 11 meetings. The last two meetings, those of February 5 and February 9, are reported upon in telegram 4774, February 6, from Paris, page 609. During this same period, the Juridical, Finance, and Military Committees, and subcommittees of those committees, continued to meet. Reports of the meetings of the Steering Committee, principal meetings of the other committees, and texts of documents generated by the committees, were reported upon to the Department of State by Ambassador Bruce in telegrams included in file 740.5. A virtually complete body of documentation for this period produced by the Conference is preserved in the EDC files, lot 57 M 44. The status of the Conference as of January 29 is authoritatively summarized in the Background Paper prepared in the Department of State, page 597, and in the Report of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community, circulated to the North Atlantic Council as document C9–D/12, February 19, 1952, page 230.

740.5/1–1152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 11, 1952—6 : 59 p. m.
PRIORITY

904. Secy called in Neth Amb Jan 10 to discuss EDC.[2] Said if there was feeling that creation of EDC lessened US interest, that this was not true. In fact quite the reverse was true. This had been made clear in great debate here last summer and in legislative history of fon aid acts that gen feelings of Amer people were that they wished to see Eur pulled together. Recognized we might over-simplify problem but nevertheless felt deeply on matter.

May be that Eur milit goals will have to be reduced. If so creation of EDC would be strong compensating factor.

Secy stressed that US had NATO as cornerstone of its fon policy. Said we were really in a time of crisis and that time factor was most important. In early weeks of 1952 considered it particularly important we move forward and not lose momentum. Noted that getting Ger aligned with West rests in large measure on personalities and that we have rare opportunity with Adenauer and Schuman both in office. Indicated he expected that Schuman would be able to continue in a reorganized Fr Govt.

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[1] This telegram was drafted by Scott (EUR/WE), cleared by Barnes (S/S), and signed for the Secretary by Perkins (EUR). It was repeated for information to Paris for Bruce and MacArthur, to London, and to Bonn. In a paper presented to Secretary Acheson by Assistant Secretary Perkins on Jan. 9 and concurred in by Nash (Defense), Gordon (MSA), Byroade (GER), and Ambassadors Murphy and Chapin, then in Washington for consultation, Acheson was urged to call in the Netherlands and Belgian Ambassadors as soon as possible and put before them certain arguments supporting Benelux participation in the European Defense Community (740.5/1–952).

[2] The account in this telegram is a close paraphrase of Perkins' memorandum of Acheson's conversation with Ambassador van Roijen on Jan. 10 (740.5/1–1052).

Secy continued that at Paris meeting of EDC Ministers Fr, Ger, and Ital had been for close ties whereas Benelux countries had been for loose ties. Was not the place of US to get into details which these countries wld work out among themselves but shld be pointed out it seemed to us that Benelux views at Paris wld result in either (1) unequal treatment for Ger or (2) creation of a Ger national mil organization. Shld either of these things happen both Fr and Ger wld be lost from EDC.

Secy expressed hope that Stikker wld study how far Neth could move their position. If Stikker feared US may move away, that was incorrect. We considered it essential that Ger be gotten into Western community. Also wanted Stikker to know that if he fearful that EDC might prejudice Neth interest in favor of Ger was our view that this was covered by the TCC for year 1952 and that it should be covered in much the same way for 1953. So far as we were concerned NATO shld continue to be agency to work out that problem.

Van Roijen replied that his people were not as fearful that US wld move away from NATO as they were that the Fr might. He quoted Schuman as saying that "NATO was transitory and essentially ephemeral". Dutch had gathered from this that Schuman thought NATO was an *ad hoc* org for a specific peril. Their main worry was that EDC might take a line independent of NATO and that EDC wld be represented in NATO with only one voice. They were neither prepared to give up their sovereignty for a purpose that was not constructive nor for purpose of destroying NATO. He thought that the commissariat problem could be worked out but told the Secy that original scheme had been that Defense Minister shld be Fr, Chief of Staff Ger, and President of Assembly Ital. The Dutch were afraid they wld not only have little say in EDC but they wld also end up with little voice in NATO. What they really wanted was assurance that the EDC wld be brought into relationship with NATO in such a way as to prevent this.[3]

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[3] Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy de Beus called at the Department of State on Jan. 9 to state that his government supported the idea of a European Defense Community and wanted to participate in it, but that Netherlands' officials were greatly concerned by the impression that they had received during the Dec. 27–30 ministerial discussions in Paris that France no longer conceived of a European Defense Community being established and functioning within the framework of an increasingly tight North Atlantic Community and particularly within NATO. De Beus was assured that the United States had no doubts but that the EDC was to function within the North Atlantic Community and specifically within the NATO framework. Nor had American officials heard any ex-

Footnote continued on following page.

Secy pointed out to van Roijen importance we attached to working out a proper relationship between NATO and EDC. Recalled our concern with that problem in Rome and the resolution that had been passed at Rome directing Deputies to take up the problem of the relationship between the two organizations.[4] Secy promised we wld press the Deputies to get on with their consideration of this problem.

ACHESON

Footnote continued from preceding page.

pression of views which would indicate that the French had changed their attitude on the matter (telegram 3969, Jan. 9, to Paris, repeated for information to London, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, and Bonn; 740/12–551). The same Dutch concern was raised by Foreign Minister Stikker in conversations with Chargé Trimble on Jan. 8 and 10, reported upon in telegrams 686 and 692, Jan. 9 and 10, respectively, from The Hague (740.5/1–952 and 740.5/1–1052).

[4] Documentation on the North Atlantic Council session in Rome in November 1951 and on the EDC–NATO relationships under reference here is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 693 ff.

740.5/1–1152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 11, 1952—7:01 p. m.

1023. Secy called in Belg Amb Jan 10 to discuss EDC.[2] Said we felt it very important that action be taken by NATO early in 1952 in order not lose momentum. There were three things which had to be done. One was to establish the EDC; another was to complete the contractual arrangements with Ger; the third was the approval of the TCC recommendations. Situation was particularly difficult because of Fr governmental troubles at present time and possibility also that Belg governmental situation might further complicate the situation.

Silvercruys interrupted to say he was sure everyone in Belg wanted to get where we wanted them to be but there was question as to how fast this cld be accomplished.

Secy continued that perhaps US cld be helpful in situation. Observed that combination of Schuman and Adenauer both in office at same time was rare opportunity which shld be exploited in endeavor to heal breach between Fr and Ger. Recalled that in New York in 1950 we had made certain suggestions about bringing Ger into Western defense but these had not proved to be the way to accomplish this purpose. We were now persuaded that the EDC was the only way to get

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[1] The drafting, clearance, and transmission of this telegram was identical with that of telegram 904, Jan. 11, to The Hague, *supra*.

[2] The account in this telegram is a close paraphrase of Perkins' memorandum of Acheson's conversation with Ambassador Silvercruys on Jan. 10 (740.5/1–1052).

Ger into Western defense. We thought that perhaps some of difficulties which Benelux countries had might relate to fears which they had concerning US attitudes and reactions to situation. Perhaps Benelux countries were concerned lest establishment of EDC might encourage US isolationism. Secy said he was convinced that reverse of this was true. There was a great feeling in US that closer tying together of Eur countries wld be of great assistance. Wld create more enthusiasm in US for Eur aid than wld exist otherwise. Also pointed out he felt NATO was keystone of US foreign policy and that NATO org itself needed to be tightened and the US drawn more closely into it. Was sure that for a long time to come both US and UK must stay close to Eur and that this wld be so even if strength of Eur was increased. Was sure that the Belgs wld do all they possibly cld and that opposing ideas at Paris Conference cld be drawn together.

Silvercruys said he knew all leaders in Belg were for closer drawing together of Eur.

Secy interrupted him to say he had read Van Zeeland's speeches on the matter and was sure that was true.

Silvercruys continued to effect that Belg people were a little uneasy. They wld feel better if UK were closer to EDC. They fear being left alone with Fr and Ger and perhaps Ital. These doubts wld disappear if UK were in the picture. He mentioned that Churchill had not been as outspoken recently as he had been previously in the Council of Eur at Strasbourg. He said that Belg constitutional difficulties cld be overcome if it were made clear to Belg people that joining EDC was wise thing to do. He said that Van Zeeland because of his desires for Eur unity was not happy in position he was now taking. He added there had been some progress at EDC Ministers meeting in Paris and believed more wld be made at other meetings preparatory to Lisbon.

Secy said that thing which had disturbed him about Paris meetings was that it seemed to us that if Benelux position were adopted one of two things wld happen. Either there wld be no equality for Ger or there would be the beginnings of a Ger national army. Both of these were bad because if there were no equality for Ger it wld keep Ger out of Western defense system and obviously creation of a Ger national army wld be dangerous.

Silvercruys mentioned that the Fr were keeping some forces out of EDC and thought personally that perhaps the reverse could be true of the UK and that they cld put some few [*new*] forces into EDC.

Secy told him was not in position to comment on what UK wld or wld not do but wished stress our view that Eur cld not stand alone and pointed out that US, UK and Canad all had troops there now.

ACHESON

740.5/1–1252 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, January 12, 1952—4 p. m.

4161. From MacArthur. ReEmbtel 4076, Jan 9 rptd The Hague 126.[2] Gen Eisenhower talked to Stikker this morning re EDC stressing the urgency of agreement on EDC and making number of points set forth in Intel Jan 10, 4 a. m.[3] Stikker fully agreed as to urgency and expressed view that if French crisis could rapidly be solved agreement might still be reached prior Lisbon mtg. He then developed some of Neth's apprehensions (i.e. that without UK participation and with a "weak France" Ger might dominate EDC; that EDC might not evolve within NATO framework and might result in weakening NATO; that US might become less interested in Europe, etc).

Gen Eisenhower again rebutted these and expressed forcefully his conviction that if Europeans fail in agreement on EDC Amer people and Congress will be much less disposed to continue to assist Europe in developing defense since they will lose faith in Eur ability to face up to situation and do what is obviously necessary.

Stikker agreed and said he believed solution cld be reached. He said 80 percent of Dutch Parliament wld approve idea of Eur political federation. While EDC was step in this direction it should be developed in a way which wld not interfere with, hinder or complicate Eur political union which is essential. Gen Eisenhower agreed but said he strongly believed that EDC with Schuman Plan would prove necessity for further federative steps and wld thus hasten union. Important thing was to get rapid agreement on EDC.

Stikker professed to concur and said he was prepared to do his best. He wished to state, however, that the handling of EDC conf had been atrocious and atmosphere during first part of Dec 27–30 ministerial mtg, "the worst I have ever encountered in any internatl conference". He said whenever smaller Benelux put forth a suggestion they were brutally slapped down by French and often Gers and Itals without privately to Schuman about this and believed that in future there wld their view being seriously examined or discussed. He had spoken be more tactful and able handling of mtgs. He also mentioned that until he had spoken to Schuman French had screened the minutes and then released them without giving other participants opportunity to join in screening. This and similar incidents had created bad impression but were, he believed, now corrected.

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[1] Repeated for information to The Hague, London, and Brussels.

[2] Not printed. It reported that General Eisenhower had invited 23 Belgian and 6 Luxembourg parliamentarians to visit SHAPE headquarters on Jan. 10 for a full briefing and lunch. He had also invited Netherlands Foreign Minister Stikker to visit SHAPE on Jan. 12 for a private talk. Eisenhower intended to use both visits to try to influence Benelux to take a more constructive position regarding the European Defense Force idea. (740.5/1–952)

[3] Not further identified.

Meeting concluded with Stikker indicating some optimism re possibility of agreement and said that mtgs of EDC conferees in past two days had made some real progress at technical level.

Bruce

740.5/1-1452

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) [1]

SECRET [Washington,] January 14, 1952.

Subject: European Defense Community
Participants: Ambassador Wrong, Canadian Embassy
Assistant Secretary Perkins, EUR
Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Wrong called on me this noon at his request. He opened the conversation by stating that Mr. Stikker, through the Netherlands Ambassador in Ottawa, had recently asked Mr. Pearson for his views on the question of European Defense Community and its relationship to NATO. Ambassador Wrong stated that Mr. Pearson had taken this opportunity to send a personal message to Mr. Stikker on the 11th. He read this message to me. It was excellent and stressed the overriding importance of NATO and that European Defense Community should be fitted into the larger Atlantic Community pattern. It made the point rather strongly that the EDC concept and the Atlantic concept were supplemental rather than competitive and that in his opinion U.S. and, in fact, U.K. continued participation in the Atlantic framework and interest in Europe would be furthered by the completion of the EDC project. It also made the point strongly that Pearson did not feel the U.K. would actually participate in EDC or other like organizations but would be prepared to cooperate with them. The message also suggested to Stikker the desirability of having the NATO and EDC headquarters in the same place in order to be a cohesive influence.

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[1] This memorandum was jointly drafted by Perkins and Raynor (EUR/BNA).

740.5/1-1552: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, January 15, 1952—4:53 p. m.

4085. For Emb and MacArthur. De Juniac, Acting Minister Counselor Fr Emb, called on Perkins this morning under instrs to ask us to make clear to Drees[2] US support of EDF and US desire that Benelux join. Perkins told de Juniac this wld be done but that our info re current Dutch worries this subj was to effect Dutch more worried about Fr attitudes than about US views. Pointed out specifically Stikker's worry about Schuman's remark re ephemeral character NATO.[3] Said our understanding was that Dutch were genuinely wedded Atlantic community concept and did not wish to participate in EDF in such a way as to prejudice that concept. Asked de Juniac urge his FonOff do what it cld calm Dutch fears re NATO/EDF relationship.

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[1] This telegram, which was drafted by Scott (EUR/WE), cleared by Godley (EUR/WE), and signed by Perkins for the Secretary, was repeated for information to The Hague.

De Juniac said Fr Amb Hague reports large majority Neth Parliament solidly behind EDF but that Neth Govt less enthusiastic. Within Cabinet identified Drees, Stikker and Lieftinck as being least enthusiastic. We did not challenge this although we had assumed here that Drees by far most reluctant member Cab re EDF.

Expect here to rpt to Drees points included Secy's conversation van Roijen Jan 10 (Deptel 904, Jan 11, rptd Paris 4018[4]). Embs Paris and Hague requested let us know whether they wish these or any other points re EDF especially emphasized with Drees.

Acheson

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[2] Netherlands Prime Minister Drees made an informal visit to the United States between Jan. 12 and 24. Regarding that visit, see Acheson's memorandum of his conversation with Drees on Jan. 21, p. 589.

[3] In telegram 686, Jan. 9, from The Hague, Chargé Trimble reported on a conversation with Foreign Minister Stikker during which Stikker quoted a statement by French Foreign Minister Schuman made at the Six-Power Meetings of Foreign Ministers in Paris, Dec. 27–30, to the effect that the EDC would be the lasting defense organization for Europe whereas NATO was only transitory and "essentially ephemeral". (740.5/1–952)

[4] *Ante*, p. 580.

740.5/1–1752 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BRUSSELS, January 17, 1952—8 p. m.

986. New Belgian Prime Minister Van Houtte spoke to me frankly today about Belgian attitude re European Defense Community. In referring again to current discount of possibility of war on part of Belgian public and Parliament he said that abstention of UK is dominant factor in Belgian thinking. Belgians accustomed to rely on Great Britain for protection coupled with knowledge that behind UK is US. Their absence from EDC deprives that organization of security factor. Belgians, he said do not trust either France or Germany (he referred to incident period Franco-Prussian war when Napoleon III was ready to agree with Bismarck for territorial division of Belgium). Confident that Pleven plan represents French notion of dominating situation but in end it will be Germany who will dominate leaving small countries like Belgium exposed and helpless. He distrusts political superstruc-

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris, London, and Bonn.

ture of Pleven plan and does not understand why under present circumstances interntl mil force under auspices of NATO with Germany accepted as member of NATO shld not be adequate and acceptable to France. Convinced Belgian Parliament backed by public opinion, would not accept surrender sovereignty inherent in Pleven plan.

I referred to Secretary's conversation with Belgian Amb[2] and to US concern over delay in arriving at European community action stressing US view of urgency. Van Houtte expressed confidence our objectives identical with Belgium but is unimpressed with efficacy of Pleven formula. He shrugged his shoulders in response to my suggestion that advantage be taken of "historic moment" mentioned by McCloy when France and Germany together with Italy seem prepared to agree on EDC. His skepticism, he said, is founded on distrust of both France and Germany for different reasons. He prefers to look to UK and US within framework of an Atlantic community.

His expressed views as well as Van Zeeland's do not harmonize with optimism of De Staercke mentioned in London's 820.[3]

MURPHY

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[2] See telegram 1023, Jan. 11, to Brussels, p. 582.

[3] Not printed; in it Ambassador Spofford reported on a conversation with De Staercke who expressed optimism at the prospects of reaching an early and generally satisfactory agreement on a European Defense Community—possibly within 2 weeks. (740.5/1-1652)

740.5/1-1952 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, January 19, 1952—3 p. m.

994. After lunch today for 6 American correspondents Van Zeeland had invited to Brussels to receive explanation Belg position Eur def community Van Zeeland asked me to meet with Belg deputy De Staercke and himself for discussion same subj.

FonMin referred to Secy's conversation with Silvercruys[2] which was reported to Brussels as an offer to assist Belg if possible in arriving at a solution of problem and asked that Secy be requested to give Belg support now. Krovthe said has carefully reviewed position and De Staercke is attending mtg of experts next Tuesday[3] armed with new instructions which represent the maximum distance Belg can go. They include additional "concessions" regarding the common budget which Van Zeeland and De Staercke both assert will go far to meet Fr and German position, but they did not give me text.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, and Bonn.

[2] For the report on the conversations under reference here, see telegram 1023, Jan. 11, to Brussels, p. 582.

[3] Presumably, the reference here is to the scheduled meeting of the Steering Committee of the Paris Conference for a European Defense Community on Tuesday, Jan. 22; regarding that meeting, see footnote 5, below.

They said that up to present Belg had made ⅘ of all concessions during the conversations which began early in 1950 and which after one initial mtg of ministers were carried on at the technical level throughout the year until Strasbourg and Paris at end of year. Belg suggestions for interim ministerial mtgs were always evaded with the result that text by time of Paris mtg was heavily interlarded with reservations and did not represent substantial agreement. He referred to Monnet and Hirsch forcing the pace apparently in hope of achieving Eur unity by the back door and loading down the Eur army proposal with top heavy polit superstructure borrowed from Schuman Plan which in Belg opinion is not necessary for creation Eur army. Van Zeeland said he had noted several times in conversations with Schuman that their ideas were very close together but after Schuman consulted Monnet, Hirsch and Alphand he changed position.

Van Zeeland declared that as matters now stood some members govt and parliament were lukewarm in favor of Eur army giving it lip service only and that it wld not take much talk to effect that larger powers pressuring smaller to make issue most unpopular in Belg. Brit abstention alone discouraged many and there is abundant suspicion long term motives both French and Germans. He has been sounding out key members of House and Senate and finds great reserve and much opposition. There is, he said, increasing sentiment that Swiss are in happy position and perhaps Belg cld copy them.

Present govt instructions to deputy go as far as legal position permits and "if Belg next Tuesday is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude Belg will leave it" and in doing so govt is certain of parliamentary and public support.

I told Van Zeeland that it was difficult for us to understand why constitutional question seemed to be so much easier for the Fr and Itals and Germans than for the Belgs who cld also perhaps find other grounds for reserve and I went all over other points such as Franco-German *rapprochement* as the key to Eur peace. He replied that Belg constitution had not been amended since 1881 and did not provide the escape clauses now available in the more modern texts of the 3 larger powers. In this case, for Belg to accept Pleven formula, it wld take Belg 2 years to complete procedures required for constitutional amendment including general election. We cld be assured that govt incapable of acceptance even if it wished that formula and it did not wish it. As for Franco-German *rapprochement* Van Zeeland said he is all for it but in Belg opinion it does not hinge on acceptance a particular formula. He doubted wisdom attempting achieve Eur unification by a back-door process. If nations ready for Eur federation or some form of unity there shld be a direct and honest approach and not an attempt to get [illegible] by loading a top heavy political superstructure on a proposal to [illegible] Eur army at Gen Eisenhower's disposal.

Van Zeeland pleads that Secy now use his influence to persuade Fr, Germans and Itals to make reasonable effort to agree Belg proposals which if accepted he asserts will achieve the desired results of creating Eur army and that more quickly than other formula. I inquired whether this represented a Benelux position and he said he cld only speak for Belg but that he doubted that Neths or Lux wld go further.

I would like to add opinion that Van Zeeland assessment parliamentary attitude corresponds with what I have been able to learn from other sources since my return.

Paris 4289 [4] recd after conversation with Van Zeeland which attended by De Staercke who gave every indication full approval Van Zeeland statements. De Staercke said Tuesday next is momentous day [5] and how hoped Secy cld support Belg position.

MURPHY

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[4] Not printed. In it Ambassador Bruce reported having been informed by De Staercke, the Belgian representative to the EDC Conference, that it was clear to him that concessions by the French, West German, and Italian Delegations at the Conference would allow the Netherlands to participate in the proposed EDC but might not be acceptable to the Belgian Government. De Staercke hoped that the United States would do what it could to convince the Belgian Government of the importance of Belgian participation in the EDC. (740.5/1-1952)

[5] Telegram 4369, Jan. 22, from Paris, reported on the meeting that day of the Steering Committee of the EDC Conference. After a weekend of consultations with the new Belgian Government of Prime Minister Van Houtte, De Staercke made a "very constructive statement" on the distribution of powers between the proposed Council and High Authority of the proposed EDC and on the common financing during 1953. Alphand expressed gratitude to De Staercke for his considerable contribution and expressed belief that solutions could be found for the problems (740.5/1-2252). Earlier, in telegram 4364, Jan. 22, from Paris, Bruce reported that the Steering Committee had that day decided that the six Foreign Ministers should meet again on Jan. 26 to settle all the outstanding problems (740.5/1-2252).

740.5/1-2152

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 21, 1952.

Subject: Netherlands Views on European Defense Force and on Relations with Indonesia

Participants: The Secretary
Assistant Secretary George W. Perkins
Ambassador Selden Chapin
WE—Joseph W. Scott
Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Dr. Willem Drees [1]
Ambassador J. H. van Roijen of the Netherlands

After an exchange of courtesies, the Prime Minister said that he would like us to have his Government's views on the European Defense

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[1] Prime Minister Drees made an informal visit to the United States, Jan. 12 to 24, 1952. He visited New York City, Jan. 12 to 16 (including a brief trip to Bridgeport, Connecticut), Pittsburgh, Jan. 17-19 (including brief stopovers at Niagara

Footnote continued on following page.

Force. He said that the Netherlands Government had not originally been enthusiastic about the EDF. This was not because they minded relinquishing sovereignty to a supranational authority; they were doing that in the Schuman Plan. They did, however, have a number of serious worries about the EDF; and the Prime Minister thought that the Netherlands could participate only on the following conditions.

1. The Netherlands must remain a member of NATO in full and good standing.
2. For symbolic reasons, it was important that the EDF treaty and the NATO treaty should remain in force for the same period of time.
3. In defense matters, the Netherlands is not prepared to accept the decisions of one man. What they want is a collegial structure along the lines of the Schuman Plan. Its members, however, need not be under governmental instructions.
4. The Netherlands cannot accept a common budget as conceived in the original French plan. As long as there was no real political federation of Europe in which there was a supranational authority which would have total responsibility and corresponding authority to raise taxes, etc., the Netherlands cannot allow outsiders to determine military expenditures and thus social expenditures for the Netherlands people.
5. The Netherlands will have to secure guarantees of the above desiderata before signing a treaty. The Prime Minister thought it would be "grotesque" to expect that Benelux could successfully oppose Germany on any important issue once Benelux were an actual member of the EDF.

The Prime Minister concluded his opening remarks by saying that the French thought Benelux would be forced to participate in the EDF under pressure from the U.S. The French were mistaken about this and he wanted us to realize that we were asking his country to join in a tight-knit defense community with two of the most unstable governments in Europe. He added that Italy was 40% Communist and France was 25% Communist. So long as this was true, the Netherlands did not want to participate in any federation with an assembly in which they could be overwhelmed by the voting strength of France's or Italy's Communist factions.

I told the Prime Minister that I was familiar with many of the doubts he had expressed regarding Netherlands participation in the EDF. As to the first concern he had mentioned, I said there was no doubt so far as we were concerned that the Netherlands would continue to be a member of NATO exactly as at present. So far as Dutch political relations with other members of the European Defense Com-

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

Falls and Buffalo), Washington, Jan. 20–23 (including a trip to the Parris Island Marine Base), and New York, Jan. 23–24. Prime Minister Drees' meetings with American officials in Washington occurred on Jan. 21: he called on Secretary Acheson at 11 a. m., made a 10-minute visit to the White House to meet President Truman at noon, luncheoned with President Truman at Blair House, and paid an informal visit to offices of the Congress in the afternoon. The small amount of available documentation on the Drees visit is all included in file 756.13.

munity were concerned, we assumed that each member of the EDC would continue to be represented as independent countries on the NATO Council.

With regard to the other prerequisites the Prime Minister had mentioned, I told him I thought there was an area in which agreement could be reached. The treaty could, for example, contain guarantees which should take care of any Netherlands' worry that its economic stability might be jettisoned by others through the imposition of financial burdens.

As for any general worry the Netherlands might have regarding possible domination by Germany in a defense organization, I told the Prime Minister it was our view that the best way, and perhaps the only sure way, to avoid the building of a complete national military establishment by Germany was provided in the EDF. I said that I knew the Dutch believed Germany should come into NATO as a full member. On the other hand, this would not be possible for the French to accept unless the Germans were first brought into an EDF in such a way as to preclude the rebuilding of a complete national military establishment by Germany.

In conclusion, I told the Prime Minister I hoped that at the meetings to be resumed in Paris tomorrow, each governmental representative would be able to maintain a sufficiently fluid position to render remaining differences negotiable.

The Prime Minister again summarized, in briefer form, the Netherlands concerns he had expressed above, adding that Benelux experiences to date in negotiation with the Germans, French and Italians had not relieved them of these worries. He emphasized particularly a tendency on the part of the French, each time the Dutch thought they had made some headway, to keep going back to the original French plan. This made it difficult to know just where they stood at any given time. He hoped, however, that at the forthcoming meetings of the EDF Ministers there could be some final decision taken. On the matter of constitutional difficulties, the Prime Minister noted that this was more of a problem in Belgium than in the Netherlands. He said that the Dutch were going to amend their Constitution and have general elections next summer anyway. He didn't believe the Belgian Government, however, wants elections at this time because the present Government has only a four vote majority in Parliament.

Ambassador van Roijen asked what would be the effect on U.S. public opinion if an EDF treaty could be signed but not ratified by the time of the NATO Council meeting in Lisbon. I replied that I was sure this country would consider it a great step forward if an EDF treaty had been signed by the time of the NATO Council meeting in Lisbon. It was understood here that ratification was a lengthy process and no one would expect ratification to be completed by that time. On the other hand, we did not want to see the training of German troops postponed until the ratification process was completed since this might take several months.

The Prime Minister said there would be no difficulty with the Netherlands Parliament ratifying anything the Netherlands Cabinet signed because the Cabinet was such an accurate reflection of the political complexion of the States General. He did think, however, that there would be difficulty with any EDF treaty in the French, Belgian and German legislatures.

I said it seemed to me from what I had heard that there was an area in which problems posed by the EDF could be worked out, that I thought it extremely important that we keep our present momentum and that it would be a tragedy if this were not done.

The Prime Minister said that on the whole general question of rearmament he had been represented in the U.S. press as lacking enthusiasm for a vigorous Netherlands defense effort. He said that he was enthusiastic about the Atlantic Pact because he believed that it was the Atlantic Pact which would keep the Russians away, not a European army. He was convinced that the Russians were not going to commit aggression against Western Europe by direct armed attack. He thought their attack would be through infiltration and subversion. He believed the Russians were acting in Europe on the basis of an old saying to the effect that you need not "cut anyone's throat when you can put poison in his soup". Following up this line of thought, he said it was obviously necessary to maintain economic stability in order to prevent undermining by the Russians. If we go too far in the direction of military expenditures, obviously the economic and political consequences would be considerable. He mentioned neutralism as being one such consequence. These considerations called for finding a proper balance between economic and military expenditures. Finally, he said it seemed to him the greatest military danger from Russia was in Africa and in Asia, that the Russian threat to Western Europe would continue in the form of efforts to weaken the West economically.

I agreed that there had been some tendency on the part of soldiers, both in Europe and here, to ask for more military outlay than it was possible to support. The findings of the TCC bore this out.

The Prime Minister in response said the Dutch had increased their taxes, had cut their consumption, had cut their investments, had cut their construction of housing, and that their budgetary position was accordingly good. Moreover, tax morality in the Netherlands was such that his Government in fact collected the taxes it imposed. Dutch living standards, however, were so low that the present Government could not add the additional 500 million guilders to its 1500 million guilder annual defense budget as the TCC had recommended for fiscal 53. I told the Prime Minister I was sure we in the West could find a way to raise forces of sufficient size and quality to deter aggression without at the same time causing a deterioration on the home front.

Netherlands-Indonesian Relations

Ambassador van Roijen said he had been instructed by his Government to ask whether the *démarche* we had made recently at The Hague urging the Netherlands to resume talks with the Indonesians regarding the Netherlands-Indonesian Union Statute and the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea should be considered as our taking sides on this issue.* He said that prior to our having made the *démarche*, the Netherlands Cabinet had in fact already decided to resume the talks. The U.S., however, did not know this at the time we had asked that the talks be resumed and the Netherlands Government wanted to know if this meant a change in our position of impartiality. I told the Ambassador and the Prime Minister that our thought in making the *démarche* was simply to keep the talks going. The Prime Minister interjected to say the Indonesians never kept political agreements, and he hoped I was aware of all the facts in this situation. He thought I ought to know it seemed to the Dutch that Ambassador Cochran always appeared to side with the Indonesians.

I told the Prime Minister and the Ambassador I was glad they had brought the above matters to my attention and that I would keep them in mind.

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*Ambassador van Roijen later told Ambassador Chapin that The Hague had requested the Prime Minister to bring this matter up himself. It was decided here that the Ambassador should bring it up "with the Prime Minister present". [Footnote in the source text. Documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the situation in Indonesia is presented in volume XII.]

740.5/1-2152

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Van Zeeland [1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, January 21, 1952.]

DEAR MR. VAN ZEELAND: I have just seen the reports of the conversations which you had with Amb Murphy last Sat.[2] As I indicated to Amb Silvercruys [3] I understand the position in which the Benelux countries find themselves. As I also indicated to him I am persuaded that certain requirements are basic for German-French *rapprochement*, which in turn is neces for the establishment of real strength and unity of purpose in Europe.

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[1] The source text, transmitted in telegram 1080, Jan. 21, to Brussels (repeated to London, Paris, The Hague, and Bonn), was drafted by Perkins (EUR), cleared by Secretary Acheson, and signed for the Secretary by Perkins.

[2] See telegram 994, Jan. 19, from Brussels, p. 587.

[3] See telegram 1023, Jan. 11, to Brussels, p. 582.

I understand from Amb Murphy that you wld like us to support your position, in particular with the Fr. I can assure you that in general terms in the past we have done so, and I had thought that most of your difficulties had been resolved.

It seems to me that reports of the latest conversations in Paris indicated that the Fr and Gers, and the Itals for that matter, have gone a long way to meet the requirements of the Benelux countries while still retaining the requisite essentials. In view of this I want to urge most strongly that you do everything possible on your side to meet these modifications which we understand have been proposed, and that nothing will be done which results in a break in the conversations.[4]

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[4] In his telegram 1009, Jan. 22, from Brussels, Ambassador Murphy reported that he had delivered the Secretary's message to the Secretary General of the Belgian Foreign Ministry De Gruben, Van Zeeland being absent from the city. De Gruben advanced the opinion that there was no danger of the EDC meetings in Paris breaking down, but he was concerned about the general lack of understanding and information about the EDC plan by members of the Belgian Parliament. The Parliament was due to convene that same day, and Murphy and his staff intended to meet as many influential members as possible in order to convey to them a better understanding of the American view of the importance of the EDC (740.5/1–2252). In a conversation with Murphy reported upon in telegram 1028, Jan. 24, from Brussels, Van Zeeland expressed satisfaction with the progress of the meeting of the experts on the EDC in Paris, indicated a hope that the French were moving toward a better understanding of the political features of the EDC, and said that Acheson's message had been most useful to him (740.5/1–2452).

Editorial Note

At its meeting on January 21, the Steering Committee of the Paris Conference for the Establishment of a European Defense Community agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the six participating states should meet to resolve remaining outstanding problems facing the Conference. French Foreign Minister Schuman, Italian Foreign Minister De Gasperi, West German State Secretary Hallstein (representing Chancellor Adenauer who was unable to attend), Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, Netherlands Foreign Minister Stikker, and Luxembourg Foreign Minister Bech held three meetings on January 26 and 27 in Paris. During their meetings, the Ministers reached agreement on a number of important issues including the composition of the Commissariat which would be responsible for the forces of the member states, the form and authority of the Assembly of the Community, and the voting procedure in the Council of Ministers of the Community. The achievements of the Ministers were spelled out in some detail in a communiqué issued in Paris at the conclusion of the meetings; see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, page 74 or *L'Annee politique 1952*, page 475 for the text of the communiqué. The proceedings of the meetings were reported upon in some detail to the Department of State by Ambassador Bruce in a series of seven telegrams from Paris (4536, January 28; 4539, January 28; 4551, January 29; 4537, January 29; 4538, January 29; 4540, January 29; 4541, January 29) all included in file 740.5. One of the major problems discussed during the meetings of the Ministers was the use of forces of the Community and the relationship between the Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. State Secretary Hallstein took the occasion to restate the unwillingness of the Federal Republic to join the Community unless it were also allowed to enter NATO or the Community were brought within NATO in some way. The Hallstein position and other aspects of this issue are examined in some detail in the Background Paper prepared in the Department of State, page 597.

740.5/1-2852 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, January 28, 1952—8 p. m.

4524. From MacArthur. Hallstein asked to see Gen Eisenhower today "to pay courtesy visit and bring him up to date on EDF discussions". He opened conversation by saying EDF Min conf over weekend [2] had made substantial progress but there had been several serious developments. He first mentioned Saar and said Fr decision to reopen Saar issue at this particular time had been most unfortunate both in terms of making progress in EDF and also re ratification of Schuman Plan. He explained that Schuman Plan still had to be ratified by Ger Upper House of Parliament (Bundesrat) and that raising this issue this time might cause serious complications re Schuman Plan.

Gen Eisenhower replied this matter did not of course fall within scope of his responsibility and it was essentially political matter for resolution by govts. Hallstein said he fully understood this and had simply mentioned it as an unfortunate occurrence.

Hallstein next said a serious question had arisen in Min mtgs of EDF, namely the relationship between Ger and NATO, which Mins had not previously discussed. Adenauer he said wld have very difficult Parl debate on EDF and wld be in impossible position if he were not able to counteract opposition charge that while Ger was being asked to contribute forces to defense WE it had no voice in (NATO) political decisions which wld govern use of EDF (including Ger) forces. He said realized there was objection "largely on part of Fr", to Ger joining NATO at this time but that some formula perhaps more theoretical than substantive shld be found to avoid impression Ger was totally excluded from policy decisions and was a second class partner.

Gen Eisenhower said whole question of Ger relationship to NATO was one for decision by NAT Council and that SHAPE cld not get into this since it was essentially political and not military. He recognized there was a complicated problem but felt certain that with maximum goodwill and understanding a solution cld be found. In any event, SHAPE cld not take any position on this question.

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[1] Repeated for information to London and Bonn.

[2] Regarding the Six-Power Ministerial Meetings in Paris, Jan. 26–27 under reference here, see the editorial note, *supra*.

Hallstein then said that connected with this problem was military question of Ger being able to have knowledge of strategic concept which wld serve as basis for defense of WE. He pointed out that Ger wld contribute forces for this defense but strategic concept was determined by NATO of which Ger was not member. Hallstein observed that if Ger cld have some means of obtaining knowledge of strategic concept and if Adenauer cld let it be known Ger had such knowledge, latter's task with Bundestag wld be much simplified.

Gen Eisenhower replied that what Hallstein was raising in a different form was really another aspect of question of Ger relationship to NATO. This was political problem. On purely military side Gen Eisenhower cld assure him that if Ger units served under his command they and their commanders wld be on exactly same basis of equality as other units and commanders. Furthermore, Ger wld be represented in military structure of EDC which by very nature of things wld have considerable knowledge about strategic plans since EDC wld have to support EDF in carrying out of plans. While recognizing there was problem re proper handling of Ger public and Parl opinion, Gen Eisenhower felt that as practical matter Ger had little to worry about when EDF was set up and Ger was participating directly with other countries in defense of Eur. Hallstein reiterated opinion that some formula wld have to be devised if Adenauer were to make successful presentation to Bundestag.

Gen Eisenhower in conclusion said he wished to inquire on personal basis what general reaction was in Ger to united Eur. Hallstein said majority opinion strongly favored politically and economically united Eur and that it was on basis of such a resolution by Ger Parl made about year and a half ago that Ger had participated in Schuman and EDF plans. These he said were both steps which if taken wld necessarily lead to closer Eur integration. This was essential if existing econ and financial problems, such as transfers of civilian and military goods and services between Eur countries, were to be solved. He said he agreed with thesis which he understood Gen Eisenhower put forward that in long term, Eur econ viability coupled with adequate defensive strength cld only be achieved thru uniting of nations of continental Eur so they cld make maximum collective use of their individual capabilities.

Bruce

740.5/2-552

Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State[1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

EDC AND THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE

1. *Development of Concept*

The current negotiations for the establishment of a European Defense Force (EDF) within the framework of a European Defense Community (EDC), begun in February, 1951, are the result of French initiative. France's decision to call such a conference followed its acceptance in principle of German rearmament, proposed by the US at the NAT Council meeting of September, 1950, and had as its primary objective, the minimizing of the threat that it believed inherent in German rearmament by integrating European armed forces, including those proposed for Germany, into a European army controlled by supranational political and military institutions and endowed with common organs of command, financing, supply, etc. France also presented this integration plan as another step forward toward European federation. Although all the European NAT powers and Western Germany were invited to participate, the conference has been restricted to six powers—France, Western Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries; the Netherlands, which initially sent observers to the conference, became a full member in October, 1951. The negotiations which have ensued since February, 1951 may be divided roughly into three periods:

From February 15 to July 24 when the conference issued its interim report[2]—the "Alphand" report—negotiations centered mainly around principles. Although some progress was made in technical military fields, little was accomplished in the way of concrete political agreement. The slow progress of the negotiations which were speeded up in July when the US and General Eisenhower explicitly gave support to the EDF formula, was due partly to difficulties inherent in launching such a far-reaching program and to the belief of the Germans and other delegations that the US was dubious of the EDF concept. Outright opposition to the extreme supranational position of France, however was displayed by Italy which professed to fear constitutional and parliamentary difficulties at home, French domination in Europe, and the diminution of Italy's position in the North Atlantic Community.

From July 24 through December, when the six-power Foreign Ministers met in Paris to discuss the problems of EDC, negotiations were pressed much more vigorously due to US encouragement and realization that the EDC formula was generally recognized by NATO as being the most desirable medium for German rearmament. With the assistance of SHAPE which supplied advisory opinions, agreement was quickly reached on the technical military aspects of the EDC. Political agreement on many essential points was blocked, however, by the opposing views of the two groups into which the conference had split. Reversing its previous position, Italy joined Germany and France in supporting a strong supranational political and military structure; the Benelux countries, on the other hand, proposed solutions that tended more to coalition than defense integration. The motivation of the Benelux position was complex: The absence of the UK with whom Belgium and Netherlands traditionally have close ties, fear of French or eventually German domination, predilection for the North Atlantic defense community as opposed to the European defense community; belief that the establishment of EDC would eventuate in lessened US interest in Europe; and, above all, fear especially on the part of Belgium where experiences with EPU financing and TCC burden-sharing estimates were arousing public and parliamentary opposition, that supranational control of EDC finances would adversely affect the economic and social position of their countries. The meetings of the six-power Foreign Ministers, December 27–30 in Paris, failed to solve the most important difficulties of the negotiations.

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[1] This background paper was one of a series of such papers drawn up in preparation for the forthcoming session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. As approved on Jan. 31, 1952 by the "Steering Group" (the special interagency committee responsible for coordinating such background papers), this paper was circulated as LIS D-5/1a, Feb. 1, 1952. The original version of this paper, which was circulated as LIS D-5/1, Jan. 30, was drafted by Barnard (EUR/RA). This was one of several papers submitted by Perkins (EUR) to Secretary Acheson on Feb. 5.

[2] The report under reference here, dated July 24, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 843.

Since January, negotiations in the conference and in the third meeting of the six Foreign Ministers, January 26–27 [3] have resulted in agreement on most of the institutional problems and the narrowing down of disagreement on most of the remaining problems. This success is attributable partly to US and, to a lesser degree, UK pressure for the consummation of an agreement prior to the projected Lisbon NAT meeting in February. The US has taken occasion to impress on the Benelux countries the seriousness that failure to achieve the EDC will have on NATO and on US opinion and to reassure them that the establishment of EDC will strengthen US interest in Europe. The Netherlands and Belgium consequently have put forth a more serious effort to secure a compromise. On the other hand, France, Germany, and Italy have made major concessions even to the point of weakening their EDC supranational structure in order to satisfy the smaller powers.

2. *Institutional Organization*

The original French draft treaty provided for *a*) a European Commissioner endowed with executive authority over the EDC and with direct powers of action and control; *b*) Council of Ministers in which votes should be weighted and whose approval by a qualified majority would be necessary for certain important decisions of the Commissioner; *c*) an Assembly possessing the power to censure and remove the Commissioner; and *d*) a Court.

The basic functions of the Court were readily agreed on in the early phases of the negotiations. These functions include: 1) Jurisdiction over appeals from executive decisions by a member state, the Council, or assembly on the basis of violation of the treaty, lack of legal competence, etc.; 2) The right to annul decisions or recommendations of the executive resulting from such appeals; 3) Jurisdiction in disputes involving contracts let by the executive on a basis determined in the treaty. There is also general agreement that the Court should be empowered to remove the Commissioners if such removal is requested by a ⅔ vote of the Council.

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[3] See the editorial note, p. 594.

The major difficulties in establishing the institutional structure of the EDC have been in connection with the composition and powers of the *High Authority.* France which originally proposed a single-member Executive gradually revised its position and accepted the Italo-German plan of a three-member Executive, exercising real authority independent of the Council of Ministers, and jointly responsible for actions of its members. The Franco-German-Italian position was opposed by the Benelux countries which insisted that 1) the Executive be composed of a six-member college with each participating country represented; 2) the Executive be subordinated in the exercise of its powers to the Council of Ministers; and 3) that decisions in the Executive be taken by majority vote. The solution of those problems was made possible by two important concessions made to the Benelux countries in December and early January: 1) Franco-German-Italian acceptance of a multi-member Executive composed of different nationalities and 2) acceptance of a Belgian compromise proposal that the Council be able to issue directives on any subject to the Executive but that in the absence of such directives the latter would be free to act on its own responsibility. At the meeting of the six Foreign Ministers January 26–27, final agreement was reached on the establishment of a Commissariat of nine members which shall be named by unanimous agreement of the governments and of which not more than two can be nationals of the same state. The division of functions among the nine Commissioners and its method of work was left to internal regulations to be drawn up by the Commissariat itself.

Differences of opinion on the powers of the *Council* have related primarily to: 1) its relations to the Commissariat and, 2) the majority necessary to take decisions on important measures. Generally, the Franco-German-Italian position emphasized the restriction of the powers of the Council vis-à-vis the Commissariat to decisions, recommendations, and directives specifically stated in the Treaty and, except for the voting of the budget and a few other important matters, favored a decision by a qualified majority. The Benelux countries, on the other hand, regarded the Commissariat as subordinate to the Council, and to protect the interests of the smaller states insisted on unanimity in the Council for all important decisions. The Benelux insistence on unanimity has been relaxed following certain concessions to national authority and actions especially in the transitional period. With respect to weighted voting in the Council, the original French proposal to make decisions in tie votes and those requiring qualified majorities contingent on the support of those countries contributing 50 percent of the financial contributions to the EDC was not accepted by any of the participating countries although all agreed that some form of weighted voting would be desirable. A compromise was finally agreed to by the Ministers that in such case the votes of members making ⅔ of the total financial and troop contributions will carry.

The composition and powers of the *Assembly* did not loom very large in the early phase of the negotiations. While the conferees generally were agreed that the Assembly should exercise authority to remove the Executive by a vote of censure supported by a ⅔ majority they differed in their views as to the role of the Assembly in financial matters. Initially both Italy and Belgium opposed giving the Assembly any authority in budgetary matters and Belgium later desired to abolish the Assembly altogether while Italy reversed its position and became the most ardent advocate of a strong Assembly in the conference. In December, the Foreign Ministers agreed that the Assembly should be retained and that it should be given the task of studying and reporting to the Council of Ministers on a plan for the transformation of the EDC into a federal or confederal structure. Moreover, agreement was reached in January to give the Assembly the right to modify budgetary expenditures without, however, raising the total. At the same time, the Council is empowered to veto such proposals by a majority vote.

On the question of Assembly composition, the latest Ministerial meeting produced agreement that the Assembly will consist of 21 members each from France, Italy and Germany, 10 each from Belgium and The Netherlands, and four from Luxembourg. The EDC Assembly will be the same body as the Schuman Plan Assembly. This will mean that extra French, German and Italian representatives will be added to the regular Schuman Plan members when EDC matters are discussed. It was further agreed that a provision would be included in the treaty stating that if no definite steps towards federation have been taken within three years after the ratification of the EDC Treaty, the latter will be amended to alter the composition of the Assembly.

3. *Financial and Economic Provisions*

The most serious problems in the EDC negotiations have been related primarily to financial and economic matters, primarily 1) the nature and content of the common budget, 2) the manner of fixing national contributions, 3) the extent of the High Authority's control over expenditures, and 4) the latter's authority in the matter of armaments production and supply including US financial and economic aid to EDC. These problems have arisen essentially because of the conflict between the Franco-Italian-German view and that of Benelux. The Benelux countries have insisted on the retention, at least through

1953, of their national armaments program and financial commitments under NATO and of a certain measure of national control over the EDC budget and expenditures. France, Germany, and Italy on the other hand, have insisted that there must be a common budget from the first day the Treaty is in effect and that the EDC Executive must be free to utilize the national contributions for common armaments and supply in the "best interests" of the community.

In the long and involved discussions which have ensued since October, 1951, disagreement between the two points of view has been narrowed by various concessions made to the Benelux countries including: 1) assurance of their representation in the High Authority which will administer the common budget; 2) acceptance of unanimity in the Council for the voting of the budget and determining national contributions; and 3) agreement that the national contributions shall be made according to NATO procedures. The Benelux countries are insisting, however, on guarantees that their national rearmaments program will be respected through 1953, and continue to oppose the establishment of any minimum contribution that would bind their parliaments in the future as is desired by the Franco-German-Italian group.

Most of the financial and economic issues have now been cleared up in the Steering Committee at the technical level. It has been agreed that the common budget would enter into effect from the first day, that the national contributions to the budget would be made in accord with NATO procedures during the first two periods and that the budget as a whole would be adopted by the Council acting unanimously. In the event that the Council is unable to act, the budget for the previous year will be continued. It has been agreed that the expenditures side of the Common Budget would be approved by the Council acting by a qualified majority. It has further been agreed that NATO commitments and existing contracts would be respected in executing the Common Budget.

Problems which still remain to be solved are, in addition to the question of the establishment of a minimum level of contributions for the years subsequent to the enactment of the Treaty: 1) the German contention that its expenditures for the support of non-EDC troops in Germany be negotiated by the EDC and paid out of the common budget; 2) the German proposal to submit a plan for expenditure of its contribution in 1952 to the Commissariat, just as the other members will do; and 3) the portion of the national defense effort of each EDC country that can be transferred to another EDC country.

4. *Military Organization*

Since October when the size of national units in the EDF and the number of divisions was fixed on the advice of SHAPE according to a formula which approximated divisional strength for the national units advocated by the Germans, military problems in the EDC negotiations have largely been confined to the relatively minor issues of 1) the question of territorial command, 2) the command of internal security forces, i.e., the extent of national control in each case, and 3) command of naval forces.

5. *EDC–NATO Relationships*

Discussions in the Steering Committee of the Paris Conference, in the December and January meetings of the six Foreign Ministers, and in the NAT Council Deputies have emphasized three major problems in the relationships between EDC and NATO: 1) the use of EDC troops, 2) reciprocal security guarantees between EDC and NATO, 3) Western Germany's position vis-à-vis NATO. Differences of opinion among the Paris conferees on the questions of the use of troops and reciprocal guarantees derive in part from the existence of two different concepts of the EDC: 1) the French thesis which is shared by Italy and Germany that EDC, although established within the framework of NATO, is nevertheless a separate organization with its own political and juridical status and 2) the concept of the Benelux countries, especially the Netherlands, which emphasizes the EDC as constituting only an element of the greater North Atlantic system.

Use of EDC forces. The use of EDC forces has been envisaged by the French under three contingencies: 1) an attack against a member state of EDC, 2) an attack against a NATO power that is not a member of EDC, and 3) an attack against a country such as Yugoslavia which is a member of neither EDC nor NATO but whose preservation is important for the security of the EDC countries. France appears to have initially thought of making the use of EDC troops in some contingencies dependent on the action of either the EDC Council of Ministers or the High Authority. At the December meeting of the six Foreign Ministers, Schuman stated that while the French position had not been fixed, the use of forces offered an example on which the Council might act by unanimity. Later, in a January meeting of the Steering Committee, Alphand stated that in the event of an attack on an EDC member or a NATO power, the use of EDC troops should be automatic and the EDC Executive should be empowered to order EDC troops into action or authorize SACEUR to do so without reference to any other body.

Official proposals made by France to the EDC conference late in January, however, and Schuman's declaration at the January meeting of the six Foreign Ministers indicate clearly that the French support a treaty provision that would make the use of EDC troops, in the event of an attack on an EDC or NATO state, automatic without mentioning the agency that shall order such action. Schuman, in fact, stated that the omission of any mention in the Treaty of the agency which should order EDC troops into action under either of these two contingencies was to avoid any consitutional difficulties in the national parliaments relative to the power to order troops into action. On the question of the use of EDC troops in the event of an attack on a non-EDC, non-NATO state such as Yugoslavia, the French are insistent that provision for such be made in the EDC Treaty and that such action be made dependent on the unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers.

France's position on the use of troops is strongly supported by Germany and Italy. While Belgium supports the idea of the automatic use of the EDC troops in the event of an attack against an EDC or NATO member, the Netherlands position is that there is no need for an explicit treaty provision ensuring automatic action by EDC troops. The Dutch argue that the decision concerning the use of forces should be made within NATO and that EDC forces should be used each time Atlantic forces take action by virtue of NAT treaties. Moreover, the Dutch view the explicit mention of automatic guarantees as raising a problem in connection with the Brussels Pact which includes the UK and which binds the signatories to common action in the event of an attack. Both the Netherlands and Belgium, however, are opposed to any mention in the Treaty of the use of troops in the event of an attack on a non-EDC and non-NATO state, stating that such an eventuality is covered by Article 4 of NAT and that any more explicit provision in the EDC Treaty would extend their commitments.

Reciprocal Security Guarantees. The French initially proposed that on the signing of the EDC Treaty, two simultaneous declarations should be made, one by the EDC declaring an attack against a NATO member would be considered an attack against the EDC and a similar declaration by NATO. The EDC conference is at present considering a draft text on security guarantees to the NATO countries to be included in the EDC treaty.

At present the NAT Council Deputies are considering the following declaration to be made by the Council:

> "The parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, convinced that the creation of the EDC will strengthen the North Atlantic Community and the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area:
>
> "Agree that an armed attack on the territory in Europe of any member of the EDC or on the forces, vessels or aircraft of the EDC, when in or over the territories covered by Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty, shall be considered an armed attack against all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty within the meaning of Article V."

Such a declaration by the NATO members provides Germany with the guarantee of protection of her territory and of her forces, vessels or aircraft contributed to the EDF of the same nature now enjoyed by NATO members under the terms of Article V of the Treaty. As described above the EDC Treaty provides the NATO members with the guaranty that the EDF (including its German elements) will be at the disposition of the NATO members in the event of an armed attack on one or more of the members. In effect, therefore, Germany would share the privileges and burdens of the security provisions of the NAT (Articles V and VI).

Western Germany's Position vis-à-vis NATO. In a late January meeting of the Steering Committee, the German delegate Blank, declared that NATO could not be permitted to take decisions affecting the EDC without German representation and that for the EDC Treaty to be acceptable to the Federal Republic either 1) EDC would have to become a member of NATO in one form or another thus giving Germany indirect participation or 2) Germany should be made a member of NATO. At the January meeting of the six Foreign Ministers, Hallstein stated the German position as follows: provided, it is clearly recognized that Germany's non-membership in NATO is purely temporary, Germany would accept the following arrangements concerning EDC–NATO relationships: 1) that EDC have a corporate membership in NATO and that the present NATO members of EDC withdraw from NATO, or 2) that present NATO members of EDC retain their membership and that EDC corporate membership be added. Hallstein stated that he did not wish to issue an ultimatum but simply to state that any arrangement that totally excluded Germany from NATO membership would be unacceptable.

The German position has presented the EDC with one of its most serious problems. Heretofore, the EDC countries have contemplated the institutional relationships of EDC with NATO only in terms of the assignment of observers from the Commissariat to the various agencies of NATO and the assignment of EDC officers to SHAPE. None of the EDC countries appears prepared to weaken its individual membership in NATO through the corporate membership of EDC. Although most of the NATO countries would be willing to consider full German membership in NATO, France continues to be adamant in its opposition.

In letter to the Secretary, dated January 29,[4] Mr. Schuman said that the German position on NATO membership as cited above made it his duty to remove any misunderstanding; the relations to be established between EDC and NATO are by no means insoluble, but they become so the moment the adherence of the German Federal Republic to the NAT is envisaged. Schuman repeated the argument that entrance of Germany into NATO would appear to many as a radical alteration in the character of the alliance since, with the entrance of a country the structure of which would lead it to advance territorial claims, it could not be said with the same persuasive force as when the pact was signed that NATO was defensive in character. Furthermore, if the entrance of Germany into NATO were envisaged, the creation of the EDC and the sacrifices involved therein for several countries would be much less easily accepted by public and Parliamentary opinion. Schuman emphasized that the French Parliament was resolutely hostile to the accession of Germany to NAT and added that there are no grounds for believing that this attitude may be changed in the foreseeable future.

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[4] *Ante*, p. 7.

In the same letter, Schuman defended the French decision to create a diplomatic mission in place of the former French High Commission in the Saar by saying that the economic union of France and the Saar is an essential element of economic balance inside the European community and that France was executing a decision which was not incompatible with the provisional character of the present status of the territory. Following French action on the Saar, Adenauer instructed Hallstein to refrain from any further agreements in the EDC discussions, and in a press statement said that "until there has been a discussion of the entire question in the Bundestag the Federal Chancellor will in no case agree to a treaty on the entrance of the Federal Republic into the European Defense Community in any form."

Although there is some reason to believe that the Adenauer positions on NATO and on the Saar questions have been made in part for domestic political reasons in Germany, both are issues from which it will be difficult for either the French or Germans to retreat. With regard to German representation on NATO, Stikker has suggested that a solution might be found in some arrangement whereby in a *causa foederis* (act which brings treaty provisions into force) involving EDC, all members should meet with NATO to determine the common policy. According to Stikker, Schuman is reported to have agreed to such an arrangement but Hallstein has said that it would not be sufficient to overcome German objections. On the Saar issue, a possible formula has been advanced allegedly as coming from Adenauer to the effect that the Saar should be the seat of the EDC and the Schuman Plan and have a status analagous to that of the District of Columbia.

740.5/1-3052 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Trimble) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, January 30, 1952—7 p. m.

775. Drees most enthusiastic about recent trip US [2] when I called on him yesterday and said thought discussions he had US offs been most satisfactory. He grateful for explanations given him US upon matters common interest and equally happy that he in turn had op-

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Washington during his informal visit to the United States, Jan. 12–24, p. 589.

[1] Repeated for information to London, Paris, Brussels, and Bonn.

[2] See Acheson's memorandum of his conversation with Drees on Jan. 21 in

portunity explain Neths point view regarding them. Drees said was particularly impressed by Pres' health and good humor saying he cld not see how it possible for man "with problems of world on his shoulders" in addition those domestic nature cld be so well and cheerful.

Drees stated that in his talks Wash attempted make clear Neths attitude re EDC. Dutch favor plan but had felt it necessary put forward certain reservation re three aspects of proposal namely common budget, size of assembly and relationship EDC to NATO. Added that fortunately these questions been settled his satisfaction during discussions Paris past two months and intimated that as far as Neth concerned there clear sailing ahead.

PriMin said he thought FedRep shld be admitted NATO but unlike Stikker (ref Embtel 769, Jan 29 rptd London 179, Paris 167, Brussels 66, Bonn 14[3]) did not express himself in favor taking such step this time. Gers, he remarked, shld be more temperate their demands and not forget that in final analysis they responsible for sitn which they find themselves today.

Drees said he regretted fact that Saar issue has come up again and felt that this wld render far more difficult Adenauer's efforts obtain Parl approval EDC. He also sorry that fellow Soc Schumacher taking such strong natl line with consequence that to defend himself Adenauer compelled to put forward proposals for Ger inclusion NATO. Schumacher who was "fanatic" ruled his party with iron hand and permitted no deviation whatsoever from his own views. This in contrast sitn Soc Parties here and in UK which were sufficiently flexible permit independent thought without impairment basic tents. Reply my inquiry as to whether Neth Socs might exercise influence their Ger colleagues favor EDC Drees said efforts along such lines wld be fruitless. Vorrink Chairman Neth Labor Party had close personal friendship with Ollenhauer but unfortunately latter cld not influence Adenauer on questions this nature.

Drees said he had replied in negative to inquiry by Secy as to possib finding solution NNG problem after elections here this spring. Sukarno adamant in demanding complete transfer sovereignty NNG to RI and unwilling consider any compromise solution. At same time opinion Neth Parl increasingly opposed transfer. Public opinion Neth little interested in question at time being but wld undoubtedly become aroused shld there be any indication Neth Govt considered possibility transfer. This wld be especially true in preelection period and if for example Neth Labor Party shld make such suggestion other parties with exception Commies wld immed play it up as major campaign issue. Drees reiterated that he personally opposed to such move either now or after election stressing *inter alia* point that transfer wld in no way satisfy Indo and merely lead to further demands form nationalization oil properties, Neth shipping lines operating to Indo, etc.

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[3] Not printed. In it Trimble reported that he called on Foreign Minister Stikker that morning to ascertain his reaction to the Six-Power Meetings of Foreign Ministers in Paris, Jan. 26–27. Stikker said great progress had been made, the Belgians appeared to be satisfied, and he thought the EDC was "finally in the bag". However, Stikker felt that the West German demand to be admitted into NATO made it unlikely that agreement on the EDC could be reached before the forthcoming session of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon. Stikker personally favored West German admission into NATO and felt that the longer such admission was delayed the more difficult it would be to keep West Germany aligned with the West. (740.5/1–2952)

Drees said also been skeptical possibilities spinning out current conversations asserting that point may shortly be reached when Indo obsession with NNG issue will reduce talks to yes and no basis and when that stage reached it practically impossible go on.[4]

Reverting to his visit to US Drees said only disappointment fact that tightness schedule prevented him from spending more than hour Parris Island since specially interested in seeing with his own eyes training given to US troops. He concluded conversation with statement effect that his impressions US been highly favorable and that he most grateful for opportunity Pres' invitation had given him to visit it.

TRIMBLE

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[4] Documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the situation in Indonesia is presented in volume XII.

740.5/1–3152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, January 31, 1952—4 p. m.

3288. FonOff advises Blankenhorn "showed up in London last week" ostensibly on private business, but called "informally" on Frank Roberts, Dep Under Secy in charge of Ger Affairs. Stated that Adenauer hoped Brit wld appreciate serious Parl difficulties impending in Bonn and referred in gen terms to security controls, fin contribution and constitution of restitution court, without making any specific requests. Then went on to say that Hallstein wld be making a statement in Paris at EDC FonMin mtg and wld raise question Ger-NATO membership.[2] He indicated belief Adenauer Parl problems might be adequately met if EDC cld have "corporate membership" in NATO since fully realized question Ger membership cld be solved only gradually and not in time to meet Adenauer Parl problems.

In response to question from Roberts, Blankenhorn stated that if some such arrangement were possible, Gers wld not press question their national membership and agreed that national membership in

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[1] Repeated for information to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Regarding the Six-Power Meetings of Foreign Ministers at Paris, Jan. 26–27 under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 594.

NATO of other EDC participants wld continue. FonOff rep stated that after further consideration Blankenhorn statement doubt he meant "membership" for EDC in literal sense since FonOff legal advisors consider this precluded by terms of NATO agrmt. FonOff believes he actually meant EDC representation on appropriate NATO bodies. If this Ger position, FonOff think question whether Ger believe NAT representation other EDC participants in such bodies shld continue wld then become relevant.

FonOff has noted discrepancy between Blankenhorn's statement and that of Hallstein to effect other EDC participants shld renounce NATO membership in favor corporate EDC membership and believes Hallstein's statement represents initial bargaining proposal and Blankenhorn's represents position to which FedRep willing to be driven back.

GIFFORD

740.5/2–552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, February 5, 1952—3 p. m.

4740. Subj is Eur def forces.

1. Alphand called us today in great alarm over report from Ger headlined throughout French press that Adenauer in speech to CDU Bundestag faction had stated that Ger cld not agree to EDC or contractual agrmts without prior settlement of Saar quest and Ger's relations with NATO. While text of agency desps appears to indicate that Adenauer did not insist on a specific formula for either settlement, French press interprets his statements and subsequent CDU res as new demand for return of Saar to Ger and immediate Ger membership in NATO.

2. Ger dels to EDC conf who returned from Bonn last night were also apparently taken aback at Adenauer's alleged statement and alarmed by French reaction. After telephoning to Bonn they told Alphand that press reports were untrue and wld be denied by FedRep Govt. Alphand's info from French reps at Bonn, however, indicated that Chancellor apparently did make substantially statement reported by press.

3. Pertinax art in today's *France Soir* claims that SHAPE has now abandoned idea of integrated corps and will insist at Lisbon on formation homogeneous Ger army corps of 80,000 to 90,000 men. Pertinax says he obtained this info from SHAPE last night. After consulting SHAPE Alphand intends issue denial, and says SHAPE will also.

4. Alphand was deeply discouraged at these developments, which we thought wld seriously endanger support for EDC in next week's

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

Parliamentary debate. Despite denials he feels that incidents will complicate task of French Govt in getting Parliamentary vote for EDC without having its hands tied. Problem will, of course, be even more difficult if forthcoming debate in Bonn establishes any formal conditions on the Saar and NATO issues. French Assembly wld certainly impose rigid conditions on French side and make it difficult or impossible to pursue negotiations.

BRUCE

740.5/2–652 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, February 6, 1952—1 p. m.

4774. Subj is Eur Def Community.

1. Steering Comite mtg Feb 5 opened with statement by Ger deleg (Blank absent in Bonn) that Fed Govt had authorized deleg to deny categorically that Chancellor had made statement re NATO which press had reported him to have made (see 4740 Feb 5[2]).

2. Alphand laid before comite draft of report to be made at Lisbon, which he had promised at last Steering Comite mtg that Fr deleg wld submit. He asked that delegs study draft, submit such comments as they might have in writing by noon Feb 7 and be prepared to finalize draft at mtg Steering Comite morning of Feb 9. He pointed out that he believed draft to contain little that cld be deemed controversial by other delegs and hoped therefore that revisions wld be kept to minimum since, if they were to be extensive, it wld be difficult to have report ready in time. Delegs had had chance to see draft briefly before mtg. De Staercke took occasion to agree with Alphand that draft was good job and fair statement of results reached by conf. Other delegs also agreed that extensive revision not likely to be necessary. Alphand's timetable was agreed to. We will cable draft report as soon as translated.[3]

3. There was gen agreement that such outstanding questions as remain before conf wld be resolved after Lisbon. Feeling was that their solution wld be easier after successful Lisbon mtg than it might

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[1] Repeated for information to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Telegram 4901, Feb. 10, from Paris (740.5/2–1052) reported as follows:

"Steering Comite EDC Conf met February 9 to consider draft report prepared by Secretariat for Lisbon. With some modifications report was unanimously adopted by Steering Comite. On request of Ger del, it was made clear at mtg that report does not formally bind govts because some of them have taken promises not to accept definite commitments without consulting their Parliaments. However, all provisions in report have been approved by six dels and almost all by Mins."

For the text of the report as subsequently circulated to the North Atlantic Council as document C9–D/12, Feb. 19, see p. 230.

be now. For this reason, as well as because of shortness of remaining time, Steering Comite did not think it worth while to discuss, before Lisbon, remaining budgetary questions (e.g., what changes may be made by EDC in Ger program for 1953, shall a minimum be set for contributions in permanent period), question of territorial organization of EDF or question of use of forces. Latter two are, however, to be studied further this week by mil and juridical comites respectively.

4. Steering Comite approved summary, which juridical comite had prepared, reviewing specific cases in which, under present agreement, commissariat can act only with advice and consent of council and cases in which council is entitled to issue directives to commissariat, as well as type of vote by which council wld discharge its responsibility in these areas.

BRUCE

740.5/2–752

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1952.

Subject: The European Army

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Minister Counselor of the French Embassy, and Mr. Charles E. Bohlen

Mr. Daridan, the French Minister, came to see me today following his return from Paris. He was very critical of his own Government—or more particularly, of French political parties—in regard to the matter of the Saar and very critical of the Germans for having raised publicly the NATO membership question. He gave me, I believe, very frankly his impressions of the deeper reasons which are beginning to affect French policy on the questions of rearmament and Germany.

Mr. Daridan said, as we knew, France was not able to carry both the burden of Indochina and the planned rearmament under NATO and that this fact was affecting the French attitude towards the EDF and German rearmament. It was generally accepted that nothing immediate could be done about Indochina, although the prospect of the endless drain on France (quite apart from any Chinese involvement) was beginning to have its effect on French political parties and to a much lesser degree on French public opinion. Excepting, however, the necessity of continuing the present effort in Indochina, the French Government was very much afraid of its effect on the European Army concept. With the bulk of French professional forces in Indochina and the probable necessity for a cutback in French divisions in Europe, there was real apprehension that the European Army would be completely German-dominated. He said he had argued very strongly against the prevailing thesis that American policy was not adverse to that development, i.e., a German military superiority in the European Army to that of France while the bulk of French forces were held in Indochina. In his opinion, the fear that by the combination of these factors France would find herself faced with a German military superiority in the European Army in the near future was affecting French attitude towards the European Army issue. He felt the problem was very serious as he did not see any French Assembly accepting German rearmament on the basis where there would be more German divisions than French in the European Army and that, quite apart from the Saar question or the German membership in NATO question, if France was forced to cut back her European divisions, the German contribution would have to be reduced if there was to be French acceptance. Mr. Daridan said that while he realized this was unthinking emotion, nevertheless, the feeling did exist that the United States was primarily interested in the question of German rearmament. Mr. Daridan did not attempt to suggest what the United States should or should not do in the circumstances but said he was merely giving me his impressions and the underlying reason for the difficulties with which the EDF was now faced.

Charles E. Bohlen

740.5/2–952 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY Bonn, February 9, 1952—3 p. m.

1499. For the Secretary and Byroade. In my judgement Bundestag debate[1] was as satisfactory as I believe one cld expect after the developments of the last two weeks. The narrowed majority as compared with the Schuman Plan vote reflects in part the loss of momentum which the Saar episode induced, altho at best we were bound to lose some votes in the center.

The Chancellor did not have the same confident and spirited touch he displayed in the Schuman Plan debate, and he generally reflected the rather resigned mood he was in last week.

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[1] On Feb. 7–8, 1952 the Bundestag of the German Federal Republic held a debate on the course of conduct adopted by the Federal Republic Government regarding accession to the European Defense Community. The Bundestag adopted this course of action on Feb. 8 by a vote of 204 to 156 subject to a number of qualifying resolutions defining German rights and interests in such an organization. For the texts of the resolutions, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 76–79 or *10th Report on Germany*, pp. 86–88.

Although result cld have been much worse, and it is a victory, I feel it marks a certain ebb rather than a rising tide of support. How things are handled in the next few weeks will determine how solidly favorable yesterday's vote can be appraised. I can not estimate as yet the full effect of the attending stipulations. I hope to see the Chancellor this weekend to talk the significance of these over with him. I understand the Fr here are eager to assert that they entirely objectionable and preclude any mtg with the Chancellor in London. I do not agree and I believe that we must be prepared to counter any such move strongly. I believe that the stipulations and the record of the Bundestag mean stiffened resistance in our final negots which we wld either not have or wld not have met in as heavy form but for the Saar. Cabling exact text of resolutions as soon as possible.

McCLOY

740.5/2–1252 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1952—5 p. m.

4939. At mid-way point of Eur Army debate,[2] with three more sittings scheduled before final motion is voted, it appears clear once more that parliamentary problems facing EDC in Fr are at least as great and probably much greater than in Ger. Composition of Parliament is more complicated here, the groups are more disunited within themselves, the equilibrium of Govt more precarious, suspicions re Ger deeply rooted, and general climate surrounding EDC still quite uncertain. Add to this the feeling that Ger is continually increasing its demands, that the US is putting pressure on Fr and that it is favoring Ger over Fr or at least unwilling to support Fr adequately in its dealings with Ger in final stages of EDC and related negots, also that Fr is receiving insufficient credit and support for its commitments in Asia (which make it relatively weak in Europe), and there results feeling of irritation, frustration, and assertiveness, which is the atmosphere that prevails at present in the assembly; this feeling will cool down as the debate progresses. It still seems likely that motion endorsing broad principles of EDC will be voted, but question does not so much concern this as whether there will be outright reaction to Bonn resolutions[3] or wiser and more moderate position adopted which does not set back negots and unduly delay final settlement. It is true that early speakers have, according to the scheduling of debate, been those who attacked EDC most strongly, but what is important is pattern of response of deps and that pattern is at present along lines described above. Jules Moch has drawn considerable applause also from the right, and Aumeran and other rightists drew applause also from the Socialists, when they spoke of dangers of encouraging Ger Irredentism and cited Ger statements viewing EDC as means for restoring Ger unity. Moch was quite clear, and appeared to be speaking formally in name of his party, when he distinguished between Ger equality within EDC and inequality in other respects. ("It does not follow that it has right to become our associate also in every other respect.") Assembly appeared clearly to desire be reassured on this principle, and there appears little doubt but that motion will emphasize limits to Ger equality, need for safeguards (for instance in security controls field), necessity for making new efforts to obtain Brit participation, and possibly even to take into account work of UN Disarmament Commission.

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[1] This telegram was repeated to Bonn and London for information.

[2] In telegram 4919, Feb. 11, from Paris, Ambassador Bruce reported that the debate over French participation in the proposed European Defense Community which was scheduled to begin in the French National Assembly that afternoon would reach its crucial stage on Feb. 13 when there would be voting on motions by which the government would be guided in future international negotiations on the Defense Community (740.5/2–1152). A summary of the debate appears in *L'Année politique 1952*, pp. 307–312.

There obviously exist strong reservations with respect to EDC not only among Socialists, whose draft motion has still not seen light of day (they are continuing to hold meetings on subject as debate progresses), but more surprisingly also in MRP. Majority of radicals appear to agree with Delbos, who strongly supported Govt, rather than with Daladier who even was ready to dare US to withdraw from Eur. Among Independents, majority appears to favor Govt and expose by De Beaumont, who eloquently warned against US isolationism, was apparently quite effective. But there are rumors that Govt does not feel it can afford too strenuously to oppose number of points in forthcoming motion, such as those dealing with NATO, security controls, Saar, and that it also considers it needs to have its hands strengthened in further international dealings to persuade US and UK that there are limits beyond which Fr simply cannot go in order to obtain agreement on Eur army.

BRUCE

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[3] Regarding the Bundestag resolutions under reference, see telegram 1490, Feb. 9, from Bonn, *supra*.

740.5/2-1452 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, February 14, 1952—6 p. m.

4989. Part 4.[2] In our opinion French Govt showed unexpected courage in drafting of compromise motion re Eur army (Embtel

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, and Lisbon.

[2] This was the fourth in a series of telegrams in which the Embassy in France sought to review events in the French National Assembly and the ongoing debate

Footnote continued on following page.

4977 [3]) of which Faure finally put question of confidence. Debate had gone badly practically up to the time when Faure made his concluding statement, and when faced with the Gaullist maneuver of support for the disastrous motion put forward by the Socialists, govt obviously was tempted to make concessions which might have made it unnecessary to force the issue. Such concessions, particularly to anti-German sentiment and to the most ignorant of the critics of EDC, would have simply traded internal political headache for new headaches in connection with Franco-German relations. Govt has faced up to challenge and has not yielded to opposition on any material point.

Compromise motion appears to be the best that could be obtained under the circumstances, and the question indeed is whether it is yet perhaps too good to gain acceptance by a majority, in view of its moderation and the sometimes elaborate tactfulness of its wording. There is no mention in it at all of Ger Saar issue, which as matter of fact was not prominent in the debate after Schuman's opening statement (Embtel 4926, Feb 12 [4]). Motion does not exclude Ger NATO membership outright but merely speaks of it as not being "linked" to Germany's entry into EDC. As we expected, it contains request for US and UK guarantee against Ger withdrawal from EDC. This had been contained in the Pleven and Guerin de Beaumont versions (and in the Socialist draft) and apparently has support of all groups of the majority. We note on other hand that request is not specific with respect to implementation of the desired guarantee. In this it is softer and easier to deal with than similar thoughts expressed in predecessor drafts that were withdrawn.

On other hand, the reference to "necessary guarantees with respect to arms production, police and distribution of financial burdens" connection with contractual arrangement may represent Fr Govt effort to strengthen its bargaining position. Wording, however, is vague and would appear to give them some flexibility, altho it seems to make it imperative for Fr Govt to resist having restrictions on arms production placed in form of unilateral German declaration. Point (*d*) calling for equality between French forces in EDC and those of any

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

over the European Defense Community. In Part 1 (telegram 4976, Feb. 14) the Embassy recapitulated the events of the all-night session on the third day of the debate over the European Army in the National Assembly which resulted in Prime Minister Faure putting a question of confidence on a compromise motion endorsed by the government (740.5/2–1452). Part 2 of the series (telegram 4977) transmitted the text of the compromise motion on the European Defense Community (740.5/2–1452). For the text of that motion, see *L'Année politique 1952*, pp. 488–489. Part 3 of the series (telegram 4980) transmitted the text of the motion proposed by the French Socialist Party and defeated on a test vote (740.5/2–1452).

[3] Not printed; see footnote 2, above.

[4] The telegram under reference, which transmitted a summary of Schuman's statement to the National Assembly, is not printed (740.5/2–1252). The text of that statement appears in *L'Année politique 1952*, pp. 477–482.

(rather than "all") other members, is new not far from involving difficulties it represents more accommodating position of Fr Govt than that which it had provisionally put forward at EDC conf. At same time, it is more specific than Socialist resolution was on this point.

Large portions of Socialist motion, though little of substance of restrictive provisions, have been accepted into compromise draft, incl first 4 paras (up to "build-up their strength"), points about supranational authority, unanimity in Council of Ministers, common budget not subject to veto. The points about submission of treaty to Strasbourg and the wording concerning "supra-national political authority with limited but real powers" were inserted with view to their acceptability to Socialists, the phrasing in case of the latter point being allegedly considered important by Mollet in connection with any remaining hopes of later Brit adherence. On other hand, Socialist points about progressive integration, combat terms, and belligerent language about NATO have all been watered down to the point of innocuousness or eliminated.

Bonsal

740.5/2-1752 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State [1]

RESTRICTED NIACT PARIS, February 17, 1952—7 a. m.

5048. Part 1. After withdrawal of motion on which Faure had put confidence question on Feb 14,[2] and after obtaining apparent agreement of Socialists upon newly revised version of motion ending European army debate, Prime Minister Faure was forced to put new confidence question early this morning, this time for procedural reasons: As Gaullists had demanded roll-call vote ("at speaker's platform") in which only those who are actually present can vote. Although there was evidence that in conventional voting govt wld have the votes to put through the new motion, which embodies certain important concessions to Socialists, Faure cld not afford to leave outcome to actual physical presence of majority deputies. Confidence vote is to take place morning of Tuesday, Feb 19.

Changes of revised motion as against "compromise" motion reported in Embtel 4977 Feb 14 (London 1370, Bonn 422, Lisbon 77 [3]) are detailed textually in separate telegram. They involve four points: (1) no recruitment of German troops before Parliamentary ratification EDC treaty; (2) statement that no new member can be admitted to NATO without concurrence of Parliament, and that countries with territorial claims cannot be admitted to this purely defensive organization; (3) progressive character of integration into European army, in proportion as the organization comes physically into being; (4) recommendation that provision be made for possible watering-down of supranational character of EDC if this were capable of bringing Britain into it.[4]

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, and Lisbon.

[2] Regarding the question of confidence under reference here, see telegram 4989, Feb. 14, from Paris, *supra*.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, *supra*.

There were several test votes in course of debate, which brought number of other important developments:

a. Vote on according priority to newly revised motion: 327 to 276. Believe that opposition total includes 15 Socialists, 6 MRP, the 23 dissident Peasants and miscellaneous Radicals and independents, in addition of course to Gaullists and Communists. (Official breakdown will become available only late today.) Under normal circumstances, this vote wld be indicative of probable outcome of Tuesday's vote on substance of revised motion. This is subject to some qualification, however, as stated in next fol message.

b. Vote to reject amendments proposed by Gaullists and dissident Peasants: 345 to 267. This vote of interest because RPF proposed as one amendment the point about deferring any definitive decision re EDC until June report of UN Disarmament Commission, which point had originally figured in Socialist resolution (see para one Embtel 4980, Feb 14, London 1372[5]). Majority of Socialists stuck to bargain with govt on this occasion.

c. Vote to reject proposal put forward by Gaullists and Communists, that confidence vote take place Tuesday afternoon rather than Tuesday morning: 309 to 306. This vote indicates desire of many deputies to profit from the postponement of vote to wait as long as possible for news of developments in London before casting their ballots on Tuesday.

Bonsal

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[4] For the text of the revised motion summarized here and eventually adopted by the French National Assembly on Feb. 19 by a vote of 327 to 287, see *L'Année politique 1952*, pp. 489–490, *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, pp. 81–82, or *10th Report on Germany*, pp. 86–88.

[5] Not printed; see footnote 2, *supra*.

740.5/2–1752: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State[1]

RESTRICTED NIACT PARIS, February 17, 1952—7 a. m.

5049. Part 2. Although debate on the revised motion brought evidence that Socialists except for small group of dissidents, will stick to bargain with govt and vote the revised motion, debate also brought out Socialist misgivings in connection with guarantees to be sought from US and UK against possible break-up of EDC, and in connection with invitation to Adenauer to attend London mtg with three Western Foreign Ministers. If the vote on revised motion had taken place today, without confidence question, as had been intended by govt, motion wld have passed substantially with similar result as in vote on priority, i.e., with margin of some 50 votes. The Gaullist demand for roll call vote, which had effect of postponing the final vote, was in part doubtless motivated by hope that intervening days wld bring developments in London that wld increase Socialist suspicions and perhaps jeopardize favorable outcome of Assembly vote.[3]

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[1] This telegram was repeated for information to London, Bonn, and Lisbon.

With respect to guarantees, Guy Mollet questioned Schuman about UP message to effect that Secretary had denied that US had given, or cld give, guarantee sought by France. (AFP had apparently earlier disseminated news that such guarantees had in effect been promised by Secretary). Schuman replied that nothing had been decided one way or another and that negotiations are in progress. Faure was forced to intervene three times on this point, the last time on basis of Ins story that had just been handed to him and which tended to indicate US not unfavorable to the French request but that no decision one way or another had been made. Although it was pointed out to them that motion concerns what French are to request, and that consequently initial US reaction not relevant to the present Assembly debate, there was evidence that Socialists were disturbed by the UP dementi and that they will look with anxiety to any news from London and Washington on subject between now and when vote takes place on Tuesday.

With respect to invitation to Adenauer, Schuman cut rather unfortunate figure. He repeatedly stated that he had nothing to hide, which was in itself apt to arouse suspicions. Besides, he contradicted himself, having at first said that "it is possible" that three western Foreign Ministers wld meet Adenauer in London, but when confronted with Reuters story that invitation had already been issued to Adenauer in name of three Ministers, he stated that invitation had indeed been issued, adding that mtg had been "envisaged by Mr. Eden" for Monday evening. Schuman finally extricated himself by stating that he "considered it desirable that useful things be told to Chancellor Adenauer, particularly if we say them together, all three of us, after having arrived at common agreement." But there was evidence of RPF and Socialists being together in suspecting that tripartite talks with Adenauer wld involve further concessions to Federal Republic.

BONSAL

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[3] Telegram 5071, Feb. 18, from Paris, repeated to London (740.5/2–1852), forecast the impending vote of confidence as follows:

"Unless new outside developments supervene, we do not expect debate preceding vote tomorrow to be lengthy, nor vote itself to involve undue difficulty. As matter of fact, it appears possible that govts majority will be larger than that obtained in the test vote according the revised motion priority."

On Feb. 19, the National Assembly voted confidence by 327 to 287.

Editorial Note

From the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council meeting at Lisbon on February 25 to the signing of the European Defense Treaty at Paris on May 27, the twin issues of a European Defense Community and Contractual Relations between the United States, United Kingdom, and France on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other, were inseparably linked. As the communiqué issued at the close of the tripartite and quadripartite meetings of the Foreign Ministers at London which preceded the Lisbon meeting stated, "The Four Ministers welcome the progress made towards the conclusion of the Treaty for the establishment of the European Defense Community which will provide a solid foundation for the agreements to be concluded between the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. This Treaty and the agreements will constitute a single structure designed to bring about the association of the Federal Republic with the free world and to solidify the defence of Western Europe." The communiqué, dated January 19, is printed in full on page 106.

Throughout March, April, and May, discussions were held at Bonn between officials of the Federal Republic and the Allied High Commissioners' Offices looking toward final completion of the Contractual Arrangements, and these discussions are frequently alluded to in the documentation in this compilation. Documentation on the completion of the Contractual Arrangements is in volume VII. Documentation on the tripartite and quadripartite meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany at London, February 13 to 19 and on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, February 20 to 25 is on pages 36 ff. and 107 ff., respectively.

Meanwhile, the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community continued to function during and following the Lisbon Conference. The Juridical, Armaments, Military, and Finance Committees as well as the Planning Group continued their work in frequent sessions considering drafts and transmitting texts of various treaty and protocol articles and passages still in dispute through the Conference Secretariat to the various delegations. The Steering Committee of the Conference resumed meeting on March 6 and held at least two further meetings through March 16. Thereafter, there are no official records in Department of State files of further meetings, though it is evident from documentation in the following pages and from file 740.5 that it met regularly as late as the second week in May. Department of State files also indicate that the Juridical, Armaments, and Finance Committees had completed their work by the end of April.

The Military Committee was active as late as May 13, and the Planning Group continued to meet at least through May 23.

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the European Defense Community met at Paris, May 19 to 21, 1952 and reconvened at Strasbourg on May 23 to consider the drafts of various articles and proposals still in dispute. No minutes of these meetings have been found in Department of State files, but records of actions taken or deferred are available.

Official records of the above Committees, Secretariat, and Foreign Ministers' actions at the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community are in the Paris Embassy files, lot 57 M 44, Mr. Cleveland's Working files–EDC, in the following folders: CM/Del/CR, EA–D/N, CM/GP/SEC, CM/GP/GT, EA Financial Documents, EA Financial Minutes, CM/DEL D–Military Delegates Committee. The records are entirely in French.

740.5/3–752: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 7, 1952—6 p. m.

5397. Subj is Eur Def Community. Conf resumed sessions yesterday fol Lisbon recess.[2]

1. Alphand reported to Steering Comite on Fr Assembly debate and resolution concerning EDC. He said Assembly had endorsed principles of Eur unity and integration on which Fr fon policy in Eur is based. Assembly had, however, made a number of recommendations of which Fr deleg in conf would have to take account. This Assembly had expressed desire that treaty: underline defensive character of EDC; provide for an equitable hearing of finan burden among member states, having regard for special additional burden borne by Fr in Indochina; be strengthened by guarantee from US and UK ensuring future maintenance of EDC as now envisioned; ensure that there will be no recreation on Ger natl army and gen staff, while at same time not embodying any provisions which will discriminate against Ger; provide for highest degree of integration possible, under supranational auth; provide for maintenance of reasonable proportion among forces contributed by the seven member states; and provide for the gradual coming into full power and functions of institutions of the community. These conditions, Alphand added, would seem to require no substantial changes in basic agreements so far attained by conf.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Rome, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Reference is to the Steering Committee meeting of Mar. 2. See editorial note, *supra*.

2. In his capacity as chairman of the conf, Alphand said, he thought it appropriate to report on decisions reached in London and Lisbon. These were as fols:

(*a*) It was decided in London that the art of the EDC treaty dealing with the production of armaments should provide that there would be no production of certain armaments in strategically exposed areas. There would be a list appended to this art and there was to be also a declaration by the Ger Govt. There remains for the conf drafting problem in this respect.

(*b*) As to internal police forces it was decided in London that EDF treaty should provide that member states might maintain only such police forces as are necessary to carry out internal police functions, and that EDC commissariat should be empowered to see to it that this provision is respected and to make recommendations regarding its implementation to member states.

(*c*) Agreement was reached in London on Ger financial contribution. It remains for conference to settle, in accordance with Lisbon discussions, the details for the first year of all financial contributions including the German. This matter was not quite ripe yet at the moment to be tackled by the conference, but would be soon.

(*d*) Concerning mutual guarantees between NATO and EDF principles were agreed in London and Lisbon.

(*e*) Concerning institutional relations between EDC and NATO, and particularly consultations between councils of two organizations, detailed agreements were reached in London and Lisbon on which confs might now put formal stamp of approval.

(*f*) Concerning US and UK guarantees for future maintenance of EDF, Alphand said US and UK Foreign Mins had issued a communiqué in London. He read this communiqué and said it was an important and gratifying step indicating intentions of US and UK. It was not, however, final word on subject. French Govt will carry on further conversations on this subj, of which it will keep conf informed.

3. In response to question by Alphand whether anybody had comments or statements to make, Blank said German parliament had also had debate in course of which basic principles of EDF had likewise been approved and recommendations had been made which, like French, would not, to his mind, create any difficulty but of which German delegation would also have to take account. Blank expressed high hope that conf could soon successfully conclude its work. Conditions or recommendations put forward by the French Assembly seemed to him not to give rise to any difficulties. He reviewed them seriatim:

(*a*) Defensive character of EDF had always clearly been understood. Gers ready to accept any new language designed to make it even clearer.

(*b*) That financial burden would be equitably distributed and that account would be taken special situation in Indochina had also previously been agreed.

(*c*) Germany would present no objection to a guarantee from US and UK. In fact Ger would like to see US and UK extend guarantee against any party to EDC ever seceding from it.

(*d*) As to recreation of Ger Natl Army and general staff, Blank said he felt hurt that it was thought necessary to mention this. Gers had said often enough they did not want a national army and if there was to be no national army there would be no general staff. It was for this purpose, that is to avoid recreating a national army, that Germany had participated in this conference. Blank said he would state solemnly once again, and he was authorized so to state, that German Govt wanted no national army. But he must draw attention to fact that there must be no discrimination, which means that, save for exceptions so far agreed, other parties to EDF would also not maintain national armies and general staffs.

(*e*) Desirability of as much integration under supranational authority as possible had also been agreed.

(*f*) Same held for maintenance of reasonable proportion between forces contributed by member states.

(*g*) As for fact that Community would assume powers and functions gradually—no one ever thought that it could be done all at once.

Blank then commented on Alphand's report of agreements reached in London and Lisbon. He said Adenauer had concurred in armament production agreement and drafting problem should not raise great difficulty. Blank said he heard for first time about agreement on internal police of which Alphand had spoken. He said he was not aware that there had been any such agreement reached in London. However, he said, he thought it was a good idea, consonant with principles to which German delegation adhered. In fact, if there was anything he had against this idea it was that he had not thought of it himself. Concerning financial questions and question of EDC–NATO relations, German delegation was quite satisfied with solution which had been put forward.

4. Lombardo stated he had little to add beyond thanking Alphand for his reports and for his contribution to agreements which had been obtained. Lombardo announced that, happily, Italian Parliament had had no debate and had made no recommendations on EDC.

5. Van Vredenburch said he agreed with consensus so far expressed that conference was now entering final phase of its work. He would suggest in fact that it might help for conference to set itself a deadline for completion of treaty draft. Van Vredenburch noted that Dutch Parliament had also debated EDC and that, although no definite recommendations had been made by Dutch Parliament, Dutch delegation would have to have due regard for what had been said in debate. He hoped that conference would complete its work in spirit of compromise and conciliation.

6. De Staercke said his view also was that decisive steps had been taken in last few weeks and that signature of treaty could be accomplished in a matter of weeks. He endorsed suggestion of setting deadline. He added that Belgian Parliament had, like Dutch had, not made definite recommendations or set conditions. But he said it may do so at any time and it was important therefore that equilibrium of agreement so far reached not be upset. For Belgian delegation, conference report to Lisbon meeting formed basis for definitive treaty draft.

7. Alphand answered De Staercke and Van Vredenburch by agreeing that report to Lisbon meeting stated basic agreements which would not be departed from. However, he said, one had to keep an eye on need for eventual ratification of treaty and therefore French would make some new suggestions to implement recommendations made by their Parliament. However, he did not expect these would raise any difficulties. Alphand then proposed April 15 as deadline for completion of treaty and military protocol. A number of other annexed documents, most important of which was convention on status of EDF, would be finished some time later, but general principles governing them would appear in treaty. Blank expressed preference for earlier deadline of March 31. After some discussion April 6 was agreed upon as deadline, Alphand remarking that he hoped nobody would inform the press about it.

8. Alphand then distributed a paper, prepared by secretariat, listing all matters, both those of substance and those presenting only minor drafting problems, which still remained to be settled. Steering Committee would also have to review once more, for form, all articles in existing treaty draft. (Secretariat has prepared and we have translated and are pouching today new treaty draft incorporating all agreements reached prior to Lisbon.) Alphand proposed, and it was agreed, that technical committees work through weekend and that Steering Committee meet again next Tuesday. We are transmitting Secretariat's list of remaining questions in immediately following cable.

9. At meeting yesterday morning Juridical Committee reviewed progress made by committee which had been studying questions of status of forces (see Embtel 4846, Feb 8, rptd London 1337, Bonn 399;[2] Embassy despatch 1692 to Dept, Dec 27, 1951, CC HICOG Bonn).[3] It noted that task assumed had perhaps been somewhat too ambitious and that transitional solutions would perhaps have to be adopted on some questions. Consensus however was that work could

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[2] Not printed. (740.5/2–852)

[3] Not printed. (740.5/12–2751)

be completed some time after signature of treaty and before ratification. The treaty itself would contain statement of gen principles. Germans announced they were about to introduce a number of compromise proposals. Status Comite was directed to receive and consider these during next week and report again to Juridical Comite shortly thereafter.

[DUNN]

740.5/3–752 : Telegram

The Consul at Geneva (Oakley) to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET GENEVA, March 7, 1952—3 p. m.

215. In long conv with Ramsey at Porter dinner party last night and in presence Nor deleg (Frihagen), Andre Philip, French Socialist and head Fr del to ECE, said EDF treaty "in present form" would be defeated in Fr Assembly by 60 votes, that as result last Sunday's caucus of Socialists it was clear Socialist Party would reject present concept of EDF and that Socialists could support present EDF treaty only if UK adhered or if legislation providing for polit integration EDC presented to Assembly simultaneously with treaty.

We pass his views on because he spoke with such frankness, passion and tone of authority. His principal points were these:

1. Of conditions imposed by Socialists in EDF debate in Assembly, none more important than that polit integration of EDC must parallel milit integration. To create EDF before there is an EDC supranatl fon policy was "natl suicide" and "putting cart before horse". Latter could be attained only through greater measure polit integration than present EDF treaty contemplates. Danger of proceeding to rearm FedRep with EDF, in absence supranatl EDC, could be illustrated by two examples. Until FedRep pools its sovereignty within EDC, Sovs could always disrupt EDF by dangling prize of reunification of Ger on terms no Ger Govt could turn down. If Yugo were attacked for example, and EDF should go to defense, could not Soviets neutralize Ger by offering bait of restitution of East Ger or part of Oder-Neisse territories? Hence, an EDC policy on Ger unity must be thought out and pooled before EDF activated. His own view was that EDC could not deny goal of Ger unity but that West Gers must now, and before rearming, agree by pooling sovereignty and fon policy that unity should be attained only after buildup of defensive strength within politically united EDC made negots possible with USSR toward end peaceful reunification of Ger.

2. Socialist EDF conditions had been "minimum". Party had not wanted to underline prestige of Eisenhower or encourage isolationism in US by "Fr failures". However, even these minimal conditions had

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, and Washington.

failed to keep 15 Socialist deputies in line and last Sunday's caucus revealed that party sentiment was such that these deputies cld not be disciplined. This was indicative of sober "second-thoughts" on part of party.

3. It would be hard to exaggerate the importance party places on UK adherence to EDF. It "approximated a mistique" and was recognized as easier solution to Socialist fears than requirement of supranatl EDC. But one or the other was a *sine qua non*.

4. Fr Socialists realized that "Gers must have enough with which to live and also enough with which to dream". Supranatl EDC should provide both if Gers could be persuaded that integration could lead to unity.

5. He had visited mid-Feb Socialist congress in Frankfort and had then traveled and lectured extensively in Hesse and Lower Saxony. His impressions were that rearmament was unpopular with youth but that former Wehrmacht members would happily re-enlist and accept traditional militaristic concept and disciplines which had made Ger so dangerous in past. Prospects of FedRep contingents of former Wehrmacht soldiers in EDF "made his blood congeal."

6. He did not trust Kurt Schumacher and thought, if either he or his party should succeed to power, SPD would be more militaristic than Adenauer.

7. For Fr to deny Ger aspiration of natl unity would be to deny possibility of formulation of supranatl EDC fon policy. Fr had been divided during war and every Frenchman who went through experience should appreciate lack of realism in denying aspiration of natl unity to Ger, notwithstanding difficulties such could cause Fr. But Fr would be better off to develop common policy with Gers now and associate themselves with the inevitable.

OAKLEY

740.5/3–452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 8, 1952—12 : 19 p. m.

1941. For McCloy. Ref: Bonn 1824,[2] rptd Paris 585, London 489,

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[1] Drafted by Laukhuff, Hay, William K. Miller, and Jacobs of GER, cleared in substance with Byroade of GER, Barnard of RA, and Fahey of Defense. Repeated to London and Paris.

[2] Not printed; it contained a brief summary report of an informal meeting of High Commissioners held on Mar. 4 at which the French High Commissioner stated that the French agreement at the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February relating to security controls over German production of propellants and gun barrels as well as civil aviation "was only given as part of an overall settlement." Unless the United States and United Kingdom would agree that the EDC should have a monopoly on the construction of plants producing propellants and that such plants would be in strategically appropriate locations, and unless France also received satisfaction on a German civil aviation declaration, the French Government would have to ask that the entire problem of German armament production be reconsidered (740.5/3–452).

Mar 4; Bonn 1839,[3] rptd London 493, Paris 589, Mar 5; Bonn 1840[4] rptd London 493, Paris 589, Mar 5.

1. We have impression that Fr and possibly Brit have had some second thoughts on agreements reached re security controls at London and Lisbon, and are now attempting stretch definitions to include areas of control beyond those agreed by Fon Mins. This departure from agreed principles in effect constitutes a renunciation of an agreement presumably made in good faith with the Chancellor, will increase his difficulties with the Bundestag, and because of nature of restrictions which Fr intend to add (e. g. productive capacity), if accepted, may lead in post-occupation period to unnecessarily strict interpretations of treaty provisions by Fr and consequent attempts to interfere in Ger internal affairs.

2. Four actions need to be taken in field of security controls as result of decisions reached London and Lisbon. To recapitulate, they are:

a. Art 4*a* of EDC treaty wld be amended to give EDC Commissariat discretion not to place orders for production items on annexed list II in strategically exposed areas (e.g. Fed Rep).

b. Adenauer wld send letter to US, Brit and Fr indicating that action of EDC under Art 4*a* wld not be regarded by Fed Rep as discriminatory.

c. Adenauer wld address letter to US and UK govts assuring them that EDC treaty (including provision concerning limitation of arms production) will become Ger law, and prohibitions will also have effect re UK and US.

d. Adenauer wld address letter to US, UK, and Fr govts assuring them with respect Civil aircraft (1) that none are being produced in Fed Rep at present and no facilities were available for such production, (2) that the Fed Rep intends purchase from other countries such Civil aircraft as may be required in Ger and (3) that if conditions changed in future Fed Rep wld seek agreement on this matter with the US, UK and Fr in light of conditions then prevailing. We wld prefer that this be included in ltr noted para 2*b* above, tho it was not so agreed with Adenauer.

3. Our views follow on specific points introduced by Brit and Fr, and reported in reftels:

a. Re Bonn 1839 para 1 as indicated Deptel 1937 Mar. 7,[5] we do not approve inclusion influence mines in definition long range and guided missiles as this weapon never discussed at London. However you may agree to this if Brit and Fr insist.

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[3] Not printed; it reported on a meeting at the technical level in an effort to reach further agreement on clarification of German armament production limitations and requested permission for agreement by U.S. officials if the French remained adamant (740.5/3–552).

[4] Not printed; it contained a draft formula concerning production by the proposed EDC of propellants which, as explained by the French High Commissioner, did not "exclude possibility of some manufacture of propellants in Germany if under Article A 7 of EDC treaty this should be decided by majority vote." However, it was reported that "French are at present opposed to authorizing such manufacture in Germany and argue that existing capacities elsewhere should first be developed." McCloy stated that "Although French formula does not entirely correspond to our understanding of Lisbon agreements, it nevertheless does not give French absolute veto in EDC and probably represents the furthest to which French Govt is prepared to go" (740.5/3–552).

[5] Not printed.

b. Definition mil aircraft Bonn 1839 definitely not acceptable to us. It represents considerable retrogression from TGG London recommendation in that it probably wld not permit production most component and spare parts. We believe component parts listed Paras 1 *b* and *c* London Report (TGG 20 final Oct 25 [6]) shld be absolute maximum components covered in this definition. We wld prefer definitions covering only complete mil aircraft and complete air frames and engines for mil aircraft.

c. We wld reluctantly accept proposal para 3 urtel 1839 for inclusion of mfg capacity in definition of weapons.

d. Agree formula re propellants plans urtel 1840.

e. Agree definition naval vessels para 4 urtel 1839, with exception of Fr amendment to para 2 re vessels for reception and launching of aircraft or guided missiles. From our point of view Fr amendment is unnecessary in view of restrictions on vessel tonnage and guided and long range missiles, but you may accept it for proposal to Gers if you feel some "give" is necessary.

f. It was sense of Lisbon agreement that Adenauer wld send ltr or communication on civil aircraft to three govts, not make "declaration". We believe this distinction shld be noted. It was understood at Lisbon that this ltr, as well as those noted under 2 *b* and *c* above, must be laid before Bundestag and that they wld be part of overall package deal. The word "approval" was used. It was not rpt not made clear specifically what this meant, but it is clear that it wld at least require that Bundestag not raise objection to ltrs. We therefore believe you shld go along with Fr proposal on this point (urtel 1840) at least until Ger reaction is ascertained.

4. While we recognize HICOM shld discuss its proposals with Adenauer and recognize that Fr may insist that his agreement, at least in principle, be obtained before discussion and drafting begins in EDC conference, we believe no effort shld be spared to prevent development of Allied-Ger split on this issue and further delay in reaching final agreement on terms of necessary articles of EDC treaty. We also believe other members of EDC are likely to argue that more objectionable aspects of Fr inspired limitations shld be modified. In any case they cannot be asked to accept without discussion and possible modification provisions applicable to their own activities. We of course hope that proposed definitions will be passed to EDC for final action as quickly as possible.

5. In conclusion, as indicated para 1 above, we believe some of Fr and Brit proposals go beyond mins decisions and agreement with Adenauer and hence are likely to provoke justifiable resentment on Adenauer's part. We therefore think you shld, in agreeing to present them to him, point out to Fr that they were not mentioned to him at

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[6] Not printed; a copy of TGG(SC)P.20 Final, Oct. 10, 1951 and Appendix E, thereto, the paragraphs under reference here, is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 205.

London and that your Govt believes his refusal to accept them, if he does refuse, must result in reconsideration of Allied position, at least so far as commitments or coverage of definitions additional to those discussed with Adenauer at London are concerned.

ACHESON

740.5/3–2252 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 22, 1952—6 p. m.

5798. Subj is European defense community. Ref: Embtel 5627, March 15[2] rptd London 1555, Bonn 524 and Deptel 4578[3] to London March 19 rptd Bonn 2115.

1. British Emb officer here informs us of misgivings in UK FonOff (much along lines London's 4125 to Dept, March 20[4] rptd Bonn 404) concerning proposed Brussels pact-EDC security guaranty. Britain would be binding herself, under proposal, to Italy and Germany for period which might possibly exceed duration of NAT and might certainly exceed presence US troops in Europe. This gives rise to uncomfortable feeling in some UK FonOff circles. Caution has been advised, and as result our informant did not believe Eden had discussed matter with Schuman (as had been expected he would) except, perhaps, casually.

2. Our informant mentioned that UK FonOff opinion had brought out advantages to Brit inherent in proposal as well. Proposal would ensure continuing validity for UK of Brussels pact guaranty itself,

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it reported that at a meeting of the Juridical Committee of the EDC Conference held on Mar. 14, the French Delegate submitted for approval two unofficial working draft protocols designed to extend mutual defense guarantees between the Brussels Pact countries and the EDC nations. The Committee swiftly approved the two drafts with the addition of a reference to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The observer from the United Kingdom informed the Committee that a British answer to the protocols would require Cabinet action but that he was conscious of the need for speed (740.5/3–1552). Texts of the working draft protocols on mutual defense guarantees were dispatched to the Department in telegrams 5628 and 5629 from Paris, Mar. 15 (740.5/3–1552).

[3] Not printed; it reported that "Brussels Pact–EDC Security Guarantee formula provides good solution apparent impasse Dutch-Ger positions re automatic internal def commitments EDC" and also would appear to make more likely French ratification of the EDC Treaty while solving the problem of reconciling commitments under the two treaties which the Dutch Delegation had stressed must be faced. For these reasons, the Embassy in the United Kingdom was instructed to make known to the Foreign Office "our favorable attitude toward this solution". (740.5/3–1852)

[4] Not printed; it reported that the Department's favorable views toward the proposed Brussels Pact–EDC security guarantee had been conveyed to the Foreign Office whose response was that the proposal was under study but that while the United Kingdom was aware of the obvious advantages of the proposal to the continental countries, there was less direct advantage to Britain. "One factor in their thinking is what their position would be if NATO terminates 17 years from now and they are left with a 50 year EDC commitment". (740.5/3–1952)

which would otherwise lose all substance for UK upon creation of EDC. (UK would be left with guaranty from countries no longer disposing of substantial armed forces.) Furthermore, there is obvious argument in answer to fear of UK commitment lasting past NATO. That is that UK itself would benefit from reciprocal nature of such commitment in event NATO should cease to exist. Nevertheless, our impression is that prevailing atmosphere is one of caution. Matter will, of course, be brought up in cabinet, though it has not been as yet.

3. Possible outcome, our informant suggested, might be qualified acceptance of proposal and extension of guaranty only for period of duration of NAT. Such qualified acceptance however, might well fail to serve purpose of solving current impasse in EDC conf re an internal security guaranty, since reason for Dutch position on latter is precisely a long-range uneasiness at being closely bound to Italy and Germany by arrangement divorced from UK. (See The Hague's 983 to Dept,[5] March 19, rptd London 224, Bonn 28). Such qualified acceptance might therefore be expected at very least to revive Benelux arguments for limiting duration such treaty to duration NAT. This argument, when made at first Paris EDC ministers meeting, ran into vigorous opposition from Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi.

BONSAL

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[5] Not printed; it informed the Department of a meeting of the Benelux political committee at The Hague on Mar. 14 as reported to Embassy officials by a member of the Dutch Foreign Office (740.5/3-1952).

740.5/3-2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, March 28, 1952—7 p. m.

5962. From MacArthur. Following is US eyes only and FYI only. Re Deptel 5503 to Paris March 18.[2]

Nutting (Parliamentary Under Secretary UK FonOff) called on General Eisenhower today. In course of conversation General Eisenhower emphasized vital importance of moving ahead rapidly toward signing EDC treaty. He said while there were number of issues on which agreement still must be reached, there was one where early and constructive action by UK might represent major contribution to hastening signature of treaty. This was question of some form of Brussels Pact-EDC security guarantee formula which wld provide solution to impasse between Dutch and Germans re automatic internal defense commitments in EDC. (Re Paris Embtel 5526, March 12.[3]) Anything constructive UK cld do now to make such commitment wld be of tremendous importance. General Eisenhower asked Nutting to convey his views to Eden as soon as possible.

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[1] Repeated to London for Gifford and Spofford, The Hague, Brussels, Bonn, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] Same as telegram 4578 to London, Mar. 19, summarized in footnote 3, *supra*.

Nutting replied he was returning London by air tonight and wld see Eden and report fully on General's views and sense of urgency. He said UK Govt was fully aware of importance of early constructive action and that Eden had developed a formula which he thought wld meet Dutch position and be helpful with French, Germans, and others. Originally it had been hoped to submit this formula to Cabinet today but legal experts in FonOff were giving it a last going-over. According to present plans, Eden formula wld be presented to Cabinet on Monday or Tuesday of next week, and if approved, UK wld in first instance convey formula to French late in week. Nutting expressed opinion substance of Eden proposal wld be satisfactory to EDC members with possible exception of one point. Namely, length of duration of such British guarantee. He indicated that strong UK position was it shld be limited to duration of NATO and not to duration of EDC or Brussels Pact.

General Eisenhower replied that if UK proposal was satisfactory except for length of duration, he wld press strongly French and Benelux to accept it particularly since Nutting had stated that British were going just as far as they possibly cld to be helpful and constructive.

DUNN

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[3] Not printed; it informed the Department that the German-Dutch deadlock in the Juridical Committee of the EDC Conference over internal mutual defense guarantees among EDC members to be included in the EDC Treaty continued, the Germans asking for an "automatic" defense commitment among EDC members, the Dutch demanding that internal mutual guarantees among EDC members should read precisely as the reciprocal guarantee between EDC and NATO members as framed in the language of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (740.5/3-1352).

740.5/3-3052 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 30, 1952—7 p. m.

5987. Subj: EDC.

1. Fr and Ger delegations to EDC conf have been showing increasing worry in past week over absence Brit reply to conf proposal for exchanging mutual def guarantee with EDC. (See Embtel 5798,[2] rptd London 1604, Bonn 561 and Deptel 4578 to London March 19).[3] Both delegations feel that Brit rejection of proposal wld create very serious

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Dated Mar. 22, p. 627.

[3] Summarized in footnote 3, *ibid.*

sitn in conf. Clock wld be turned back to two weeks ago and deadlock between Dutch and Gers on issue of internal EDC def guarantees, for which no acceptable other way out has yet been suggested, wld again exist.

a. Alphand told US observer that unless Brit accept proposal which has been made to them, problems of internal mutual def guarantee and use of forces will become nearly insoluble in any way which cld meet with approval all around in conf and in NATO. He added that if Brit reject proposal, Fr govt wld lose an important talking point with Fr parliament.

b. Ophuls, legal member of Ger del, approached US observer and said that prospect of unfavorable Brit reply to mutual guarantees proposal seemed disastrous from point of view of Ger del. He said it was perfectly clear, as far as he was concerned, that unless UK accepted proposed scheme, Dutch wld not budge from their opposition to automatic internal EDC def guarantee or from their insistence that EDC go into action only by unanimous consent of member states. This, Ophuls said, was unacceptable to Gers and he understood from Alphand that it was considered undesirable in NATO as well. If Brit rejected proposal therefore, there wld again be an impasse in conf on this major issue, from which he cld see no way out.

2. Deadlock in conf on matter of def guarantee, which everyone foresees in case Brit reject proposal, wld be very serious matter. While it is true that everyone but the Gers and possibly the Itals wld be willing to settle for a provision along lines favored by Dutch (EDC goes into action unanimous consent), Ger objection is a fundamental one and wld probably be hard to overcome. Gers will find it difficult to go to Bundestag and say that they have merged their forces with those of countries which are not willing to include Ger in a system of def guarantees such as exists among themselves, (i.e. Brussels pact) or to extend to Gers similar guarantee. Adenauer wld have to go to the Bundestag with a treaty which makes it possible for Germany's partners to refuse to defend German territory—which makes it possible, indeed, for any single one of Gers partners to endorse such a refusal. Certainly, under the Dutch system, it wld be true that Ger cld also prevent the def of Dutch or Fr territory, but the Gers not unjustifiably feel that they are in the more immed danger on account of their geographical position.

3. It wld appear from Nutting's conversation with Gen Eisenhower (Embtel 5962, March 28 from MacArthur [4]) that Brit are prepared to go as far as they feel they can to meet conf desires. However, if as Nutting indicated Brit proposals limited to duration of NATO, there is real danger that Dutch will use this occasion as a pretext to return to insisting that EDC treaty itself be limited to duration of existence of NATO. See para 3 Embtel 5798, rptd London 1604, Bonn 561).

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[4] *Supra.*

When at Paris mins mtg in Dec, Stikker with Van Zeelands support urged limiting duration EDC in this way, he met determined opposition from Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi. (See Embtel 3891, Dec 30, rptd London 1034, Bonn 230[5]). They argued strongly at that time that to limit duration EDC treaty to less than 50-year figure chosen for Schuman plan wld give impression that EDC was in nature of a "temporary expedient" of essentially mil character, and wld thus seriously weaken its psychological value as another step towards Eur federation. Adenauer was particularly vehement on subj, arguing that present opportunities shld be seized to build permanent structure that wld bind future generations.

It is possible, of course, that Franco-German-Ital position on this point wld be modified after Brit answer in sense mentioned by Nutting. But issue of duration of EDC treaty, seems to have important implications, in Ger eyes at least. When matter was discussed in Dec, Adenauer gave impression that he considered his own attitude on this issue, and therefore the attitude of the other govts involved, to represent measure of their trust in each other. In this sense treaty duration is really same kind of issue as automatic internal def guarantee, on which Ger position has been so unshakable.[6]

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[5] Not printed.

[6] On Mar. 20, Porter called upon Barnard at his request to discuss the question of U.S. and U.K. security guarantees to the EDC. Porter left with Barnard a draft of the proposed British Declaration on the European Defense Community which stated, in part, that the establishment of the EDC did not relieve the United Kingdom of current commitments in Europe for the maintenance of peace and that the principles laid down in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty should be upheld. Therefore, the United Kingdom declared that it would consider any action which threatened the integrity of the EDC as a matter of the gravest concern which would call for consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (memorandum of conversation by Barnard, Mar. 20, 740.5/3–2052). In telegram 5989 from Paris, Mar. 31, MacArthur informed Bruce that "If British come up with Brussels Pact–EDC security guarantee formula which is satisfactory in all respects except that is for duration NATO rather than EDC or Brussels Pact, and if Dutch then use this point as pretext to create difficulties, I believe consensus opinion here is that Dutch shld be pressed very hard indeed to accept British proposal" (740.5/3–3152).

740.5/3–3152

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 31, 1952.

In response to your request for clarification of (1) the internal EDC security guarantee problem and (2) the US/UK guarantee of the integrity of the EDC, the following is submitted for your information:

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[1] Drafted by Barnard. The source text bears the handwritten notation "Sec[retary of State] saw."

1. *Internal EDC Security Guarantee*

a) Problem:

The German EDC delegation insists that the EDC Treaty must contain an automatic commitment on the part of the EDC members to come to the aid of each other with all their resources, including military force, in the event of an attack on any member of the EDC.

The Dutch delegation has shown great reluctance to accept an internal EDC security guarantee that would be more binding than Article V of NAT.

b) Proposed Solution:

The Dutch have said they might agree to an automatic internal EDC guarantee provided that the Brussels Pact, which has an automatic internal guarantee, extends an automatic guarantee to EDC, which in turn would extend a similar guarantee to Brussels Pact. Effect is to bind UK into automatic guarantee system of EDC. The EDC Juridical Committee has approved two draft protocols reflecting the above reciprocal guarantees, and these have been transmitted to the UK Foreign Office.

c) Present Status:

UK reaction to date has been cautious but "sympathetic consideration" has been promised when the matter is taken up by the Cabinet. This is scheduled for March 31 or April 1.

In view of the appeal to Benelux of closer British association with EDC, the fact that Brussels Pact and EDC commitments will have to be reconciled in any case, and the salutary effects on the French Assembly if the UK were to agree, we have communicated to the UK our favorable attitude towards the Dutch proposal.

We are informed that the UK has misgivings concerning the proposed Brussels Pact-EDC security guarantee solution in that the UK would be binding herself under this proposal to Italy and Germany for a period which might exceed the duration of NAT and might certainly exceed the presence of US troops in Europe. It would appear from a conversation on March 28 between General Eisenhower and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the British are prepared to go as far as they can to meet the EDC Conference's desires. However. British acceptance probably would be limited to the duration of NATO, which reaction might not be acceptable to the Dutch and might be used by the Dutch as a pretext to insist again that the EDC Treaty itself be limited to the duration of NATO, rather than 50 years insisted upon by French and Germans.

We have pointed out to our Embassy in London that the UK is already committed to a 50 year automatic guarantee to 4 of the EDC countries by virtue of Articles 4 and 10 of the Brussels Pact.

d) Further Steps:

In view of the importance which both Germany and France attach to UK acceptance of the Brussels Pact solution (Paris 5987) [2] it is suggested that a personal message from you to Mr. Eden might prove extremely helpful at this juncture.[3]

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] A handwritten notation in the margin, signed by Perkins, reads: "I do not recommend this at this time. May be desirable after we get clearer view of UK position."

If the British come up with a Brussels Pact-EDC security formula which is satisfactory in all respects except that it is for the duration of NATO rather than the EDC Treaty or Brussels Pact, we should press all EDC countries to accept the British proposal.

2. *US/UK Guarantee of the Integrity of EDC*

a) Problem:

The French have been concerned that Germany, after its forces have been built up, may secede from the EDC. Consequently, they have sought to acquire from the US and the UK as formal a guarantee as possible that the US and the UK will not stand idly by should any country attempt to secede from the EDC.

b) NATO Guarantee:

On February 22, the NAC approved the CD report on relations between EDC and NATO, of which the following is a pertinent passage:

> "Whenever any of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or any of the parties to the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community considers that the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them or the continued existence or integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Defence Community is threatened, a combined meeting [of the two Councils] [4] will be summoned at the request of that party in order to consider the measures necessary to meet the situation."

c) US Position:

At the London meeting with Eden and Schuman, you pointed out in answer to the latter's attempt to get a more definite US guarantee against German secession from the EDC that you must stay within limits already approved by Congress, but that Congress had given frequent support to Eur integration including the stationing of US troops in Europe for as long as necessary, and that we would attempt to meet the French problem through the President's message to Congress transmitting the Contractual Arrangements and the NATO–EDC resolution.

d) Proposed UK Declaration:

At the London meeting, Mr. Eden said that the UK might be able to say more than this.

The UK Embassy last week left with the Department the following draft of a proposed British Declaration on the EDC:

> "Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been greatly encouraged by the progress made by the Governments of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the German Federal Republic towards agreeing on the establishment of a European Defence Community and they wish once more to make clear after consultation with those governments what their attitude to the Defence Community will be when it is established. Her Majesty's Government do not consider that the establishment of E.D.C. will relieve them of their present commitments in Europe for the maintenance of peace. The defence of Western

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[4] Brackets appear in the source text.

Europe is an enterprise in which the United Kingdom is already a partner by virtue of the Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. Her Majesty's Government believes that the principles laid down in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty are upheld. They thus have an abiding interest in the strength and continuing integrity of the Community and will afford its institutions their cooperation and support. They declare that they would consider any action which threatened the integrity of the Community as a matter of the gravest concern to them calling for consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to agree on measures to meet the situation thus created."

e) Present Status:

Meanwhile we have received information that Maurice Schumann is assuming that your London statement of concern re the integrity of the EDC implies the sanction of withdrawal of American aid from a country that secedes. We have replied that such an assumption is unwarranted and that from a practical angle withholding American aid would be a small deterrent.

A far more serious question is raised by Robert Schuman's recent statement before the Assembly [5] (Paris 5703) [6] that the French Government is pressing the US for more concrete reassurances concerning the integrity of the EDC. We have asked Paris to ascertain whether Schuman has committed the French Government to ask the US for a Senate ratified document containing a guarantee that the US would somehow prevent withdrawal of a member state from EDC.

f) Further Steps:

Should Robert Schuman's statement prove to be more than merely one for the record (we hope that it is nothing more than this), we will have to point out as we did in the case of Maurice Schumann's assumption re the withdrawal of American aid from an offender that the French would be ill-advised to agitate this concept publicly since Congressional reaction to EDC might be unpalatable to the French, based on the logical query, "Do we now have to protect EDC against itself?"

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[5] A handwritten notation in the margin at this point reads "Foreign Affairs Committee".

[6] Not printed. It transmitted that part of the official French communiqué reporting Schuman's remarks to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Assembly (740.5/3–1952).

662A.00/3–3152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, March 31, 1952—5 p. m.

4342. Verbatim text of revised draft.[2]

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[1] Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] In telegram 4341, Mar. 31, from London (662A.00/3–3152), Gifford reported that the revised text of a proposed statement to be made at the time of the signing of the contractual arrangements with Germany would be transmitted in the immediately following telegram. The origins of this proposed Franco-British draft statement, which evolved into the Tripartite Declaration of May 27, 1952, cannot be determined further, but see telegram 5208 to London, Apr. 14, p. 643.

"1. The Govts of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France have today marked the estab of a new relationship between themselves and the FedRep of Germany thru the signature of the convention of general relations and the related conventions. These conventions and the treaties, to which France but not the United States or the United Kingdom are party, for a European defense community and a European coal and steel authority provide a new basis for uniting Europe and for association Ger with the West, whilst ensuring against any future revival of German militarism. They make possible the removal of special restraints hitherto imposed on Ger and permit the participation of the FedRep as an equal partner in Western defense.

"2. These conventions and treaties respond to the desire to provide by united efforts for the prosperity and security of West Europe. The US and UK Govts share that desire and wish to assist in estab and maintaining measures necessary to fulfil it. They will support and cooperate with the Eur institutions estab by these treaties.

"3. Western defense is a common enterprise in which the US and UK Govts are already partners thru their membership in NATO. They have each expressed their resolve to station such forces in Eur as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute their fair share to the joint defense of the North Atlantic area. They thus have each an abiding interest in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the Eur defense community and in the strength and continuing integrity of the community. Accordingly if any action from whatever quarters threatens the continuing integrity and unity of the community the two govts wld consider it a matter of the gravest concern to them calling for consultation under Article IV of the North Atlantic treaty in order to agree the measures to meet the situation thus created.

"Alternative para 3 proposed by the Foreign Office:

"3. Western defense is a common enterprise in which the US and the United Kingdom Govts are already partners thru their membership in NATO. Thus they have each an abiding interest in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the EDC and in the strength and continuing integrity of the community. Accordingly if any action from whatever quarter threatens the continuing integrity and unity of the community the two govts wld consider it a matter of the gravest concern to them calling for consultation under Article IV of the NAT in order to agree the measures to meet the situation thus created. Furthermore they declare their intention to maintain armed forces on the continent of Eur for such time as they deem necessary, having regard to their interest in the integrity of the EDC, their obligations under the NAT, and their special responsibilities in Ger."

GIFFORD

740.5/4–552: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 5, 1952—1 p. m.

6127. Personal for Bruce from MacArthur. Re Deptel 5887, Apr 3 and Embtel 6125.[1] We at SHAPE who have been following EDC developments are increasingly disturbed over tendency on part of EDC Conf to slow down. Sense of urgency in getting on with EDC which was evident between Rome and Lisbon mtgs seems almost entirely lacking. While there are of course very real problems both in Paris and Bonn (which I do not minimize) we have impression that with Fr and Benelux at least, there is tendency on part of members of the govts as well as of the parliaments who have been supporting (or paying lip service) to EDC instinctively to hold back or at most not to press for speedy action in form of signature EDC treaty. When we inquire when we may expect signature Alphand and other members EDC Conf mention target date of "end of April" but without conviction, and indeed when pressed they are frank to say they cannot guarantee any date. They point to slow progress at Bonn (on Ger finan contribution and other problems) on which decisions must be reached before EDC treaty can be completed. Others point to penchant of Benelux to add new subjects for consideration as well as tendency of some EDC participants to try to spell out all details of EDC for years to come to "last nut and bolt". French delegation seems more inclined than ever to keep glancing over its shoulder at French Parliament (particularly at Socialists) and tries to write things into treaty to please Parl or for same reason desires to modify points on which conf agreement has already been reached.

My own view which is shared by our people at SHAPE is that one of key missing components at this juncture is some kind of deadline for EDC Conf to work against similar to Lisbon deadline. If we cannot devise some form of deadline I am apprehensive that target date set by conf which has already slipped from April 6 to "end of April" may continue to slip indefinitely (which wld be disastrous) or at best might slip till some time in late May or June, when subsequent parliamentary action on treaty wld become impossible till next autumn or winter due to summer recesses most Parliaments.

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[1] Neither printed. Telegram 5887 renewed the request initially made in telegram 5728 to Paris, Mar. 25 for an estimate on the probable date that an agreed draft EDC Treaty would be ready for signature by the appropriate governments. Telegram 5887 stated that this information was needed in view of "Secretary's hope attend signing contractual arrangements and EDC treaty" (740.5/3–2652 and 4–352). Telegram 6125 reported that while the EDC conference had cleared up a number of outstanding issues during the past two weeks, still others remained to be resolved. Among those which "stand in way of final signature of treaty" and depended for their settlement "on decisions to be taken outside Paris conf" were (1) the German financial contribution, (2) armaments control, (3) Allied labor battalions, (4) mutual defense guarantees and use of forces, (5) U.S.–U.K. guarantees, and (6) British participation. Among the remaining issues "which are wholly within competence of Paris conf to settle" were (1) territorial organization of the EDF, (2) EDC–NATO relations, (3) length of service, and (4) air and naval forces. It was contemplated that the conference would recess on Apr. 10 for Easter weekend and that thereafter a "few days work after Easter may produce final drafts of treaty and of documents which conf decides must be signed at same time." As in the case of the Schuman Plan, all papers would be initialed by heads of delegations as final conference action (740.5/4–552).

While I may be doing an injustice, I personally believe that a number of parliamentarians in France—and probably other countries—whose parties are more or less committed to support EDC wld welcome such postponement as means of avoiding having to face up to question of German rearmament. At least some members of French Govt believe this to be true and subconsciously this makes them reluctant to press for early and speedy action.

The purpose of this message is to suggest that consideration be given by Dept to devising means of establishing some kind of reasonably firm deadline in early May for both EDC Conf and Bonn. (An EDC deadline is pointless unless there is Bonn deadline since parts of EDC treaty depend on Bonn agreements.) Perhaps Secretary's availability to come to Eur in early or middle May (and perhaps not later) to sign Bonn agreements cld be used to advantage with Adenauer. Perhaps this cld also be woven into some kind of msg from Secretary to Schuman to get latter (as host) to endeavor to establish an EDC deadline. Perhaps msg cld be related to MSA hearings and appropriations.

Foregoing is, I fear, not very helpful but I do believe one of principal missing ingredients which has caused EDC Conf to slow down and demonstrate a diminishing sense of urgency is lack of some real target date or deadline which in itself tends to encourage existing tendency of certain elements to procrastinate. If we cld establish such a deadline and couple this with appropriate but firm pressures to get French, German, Belg, and Dutch (particularly latter) off dead center and moving forward in EDC Conf, we might reverse present slowdown trend and get treaty signed in next four weeks. At same time we wld of course have to exert great efforts at Bonn to reach necessary agreements there just as fast as we possibly can.[3]

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[3] In telegram 6129, Apr. 5, from Paris, MacArthur reported that Dutch Defense Minister Staf had called on General Eisenhower the previous day and had been informed of the importance "of getting ahead with EDC treaty and securing signature by all participants at earliest possible moment." Eisenhower told Staf that "it was futile to attempt to write out in treaty all the implementing details." The treaty should be general in nature, Eisenhower added, leaving details to be determined later and incorporated in some form of annex or agreement. MacArthur stated that Staf agreed "thoroughly" with Eisenhower's views and that his government would support this approach (740.5/4–552). In telegram 6177 from Paris, Apr. 8, MacArthur informed Bruce that he had suggested to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge that while in Paris Lodge should "urge his French political friends to get on with the EDC", and MacArthur added that the Senator had already seen René Pleven and had met with the Franco-American Parliamentary Friendship Group (740.5/4–852). In telegram 6250 of Apr. 10 from Paris, Dunn reported that during the previous week "we have taken every opportunity in talks with EDC conf dels to urge importance of completing treaty and attached docs as quickly as possible" (740.5/4–1052).

740.5/4–952: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 9, 1952—4 p. m.

6197. Subj is European Defense Community.

1. Alphand laid before Steering Comite afternoon April 8 text British qualified acceptance of proposal for mutual defense guarantee between UK and EDC (see Embtel 6154, April 7[2]). He asked Brit observer (Hayter, UK Min Paris) if latter wished to say anything. Hayter said Brit answer spoke for itself. It met conf proposal in being an "automatic" defense commitment, tho it was limited in time. One thing Hayter thought he cld add was that "this is as far as we shall go." There were fruitful fields for cooperation between UK and EDC but everyone shld understand by now that UK cannot and will not join in EDC. Finally, Hayter said his govt was anxious that this def arrangement between it and EDC if agreed, be made public at proper time in proper fashion. He urged therefore that it be communicated to press only in fashion and at time to be decided upon jointly by UK and EDC Conference.

2. Starting round of very cordial little speeches, Van Vredenburch expressed satis at Brit answer, which he thought conf shld fully accept. He said Brit had broken serious conf deadlock. Further, Brit were offering "an engagement which binds not men but states and not for brief but for considerable period of time." For this his govt wld be thankful. In time, perhaps, Van Vredenburch added, we will get similar engagements from others as well. But no need to talk about that now. Now was time to thank UK. De Staercke fully associated his govt with Van Vredenburch's remarks. Lombardo also expressed his gratitude. Italian Government wld study Brit answer soonest. Blank said that when time came to make Brit answer public, effect in FedRep wld be great and favorable in extreme. Brit answer marked milestone in Eur affairs, and Gers duly grateful. Luxembourg ditto. Alphand summed up by saying that without this answer from UK there wld have been no EDC. French Cabinet was taking up UK answer and reaction wld doubtless be favorable. Engagement UK willing to undertake will "contribute to creating necessary bond between UK and the Eur which is aborning."

3. Alphand asked Chairman Juridical Comite to bring Steering Comite up to date on discussion re defense guarantees and EDC–

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it contained the text of the British reply to the EDC conference request for an exchange of automatic mutual security guarantees between the United Kingdom and the EDC. Dunn characterized this reply as "qualified acceptance, with guarantee limited to duration of UK membership in NAT" (740.5/4–752).

NATO relations, which had been suspended pending receipt of Brit reply. Juridical Comite Chairman reported:

(*a*) Agreement on text of protocol embodying EDC defense guarantee to NATO, as reported Embtel 5552, 13 March.[3]

(*b*) Agreement to adopt language closely similar to that of deputies report approved in NATO, concerning:

i) Joint meetings of EDC and NATO Councils of Mins,

ii) Cooperation between NATO and EDC civilian agencies, and

iii) Collaboration between NATO and EDC military agencies.

This agreement reported respectively in paras 5(*c*), (*a*) and (*b*) of Embtel 5559, 13 March[3] (see also Embtels 5497, 11 March[4] and 5498, 11 March.[5]

(*c*) Agreement on provisions to be included in treaty stating that decisions taken at joint mtgs of EDC and NATO Councils will be binding on EDC institutions. This agreement reported Embtel 5554, 13 March.[6]

Steering Comite will resume consideration questions of defense guarantees and EDC–NATO relations this morning.[7]

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[3] Not printed. (740.5/3–1352)

[4] Not printed; it reported the results of a Juridical Committee meeting of Mar. 11 at which the chief German Delegate introduced a revised and extended draft German proposal on EDC–NATO relations (740.5/3–1152).

[5] Not printed; it reported on the discussions in the Juridical Committee of Mar. 11 with respect to the draft German proposal on EDC–NATO relations (740.5/3–1152).

[6] Not printed. (740.5/3–1352)

[7] In telegram 6229 from Paris, Apr. 10, Dunn reported that Alphand and Lombardo, respectively, had informed both the Steering Committee and the *rapporteur* group late on Apr. 9 that the French and Italian Governments had considered and declared themselves highly pleased with the British offer to enter into a system of mutual defense guarantees with the EDC. The British observer, Hayter, was thus informed that the EDC conference was now agreed with the government of the United Kingdom to exchange mutual defense guarantees in the form suggested by the United Kingdom. It was agreed to make the matter public simultaneously in the six capitals involved "some time around Tuesday, Apr. 15" (740.5/4–1052).

662A.00/4–752: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 11, 1952—12:34 p. m.

6022. For Chief of Mission personal from the Secretary.[2]

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[1] Drafted by Calhoun and Laukhuff of GER. Sent also to Bonn, London, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] The origins of this telegram lie in a memorandum dated Apr. 8 from the Secretary to Bruce, Matthews, Perkins, and Lewis in which Acheson stated that three telegrams in that day's log: 6127 from Paris, Apr. 5, p. 636; 2278 from Bonn, summarized in footnote 3, below; and 4478 from London, summarized in footnote 6, below, "add to my growing concern over the lack of progress in completing the EDC arrangements and some of the decisions which have to be taken at Bonn in connection therewith." Acheson added that "we should give this whole matter

Footnote continued on following page.

I am gratified at progress recently made at Bonn in speeding up conclusion contractual negots as result McCloy's efforts (Bonn's 2278,[3] rptd Paris 711, London 605). As time has continued to slip by since Lisbon with slower progress in Paris on EDC treaty and in Bonn on contractuals than we had anticipated, I have become increasingly concerned to find some means of successfully completing these arrangements.

Deptel 2420,[4] rptd London 4999, Paris 5925, expressed the conclusion to which I have more and more come that a deadline for signing must be set and must be met or we shall be faced with the prospect that all our efforts to bring about the EDC and to establish new relationships with Ger will founder. I note similar conclusion reported Paris' 6127,[5] giving MacArthur's and SHAPE's views. I recognize and have weighed carefully the dangers inherent in establishing a deadline as set forth by Roberts of Brit FonOff (London's 4478,[6] rptd Paris 2092, Bonn 479) but am firmly convinced risks involved in not doing so far outweigh them. Probable trend of Ger opinion under pressure of Sov proposals on Ger unity[7] appealing to their natl instincts causes us anxiety. Some EDC countries appear to be increasingly hesitant to take final decision to join with Ger in EDC. In addition, Congressional attitude toward MSA appropriations, which will probably be under full consideration by mid-May, cannot be predicted if real success in uniting Eur defense efforts cannot be reported. Furthermore, this session of Cong will certainly end by Jul 3 at latest, and possibly earlier. If contractuals are not submitted sufficiently far in advance of that date there can be no ratification before 1953, except in the very unlikely event of a brief autumn session of the Cong. Any such delay wld represent a severe check to our plans.

Footnote continued from preceding page.

urgent attention" with the following questions in mind: was it possible to keep the EDC and contractual arrangements linked "if the latter gets hopelessly bogged down"; had careful plans been made for having the Senate consider and approve the German contractuals? "If the Congress is going to get out of Washington by the end of June," Acheson continued, "there will be very little time for hearings and consideration if the signature of these documents drags on until the end of May," and that might well mean that the Senate might not get around to full consideration of the entire EDC matter "until January 1953, with all the delay and uncertainty that that involves" (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, "Memo from S & U–1952").

[3] Dated Apr. 7; for text, see chapter I in volume VII.

[4] Not printed.

[5] Dated Apr. 5, p. 636.

[6] Not printed; Roberts was reported to have stressed the need to secure proper safeguards with respect to the German financial contribution, a "most difficult subject", and to take into account the possible necessity of a "top level tripartite conference" to determine a common position with which "to confront FedRep" on other outstanding issues that might prove difficult to resolve (662A.00/4–752).

[7] For documentation on Soviet notes of Mar. 10 and Apr. 9 proposing a peace treaty with Germany and the establishment of an all-German government, see volume VII.

Will you therefore pls present the fol personal msg from me to the FonMin of the govt to which you are accredited without delay:

Begin message. "at the various mtgs in London and Lisbon last Feb, I was encouraged by the progress made and was led to hope that problems of concluding the treaty for the Eur Defense Community and the various contractual agreements with the Ger FedRep cld be speedily resolved. Since then I have been increasingly concerned by the slow rate of progress, which I believe is gravely imperiling all our plans. I therefore wish to make this appeal to you to join with me and our other colleagues in the countries concerned to make a supreme effort to conclude the various treaties and agreements in time for signature on a definite date in the near future.

"You are, of course, well aware of the risks which delay will cause in Europe. You are perhaps less well aware of certain grave difficulties which will be encountered in the US with respect to Congressional action if there is further delay. The proposed appropriations for Mutual Security Assistance will be under active consideration by the Cong by mid-May at the latest. The Govt will be very hard pressed to present effective arguments for the voting of such appropriations in the absence of a successful conclusion of the efforts being made to establish a Eur Defense Community. Further indefinite promises of progress in this field wld, I fear, be regarded by the Cong as discouraging evidence of inability to achieve a unified defense effort in Europe.

"I also wish to point out that this session of Cong will end at the very latest by Jul 3 and possibly several days earlier. If the contractual agreements with Ger are to be ratified at this session they must, therefore, be laid before the Senate by the middle of May at the very latest. Even this date wld make action by the Senate difficult. If the agreements cannot be completed and submitted to the Senate in time for action at this session they will have to go over until the session which begins in Jan 1953. I do not need to impress upon you the grave jeopardy in which such a lengthy delay wld place the entire Western policy with regard to the common defense and with regard to Ger.

"All of these considerations have persuaded me that there is no alternative but to set for ourselves a specific date now for signing the contractuals and the EDC treaty and such other docs as must be signed simultaneously. I wld hope that we could set May 9 as the date for signing both sets of agreements. I stress the point of signing both sets of agreements, and I believe it is highly important not to [allow?] EDC and the contractual arrangements to be separated chronologically.

"I have given a good deal of thought to the question of the place of signing. The contractual agreements cld, of course, be signed at Bonn, but I question the desirability of having the EDC treaty signed there. Paris has been suggested for the signature of the latter treaty but I consider it wld be unfortunate if the contractual agreements were to be signed in any of the three Western capitals. The signing of the two acts of agreements in different places not only is absurd from the point of view of physical arrangements for moving Ministers back and forth on the same day, or even on successive days, but likewise wld be a regrettable loss of an opportunity which it seems to me we shld grasp to make an impressive and historic ceremony of the simultaneous signing of both sets of agreements. I therefore suggest that we consider selecting The Hague. Prominently associated as it is with ideals of peace, and containing the Peace Palace where the ceremony cld occur, it wld seem to me to be an ideal site.

"Most important, however, in my thinking, is the necessity for setting a date, preferably May 9, and making a public announcement of that fact without delay. This wld, of course, mean that the draft EDC treaty and the contractual conventions wld have to be initialed by the negotiators by Apr 30 at the latest in order to permit final governmental consideration of them before signing. I appreciate that this means renewed and untiring efforts on the part of the negotiators in Paris and Bonn. From the info I have at hand, however, I conclude that with such efforts on the part of the reps of every govt, the remaining points at issue can be settled during Apr. I am instructing the US Reps at Bonn to cooperate to the utmost in achieving the result we aim at and I urge you to similarly instruct your reps at Paris [and/or Bonn]."[8] *End message.*

Paris for MacArthur. Pls inform Gen Eisenhower of above and of my earnest request that he continue his already helpful efforts to speed up negots.

The Hague: Secy went over substance this msg with Stikker in great detail but did not mention Hague as place of signature nor specify May 9 as date. Pls deliver substance to FonOff.[9]

ACHESON

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[8] Brackets appear in the source text.

[9] On Apr. 17, the British Embassy delivered to the Department the text of a message, dated Apr. 16, from Eden to Acheson in which the Foreign Secretary asserted his equally strong desire to hasten as rapidly as possible the conclusion of a treaty establishing the European Defense Community. Eden noted the recent decision by the United Kingdom to guarantee the EDC Treaty and the warm reception that this decision had received by the EDC governments. However, he added that the issue of the German contractuals remained sufficiently difficult and complex as to suggest that the earliest date on which the various documents could be ready for signature would be May 15th or 20th, and in particular, the very important financial provisions must be fully agreed upon. Eden agreed that the German contractuals and the EDC Treaty should be signed at the same time, but argued that Paris was a more appropriate site than Bonn, and stressed again the hope that Acheson would accept mid-May as a more realistic target date. A copy of the text of the Eden message is in file 740.5/4–1652. On Apr. 23, the Belgian Ambassador, Baron Silvercruys, called upon Under Secretary Bruce and left a reply to the Secretary's message of Apr. 11 which stated the Belgian Government's belief that May 9 was too early and that May 20 was a more realistic date, with Paris favored as the site of signing (Memorandum of conversation by R. D. McClelland, Apr. 23, 1952, 740.5/4–2352). In telegram 1146 from The Hague, Apr. 28, Counselor Trimble transmitted the text of the Netherlands Government reply to the Secretary's message which stated that although the Netherlands Government was in complete sympathy with the views expressed by Secretary Acheson, the existence of a considerable number of outstanding problems made it unrealistic to set a specific date for the signing of the necessary documents relating to German contractuals and the EDC (740.5/4–2852).

662A.00/3–3152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 14, 1952—6:42 p. m.

5208. 1. Urtels 4341 [2] and 4342 [3] Mar 31, rptd Paris 2020 and 2021, Bonn 444 and 445. Dept is prepared to approve revised draft statement to be made at time of signature of contractuals with fol modifications:

(*a*) Deletion of "Ger" before "militarism" at end of second sentence Para 1. We believe it desirable to eliminate specific reference to Ger militarism in order to avoid striking unnecessarily sour note at time of signings, and this wld conform with the phrase used in para 6 of the tripartite reply of Mar 25 to Sov note on Ger.

(*b*) Since language in second sentence of original para 3 conforms with Senate res of Apr 1951 on stationing of U.S. forces abroad,[4] we consider it necessary to retain such language in any statement we make. We are prepared, however, to accept language of second part of last sentence of alternative para proposed by FonOff. We have no rpt no objection to placing resulting sentence at end of para. As revised it wld read "Furthermore they have each expressed their resolve to station such forces in Eur as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute their fair share to the joint defense of the North Atlantic area, having regard to their interest in the integrity of the EDC, their obligations under the NAT, and their special responsibilities in Ger".

2. Brit Emb has informed us FonOff reason for suggesting alternative para 3 is that language of last sentence is taken from tripartite security guarantee for FedRep and Berlin agreed with Adenauer at Paris in Nov 1951 (Secto 63 Nov 22 rptd London 837 Bonn 86)[5] and they consider various Allied statements on this subj shld conform as closely as possible to each other. We hope they will be prepared accept formulation in para 1 above for reasons stated, however.

3. We also understand Brit FonOff is of opinion tripartite security guarantee mentioned para 2 above will still be issued at time of signing of contractual conventions. Although there was no discussion of this point at London and Lisbon we have been proceeding on assumption NATO security guarantee to EDC adopted at Lisbon had superseded tripartite guarantee and in fact made latter unnecessary. Believe system of mutual security guarantees being worked out between NATO, EDC and Brussels Pact countries is more than adequate and issuance further tripartite guarantee to FedRep and Berlin wld be not

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[1] Drafted by Calhoun of GPA, cleared by Lewis of GER, Perkins, and Bruce. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; see footnote 2, p. 634.

[3] *Ante*, p. 634.

[4] Regarding the "Great Debate" concerning the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe which resulted in the Senate Resolution of April 1951, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 22.

[5] For text of the communiqué, see *ibid.*, Part 2, p. 1607.

only redundant but confusing. Brit point out Berlin not covered by NATO–EDC guarantee, which is true, but we believe Berlin is adequately protected by N.Y. FonMins tripartite guarantee to FedRep and Berlin[6] as well as language Art 6 of NAT as modified by Greek-Turkish Protocol.[7] In view this difference of opinion request you discuss status tripartite guarantee with respective FonOffs urgently. You shld put forward views outlined above, pointing out that at time tripartite guarantee was agreed at Paris system of mutual NATO–EDC security guarantees had not been worked out. We wld hope UK, Fr and Ger govts will accept our view that additional tripartite guarantee as worked out in Paris no longer necessary.

4. Brit Emb also informs us FonOff considers suggested statement (London's 4342) wld be tripartite. We had assumed it wld be US–UK statement since it deals primarily with bilateral assurances re EDC. This still seems preferable to us but if Brit and Fr FonOffs strongly prefer tripartite statement we wld not insist on this point.[8]

ACHESON

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[6] Documentation on the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at New York, Sept. 12–19, 1950 is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 1108 ff.

[7] The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, signed at London on Oct. 22, 1951 is printed in *NATO: Facts About The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, NATO Information Service, Paris, January 1962, pp. 201–202. Documentation on developments leading to the Protocol is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 460 ff. and 616 ff.

[8] For another draft of the proposed tripartite declaration and the Department's comments on it, see telegrams 6671, Apr. 30, from Paris, and 6494, May 3, to Paris, pp. 645 and 647, respectively.

740.5/4–1852: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, April 18, 1952—5 p. m.

6385. From MacArthur. During his Apr 16 visit to Brussels, Gen Eisenhower devoted his major effort in convs with Belg Cab members and officials to urgency of speeding up work on EDC treaty, using points from Secy's msg Deptel 6022 to Paris.[2] He urged that new issues not be injected into Paris conf this late date, and stressed necessity for signature in early May in his convs with King, PriMin, Def Min, and FonOff officials, saying he understood one of main stumbling blocks was Belg insistence on writing into treaty a specific length of mil service.

Gen Eisenhower urged that Belg not insist on this as a condition for signature. If they did, the length of service in EDC wld most certainly be that of lowest common denominator. He fully agreed EDC must eventually fix an agreed length of mil service but urged that length of service be agreed by EDC council after treaty had entered into effect. Furthermore, Belg might well obtain agreement of EDC conf in Paris that length of service wld be agreed within certain time limit after treaty enters into effect, within a year for example. Even then circumstances might dictate wisdom of providing a temporary exception for few months in case of a particular country if by such an additional period of grace it cld be then brought up to level agreed by other participants.

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[1] Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, Rome, London, and Luxembourg.

[2] Dated Apr. 11, p. 639.

Gen Eisenhower praised Belg Govt very highly for its leadership in going to 24 months service and said he trusted most earnestly they wld not reduce this period until final agreement had been reached by EDC council at some date following entry into effect of treaty.

Our impression is that Gen Eisenhower made progress but that Belgs are not yet ready to go along in EDC conf with solution to length of service similar to that put forward by Gen Eisenhower. However, we have impression that if agrmt is reached on other EDC questions, Belg will probably not hold out on this.[8]

DUNN

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[8] In telegram 6419 from Paris of Apr. 19, Dunn reported that in opening the EDC Steering Committee session the previous day, Alphand had stressed the urgency of the situation in which the conference now found itself, and stated that it was the duty of the conference to push forward to an early conclusion of its work. At Alphand's suggestion, it was agreed that a deadline of May 3 should be established, and that if by that date the treaty was completed but supplementary documents were not, the conference could forward the treaty to the various governments and complete such other documents in the two weeks that would elapse between May 3 and the final Ministers meeting. It was also agreed that the deadline date should not be made public. Alphand then laid before the conference the French proposal on territorial applicability of the EDC Treaty, the principle of which was to restrict the treaty's territorial applicability while (1) taking account of the possible need to station EDC troops or build EDC installations elsewhere than within the EDC territory and (2) to permit member states to recruit men for their EDC contingents from non-European territories under their jurisdiction. The proposal was referred to appropriate committees for early consideration. The Steering Committee then adopted the definitive text of the protocol defining EDC–NATO relations, and commenced an article-by-article review of the treaty draft, accepting without modification a number of articles and approving modification or new texts of several others. (740.5/4–1952)

740.5/4–3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 30, 1952—noon.

6671. Re Embtel 6619, April 28.[2]

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it contained the drafts of two letters proposed by the French Foreign Ministry. One was to Chancellor Adenauer which would transmit the text of the tripartite declaration to the Federal Republic; the other was to the Mayor of Berlin confirming the integrity of Berlin as an essential element of the peace of the free world and pledging the maintenance of French, British, and American armed forces within the territory of Berlin so long as tripartite responsibilities and the world situation required (740.5/4–2852).

1. Fol represents translation of new draft of proposed tripartite declaration prepared by French after mtg with US and reps of Brit Emb. Pls send your comments urgently.

Begin text. Draft tripartite declaration.
The govts of the US of Amer, the UK, and France have today signed with the Ger FedRep agrmts which will establish a new relationship with that country. These agrmts, as well as the treaties for a Eur Def Community and a Eur Coal and Steel Community, of which France is a signatory, provide a new basis for uniting Eur and for associating Ger with the West. They also ensure against any future revival of aggressive militarism. They make possible the removal of special restraints hitherto imposed on the FedRep of Ger and permit its participation as an equal partner in western def.

These conventions and treaties respond to the desire to provide by united efforts for the prosperity and security of Western Eur. The govts of the US and the UK consider that the establishment and development of the two Eur communities correspond to their own basic interests and will therefore lend them every cooperation and support.

Moreover, western def is a common enterprise in which the govts of the US and the UK are already partners through the North Atlantic Treaty Org.

Finally, the three govts recall that the system of reciprocal guarantees established between the member states of the NATO and the member states of the EDC, and between the latter and the UK, applies to the interested countries only as such and as long as they remain parties to one or the other of the treaties creating these orgs.

For these various reasons the govts of the US and UK have, as also has the govt of France, an abiding interest in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the EDC and in the strength and integrity of that community. Accordingly, if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the community, the two govts wld consider the matter of the greatest concern to them, calling for consultation under Art IV of the NAT in order to reach agrmt on measures to meet the situation thus created. Moreover, they have both expressed their resolve to station such forces on the Continent of Eur as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute their fair share to the joint def of the North Atlantic area, having regard to their interests in the integrity of EDC, their obligations under the NAT, and their special responsibilities in Ger. *End text.*

2. Brit reps said Kirkpatrick strongly of opinion, and Brit FonOff inclined to agree, that Chancellor Adenauer wld insist on issuance of unilateral statement on Berlin and Ger, as agreed with him in Nov 1951.[3] Brit view consequently was that language on countries benefiting from system only as long as they are members of two orgs shld be deleted and that appropriate change shld be made in last para.

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[3] **Regarding the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom with Chancellor Adenauer at Paris, Nov. 22, 1951, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, the editorial note on p. 1312.**

French reps took flat position that this was out of question and, after French made very convincing presentation of their point of view, Brit Emb agreed to ask Brit FonOff to reconsider position.

DUNN

740.5/5–152 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 3, 1952—3:55 p. m.

6494. Urtels 6619,[2] rptd London 1825, Bonn 729; 6671,[3] rptd London 1838, Bonn 738; and 6709 May 1,[4] rptd London 1846, Bonn 746.

Fol are our comments on draft declaration quoted your 6671.

1. We consider that declaration shld be issued at time of signing of EDC Treaty rather than contractuals since it deals more directly with former than with latter. If EDC signed on day fol signature of contractuals, this point cld be covered by deletion of "today" from first sentence of declaration.

2. Use of words "agrmts" and "conventions" is inconsistent. We wld favor use of latter but do not feel strongly on this point.

3. Word "possible" shld be inserted in second sentence, para 2, so it wld read "lend them every possible cooperation and support".

4. We still prefer deletion Fr language of penultimate para and will only accept it if Brit agree and Fr continue to insist on it. We wonder what "convincing" arguments were which you refer to in Para 2 of Embtel 6671. Re para 3 urtel 6709, if this para retained, agree to deletion "as such and".

5. Re para 3 urtel 6709 we strongly prefer retention "their fair share". Accept modification to read "defense of the area of the North Atlantic Treaty". As pointed out in earlier tels, this specific sentence derives from Senate res on US forces abroad and we consider it highly important to keep language from that res.

6. Request that order of phrases in second half of last sentence of declaration quoted urtel 6671 be changed so as to read "having regard

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[1] Drafted by Calhoun of GPA. Cleared by Lewis of GER, Raymond of L/GER, Bruce, Parsons of EUR, and Acheson. A handwritten notation at the bottom of the source text reads: "approved Acheson". Repeated to Bonn, London, and Berlin.

[2] Summarized in footnote 2, *supra*.

[3] *Supra*.

[4] Not printed; it reported that the British representative to the tripartite drafting committee was still without instructions from the Foreign Office about the maintenance of a unilateral security guarantee for Germany which the French continued to oppose as depriving the contemplated U.S.–U.K. declaration of most of its political purpose and appeal. The matter had been referred to Eden, and the drafting committee would resume its meeting as soon as Eden's decision was obtained. Meantime, some further work had been done on amending the draft declaration as it stood (740.5/5–152).

to their obligs under the NAT, their interest in the integrity of EDC, and their special responsibilities in Ger". Purpose of change is to put phrases in logical order of scope and importance.

7. We have greatest difficulty with interrelated problems of status of NY guarantee of Sept 1950 and Paris guarantee of Nov 1951 (not published). An important consideration in our minds is question of necessity for Senate action. After careful study I have come to firm conclusion that new system of interlocking guarantees among NATO, EDC and Brussels Pact countries affords adequate guarantees for security of FedRep. NY declaration was given to Adenauer at his request at a time when it was not contemplated that FedRep wld be party to EDC and thus guaranteed both by NATO and EDC countries. Thus when NATO-EDC-Brussels Pact arrangements come into effect FedRep will be protected on as favorable a basis as other Eur countries and I believe this is all Adenauer can reasonably ask.

Berlin, although in a somewhat different position since it is not covered by specific territorial guarantees from the NATO, EDC, and Brussels Pact countries, is protected under Art VI of the NAT by the presence of US, UK and Fr forces there. This fact coupled with language of tripartite declaration re maintaining US-UK forces on Continent of Eur, constitutes best guarantee we can give Berlin. Recognizing the special situation in that city however we are prepared to reaffirm in the tripartite declaration our support and protection for Berlin. I propose therefore that fol two paras be placed at end of declaration and ltrs to Adenauer and Reuter (urtel 6619) be eliminated:

> "The three Powers consider that the new arrangements for mutual security guarantees among the Parties to the NAT, the Parties to the Brussels Pact and the Members of the EDC supersede the assurances contained in the declaration of the three FonMins at NY on Sept 19, 1950.
>
> "The integrity and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three Powers there are regarded by the three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present internatl situation. Accordingly they reaffirm that they will treat any attack against their forces in Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves under Art VI of the NAT".

This procedure will of course require consultation with Adenauer and Reuter. I therefore urge that tripartite agreement be reached rapidly in Paris on text of declaration and that HICOMers be requested to discuss problem with them. In addition to points discussed above it shld be stressed that we agreed to Nov 1951 security guarantee at time when mutual NATO-EDC-Brussels Pact guarantees were not worked out, that FedRep is now as well guaranteed as other Eur countries and that unnecessary duplication of guarantees shld be avoided. Moreover Nov 1951 agreement wld require Senate consent before coming into effect. We are not at all confident that such consent cld be obtained since this guarantee wld duplicate other guarantees already given or being given and furthermore is unlimited as to time (as compared with NAT which is limited by terms of arts 12 and 13). If the Senate refused consent or attached a reservation, the entire package of contractuals—EDC–NATO protocol might be delayed indefinitely.

For foregoing reasons request that Brit and Fr, and subsequently Adenauer and Reuter be strongly urged to accept arrangement outlined above. From viewpoint US Govt I doubt that any other course is now possible and I believe that tripartite declaration satisfactorily meets Fr desires for assurance re integrity of EDC and Ger desires for security guarantees.[5]

ACHESON

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[5] Further drafting sessions at Paris produced yet another draft tripartite declaration along the lines suggested in telegram 6494 to Paris. This draft tripartite declaration was transmitted to the Department in telegram 6817 from Paris, May 5 (740.5/5–552). The Department responded in telegram 2959 to Bonn, May 6, insisting on the retention of various phrases and paragraphs designed to delimit carefully the extension of U.S. commitments and simplify the declaration of U.S. intent in Berlin in order to ensure Senate approval, and instructing the Office of the High Commissioner to discuss this matter with both Adenauer and Mayor Reuter in concert with French and British officials (662A.00/5–652). Further discussions at Paris and Bonn produced a further redraft of the tripartite declaration contained in telegram 7111 from Paris, May 16, p. 660.

740.5/5–352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

PARIS, May 3, 1952—5 p. m.

6775. From MacArthur. Following is my résumé of Adenauer–Eisenhower conversation at Bonn yesterday. I did not take notes but think fol is reasonably accurate summary.

Gen Eisenhower opened saying he had not wished to leave Europe[2] without coming to Bonn to pay farewell visit to Adenauer and also to have talk with him about European problems. Adenauer expressed deep appreciation for Eisenhower's visit, particularly, in view of latter's heavy schedule.

Gen Eisenhower then said he wld like to expound few of his views on Europe. He believed we are on threshold of developments of historic importance whereby Eur will move steadily toward unification, with Ger being integrated into European community on basis of full equality but also equal responsibility. Signature of EDC and contractuals in May is essential as first step toward process of European federation. Hopes and expectations have been built up which shld not be blasted by procrastination or delay. Delay in signature will not win any new supporters to EDC or contractuals and will only be exploited by opponents to create confusion and increase opposition to both agreements and to Eur federation. In addition to dangerous effect delay wld have in Eur, it wld also create very bad reaction in US. US has invested billions of dollars in trying first to reestablish Europe's war-torn economy and second to assist in building up adequate Eur defensive strength. Conviction in US is Eur can be viable only if it makes maximum collective use of its individual capabilities. EDC is a positive and constructive step in this process and its signature and entry into effect wld, in Gen Eisenhower's view, do much toward assuring US continued interest and desire to aid Eur reach point where it is viable in both econ and security fields. Eisenhower believed completion of contractuals and EDC leading eventually to econ and polit federation was only way in sight by which Eur over period of coming years cld raise and maintain necessary minimum security forces and at same time hold out hope for improved living standards. These were essential points in maintenance of peace.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn.

[2] Regarding General Eisenhower's request to be relieved as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, on Apr. 2, see the editorial note, p. 297.

Gen Eisenhower then said at heart of problem is question of understanding between France and Germany. Each must concentrate not only on its own problems but endeavor to assist other in reaching sound understanding. He had spent much time in pressing these views on France and he thought France had come long way in past year in facing up to problems. They were trying to be realistic. At same time they had serious problems with parliamentary and public opinion based on historic experience with Ger. He recognized West Ger Govt had similar problems. But in desire to solve individual problems neither France nor Ger shld complicate overall and essential objective of a real Franco-Ger *entente*.

Chancellor Adenauer said he agreed with Gen Eisenhower. It was essential EDC and contractuals be signed and he was confident signature cld be achieved about May 20. Delay wld be fatal. He then said he was going to tell Gen Eisenhower something which might startle him. He had just received results of public opinion poll on contractual agreements in West Ger which covered about three thousand Germans of different walks of life. 82% of those polled did not even know what contractuals were about. This despite fact there had been good deal about them in Ger press. This was indicative of a sort of mental apathy on part of Ger people—a lack of awareness and interest. It was essential public opinion everywhere, and particularly in Ger, know what was going on. He felt when EDC and contractuals cld be made public, there wld be something concrete to put before public opinion. On other hand, picture was not as dark as public opinion poll indicated. On April 30, he had addressed meeting of 12,000 Germans, 9,000 of which were workers. He had set forth his views on new role envisaged for Ger and he had detected no opposition and indeed approval of his program. He, therefore, believed when more info cld be made public, it wld be possible to develop healthy interest in Germany's position and its new role in international affairs.

Adenauer felt there wld be more approval in Ger EDC than contractuals. Some rather serious difficulties had developed within his coalition Govt on contractuals which coincided with but were in no way related to Gen Eisenhower's trip. Two members of coalition indicated publicly and in press they were not in agreement with envisaged contractual arrangements. This was unfortunate development but he hoped to be able to solve it.

Referring to Gen Eisenhower's view that Franco-Ger relations were at heart of problem of Eur, Adenauer fully agreed. He said Germans had endeavored develop a program of exchange visits between people of different walks of life in France and Ger, particularly youth workers, intellectuals, etc. French did not seem anxious proceed in this direction. He did not believe this was necessarily policy of French govt but perhaps a question of French governmental red tape, etc. However, anything Gen Eisenhower might be able to say to encourage such a program so that peoples of the two countries can get to know each other better wld be most helpful.

Gen Eisenhower asked for Adenauer's views re effect of Soviet notes [3] on Ger opinion. Adenauer did not believe Sov efforts to inject question of Ger unification as means of preventing Germany's integration with West wld succeed. People in East Ger were submitted to Commie regime that was twice as bad as Nazi regime, because it was even more oppressive and had an oriental quality of cruelty. Neutralism in Eastern Ger was not an issue. He had had reliable reports that Pastor Niemoller had been very poorly received when he had recently visited East Ger to preach his neutralist doctrine. East Germans, he believed, wld rather continue their present fate than risk possibility of having all Ger united under Sov regime. He believed best hope for eventual Ger unification was if West Ger were first integrated solidly with west.

In conclusion, Adenauer said he wished to express his own appreciation and that of his people for the enlightened and constructive policy which US had carried out with respect to Europe and particularly Germany.

Dunn

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[3] See footnote 7, p. 640.

740.5/5–352 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 3, 1952—1 : 23 p. m.

6490. In terms action listed below, pls bring to attn appropriate officials fol US proposals for program designed to save time in bringing about effective and logical correlation signing EDC, contractuals and NATO protocol. In doing so emphasize that while US is not member of EDC conference, we believe coordinated action is necessary and wld welcome initiative on part other countries, particularly Fr and FedRep as only countries participating both in contractuals and EDC. US recommendations are as follows:

1. *Place and sequence of signature of EDC and contractuals:* In spite of our previous suggestions on this subject, we now believe that best course is signature first of contractuals at Bonn followed immed by signature EDC treaty and NATO protocol in Paris. Decision will require reversal of present Ger position favoring Hague for combined ceremony and a return to their original view. Unless this reversal will create difficulties for Adenauer's coalition, signature of contractuals at Bonn will have long term significance in development of Ger Policy, particularly if Adenauer can be prominently identified with Paris ceremony for EDC and NATO protocol.

In proposing that signature of contractuals precede EDC, we consider this sequence wld provide maximum public impact. Signature of contractuals wld signify termination of a situation in Ger arising out of the past, to be followed by EDC which inaugurates a new era in WE affairs which in turn wld be recognized by NATO action. Tripartite declaration cld be issued as communiqué after signature treaty.

2. *NATO protocol and NATO–EDC relations:* Immed fol signature of EDC treaty Paris we propose public session NATO Council Paris to sign protocol which was conditionally approved in draft form in Lisbon. We hope that Fr will agree that Adenauer shld be invited as observer to this public ceremony. Representation on Council wld consist of mins in Paris for EDC ceremony and mins of any other NAT members desiring to attend or their permanent reps. Previously, Permanent Council will have examined treaty as initialed, noted any changes, taken any *pro forma* action required. Possible that EDC cld be signed at noon and protocol in late afternoon, although for practical reasons signature of protocol may be postponed to fol day.

US hopes that Secy and Eden will be invited to attend EDC signature as observers as a demonstration US–UK view of importance of treaty. EDC conference may wish to decide whether other mins shld be invited.

3. *NATO Council meeting:* We consider that it wld be helpful to utilize presence of numerous mins in Paris at this time to hold regular session NAC on morning fol public session for signature protocol. This session of Council wld consist only FonMins or permanent reps and wld be devoted solely to brief exchange views on polit ques-

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[1] Drafted by Williamson, cleared by Calhoun and Perkins, and with Bruce and Secretary Acheson. Sent also to Bonn and London; repeated to Moscow.

tions during which Secy wld be willing to report on our negots with Spain, Ismay cld report on internatl staff, and Council informed of current exchange of notes with Sovs on Ger. It wld be necessary to devise and control an agenda appropriate for discussions of this type which do not require presence of large dels. Such a mtg wld not only meet idea that Council shld meet three or four times a year, but wld satisfy budding desire in many quarters that mtg be held this summer and enable postponement of full fledged Council mtg until fall when basic discussions and decisions will be required.

4. *Conversations with FonMins:* Inevitable that number of FonMins present in Paris will desire discussions with Secy on specific subjects. Also desirable that Secy raise subjs with other FonMins either on bilateral or tripartite basis. For example, Stikker will wish to discuss again his worries concerning OEEC and EPU. We will doubtless wish to raise certain questions such as Tunisia, Trieste, and US negots with Spain. Issue of Saar may be injected into discussions either in Bonn or Paris.

5. *Timing:* On assumption agreement will be reached, which is present basis for planning, Secy cld arrive in Bonn on day before signature of contractuals, sign fol day, and proceed to Paris for dual purpose of attending EDC signing and NATO mtg. Exact dates cannot be set at this time but hope that min mtg can be held on May 12 (Paris 6718, May 2)[2] or before in order that all necessary action can be taken to permit signatures of the agreements in an uninterrupted fashion. In order that our arrangements can be made, we hope that unfinished business can be completed as soon as possible.

We consider that foregoing program for signature wld have great public impact and we assume Fr Govt wld take necessary steps to provide proper setting for this historic occasion. In addition we believe agreements shld be related, both officially and in public mind. Program wld be a demonstration of Western solidarity of particular importance fol despatch proposed tripartite note to Sovs on Ger around May 10 which stresses will to Eur integration. Success of program, however, depends on Eur agreement as soon as possible on all points in related negots.

Action required

a. On basis Secy's recent personal msg and info contained in Paris 6718, May 2, pls utilize every appropriate opportunity to urge that conference complete its work soonest in order that necessary govt action may be taken and exact dates set for signing of three agreements.

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[2] Not printed; it reported that the delegations to the EDC conference's Steering Committee "seem to have accepted initialing of treaty cannot take place until May 5 or 6" and that the Italian Delegation would ask the conference to fix another definite date, to be made public, within a day. It added that Alphand and Blank believed that the Dutch could be prevailed upon to initial the treaty even before the results of the Bonn talks on the German financial contribution and security controls had been concluded, but both men were anxious to write the results of the Bonn discussions into the treaty before the Ministers met and that in any case a Ministers meeting "is out of question" until the results of the Bonn talks were known. In private discussions, "all delegations have told us they wld be willing to continue in contact between initialing and Mins mtg to reduce issue(s) outstanding" (740.5/5-252).

b. Ascertain whether Fr and Gers, as chief participating countries in both agreements, agree that contractuals shld be signed in Bonn, followed immed by signature of EDC in Paris? Dunn and McCloy shld consult with these govts with suggestion they might arrive at joint position. Other EDC countries shld then be consulted by Fr and Gers.

c. Is it desire of EDC conference that Secy and Eden and perhaps other non-EDC NATO FonMins shld attend signature of treaty as observers? If so, Alphand shld be reminded that formal invitation wld be desirable, to be extended perhaps by Fr as host govt on behalf of conference. Secy will accept such invitation if Eden is willing to attend.

d. Ismay shld be consulted by Draper to assure that all necessary steps are taken to permit signature of NATO protocol as scheduled above. Contents this telegram concerning NAC as appropriate shld be communicated to Ismay, suggesting it might be discussed in Permanent Council. If NAC ministerial meeting agreed, particular reference shld be made to agenda for proposed meeting urging that it be short and confined to genl exchange of views on polit questions. Assume Ismay will ascertain whether non-EDC FonMins wld attend NAC.

e. Paris shld ascertain whether Fr wld object to Adenauer's attendance as observer at public session NAC. If no objection, Pearson wld have to extend formal invitation.

f. Missions shld advise Dept immed what problems might be brought up for private discussions by FonMins with Secy, bearing in mind that list shld be kept at minimum and consist only of key questions of pressing importance. Ref para 4 above, Paris and London pls report Fr and Brit views concerning possible tripartite session.

g. Text of this telegram being discussed with Canad Emb here so that Pearson may be fully informed.

ACHESON

740.5/5–1152 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, May 11, 1952—1 p. m.

6966. Re Embtel 6958, May 10.[2] With initialing of EDC treaty,[3] bearish comment on prospects of its ratification, which has been recently noticeable in official circles, is being reflected in press. Some of it is bitterly cynical with implications EDC is being forced upon a reluctant France by a US interested only in rearming Ger.

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it summarized press comment on initialing of European Defense Treaty, observing *inter alia* that emphasis "lies for most part on difficulties which lie ahead, particularly in its ratification by national parliaments" (740.5/5–1052).

[3] Acheson was briefed by Jessup on the afternoon of May 9, and told that while the initialing of the EDC Treaty would be that day, the date of the EDC Ministers meeting had not yet been set because the question of the German financial contribution remained outstanding, and if it remained so, it might be necessary for the Secretary to go to Bonn for discussions. Jessup then asked whether Acheson agreed "that regardless of whether it began to appear that the signing dates were

Maurice Schumann and Alphand have told us privately that a majority for ratification cld not be obtained in the Assembly at this time, that it is not planned to submit treaty to Assembly before October and that final action is not anticipated until after US elections. Harvey states Robert Schuman has spoken to him along similar lines. We have heard suggestions that chances of French ratification wld be better if treaty were presented immediately after signature in present relatively calm political atmosphere and with maximum US influence added to momentum of signature. On this question however, Robert Schuman is presumably best judge.

We have been concentrating until now on obtaining early signature and will continue to do so until treaty has been signed. Once it has been, we wld hope change from present pessimistic tone wld set in in view of greater difficulty of repudiating treaty concluded on French initiative.

There is no point at this time in trying to count noses other than in broadest terms. At same time we shld recognize and seek to deal with various adverse factors affecting French opinion. These factors cut across party lines. Unless they are satisfactorily dealt with there may well be not only Socialist hostility (Embtel 6872, May 7,)[4] but also abstentions or negative votes from members of govt parties in numbers sufficient to prevent ratification.

These factors are numerous and varied. There is basic one of reluctance to take plunge into supernational experiment with relinquishment of national army and national [garble] of defense. There is almost equally basic Fr reluctance to see Germany rearmed under any circumstance which is motivated behind many other adverse arguments. There is fear of Ger preponderance in EDC accentuated by Indochina situation[5] which prevents French from unfolding its maximum potential in EDC. There is desire to postpone day of decision both from practical point of view of wishing to maintain as long as

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slipping later and later, we should still keep pressure on the EDC conference to complete their work as soon as possible. The Secretary emphatically agreed with this and said that there should be no cessation of activity until agreement was reached." Later in the briefing, Acheson noted Lester Pearson's stated interest in holding a North Atlantic Council meeting in conjunction with the signing ceremonies specifically in order "to get into some kind of TCC discussion." Acheson "believed that this was a mistake, however, and that preparation for such discussion might cause some confusion between Mr. Harriman's staff and Defense". (740.5/5–952) Documentation on the Temporary Council Committee is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 272 ff., and pp. 203 ff. herein.

[4] Not printed; it reported that Mollet had called on Pleven on May 2 and had indicated that the trend in the Socialist Party was moving against the EDC Treaty in its present form (740.5/5–752).

[5] Documentation on Indochina is presented in volume XIII.

possible Fr lead over Germany in receipt of US end item aid and from visionary feeling that need for decision might be avoided through East-West agreement on Ger unification. There is fear that resurgent isolationism might bring US withdrawal from Eur. Finally there is inevitable public and parliamentary preoccupation with domestic problems and inertia toward foreign experiments, at present reflected here in relative indifference of Pinay toward foreign affairs which makes it questionable that he wld personally make an all-out fight for ratification.

Some of the foregoing factors may change before fall. Fact of signature will help, as will degree of British association with EDC which British now appear willing to accept, and Anglo-American declaration. Maurice Schumann states that while it is difficult to foretell how that declaration will be received by parliamentarians, FonOff considers it all that cld be expected.

It is clear that French ratification cannot be taken for granted and that Schumann will need maximum help from British and US. Even now there is some tendency to regard EDC not as French initiative supported by US but as something forced upon France by US pressure. Problem is of course one for French Govt to convince Fr Public and parliament that this French project is preferable to any visible alternative. Possibilities of recreation of Wehrmacht with full American support or American withdrawal from Europe are of course far less attractive to French but they must make up their own minds as to relative prospects of any of these courses without any action by us which they cld interpret as threats or pressure.

DUNN

740.5/5–1252 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, May 12, 1952—7:25 p. m.

941. 1. Re Paris tel 6968 May 11 [2] and subj to qualification in para 2 below, request all recipients this tel support at every opportunity

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[1] Drafted by Parsons of RA, cleared with Perkins, Lewis, Jessup, and Bruce. Sent to Brussels, Ottawa, Copenhagen, Paris for Dunn and Draper, and to Rome, The Hague, Oslo, Lisbon, London, Athens, Ankara, Luxembourg, Reykjavik, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported that the heads of the EDC conference delegations were all agreed that the earliest feasible date for the EDC Ministers meeting was May 19, that Eden apparently could not get away from London earlier than May 24 and De Gasperi could not be in Paris before May 26, and that therefore, the "most feasible schedule" would be one in which the contractuals would be signed in Bonn, May 24, and the EDC Treaty and EDC–NATO protocols signed in Paris on May 26. It added that Ismay, "Canadians, Norwegians and British have pressed Draper strongly to give non-EDC NATO countries up to two weeks after final EDC treaty is available to consult their govts before signing EDC–NATO protocol" (740.5/5–1152).

timetable for Contractual–EDC–NATO Protocol finalization set forth paras 1 and 2. Agree most important not to let slip May 19 date for EDC Mins mtg. Rome pls express great appreciation special arrangements made by De Gasperi at most awkward time for him.

2. Pending results of mtgs and negotiations taking place this week Paris and Bonn and in view of various questions involved in visit by Secy to Strasbourg during Council of Mins mtg, we do not wish to make any commitment now re his willingness to go there. If in end some issues do have to go to mins before Contractuals can be signed, it may be preferable urge tripartite talks Paris 21st and quadripartite 22nd. Additional advantage wld be to allow one more day before deadline of 24th is reached (*a*) for govt approval final text of Contractuals as fixed by mins, and (*b*) for tech work of engrossing documents for signature. (In referring here to tripartite talks we mean any talks which may be needed to reach common position before seeing Adenauer rather than talks on gen subjs envisaged para 4 Deptel to Paris 6490 May 3,[3] rptd Bonn 2913, London 5676. Latter talks cld be fitted in at time which proves mutually most convenient.)

3. Re para 3 reftel, we hope non-EDC NATO countries will not take too legalistic view of Lisbon res (C9–D/19[4]) and insist on close scrutiny entire text and annexes. In effect, they approved gen principles at Lisbon. In our view primary interest of NATO countries is in Protocols on relations EDC to NATO and on EDC guarantee to NATO. They shld already be familiar with these in view of NAC consideration at Lisbon and recently. If they were to have two weeks from May 21 to study EDC Treaty before signing NATO Protocol it wld prevent signature of EDC and NATO Protocol as one package with Sec present and make impossible Senate ratification NATO Protocol this session. We believe EDC and NATO members understand and share our view of importance ratification of Contractual and NATO Protocol by Congress this session.

4. Fail understand why Brit have pressed Draper give non-EDC countries two weeks to study final text of Treaty especially as Brit Amb submitted to us May 10 proposed schedule which differs from this. London pls clarify Brit position. In our view four days shld be ample for non-EDC countries to review limited number changes in text which may result from EDC Mins mtg. They will of course already have had from May 13 to 21st to review text as initialled.

5. In later tel will advise Sec's itinerary and dates.

6. For Paris Only. There are two aspects of this timetable which we find disturbing. Reftel indicates four principals wld be in Strasbourg thru 24th and yet Contractual signatures are to take place that day in Bonn. We are not clear as to just what Schuman, Eden and

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[3] *Ante*, p. 652.

[4] Dated Feb. 22, p. 252.

Adenauer have to do in Strasbourg 24th or which days before that they have to be there. Do any of these mins have to arrive 21st, which was impression given us some time ago? Wld be helpful to have soonest confirmation in some detail of Council of Mins schedule with indication which days Eden, Schuman and Adenauer must be there.

Our more serious worry arises from possibility Secy might have to leave here before knowing whether EDC Mins mtg had resolved all difficulties or resulted in impasse. It is awkward enough to contemplate possibility Secy may have to leave before all difficulties re Contractuals have been resolved but we are most nervous about his being committed to trip before we know if EDC problems are settled and signature assured. In view of this wld appreciate if Dunn cld explore with EDC Dels to see if any possibility mins mtg might conclude May 20th.[5]

ACHESON

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[5] In telegram 7035 from Paris, May 14, Dunn reported *inter alia* that at a meeting of the EDC conference Steering Committee on May 13, Alphand had outlined in some detail the timetable for finalizing the EDC Treaty and related agreements while stressing the importance to the United States of holding to such a schedule. All delegations accepted May 19 as the date for the EDC Ministers meeting which would carry through, if necessary, to May 21. "He commented that he hoped contractuals might be signed at Bonn May 24 or 25 and that EDC treaty cld be signed in Paris May 26 or 27" (740.5/5–1452).

740.5/5–1252

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1952.

Although the EDC treaty was initialled Friday, reservations have been placed by the Dutch, Germans and French on certain articles which must be resolved at the forthcoming meeting of EDC ministers.[2]

I. *Dutch reservations:*

(*a*) Recruitment in territories of member states (ex Art 10, Sect. 2): Agreement has been reached by all except Dutch on German proposal to include provision against recruitment in member states. German labor service units are temporary exception to be handled in special agreement in exact language used at Bonn. When queried on reasons for Dutch delegation's objections, neither Stikker nor Stuyt, Foreign Office EDC expert knew the answer.

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[1] Drafted by Barnard of RA. Copies to Bruce, Matthews, Jessup, Lewis, and Martin of RA. The source text bears the handwritten notation "Sec[retary of State] saw."

[2] Reference is to the meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the European Defense Community which met at Paris, May 19–21 and reconvened at Strasbourg on May 23. See the editorial note, p. 618.

(*b*) Weighted voting in the Council (ex Art 55): Dutch are opposed to inclusion of German support costs in calculation voting strength in Council. Stikker, however, said on May 9 that Dutch cabinet would probably agree to signing of treaty without awaiting settlement of German contribution issue.

(*c*) Stationing EDC troops outside Europe (ex Art 117): Dutch feel they should have right to specify where Dutch nationals can not be assigned. Stikker, however, has agreed to the validity of the argument that the EDC should not tie its hands in this respect. We have joined the British in pressing the above point but wish to avoid touching Dutch sensitivity to alleged "ganging up" of the major powers.

(*d*) Duration of the treaty (ex Art 118): Dutch wish to tie EDC treaty to life of NATO and probably will make reservation at time of signing that Netherlands will be bound by EDC as long as UK guarantee is in force but that should the latter be withdrawn then Netherlands would have the right to withdraw from EDC. (The UK guarantee is for as long as "the UK is a party to NAT".)

II. *German reservations:*

(*a*) Vote by which EDC Council will call for joint meeting with NATO Council: The Germans have taken the position that any single country should be able to call such a meeting, while the French insist that the EDC Council be empowered to call joint meetings with NATO only by unanimous agreement. Ex Art 56 is being held up pending resolution of this issue. It has been removed from consideration in ex Art 13.

(*b*) Subsequent treaties to be entered into by member states (ex Art 113 quinquies): The Germans have proposed that these should be submitted to the Commissariat for approval, but the Dutch and the Belgians consider this proposal too broad.

III. *French reservations:*

(*a*) Recruitment and maintenance of national forces required for international missions (ex Art 10, Sect 4): The French fear creation of a German national staff under this provision and may reopen question at ministerial meeting.

(*b*) Nomination of Officers (ex Art 39): The French military are reported to consider the present provisions impractical and may reopen this question.

IV. *Reservations by all:*

(*a*) Common pay scale (new Art. 99)
(*b*) Definition of prohibited armaments (ex Art. 100, Annex 2)
(*c*) Seat of institutions (ex Art. 110)
(*d*) Official language (ex Art. 111)
(*e*) Auxiliary languages (Mil. Protocol, Chapter V)

George W. Perkins

740.5/5–1252 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Canada [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 13, 1952—7:16 p. m.

285. Following para excerpted from Draper's report [2] of conversation with Stikker at the Hague re outstanding EDC problems.

"Stikker reiterated likely course of action by Dutch re reservation concerning settlement question Ger contribution. In reply my question he said Dutch not concerned about poss their underwriting Ger rearmament in event Ger contrib shld be insufficient to cover cost as well as that of support allied forces but rather that total might not be sufficient to permit Brit with their fon exchange problem to continue maintaining existing UK forces in Ger if their share support costs appreciably reduced. In other words he was concerned there shld in fact be a net addition to strength of Eur forces and not merely substitution Ger unit for Brit. He said he had talked question over with Pearson who appeared favorable to proposal whereby Canada wld furnish econ aid to UK to make up for poss reduction support costs. Such solution according to Pearson might well be favorably received by Canad Parl which Stikker (*sic*) wld prefer extending econ aid to indef maintenance Canad troops in Ger. I expressed view that problem wld take care of itself, and Stikker feels that this might well be case."

Dept wld appreciate Emb's comments on views attributed by Stikker to Pearson as Dept has had no intimation (*a*) Canada giving any consideration to revising position re econ aid taken fol TCC recommendation or (*b*) that any feeling existed Canad troops shld be recalled from Eur near future. Dept assumes you wld agree neither point shld be raised with Canads this time.[3]

ACHESON

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[1] Drafted by Raynor of BNA. Repeated to Paris for Draper and to The Hague.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

[3] In telegram 1221 from The Hague, May 15, Ambassador Chapin reported *inter alia* that the Dutch Cabinet had given Stikker authorization to sign the EDC Treaty on the assumption that agreement would be reached either before or during the EDC Ministerial talks on issues still outstanding. In advising American officials of this decision, Hendrik Boon, Secretary General of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, said that in addition to the points of concern mentioned by Stikker to Draper, a new difficulty had arisen with respect to pension provisions. However, Boon felt certain that this issue could also be resolved in the Ministerial talks and "Therefore as far as Dutch concerned there was 'plain sailing' ahead as regards signature EDC" (740.5/5–1552).

740.5/5–1652 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, May 16, 1952—7 p. m.

7111. Fol is new redraft tripartite declaration as discussed in our immediately preceding tel.[2]

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Should read "our immediately following tel" as telegram 7110 concerns

Begin Text. The Govts of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France have signed conventions with the German Federal Republic which will establish a new relationship with that country. These conventions, as well as the treaties for a European defense community and a European coal and steel community, of which France is a signatory, provide a new basis for uniting Europe and for the realization of Germany's partnership in the European community. They are designed to prevent the resurgence of former tensions and conflicts among the free nations of Europe and against any future revival of aggressive militarism. They make possible the removal of the special restraints hitherto imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany and permit its participation as an equal partner in Western defense.

These conventions and treaties respond to the desire to provide by united efforts for the prosperity and security of Western Europe. The Govts of the US and the United Kingdom consider that the establishment and development of these institutions of the European community correspond to their own interests and will therefore lend them every possible cooperation and support.

Moreover, Western defense is a common enterprise in which the Govts of the US and the United Kingdom are already partners through membership of the North Atlantic Treaty organization.

These bonds are now strengthened by the system of reciprocal guarantees agreed to between the member states of the European Defense Community, between these member states and the United Kingdom and also between these member states and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty organization.

For these various reasons, including the fact that these new guarantees will apply to the states concerned only as members of one or the other of these organizations, the govts of the US and the United Kingdom have an abiding interest, as has the Govt of France, in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the European Defense Community and in the strength and integrity of that community. Accordingly, if any action from whatever quarter were to threaten the integrity or unity of the community, the two govts would consider the matter of the greatest concern to them, calling for consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to agree on measures to meet the situation thus created. Moreover, they have each expressed their resolve to station such forces on the continent of Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as they deem necessary and appropriate to contribute to the joint defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area,

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another subject. Telegram 7112 from Paris, May 16, reported that the final text of the tripartite declaration "as agreed today subject to Dept's agreement" on several points was being dispatched in the immediately preceding telegram. The several points that remained at issue dealt with wording on commitment to the maintenance of armed forces on the continent and the precise language with respect to financial burden sharing with respect to such forces (740.5/5-1652).

having regard to their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, their interest in the integrity of the European Defense Community, and their special responsibilities in Germany.

The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by the three powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. They reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves. They will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it.

These new security guarantees supersede the assurances contained in the declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the US, and France at New York on September 19, 1950.[3]

DUNN

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[3] In telegram 7148 from Paris, May 19, Dunn reported that Eden's unavailability over the previous week had postponed until that moment final agreement on the tripartite declaration. The agreed declaration now read as it did in the source text with one modification. The penultimate paragraph now read: "The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the three powers there are regarded by the three powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin so long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves" (740.5/5–1952). The text of the Sept. 19, 1950, guarantee is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 1296.

740.5/5–1952 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, May 19, 1952—9 p. m.

7162. In giving us French concurrence regarding tripartite declaration (Embtel 7148,[2] repeated Bonn 865, London 2009) Foreign Office official stated that while text had been approved by Schuman, declaration as well as all EDC texts would come up for Cabinet approval in about two days and official French concurrence would technically only be obtained at that meeting; although he had no reason to believe that "final" concurrence would not be forthcoming in due course.

Foreign Office is somewhat disturbed by story in today's *France-Soir*, datelined London, to the effect that "US–UK guarantee envisages only 'consultation' in event EDC Treaty is broken". Article says "text will be disappointment for those who hoped to obtain solid US–UK guarantee against attempt by Germany to recreate an independent army" and attributed absence of such "solid" guarantee to impossibility of obtaining US Congressional approval.

Obviously, only that part of declaration has leaked to press which is susceptible of such unfavorable interpretation. Foreign Office intends to furnish brief explanatory comment to selected journalists, pointing out that declaration will also express determination of US and UK to maintain troops on Continent, which is the point on which National Assembly had laid stress and which, in fact, it had defined as the essence of desired "guarantee".

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Summarized in footnote 3, *supra*.

DUNN

740.5/5-2052 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, May 20, 1952—1 p. m.

7169. Late last evening Maurice Schumann informed me that discussion of EDC in restricted French Cabinet mtg yesterday had not gone well at all. Pleven was only Minister giving Robert Schuman real support. There was considerable sentiment for postponing signature of EDC treaty and contractual agreements. It was decided to take question to full Cabinet mtg on Wed. Until then Schuman is not authorized to sign.

Schuman and Pleven had a particularly difficult time on question of assistance France was receiving from other NATO nations to carry out effort in Indochina and at same time to be in a position to contribute defense production and forces in Europe. Cabinet wished to postpone beginning German production until size of cutbacks of present French production program were known.

Maurice Schumann said he believed Cabinet after very difficult discussion wld give Schuman authority to sign but he cld not be certain until Wed. One thing I found disturbing in his account was apparent extent to which Pinay and other Cabinet members considered EDC as complicating factor in domestic program. We hear from various sources that Schuman is having difficult time in Cabinet allegedly for following "too liberal" policy in Tunis. Believe it more probable that opposition to him arises primarily from his views on EDC and Ger problem as whole with Tunis merely an excuse.

DUNN

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

740.5/5-2052 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 20, 1952—9 : 02 a. m.

3256. Fol highlights EDC Mins mtg Paris May 19-20[2] as reported by telecon to Dept:

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[1] Drafted by Barnard of RA. Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, London, Paris, and Luxembourg.

[2] See editorial note, p. 618.

1) *Signing Date:* Owing to scheduled Van Zeeland and Stikker speeches at Council of Eur on May 26, EDC Treaty and EDC and NATO protocols cannot be signed until Tues May 27.

2) *Ger Fin Contribution:* All Mins agreed with Stikker that they shld have opportunity discuss and reach decisions basis latest drafts of Contractuals. Question re Ger Fin contribution therefore placed end of agenda.

3) *Labor Battalions:* Agreement reached that nothing shld be mentioned in treaty itself this subj but that Bonn agreement on phasing out labor battalions in Ger be placed in special protocol.

4) *Natl Forces for Internatl Missions:* Schuman wanted limitation to UN type missions; Hallstein said NATO might require special contingents. Agreement being reached on language to meet Schuman point that, if NATO wanted contingents for any purpose, it shld request EDC and not natl govts to furnish them.

5) *Voting Rights:* Schuman argued that consideration be given now to principle underlying computation of voting rights and that mins shld not wait for Bonn decisions re Ger Fin contributions. Problem postponed to end of agenda.

6) *Seat of Institutions:* Hallstein requested decision be postponed until after ratification EDC treaty by FedRep. Probably will be taken up in June mtg EDC Mins when they plan discuss implications of Eden proposal RE Council of Eur and EDC and Schuman Plan.

7) *Ratification:* Hallstein said his govt determined carry thru debate on EDC before Parl vacation. Stikker says Dutch ratification impossible before Dec at earliest.

8) *Language:* (*a*) Interim org to consider languages to be used by Institutions of the Community. Official languages will probably be same as those being considered by Coal and Steel Community; i.e. Fr, Ger, Ital and Dutch. (*b*) Auxiliary language EDF; to be decided by unanimous vote of Council, it being understood that language will be English but with flexibility to permit others to be used. Reason for this provision was that all agreed English was desirable auxiliary language for EDF but that it wld be difficult to present to the EDC parls a text which required use of a language other than that of the six countries. (*c*) Official text of treaty will be in Fr but with authenstic official translations in all other EDC languages. In case of discrepancies Fr will govern.

9) *Stationing EDF Outside Eur as Defined Art 6 NAT:* Mins decided firmly against permitting EDF to be sent out of area defined Art 6 NAT. Stikker stated he did not wish EDF to go anywhere where they were not covered by UK and NATO guarantees. Van Zeeland said he wld agree to enlarge area in which EDF can be stationed to whole area covered in Art 6 NAT. Altho Stikker maintained that under Van Zeeland suggestion EDF cld be stationed in an area not

covered by UK guarantee to EDC, he said he wld think it over. Mins decided to reconsider Van Zeeland suggestion and also, at Schuman's urging, to reconsider whether EDF schools and training centers might not by unanimous decision EDC Council be installed outside Art 6 area.

10) *Duration of Treaty:* Dutch ultimatum to effect that unless other countries agree by tomorrow that EDC treaty is only for 17 years; i.e. identical in time with NAT, or that Dutch at least can pull out at that time, Dutch will not sign. Schuman, Taviani, and Hallstein, particularly the latter, insisted on 50 year duration. Schuman and Hallstein offered compromise along lines that, in case of NATO change in membership, EDC states wld consult. Stikker found this unacceptable and said he had firm instrs not to sign treaty unless Dutch wld be free to withdraw whenever US or UK defense guarantee no longer in force. Question, he said, was whether it was desired to have Netherlands as member EDC on this condition or to conclude EDC treaty without Dutch participation.

11) *Ger Unification:* Schuman said many Fr Parliamentarians wondered how Ger unification wld affect both EDC and Schuman Plan, but discussion brief and no conclusions reached.

12) *EDC Council Vote on Joint mtg with NAT Council;* Fr agreed joint mtg of two Councils can be called by majority vote in EDC Council.

ACHESON

740.5/5–2152

The Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary Eden [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1952.

DEAR ANTHONY: A most critical situation has arisen in the EDC negotiations as you have been informed by reason of the impasse between the Dutch view and that of the other five nations regarding the duration of the treaty. The Dutch insist that they must have the right of withdrawing at any time when your guarantee to EDC should cease and since your guarantee lasts only as long as you are a member of NATO they wish these two periods to be coextensive in time. The other five nations with some qualification on the part of Belgium insist that the EDC treaty last for fifty years. During today's meeting Schuman proposed the following compromise: "The present treaty is concluded for a period of fifty years from the date of its entry into force. In the event that the North Atlantic Treaty should cease to be in effect before the expiration of the present treaty then the States shall consult together and agree on measures to be taken."

From what we know of the situation it seems to us that the attitude of the majority countries, especially France, Germany and Italy, is very deep-seated on this matter. They believe that if the treaty has a short duration it will prejudice the whole movement toward unity in Western Europe and will undermine the creation of sound and lasting institutions for EDC. I have great sympathy with this point of view. It seems to me that from a realistic point of view Schuman's proposal goes a long way to meet the Dutch difficulty. The difference between his proposal and the Dutch attitude is only that the latter insist upon the clear legal right to withdraw from EDC on certain eventualities, regardless of the views of others. In reality it seems to us that if a development occurred as serious as the withdrawal of either UK or the US from NATO under Article 13 the other countries would have to reconsider their situation and that in effect they would have to reach a meeting of minds on their future course. This is true because the actualities of international affairs rest less on the possession of naked legal rights than on the maintenance of real unanimity of view among the contracting parties that their basic interests are protected by the contract.

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 6901 to Paris, May 21, with instructions to deliver to Eden "before he leaves for Strasbourg" (740.5/5–2152). Eden was presumably en route to the resumption of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the European Defense Community. See editorial note, p. 618.

We are sending a message pressing this view on Stikker and the Dutch Government [2] but I believe that you can have the greatest influence upon them. I send this message to urge that you use this influence to help resolve the crisis so that we can conclude the agreements in the next few days. If we do not, I am very much afraid that a series of developments will occur, complicated by our correspondence with Moscow, which may result in this opportunity slipping from our grasp. Among the consequences would be the most untoward effects upon the consideration now being given by Congress to new appropriations for our Mutual Aid Program.

I am delaying my own departure until the situation becomes a little more clear. I am of course willing to run risks in order to achieve results. I do not want to land in Europe just in time to find that we are all faced with a most insoluble dilemma resulting from possible agreement on the contractuals and a deadlock on the EDC.

With warm regards,[3] DEAN

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[2] *Infra.*

[3] On May 22, Sir Christopher Steel, British Minister in the United States, left with Assistant Secretary Perkins a personal message from Eden to Acheson, a copy of a telegram from Eden to the Foreign Office reporting on the just concluded conversations with French officials, and a copy of a message from the Foreign Office to Eden reporting on conversations between Chancellor Adenauer and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick in Bonn, none printed. In his brief message to Acheson, Eden stated that he was on the point of departure for Strasbourg and would do his best there to convince Stikker to give way. He also briefly reported on his conversations with French officials stating that the reason why the French Cabinet refused to approve the EDC Treaty to date was the alleged hardening of German attitudes concerning the status of French forces in Germany to June 1953. Eden concluded by urging Acheson to come to Europe immediately as the tangle of problems surrounding the EDC Treaty and German contractuals could not be unraveled until the two men met with Schuman and perhaps Adenauer as well (662A.00/5-2252).

740.5/5–2152

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Stikker [1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1952.

DEAR DIRK: From our past conversations, I know the importance which you and your Government attach to the view regarding the duration of the EDC treaty which you have so consistently advocated. We have not expressed any views on this discussion because of our confident belief and hope that the nations directly involved would be able to work out an acceptable solution of the problem. It now appears that this has not been done and the resulting crisis gravely threatens the whole defense edifice which all of us are trying to create in Europe as well as the great movement toward European unification which these treaties will forward. No one has contributed more to these accomplishments than yourself. You also know the situation in the US so well that I need only mention the adverse effect that a setback at this time would have on US support for Europe.

I am sending this message only because of this critical situation, because of the vast importance which we, in common with the other countries concerned, attach to the success of these efforts, and because I know I can rely upon your friendship to receive this message in the spirit in which it is sent.

The purpose of this message is to urge that you and your Government consider once more whether something along the line of the proposal which Mr. Schuman made today does not go a long way to meet your problems. As I understand it, his proposal was to include in the EDC treaty something about as follows:

"The present treaty is concluded for a period of fifty years from the date of its entry into force. In the event that the NAT should cease to be in effect before the expiration of the present treaty, member states shall consult together and agree on measures to be taken."

I understand that some such provision would be acceptable to the other five states. The difference between this proposal and your posi-

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 690, to Paris, May 21, repeated to The Hague, with instructions to deliver to Stikker at Strasbourg "by quickest possible means. In any event Achilles should take it with him when he goes there Thursday". At the same time that Acheson drafted and transmitted the source text, he also drafted and sent telegram 1512 to The Hague which reads: "Next following tel to Strasbourg via Paris contains personal message from me to Stikker. Please deliver copy immediately to Prime Minister informing him it was sent after I had consulted with the President. Remind him of the tremendous importance which the American Congress and the American people attach to the successful conclusion of the contractual relations with Germany and the EDC, not only for the immediate accomplishments involved, but because of the great effect on the movement toward unity in Western Europe. You should also tell him that Congress is now considering new appropriations for the Mutual Aid Program and that a set-

Footnote continued on following page.

tion is that your position maintains the clear legal right of the Netherlands to withdraw from the EDC should the British end their guarantee to the EDC states, which would occur in the event that under Article 13 of NAT they withdraw from the obligations of that treaty.

The legal difference is, of course, clear. But I wish to urge upon you that the essence of the two situations is not really different. The actualities of international affairs do not depend upon naked, legal rights. They rest upon maintaining between the contracting parties the conviction that the contract will continue to preserve their basic interests. This in many situations which you and I could mention leads to modification of the contracts between states when that is necessary to continue that result.

I believe that, if any change in the international situation as far reaching as the withdrawal of the UK should take place, member states would be forced to do what the Schuman proposal requires: That is, to re-examine their position and to reach conclusions which would be satisfactory to all of them. In no other way could any institution so vital to the security of all six be continued.

Therefore, it seems to me that, while the Schuman proposal does not provide for the legal right of withdrawal which you desire, it does recognize the situation which you have insisted upon: That is, that the change in NATO which I have mentioned would require a review of EDC and a new meeting of the minds on what steps are necessary to meet it.

I hope that you will be willing to give these thoughts careful consideration, and I know that you will do all in your power to aid in solving the impasse which firm adherence to the two attitudes mentioned above would produce.

Since I know that you have been acting under instructions from your Government, I am asking Ambassador Chapin to bring this message to the attention of Prime Minister.

With warm regards,

DEAN

Footnote continued from preceding page.

back in the present developments in Europe would, we fear, come pretty close to terminating the interest of the Congress in the Mutual Security Program" (740.5/5-2152). On the same day, Acheson submitted a memorandum to the President enclosing the source text. The memorandum reads: "You will recall that I called you last night regarding the difficulty with the Dutch over the question of duration of the European Defense Community Treaty. I am attaching a copy of the message which I sent to Mr. Stikker on this matter. A copy of this message was also delivered to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands who was told that the message had been sent after consultation with you. I will appreciate confirmation of the verbal authorization you gave me last night to send this message." A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "Approved 5/22/52 Harry S. Truman" (740.5/5-2252).

740.5/5-2152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, May 21, 1952—8:13 p. m.

3285. Fol are highlights EDC Mins mtg May 21 at Paris as reported by telecon to Dept:

1) *Length of Service:* Van Zeeland stated that Belgians attach greatest importance to uniformity of lgth of service. However, he requested that second para be added to special protocol on lgth of service which wld say that member states wld reach agreement soon as possible and at latest in three months. Without above para, Van Zeeland said, ratification in Belgium wld be extremely difficult and govt cld not hold in service present classes which will have completed 18 months at end of July. With above para political situ inside Belgium cld be maintained until EDC had taken its decision. He said frankly that if above text not accepted he wld have to consult Cabinet and was not sure of obtaining authorization to sign. Even if he was authorized to sign, he wld have to make a declaration on necessity of bringing into effect provisions of protocol in very brief delay. If Belgium request not accepted it might be necessary for Belgium to delay Parliamentary ratification until inter-governmental agreement reached. He stated that until treaty ratified, Belgium wld maintain its entire liberty to modify by itself duration of service. Schuman stated that Fr Parl wld have to approve lgth of service change and it wld be difficult for Fr Govt to make a commitment on final solution. Hallstein agreed with Van Zeeland amendment. Experts will study this question tomorrow but mins will probably have to take up on Fri.

2) *Nomination of Officers:* Art 30—Member states can choose whether commissions will be granted and promotions made by Commissariat on recommendation of mil echelons of Community, after consultation with natl authorities on recommendation of Commissariat. This does not apply to gen officers, who are appointed by Council.

3) *Article 10:* Generally agreed so that there can be natl forces for internatl missions limited to those assumed in Berlin, Austria or as a result of UN decisions. At completion of these missions these units will be either dissolved or put at disposal of EDC. In case where an internatl mission is conferred on a member state outside territory defined in Art 119 para 1, a fraction of natl contingents necessary for this mission can be provided by Commissariat with agreement of SHAPE and a two-thirds majority approval of EDC Council. Contingents thus detached from community cease to belong to Community until completion of their mission. Under this provision natl con-

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[1] Drafted by Barnard; sent also to Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Paris, and Luxembourg.

tingents in being can, with approval of EDC, be released to meet aggression outside Eur at request of UN.

4) *Duration of Treaty:* Stikker reported that Neth had not changed position and asked if other Dels had any remarks to make. Alphand (sitting for Schuman, who had gone to Cabinet meeting) replied that Schuman was requesting instrs from Cabinet but that Schuman attached great importance to Neth and of course Belg being members of EDC. Without Benelux difficult to envisage an EDC. On other hand, Schuman simply did not see how it wld be possible to accept Dutch reservation which wld place permanence of EDC in peril. Hallstein stated he completely approved Alphand's statement of Schuman views. Taviani stated it will be impossible for Ital Parl to accept Dutch reservation. No further discussion.

5) Stikker then reported in view of opinions of all other dels on Article 119 he cld accept that EDF forces cld be sent into all territories covered by Art 6 of NAT and not just Eur territory covered by Brit guarantee. He stated he cld make this concession because he was convinced that in case in question all members of EDC and not just Neth wld act only after consultation and close contact with UK.

6) *Subsequent treaties:* (Art 120) Hallstein agreed to drop Ger proposal that Commissariat be empowered to make recommendations on draft internatl agreements of each country if they affected EDC. Mins however agreed that implications of proposal for a common foreign policy of six states was an objective which must be kept in mind for future and wld be an essential part of any federation.

7) *Weighted Voting in Council (Art 42 and 42 bis):* Until end of build-up period in 1954, voting rights will be calculated arbitrarily as fol—Fr (3), Ger (3), Ital (3), Belg (2), Neth (2), Luxem (1). After 1954 voting rights will be based on average of forces and finances effectively contributed to EDC as now set forth in May 9 treaty draft.

8) Fr Cabinet mtg today inconclusive re giving Schuman authority to sign EDC. Chief problem that of rights and privileges Fr troops in Ger up to June 30, 1953. Gers once agreed that logistical support provisions applying to Fr in Ger till June 30, 1953, wld be those of Bonn convention on rights and obligations, which apply to US and UK and not those of EDC status convention. Recently Gers reneged on this agreement in Bonn, and they remained adamant at this evenings meetings in Paris.

On other hand, Fr till now seemed anxious to have Bonn convention apply to them only with respect to logistical support provisions; they seemed content to be covered in jurisdictional and taxation matters by EDC status convention. We were told tonight that Fr this afternoon insisted that on these matters also they must come under Bonn and not under EDC convention. It is not entirely clear just what Fr position now is. But if it is as described above on jurisdictional matter, then it is new and promises good deal of trouble. Fr and Ger conversations in Paris today on this point went very badly. Fr and Ger experts now say they cannot reach agreement and say question shld go back to Bonn and if necessary to mins.

9) Steering Comite will meet beginning 11:30 tomorrow morning to do necessary redrafting on Art 119, convention on EDC tax regime, text on official language and translations of treaty and Art 42 on voting rights. Status convention will also be considered by Steering Comite. Technical comites will also meet to consider Van Zeeland amendment on lgth of service protocol and question of EDC schools outside territory defined in Art 6 of NAT.

10) Ref para 4 above compromise proposed by Schuman but rejected by Stikker was as fol: "The present treaty is concluded for a period of 50 years from the date of its entry into force. In the event that the North Atlantic Treaty shld cease to be in effect before the expiration of the present treaty, the member states shall consult together and agree on measures to be taken".

ACHESON

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, "Memcons w/ Pres, 1952"

Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 22, 1952.

Item 2. The Present Situation regarding the EDC and the Contractual Negotiations.[1]

I went over the principal matters still unresolved leading up to asking the President's advice or instruction as to whether I should take off some time today for Europe. I reported to him the letter from Mr. Eden urging that I go.[2]

The President was strongly of the opinion that I should go. He recognized the hazards of failure but in his judgment these were more than balanced by the greatly increased possibilities of success if I should go. He said that he was most anxious to see me off, both for the personal satisfaction which this gave him and because he thought it had important effects abroad as a visual demonstration of his support of my mission. Since he and Mrs. Truman are going to the theatre this evening, he would not be able to see us off at 10 o'clock. He suggested an 8-o'clock departure with everyone arriving at the field at 7:45 p. m. This has since been confirmed.

I also went over with the President the situation regarding the

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[1] This item was one of five taken up with the President this day by the Secretary of State, the others being Korean negotiations, support for Senator Benton in his dispute with Senator McCarthy, Bolivian recognition, and approval of the message to the Dutch Government, p. 667. Copies of this memorandum were sent to Jessup, Riddleberger, Perkins, Armstrong, and Bruce.

[2] See footnote 3, p. 666.

Intelligence Agencies and their concern at dropping from Article 6 guarantee against prosecution of Germans who cooperated with the Allies. I told him that we were doing all we could to get the best possible result but that I thought Mr. McCloy was in a most difficult situation and I did not believe that we should jeopardize conclusion of the whole arrangements by insisting on this point, if I believed that it could not be obtained.

The President agreed with this and said that he would support my judgment in the matter.[3]

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

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[3] The President's approval of Acheson's suggestion that he leave immediately for Europe led to a series of hasty telephone calls from Bonbright to the British and Canadian Embassies informing them of the Secretary's plans. In speaking to Bernard Burrows, Counselor of the British Embassy, Bonbright "referred to the message from Mr. Eden this morning urging the Secretary to come and I therefore asked Mr. Burrows to get word to Mr. Eden in Strasbourg as quickly as he could that the Secretary was complying with his request. He said he would do so." Bonbright also telephoned the Embassy in France about the Secretary's imminent arrival and asked that Achilles then in Strasbourg be informed and instructed to pass the information to Eden, Stikker, and Schuman, "with particular emphasis on the first two in view of their expressed wish that the Secretary arrive as soon as possible" (Memoranda of telephone conversations by Bonbright, May 22, 662A.00/5–2252).

740.5/5–2252: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT THE HAGUE, May 22, 1952—1 p. m.

1259. 1. As today is legal holiday in Netherlands and PriMin is in countryside electioneering I therefore delivered to Boon SecGen FonOff copy Secretary's message to Stikker.[2] Boon said when I arrived that he supposed I had come to talk about EDC and message to Stikker but added that he had not yet obtained text from Strasbourg. I then handed him copy of message and made representations along lines Dept's 1512 May 21[3] together with some development Secretary's arguments in letter itself.

2. Boon showed considerable annoyance, not at US, for he remarked he could well understand how and why Secretary felt such a message was necessary in present situation. He did however, lash out at Germany, Italy and particularly France and Schuman stating that France sinking in its power as European leader was attempting compensate its weakness which derived from domestic political instability and ineptitude by trying to regain its leadership by writing it in for 50 years in EDC treaty. He repeated well-known argument that Dutch were somewhat tired of being blamed for being "bad boy" in not wholeheartedly embracing EDC when no recriminations were apparently

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] Dated May 21, p. 667.

[3] Quoted in footnote 1, *ibid.*

addressed to Denmark and Norway also small countries which had not joined. Netherlands had made really substantial concessions all along the line and interest of Dutch people in EDC was growing continually. While he appreciated difficulty French, German and Italian Govts in obtaining ratification of treaty he could not see why they should object to simple reservation on Dutch part regarding possible NATO termination.

3. Boon said Dutch were convinced that Fr still regarded the Atlantic Pact as "ephemeral" and that once treaty signed and ratified French wld insist upon very letter of law and no changes, however reasonable, which might be put forward by smaller nations would be accepted by French if they did not coincide completely with French policy. It was for this reason that Dutch had been so adamant from beginning with regard to right to withdraw shld NATO expire. In this connection he appreciated arguments brought forward by Secretary in his letter to Stikker but said Schuman had many times indicated that he felt phrase "consult together and agree on measures to be taken" meant merely a gesture permitting "consideration" of any matters raised by smaller powers but in no way implied any possibility of permitting them to leave EDC short of 50 years.

4. Although Dutch position might appear legalistic such legal language had been insisted on by Drees and Lieftinck because of French attitude. (Boon mentioned in this connection that these two men were not interested in continuing in office after Dutch elections and would not therefore be much moved by personal consideration that they might be blamed if aid program were stopped or seriously reduced.) Stikker he said was not in position alter his stand without further instructions from Cabinet which not scheduled meet until May 26.

5. Boon asserted entire difficulty with regard to duration of EDC treaty stems back to US unwillingness conclude North Atlantic Pact for longer than 20 year period. He said therefore and I quote his exact words which I read back to him: "It would be very important if the present US Govt (and he realized that with elections pending in US no firm commitment could be made) could give some indication of a desire at an early appropriate time to consult with other members of NATO for an extension of term of North Atlantic Pact." He believed this would have very important effect on hold-out members of Netherlands Cabinet. Even if such a declaration could not be made public but were only in form of a confidential message to Dutch Govt Boon believed it would be very helpful.

6. Along these lines Boon said Dutch Govt was itself sincerely desirous finding solution to impasse and has, as I wld recall, put forward several suggestions. Dutch Delegation under instructions wld probably bring forward at Strasbourg in next day or two a proposal

for resolution of the six EDC powers that they would use their influence to bring about consultations to consider extension of duration of Atlantic Pact beyond the 20 years originally concluded. He believed such a resolution wld certainly be acceptable to all since everyone in West Europe desired an extension of that pact.[4]

CHAPIN

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[4] In telegram 146 from Strasbourg, May 22, Consul George D. Andrews reported that he had delivered the Secretary's message to Stikker at 12:30 p. m. and that Achilles would see Stikker later in the afternoon (740.5/5–2352). In telegram 147 from Strasbourg, May 22, Achilles informed the Department that Stikker had told him that he was "under rigid Cabinet instructions reaffirmed yesterday" but nevertheless anxious to find a solution to the duration problem. Achilles added that Stikker saw two possible lines of progress, the combination of which would help materially. One was that the United States make clear its concept of NATO as a permanent institution rather than of only 17 years duration, the second was if the treaty provision clearly required not merely consultation but agreement. This, Stikker claimed, should go a considerable ways toward meeting the position of the Netherlands Government and Achilles promised to "follow this up with Fr here and in Paris." He closed with the report that British officials had informed him that Eden "fully agrees Secretary's position and will work on Stikker this evening" (740.5/5–2252).

740.5/5–2352 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT STRASBOURG, May 23, 1952—9 a. m.

149. From Achilles. After evening with Stikker Eden is optimistic that duration problem is near solution along lines indicated Contel 147.[2] He also feels question largely academic but that Stikker needs help in getting PriMin and Cabinet approval.

Fr text of Schuman proposal uses merely words "se concerter". While Eden [feels] addition of words "and agree" cuts both ways, he is seeking Schuman's agreement to add them.

On UK view as to permanence of NAT, Eden told Stikker he had repeatedly stated publicly that HMG regarded Atlantic Association as a permanent thing in broadest sense rather than from narrow legal or military point of view. He reiterated that treaty itself makes clear intention of parties that it continue indefinitely although any state might withdraw after twenty years.

Stikker wants merely some reassurance along this line from UK and US, not necessarily public statements. Eden has asked London's authorization to give him letter to this effect provided US will do same. He is unprepared to do so unless we will give similar reassurance because of recent domestic criticism of HMG for going beyond

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, and The Hague.
[2] Summarized in footnote 4, *supra*.

US in giving guarantee to EDC. Dixon and I are working on language which will be transmitted soonest.[3]

DUNN

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[3] In telegram 7286 from Paris, May 24, Dunn reported that the French Cabinet had met twice the day before "in what I gather were stormy sessions on question authorizing signature of EDC. Late last night they gave what Maurice Schumann calls 'reluctant assent' to signature on condition that Robert Schuman shld obtain strengthening of tripartite declaration to contain more precise US and UK guarantees against Ger secession from EDC." Dunn added that appropriate instructions had been sent to Schuman at Bonn and that this had been fully reported to the Secretary who had also arrived at Bonn (740.5/5–2452).

Editorial Note

In anticipation of Secretary Acheson's participation in the signing ceremonies at Bonn and Paris, a Steering Group had been established in the Department of State early in May to draft negotiating papers, statements, and proposals for use by the Secretary and his party in the expected round of conversations that would accompany the signing of the Contractual Relations and the EDC Treaty. In fact, the Group remained in being drafting papers through June 9 as it became entrusted not only with those topics which the Secretary anticipated before his departure but also those which required further thought or action as a result of his conversations in Europe in late May. In all, 53 papers were drafted, some of which superseded others. They were given the designation "SCEM D" with the subtitle "Signing Ceremonies in Europe", and covered a broad range of topics including Tangier, Egypt, Indochina, the Secretary's Statements at Bonn and Paris, the President's Statement to the Senate of the United States (on EDC and Contractual Relations), EDC Guarantees, and EDC Protocol, etc. Although these papers are divided into six general subgroups (SCEM D–1 through SCEM D–6), there seems to have been no effort made to correlate subgroupings with topical divisions. A file of the SCEM D documents is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 109 and CF 110.

The Secretary took a small party with him to Europe including Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George Perkins, and Helen Kirkpatrick, Public Affairs Officer in the Bureau of European Affairs.

Prior to his departure, the Secretary had been advised by McCloy that Adenauer would wish to discuss a number of topics with him, including an Israeli financial settlement, the financial aspects of the proposed German defense contribution, general military and economic assistance to the Federal Republic, and a general exchange of views on United States foreign policy (telegram 2855 from Bonn, May 15: Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108). Acheson arrived at Bonn on

May 23 and met that afternoon with French Foreign Minister Schuman. Acheson then met with McCloy and his staff and General Mathewson and Cecil Lyon from Berlin for a briefing session. This meeting is summarized in telegram Actel 3, from Bonn, May 24, which was not declassified in time for publication.

On May 24, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France held tripartite sessions at 2: 30 p. m. and 10: 30 p. m. devoted exclusively to contractual relations. Quadripartite meetings including Chancellor Adenauer were held at 4: 45 p. m. on May 24 and at 10: 30 a. m. on May 25. During the course of the first quadripartite meeting, the Chancellor stressed the "difficulties which would arise in Federal Republic and other West European countries if EDC treaty did not go promptly into effect" and he added that the Government of the Federal Republic intended to secure ratification by the Bundestag by the end of July. The second quadripartite meeting devoted some time to a discussion of the powers of the proposed EDC commissariat to intervene in logistical support matters prior to June 30, 1953. The tripartite meetings were reported on in telegrams 3049 and 3053 from Bonn, May 25. The quadripartite meetings were reported on in telegrams 3050 and 3062 from Bonn, May 25. For documentation on these meetings, see volume VII, chapter I.

Acheson also held separate talks with French and German officials on May 24 and 25. The Secretary paid a call on President Heuss at 6: 45 p. m. on May 24. It was termed "brief and formal but characterized by an atmosphere of great cordiality." A memorandum of conversation between Acheson and President Heuss is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108. On the morning of May 25, Acheson and Chancellor Adenauer met to discuss problems relating to Israeli and Jewish claims. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to the Department in telegram 3059 from Bonn, May 25, printed in volume VII. On the evening of May 25, following a dinner given by Chancellor Adenauer, Acheson, McCloy, Jessup, Perkins, Reber, and Battle met with Hervé Alphand and Con D. W. O'Neill, Political Director to the British High Commissioner for Germany for further talks on the EDC. A copy of the memorandum of meeting is in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108. It was reported on in telegram 3065 from Bonn, May 26, summarized in footnote 3, page 682. Further quadripartite conversations took place on the morning of May 26 leading to those agreements about which Secretary Acheson informed President Truman in his message on May 26, page 680.

Following signature of the Bonn Agreements on May 26, Acheson and his party departed for Paris where on the evening of May 26 discussions were held with United Kingdom officials headed by Foreign Secretary Eden. Among the broad range of topics discussed were rubber, the Tripartite Declaration, the Saar, Israeli financial claims, the

Soviet note of May 24, Spain, Trieste, Korea, and Tunis. On May 27, Acheson lunched with Schuman and met with various United States officials in Europe to discuss the Ambassadors' meeting in London. On the morning of May 28, a tripartite meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France was held to discuss Indochina, the Soviet note, and Berlin and reparations. Later that morning Acheson met with Eden to discuss Trieste, Japan, and Korea before lunching with Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi. That afternoon, the Secretary met with French officials to discuss North Africa, economic aid, and "French attitudes re Communists". Acheson also met briefly with President Auriol. The records of Acheson's meetings in Paris are in minutes, designated SCEM MIN 1 through SCEM MIN 4, and telegrams (7346, 7387, 7397, 7398, 7404, 7405, 7407, 7408, 7432, and 7449) all of which are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108.

The principals' own recollections of the signing ceremonies in Europe and the discussions surrounding them may be found in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pages 643–650 and Eden, *Full Circle*, pages 46–47. Adenauer's recollections place the signings in their broader context. See his *Memoirs*, pages 400–428.

740.5/5–2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BONN, May 24, 1952—1 p. m.

3038. From Secretary for Bruce and Matthews. Before scheduled trip meeting[1] Schuman requested private session attended by three ministers and three HICOMers. He reported French Cabinet principal objection to authorizing signature was unsatisfactory nature US–UK guarantees in trip declaration. He accordingly proposed following modifications in fifth paragraph Doc SCEM D–2/7:[2] In last sentence replace "as they deem necessary and appropriate" by "as are necessary and appropriate". Insert additional sentence reading as follows: "If the existence and the security of this community should be threatened by the action which one of its members might take to withdraw from its obligations, these forces would be augmented by the two governments in such a way as to safeguard the requirements of the common defense".

Eden and I rejected both changes out of hand refusing even to discuss them. I then read from draft President's message Congress paragraph beginning bottom page two running top page three Doc

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[1] Reference is presumably to the first scheduled tripartite meeting at Bonn at 2:30 p. m. on May 24. See editorial note, *supra*.

[2] Tripartite Declaration to be issued at the signing of the EDC Treaty. See editorial note, *supra*.

SCEM D–1/5A.[3] Eden stated this extraordinarily strong declaration. Schuman inquired whether it could be inserted in trip declaration. I said it could not and that its very importance lay in the fact that it was US statement of its own conviction of its own interests. Schuman asked if he could send text to Paris. I refused saying we could not afford to have any risk of text leak out putting President in position of making statement which he had been forced to make under French pressure.

I agreed Schuman might telephone general idea to Paris without having text. We will meet with him again shortly. My concern is that in view of this situation that the paragraph of President's message referred to and particularly penultimate sentence of that paragraph should not be changed. Please take this up urgently with President.[4]

ACHESON

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[3] Draft Message of the President to the Senate of the United States. See editorial note, *supra*.

[4] In telegram 3359 to Bonn, May 24, Bruce informed Acheson that he had "just talked on telephone to President at Annapolis. Read him pertinent paragraphs of message referred to your telegram 3038 of May 24 and particularly stressed penultimate sentence, requesting his assent to no later change in language that paragraph. President agreed completely, said it was a good statement and for you to proceed on that basis" (740.5/5–2452).

740.5/5–2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BONN, May 24, 1952—4 p. m.

3042. From Secretary for Bruce and Matthews. Further to my 3038, May 24.[1] French Cabinet is bound by communiqué which they have already given out. It requires that "something new" must be forthcoming. It is suggested that anything might do but some addition must be made. Consequently, they have proposed to us the following modifications of their proposal of this morning:

(*a*) Modify fifth paragraph Doc SCEM D–2/7[2] by adding after this morning's change the words "in equitable proportions".

(*b*) Additional sentence given in 3038 would be withdrawn and replaced by new sentence which is incorporated in French proposed redraft of entire section which follows:

"For these various reasons, including the fact that these new guarantees will apply to the states concerned only as members of one or the other of these organizations, the Govts of US and UK have an abiding interest, as has the Govt of France, in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the EDC and in the strength and integrity of that community. Therefore, they have expressed their resolve to station such forces on the continent in Europe including the FRG as are necessary and appropriate to contribute in equitable proportions, to the joint defense of the North Atlantic area, having regard to their obligations under

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[1] *Supra.*

[2] See footnote 2, *supra.*

NAT, their interest in the integrity of the EDC, and their special responsibilities in Germany.

If any action from whatever quarter were to threaten the integrity or unity of the community, the two govts would consider the matter of the greatest concern to them calling for consultation under Article IV of NAT in order to agree on measures to meet the situation thus created.

In particular, should this threat to the integrity or to the unity of the community result from action taken by one of its members with a view to withdrawing from its obligations, all measures would be taken to safeguard the requirements for the common defense and to maintain at an appropriate level the potential of west Europe's defense.

"The integrity and welfare of Berlin, etc. . . ."

Eden and I have rejected this new proposal of Schuman but are seeking to work out some solution.

The Socialist convention in France voted by 2000 to 800 in favor of entering EDC treaty. This was quite unexpected and is viewed as a very favorable development.[3]

ACHESON

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[3] In telegram 7300 from Paris, May 24, Dunn stated *inter alia* "It appears that Guy Mollet is in full control and will swing his party in direction of approval in principle of EDC treaty. His speech delivered late yesterday, again demonstrated that in stature and prestige, despite his quiet manner and unimpressive appearance, he towered far above the other socialist leaders" (740.5/5-2452).

740.5/5-2452 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT BONN, May 24, 1952—10 p. m.

3048. From the Secretary for Bruce and Matthews. I wld much appreciate the President's auth to change the second sentence of the fifth para of the tripartite declaration, beginning "Accordingly, if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the community, the two govts will regard such action as a threat to their own security and will institute action in accordance with Art 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

It may not be necessary to use this auth but the reason for asking it is as follows. As reported in Bonn's 3038 to Wash, May 24,[1] the French have asked for an addl sentence in the declaration which we turned down immediately. Later in the day, as reported in Bonn's 3042 of May 24,[2] they asked for another sentence which was similarly rejected. We gather that they are now in a position where it may be necessary to have some change in order to meet the problems which they have created for themselves even if the change has no particular significance. The sentence that I now suggest has been devised in order to take from Art 4 of the NAT the reason for action under that Art which wld be here applicable, that is, a threat to the security of any of the nations involved. It omits reference in terms to consultation and says instead that we would take action in accordance with the Art which of course means consultation. The purpose of the sentence as we have devised it is first to make a change and second to make a change which although not altering the meaning expresses the meaning in more vigorous phraseology.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 677.

[2] *Supra*.

Since we are trying to close all outstanding matters tonight it would be helpful to have an immediate reply by fastest means.[3]

[ACHESON]

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[3] Source text indicates that this message was received in the Department at 4:29 p. m. At approximately 6:00 p. m. the Department received a request from Bonn for a telecon with Matthews and Bruce, the purpose of which was to get a rapid answer to telegram 3048. After conferring some time with Perkins, Knight, Calhoun, and Pollack at Bonn, Bruce placed a call to President Truman aboard the yacht *Williamsburg* and informed him of the message contained in telegram 3048. "The President approved the request of Secretary Acheson and the word was sent back to Bonn on the telecon." (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108) In telegram 7299 from Paris received at 2:16 p. m., May 24, in the Department of State, Dunn reported that the French Cabinet had met in emergency session that afternoon and Maurice Schumann had told Dunn it adjourned without reaching any decision on signature of the EDC Treaty since negotiations were still in progress at Bonn and what progress had been made was considered insufficient. Schumann added that there would be no more Cabinet meetings but that the Cabinet had authorized a smaller group including Antoine Pinay, Pleven, Robert Schuman, and Maurice Schumann to decide what was acceptable (740.5/5–2452). In a memorandum to the Acting Secretary later on May 24, Ridgway Knight reported that Dunn had called from Paris at 6:00 p. m. to say that Maurice Schumann had informed him that a second Cabinet meeting had been held that afternoon "which again ended on an inconclusive note". Dunn added that Schumann had stressed two points. First, it was "absolutely essential" to obtain what the French Government considered acceptable minimum guarantees regarding the treaty, and second, the Cabinet had given the power of approval to a triumvirate consisting of Pinay, Pleven, "and one other (whose name Ambassador Dunn did not get)" (740.5/5–2452). The final version of the "Declaration by the Governments of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France on their interest in the strength and integrity of the European Defense Community" issued at Paris on May 27 in conjunction with the signing of the EDC Treaty is printed on p. 686.

740.5/5–2652

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

SECRET BONN, May 26, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This morning we reached complete agreement between ourselves, the British, the French, and the Germans on the text of the contractual relations to be established between us.[2] As of noon yesterday this agreement seemed hardly possible, as you certainly gathered from the several messages which were communicated to you from me and from the pessimistic rumors which were circulating. I think we have reason to be pleased for we now have successfully completed another phase in our postwar policy: containment of the new threat with the cooperation of our former enemy.

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 3064 from Bonn, May 26, with instructions to "deliver immediately" to the President.

[2] See editorial note, p. 684.

Of course the European Defense Community is not yet signed, but this is now pure formality. Indeed the three documents which will be signed in the next two days are an interrelated whole and the last thing the French would do would be to sign the contractual relations convention which gives a generous measure of freedom for Germany without also signing the European Defense Community which brings the Germans voluntarily into the common defense under the control of common institutions.

Since I said goodby to you on Thursday, we have gone through greater emotions than any mystery story could provide. The unusual thing about this thriller is that the villain changed his identity. Prior to my departure from Washington the complications stemmed principally from our estimable, if stubborn Dutch friends. As you know, they are practical in everything and traditionally turned toward the sea and the world, rather than toward the continent at their back. Furthermore, they are forever afraid that membership in the European Defense Community will reduce the aid which they expect to receive from us, and their hesitations have been reflected in an unending series, the last one of which was their demand that they could withdraw from the European Defense Community if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be dissolved before the fifty year term of the former. While this sounds eminently reasonable, it reflects a fundamental point of cleavage, as the French, Germans and Italians, the three major parties, are going into this understanding with the idea that it is permanent. Consequently, they considered that any injection at the start of doubt as to the permanence would automatically prevent the implementation of the treaty provisions in a manner leading to permanence.

Day before yesterday at Strasbourg agreement was reached between the Foreign Ministers of the six European Defense Community countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) on this point. It is not perfect, but it has obtained the agreement of all: if, before the end of the fifty year term of the European Defense Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be dissolved or the United Kingdom or ourselves withdraw from it, the European Defense Community countries will consult as to what to do. Frankly, I believe that all this is largely theoretical. Seventeen years hence either the European Defense Community will be a strong, vital community from which no component would wish to withdraw, or else long before then it will have received the kiss of death and be but a hollow shell.

When I landed in Bonn, the French problems had taken the place of the Dutch. As you read this, you might bear in mind the general state of mind in France. Events have moved swiftly and the French people, while anxious for a new day, can not quite yet believe that Germany's perspective has fundamentally changed. Furthermore, the present French Government of Mr. Pinay, in addition to stabilizing the franc, is definitely more traditionally minded than its immediate predecessors.

We had heard just before my departure that the French would not sign unless they were satisfied about many points. Most of these can be reduced to their fear of being quickly outdistanced by their German neighbors. (You should remember that their inferiority complex relative to the German birth rate and industriousness is increased by such things as their burden in Indochina, which haunts them as distracting too much of their resources in all fields from the European theater where the Germans can concentrate their all.) Likewise they are worried about maintaining their position in North Africa, to which they attach the greatest importance. These fears of the French crystallized into one, which is a symptom of all: What could the United States and the United Kingdom do to guarantee France against German secession from the European Defense Community, when German contingents would be built up and could threaten her anew? Obviously we could not agree to their two first proposals to be incorporated in the tripartite declaration to be issued upon signature of the German contractuals—European Defense Community tandem. It is only because of your personal approval of our counterproposal of last evening that they have gone along. Schuman knows that our intent is genuine and that we in fact consider this complex of treaties and conventions as a whole essential to our own interests. However, they still have the problem of convincing their public opinion, unreasonable as it may be in view of our actions since the war.

I am grateful to Schuman for having obtained his government's agreement to sign the treaties. This evening after informing me of this decision he told me of a request from President Auriol for some modifications in the text of the declaration. These are not a condition and are not a request by the French Government as such, but a personal indication of President Auriol's views. I am reporting these in a separate telegram. One of them seems to be possible. The other, I believe, is not.[8]

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[8] Telegram 3065 from Bonn, May 26, reported that Alphand had presented details of the French suggestions for minor changes in language to Acheson, McCloy, and the British Delegate O'Neill that evening after the Chancellor's dinner. The first suggestion dealt with dividing that sentence of the declaration having to do with reactions to threats to the integrity of the proposed Community which Acheson indicated was acceptable. The second suggestion dealt with that sentence of paragraph 5 concerning the permanent stationing of U.S. and U.K. forces on the Continent including the Federal Republic. The French believed the clause "as they deem necessary" was too weak, but Acheson replied that the words were taken directly from the North Atlantic Treaty, and he hesitated to make the change suggested by the French "lest variation between the declaration and the treaty cause difficulty in US Congress." The telegram also reported that "Alphand explained carefully that these two proposals did not represent a condi-

Eden has been most cooperative and has helped much in overcoming both Dutch and French difficulties. Adenauer, although a good and patriotic bargainer, has revealed himself again as a European statesman knowing when essential to compromise in order to save a possible great future from the threat of present difficulties of detail. I hope we have him with us for a long while.

Of course the Soviet's note[4] may open a new cycle of difficulties, but I am fairly optimistic. The timing of the note was as anticipated. The contents could have been more troublesome. We may well experience trouble in Berlin and in Western Germany as the Communists like and need a few martyrs. All of us realize this, and I believe none will be deflected from their course.

I have emphasized with my colleagues here the importance of early ratification and our intention to urge the Senate to take favorable action before Congress adjourns.

Finally, I think that a fair indication of our leadership is the friendly cooperative spirit which characterized today's meeting, as compared with the dissensions, bitterness, and acrimony prevalent at Versailles less than a quarter century ago.[5]

ACHESON

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tion precedent to signing of either contractuals or EDC and were put forth just as personal suggestions of President Auriol and were outside governmental channel" (740.5/5–2652).

[4] Regarding the Soviet note of May 24, see volume VII.

[5] Acting Secretary Bruce met with President Truman on May 26 to discuss a variety of matters including the Soviet note, a recent message from Chester Bowles, and hearings on S.J. Res. 130 proposing a constitutional amendment relative to the making of treaties and executive agreements. Bruce gave the President a copy of the source text to which Truman responded that he "was delighted over the signature of the contractuals and thought this was of great historical significance". At the same time, Bruce asked if the President wished to go over the materials, including telegram 3065 from Bonn, May 26, relating to changes in the texts of the Tripartite Declaration and the President's own suggested message to the Senate. Truman "said he did not need to have anything left with him and that he was satisfied with the decisions reached" (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, "Memcons w/Pres, 1952").

740.5/5–2752

The Secretary of State to the President[1]

SECRET PARIS, May 27, 1952.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When I told you at the plane that I hoped to be able to return to Washington and report to you "mission accomplished" I had my fingers crossed. On Saturday things looked so dark I never thought we could make it. I am delighted to report that the European Defense Community treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization protocol and related documents were signed about an hour ago.[2] We have also signed the tripartite declaration concerning the vital interest which the United States and United Kingdom place in the European Defense Community and which has caused so much trouble over the weekend. This will be released to the press within the next few minutes. You will probably see the text before this message reaches you. We felt we came out alright on it and the phraseology as it stands is within the bounds of that which you approved. Tomorrow we begin a tripartite session with Mr. Schuman and Mr. Eden and expect to get into Far Eastern questions, particularly the Indochina matter which you and I, Bob Lovett and General Bradley went over just before my departure. We will also have a preliminary exchange of views on the recent Soviet notes and will probably touch on the situation in Berlin. Later in the afternoon and on the following day, I will be talking with Mr. Schuman and members of the French Cabinet including Mr. Pinay and Mr. Pleven. We expect to have a thorough go-around on the North African situation and I hope we can make some progress on getting the French to go forth with a really constructive program for Tunisia.

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[1] Transmitted in telegram 7372, from Paris, May 27, with instructions to deliver immediately to the President.

[2] See editorial note, *infra*.

We will leave here Thursday night and arrive about 1000 Friday morning.

I understand you expect to be on the *Williamsburg* over weekend. In case you by any chance had any thought of it, please do not let my arrival in any way affect your plans. I will have a talk with you on Monday and give you a full report of what has occurred here.

ACHESON

Editorial Note

On May 27, 1952, the treaty establishing a European Defense Community with a "Special Agreement" on the level of forces annexed thereto was signed at Paris by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; Paul Van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium; Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France; Alcide De Gasperi, Prime Minister of Italy; Joseph Bech, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense of Luxembourg; and Dirk Stikker, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. A photograph of the signing ceremonies is printed on page 565. At the same time, military, financial, and jurisdictional protocols were signed as was a Convention Relative to the Status of European Defense Forces and the Tax and Commercial Regime of the European Defense Community. Finally, a Common Declaration by the Foreign Ministers was issued expressing the wish that the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty be brought into conformity with the 50-year period of the European Defense Community.

On the same occasion, a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty was signed extending to member nations of the European Defense Community the assurance that the member states of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization would consider an attack on the European territory of any of the EDC states, or on any of their forces when in the area described in Article VI (2) of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an attack against all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and that they would take action accordingly within the meaning of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, i.e., each would take such action as it deemed necessary. Secretary Acheson signed this protocol on behalf of the United States. A similar protocol guaranteeing assistance by the EDC member states to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the EDC member states. A Tripartite Declaration emphasizing the concern of the United States, United Kingdom, and France with the integrity of the EDC as then constituted was also signed by Acheson, Foreign Secretary Eden, and Foreign Minister Schuman. Finally, a treaty between the United Kingdom and the member states of the European Defense Community was signed by the appropriate foreign ministers pledging mutual military assistance and aid in the event that either the United Kingdom or one or all of the member states of the EDC should be the object of an armed attack "in Europe".

A protocol was also signed by the Foreign Ministers of the European Defense Community providing that "The delegations which participated in drawing up the Treaty shall continue to meet as an Interim Committee during the period between the date of signature of the Treaty and the date when the institutions of the European Defense Community begin to function." The Interim Committee was charged with considering those problems which concerned the Community and the measures which the signatory governments might be required to take before the EDC institutions should begin to function. It was to draft the texts of those protocols and conventions which were to be put into force at the same time as the Treaty. It was to collect all information needed to facilitate performance by the EDC Commissariat of the most urgent tasks for which it was responsible. Finally, the Interim Committee was empowered to appoint *ad hoc* working groups and call experts on a temporary basis in order to carry out its above mandate.

The Tripartite Declaration of the United States, United Kingdom, and France pledging the signators' interest in the strength and integrity of the European Defense Community is printed *infra.* All other documents here cited are published, in English, in *AFP*, volume I, pages 1107–1198. The protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Tripartite Declaration are also printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, pages 896–897, along with a brief statement by Acheson on the occasion of the signing of the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. An extract from the "Special Agreement" on level of forces, later redesignated as C–M (54) 96, is in the NATO Sub-Registry at Brussels.

Following discussions between Acheson and Schuman at Paris on May 29, a communiqué, in French, was issued stating *inter alia* that the talks had been held in conformity with the longstanding practice of holding conversations following international conferences between various foreign ministers and that a number of problems of common interest had been explored including those dealing with the Far East and North Africa. The communiqué is printed in *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1952, page 170. Further documentation on these talks is in the compilation on France in volume VI.

On June 2, Secretary Acheson addressed the nation on the Bonn Agreements regarding contractual relations and on the European Defense Community. That same day President Truman formally transmitted to the Senate the German Contractual Agreements and the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty relating to security guarantees to the EDC member states. The President asked the Senate to give an early and favorable consideration to both documents. The texts of Secretary Acheson's address and the President's letter of transmittal to the Senate are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 16, 1952, pages 931–933 and 947–949. Throughout early June, Department of State officials appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to urge prompt, bipartisan approval of the Contractual Agreements and the NAT protocol in order to allay European nervousness. Secretary Acheson assured a joint meeting of the House and Senate committees that no secret agreements had been undertaken at either Bonn or Paris. For his testimony on June 2, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, volume IV, 1952 (Washington, 1976), pages 467 ff. Under Secretary Bruce appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 11, and McCloy followed on June 12. The statements of both men in support of prompt, unconditional ratification of both the Contractual Agreements and the NAT protocol are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108. On June 23 and 24, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave its approval to both documents and sent them to the full Senate for consideration.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION [1]

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France have signed conventions with the German Federal Republic which will establish a new relationship with that country.[2] These conventions, as well as the treaties for a European Defense Community and a European coal and steel community, of which France is a signatory, provide a new basis for uniting Europe and for the realization of Germany's partnership in the European community. They are designed to prevent the resurgence of former tensions and conflicts among the free nations of Europe and any future revival of aggressive militarism. They make possible the removal of the special restraints hitherto imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany and permit its participation as an equal partner in Western defense.

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[1] Reprinted from the Department of State *Bulletin*, June 9, 1952, p. 897.

[2] See editorial note, p. 675.

These conventions and treaties respond to the desire to provide by united efforts for the prosperity and security of Western Europe. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom consider that the establishment and development of these institutions of the European community correspond to their own basic interests and will therefore lend them every possible co-operation and support.

Moreover, Western defense is a common enterprise in which the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are already partners through membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

These bonds are now strengthened by the system of reciprocal guarantees agreed to between the member states of the European Defense Community, between these member states and the United Kingdom and also between these member states and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For these various reasons, including the fact that these new guarantees will apply to the states concerned only as members of one or the other of these organizations, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have an abiding interest, as has the Government of France, in the effectiveness of the treaty creating the European Defense Community and in the strength and integrity of that community. Accordingly, if any action from whatever quarter threatens the integrity or unity of the community, the two Governments will regard this as a threat to their own security. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, they have each expressed their resolve to station such forces on the continent of Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany, as they deem necessary and appropriate to contribute to the joint defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area, having regard to their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, their interest in the integrity of the European Defense Community, and their special responsibilities in Germany.

The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

These new security guarantees supersede the assurances contained in the declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France at New York on September 19, 1950.[3]

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[3] For text of the Agreement on Berlin Security and the Communiqué on Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 1296.

B. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY, JUNE 1952–DECEMBER 1953

740.5/6–2052 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 20, 1952—5 p. m.

7991. Embtel 7990 gives our current estimate of prospects of Fr ratification of EDC and various factors influencing Fr public and official opinion.[2] Corollary problem is how US can assist Fr Govt to obtain ratification. This msg gives our thinking as of possible assistance in connection Secretary's forthcoming discussions with Schuman and Eden.

Problem has three aspects relating respectively to Fr thinking with respect to (1) Ger, (2) USSR and (3) US.

1. Ger. On this aspect US must be careful to avoid giving basis for Fr fears that US, and particularly US mil, will in some way favor Gers over Fr in EDC. At same time, we must not permit fact to be lost from sight that German contribution to Western def is essential to fulfillment of current def plans and that is [*if*] it is not forthcoming through EDC, it must be sought in some other form. Naturally Fr presentation of this fact wld be far preferable to Amer. We shld also, of course, continue to seek both in France and in Ger to prevent steps in either country which wld exacerbate opinion in other as for example in relation to Saar or such statements as Blank's referring to "Ger" decisions, etc.

2. USSR. Much Fr public opinion resembles that of US four or five years ago with respect to possibility of reaching "settlement" or *détente* with USSR through four-power mtg. It is difficult to say how much of this is naive wishful thinking and how much is more calculated thought that "we must leave no stone unturned" or "go through all the motions" but Schuman and cabinet attach major importance to

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it stated *inter alia* that although the EDC Treaty might be transmitted to the Assembly prior to the summer recess, the government was not likely to ask for debate until after the U.S. Senate had ratified the contractuals and the Bundestag had ratified both the contractuals and the EDC. (740.5/6–2052)

it and we must take it into account. Unless developments in near future, and as soon as possible without interfering with Ger or US ratifications, make clear that Russ have no intention of negotiating settlement on Ger which wld be acceptable to West, we may well be faced this fall with Fr insistence on delay pending further exploration of possible settlement. We may be faced with this in any event or if four-power talks shld be in progress, we may have difficulty in preventing Russ from dragging them out indefinitely.

3. US. Fact that EDC represents fulfillment of Fr policy for which France has obtained US support has been almost entirely lost from sight. Psychological picture is of US forcing reluctant France to accept EDC which has become synonymous in Fr thinking with Ger rearmament. Result is gen impression not only among public but in govt that France is in position to demand concessions from us in connection with ratification. Flagrant example is council of republic resolution (Embtel 7827, June 14)[3] which expressed view that US and UK guarantee must "go beyond simple obligation to consult" and "invited govt to pursue negotiations with its allies with view to treaty of guarantee and mutual assistance with direct ref to Art 5 of NAT". Obvious but unmade answer of Fr. Govt shld have been that it already has "treaty of guarantee and mutual assistance" in NAT.

Unless this line of thinking is checked, it will grow worse as ratification debate nears. Developments in next few months will indicate how our line shld develop but for time being I wld strongly recommend that we avoid expressing too much interest in the matter. Less we say about it, the better. While continuing to extend maximum cooperation in working out common problems, we shld, I believe, take line whenever other requests are made to us linked with EDC ratification that EDC is Fr project which we heartily support but which we are not paying Fr to complete.

4. Fr Govt has hitherto taken defensive line which has contributed to picture of US forcing EDC on France. While it will not be easy, believe that we must quietly persuade Fr Govt to undertake active public opinion campaign to sell Fr public on this as Fr project. Absence of US pressure, coupled with US and Ger ratifications, concrete development of Schuman Plan and possible initiation of discussions or creation common pol auth will all be favorable factors.

Mental assoc of EDC and Ger rearmament has led many Fr to think or rather "feel" that alternative to EDC is no Ger rearmament. Cuerin De Beaumont, *rapporteur* of assembly For Affairs Comm, and others who favor ratification have been advocating it in terms of three alternatives, starting from premise that Ger contribution is essential to adequate western def. These alternatives are: (1) EDC; (2) Ger natl army or; (3) Abandonment of strategy of def in Ger and reversion to concept of peripheral conduct of war. Presented in these terms, EDC naturally has strong appeal. US argumentation along these lines at this time wld annoy Fr and possibly overfrighten them, but Fr presentation, which we can discreetly encourage, shld be very effective.[4]

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[3] Not printed. (740.5/6-1452)

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[4] In telegram 7555 to Paris, June 24, Acting Secretary Bruce endorsed the conclusions reached in telegram 7991 "especially so far as undesirability overpressuring Fr concerned," and regarding the "urgent necessity check Fr line of thinking that EDC US project". Bruce added that various possibilities were being studied to remind France that EDC was its idea and the Embassy in Paris was urged to "avail itself all opportunities encourage Fr Govt take initiative depict EDC in its true light". Bruce concluded with the endorsement of the analysis presented in telegram 7990, "especially Emb's conclusion no outside pressures are likely speed up Assembly action. We are of course concerned stories such as *NY Times* June 21 (Callender) to effect ratification unlikely but conclude from Embtel 7990 Emb somewhat more optimistic" (740.5/6–2052).

740.5/8–2652: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 6, 1952—1:02 p. m.

1305. While Dept under no illusion re difficulties in path Fr ratification of EDC–Contractuals indirect ref by Schuman (and spelled out by La Tournelle and Seydoux—Embtel 1216)[2] to side issues raised by him at Bonn in last stages prior EDC signing in May comes as disappointment. We realize full well that these four major questions (Indochina, North Africa, OSP and "Guarantee") constitute major worries for large sectors Fr public opinion which lags behind Eur leadership of small band under Schuman, Pleven and Monnet. As Emb and Dept have frequently noted, farsighted policies of this small group have lacked public relations backup both with Parliament and public. Regardless of lack of logic and lack of justification connecting these with EDC, we are conscious that these issues cannot be disregarded as they represent polit facts in Fr today and whether we like it or not they have a bearing on ratification problem. Our objective, however, shld be to reduce them to their proper proportions and to separate them in every way possible from the ratification action.

Re ratification problem in genl Dept is of opinion it wld be difficult to determine precise course of action until parliament reconvenes as evolution of party relationships and strengths during summer recess shld have a considerable bearing.

While it wld be vain to seek develop precise tactics now, there are certain broad strategic lines which we shld either develop or continue to pursue immed.

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[1] Drafted by Knight and Calhoun, cleared by Bonbright and Riddleberger, repeated to Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it listed the problems enumerated below as difficulties in the path of French ratification (740.5/8–2652).

Most important of all appears to be renewed stress on our policy enunciated so clearly in Embtel 7991 of June 20[3] by all means at our disposal we shld seek bring Fr Govt and press to propound that EDC is fulfillment of Fr policy; that EDC–NATO relationship bringing with it active US participation in def Western Eur and Fr represents achievement of goal sought by Fr foreign policy since 1919, every means at our disposal shld be used to dispel picture of US forcing a reluctant Fr to accept EDC. We are all agreed any attitude on our part indicating desire to buy this ratification cld only make matters worse by seemingly confirming impression EDC is Amer project primarily benefiting US.

With ref to four "related problem" we shld immed scotch reemerging issue of US guarantee against Ger secession from EDC incl replacement of Ger divs thereby lost. Unfortunately this looks like attempt to squeeze this old lemon even drier. What with evidence of UK good faith re Six Nation EDC–CSC combination and of desire close relationship with an entity which UK appears to have accepted, public pressure in Fr for guarantee shld, if anything, be diminishing. Likewise, fact that both candidates US elections are genuine supporters of NATO and other major Eur policies fol since war shld be reassuring to Fr with regard future US policy. Consequently, any initiative on part Fr Govt publicize this whole issue now wld be seriously misunderstood in this country. In tripartite mtg of FonMins at Bonn, as reported Bonn's 3053,[4] it was made clear by Secy that US assurances cld not go beyond tripartite declaration. Eden's statements were equally categoric. If there is any doubt on this score in Fr minds or if they believe that this issue can be used once more in connection with Fr ratification of EDC Dept believes they shld be clearly and promptly disillusioned of this idea. Emb shld, therefore, discuss problem with FonOff at whatever level seems appropriate and stress that US will not permit this question to be used as part of any price to be paid for EDC.

North Af situation dealt with in Deptel 1121 Aug 30.[5]

Re two remaining problems, Indochina and OSP, we must continue to deal with them on their own merits. Grave importance we place on Indochina shld have been clearly demonstrated to Fr during Letourneau talks in June and by our concrete actions before and since then. Re OSP we are earnestly seeking every means to give every reasonable satis to Fr aspirations for vigorous and well rounded Def industry within limits of seriously reduced FY 1953 appropriations and of our other major responsibilities. In so doing we are demonstrating our realization of polit importance thereof in Fr even though this might appear slightly contradictory to gen policy of "Eur integration".

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[3] *Supra.*
[4] Dated May 25, this telegram discussed contractual relations with Germany; see volume VII, chapter I.
[5] Not printed.

We will continue to take these strong Fr views into account in our decisions but it wld be fundamental mistake to let them become the quid of the quo of the EDC ratification. We wld hope that Fr realize that failure or undue delay in implementing Eur policy embodied in EDC and Schuman Plan which resulted from Fr initiative of high statesmanship and which we have enthusiastically and wholeheartedly supported cld only lead to consideration of alternative courses all of which wld surely be far less desirable and even acceptable to Fr as they wld be less auspicious for West as a whole.[6]

ACHESON

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[6] Telegram 1538 from Paris, Sept. 11, reported *inter alia* that de Margerie had indicated that the EDC debate could not begin in the French Assembly before the end of October. De Margerie also indicated that there was a widespread skepticism in France toward EDC, some considering it the epitome of a soft policy toward Germany, others a desperate proposal designed to avoid creation of a German national army, but one that would nonetheless entail a significant loss of French sovereignty (740.5/9–1152). In a memorandum to Perkins on Sept. 13, Ambassador at Large Jessup called attention to telegram 1538 and wondered "if it wouldn't be worthwhile considering the possibility of a statement of our president-elect just as the French parliamentary debates begin. Such a statement need not go further than what we have already said but its repetition at that time might be helpful" (740.5/9–1152).

740.5/9–2552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LONDON, September 25, 1952—7 p. m.

1755. FonOff advises that Eden asked De Gasperi in Strasbourg if Italian ratification EDC "could not be accelerated." De Gasperi, taking advantage of the fact that they had been prevously discussing Trieste, replied that so long as the problem of Trieste remained unsolved there wld be difficulty in persuading the Italians that their armed forces cld be merged in a European defense community. According to Eden's report of the conversation, the matter was left there.

Pursuant to Deptel 2132, Sept 24,[2] Embassy officers stated the view of the Dept that early parallel action by separate informal approaches at a high level in Rome shld be made, and observed that this appeared to be all the more desirable in view of the unsatisfactory response to Eden.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Rome, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it urged that the United Kingdom join with the United States in informally approaching the Italian Government to request an early ratification of the EDC Treaty as a "great service to cause of Eur unification and to speeding up Fr and Benelux ratification" (740.5/9–2452).

FonOff rep deprecated significance of De Gasperi's reference to Trieste and said that FonOff wld wish to know what transpired between Adenauer and De Gasperi before raising the matter again with the Italians and said that it would also have to be referred to Eden, who is expected to return Saturday. FonOff promised to advise us of Brit position as soon as possible.[3]

Gifford

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[3] In telegram 1966 from London, Oct. 3, Gifford informed the Department that the Foreign Office feared that the Italian Government might use the occasion of a joint Anglo-American representation urging EDC ratification to link a settlement of the Trieste issue to approval of the EDC (740.5/10-352). In telegram 1561 to Rome, Oct. 9, Acheson stated that the Department shared British concern regarding Trieste and the ratification of the EDC Treaty and "therefore unilateral representations requested Deptel 2132 London need not be made if in Emb opinion will not contribute objective early ratification or will encourage Itals to link Trieste problem to EDC approval" (740.5/10-352).

Editorial Note

In early September 1952, various bureaus and offices in the Department of State, including EUR, RA, WE, GER, the Policy Planning Staff, the office of Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup, and that of Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, became interested in seeking a definition of United States policy in the event of nonratification of the EDC and/or the German Contractuals. Various position papers were drafted, initially prompted by telegram 887 from Bonn, August 28, in which the new United States High Commissioner, Walter J. Donnelly, emphasized the growing dynamism of the Federal Republic and the growing imbalance in power relationships between the Federal Republic and France. This was evident in the Saar issue in which Germany's demand for either the total "Europeanization" of the region within an EDC framework or its outright return to Germany was opposed by French desires to see the Saar totally alienated from Germany "and its incorporation in Fr econ complex as essential to even approx Fr parity with Ger." (662A.00/8-2852) In a memorandum to Fisher Howe, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, dated September 9, Philip H. Watts of the Policy Planning Staff enclosed a copy of a memorandum "re Germany's position in Europe" written by Leon Fuller, Deputy Director of GPA. Watts informed Howe *inter alia* that Fuller "is currently working with Ger and some of your boys on possible courses of action in the event EDC is not ratified." (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Chronological, 1952") In a memorandum to Perkins, Bonbright, and Riddleberger of the same day, Watts stated that the Fuller memorandum was "based on Bonn's 887 of August 28". Fuller's initial working paper seems to have been drafted on September 2 and a companion paper, title unknown, was drafted on September 13. (Memorandum by Watts to Perkins, *et al.*, September 13, 1952) A further draft of the September 2 working paper, dated October 3, was submitted to Jessup by Watts on October 7 (memorandum by Watts to Jessup), and a third draft, dated October 27, was submitted by Watts to Laukhuff and Williamson on October 28 (memorandum by Watts to Laukhuff and Williamson). (All three drafts are in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Chronological, 1952") A two-page memorandum from Moore to Williamson, October 17, commenting "on the S/P paper on the EDC situation" which also evidently dealt with the problem of nonratification, is in file 740.5/10–1752.

None of the above reference draft papers have been found in Department of State files. However, a paper entitled "United States Policy in the Event of Non-Ratification of the EDC and Contractual Agreements", drafted by "L. W. Fuller: S/P" and dated December 3, 1952 with the notation "Fifth Draft" is in the PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Record Copies, Dec 1952". Appended to this 30-page study is a 12-page Annex also written by Fuller and dated December 16, 1952. In this draft, Fuller stated *inter alia* that France and the Federal Republic continued to hold the key to eventual ratification; success in these two countries depended upon the ability of Adenauer and Pinay to overcome strong oppositional forces, while "there need be little concern as to the eventual behavior of the Benelux countries and Italy, although their procrastination may prove vexatious and embarrassing" (page 5). Various alternatives to the EDC, which received extended analysis in the paper, included outright German membership in NATO, German association with NATO, German rearmament independent of NATO, some form of German nonmilitary contribution to Western defense, or retreat to a peripheral defense of Europe based on an arc from Norway through the British Isles to Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. In recommending a course of action, Fuller admitted that "we may find ourselves under the necessity of submitting to a species of blackmail in order to salvage a dangerous situation" (page 22). It might be necessary to offer the French various inducements including "the extension of more specific assurances against German violation of the EDC treaty, efforts to secure closer relationships between the UK and the EDC, an increase in our aid to the full $650 million expected by the French, more favorable terms for France respecting off-short procurement, a willingness to agree to some formula of burden-sharing as the basis of future assistance, the assumption of increased responsibility for French costs in Indo-China, a pledge of support for the French population in North Africa, and arrangements that will give France more participation in the higher military direction for area [*defense*?] of the NATO area" (pages 22*a*–23).

740.5/10–2552 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 8, 1952—7 : 08 p. m.

609. Embtel 444, Oct 22,[2] Paris tel 2520, Oct 23,[3] rptd info Brussels 89.

Emb will recall that Belgs similarly appealed to US on eve signature EDC Treaty to press other member countries adopt uniform 24 months mil serv (Deptel 6409 to Paris, 1672 to Brussels, Apr 30).[4] At that time UnderSecy was strictly non-committal and told Belg Amb flatly we considered it a practical impossibility for Fr adopt two years conscription. This is still the case, aggravated, moreover, by recent political developments. Situation Italy analogous.

Dept recommends that Emb respond orally to De Greef's representations along fol lines as suggested by MacArthur:

1. US fully shares De Greef's concern that EDC and NATO partners all strive toward creation as strong mil forces as possible. We will therefore continue to urge all to make maximum effort, and to this end support recommendation of leading mil authorities that 24 months

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[1] Drafted by McClelland, cleared by Knight, Parsons, and Captain Matter of Defense. Repeated to Paris for MacArthur.

[2] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* that Belgian Defense Minister De Greef in a conversation on Oct. 20 with the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group for the Benelux area and with the MDAP special assistant, was "most emphatic" in stating that the United States should make a "political approach" to the NATO countries urging them to adopt a uniform 24-month military service period. De Greef added that General Ridgway and other military leaders had made clear the necessity for such a military service period, "but that US Dept of State had not pushed for it politically and this shld be done" (740.5/10–2252). In telegram 413 from Brussels, Oct. 15, Ambassador Cowen had reported *inter alia* that during General Ridgway's visit that day, Prime Minister Van Houtte had informed the General that Belgium could not ratify the EDC Treaty until agreement was reached among all EDC countries on the length of military service (740.5/10–1552).

[3] Not printed; it informed the Department that in Ambassador Dunn's personal view, it would be unwise to place heavy political pressure on the NATO countries to adopt a uniform military service policy of 24 months. Dunn stated that no amount of pressure would succeed in pushing France "and other countries" to 24 months at this time, and that therefore, the application of such pressure would be counterproductive, exacerbating "present state of mind of at least a significant sector of European opinion which I fear increasingly tends toward idea that US views Eur in light of teacher-pupil, prince-pauper relationship". The 24-month service policy should, Dunn added, be urged as a goal, not insisted upon as a policy the United States had the right to impose (740.5/10–2352).

[4] Not printed; it informed the Embassy in France that on the instruction of his Government, the Belgian Ambassador had on that day called upon the Under Secretary of State to express the misgivings of the Belgian Government in reference to initialing the EDC Treaty unless a uniform 24-month length of service was specified and adopted by all members. Following further representations to the U.S. Government and to the Steering Committee of the EDC conference, the Belgian Government accepted a compromise in which a statement of principle of uniformity was written into the Treaty while for the time being the length of service was fixed at a minimum of 18 months subject to change by unanimous agreement by the Council. Further documentation on this issue is in file 740.5/5–252 to 5–652.

service necessary goal if adequate defense establishment to be achieved.

2. We are convinced, however, that heavy political pressure by US particularly but not solely in the case of Fr, wld not at this juncture attain desired result.

3. In specific case Fr, it should be pointed out to De Greef that serious limiting factors exist with which Belg happily does not have to contend: manpower drain of prolonged struggle against communist aggression in Indochina and cancer in Fr body politic of 26 percent popular commie vote (6 times greater than in Belg) on which Sov Union yearly lavishes substantial propaganda funds.

4. For this reason it is all the more important that Belg, through its longer conscription period and splendid physical force build-up, do its utmost maintain its position as impressive example of what its EDC partners shld, and US is confident, ultimately will achieve. Therefore US wld greatly regret to see Belg abandon its position of leadership in these respects among EDC countries.

5. US considers it fundamental to success of collective Western defensive endeavor of NATO and EDC that partners refrain from looking over their shoulders since this wld inevitably reduce total effort to mediocre and probably inadequate level of lowest common denominator.

6. US firmly believes that relative magnitude in its own contribution in men (and it shld be emphasized that we require 2 years mil serv of our young men) and resources justifies expectation of Amer people, congr and gov that our partners be willing bear comparable burden in terms of their own manpower and resources. Shld be observed that it is no easier convince US Congr and public than it is their Belg counterparts of continued necessity this effort. We must all rely on one another's example to sustain our own effort.

BRUCE

740.5/11–1252

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)

TOP SECRET NEW YORK, November 12, 1952.

Subject: European Items raised by Mr. Eden in New York

Participants: Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Mr. Eden
The Secretary of State
Mr. Perkins
Mr. Jessup
Mr. Byington

EDC. Mr. Eden referred to the increasingly difficult situation with regard to Franco-German relations. He mentioned his conversations with both Pleven and Schuman at the time of the denunciation of the

EDC by Herriot and Daladier [1] and said that the situation with regard to French ratification was precarious. He said that recently Pleven had informed him that the problem of French ratification of the EDC was so great that he had again to urge UK participation. Mr. Eden had done his best to discourage any such idea. He said that this was out of the question for the British Government even under some partial form of participation, as for instance contributing a number of divisions, or, as had once been suggested, the participation of British officers. He had pointed to the enormous loss of time, if the whole subject had to be reopened and rediscussed, and mentioned the alternative the Germans might put forth of German participation in the NATO. Mr. Eden was very concerned over the present drift of the French attitude. They seemed to be weakening in their determination regarding the EDC to such an extent that Pleven had lamented that EDC would leave them alone with the Germans. He (Mr. Eden) had replied that there were 50 million French as well as 50 million Germans; moreover, there were other countries participating in EDC.

The Secretary referred to his recent conversations with M. Bech and M. Van Zeeland and the similar preoccupations of both of these Foreign Ministers. M. Bech had stressed that the whole situation hung on the single thread of two lives—Mr. Schuman and Mr. Adenauer—the former was likely to be thrown out of office at any time after the budget had come up for consideration, and the latter was very old, infirm and facing a national election next year. Mr. Van Zeeland had likewise outlined the difficulties brought about by the rapid resurgence of Germany, but could offer no solution. The Secretary had said to both we would welcome any suggestions they might have.

Mr. Eden mentioned the doubts of the Europeans regarding Italy and their fear of Mr. de Gasperi's losing his grip in the face of growing neo-fascism.

Mr. Perkins said that he did not believe there was much the U.S. should do now with regard to putting on pressure for hastening parliamentary consideration of EDC. He said that we had done about as much as we could and that additional representations now might make the situtation worse rather than better because of the resentment such pressure would arouse. Mr. Eden recognized this and said he had wanted to help in every way that he could short of British participation in the organization itself. Aside from this, however, we should begin to think about what alternative plan we could fall back on in the event that it should become clear the French would be unable to ratify.

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[1] At the annual congress of the Radical Socialist Party in Bordeaux on Oct. 17, both Herriot and Daladier attacked the EDC Treaty for permitting domination of the proposed Community by Germany in a number of ways. The Daladier and Herriot speeches are summarized in telegrams 2401 and 2404 from Paris, Oct. 18 and 20, respectively (751.001/10-1852, 10-2052).

The Saar. Mr. Eden referred to his conversations with Mr. Schuman regarding the Saar. He expressed his regret that Adenauer and Schuman had failed to agree on a joint statement and blame the French Parliament for its insistence on retention of the economic *status quo* in the face of Adenauer's very important concession from Germany—namely, acceptance now of the principle of Europeanization. Mr. Acheson referred to the joint U.S.-British proposal for Europeanization of the Saar worked out last July and suggested we might continue our bilateral conversations along those lines. He understood that the U.K. had some suggestions as to the wording. Mr. Eden thanked the Secretary for this suggestion which was one he had been asked to make. It was agreed that both Governments should consult further together.

[Here follows a discussion of the North Atlantic Council meeting on December 15, Trieste, and Egypt.]

Editorial Note

In preparation for the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris in mid-December 1952, Counselor Charles E. Bohlen, John Hay of GPA, and Russell Fessenden of RA submitted working papers for possible use by Secretary Acheson in discussing the EDC both in the forthcoming Council meetings and in bilateral talks. Bohlen's paper, designated PBT D–1/1 and dated December 9, stressed the unhappy prospects for successful completion of EDC Treaty ratification "in the relatively near future." There had been, Bohlen said, "a steady loss of momentum since the signature of the EDC and the Contractuals last May which has been highlighted by the postponement by the German Government of ratification until the early part of January, at the earliest, and the growing indication of great difficulty with the French Assembly." Bohlen went on to suggest that both in his remarks before the Council and in private conversations with the French, the Secretary should stress the facts of consistent American interest in European integration, the inevitability of some form of German rearmament, the impetus to EDC given by the Europeans themselves, and especially the French, and the "tragic dilemma" that would face the United States Government, no matter which administration was in power, should the impetus to European political and military integration falter or fail. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129) In his paper, designated PBT D–1 and dated December 10, Fessenden noted *inter alia* that "Two general points might be made in talks with the Foreign Ministers of each EDC country:" (1) that although the treaty had passed two readings in the Bundestag by a clear majority, it might well be true that some "unfavorable" action by the German Constitutional Court would occur by the time of the Paris meeting and that the tendency of the other EDC countries to "hold back" and await German action was having the effect of compounding Chancellor Adenauer's difficulties as it appeared to many Germans that they were being asked to proceed "on their own without the support of the other countries". (2) "A second reason for moving ahead with ratification is the onset of the 'election season' in Europe during the spring and summer of 1953. Unless ratification takes place by April 1, it is likely that elections will cause ratification to be delayed at least until the end of the summer" (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129).

Hay's paper was addressed solely to the current problem of German ratification. According to Hay, the Bundestag on December 6 had approved a second reading of the Contractual Conventions and the EDC Treaty by votes of 218–164 and 216–165, respectively, and the Chancellor had then asked and received a postponement of the third reading until January 15. This move was taken, it was supposed, in order to improve the chances that the Constitutional Court would rule in the Government's favor on a motion made several months before by President Heuss for an advisory opinion from the Court on the constitutionality of the treaties. Recently, Hay continued, it had become evident to Adenauer that the Court's plenum might rule against the Government. The SPD had also threatened nonacceptance of a Court ruling favorable to the Government. On December 9, the Court had opened hearings on the Heuss request and announced that its opinion would be legally binding. The Government promptly moved for a stay of hearing and Government spokesmen challenged the Court's right to give binding effect to an opinion. President Heuss was also prevailed upon to withdraw his request, and that, Hay concluded, was where the situation remained at the moment (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129 "Bilateral Talks").

Before and during the North Atlantic Council meeting at Paris, American officials held a number of talks with their European counterparts with regard to the EDC. Acheson and Jean Monnet, President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, conversed on December 14 and 15 during which time Monnet stressed the critical nature of the German Court problem and the essential need that there "should be a real yielding of sovereignty in specific fields if true European military and political integration was to proceed." Monnet singled out the United Kingdom and Belgium as the source of "primary problems" stating that the British in particular must support and associate themselves with "true unity on the continent" without giving up ultimate sovereignty. Monnet then asked Acheson for "another declaration strongly supporting the unification of Europe, including the EDC," along the lines of those made in September 1951 and May 1952. Acheson replied "that I could not propose such a declaration at this late date and doubted whether Mr. Eden and Mr. Schuman would think it appropriate" with the imminent arrival in Washington of a new administration (Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 131).

At luncheon on December 15, French Defense Minister Pleven "stated categorically" to Helen Kirkpatrick, Public Affairs Adviser to the Bureau of European Affairs, that the EDC would be ratified by the French Assembly in March. There would, Pleven told Kirkpatrick, be "about 400 votes for it and a qualifying clause calling for British association with it. It would not be necessary for the U.K. to join the Community, but it must associate itself in clear and unmistakable terms" (Memorandum of conversation by Helen P. Kirkpatrick, Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 131).

During the course of the Tenth Session, the North Atlantic Council on December 17 adopted a Resolution on the European Defense Community. The Resolution is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 3, 1953, pages 4–5. Further documentation on the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council is printed on pages 348 ff.

Editorial Note

On December 11, Acheson discussed with President Truman "the difficulties arising in the path of ratification of the EDC Treaty, the rumors which were being spread in Germany about the views of the new Administration, and that I thought that we should get in touch with Mr. Dulles to advise with him as to what, if anything, he or General Eisenhower might wish to do". The President "approved of any such action that we might wish to pursue". (Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, "Memcons w/Pres–1952") The Truman Administration had already established close liaison with President-elect Eisenhower and his entourage following the national elections of November 4, and Eisenhower had been invited to the White House on November 18, 1952 for a briefing by both Truman and Acheson where the European Defense Community was a topic of conversation. For the memorandum of the November 18, 1952 White House meeting, see volume I.

In telegram 3474 from Paris, December 14, Acheson, Dunn, and Perkins reported their belief that an early statement by Eisenhower would "be most important in reversing current unfavorable trend with respect EDC ratification in both Ger and Fr. Believe informal comment by him at press conference immed fol close of NAC wld be appropriate" in light of the expected NAC resolution urging ratification of the EDC and the NATO protocol. Acheson, Dunn, and Perkins suggested that the proposed Eisenhower statement might cover a number of points including the following: (1) that the EDC represented a bold initiative by free Europeans to solve both historic and current problems, and (2) that the coming into effect of the EDC and the German contractual relations "represents only visible means of Ger regaining status of free, respected and equal partner in free world, of playing its part in common Western def and of inaugurating new era of Franco-Ger cooperation" (740.5/12-1452). At the Secretary's daily meeting on December 15, presided over by Acting Secretary Bruce, it was agreed that such a proposed statement ought to be made and that GER and EUR ought to collaborate on a draft, and that all pertinent cables on the subject should be collected and given to Bruce "so that he could show them to Mr. Dulles." (Secretary of State's Daily Meetings, lot 58 D 609, "1952") Later that same day Bonbright submitted a draft of a possible statement by the President-elect to Bruce (740.5/12-1552). On December 18, Paul H. Nitze submitted the views of the Policy Planning Staff which chiefly objected to such a statement on the grounds that it might "appear to gage the fate of Europe on EDC, precisely as defined in the treaty, or which would handicap the new Administration in living with some other form of European military organization embodying EDC essentials." Nitze then submitted a much shorter declaration to be made by the President-elect "or, preferably, by Mr. Dulles after consultation with the General" (740.5/12-1852). The same day, Bonbright submitted to Bruce a 12-page background paper on various aspects of the European Defense Community together with drafts of two statements, one a formal comment, the other a statement "pegged on a planted press question," dealing with imperative need for early ratification of the EDC. (Memorandum by McWilliams, December 18, 740.5/12-1852)

Upon his return from Paris, Acheson immediately contacted Dulles to report on the trip, and five days later, on December 24, Dulles came to the Department for further talks with Acheson and others. In a memorandum to Truman early in January, Acheson stated that Dulles had been given an office in the Department and had been encouraged to meet with Department officials to discuss a wide variety of topics including the EDC. At this time, Acheson and others were suggesting to Dulles that he recommend to President Eisenhower the dispatch of a New Year's message to General Ridgway at Paris that might include a statement strongly endorsing the EDC. Dulles made no firm commitment to these suggestions. For the memorandum of Acheson's telephone conversation with Dulles on December 19 and the Dulles-

Acheson talks of December 24, and Acheson's memorandum to Truman of January 12, 1953, see volume I.

On January 6, 1953, Eisenhower released a public message he had sent to Chancellor Adenauer which reads as follows: "I would like to thank you for your New Year's message and to reply to it most heartily. I share your hope that this year will bring a great message of progress in securing world peace. You will probably know about my New Year's message to General Ridgway in Paris in which I stressed the importance of a growing European unity and the establishment of a European Defense Community. I believe that such a development would contribute much to promote peace and the security of the free world." (*New York Times*, January 7, 1953, page 1, column 1)

740.5/1–1553 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, January 15, 1953—8 p. m.

3975. Reference Polto 1152, January 14[2] and Embtel 3964, January 15.[3] Subject is European Defense Community.

In conversation with Embassy EDC observer this morning, Alphand outlined tentative plans of French Government on additional protocols to EDC treaty. He stressed that protocols should be considered as implementation or completion of EDC treaty and that French proposals do not require any revision of any paragraph in EDC treaty. He regretted that Mayer had used term "rectification" in EDC treaty in speech before Anglo-American press club but acknowledged that perhaps this word might give certain groups in France satisfaction even though it was inaccurate. Alphand was troubled that certain newspapers already took line that protocols being sought did not amount to anything. It would help ratification greatly if assembly could believe protocols were very important. Following is substance present French intentions:

(1) With reference to protocol directing SACEUR to approve withdrawal of French units for use in French Union, Alphand added

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported that since the investiture of René Mayer as French Prime Minister at the turn of the year Alphand and other supporters were greatly encouraged about the prospects for French ratification of the EDC Treaty. (740.5/1–1353)

[3] Not printed; it reported that French officials on the EDC Interim Committee had advised the SHAPE observer that the modifications to EDC proposed by the Mayer government were limited to negotiating protocols which would insure French freedom to withdraw forces for use within the French Union, insure French freedom to produce and export war matériel within the French Union without the possibility of a veto by the EDC Commissariat, insure the integrity of French forces and Franco-German equality in a weighted voting procedure, and, finally, insure that French forces remaining in the Federal Republic after June 30, 1953 would have the same status as U.K. and U.S. forces. (740.5/1–553)

very little to information in earlier messages. He did say that protocol should also include binding recommendation to French Government to replace withdrawn units as quickly as possible. Exact language proposed should be available to us this week end.

(2) Alphand suggested that theoretical problem of weighted-voting procedure under Article 43–BIS might be corrected by provision prolonging indefinitely transitional voting procedure, thus maintaining Franco-German equality.

(3) On maintenance of "integrity" of French forces, Alphand stressed that EDC administration would have a voice in naming officers in French overseas forces in same way that France would have a voice in nomination of officers in EDC forces. He hoped this important concession of joint administration would enable other EDC countries to agree quickly to French proposal.

(4) Alphand again mentioned two years as length of interim period for French troops to have special status in Germany taking into account status of United States and British troops. He added that French would also propose establishment of a system whereby EDC forces, stationed in a country other than their own, would receive certain station and expatriation allowances.

(5) Alphand said French would propose that support costs for French troops in Germany continue for six months after date EDC treaty and contractual agreements enter into force.

(6) Alphand proposed three lines of action for British:

> (*a*) Certain agreements covering manner in which land and air forces of United Kingdom and EDC would be integrated and work together, including provision for mixed commands, are already being discussed and drafts from Hoyer-Millar are expected soon.
>
> (*b*) New ways should be found for British to go further in committing themselves to maintain troops on European continent.
>
> (*c*) Institutional association between United Kingdom and EDC, such as that being discussed in Luxembourg and Strasbourg, should be developed.

(7) Alphand also said that a general understanding would have to be reached with United States on administration, organization and procedures in connection with end-item assistance.[4] He apologized for pressing United States now in view of delay of interim committee in not accepting our proposal to exchange views sooner. He hoped we could submit in next few days a preliminary paper on our intentions which would provide a basis for talks to proceed with interim committee.

Alphand concluded by stating that these points had not been definitively approved by Cabinet action but he believed requests for protocols would be limited to these points. He then touched on Saar and United States aid as related matters which would have to be discussed. He expected French Cabinet to make final decisions next week on these subjects and to begin conversations with other EDC countries the week following. He said he would give German EDC delegation some indication of French intentions and is making an appointment with deputy head of German delegation this afternoon.

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[4] Documentation on U.S. economic assistance to France is presented in volume VI.

Alphand confirmed that groups in French Government were still thinking about possibility of interim period in which certain provisions of EDC treaty would not go into effect.

He said suggestions involved permitting each government, including German Government, to exercise defense powers for brief period which would be directly in conflict with EDC treaty. He did not expect any of suggestions to be adopted. His staff was now preparing a paper to demonstrate that EDC treaty already had made provision for transitional period adequate to permit practical operation.[5]

Dunn

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[5] Telegrams Polto 1171 (Jan. 15), 3998 (Jan. 16), 4031 (Jan. 19), and 4045 (Jan. 20) from Draper and Dunn at Paris reported the confused and concerned reaction of EDC signatory governments, especially Italy and the United Kingdom, to the planned introduction by France of new protocols to the EDC Treaty. Telegram 4045 also reported that Alphand had responded to this unfavorable reaction with the promise to make the drafts of the suggested protocols available to the heads of the delegations to the EDC Interim Committee as quickly as possible, perhaps as early as Feb. 15. All telegrams cited above are in file 740.5.

740.5/1-1653 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, January 16, 1953—6 p. m.

3993. Subject is European Defense Community.

1. At meeting between members of German EDC delegation and Embassy EDC observer group, former briefly reviewed EDC situation as it has evolved over past month. They said that Blank and others in German Government close to EDC negotiations were very disturbed by Adenauer's Munich speech, in which he agreed to talk about additional protocols before ratification. Adenauer intended his remarks to help French over their crisis. Apparently due to efforts of Blank and others, Adenauer is now persuaded that it is wiser not to encourage additional protocols.

2. Germans hope that heads of EDC delegations will meet early next week to discuss possible talks on treaty modifications. German position appears to be that treaty makes adequate provision for cases raised by French. They will probably be willing to sign additional agreements which would spell out in more detail actual procedures which will put into effect certain provisions of the treaty. They mentioned that Article 13 and "integrity" of French army—personnel administration—were problems which could be settled in this manner.

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

3. In connection with meeting of heads of delegations next week, Blank is expected to propose that interim commission staff be cut and that no controversial problems be treated in interim commission until ratification is assured. Blank is apparently very much concerned that disputes in interim mission on possible changes in treaty will be used by national parliamentarians in their debates. Also, we received impression that Blank and other exponents of civilian control are worried lest the military elements of French and German delegations begin irresponsible discussions on proposals which would in effect suggest creation of German national army and thus make ratification impossible.[2]

[Here follow two brief paragraphs dealing with the German NATO Annual Review submission and unspecified informal talks between Alphand and Von Kessel.]

DUNN

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[2] In telegram 3323 from Bonn, Jan. 19, Reber reported that Bérard had just returned from Paris with instructions to give the Federal Republic the following assurances with respect to the EDC: (1) The new French Government of René Mayer firmly supported European integration and the EDC. (2) The French Government did not desire any modifications or alterations of the treaty which would require new negotiations. Only "supplementary interpretations" were desired. (3) Any such adjustments as were necessary could be handled by and within the EDC Interim Committee (740.5/1-1953).

740.5/1-2153 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, January 21, 1953—3 p. m.

4053. Re Polto 1194, January 20.[2] Subject is European Defense Community.

1. De Staercke in conversation with Ambassador Draper and Tomlinson appeared to understand French intentions much better than his Italian and German colleagues. See Embtels 4031 and 4032, January 19.[3] He indicated that Belgian, Italian, Dutch and Luxembourg

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it reported that Spaak had informed Draper that he and a number of his fellow Belgian Socialists would fight any effort to vote down the EDC Treaty within the Socialist Party. It also reported that De Staercke had been pressing Van Zeeland to move for a quick ratification by Belgium and that Van Zeeland was continuing to demand a common length of military service before agreeing to ratification. (740.5/1-2053)

[3] Telegram 4031 is summarized in footnote 5, p. 704. Telegram 4032, not printed, reported that Von Kessel, the Deputy Chief of the German Delegation in the EDC Interim Committee, expressed greater optimism than some in the Committee regarding the proposed French protocols, but nonetheless foresaw possible serious difficulties on some of the questions the French had raised. In reviewing the French proposals, Von Kessel had stated that the French should present all they desired at once; that he recognized the need to satisfy French wishes to some extent with regard to Article 13; that he attached little importance to the

Footnote continued on following page.

EDC delegations had discussed question thoroughly. They had all agreed to recommend to their governments that they be permitted to reach agreement with French on protocols requested on following assumptions:

(*a*) Protocols would be really interpretive and fully consistent with spirit and intent of EDC treaty. Language of EDC treaty should not be changed. De Staercke expected question of Article 13 [4] to be particularly difficult.

(*b*) Each country would continue with its parliamentary process on ratification while protocols being negotiated.

(*c*) EDC interim commission would be convened for sole and express purpose of negotiating protocols and of facilitating ratification. Each delegation would be expected to be completely open and frank in discussing its situation. Any protocols or understandings necessary for ratification in a particular country would be obtained now and not later.

(*d*) Session should be limited to three or four weeks. Goal should be to complete ratification in all countries in April.

(*e*) Any protocols agreed upon should apply without discrimination to all EDC countries in comparable position.

2. De Staercke urged that the United States should press all countries in every appropriate way to adhere to above schedule. In particular, he hoped we would make our views known in Brussels as soon as we had sufficient information on French intentions.

Dunn

Footnote continued from preceding page.

weighted-vote issue; that the French were contradictory in their proposals with regard to integrity of French forces; that the extension of privileged French status of forces in Germany beyond June 30, 1953 would raise great difficulties, but that the Federal Republic would hope to find some way to help. (740.5/1–1953)

[4] Right of withdrawal of forces.

740.5/1–2153 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET Washington, January 24, 1953—4:06 p.m.

4028. Re Paris Embtels 4031,[2] 4032,[3] 4053,[4] and Polto 1192,[5] all rptd info Brussels, Rome, The Hague, Bonn, London, and circular infotel sent Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Rome, Jan 22, 1953, 5:00 a. m.[6]

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Perkins, Bonbright, Riddleberger, and Secretary Dulles. Approved for transmission by Parsons. Sent also to Brussels, Rome, The Hague, Bonn, Luxembourg, and repeated to London.

[2] Summarized in footnote 5, p. 704.

[3] Summarized in footnote 3, *supra*.

[4] *Supra*.

[5] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Draper and Vigeveno of the Dutch NATO Delegation in which Vigeveno stated that he shared the general impression of the Italian and German Delegations that the French intended to go very far in administering French EDC contingents along national lines, that the chief problem was in getting the French and Germans to agree with one another, that the major Dutch concern was continued delay in ratifica-

Reference telegrams indicate protocols or interpretive modifications EDC Treaty will be subject of considerable attention by Government of EDC countries in immediate future. Although no definite decision yet reached, EDC Interim Commission may become forum for discussion Treaty protocols, with possibility that matter will be further discussed by Foreign Ministers at February 15 Brussels meeting.

In view above likely that EDC Governments will be seeking comments from U.S. missions regarding our attitude toward protocols to Treaty. Points below have therefore been prepared for your guidance in discussing U.S. attitude toward protocols to Treaty with foreign governments. Guidance at this time confined to general U.S. attitude toward EDC, since specific information not yet available regarding actual proposals by French or others. To extent proposals have so far been made manifest they do not appear to present insuperable difficulties or run counter to essential principles EDC Treaty.

(1) As general principle, U.S. believes in flexible attitude toward minor modifications to EDC Treaty through protocols or interpretations, providing such changes can be accomplished (*a*) with minimum of delay; (*b*) without reopening Treaty or Contractuals to actual amendments; (*c*) without violating essential features of system of six-country integration; (*d*) without prejudicing German defense contribution; and (*e*) without leading U.S. public opinion to conclude situation disintegrating.

(2) U.S. not in any sense encouraging modifications to Treaty. Would be best if protocols or interpretations could be confined to French proposals, although realize that some other EDC countries will maintain they also have right to submit protocols. If others insist on protocols of their own, these should be confined to those absolutely essential to ratification. In any case, no protocols should be submitted which will reopen old wounds arising out of Articles which were negotiated after bitter debate.

(3) U.S. not in any sense interfering; modifications in EDC Treaty mainly a matter for Europeans themselves to work out. Must also remember, however, that U.S. involved in two important ways: (*a*) Some Articles do definitely affect the U.S., such as Article 13 with its NATO implications and requirements for SACEUR approval; and (*b*) U.S. has already ratified Contractuals and NATO–EDC Protocol, and modifications affecting these agreements would have serious repercussions for U.S. by raising the question of reconsideration by the U.S.

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tion, that the Italians and especially the French might demand still more changes during their respective Parliamentary debates, that René Mayer had probably made much greater concessions to the RPF than was generally known, and that French plans were to seek to honor such concessions at a later date (740.5/1-2053).

[6] Not found in Department of State files.

Senate. This makes it important as general rule that modifications be worked out in EDC, rather than NATO framework.

(4) Regarding procedure for negotiating protocols, we hope it will be possible for EDC countries to proceed expeditiously, possibly along following lines. If a country must propose protocols, they should be submitted all at one time and prior to opening of negotiations. If Interim Commission becomes forum, it should concentrate solely on task of negotiating protocols. Every effort should be made to complete negotiations before February 15 Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels so that any unresolved issues can be settled by Ministers.

(5) Highly important that all Governments push steadily ahead with parliamentary and other steps required to obtain ratification. Temptation will be great to hold back and await outcome protocol negotiations. To do so, however, would be to lose valuable time in ratification process, which in most countries must go through a number of preliminary steps before the time of basic decision is arrived at.

As foregoing indicates, no change in basic U.S. policy re EDC. U.S. continues to give fullest support to EDC as best means for strengthening defense of Europe through German contribution and as essential step in Europe's continued progress toward unity. Inaugural Address and recent Eisenhower statements to Ridgway and Adenauer make this abundantly clear and should be cited as often as possible as conclusive evidence U.S. support of EDC.

After specific proposals have been made, U.S. will be in position consider what if any steps be taken to help promote ratification. However, it is already clear one factor favorable to ratification would be closer British military association with EDF. U.S. attitude continues to be one of encouraging British association with the functional as distinct from constitutional aspects of the Community of Six.

Department would appreciate any information re (*a*) your country's attitude toward French protocols or (*b*) any protocols or interpretive modifications which country itself may propose.[7]

DULLES

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[7] In telegram 4129 from London, Jan. 27, Holmes reported that the United Kingdom concurred generally with the attitudes toward the EDC protocols expressed in the source text, particularly with regard to assuming a flexible attitude on minimum modifications which would not unduly delay ratification (740.5/1–2753).

740.5/1–2653 : Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, January 26, 1953—9 p. m.

Polto 1246. Limit distribution. Personal for the Secretary from Draper.

1. I realize that there is little I can add to information available to you in Washington in preparation for your trip.[1] Nevertheless, I thought it might be helpful if I laid before you my thoughts on what to me is the most pressing current problem in Europe for the security of our country. This is the EDC, with which I have inevitably become involved by reason of its organic connection with NATO and the part it plays in all our concerns in Europe under the Mutual Security program. Since my return from the United States nearly every other permanent representative has raised with me the problem of EDC.

2. In all six signatory countries progress since last May toward ratification has been desultory and disappointing. The excuses and explanations vary, but I am convinced the real difficulty lies in France and Germany. The other four will follow the lead and present no insurmountable problem.

3. If we accept the fact that our controlling interest is to secure an effective German military contribution to the defense of free Europe on terms which bind Germany to us and our allies, bury age-old Franco-German hostility and reassure our smaller allies, then the EDC remains the only available instrument (however imperfect) for our purpose. I do not, of course, exclude certain interpretive protocols which would not reopen the text of the treaty for renegotiation.

4. The alternatives seem to me either inacceptable or unachievable. Let me list them: *a.* Immediate German entrance into NATO (probably acceptable to 12 of our partners but surely vetoed at this time by France);

b. Bilateral US security pact with Germany (involving violent objection by France as a clear choice between France and Germany with the result United States troops up front would be backed against an unfriendly France with their loc running parallel to their front).

5. Apart from the fact that the EDC is in fact Hobson's choice, it has the very considerable asset of being European conceived and negotiated. It is after all the Pleven Plan.

6. The problem then is how to bring it into existence to brace our defenses and to avoid the risk of American patience running out. The time available is short. In late spring the Italians shortly followed by the Germans will hold national elections. If the treaty is still unratified when the campaigns go into full swing, it will inevitably be an issue. Even if it escapes mutilation or rejection in one or both of the campaigns, a further delay of months seems inevitable.

7. As I said, France and Germany are the key countries—the former because the original leadership was hers and it is here that the most

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[1] For documentation on Secretary Dulles' trip to Europe, Jan. 31–Feb. 8, 1953, see pp. 1548 ff.

serious public doubts are now expressed—Germany because there is understandable reluctance in all other five countries to ratify until there is visible proof that the defeated enemy has accepted not only EDC but the companion contractual agreement.

8. The situation in Germany of course complicated by the constitutional issue which may be raised by the court in its forthcoming opinion which might affect aspects of EDC treaty or the contractual agreement or both. If a problem were thereby raised in connection with treaty (and a two-thirds majority necessary to ratify) it might be necessary then to consider some device (possibly bringing EDC and hence FedRep into more intimate association with NAC) for the purpose of attracting SPD support.

9. The United States has left Europe in no doubt either before or after the election that it supports EDC fully. Although I believe this support should be reiterated publicly from time to time by the President and yourself, I do not believe that this alone will be enough. Nor do I believe that public threats from the United States will help. It is essential that European initiative, best taken under French leadership, be clear both in fact and in appearance.

10. It seems to me your impending trip to Europe provides the opportunity for you to warn the leaders of Europe privately and with great gravity that time is running out on EDC and that the consequences of its abandonment, or further serious delay in its ratification, are literally incalculable. They in turn could make effective use of this private warning in their efforts to rally the wavering. I suggest that you particularly emphasize this to the French and the Germans but also make the same point to the other four, since prompt and even independent action by one or more of them would generate in some degree pressure on France.

11. I have the impression that the United Kingdom shares our sense of urgency in this matter. Some action on their part, properly timed, and presented to strengthen their practical but not constitutional association with the EDC, would seem to be an important factor in securing French ratification. I assume this will come up in your talks in London.

12. I do appreciate that the purpose of your entire trip is to listen. Nevertheless, it provides an unusual opportunity which may not recur to move forward the project which is central to all our policies in Europe and which is now faltering.

DRAPER

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417, "Jan-June, 1953"

Memorandum of Discussion of State-Mutual Security Agency-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held at the Pentagon Building, January 28, 1953, 10:30 p.m.[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1953.

Present: Mr. Dulles
General Smith
Mr. Matthews
Mr. MacArthur
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Stassen
General Bradley
General Hull
Admiral Fechteler
General Twining
General Lemnitzer
Admiral Duncan
General White[2]
Admiral Lalor
Colonel Carns
Admiral Davis
General Gerhart
General Rogers
General Fox
Admiral Boone
Mr. Frank Nash

General Bradley: I understand that Mr. Dulles wishes to discuss possible alternatives to EDC. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee has been studying this matter and has prepared a paper which has not yet, however, been coordinated for distribution.

From the military viewpoint, EDC presents a solution to the problem of German participation and it is thus desired by the military. If this is not possible, the military would prefer full German participation in NATO.

The French have come a long way in the last two years in moving toward German participation. Two years ago Moch was in favor of German privates being recruited into French squads. Since that time they have accepted the idea of larger units.

Our military finally came to the position that EDC would be an acceptable solution, although not as good as German full membership in NATO.

Eisenhower recommended that we push the EDC. The real problem is that of getting German participation. Anything which does not accomplish that doesn't mean very much. In hearings before the Congress, I have always had to face the question as to when we were going to get German help in defending Europe. It would be difficult to justify Congressional appropriations for Europe if there were no such prospect. If this is not possible, the only alternative would be to fall way back. We would be surrendering many important things which would likely get us into great difficulties.

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[1] There is no indication on the source text as to who drafted this memorandum. It was prepared by the Department of State.

[2] Presumably Lt. Gen. Thomas D. White, USAF.

The military are worried about the general attitude in Europe. There has been a let up on the ground that the threat is not as great as it was assumed to be. From our viewpoint the USSR's capability is still there. We have no way of knowing what Soviet intentions are. Initially, our problem was one of encouragement and of laying out the general outline of a plan for European defense. Now considerable progress has been made, and Ridgway has had to move into a different field—that of pointing out where deficiencies are and urging the European countries to come up to scratch. They then complain that Ridgway isn't doing a good job.

Mr. Dulles: I'm surprised at your statement that you consider full membership in NATO to be better than the EDC.

General Bradley: We have been concerned about the strings on German production which the French are pressing for in connection with EDC. As a full member in NATO, Germany would not be under such restrictions.

Mr. Dulles: From the political standpoint, EDC is much to be preferred. It would serve to combine Germany and France in a manner more trustworthy than a treaty relationship. The problem in Europe has been the recurrent conflicts between France and Germany leading to recurrent wars. Unless these conflicts are buried, difficulties between them are apt to reappear. We may find that treaty relationships, like the German-USSR alliance,[3] will be torn up.

General Bradley: We realize that a political alliance would be better than a treaty. The French, however, have protocols to the EDC drawn up which contain very bad restrictions from our standpoint.

Mr. Dulles: We kept all restrictions out of the Japanese Treaty.[4] I say this not to boast, but merely to indicate that I agree that restrictions are a bad thing.

General Bradley: We realize that rotation of officers may be necessary, but some of the French protocols would seem to make it impossible to get anything effective in the way of EDC forces.

Mr. Dulles: If you can't get EDC, wouldn't you have to give up the conception of continental defense? Wouldn't you have to think of a defense based on Spain, Turkey, and various islands.

General Bradley: We have given much thought to that conception. From our standpoint, it isn't very good.

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[3] Reference is presumably to the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939.

[4] Reference is to the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 777 ff.

Mr. Dulles: From the negotiations standpoint, it is useful to have alternatives. If the French and Germans should come to see that the military position would be tolerable for us if we could hold Turkey, Spain, etc. that would create pressures on them which would not exist if they think we are so committed that we must carry the entire load in the area.

General Bradley: If one looks at the alternative, however, and contemplates going back onto the continent after having lost it, all the people we now know would be gone.

Mr. Dulles: We need something that is within our own control. The alternative may not be nice, but otherwise we are dependent upon the Europeans. We are not thinking of how to give up the EDC; the question is how to get the EDC. An alternative is necessary if we are to get it.

General Bradley: If we were to give up the concept of defending Germany, the Iron Curtain might move to the Rhine which would give us a very serious military problem. There would also be political problems.

Mr. Nitze: Mr. Secretary, last fall we prepared a paper on the alternatives to EDC[5] on the assumption that EDC ratification was delayed so long as to be tantamount to rejection and that full German participation in NATO was impossible. The best alternatives we could come up with did not look very good. Even if one went to a peripheral defense it would probably still be necessary to maintain considerable forces in Europe to avoid losing Europe in the cold war. These forces would be in a militarily unfavorable position.

General Bradley: I think our position is generally in agreement with that paper.

Admiral Fechteler: Maybe we should go to an Anglo-German-US alliance. If one talks of moving back to Spain, the Scandinavian countries would probably drop out of the alliance. If you give up Germany, the Dutch would probably drop out.

General Hull: It seems to me that what we are discussing are the results of a failure to get EDC rather than an alternative to EDC.

General Smith: Isn't it true that Churchill does not believe in the EDC?

General Bradley: Our experience in Korea has shown that people will fight pretty well for a principle and under the U.N. flag.

Mr. Dulles: Churchill himself feels that one can only fight for a nation and, therefore, feels that other people react the same way. He may very well be wrong about this.

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[5] See editorial note, p. 693.

Mr. Stassen: How much time have we got to get German contribution? If it were to take two years, would we be taking an awful chance?

General Bradley: Our intelligence estimate was that the period 1954–55 would be the most dangerous, and that by that time we should be able to get forces up to such a state that an attack would be less probable. The British think the danger has already become less and the French tend to agree with them. We on the other hand feel that the Soviets have the necessary capabilities and that some miscalculation might cause them to move. We find it difficult to judge Soviet intentions. What is your view, General Smith?

General Smith: I can only agree with your analysis.

Mr. Stassen: Couldn't we, with the use of atomic weapons, slow up any Russian advance?

General Bradley: We think we could even now with atomic weapons slow them up, but they have built up their forward stockpiles and have increased their mobility. They have motorized a number of divisions. While our stockpile has gone up, they have also increased their capabilities.

Mr. Stassen: What are the chances of trouble behind their lines?

General Smith: Not great until it looks as though the pendulum were about to swing against them. There would be some opposition even while the Russians were advancing, but it would not be much or very effective until the people realized that it was only a matter of time until the Russians would have to withdraw. In France, the Maquis were not effective until the pendulum had clearly begun to swing. Our intelligence reports are extremely disappointing as to any effective underground behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. Stassen: Combining everything, does it add up that we can't contemplate holding the center of Europe without German troops?

General Bradley: We need enough to make them concentrated. We don't have enough atomic weapons to plaster all of Europe. Twelve German divisions would put a completely different picture on the situation. It would force them to a considerable build-up before they could attack. German participation would make it certain that we were given warning.

Mr. Matthews: Returning to Admiral Fechteler's suggestion, I do not think the British would go along with a German-British-US alliance.

Admiral Fechteler: A British admiral told me that their mistake was in fighting the Germans and not the French.

General Bradley: The JCS realizes that the EDC may lead to unity in Europe. They feel this would be fine. German membership in

NATO would be better only if EDC results in too many restrictions being put on the Germans.

Mr. Stassen: If France went Communist, would German troops be of any use?

General Bradley: It would be pretty tough having commies on one's line of communication.

General Hull: If France were allied with the Russians, we would be in a completely untenable position in Germany.

General Bradley: If we were to lose Germany and were reduced to the possibility of holding on the Rhine, it would become very difficult to decide whether to invest more of our resources in attempting to hold there.

Mr. Stassen: How important is Europe from the air standpoint?

General Twining: Europe doesn't make too much difference to SAC.

Mr. Nitze: Wouldn't the defense of the UK be more difficult if the commies were on the English Channel?

General Twining: It wouldn't have too much bearing on the defense of the U.K.

Mr. Dulles: What would happen in North Africa if France were to go commie?

General Bradley: This would be serious. Our problem is that we are faced with more and more demands from the French. Maybe what we should do is to tell them that they will receive nothing more until they do something about ratifying the EDC.

Mr. Stassen: I am worried as to what would happen in the meantime. Suppose they were to drop Indochina?

General Bradley: This would be very bad.

Mr. Stassen: If Japan got stronger, how bad would it be if Indochina were lost?

General Bradley: It would still be bad. It would lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia.

Mr. Dulles: If Southeast Asia were lost, this would lead to the loss of Japan. The situation of the Japanese is hard enough with China being commie. You would not lose Japan immediately, but from there on out the Japs would be thinking on how to get on the other side.

Mr. Stassen: How anxious are the French to hold Indochina?

Mr. Dulles: They have no desire to hold Indochina except for the effect that the loss of Indochina would have in North Africa.

Mr. Matthews: They feel North Africa is vital; otherwise they would become a country like Belgium.

Mr. Stassen: It is possible to hold a beachhead in Indochina?

General Bradley: Our present capabilities are not enough.

Mr. Stassen: If you were to hold a nubbin, wouldn't that be of psychological importance?

Mr. Dulles: What should our answer be if the French put it up to us that they are going to withdraw from Indochina?

General Bradley: We studied the Indochinese situation in five-power discussions with the French, British, Australians and New Zealanders. We were considering the question of what we could do if the Chinese moved overtly into Indochina. We did not consider French withdrawal in these discussions because the French were participating in them. We are quite clear that we would have to react against China itself. The French and British are leery about blockades, etc.

Mr. Stassen: Unless the Chinese were prepared to accept retaliation by our air, etc., it is doubtful whether they would move into Indochina. But if one were to assume that the French weakened their position in Indochina, might not the Chinese move in some way unless they thought we were prepared to hold at least a beachhead?

General Bradley: We think the Vietnam[ese] could hold the Vietminh if they knew what their future status would be and if the necessary forces could be trained.

Mr. Stassen: Have we no training mission in Indochina?

General Bradley: The French are touchy about training missions for non-commissioned officers. They never took advantage of our offer to have them inspect our Korean training operation.

Mr. Stassen: Should we tie their acceptance of a training mission to any additional help for Indochina?

General Bradley: That might lead them to say that we should take the whole thing. If they would adopt a training system similar to that we use in Korea that might be enough and might obviate a U.S. training mission.

Mr. Dulles: As I gather it, you would not see anything seriously wrong with the deGaullist point of view.

General Bradley: Yes we do. Isn't deGaulle opposed to arming the Germans at all.

Mr. Matthews: He is a little fuzzy on what he wants.

Mr. MacArthur: The deGaullists are not opposed to German forces in NATO, but they indicate that this should only be done after French forces are built up to 22 divisions. They don't really come clean as to what it is they propose, but they certainly don't propose going ahead with German participation right away.

Mr. Dulles: How soon could you get a German army?

General Hull: This depends largely on equipment. Certain types of equipment will be in short supply as long as the Korean build-up continues and the build-up of our own forces. Some items will be critical for some time.

Mr. Dulles: By some time do you mean two years?

General Hull: One to two years.

General Bradley: We have been hoping that the Germans could produce many of the necessary items themselves.

General Hull: The NATO build-up is a year behind because of Korea. Korea has been supported out of existing means. Then these are replaced as funds are made available. 105 mm howitzers, which constitute the divisional artillery support, are the real problem in expanding forces.

Mr. Matthews: Would you have enough for German training purposes?

General Hull: Yes.

General Bradley: In some items of equipment, such as F–84's, we have more than the European are ready to accept.

Mr. Stassen: Are we using F–84's in our own forces?

General Twining: These are our best fighter bombers, and we will have eight wings of F–84's.

Mr. Stassen: I take it the critical items are artillery, radar, and ammunition.

General Hull: The equipping of German forces could probably be accomplished about as rapidly as the training, etc. could be done.

General Bradley: The Germans still have a reservoir of trained noncommissioned officers and officers. Cadres could rapidly be built from these men. Later they could be filled up with younger men.

General Twining: One further point. The air force is much pleased with the progress being made in negotiations with Spain.[6] It hopes these negotiations will continue with the new Administration's full support.

The meeting then adjourned.

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[6] Documentation on relations with Spain is presented in volume VI.

Editorial Note

Secretary of State Dulles and Harold E. Stassen, Director of the Mutual Security Administration, visited Western Europe between January 31 and February 8, 1953 for a series of conferences and discussions with various American and European officials on outstanding problems facing the Western alliance including the EDC. For documentation on the Dulles–Stassen trip to Europe in January and February 1953, see pages 1548 ff.

740.5/2–653: Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Draper) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 6, 1953—5 p. m.

Polto 1354. Rossi-Longhi, Italian permanent representative to NAC came in February 5 seeking my personal advice on aspect EDC ratification. He said that question in Italian Government's mind apparently is should it proceed all possible parliamentary haste to ratify protocols in accordance assurances De Gasperi gave you[2] regarding rapid action or should the government await receipt, study and possibly negotiation of protocols in Interim Committee prior to prodding Parliament. Obvious advantage first course would be concrete evidence progress in one capital and pressure passage in Rome would exert on French. He pointed out, however, that we would be risking difficulties in Italian Parliament if it were asked to act on treaty alone with knowledge protocols almost inevitable. Rossi-Longhi also feared that we would put pressure on Italy to accept unsatisfactory protocols that might arise after Italian ratification. He pointed out that French could very well ask for additional protocols under pressure from French Parliament.

In reply I stressed over-riding importance of early action in ratifying treaty but asked Rossi-Longhi to discuss question again after I had had an opportunity to discuss with my colleagues. After cabling substance my proposed reply to Secretary in Bonn, I urged Rossi-Longhi to push ahead with ratification. I pointed out to him that best way to avoid additional delays and new requests for protocols from French was for other EDC countries to complete parliamentary process. This was also best way to help Mayer keep his promise against parliamentary pressure that France would ask only for protocols that were "interpretative" and in every way consistent with spirit and intent of treaty. Rossi-Longhi again mentioned the possible risks involved, but said he agreed and that he would use his influence to obtain quick action in Rome. He said that Italian Ambassador in Paris would support him. He mentioned that he had also been encouraged because in a talk with Van Starkenborgh yesterday, latter had been more favorably inclined and had said that he would recommend that the Dutch Government follow the same course.

DRAPER

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[1] Repeated to Rome and to The Hague for Secretary Dulles, who was visiting Western European capitals with Mutual Security Administrator Stassen. For documentation on their trip, see pp. 1548 ff.

[2] For a record of Dulles' conversation with De Gasperi, see telegram 4275, Feb. 1, p. 1551.

740.5/2–1253 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1953—1 a. m.

4503. Limit distribution. Subject is European Defense Community. This cable transmits report of meeting of heads of EDC delegations held this afternoon.[1] Translation of note submitted at meeting by French containing their proposed protocols is forwarded in immediately following three cables.[2]

1. Alphand opened meeting by reaffirming intention of French Government to ratify treaty. He explained that need to interpret and to clarify treaty before ratification arose mainly because of problems resulting from France's defense responsibilities in Indochina and other non-European territories.

2. He stressed that proposals of French Government would not be inconsistent with the spirit or the letter of the treaty.

(*a*) Protocol on interchangeability of personnel was needed for rotation of officers and NCO's between EDC contingents and national forces needed for Indochina and other non-European defense responsibilities. France was faced with situation of fact, and practical means to conserve rank and privileges of personnel were required. He stressed that it was not intended that rotation be extensive unless required by crisis situation such as Indochina.

Alphand said that after recruitment French personnel would be divided into European contingents and national contingents. He stressed that instruction, discipline and training of European contingents would be same in every respect as contingents from other EDC countries. European contingents of French origin would be subject to European statutes as soon as they are drawn up just as other contingents. He pointed out that French proposals are based on and are entirely consistent with Article 10(5), Article 31, and Article 11 of military protocol.

(*b*) Alphand's comments on Article 13 are being reported tomorrow in separate message.[3]

(*c*) Protocol on extension of weighted voting under Article 43 bis stems from theoretical, if not psychological, considerations. After passing cut-off date set in Article 43 bis, France may be called on to make substantial defense contributions outside of the EDC reducing her EDC contribution. French Government must show that provisions of 43 bis are extended to take care of such a contingency.

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[1] In telegram 4462 from Paris, Feb. 10, Dunn had reported that he had accepted Alphand's invitation to attend the closed meeting of the heads of delegations of the EDC Interim Committee at which the French protocols were to be presented (740.5/2–1053). The EDC Interim Committee had been created by protocol at the time of the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952 in order to act as a steering and coordinating body during the interim period between Treaty signing and full ratification by all member nations. See editorial note, p. 684. The Interim Committee established its own subcommittees to deal with the various problems that emerged during the interim period. Further documentation on the detailed workings of the Interim Committee may be found in the Bruce Mission files, lot 57 M 38. See editorial note, p. 734.

[2] Telegrams 4504, 4505, 4506, and 4509, *infra*, pp. 722, 724, and 725, respectively.

[3] See telegram 4508, Feb. 12, p. 726.

(*d*) Protocol on schools designed to demonstrate that EDF schools can be used by French national forces, since clearly France cannot afford to maintain a military school system separate from the EDF schools. He said financial consequences would have to be worked out.

(*e*) Article 107 protocol was merely to clarify right which France has under the treaty to produce, import and export armaments for use in connection with defense of overseas territories.

(*f*) Article 75 protocol was also only to make more explicit fact that until European mobilizations plans are drawn up by the commissariat, national plans remain in effect.

3. Two other points on which French wish decisions before ratification are following:

(*a*) Question of status of non-German EDC forces stationed in Germany. Preliminary discussions have already been held on this problem. Final decision should be subject of a project d'accord between Federal Republic and EDC Commissariat.

(*b*) Procedures for handling end-item aid from United States destined for EDC contingents.

4. Alphand continued that he knew other delegations wished to know if these were the only requests French had to make. On this he could give no final answer. Each government must make its own judgment on the basis of its own parliamentary situation. He assured other delegations that if any additional texts were submitted by France, they would also be within letter and spirit of treaty.

In quick succession, other delegations said they were willing to be of assistance but insisted on basic principle that protocols must not change or modify the treaty. De Staercke and Van Starkenborgh in particular took very strong position that French must adhere to promise in Bidault's letter repeated in expose Alphand had just made and must not upset delicate balance in treaty which was reached only after long and difficult negotiation. Von Kessel, German delegate, pointed out that he recognized and appreciated position French were in, but that French must also recognize problems which existed in Germany, underlining need of keeping discussions and protocols in a completely "European" context. Lombardo, for Italians, reaffirmed what other delegates had said, pointing out that Italy has submitted treaty to Parliament with intention of pushing ratification through as rapidly as possible and that proposals must not complicate situation in Italy.

5. De Staercke raised uniform length of service question. His government felt that this question could no longer be avoided, and that it could not ratify treaty until it was able to give Parliament a clear indication of its commitments. Other delegations unanimously expressed their willingness to consider De Staercke's request.

6. On a different subject, Hoyer Millar, for United Kingdom, stated that United Kingdom proposal on military association dealt with only the technical military aspects of British EDC association, and did not cover political association, on which he expected to have something later. He said that text was tentative only, and not final, and that United Kingdom was prepared to modify or change its proposal if discussions indicated this desirable.

7. Next meeting of Directing Committee scheduled Friday, February 20. Delegations hope to have discussed protocols sufficiently with their governments to permit them to make fair amount of progress before Ministers' meeting in Rome on 24th.

8. All delegations agreed that protocols and discussions should be kept absolutely secret and that nothing should be said to press.

DUNN

740.5/2-1253 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1953—1 a. m.

4504. Limit distribution. Re Embtel 4503, February 12, 1953.[1] Subject is European Defense Community.

This is second of series of four cables. Following is translation of note submitted by French EDC delegation to EDC Interim Committee this afternoon:

Begin text. The French delegation today submits in the name of its government five drafts of interpretive and complementary protocols to the treaty creating the European Defense Community. It has the honor to inform the delegations of the states signatory to the treaty of May 27, 1952, that the French Government also expects to have the following three points settled.

I. *Agreement concerning Article 13 of the treaty.*

By reason of the importance for the defense of the free world, of the security of the non-European territories for which France assumes defense responsibilities, the possibility as provided under Article 13 of having her EDC contingents placed again at her disposal is a vital necessity for France. The French Government would, therefore, prefer that the conditions under which Article 13 will be applied be the object of a protocol agreement among the states signatory to the treaty. It will shortly submit proposals to that effect.

II. *Status and financial regime of the non-German contingents of the community stationed in Germany.*

This question is of interest especially to those countries having forces now stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic, i.e., France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Upon the entry into force of the

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[1] *Supra.*

Paris treaty, these forces will be subject to a statute distinct from that applicable at present.

Article 28 of the convention on the status of European Defense Forces recognizes this situation by stipulating that agreements will be concluded between the community and the receiving state. The French Government proposes that the preparation of these agreements be undertaken immediately within the Interim Committee.

III. *Conditions in which external aid will be granted to the community.*

The French Government deems that Article 99 relating to external aid in the form of equipment or funds furnished the community should be made more specific by means of a protocol on the subject of application of the provisions of that Article. The necessary negotiations should be undertaken without delay between the governments of the states signatory to the Paris Treaty and the representatives of the United States Government. *End Text.*

DUNN

740.5/2–1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1953—1 a. m.

4505. Limit distribution. Reference: Embtel 4503 February 12.[1] Subject is European Defense Community.

This is third of series of four cables. Following are the two parts of French proposal on interchangeability of French forces:

Begin Text. 1. Draft convention on interchangeability of French military personnel of land and air forces.

Article 1.

Articles 2 through 4 of the present convention apply to military personnel of land and air forces of French origin placed at the disposal of the EDC or forming part of the national forces referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 10 of the treaty.

The personnel referred to above are called upon to serve indifferently (indifferemment) in the European defense forces or in the national forces.

Article 2.

The French Government shall decide initial assignment of military personnel either to the French contingent of the European defense forces or to national forces.

It shall also decide, under the conditions set forth in paragraph 5 of Article 10 of the treaty, the exchanges between personnel serving the French contingent of the European defense forces and those who serve in the national forces.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 719.

Article 3.

Without prejudice to the provisions of the treaty pertaining to ranks above that of commander of a basic unit of homogeneous nationality, the French Government shall promulgate (pronounce) the promotions and in general the decisions directly affecting the career of French military personnel, either upon proposal of the commissariat or upon proposal of the competent official echelon of the national forces.

For this purpose, a table of advancement (or an aptitude list) shall be established for each rank on which will figure both the personnel proposed by the commissariat as well as those proposed by the competent official echelon of the national forces.

Article 4.

Until such time as the statute for personnel of the European defense forces enters into effect, the status of the French military personnel serving in the European defense forces or in the national French forces shall, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the military protocol, be governed by French legislation or regulations.

When the statute provided for in Article 11 of the military protocol has been approved, under the conditions set forth in Article 44 of the treaty, it shall be incumbent upon the French Government to adapt the statutes of the national forces to that statute.

Article 5.

The provisions above may be applied to any state adhering to the European Defense Community which assumes responsibilities for the defense of non-European territories.

2. Agreement for the application of Articles 10 and 31 of the treaty and of the convention on interchangeability of French military personnel.

The Commissariat of the EDC and the French Government agree as follows:

Article 1.

The personnel, who are the subject of the present convention, are divided according to their specialization into groups, each having a special statute. Following the entry into force of the statute provided for in Article 11 of the military protocol, the commissariat and the French Government shall act in concert to harmonize the regulations and the instructions in implementation thereof.

Article 2.

Decisions not directly affecting career, such as assignments or internal transfers, shall be taken independently by the commissariat or the national authority, each acting for the personnel over which it has jurisdiction at that time.

Article 3.

For the administration of certain categories of non-officer personnel to be defined by the common agreement, the French Government may grant temporary delegations of its powers to the commissariat.

With respect to these same personnel, the commissariat may, with the agreement of the French Government, delegate to its subordinate authorities certain of its powers of decision, particularly as concerns advancement. *End Text.*

DUNN

740.5/2–1253 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1953—1 a. m.

4506. Limit distribution. Re: Embtel 4503, February 12.[1] Subject is European Defense Community.

This is fourth in series of four cables. Following are translations of four proposed French protocols:

Begin Text. A. Draft protocol on weighted voting:
The provisions of Article 43 bis shall remain applicable until a date to be fixed by unanimous vote of the council.

B. Draft protocol interpreting Article 75:

1. The purpose of the plans for mobilization of European defense forces provided for under Article 75 is to determine the requirements of these forces.
2. Until the conclusion of the agreements provided for under paragraph two of Article 75 as regards the division of responsibility between the commissariat and the member states for the measures in execution of these plans, the competent national administrations shall alone retain sole responsibility for the measures in question, without prejudice to the inspection and control by the commissariat as provided for under Article 76.

C. Draft complementary protocol concerning schools:

1. Entrance to schools having European status shall be open to the personnel of national forces provided for in Article 10 of the treaty.
2. Upon the entry into effect of the treaty, elementary and advanced common course shall be created in addition to those already provided for under paragraph one of Article 27 of the military protocol, and exchanges of students among the schools shall be organized.
3. The duration of the transitional period provided for under paragraph six of section two of Article 27 of the military protocol shall be fixed by the commissariat with the agreement of the council.

D. Draft interpretive protocol of Article 107:

Article 1. The licenses provided for in paragraph 4(*e*) of Article 107 for the forces referred to in Article 10 of the treaty shall be delivered by the commissariat upon the entry into effect of the treaty and without limit as to duration. They shall be irrevocable. They shall cover the over-all requirements of each category of forces. They shall contain no quantitative or qualitative indications with respect to equipment or products.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 719.

In order to permit exercise of the control foreseen under the terms of paragraph 4(*e*) of Article 107 of the treaty, the beneficiary states shall annually furnish the commissariat with all necessary information on the nature and the volume of the equipment referred to in the present article.

Article 2. The same system shall apply to the forces of associated states for which the member states assume defense responsibilities.

Article 3. The governments receiving general licenses shall by virtue of such general licenses be authorized to issue specific licenses necessary for the production, importation or exportation of military equipment under the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 107.

Article 4. In order to achieve the best utilization of the resources of the community and to facilitate the standardization of equipment used by the various forces, the member states receiving general licenses delivered under the conditions defined in Articles 1, 2 and 3 above shall draw to the fullest extent possible on the military equipment production and the import and export possibilities of the European Defense Community. *End Text.*

DUNN

740.5/2-1253 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1953—11 a. m.

4509. Limit distribution. Re 4508, February 12.[1] Subject is European Defense Community.

Following is translation of draft French protocol on withdrawal of forces under Article 13 which Alphand submitted at meeting heads of delegations yesterday:

Begin Text. Draft Protocol Between the Signatory States of the European Defense Community Treaty.

The signatory states of the treaty constituting the European Defense Community:

Taking into consideration the necessity in which France finds itself, by reason of the defense responsibilities which it assumes in certain non-European territories, to be able at any moment to dispose of forces sufficient to face without delay an exceptional situation in one of such territories;

Deeming that the maintenance of the external and internal security of these territories constitutes an essential element of protection against the threat of direct or indirect aggression in the world, and should hereafter be considered as involved in the general strategic objectives of Western defense;

Accordingly are in agreement on the necessity of SACEUR being requested by the North Atlantic authorities from whom he depends to accede to requests which may be presented by the Government of

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[1] *Infra.*

France, pursuant to Article 13 of the EDC Treaty, to have placed at its disposal a portion of the contingents furnished by this government to the European defense forces;

Requests the Government of France and SACEUR to consult immediately, in such a case, concerning the conditions under which forces thus withdrawn will be replaced, in order to re-establish as soon as possible the integrity of the forces placed at the disposal of SACEUR.

Proposed Resolution of (North) Atlantic Council.

The Atlantic Council:

Having recognized the protocol effected on . . . between the six signatory states of the treaty constituting the European Defense Community,

Instructs the Supreme Commander in Europe to follow the recommendations set forth in the above protocol when required to take action under Article 13. *End Treaty.*

Dunn

740.5/2–1253: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 12, 1953—11 a. m.

4508. Limit distribution. Subject is European Defense Community.

1. Alphand telephoned me 20 minutes before meeting of Interim Committee this afternoon to tell me on a confidential basis that Mayer and Bidault had just given him instructions to submit earlier draft of French protocol on Article 13 (transmitted Polto 1378 of February 7)[1] to Interim Committee instead of draft that had been worked out in conversations with us. (See Polto 1400 of February 10.)[2] He said that Mayer and Bidault did not disagree with the latter draft but they insisted that the earlier draft had to be submitted this afternoon. Alphand was very embarrassed and apologetic. He said he had done his very best to have these instructions reversed and had given all the obvious arguments why such an action would be most unfortunate, but he had been unsuccessful and now there was nothing to do but to follow his instructions.

2. I told Alphand that this action seemed incredible in view of Bidault's previously expressed wish not to proceed on basis of a text which would be generally unacceptable to the US and in view of his own statement that French Government would prefer to hold back text on Article 13 if an understanding had not been reached with us.

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[1] Not printed (740.5/2–753).

[2] Not printed; it contained a translation of the latest French draft protocol on Article 13 following discussions with American Embassy officials pursuant to telegram Topol 858 to Paris, Feb. 7. Topol 858 proposed various changes in the emerging French draft in order that the "formula of protocol appear to be interpretation rather than modification of treaty". Polto 1400 is in file 740.5/2–1053. Topol 858 is in file 740.5/2–753.

Alphand replied that he had prepared for this afternoon's meeting on this basis but had been overruled. (Paragraph 2 of note submitted by French delegation and cabled in Embtel 4503,[3] bears this out.) He could do nothing but follow his instructions.

3. I asked Alphand if I could telephone Bidault immediately and urge him to hold up text, pointing out unfortunate impression which would be created in the US by this conduct. Alphand replied that this was not possible because I was not supposed to know what his instructions were in advance of the meeting.

4. During meeting, Alphand submitted protocol on Article 13 nearly identical with text sent in Polto 1378, February 7. (Exact text in immediately following cable.)[4] He did not comment on conflict with statement in paragraph I of note submitted at same time (see Embtel 4504)[5] but did stress repeatedly that this text was put forward as a basis of discussion and that he appreciated other delegates would probably have comments to make to improve presentation. He pointed out that Article 13 problem regarding withdrawal of forces is more theoretical than practical. Only twice in last thirty years have French sent forces overseas, and no one believes that SACEUR would withhold his consent if emergency arose. Unfortunately, criticisms are being made on juridical grounds, and practical answers will not suffice, hence the need for a protocol of some sort.

5. After meeting, I again told Alphand that we were dismayed by the highly irregular way in which discussions had been conducted with the US Government, particularly when his government had been informed of importance we attached to avoiding discussions and action in NAC and to avoiding highlighting question of withdrawal of forces from NATO. Alphand explained that Bidault was not in disagreement with our text but he considered it advisable to begin negotiations with language in preamble of previous text and Bidault also could not be shaken from his opinion that NAC had to give instructions to SACEUR in order to make conditions in protocol binding on him. Alphand continued that he still believed it was far preferable for French Government to submit protocol on Article 13 worked out with us, rather than for the US to do so. He said that Bidault would not be available until late Saturday because of his trip to London. He believed Bidault's agreement could be obtained if I would stress to him that SACEUR could not insist upon his right to veto withdrawal under Article 13 if he were notified of the protocol approved by the six EDC countries. I asked Alphand to arrange for me to see Bidault as soon as possible so that question could be handled in this way. I told him that in view of the fact that

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[3] Dated Feb. 12, p. 719.
[4] Telegram 4509, Feb. 12, *supra*.
[5] Dated Feb. 12, p. 721.

other delegates now have a proposed protocol on Article 13, we must inform them immediately of the reasons why we do not find the protocol as submitted to them acceptable.

DUNN

740.5/2–1353: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 13, 1953—3:04 a. m.

4397. Dept will comment later on substance French EDC protocols after study.[2]

Meanwhile feeling here is that we should do everything possible to take advantage of stimulus which the Secretary gave to EDC during his recent trip [3] and particularly to encourage early ratification (or at least parliamentary action by lower chambers) in Benelux and Italy. Following is our appraisal of situation and suggested course of action:

1. Present difficulty is that each of six EDC countries is waiting for others to ratify first. Responsibility for failure to act is widely diffused with no country in fact feeling any individual responsibility. Uncertainty over negotiation on French protocols is a major cause for this hesitation. Problem is to break "vicious circle" of inaction by instilling in certain EDC governments a real desire to push ahead with ratification and to do so in spite of French protocols.

2. Tentative conclusion here is that best solution is to persuade Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Italy to form united front, determined to push ahead with ratification. To do so would focus responsibility on both France and Germany. France has very difficult parliamentary problem but if other countries ratify, French parliament would think very carefully before bearing full responsibility for failure of EDC with all consequences of such failure. Same considerations might apply to German constitutional court, which might find itself in unenviable position of small group of men holding up final action on a project which had been approved by four other countries.

3. There are various factors favorable to success of joint "four country" action by Benelux and Italy. First, countries themselves seem to be thinking along these lines. Netherlands Government has suggested to Second Chamber that it go ahead with Committee consideration without awaiting conclusion French protocol negotiations. Italian Government is proceeding with EDC consideration in Chamber of Deputies in line with De Gasperi's statement to Secretary Dulles that he would seek immediate ratification. Furthermore, Italian EDC representative has already informed French of his government's intention proceed with ratification prior to completion protocol negotiations. This done on instructions from Rome. Finally, Van Zeeland in dis-

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden and MacArthur. Cleared with Secretary Dulles, Bonbright, Hay, Moore, Byington, and Knight. Initialed for the Secretary by MacArthur. Sent also to The Hague, Brussels, Rome, London, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

[2] See telegram 4481 to Paris, Feb. 18, p. 734.

[3] Regarding the Dulles–Stassen trip to Europe, see pp. 1548 ff.

cussing EDC before Chamber Feb. 11 urged prompt parliamentary action, adding protocol negotiations should not delay study project. Furthermore, during Secretary's Feb 8 meeting with Bech and Dupong in Luxembourg, Secretary pointed out importance of other EDC countries going ahead with ratification as means focusing responsibility on France and Germany. Bech was impressed by idea. He said ministerial committee of 6 EDC countries meets in Rome Feb 24 and he had in mind seeking agreement of Dutch and Belgian Ministers that 3 Benelux countries would proceed immediately toward getting favorable vote on EDC ratification at least in their lower chambers of parliament. If Italy could also move it would be extremely helpful. Bech added that if French Government or some prominent member of French Cabinet would suggest to him that immediate steps toward ratification would help French, it would assist Bech. He said he was seeing Robert Schuman in a few days and would talk to him privately about this possibility. On whole we do not believe Bech will succeed in obtaining informal favorable expression opinion from responsible French Government source. French leaders favoring EDC might be moved by pride while opponents would be averse at forcing French hand. Therefore, we should seek to influence Bech toward above action with his Dutch and Belgian colleagues regardless his desire have French suggest immediate steps toward ratification.

4. If, as Bech has suggested, 3 Benelux countries and also Italy could agree to push EDC at least through their lower houses in next several weeks it would be encouraging evidence that EDC is again moving forward toward successful conclusion. Such action would have a number of advantages. It would tend to limit area of discussion of protocols, would also deter French from submitting further protocols, which Alphand indicated would be a possibility (which Jules Moch might try to stimulate) and would have excellent impact on US public opinion.

5. We are not in a position to know whether Belgium and Holland will go along with Bech's suggestion, but we believe it should be supported. US Diplomatic missions in The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg and Rome take special steps to stress importance of early action and report results. Ambassador Dunn in his capacity as US Observer to EDC Interim Committee if he judges it wise could discuss Bech's suggestion with De Staercke and Starkenborgh, both of whom indicated to Secretary's party during recent trip conviction that early action by some of smaller EDC countries and Italy would have a great effect in giving new momentum to EDC.

Dulles

740.5/2–1553 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT Bonn, February 15, 1953—5 p. m.

3832. From Reber. Hallstein called on me last night with message from Chancellor who is very disturbed by content French "interpretative protocols". In his opinion these radically change nature of

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris.

EDC, destroying much of its European character and discriminating against Germany. Hallstein has given us memo setting forth Chancellor's views in greater detail, text of which follows Section II this telegram.[2] Hallstein said this represented their first impressions but did not believe further study would show they could accept any of French proposals.

Chancellor is concerned as to effect protocols will have on chances of third reading in Bundestag, as opposition is mounting both in press and coalition circles. Ollenhauer launched strong attack in radio speech and Monday's press will undoubtedly make much of issue. Hallstein pointed out either proposals are final, in which case are unacceptable to Germany, or they are negotiable in which case third reading might have to be delayed. Chancellor also fears impact on constitutional court's decision next week, although at first glance it seems to us proposals will probably strengthen present inclination of court to reject government's request for opinion, leaving constitutional issue in abeyance until after legislative action.

Pending further clarification of issue in EDC Interim Committee, we propose, unless you perceive any objection, to urge Chancellor refrain from any drastic action or strong public statement which might prejudice negotiations.

It may be difficult for him to avoid latter and there is no doubt he takes very serious view of situation now created. His position might, however, be strengthened and prospects for negotiations improved if US could indicate to him its opposition to French proposals for Article 13, making this known publicly at an early date, and then urge negotiation on other proposals. "Interchangeability of military personnel" and protocol to Article 107 seem to us to present greatest difficulties for Germany.[3]

CONANT

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[2] Section II of this telegram is not printed.

[3] In telegram 4130 to Bonn, Feb. 16, Dulles stated his strong concurrence with the third paragraph of the source text, stated that any taking of firm public stance on EDC protocols would "materially impair any chance of views being negotiated and reconciled in EDC interim committee", and expressed the hope that all EDC countries would refrain from public reaction (740.5/2–1553).

740.5/2–1653 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 16, 1953—9 p. m.

4595. Reference: Embassy telegram 4558 of 13 February.[2] Subject is European Defense Community—United Kingdom association.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the status of problems requiring resolution "one way or another" prior to EDC ratification and requested comments (740.5/2–1353).

Request all addressees to limit distribution on this and immediately following telegram.[3]

Foreign Office official who accompanied Mayer and Bidault to London[4] gave Embassy officer this afternoon text of French proposal for British participation in EDC (text in translation contained in immediately following telegram). Official emphasized he was doing so on "personal basis and without authorization". Following represents synthesis of his comments and those of Alphand on text.

(1) Proposal designed not to effect British "association with" EDC, but "participation in" EDC without, however, submission by British to supranational authority or relinquishment of sovereignty.

(2) British would be given right to "participate" in EDC Council of Ministers, Assembly and Commissariat in return for United Kingdom commitment to maintain present level of forces on continent and only for as long as they satisfy this condition. United Kingdom could withdraw forces in case of emergency under same conditions as French could withdraw EDC forces under proposed EDC protocol on Article 13. French point out that legal obligation accepted by British is no greater than their present obligation to NATO but that moral obligation, particularly in public mind, is much stronger.

When we asked what would happen if level of United Kingdom forces were changed by NATO decision or by withdrawal, Alphand replied paper was hastily drafted and this problem would have to be worked out.

(3) Presumably British Minister would only participate on an invitational basis in Council of Ministers discussions. Question of weighted voting would not arise because decisions would be taken by Council of Ministers separately and agreement would afterwards be reached with United Kingdom Minister.

(4) French pointed out that parliamentary observers also would have right to speak and vote only on an invitational basis and that powers of EDC assembly only theoretically touch on matters of United Kingdom treaty of association and matters covered in French memorandum. Alphand admits, however, that participation of United Kingdom parliamentary observers as proposed might require change in language of EDC treaty and does not see clearly how this question will be worked out. Foreign Office official, on other hand insists that proposal would require no changes in text of EDC treaty or renegotiation of treaty, nor now would it require a separate treaty. He felt that it could be handled by protocol to treaty itself or some similar device.

(5) Alphand said original proposal had suggested that British representative actually participate and vote in EDC commissariat. This had been changed at his insistence so that British representative would only attend deliberations by invitation and would not have right to participate in vote of commissariat. Of course, agreement would have to be reached later with British.

(6) Proposal has not yet been discussed with other 5 EDC signatories, Foreign Office official said, but he believed it would be welcomed in Benelux and Italy, although he had doubts re Adenauer. Alphand,

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[3] Telegram 4596, Feb. 16, not printed (740.5/2–1653).

[4] On Feb. 12–13, Prime Minister Mayer, Foreign Minister Bidault, and Minister for Economic Affairs Buron traveled to London for talks with British officials.

on other hand, was quite concerned about reactions of other countries. He was particularly worried that Adenauer might be quite upset by fact French had started discussions with United Kingdom on EDC association without consulting other member states in EDC.[5] Foreign Office official also believed it would satisfy French Socialists.

(7) Foreign Office official said it was anticipated that British would participate very frequently in meetings of EDC institutions in practice and that participation would not be limited to matters of strict interest to British.

In response to question re British reaction to proposal, Foreign Office official said Churchill had appeared view it "not unfavorably", but Eden's reaction rather less favorable as was that of Foreign Office "functionaries" with whom it was discussed. Official added that although he thought it would be "difficult for British to refuse" so reasonable a proposal, their preliminary reaction did not leave him "overly optimistic".

DUNN

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[5] A handwritten notation in the margin at this point reads: "Reads the newspapers doesn't he? Also UK mil assoc memo."

740.5/2-1753 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, February 17, 1953—8 p. m.

4616. Limit distribution. Subject is European Defense Community.

At end of my conversation with Bidault on Article 13 protocol,[1] he made some very disquieting observations on EDC.

Bidault said there was a growing feeling in France accentuating a trend toward "coalition" rather than integration. He said there were many people who were coming to conclusion that France, because of its overseas possessions, its responsibilities in Indochina and elsewhere, must not lose its national character, and that this particularly applied to its defense forces. He then went on to say that he would not even be surprised if a suggestion might come forward presently which would provide for the combination in coalition form of the forces of not only the six EDC countries, but other European countries and England. He said that if such a plan were to be proposed the objections now felt by many Frenchmen against the reconstitution of a German army would disappear, as the French would be entirely happy to join their forces in coalition form with other forces in Europe, provided they had British troops in the same organization. He stressed he had nothing more to substantiate this possibility than a presentiment which had come from indiscretions in the press and other indications from unsubstantiated sources.

I asked the Minister whether he had made progress in his talks with

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[1] No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

London. Bidault described the general character of the French proposals for British association with EDC, but said that he had no assurances from the British as to whether they could give favorable consideration to these suggestions. They merely told him they would take the suggestions under advisement. Bidault here again mentioned that the position of French Empire in the world is similar to that of British Commonwealth, that France has interests outside Europe as well as having an important position here; and that it was quite impossible to think of France giving up its position as one of the important nations of the world's powers.

DUNN

740.5/2-1853 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 18, 1953—5:04 p. m.

4467. Sent Paris for Emb and SRE.

The President is announcing later today that at his request Mr. David Bruce will leave for Europe next week to serve as US Observer to Interim Comite of EDC and US Rep to CSC as well as to follow work looking to creation of EPC.

Mr. Bruce plans reside Paris as EDC will require major part of his time for present but he will visit Luxembourg as required. Dept assumes Ambs and HICOG will continue follow six country developments closely but that it will be useful for Mr. Bruce visit other capitals and Strasbourg from time to time.

Mr. Bruce will use personnel currently working on various aspects EDC, CSC and EPC in accordance with arrangements to be made after his arrival in Paris. In carrying out his duties he will report directly to SecState.

Guidance to media will follow but obviously US desires obtain maximum psychological impact from this step which is clearest indication we could give of our close support for and belief in six country efforts towards unification.

It will be recalled that on Aug. 27, 1952 SRE Press Release reported appointment of Acting US Rep pending more definitive arrangements and designation of US rep to CSC. Dept expects that assignment of responsibility to Mr. Bruce for six country developments will serve to consolidate and strengthen our relations with their organizations.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Parsons and cleared with Bruce, MacArthur, and Bonbright. Sent also to Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Bonn and repeated to London and Strasbourg.

Editorial Note

From its inception in February 1953, the Bruce Mission at Paris collected and maintained an extensive file of materials relating to general European military (EDC), political (EPC), and economic (Coal and Steel Community) integration. Files of incoming and outgoing telegrams, memoranda of conversations, briefing papers, and background memoranda, drafts of the EDC, EPC, and Coal and Steel Community treaties, records of EDC Interim Committee meetings on the proposed French protocols to the EDC Treaty introduced in 1953, et cetera, were all carefully kept. In addition, files of telegrams and memoranda of various sorts were maintained on the Saar problem during 1953 and 1954. Finally, the Bruce Mission files also contain materials relating to various international conferences concerned with various aspects of European integration such as the EDC Council of Ministers meetings at Rome in February 1953, the meeting of United States Ambassadors at London in June 1954, the meeting of EDC Foreign Ministers at Brussels in August of 1954 which terminated efforts to secure ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty, and the Nine-Power and Four-Power Conferences at London and Paris, September and October 1954 which led to the adherence of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, et cetera.

Ambassador Bruce also added to this file his own personal records pertaining to the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meetings at London and the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon in February 1952. Other materials added to the Bruce Mission files from the years 1951 and 1952 include fragmentary records of the meetings of the Steering Committee of the Conference for the Organization of a European Defense Community for February and March 1952 and materials relating to ongoing efforts to secure ratification of the EDC Treaty in the various member countries after May 1952. The Bruce Mission files, 27 feet in all, comprise lot 57 M 38.

740.5/2–1653 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, February 18, 1953—7:11 p. m.

4481. Re: (*a*) Embtel 4558.[2] (*b*) Section II Bonn's 3388 [*3832*],[3] rptd Paris 1035 (Reply to German statement reftel *b* being covered in separate message.) (*c*) Embtel 4581.[4] Subject is Department's preliminary comments on French EDC protocols which you requested:

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[1] Drafted by Reinstein, Hay, and Fessenden. Cleared by Riddleberger, Knight, and Moore. Initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright. Repeated to The Hague, Brussels, Rome, London, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

[2] Summarized in footnote 2 to telegram 4595, p. 730.

[3] Dated Feb. 15, p. 729. Section II of that telegram is not printed.

A. *General Reaction.*

Before formulation complete position on French protocols, Department needs clarification of intent of several provisions. Complete reaction other EDC countries also must be taken into account. Reftel (*c*) indicates that most countries except Germany feel that French protocols can be negotiated into acceptable positions.

Believe we must work on assumption that protocols represent first French negotiating position, and that French can be brought around to more reasonable position that will result in eliminating features of protocols which (*a*) give French a special position not required by realities of her overseas responsibilities or (*b*) discriminate against other parties to the Community, in particular Germany. With a view to achieving this objective, it would be helpful if all countries will take flexible and moderate attitude in EDC/IC.

Department is concerned regarding Alphand's statement reported in para 4 of your 4503 [5] that French are unwilling to give assurance that protocols they have submitted represent complete list of French desiderata with respect to Treaty itself. It appears to us that uncertainty on this point will make it difficult to negotiate protocols since other countries will be reluctant to go as far as they might in meeting individual French points if they do not know totality of French demands. Furthermore, French position would seriously militate against getting early parliamentary action in other countries. In view of elections to be held in several countries, this could result in further protracted delays in ratification.

B. *General Principles.*

In addition to general principles re protocols outlined in para 1 Deptel 4028 to Paris, January 24,[6] Department feels following additional objectives should be kept in mind:

(*a*) All changes should be worked out in context of EDC Treaty thereby avoiding modifications in contractuals or changes involving NATO Council action.

(*b*) The protocols should be drafted so as to be EDC-wide in application, rather than confined to France only. Obvious that other EDC countries will insist on this in any case. Fact that French have already used EDC-wide language in several protocols is argument for extending principle to all. French Government can spell out to Assembly specific effect in France of generally applicable protocols.

(*c*) Unnecessary and pointed discrimination against Germany should be avoided. In view of fact that German "equality" is of prime importance to German ratification, French protocols which appear to go out of way to discriminate against Germany do more harm than good to over-all effort to ratify EDC.

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[4] Not printed; it reported in detail on the general reactions of the heads of the EDC Delegations to the French protocols which "are substantially same as our own" (740.5/2-1653).

[5] Dated Feb. 12, p. 719.

[6] *Ante*, p. 706.

(*d*) Possibility exists that some French points can be met by negotiations in EDC Interim Commission rather than by detailed protocols requiring full publicity of six-country ratification. This might apply to such matters as personnel statute and Article 107 licenses. Recognize that procedural and administrative solutions worked out in EDC/IC would not be binding like protocols, and hence not as useful to French in ratification. Nevertheless feel that some useful purpose might be served by such approach.

(*e*) Finally, believe protocols should in general be drafted so as to make plain they apply to France's legitimate *overseas* requirements as defined paragraph 1 Article 10 of Treaty. This necessary to allay suspicions other EDC countries that France trying to buildup national forces located in Metropole.

C. *Specific Comments.*

Following detailed comments correspond numbered and lettered paragraphs reference telegram (*a*). Where pertinent, comments called for by reference telegram (*b*) worked in:

1. *Article 13.* For your info on background of U.S. position on this Article, Department is repeating Topols 868, 858, 806, and Polto 1400 [7] to all info addressees this cable. Request that all EDC governments be informed of general U.S. opposition to French protocol as submitted to EDC/IC. Paragraph 4 reftel (*b*) indicates that statement of general U.S. opposition to French protocol as drafted would be particularly helpful to Adenauer. No public statement of U.S. position should be made, however. U.S. representatives should not attempt to indicate details of U.S. objections, nor should type of protocol U.S. would desire be made known at this time to other governments. U.S. representatives should indicate, however, that only U.S. objection is toward that aspect of French proposal that calls for NAC action as integral part of formula, when matter might be handled by understanding solely between EDC nations.

(*a*) Re idea of two division limit under Article 13 of Treaty. We are opposed thereto for following reasons:

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[7] None printed. Telegrams Polto 1400 and Topol 858 are summarized in footnote 2, p. 726. Topols 806 and 868 also dealt with the French protocol to Article 13 of the EDC Treaty. Topol 806 to Paris, Jan. 30, informed the Embassy *inter alia* that the NATO Treaty was silent on the subject of troop withdrawals and that there existed no binding legal impediment to withdrawal of national contributions of troops except for paragraph 41 of DC 24/3 which did reserve for consideration by the North Atlantic Council any political issue which might be created by a member nation withdrawing forces without equivalent replacements, and "We would not like to see DC 24/3 amended or interpreted in any way re EDC which might affect its status in NATO or its observance therein". (740.5/1–2553) Topol 868 reported the determination of the U.S. Government that no protocol to Article 13 could be agreed to which would in any way impair control of SACEUR over NATO forces under his command without prior consultation between SACEUR and appropriate authorities of the EDC. (740.5/2–1053) For text of DC 24/3, Dec. 12, 1950, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. III, p. 548.

(1) Bad as precedent for EDC and NATO.

(2) Principle should be that forces to be withdrawn under Treaty Article 13 would be those required to meet overseas emergency and which could be spared from European defense in light of situation as it may actually exist. It is impossible to prejudge, now, even though it be labelled as a ceiling, is both to invite it to become the normal quantum and to bar a greater withdrawal if worse situation is indicated. Flexibility under broad principle far more desirable.

2. *Integrity French Forces.*

(*a*) We are not entirely clear as to significance Article 2 of protocol. We note that second paragraph refers to "exchanges between personnel" whereas paragraph 5 of Article 10 of Treaty refers to "exchange of individual personnel". Perhaps this is point which has given rise to worry on part of both von Starckenburgh and Germans. We agree that French intentions must be clarified.

(*b*) Since requirement of unanimous vote carried under Article 44 of Treaty applies in any case, reference to it in protocol unnecessary. This is certainly illustration of kind of point French can make in parliamentary presentation without having to have unnecessary reference in protocol.

(*c*) Suggest that lack of statute for German forces during initial period be brought to attention French, perhaps with suggestion it might be necessary to provide for Germans drawing up own statute during interim period. This might cause French to change attitude toward this provision in protocol.

(*d*) We agree that problem of discrimination against Germany is raised most strongly by this Convention. Believe that it is essential that protocol be limited to greatest extent possible to such points as are strictly necessary to meet legitimate problem of maintenance of French overseas forces without altering character of Treaty.

(*e*) Article 3 of protocol appears inconsistent with Article 31 of Treaty. Moreover, as we understand it, it goes far beyond question of promotions by bringing entire subject personnel policy within scope national determination. This article appears to us to raise quite serious problems.

(*f*) Would appreciate further embassy comment on background of negotiation and relationship of French proposal to provisions of Chapter III of Military Protocol to Treaty.

3. *Weighted Voting* (*Article 43 bis*)*:* We are unable to appraise seriousness of change which protocol on this article would make until solutions on other problems, notably Treaty Article 13, are found. Recall, in negotiation of Treaty, Germans appeared willing to agree to fixed parity between German and French voting rights within framework of weighted voting formula, but this solution was objectionable to other countries. We suggest that it might be well to lay this problem aside in discussions until progress has been made in dealing with other French proposals.

Dutch here have objected that protocol as drafted gives French veto over possibility changing to Treaty Article 43 voting system. We have pointed out only real objection would be if French could cut back EDC defense effort through Treaty Article 13 withdraws and other means and at same time maintain fixed voting parity provided for in 43 bis. Hence, if Treaty Article 13, integrity forces, etc., satisfactorily worked out, there should be little objection to proposed protocol.

As additional argument, cautiously used, suggest following might be pointed out:

Realize that real French concern is with voting strength several years from now, when German military effort (and hence voting strength) will be predominant. Situation very different, however, during period when Treaty Article 43 voting system first goes into effect, which will be approximately two years after ratification. Very rough estimate, based on projection EDC defense expenditures and manpower contributions at end of first echelon build-up (allowing 25 percent non-NATO French contribution), is that percentage voting strength under Treaty Article 43 would be on the order of France 38, Germany 28, Italy 18, Belgium 8, Netherlands 7, Luxembourg 1, as compared with 3–3–3–2–2–1 ratio under Article 43 bis. Hence at least during immediate post-build-up period, France would have powerful voting position under Treaty Article 43, with possible veto on measures requiring two-thirds Council vote, as well as those requiring unanimous vote. Under Treaty Article 43, therefore, Italy and Benelux countries would all suffer serious cutbacks in their voting strength. Benelux in particular bound to be better off under 43 bis formula.

4. *Production and Export of Armaments.* Basic problem here appears to be to reconcile (*a*) fear of other EDC countries that France will use this protocol to build up own armament industry for national forces with (*b*) French fear that it will be hamstrung by EDC in producing and exporting armaments for forces in Indo-China. Should be possible to work out protocol in way that will reconcile these points of view.

Agree with Paris and Bonn comments re difficulty which French proposal raises for Germans. Obviously, licensing of arms production, etc., for overseas forces will have to be handled with flexibility. However, French stipulations that licenses must be irrevocable without quantitative limitation and without duration completely negates second sentence of Paragraph 4(*e*) of Treaty Article 107 which gives Commissariat right to insure that licenses are not used beyond needs specified in that sub-paragraph.

5. *Mobilization.* Agree that two French proposals appear to tend in direction maintaining full national control over mobilization, but cannot comment until have clearer notion of what French mean by "requirements of these forces". Does French proposal mean, as Germans think, that national authorities would have final decision with respect to number of troops to be mobilized? If so, we would agree that proposal affects functions of Commissariat as they have been envisaged in Treaty.

6. *Schools.* Appears here that this proposal in one sense is actually improvement. If national forces attend European schools, as provided paragraph 1 protocol, they would thereby acquire European doctrine, which should facilitate their subsequent interchange with EDF forces, if this should occur. What was meant by Alphand's reference to need to work out "financial consequences" this protocol? If French intend share cost European schools in proportion their national troops attending, this should cause no difficulty.

7. *Length of Service.* If Belgian Government insists on Protocol regarding common length of service as firm condition to ratification, appears to be little that can be done about it. However, everything should be done to ensure that Protocol will not permanently fix EDC length of service at 18 months, but will leave way open to later increase. U.S. SHAPE observer should make known views expressed by Ridgway regarding importance 24 months service period to sound defense effort. (See Topol 738 January 21 [8] regarding U.S. position on length of service question.)

8. *UK–EDC Association.* Basic U.S. position this question set forth Topol ————, still applies. Request whether any developments on Department's earlier suggestion that possible solution regarding UK support costs problem might be worked out in context UK association with EDF. Also request whether SHAPE has given any thought to "brigading in" of UK troops in EDF, with integrated command and logistical implications.[9]

9. and 10. *Status and support costs.* Covered in separate cable.

11. *US Item Aid.* Authorization to discuss coming within few days.

12. *Indo-China.* No comment.

13. *Saar.* See separate telegram.

Dulles

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[8] Not printed, but see telegram 609 to Brussels, Nov. 8, 1952, p. 695 regarding this subject.

[9] In telegram 4707 from Paris, Feb. 21, Dunn reported that in his opening statement before the heads of the EDC Delegations on Feb. 20, Alphand had expressed surprise at the emotion created by the French protocols, deplored the fact that bad drafting or unfortunate statements of his own had suggested French desires to change the existing EDC Treaty and reaffirmed that "France did not intend to drift from its European policy." Alphand then gave as an example of current misunderstanding the German interpretation of his observation "on need for status of EDC forces in Germany" which had been construed as an attempt to create a special position for France by prolonging the occupation, whereas all the French Government wished was an assurance of some short transitional period in which to adapt its forces in Germany to EDC status. Blank then replied with a prepared statement stressing among other things the need not to slow down ratification by long consideration of the protocols, that under no circumstance should acceptance of the protocols be made a condition for ratification, and that the fundamental principles of the treaty must be maintained (740.5/2–2153). A translation of Blank's remarks was subsequently sent to the Department in telegram 4714 (740.5/2–2153).

740.00/2–2653 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 26, 1953—4 p. m.

Coled 4. Limit distribution. Subject is European Political Community.[2]

Saar question[3] was not discussed at Rome meeting of six Foreign Ministers. However, Adenauer's advisers gave us following information on discussions with Italians and intentions for discussion with Bidault.

(*a*) A formal public statement by French and German Governments should record agreement already reached on broad lines of political settlement subject to revision at time of peace treaty. This settlement would be based on Saar autonomy under supervision of some European body (Germans wish it to be community of six institutions).

(*b*) Economic and monetary problem is major remaining obstacle. Adenauer's advisers believe argument over whether Franco-Saar conventions should be "abolished" or "modified" is merely question of semantics. Essential problem is to extend special customs relationship to Germany or to six countries of the community, and to find practical solution to monetary relations.

(*c*) Practical solutions to concrete problems are needed, not further polemics. Accordingly, a short-run bilateral negotiation should be avoided and a study by a committee of experts undertaken. Some of Adenauer's advisers suggest that CSC high authority take responsibility for this study, calling on French, German and Saar experts as needed. High Authority could then lay out the problems and make proposals for settlement to all concerned.

(*d*) If French would agree to this procedure, it could also be announced publicly. Adenauer's advisers hope that this announcement combined with statement of agreement on political aspects would satisfy Mayer's desire for a "solution" to the Saar problem before EDC ratification.

This proposal has already been discussed informally with Italians in hope that De Gasperi might take the initiative. Italian reaction is apparently favorable but De Gasperi's intentions not yet known. Italian officials said they are worried about taking any initiative without prior consultation with French in accordance with Santa Margherita Agreement.[4] Action to be taken will probably depend on

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[1] Repeated to Bonn.

[2] The Foreign Ministers of France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, met in Rome Feb. 24–25 to discuss matters of common concern, especially the European Defense Community and the European Political Community. For documentation on U.S. interest in European political and economic integration, see volume VI.

[3] Further documentation on the Saar is presented in volume VII.

[4] Regarding the meeting at Santa Margherita between French Prime Minister Pleven, French Foreign Minister Schuman, and Italian Prime Minister De Gasperi, Feb. 12–14, 1951, see telegram 3627, Feb. 20, 1951, printed in the compilation on Italy in *Foreign Relations*, 1951, volume IV.

Adenauer's reactions after his private meeting with Bidault yesterday. We hope to have more information next week.

BRUCE

740.5/2-2753: Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, February 27, 1953—4 p.m.

Coled 1. Subject is European Defense Community—Council of Ministers meeting in Rome.

1. Alphand gave very brief report of discussion in EDC interim committee on protocols, indicating that agreement had been reached on number of protocols but that important differences in views still exist.

2. Adenauer then gave very long speech emphasizing great and immediate danger of Soviet threat and urgent necessity for defense preparations. He said information available to German security services on large-scale preparations by Russians was in complete accord with information available to United States services. He apparently referred to figure of 220 divisions in Russia alone, with buildup substantially completed, plus a substantial buildup of satellite forces. Chancellor said that Soviets could rely upon satellite countries. He also referred to substantial number of bridges in place across Vistula for military purposes and to near completion of double lines of communication from Russia. (Alphand believes picture Chancellor painted is far too bland and is at variance with NATO information. He has asked us to review notes on Chancellor's remarks this afternoon. We hope to cable exact information at that time). Chancellor then made a very impressive run-down of all the meetings held by western powers to prepare defense of west and to make possible a German contribution. He said that at time when satisfactory agreements had been reached by all concerned, entire issue and security of entire western world had been placed in doubt by new request for protocols from French Government. Not only were protocols in flat contradiction to initiative of French Government itself and to effective defense of Europe but that this unexplained unilateral action had compromised problem of ratification in other EDC countries. Chancellor firmly insisted that EDC treaty had to be ratified quickly by all concerned as it is. There was no alternative. Continental countries had to settle their differences and to make possible a single, strong defense force in Europe supported willingly by all EDC partners or United States and England would be forced to prepare their defense on basis of peripheral strategy.

3. Bidault was clearly angry at Chancellor's remarks. He made equally flat statement that protocols were not in any way inconsistent

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, Luxembourg, The Hague, Brussels, Rome, and London.

with EDC treaty. He said that if situation was as grave as Chancellor claimed, why not accept these interpretative protocols in interest of all concerned so that ratification of EDC treaty could proceed.

4. Van Zeeland intervened at this point to underline that difficulties of ratification in France were facts which had to be met and resolved. He said France did have problems in meeting her defense responsibilities outside Europe and other European countries certainly wished to have France in position to meet those responsibilities. He believed that protocols had been substantially improved from their original form and thought perhaps other ministers not aware of progress made. He was certain that protocols could be brought in line with EDC treaty and still provide France with flexibility she needed. De Gasperi made a few conciliatory remarks and supported Chancellor's comments on difficulties for ratification created by French action. Beyen did likewise and underlined that EDC countries had to show themselves capable of common action. If not, from his six years' experience in US, he was certain Americans would lose patience.

5. At next morning's meeting, to everyone's surprise Bidault made very reasonable and positive statement in reply to Chancellor. He said flatly that French Govt would continue its European policy. French Government would proceed with ratification of treaty even if its request for protocols were rejected by other EDC countries. He hoped, however, that other EDC countries would help France accomplish common objective of ratification by giving their agreement to French requests. He underlined repeatedly that France is not asking for anything that is not an interpretation and clarification of EDC treaty. France wished to observe letter and spirit of treaty. Unfortunately, Bidault then apparently proceeded into a schoolmaster dissertation on problems and responsibilities of France throughout world, ending on very nationalistic note and dispelling part of improved atmosphere created by his first remarks.

6. Other five ministers quickly replied to Bidault that they were prepared to help France secure ratification. Each stated his government would be prepared to accept protocols if they were changed to observe "letter and intent" of EDC treaty.

7. All of ministers suported Chancellor's remarks on urgency of ratification and participated in criticism of France for having made ratification problems difficult in other countries. De Gasperi recalled experience of French-Italian customs union, where subsequent requests for changes had led to no action. De Gasperi indicated he planned to complete ratification in Lower House by April 1. Adenauer said he would complete Bundestag third reading by March 15, no matter what decision was taken by Karlsruhe Court. Dutch also spoke of intent to complete ratification in Lower House by end of March. French remarked that whether or not protocols should be submitted to Parlia-

ments along with EDC treaty should be decided by each country in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

8. Van Zeeland summed up discussions on EDC by instructing EDC interim committee to reach quick agreement on protocols "along lines of EDC treaty". This language dismayed other delegations except French. However, De Staercke assures us that he and other heads of delegations will interpret instructions of Council of Ministers to work out protocols in accordance with "letter and intent" of present treaty.

9. Unfortunately, when an effort was made to work out a communiqué, the task was given to officials of Quai d'Orsay other than Alphand. These officials created new suspicions of French by vetoing all efforts of other delegations to put any positive note in communiqué.

10. Nearly everyone concerned is pleased with results of Rome discussions on EDC. Conflict between Adenauer and Bidault had been awaited with considerable misgiving. Ministers' discussions did not clear up any of the disagreements on language of protocols but it should improve atmosphere of discussions in EDC interim committee. Most encouraging note is feeling that French Government by Bidault's remarks is now much more committed to proceed with ratification and that continued discussions will involve French more and more in a situation from which there is no possibility of postponement or escape.

11. Above is constructed entirely from conversations with officials in attendance. We hope to obtain minutes of discussions later.

Bruce

740.5/2–2753 : Despatch

The Consul General at Hamburg (Timberlake) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL HAMBURG, February 27, 1953.

No. 321

Subject: Social Democratic Opposition to EDC Finds New Basis in French Protocols.

The Social Democratic argumentation, which had previously only provided a weak basis for the party's opposition to the European Defense Community Treaty, has now been reinforced by the impact of the new French amendment proposals. The excessive demands made by the French have served to give the SPD renewed hope in its campaign against the defense treaty and have caused them to emphasize even more the anti-French side of their policy. Shortly after the visit to Bonn by Secretary Dulles,[2] it was reported by Socialists here that the SPD headquarters was plunged into despair as a result of his unyielding determination on the subject of EDC. This attitude of despair has now completely disappeared and has been replaced by a feeling of confidence which is again evident among the local supporters of the SPD line.

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[1] Also sent to all diplomatic posts in the Federal Republic and to U.S. Army Europe Liaison Office, Bonn.

[2] For documentation on the Dulles-Stassen trip to Europe, Jan. 31–Feb. 8, 1953, see pp. 1548 ff.

Confirmation of this change in attitude was given by the SPD Federal Chairman, Erich Ollenhauer, in a speech which he delivered in Hamburg on February 22nd. This talk was made to a selected gathering of the Hamburg Social Democratic intelligentsia. The audience included leading city officials, top level SPD journalists, and those Social Democrats who occupy important positions in the business life of the community, such as directors of community cooperative enterprises which are closely allied to the SPD. (This particular element, especially in Hamburg, is known to have had differences of opinion with the Social Democratic leaders on the Federal level and its members have from time to time privately expressed doubts and worries concerning the development of the Socialist policy inaugurated by Dr. Schumacher and continued by the present chairman.) Ollenhauer's words demonstrated very clearly that the SPD opposition intends to use as its new basis of opposition to the EDC the discriminatory provisions included in the proposed French protocols. The text of these amendments provided proof, according to Ollenhauer, of the accuracy of the warnings which the SPD had given to the Federal Government in this regard. He then expanded further on the impracticability of such a European Defense Community because of the Communist danger clearly apparent in both France and Italy. The SPD leader maintained that France would fall prey to a Communist fifth column as easily as it succumbed to the infiltration of the Nazi fifth column before the last war. Ollenhauer also gave a brief commentary on his meeting with Secretary Dulles,[3] confining himself to the statement that he had welcomed the opportunity to present personally the SPD views to Mr. Dulles so that the party's viewpoint would be very clear to the Americans. Ollenhauer's speech also covered several other subjects, including the Federal Government's proposed new election law, which he characterized as calculated to destroy the foundation of any real democracy in Germany.

During the discussion that followed Ollenhauer's speech, only one SPD speaker dared to disagree with the Socialist leader on the subject of the SPD opposition to the EDC. This speaker was Dr. Herbert Weichmann, the President of the Hamburg Auditing Office, who, incidentally, was formerly an American citizen. Dr. Weichmann is a close confident of Hamburg's Burgermeister Brauer and actually gave up his American citizenship and returned to Hamburg in 1948 at Brauer's request in order to assist in the establishment of a new democratic Germany. He recommended that the SPD support the EDC as the only logical and practical solution to the present problem facing Germany and further suggested that present Social Democratic policy was playing into the Communists' hands. However, Dr. Weichmann admitted privately that his ground was cut from under him as the result of the proposed French amendments to which he himself could not subscribe. As a result of this weakened position, he was unable to gain any support from the audience.

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[3] See telegram 1046, Feb. 6, from The Hague, p. 1568.

Comment: The complete lack of support which greeted Dr. Weichmann's stand is indicative of the setback which not only German-French relations, but also the non-conformist element within the SPD has suffered. Should the French modify or even withdraw these proposals, the damage has been done and the SPD leaders can be counted on to maintain their present policy with renewed vigor. The only hope which remains to the pro-EDC Socialist adherents is the establishment of the CDU-SPD coalition after the Bundestag elections.

CLARE H. TIMBERLAKE

740.5/3-453

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 4, 1953.

Subject: British Association with the EDC and Extension of the NAT Commitments.

Discussion:

It is understood that Mr. Eden wishes to discuss with you [2] the interrelated problems of British association with the EDC and in particular the U.S. attitude toward the extension of the NAT commitment to 50 years. The British Embassy on March 3 presented to us complete texts of the French proposals for British association, the British reply, and the British counter-proposals. The British reply and counter-proposal were presented to the French yesterday, who did not agree to discussing them with the other EDC countries. The British consider it imperative that we not discuss their proposal with the French or any other EDC countries at this time.

The substance of these documents is as follows:

(1) *French Proposal.* The French proposal contains the following two main elements: (*a*) A British commitment to maintain their present level of forces on the continent for an indefinite period of time, with special provision for Britain to withdraw forces to meet a non-European emergency. (*b*) In exchange for this commitment, the British would acquire the right to participate in all three of the important institutions of the EDC. A British Minister would be entitled to sit on the EDC Council when matters affecting cooperation between British and EDC forces are being considered. Members of the British Parliament would be entitled to attend meetings of the EDC Assembly as observers when problems affecting Britain are being discussed. Finally, a British representative would be entitled to participate in

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden. Cleared by Knight, Raynor, and Moore.

[2] Foreign Secretary Eden visited Washington Mar. 4–6 for discussions with American officials including Dulles and President Eisenhower. That portion of the discussions dealing with EDC and the Saar is printed in UKPT MIN-1, *infra*.

the work of the EDC Commissariat to handle practical problems of cooperation between British and EDC forces. The essential element in the proposal is the fact that, if the British cease to maintain their forces at their present level, they would lose the "right" to participate in the institutions of the EDC.

The French have put this proposal into the form of a protocol to the EDC Treaty between the EDC signatories and the U.K. The French draft protocol also contains provisions for military cooperation between British and EDC forces and for coordination of armaments, equipment and supply programs.

(2) *British Reply.* The British reply turns down the main principle of the French proposal. They say they are unable to commit themselves to station troops on the continent indefinitely, since their position is essentially different from that of the continental powers. Furthermore, they claim that it is wrong to say that the British right to be represented in the institutions of the EDC should be contingent on Britain maintaining its forces at their present level. The British point out that they have submitted far-reaching proposals for the military association of their forces with those of the EDC and that the degree of military integration they are willing to agree to in these proposals should automatically entitle them to some participation in the governing institutions of the EDC.

(3) *British Counter-Proposal.* As a substitute for the French proposal, the British have proposed the issuance of a draft declaration which, after listing the several existing British commitments to the EDC and after describing plans for close functional association between British and EDC forces, would then go on to make two new points:

(*a*) British willingness to join in a proposal to other NATO countries that the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty should be extended to make it co-terminous with the EDC.

(*b*) British willingness, if the EDC countries so desire, to participate in the institutions of the EDC, including a special British mission to the EDC Commissariat to deal with practical problems of cooperation between British and EDC forces and the appointment of a British representative to attend the EDC Council of Ministers to discuss UK–EDC cooperation and consult on matters of common concern. The British have indicated that the level of U.K. and EDC forces to be maintained on the continent at any given time might be among the matters on which to consult.

(4) *French Reaction to British Proposal.* The French reaction to the British proposal has been unfavorable. (See separate memorandum summarizing the French note.)[3] In essence, the French say that their little value in the British proposal to extend the NAT to 50 years and that it will not be sufficient to satisfy the desire of the French public for British ties to the EDC. They continue to insist that there must be a British commitment to maintain forces on the Continent, as called for in the original French proposal.

Recommendations:

In spite of the French reaction, some sort of extension of the NAT commitment appears to be the only feasible approach from the British point of view. The British maintain that they cannot agree to a troop commitment, and we are in no position to urge them otherwise. Furthermore, there are indications that the 50-year formula may have a favorable effect on the French Socialists, in spite of the French Government's insistence that it would not. In any case, it is at least worth while to explore this subject with Mr. Eden. The following points are therefore recommended in connection with a discussion of this subject:

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[3] Not printed.

(1) The British proposal is obviously a matter of major importance affecting existing U.S. commitments. As such, the United States Government would have to consult with Congressional leaders before being able to take any kind of position. However, certain preliminary observations come to mind.

(2) The U.S. considers that existing commitments and guarantees sufficient to take care of the situation. Only if it becomes absolutely essential to EDC ratification should we consider taking any further action, and we should do so in a way that will be definitely contingent upon French ratification.

(3) As to the British proposal, it appears to have the important advantage of putting the guarantee in terms which will avoid any specific commitment to maintain troops, since it is done in NAT terms and the North Atlantic Treaty does not require any specific troop commitment.

(4) The British proposal does not take account of the fact that our NATO commitment is not really a "twenty-year" commitment, as is popularly supposed. It is a treaty of indefinite duration, and was so regarded by the U.S. Senate when ratified. Article 13 of the Treaty provides only that individual members may withdraw from NATO after twenty years; the Treaty continues in effect indefinitely. The EDC Treaty, on the other hand, is specifically limited to fifty years. For this reason, it might be better to put the emphasis on the fact that the NAT commitment is neither a twenty-year or even a fifty-year commitment, but a continuing commitment which really only puts on a paper a basic fact of international life: that the countries of the North Atlantic area must remain joined together more or less indefinitely to ensure their collective security.

(5) There would appear to be various ways to do what we are trying to do: i.e., to demonstrate to the French and others that the U.K. and the U.S. have no intention of pulling out of NATO in twenty years and hence withdrawing their support from the EDC:

(*a*) One way would be a formal amendment to Article 13 of the NAT whereby "fifty years" would be substituted for "twenty years" as the time when withdrawal would be permitted. This approach should serve to allay French fears and at the same time would not interfere with the "continuing commitment" concept of the NAT. It is recommended that we not go beyond actually telling the French that the U.S. and U.K. are willing to propose and support such an amendment to the Treaty, with completion of the actual amendment being made contingent upon French ratification of the Treaty.

(*b*) A second approach would be to amend the North Atlantic

Treaty so that it would actually terminate with the EDC Treaty. (As we read it, this appears to be the British proposal, although they may have had in mind something more like (*a*). This might be clarified with Mr. Eden.) If the British actually propose to have NAT *terminate* with the EDC Treaty, then there would be the rather serious disadvantage of destroying the "continuing commitment" concept of the NAT.

(*c*) Although probably less valuable from the French ratification point of view, a third approach would be a well-timed announcement either by the U.K. alone, the U.S. and the U.K. together, or even all non-EDC NATO countries, to the effect that they regard the NATO commitment a continuing one, that they have no intention of withdrawing from the NAT when the twenty-year period is over, and that they can therefore be counted on to support EDC while it is in existence. Such a declaration would have the advantage of not requiring an amendment to the NAT and hence would avoid a possible delaying factor.

(6) It is recommended that approach (*c*) be the initial position, that approach (*a*) be used only if absolutely necessary and only in a way so as to be contingent upon French ratification.

(7) There is an added element which the British have not brought out fully and which might make the fifty-year NAT extension more acceptable to the French. By extending their NAT commitment to fifty years, the British would thereby be extending their strong commitment under the special U.K.–EDC Treaty signed May 27, 1952.[4] Under this Treaty, the U.K. extends a strong Brussels Treaty commitment to the EDC (i.e. a "go to war" commitment much stronger than NAT), but does so only for the life of the NAT. Extending the NAT to fifty years would automatically extend this stronger U.K. commitment to fifty years; a fact which should be given maximum emphasis.

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[4] See editorial note, p. 684.

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 139

Minutes of United States–United Kingdom Political Talks, March 5, 1953 [1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1953.

[UKPT MIN–1]

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	U.K.
Secretary Dulles	Foreign Secretary Eden
Ambassador Aldrich	Ambassador Makins
Mr. Matthews	Sir Pierson Dixon
Mr. Allison	Sir Christopher Steel
Mr. Bonbright	Mr. Shuckburgh
Mr. MacArthur	Mr. Tomlinson
Mr. Robertson	Mr. Henderson
Mr. O'Connor	
Mr. Beale	

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[1] Foreign Secretary Eden visited Washington Mar. 4–6, 1953 for discussions with various American officials including Secretary Dulles and President Eisen-

European Defense Community

Foreign Secretary Eden said that they had sent the French a note in reply to their proposals concerning association with the European Defense Community.[2] He thought they had done what they could to meet the French. They had said that they would consult with the EDC before withdrawing British troops. They could not, however, meet the French request not to move British troops from the Continent. He noted that the press had gone badly in connection with the exchange.

Secretary Dulles said that Ambassador Bonnet had called, as a result of a telephone message from Paris, to express the great concern felt by his Government over the British reply to the French proposals. The Secretary said that he had a word or two to say on tactics in connection with ratification of the EDC Treaty. He felt that we were not going to get anywhere until we have brought about ratification of the Treaty by countries other than France. It is at that point that we should marshal our forces. In his opinion to placate the French by dibs and dabs would fritter away our influence. He said that the way to get ratification through is to get other countries to ratify and thereby focus a sense of responsibility on France. The Secretary said that he himself could not get excited about meeting the French position today because they will want us to give more and still more.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he agreed absolutely with Secretary Dulles's statement of the situation. He said that the British were sorry they had had to do what they did.

Secretary Dulles said that he anticipated that the French, when they come to Washington, will want to talk about the Tripartite Declaration, Indochina and North Africa. He felt that it would be best if we were to bring everything into play when the French are standing alone. It was his understanding, subject to check, that there were no serious obstacles to prior action by the other five EDC countries except possibly the protocols. He recalled that during his trip to Europe he had told these other countries that the best thing to do is to get the Treaty ratified and then tackle the protocols.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that the French are being a bit difficult about this whole problem. He said that the matter concerns not only the French but other countries and yet the French were insisting that the other countries should not be told about the British position.

Secretary Dulles said that we should forget about the French for

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hower. A cover sheet attached to the source text carries the designation UKPT MIN–1 and indicates the meeting took place in Secretary Dulles' office and began at 10:30 a.m. Mar. 5. The source text does not indicate a drafting officer or whether these were the agreed minutes of the meeting. Material on Eden's trip to Washington in March 1953, including the complete text of UKPT MIN–1, is presented in volume VI. A summary of this conversation was sent to London in telegram 5962, Mar. 7. (740.5/3–753)

[2] Reference is to the British note of Mar. 3. See the Bonbright memorandum to the Secretary of State, Mar. 4, *supra*.

the next thirty days and concentrate on pushing through ratification of the Treaty. He felt confident that French ratification could be achieved as a result of the cumulative pressures we can exert on the French. He pointed out that the consequences of failure would be catastrophic. He noted that whereas Mayer in his opinion was honestly trying to put the thing through, Bidault presented a more complicated problem and no one could know quite where he stood.

Foreign Secretary Eden repeated that he agreed with Secretary Dulles on tactics.

Secretary Dulles said that the next thing to consider was what could be done.

Mr. Matthews said that the Italians were ready to go forward with ratification and that the Dutch were also ready. He noted that Mr. Adenauer had indicated the possibility of German ratification by March 19. He said that the Belgians appeared to be the most sticky on the problem and that Van Zeeland had said he wanted to wait until the French ratification.

Secretary Dulles said that the Belgian situation seemed to reflect more Van Zeeland's own view than the view of his Government. He noted that the opposition was carrying the ball on ratification and that the domestic political situation created difficulties. He felt as a result of his conversations that the Prime Minister's views on ratification were more forthright than those of Van Zeeland.

Mr. Matthews noted that Van Zeeland will be in Washington during the week of March 17.

Secretary Dulles said that the matter could be discussed with him at that time. He said that our Ambassadors in the EDC countries should be told we have a common view in this matter.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he agreed. He felt that Adenauer is fully aware of the importance attached to early ratification but there was certainly no harm in repeating the position to him.

Secretary Dulles said that it should be understood that the U.S. and U.K. would take corresponding action, not concerted action.

Foreign Secretary Eden replied in the affirmative. He then noted that the French socialists had told the British Ambassador in Paris that what they wanted was an extension of the NATO period to 50 years. He said that he did not know how difficult that question was for the United States.

Secretary Dulles said that the matter would require a two-thirds vote of the Senate. He said that he would not totally exclude the possibility if it was the thing that would finally bring about ratification. He pointed out that the question was one of who acts first. He said that it would be impossible to put anything through the U.S. Senate before ratification by the French. He stated that the French would have to ratify on the assurance that the U.S. would try to get it done. He noted that fifty years is a long time. He said that he would not say today that it could be done and he emphasized that it would not be desirable to hold out any hopes. On an informal and confidential basis he indicated that the possibility could be explored with Senate leaders if it seemed the critical thing to do. He felt that there would be strong pressure on people to do whatever was possible when the critical juncture was reached. He expressed the opinion that it was foolish to put reliance in fifty-year treaties of alliance, since all such treaties are effective only as they reflect the interests and desires of the countries at the particular time. He noted that it would be a national disaster for both the U.S. and the U.K. if the Continent of Europe were to fall into hostile hands.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he did not think the extension to fifty years was necessary nor could it mean a great deal, but he noted that the French socialists might feel that they needed it.

Secretary Dulles noted that the NATO was not limited to twenty-year life and provided the right of withdrawal.

Sir Roger Makins said that from what Secretary Dulles had said he felt that the problem of extending the NATO commitment to fifty years was a point of less difficulty.

Secretary Dulles said that the point might be covered by an exchange of notes. He felt that it was inconceivable that a situation would arise which would lead the U.S. to want to withdraw from the basic position set forth in the Treaty. He felt that it was premature, however, to think in terms of those things at this stage.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that his Government was already tied up with the French in other ways. He said that even if they could do anything more than had already been done it would be most unwise to say so at the present time.

Secretary Dulles said that the French wanted a statement from us concerning meetings of the Three Powers.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that he interpreted the French to mean that they wanted a Political Standing Group.

Secretary Dulles said that his understanding was not that the Three Powers would come together as a political standing group but that they would merely talk together when a critical situation arose. It was his understanding that the French wanted to emphasize that if the EDC goes into force the French would not be dropped out of discussions, in effect that the creation of the EDC would not mean their exclusion.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that his Government was willing to state that French membership in the EDC would not change ordinary relations. He noted that a formal organization for consultation was another thing and would be very difficult for them to do; the Canadians in particular would not like such an arrangement.

Secretary Dulles said that we could give assurances to the French that entering into the EDC would not push them down but to say that membership in the EDC would push them up was another matter. He was inclined to be somewhat evasive on this point at this stage and was against the establishment of tripartite machinery.

Foreign Secretary Eden said that their proposition was very much that of Secretary Dulles'. He said they were all for giving assurances without establishing machinery.

Sir Pierson Dixon expressed the view that the extension of NATO to fifty years would help the French.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that formal extension should not be taken for granted.

Foreign Secretary Eden noted that they had said something on the point in their note to the French and they would stand on that for the time being and would consult with the U.S. regarding any further developments.

Saar [8]

Secretary Dulles said that our position, which had been misrepresented in France and Germany, was that there was no organic relationship between the Saar and EDC. He said that the French were not justified in trying to run out on the EDC because the Saar problem had not been settled. He quoted Mr. Adenauer as having said to him, "I am prepared to resume discussions tomorrow on the Saar."

Foreign Secretary Eden said that Bidault had told him that he was quite ready to receive British advice and keep the British informed but he would not accept outside intervention. Mr. Eden said that he had told Bidault that it was important to settle the Saar question before the German elections and Bidault had said that the point was much in his mind. Mr. Matthews, in response to a question from Secretary Dulles, replied that we had not had any detailed reports on the recent talks in Rome. Foreign Secretary Eden said he thought that we should inquire. Mr. Matthews said he understood that the technical people are meeting on the subject.

Secretary Dulles asked whether we should inquire of Paris and Bonn concerning what is going on about the Saar. Foreign Secretary Eden agreed that this would be desirable and Secretary Dulles instructed that a cable be sent out.

[Here follows discussion on British arrests of neo-Nazis in Germany, Trieste, Stalin, Indochina, and Far Eastern matters.]

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[8] Further documentation on the Saar is presented in volume VII.

740.5/3–653 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 6, 1953—6 p. m.

Coled 26. Limit distribution. Re Edcol 6 March 5.[2] Subject: European Defense Community.

1. We agree that British have shown themselves cooperative in their proposals on both military and political association with the EDC. Also, general impression here is that British would be very willing to consider specific proposals from other 6 EDC countries to go even further; for example, in greater integration of ground forces.

2. French Foreign Office could have presented progress already made in negotiations as a substantial success, but have failed to do so. In addition, French have not taken advantage of progress being made in Strasbourg on question of British association with 6-nation community.[3] Instead, French Foreign Office seems solely interested in trying to put blame for their difficulties on refusal of other countries to take certain action. We have received various comments that French intransigence is explained by necessity to give impression in France that French Government has gone all out to force absolute maximum in association from British.

3. We have informed British and French on number of occasions that conducting these conversations on a bilateral basis would create serious difficulties with other EDC countries. Now that other EDC countries have officially requested French Government to inform them of exchange of notes with British, Alphand should be able obtain permission of Bidault to bring this question into the EDC interim committee. Hoyer-Millar informs us that if French do not do this, British Government will probably prepare a summary of negotiations to give to other EDC countries. We agree that other EDC countries will find British proposals constructive but, also, they will try to press US for extension of duration of North Atlantic Treaty.

4. We have repeatedly pointed out to French that, on one hand, they are asking British to assume an obligation to maintain level of forces on continent which goes substantially beyond what Britain is com-

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg for Bruce.

[2] Not printed; it reported receipt of a lengthy French *aide-mémoire* describing in "intransigent" and "cold" terms continued French insistence on a U.K. troop commitment despite the U.K. counterproposals discussed in the memorandum from Bonbright to the Secretary of State, Mar. 4, p. 745, and despite the fact that the French Government knew the United Kingdom could not make such a commitment. "Dept can only conclude that French reply is another indication that Bidault, supported by some elements in Fon Office, may be endeavoring sabotage or at least obstruct EDC ratification by posing impossible conditions to British association with EDC" and then to blame the United Kingdom for such a failure (740.5/3–553). A copy of the French *aide-mémoire* of Mar. 4 is in 740.5/3–453.

[3] Reference is to the European Political Community; for documentation, see volume VI.

mitted to by her NATO obligations. On other hand, French are insisting that under Article 13 of EDC treaty they will not accept any limitation on withdrawal which puts them in less favorable position than other NATO countries. Furthermore, EDC treaty provides that size of French EDC contribution will be fixed according to NATO procedures, while French proposal would deny British this flexibility. Alphand recognizes contradiction and tells us French will now change proposal to have level of British forces on continent determined by NATO procedures and to tie right of withdrawal to same arrangements for consultation in NATO that are being worked out for EDC forces in protocol on Article 13.

5. British might be able to accept a French proposal re maintenance of forces on continent which links UK adherence to NATO commitments with "participation in" EDC, i.e. which is in effect limited to present UK commitments under NATO. French Socialists could perhaps be convinced that an agreement linking "participation in" EDC institutions to maintenance UK forces on continent is an adequate guarantee. They might be persuaded to French Foreign Office argument that public opinion in Europe and in UK would make it very difficult for UK to withdraw forces without consultation if, by doing so, entire institutional and political association with EDC fell at same time. Admittedly, French proposal does not give assurance that UK forces will be on continent for 50 year life of EDC treaty; since theoretically, British commitment would end with NATO, whose life is ostensibly shorter than life of EDC. On other hand, establishment of institutional arrangements with EDC could be presented as being for duration of EDC treaty, thus strongly suggesting UK forces commitment for that length of time.

6. A revised French proposal on these lines might have additional advantage for United States in that we may be enabled avoid situation in which United States would be subjected to pressure from EDC countries, supported by United Kingdom, to make duration of North Atlantic Treaty coterminus with duration of EDC treaty.

7. Comments of British officials in Paris indicate they are particularly irritated by any presentation which creates impression United Kingdom is paying for right to "participate in" EDC institutions. However, British are in a sense responsible for giving French this negotiating position. French proposals are substantially same as "Eden proposals",[4] and have been kept alive only by very active British intervention in Council of Europe. British counterproposal is definite improvement because it drops institutional arrangements which might require revision of EDC treaty and thus new negotiations.

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[4] These proposals concerned European integration; see volume VI.

8. French have not informed British of intended reply and it has not yet been cleared with Bidault. Bonnet has not been informed.

ACHILLES

740.5/3-453 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 6, 1953—8:29 p. m.

Edcol 9. Ref Coled 20.[2]

1. Department seriously concerned over situation with respect to protocols reported in Coled 20. Bidault's refusal to submit revised protocol texts prepared by Alphand clearly reverses Rome decision.

2. Bidault explanation that it is necessary for him to be as intransigent as possible for benefit of Gaullists seems strange in view of recent solid stand of Gaullists against EDC. This indicates there is little point in doing anything to appease Gaullists with respect to EDC; great majority will vote against it anyway. Furthermore, as Paris telegram 4887 [3] indicates, protocols themselves important only in negative sense and would influence votes of no more than 10 or 12 Deputies in all. Other evidence also points to fact that protocols now of relatively minor importance in influencing ratification.

3. If this true, then all the more difficult to see why French Government should now be taking strong stand in protocol negotiations. Exactly opposite stand would appear to be in order if purpose is to facilitate ratification. Particularly, there is no justification whatsoever for insisting again on original texts, which were primarly designed win Gaullist votes.

4. Therefore propose following lines of action:

a. Effort should be made to impose some sort of deadline on negotiations. Referral of protocols to Juridical Committee makes plain that negotiations in danger of bogging down indefinitely unless some such positive action taken. Suggest that deadline for completion of protocol negotiations might be proposed by one of EDC countries, such as Netherlands or Italy, or joint proposal by all EDC countries except French might be best approach.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared by Knight and Hay. Repeated to Rome, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* that in accordance with the decision of the EDC Interim Committee which met at Rome on Feb. 25–28 to continue the discussions of the protocols begun in Paris the previous week, Alphand had prepared new texts of the protocols incorporating some of the changes suggested by the other EDC Delegations at Rome, but that on the morning of Mar. 4, "Bidault irritated because of press reports that French Government had withdrawn protocols refused to permit Alphand to submit new texts to Interim Committee. Bidault is reported to have stated to other French Ministers that 'for benefit of Gaullists he wished to appear as intransigent as possible'" (740.5/3-453). A summary of the EDC Interim Committee meeting at Rome is in telegram 3733 from Rome, Feb. 25 (740.5/2-2553). See also telegram Coled 1, p. 741.

[3] Not printed. (740.5/3-353)

b. As a means for facilitating or speeding negotiations, others might be encouraged prepare their own redrafts of French protocols, as Belgians did re Article 107 protocol, reported Coled 24.

c. Danger still exists that French may submit additional protocols. Department agrees with Paris telegram 4743, February 24 that unrealistic politically to insist on French giving definite commitment at this time that they will submit no more protocols. Best approach is for all other EDC countries to insist they will consider no additional French protocols. Constant pressure of this sort should make it nearly impossible for French to come forward with new protocols.

DULLES

740.5/3–1053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Bunker) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL ROME, March 10, 1953—8 p. m.

3944. Foreign Office official informed us March 9 (Department telegram 3637 March 9) [2] of government's tentative decision (Embassy telegrams 3846 March 4 [3] and 3873 March 6 [4]) not to present EDC Treaty to Chamber before elections. Foreign Office official told us in confidence however that certain Foreign Office officials and CD deputies still question wisdom this decision and have been urging De Gasperi to reverse it. This group believes that Italy must live up to its commitments to US and others on ratification this month, even if this means another vote of confidence. Foreign Office official said that some parliamentary experts believe that vote could be pushed without confidence vote.

Zoppi today confirmed foregoing report on government tentative decision saying Communists had permitted approval in Parliamentary Commission (Embassy telegram 3882 March 6 [4]) in order to utilize obstructionist tactics in debate in Chamber and make question of ratification a major election issue. Zoppi stated that government would "lose face" if ratification of Treaty not completed in Chamber prior to dissolution. He did not think government would be well advised to ask for another vote of confidence on this issue since this device had been employed in both Chambers in consideration of Electoral Bill. He has recommended to De Gasperi that treaty might be introduced in Senate now in order to expedite ratification process and that new Chamber consider it immediately after election. Zoppi was informed of substance Department telegram 3612.[5] While he agreed that ratification by some of European countries would probably break stalemate, he nonetheless feared internal political consequences present government if Communists successfully block ratification.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce, and to Bonn, London, Brussels, and The Hague.

[2] Not printed. (740.00/3–653)

[3] Not printed. (740.5/3–453)

[4] Not printed. (740.5/3–653)

Position therefore at moment is that government may not present EDC Treaty to Chamber before dissolution but De Gasperi has requested Lombardo recanvass political situation during former's absence Strasbourg. De Gasperi scheduled return Wednesday and precise information on Government's plans will be obtained from him as soon as possible.

Bunker

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[5] Not printed; it reported a Dulles-Eden conversation on Mar. 5 in which it was agreed "that for present US and UK Govts would concentrate on persuading countries other than France to ratify Treaty first, with view to focusing sense of responsibility on France as a result, and with intention that US and UK at that stage could best exert cumulative influence to bring about French ratification" (740.5/3-653).

740.5/3-1153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Cowen) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BRUSSELS, March 11, 1953—8 p. m.

986. Subject: EDC.

1. In view short time before Van Zeeland visit[2] I am reporting in considerable detail EDC ratification situation in Belgium, including Van Zeeland's views, our efforts develop drive for immediate ratification, and various Belgian interpretations of Van Zeeland tactics.

2. It is my judgment that best hope of obtaining early ratification Benelux countries lies in Secretary making abundantly clear to Van Zeeland our conviction that other signatories should proceed with ratification as rapidly as possible in advance French ratification and in persuading Van Zeeland accept leadership in obtaining agreement Benelux countries for early concurrent ratification.

3. In conversation with Foreign Minister last night I conveyed susbtance of Secretary's letter of February 26.[3] He stated that when he could tell Parliament that French are going to ratify EDC he could easily obtain at least two-thirds favorable vote in Belgian Parliament and earlier effort would result at best in small majority which would be damaging to ratification elsewhere and the future of the treaty itself.

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland visited Washington, Mar. 14–18, 1953 for discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other officials. See memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Mar. 16, p. 773.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

4. Van Zeeland said he had been working for months lining up political "chessmen" and slowly but surely had prepared key elements in Parliament for ratification adding that he had needed space in which "to maneuver".

5. Van Zeeland again described himself as no prophet but said he would promise Belgium "would not be the last to ratify and ratification elsewhere would not be delayed one second by Belgium."

6. Van Zeeland said that EDC Interim Committee is making progress and he again informed me (see Embtel 908, February 23)[4] that he is convinced the French Government is really sincere in efforts to pass treaty through French Parliament. Without protocols this would be utterly impossible and it will be difficult enough even with protocols.

7. Van Zeeland pointed out it was agreed at Rome[5] that protocols would be interpretative. He said that should protocols slightly alter sense of unimportant articles in treaty he thought this was a price worth paying for French ratification but he could not accept material alteration of treaty. Treaty itself is most complex and he implied that one could make too much of protocol problem. French had accepted and even welcomed draft protocols from other countries and he thought EDC Interim Committee was moving forward.

He added that one reason for his conviction that French Government is making a sincere effort is that it cannot now turn back and must fall if it fails to make French Chamber vote on treaty.

8. In recent talks with Moch and Guy Mollet, he found the former was now taking a somewhat less favorable position and the latter had moved still farther in opposition to treaty.

9. He referred to the obvious French weakness in Europe increased by its fully recognized good effort in Indochina, in consequence he thought French were quite honestly and justly concerned about danger of Germany. There are already signs that Italy is being attracted by growing strength of Germany and without counterweight from Britain he could not belittle French fears.

10. Of course, if the British should make really conciliatory proposals French ratification would be easy. Asked what he thought of British proposals[6] and the rumors that France had been withholding them from the other signatories for fear that those signatories would find them favorable, Van Zeeland said this was not the case. He had seen the British proposals and regarded them as "meaningless," and less helpful than the "position" of British three months ago.

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[4] Not printed. (740.5/2-453)

[5] Reference is to the Rome meeting of the six Foreign Ministers of the proposed European Political Community. See telegrams Coled 4, Feb. 26, p. 740; Coled 1, Feb. 27, p. 741; and footnote 2, p. 755.

[6] Reference is presumably to the British counterproposals on association with the EDC and the extension of the NATO commitments. See memorandum by Bonbright, Mar. 4, p. 745.

11. Asked re reports that Italy and Germany might ratify before examination of protocols, Van Zeeland said such a move in Italy is due solely to urgency caused by forthcoming Italian elections. This was agreed to and fully understood by all six at Rome. Effect of German ratification is of little importance since Germany "has no other course." He added that if purpose early German ratification is to injure French chances of obtaining approval protocols he doubted this was good tactic. After all, treaty without France is no treaty; it is in the interest of all six to have treaty; therefore, they must accept some protocols as otherwise, as stated above, treaty simply could not pass French Chamber.

12. Asked whether a concurrent Benelux ratification of the treaty might not help those in other countries who are favorable to ratification, Van Zeeland said he was not at all sure that this would necessarily be the case. France is certain that three Benelux countries will ratify: there is "no problem" in The Netherlands, Belgian ratification is certain and easy when French Government sees its way clear to ratify, and Luxembourg will follow Belgium. On the other hand it might easily have the reverse effect. French pride and excessive sensitivity might lead doubtful voters to take the position "France will not be influenced by those little countries."

13. Asked whether he was really satisfied of sincerity French assertions that their protocols would only be interpretative of treaty and to make passage through French Chamber possible, and were not a delaying tactic to extract maximum from Britain, Van Zeeland said he would answer question in "another way." If Britain would "join," of course the protocols were completely unnecessary.

14. Asked for more detailed attitude Belgian Government on ratification, Van Zeeland said a good percentage of PSC and a large percentage of the Liberals are favorable now, though some PSC members may never vote for treaty. The Socialists are the uncertain factor and are greatly influenced by attitude of French Socialists. If, as he hopes, Bidault will be able to tell him that French Parliament will ratify, many of doubtful voters particularly in Socialist Party, will swing in favor of treaty. He mentioned possibility that if treaty were put up too soon Socialists might try vote of nonconfidence not on ground of opposing treaty but on ground that a coalition government is needed to put through so important a measure.

15. We have received estimates that Parliament would now ratify by large majority. We have been acting to clarify situation and develop drive for ratification, especially as Van Zeeland position vis-à-vis party and Parliament would be more advantageous if he appeared bring treaty to vote under pressure rather than purely on own initiative. PSC government is weak with bare majority in Parliament rep-

resenting minority of voters and is subjected to disruptive internal pressures.

16. Van Zeeland position in party is weakened by lack personal following and rests on personal ability and accomplishments. Due these circumstances we have made many oblique approaches to develop support among prominent Parliamentary and financial leaders. We have paid particular attention to Van Zeeland's personal opponents such as Eyskens, leaders Liberal Party and Spaak with view that these men are more susceptible to pressure from US than from Van Zeeland. We have also approached financial leaders including prominent representatives of Societe Generale and Brufina, great Belgian holding companies, as Van Zeeland is reputed as having been associated with Brufina group. All have agreed to feasibility of early Belgian ratification on ground it presents only advantages with no serious disadvantages to Belgium and have promised to present such views to government.

17. I have tentatively discussed with Chapin (Hague) possibility of three Benelux countries proceeding with early concurrent ratification to remove any onus which any one of them might fear in taking the lead alone. Chapin studying possibility.

18. I discussed concurrent Benelux ratification also with Eyskens. He thought it a good idea, would be a new approach to problem and confirmed Van Zeeland's estimate above that Dutch have no ratification problem. He said he would talk with Van Zeeland along this line. Re special Chamber Committee now examining treaty, Eyskens said that *rapporteur* is one of his men. He added that if he were Prime Minister he would pass treaty now.

19. Various Belgian interpretations of Van Zeeland's "waiting tactics" which my staff or I have recently received follow.

20. In order avoid Socialist–Liberal obstruction of treaty on minor points with consequent possibility fall of government, Van Zeeland may be forced make deal with opposition. Such deal would include dissolution of Parliament by early summer to allow revision of constitution adapting it to realities of Belgian participation in CSC, EDC, and possibly EPC. In order gain time for concluding passage of PSC clerical education program, government postponing such deal as long as possible.

21. Although no serious consequence to Belgium if EDC negotiations fell through after Belgian ratification, Van Zeeland's personal position could be affected. Senior newspaper editor recently told Embassy officer Belgian tradition was to follow great nations in foreign affairs and not to take lead. Instances of ill-advised assumption of leadership were 24 months service issue (Van Houtte strongly concurs on this point), Spaak pursuit of grand European Design which has resulted in partial loss his strength in own party and Parliament and

Van Zeeland's application rigid sanctions against Italy in 1935 which cost him considerable prestige.

22. Van Zeeland shares French desire achieve utmost from British association with EDC. He is sincerely interested in German-French *rapprochement* and wishes to play honest broker in protocol negotiations.

23. In order aid French Government obtain French Socialist support for treaty Van Zeeland prefers defer Belgian ratification until he can obtain largest possible favorable Belgian Socialist vote.

24. I suggest Secretary set aside considerable time for talk with Van Zeeland in order to "nail him down" which is far from easy.

25. Van Zeeland necessarily concerned about his personal position (see 16 above). If Secretary can convince Van Zeeland his prestige would be enhanced and his position within Belgium strengthened by early ratification, he would be more cooperative.

COWEN

740.5/3-1053

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1953.

Participants: The President
Netherlands Foreign Minister J.M.A.H. Luns
The Under Secretary—Mr. Smith
Ambassador van Roijen

After the usual amenities, Mr. Luns expressed his appreciation for the aid given by the United States and its armed forces in the recent disaster in Holland[1] and gave a general report of conditions. The President expressed his gratitude and then said that he had wanted the opportunity to speak about the European Defense Community. He appreciated the position which the Dutch have taken so far and said that he would like to see Holland begin to take the leadership in early ratification.

Mr. Luns said the Dutch had been concerned about the French protocols. There was a difference of opinion, in that the French argued that the protocols were within the framework of EDC, whereas the Dutch felt that they added a new element. If the French were to interpret the treaty according to their national aspirations there was no reason that the Germans would not be able to do so subsequently, and while Holland was willing and anxious to see West Germany part of the European Defense Community, there remained the apprehension of what might develop from a rearmed Germany under the urge of unification between the east and west. The President said that he had spoken very frankly and bluntly to Adenauer about this matter, and that he himself did not share these apprehensions. It was quite impossible for Germany alone to undertake any military adventure since, regardless of her manufacturing capacity, she did not by herself have the materials or the industrial set-up to support an independent war. He thought, subject of course to any legal qualifications which the experts might advance, that the Dutch could ratify the treaty as it now stands. This would give an added impulse to the EDC movement. Their ratification might contain the flat statement that it was contingent on no modifying protocols which would change the sense of the treaty itself. Mr. Luns indicated that this might be a possibility which would have sympathetic reception in Holland, that the Dutch were willing and eager to complete the first vital step toward EDC.

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[1] Reference was to the series of devastating floods which had afflicted the Netherlands during the winter of 1953.

Mr. Luns then reverted to the change in the NATO command structure. The Dutch were not particularly concerned about the additional responsibilities which would be vested in Marshal Juin, but they were concerned at the report that Juin intended to create another supreme headquarters with another French general in command of the ground forces. They understood the tactical necessity for one commander to conduct the battle in the center, and the impossibility of this same commander supervising campaigns which might take place simultaneously on the flanks. However, if Juin's headquarters resolved itself into another supreme command with another French general commanding the ground forces, this multiplication of national interest would cause them grave concern. The President indicated that he had not visualized such an organization. He, himself, when commanding in Europe, had rejected the idea of a separate ground commander and had supervised the conduct of the action over the entire front, although he had under his command at the time massing of naval and air forces, which Marshal Juin would not have. He had visualized this change as simply to give Juin control over the tactical air organization which would operate with the ground forces. He suggested that the Under Secretary communicate with General Bradley and see what the actual situation was, at the same time assuring the Foreign Minister of his understanding of their apprehensions. He was aware of the possibility that this detachment of the American Supreme Commander from responsibility of the actual conduct of battle on the central front may arouse some apprehension that it was the beginning of a movement by the United States to disengage itself from Europe. This apprehension was groundless for the foreseeable future; the United States accepted the fact that its ground divisions, air forces and navy would be operating in and in connection with the

European Defense Organization. The British also, although with their usual national restraint, were apparently willing to do about everything which the European states had asked so far in connection with actual collaboration.

740.5/3-1153

Memorandum of Conversation, by Francis L. Spalding of the Office of Western European Affairs

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 11, 1953.

Subject: Visit of Dutch Foreign Minister Luns

Participants: Foreign Minister J.M.A.H. Luns
Ambassador J. H. van Roijen
The Secretary
EUR—Mr. Bonbright
WE—F. L. Spalding

The Foreign Minister remarked that he had discussed with the President many aspects of European problems and the EDC in particular. He said that the Dutch had certain misgivings as to the sincerity of some European countries' attitude toward the EDC and felt they were perhaps not convinced of the wisdom of the EDC. The Dutch objections were not that the EDC countries would be too closely knit but that they would not be bound together closely enough. Strong links and an integrated army were necessary. The Dutch, the Foreign Minister said, were not as fearful of Germany in NATO as of a loose EDC where each country would have too much autonomy over its own armed forces. The French reservations might make possible unilateral decisions such as crossing the Oder River and Western Europe would be faced with a *fait accompli* and forced into a war provoked by one country. The Secretary replied that there would be less risk of that with Germany tied into EDC. Ambassador van Roijen said there were no Dutch objections to the French having a privileged position in Europe but there would be no objections if the same privileges were given to the Germans. The Foreign Minister reiterated the Dutch had no fears of France but their fear of Germany influenced their attitude toward France. Giving in to France, the Foreign Minister said, might encourage the Germans.

The Foreign Minister said we should not rely on paper links which would permit any given country to go too far. When the Secretary urged the Netherlands to proceed with the ratification of EDC as soon as possible, the Foreign Minister replied that the Government had done all it could as the ratification bill had been submitted to Parliament with the recommendation that it be ratified. The Parliament would, however, like to know what the French decisions would be before ratifying as the Dutch were anxious about differences in interpretation and whether there would be any textual changes.

The Foreign Minister remarked that in his opinion if Italy did not ratify this month it would have to wait until after the Italian elections. The Dutch had no such problem as elections were not expected until 1958. The Dutch were convinced that, for better or worse, there must be an EDC but that Europe could only truly be united if economic unity comes into being at the same time as political integration. The Dutch feel so strongly that it would be better not to go further with political integration, military questions aside, if it is not possible to go ahead with economic integration. The Dutch believe integrated countries cannot remain in control of their own financial and economic matters as this leads to more division than unity. Van Roijen commented that economic and political integration must be parallel and simultaneous. When the Secretary said the EDC must come first, Foreign Minister Luns said that the Dutch did not tie the EDC question to political and economic integration. There were no psychological barriers in the Netherlands to EDC as the Dutch population realized the value and necessity of European unity, and were prepared to make sacrifices, if necessary, but the Parliament must know what the protocols mean.

The Foreign Minister remarked that the Dutch document on economic steps[1] needed for unity had been given a good reception in Italy which was especially favorable to the plan. In his opinion Dutch and Italian relations were becoming closer and closer, and that their positions were very similar in that they each have a surplus population problem, have lost colonies, and have a post-war feeling of uneasiness and insecurity. He remarked that De Gasperi and Beyen had gotten along very well together, and the Dutch felt they had gained a "beachhead" in Italy. Van Roijen remarked that European integration with only a political roof would not be a very solid structure Mr. Luns remarked that they now had a very good understanding with their Benelux neighbors and saw eye-to-eye on big issues, but even they had difficulties in ironing out economic problems and real economic union was not being speeded up. He remarked that the Dutch Minister for Agriculture was optimistic about the Green Pool and obtaining a common agricultural policy in Europe.[2]

The Secretary said that any concessions we might make to the French viewpoint on the EDC might lose their value if progress on ratification was not made. He hoped the Dutch would be able to take action soon, as we had the NATO meeting to face. We were in a difficult position with Congress with regard to appropriations and some sign of vitality in the EDC would be helpful. He said he had been informed his own organization would have to be cut down and if Congress was making a cut in our own organizations there would be a tendency to cut foreign assistance. As he had said in a recent press conference, the EDC was a European concept and we would want to know it if other governments changed their minds. The Foreign Minister inquired if he was not right that in American opinion the EDC was a goal in itself and there would be keen disappointment if it failed. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said EDC had become a symbol and that it was difficult to find a substitute for the plan. While the Secretary himself said he did not like it in every respect, in December prior to assuming office, it had to be decided what course to take as that was the time either to make a fresh start or throw our weight behind the EDC. It was not an easy decision, as the Republican Congress might have liked a fresh start better, but it would not be easy to retrace the steps. The possibility of getting Germany into NATO had been discussed. Maybe the Dutch were right to be concerned but to the U.S. people, EDC was the symbol that France and Germany had buried the hatchet, and the possibility of ending the feud had caught the imagination of the American people who had been frightened and worried about French-German friction over the years. We would give the Dutch every support on their desire for economic as well as political integration but we felt the EDC was necessary.

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[1] Regarding the Netherlands note of Feb. 14, 1953 on European political and economic integration, see despatch 920, Feb. 18, from The Hague, printed in volume VI.

[2] Documentation on the attitude of the United States toward European agricultural integration is presented *ibid.*

Luns replied that the Dutch Government had not only left nothing undone but would continue to do everything to help EDC. He emphasized that the protocol question had not delayed ratification, although Parliament would want to know what the protocols meant.

Referring to the reorganization of the NATO High Command, the Foreign Minister said he did not have much to add to what had been said to the President and the Under Secretary, but the Dutch did have misgivings of a grave political and psychological nature. As a result of his talk here, the Foreign Minister understood that the proposed plan would be discussed in the Standing Group and the NAC, and he realized that Juin had been chosen as he was the best man for the job and not because he was French. He also understood, contrary to his previous understanding, that a new command with a French general under Marshall Juin is not planned and that they will not see a chain of command from Ridgway to Juin to a French general. Mr. Luns said that the Under Secretary had agreed to check this understanding with General Bradley when he returned from abroad.

With reference to the recent flood, the Foreign Minister said the Dutch Cabinet had decided the military budget would not be affected and the military appropriations would not be used for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The Foreign Minister then referred to immigration bills pending before Congress and said he would appreciate the Secretary giving sympathetic consideration to them when the time comes as the flood victims would benefit by an opportunity to emigrate. Ambassador Van Roijen said he hoped the wording of the bills could be altered so that other Dutch subjects and not only flood victims could immigrate. He added the flood victims could benefit indirectly as well as directly through increased emigration.

The Foreign Minister stated he had gone into the New Guinea question[3] at length with the Under Secretary and he merely wished to point out that NNG is not the only territory in the world under dispute and mentioned Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, Sudan and others. Therefore, the Netherlands did not claim to be in any special category but he would be grateful if the U.S. made no more endeavors to have the Netherlands and Indonesia resume talks as the resumption of these talks would only widen the gap. The Secretary said he was not familiar with the question. Van Roijen referred to the "ice box" policy and Mr. Bonbright remarked that we have endeavored to keep the question "on ice". The Foreign Minister said as soon as the Indonesian political and economic position became more stable, the Indonesians would no longer need a foreign issue to foster unity at home.

The Foreign Minister then mentioned the Dutch desire to participate in the five-power talks in the Pacific[4] particularly on questions of concern to them. The Secretary asked if Mr. Bonbright was familiar with the question and when Mr. Bonbright replied in the affirmative, the Secretary asked him to give it his attention.

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[3] Documentation on New Guinea is presented in volume XII.

[4] Documentation on security matters affecting the Pacific region is presented *ibid.*

740.5/3–1253 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 12, 1953—1 a. m.

Coled 30. Distribution as directed by Under Secretary. Eyes only Chiefs of Mission. Subject is European Defense Community.

1. I have now talked to Foreign Ministers of all six nations on this subject, as well as to numbers of other officials and Parliamentarians.

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[1] Repeated niact to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

a. Adenauer certain his government will obtain passage on third reading commencing in Bundestag March 19.[2]

b. Italy's (as reported Strasbourg telegram 300 to Department)[3] Mario no longer confident they can get action in Lower Chamber before dissolution pending elections. However, this question not yet decided since De Gasperi willing to take risks if situation permits.

c. Bech talked frankly to Adenauer and myself yesterday about Luxembourg position. Is settled in determination expressed to me in Luxembourg not to seek ratification his Parliament where approval will be easy, until Belgium and perhaps France also have acted.

This springs from traditional policies his country against taking first line position. He thinks that speedy ratification Luxembourg would only irritate these other two nations and would be harmful to ultimate achievement.

d. Van Zeeland must be induced to take early action in Belgian Parliament. At present he is not pressing for vote and has no intention doing so. His tactics are considered obstructive and devious. I have discussed with Spaak, whom Van Zeeland dislikes, what might be done to influence him. Spaak believes as do some of Van Zeeland's close advisers, and also Adenauer, that best and perhaps only chance would be have President Eisenhower and Secretary talk next week frankly and firmly to this wily statesman during his stay in US,[4] playing upon his vanity and pointing out prestige to be gained for his country by this operation. His assertion that he can do nothing until French Assembly votes is highly disruptive and deemed indicative his insincerity and skepticism regarding all European integration movements. Spaak believes favorable vote relatively easy to obtain.

e. Dutch, in their methodical and reliable way, are proceeding toward ratification and if satisfactory settlement French protocol demands achieved expect favorable Parliamentary action within two months, in spite Prime Minister's distrust subject. Beyen most cooperative.

f. France is obviously the chief trouble spot in this enterprise. Pleven told me he hopes for favorable Parliamentary action in July provided that Socialist support can be attracted and that France is partially isolated by preceding votes of several partners. This prediction presupposes agreement on protocols.

Mayer is firm in his purpose obtain ratification. Told me that four conditions must be met in Parliament.

(1) Protocols in some form are agreed.

(2) A close association with Great Britain satisfactory to French Socialists is evolved.

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[2] The Bundestag approved the EDC Treaty on Mar. 19 by a vote of 224–165 and the Contractual Agreements by a vote of 226–164 following the decision of the Constitutional Court on Mar. 7 that no final judgment on the legality of the agreements could be given until after they were completely ratified.

[3] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Bruce and De Gasperi on Mar. 9 in which Bruce "again stressed key importance of early ratification of EDC in Italy" and De Gasperi expressed uncertainty due, Bruce later learned, to De Gasperi's fear of a coalition of right and left in the Italian Parliament which could successfully filibuster an EDC bill until dissolution in 3 weeks time. Bruce added that the Italian Government seemed to be considering alternative plans that might provide for early ratification (740.5/3–1053).

[4] See memorandum of conversation, Mar. 16, p. 773.

(3) He succeeds in obtaining greater American assistance in Indochina.

(4) Saar problem is settled with Adenauer. Regarding the last, Mayer feels that to accomplish this Adenauer and himself must negotiate together. Adenauer tells me he voices this view, particularly because he holds Bidault in low regard. Opportunity for two heads of state to meet without offending Bidault and causing undesirable publicity has not yet presented itself. May do so on May 12 at time governments consider EPC text. Have talked to Bidault but have not yet been able to form estimate his real intentions. He is said to be casting longing eye on succession to Auriol in autumn and therefore anxious conciliate Gaullists. Others allege he is by nature crafty and unreliable. His friends maintain he is manoeuvering skillfully to achieve ratification. He has become very unpopular with his European colleagues who consider his witty remarks and his subterranean methods signs of innate levity and lack of conviction. Bidault and Mayer are mutually unsympathetic but the support Bidault and the MRP are essential to the government.

Teitgen who is close personally to Bidault thinks latter will after municipal elections in May become aggressive sponsor of ratification EDC and there will be possibility at that time Socialists re-entering the government with Mollet a Cabinet Minister. Meanwhile Bidault is being deliberately unenthusiastic about EPC to gain Mollet and like Socialist support for EDC.[6] Mollet opposes present EPC draft primarily on grounds that being based on complete federation for six nations, it prejudices possibility of UK "participation" for "special membership". Some other French would like link EPC and EDC. French situation regard to EPC is so complex will discuss it in later telegram.

Bidault spoke to me generally along same lines as did Mayer and I think we can assume this is government position both of them wish to talk further after I have been around the six nation circuit before their departure Washington.

My own impression Bidault is playing a deep game, is lone wolf operator and counsels with few. Recently observed to me he has been long committed to the several proposals for European unity, and has repeatedly stated his support for EDC. Large majority of Foreign Office officials advising him are violently opposed to EDC.

Following Department's instructions I had long exposition from Mollet of his views and assessment of prospects EDC chances in French Parliament. Mollet says that 25 percent Socialists including Moch and Daniel Mayer will be against treaty on any terms. Another 25 percent will vote staunchly for it. Mollet is ranged with the doubtful 50 percent who have had three objectives. First a more complete US guarantee regarding duration of NATO, et cetera. Second, a more democratic form of political control over the EDC Commissariat. Third, a close association with the British including stronger understanding reference stationing UK forces on continent. His Socialists have abandoned expectation of gaining first two objectives at this time and would be satisfied if they attain the third. Mollet about 10 days ago conferred with Attlee, Morrison and other Labor as well as Conservative members House of Commons and received assurances from them that were encouraging.

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[6] A handwritten notation on the source text at this point reads: "Peculiar—may gain soc support UK assoc?"

The following is important in above connection. Mollet believes that conversations this subject between British and French at government level will not prove effective, and that British Government should appoint a delegation composed chiefly of Parliamentarians to confer with similar French delegation. In this way French Socialists who are not represented in government would be brought fully into picture.[6] He thinks that such a conference would speedily bring about agreement without British making unduly substantial further concessions. Following it he would convoke his Party Congress and announce Socialist support for EDC. In a separate telegram I will give his estimate of the probable Parliamentarian vote if treaty were submitted now.

I have talked to the above Frenchmen and others including Teitgen about delaying tactics of Jules Moch and Koenig in their capacities as committee reporters. If Socialists are won over all feel that present reporters can be replaced and others substituted, or committees discharged and matter referred directly to Assembly. This would create opportunity for Parliamentarian action late June or early July.

2. Tomlinson and I leaving March 11 for Bonn and seeing Adenauer next day. Going Rome Monday to talk De Gasperi, Lombardo and others and probably will visit Holland next week. Nothing to be explored in Belgium during Van Zeeland's absence but will see him in Brussels toward end of month.

3. Personally feel guardedly optimistic EDC will be ratified by six Parliaments. The majority of public everywhere recognizes necessity German military contribution and prefers this route to possible reconstitution German National Army. Notably in France, in spite of lack popular instruction on meaning project, the public is in advance of the politicians in wishing ratification.

4. Sentiments in *Ad Hoc* Parliamentary Assembly extremely encouraging. Here you see zeal, determination, accommodation of secular antagonisms and Europe in the making, leading to conclusion that the tide though slow in rising will finally prove irresistible.

5. It is very important to our relationships with the individuals named in this telegram that its distribution be severely restricted.

BRUCE

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[6] A handwritten notation on the source text at this point reads: "good idea. Belg attitude."

740.5/3–1653

Memorandum by John J. McCloy to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1953.

MEMORANDUM OF BLANKENHORN VISIT TO MCCLOY, SUNDAY, MARCH 15, 1953

Blankenhorn came in from Germany by plane with a message from the Chancellor, traveling secretly and with the purpose of giving advance notice of matters he proposes to bring up on his forthcoming visit to the United States.[2]

The Chancellor emphasizes that this is probably the only time in his life that he will be visiting the United States. He hopes the visit will be of significance, not merely atmospheric, and this hope is not based only on his own political situation but because he feels that we now have the last clear chance for the establishment of a solid European Defense Community, political as well as military. Further interminable delays will be disastrous and the time has now come for real advances.

First, as to his program this week, the Bundestag will have its third reading of the contractual agreements and the EDC. This action will be followed by Adenauer's trip to the United States, and on his return the treaties will be submitted to the Bundesrat. In this situation, Reinhold Meyer seems to be the key figure. Adenauer rather thinks that Meyer, although an uncertain quantity, will shrink before the enormous responsibility of repudiating these agreements. After Bundesrat approval, the President will sign the legislative acts, and then in all probability the SPD will seek from the constitutional court a sort of temporary injunction. According to Blankenhorn, the decision on this might be forthcoming in about three days after submission. According to Adenauer's calculations, it will be the end of April or the beginning of May by the time the Praesidium will have acted and the full ratification of the treaties by the Federal Republic will be completed.

Adenauer wishes to assure the Secretary of State and the President that he will do everything in his power to put this program through, and that he already has his plans well advanced. He asserts that public opinion is better now than it has been for some time, but we must expect strenuous efforts and strong propaganda from the Soviets to interfere with this schedule.

The real delays will develop in other countries than Germany, and from the Chancellor's reading of the situation he feels the situation in these other countries is still serious. The French, he is convinced, seek only delay. Bidault is a slender reed, loath to cut off the relationships which he now has with the de Gaullists largely because of his personal ambitions, and he believes that though the French will give lip service to the concept of the EDC, what they really seek is continued inaction, in the meantime gleaning all they can in the way of other concessions in return for promises to do better.

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[1] McCloy, former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, dictated this memorandum in the Office of the Secretary.

[2] Chancellor Adenauer and his party visited Washington on Apr. 7–8 for talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. See telegram 4845, Apr. 8, p. 786.

According to the Chancellor's estimate, there will be probably one year's delay before ratification. The chances for ratification this autumn, in his judgment, do not look too good considering the French political situation. Belgium and Luxembourg will drag their feet along with the French. Italy is also somewhat of a doubtful factor not through any personal defection of de Gasperi, but because of his local political problem. His statement that he would ratify before the election, it now seems, will have to be modified.

In the meantime, Soviet preparations are going on with real vigor. Refugees are being cleaned out, some being sent to the concentration camps, some being allowed to flee in the hope that the combination of these methods will leave East Germany in a more amenable form for organization by the Soviets than heretofore. One can no longer blink at the actual military preparations in East Germany. The Bereitschaften are being turned into a people's army—180,000 men trained, equipped, good tanks, good anti-tank equipment and training and some planes. The Chancellor believes that with this strength, there will be a real test of our resolution, perhaps coming in Berlin or in some other form. While Europe is badly defended in spirit and in fact, it must get beyond its present stage of paralysis if there is to be any hope of forming a progressive and vigorous Western Community. The Chancellor, conscious of the time element, therefore, proposes two things:

(1) To start training German cadres strictly according to the EDC formulas immediately after German ratification. He submits a schedule for Army, Air Force and Naval Forces, commencing with the training of volunteer veterans, former officers, none above the rank of colonel, and non-commissioned officers, the training to be accomplished with United States units preferably, but possibly also with British and French. All told, the volunteer veterans (commissioned and non-commissioned officers) would amount to about 30,000 for the Army, and about 60,000 young recruits with no previous training, also volunteers.

For the Air Force it would be contemplated that there would be about 10,000 former officers and former enlisted personnel; for the Navy about 5,000.

As I understand the proposal, nothing would be said about this in any communiqué covering the visit, but at an appropriate time disclosures could be made that selected German volunteers were training with Allied Forces.

(2) On the political front, the Chancellor would hope that the United States would announce that the U.S. would get in contact with her Allies, suggesting to them that as soon as the Federal Republic had ratified the contracts, they would come into effect, thus giving to the Federal Republic full power over its internal and external affairs subject to the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement. In effect, this would mean that the Agreements of May 26, 1952 would come into effect in precisely the same way as if all signatories to the European Defense Treaty had ratified that Treaty immediately upon the ratification by the Federal Republic itself of all the Agreements. In other words, there would be no "junctum" between the Federal ratification and that of the others, but all reserve powers would remain as stated in the General Agreement and all the rights of the troops under the so-called "Truppen Vertrag" would be in force and French troops would be given the full benefit of this Treaty as well during the interim period. The Chancellor emphasized that his proposal would involve that all the provisions of these treaties would be in force, including specifically those in Article I of the General Agreement.

Thus far, no one knows of these proposals—not even Conant or Bruce. The Chancellor took these means of communication primarily because of his fear of leaks.

As to the general situation, the Chancellor says that he has no real knowledge of the significance of the Malenkov succession.[3] He knows what is going on in East Germany, but not to any extent in Russia. He comes to the conclusion, however, that the Soviets are preparing something definite, perhaps in respect to Berlin, but probably with the idea of again testing strengths in Europe, say in 1954.

Ollenhauer and the SPD continue negative, but they still have the attraction of German unity as an offset to Adenauer's policies. There were certain other incidentals. He wonders whether some further governmental action might not be taken toward the refugee problem in Germany. This would greatly help him and it would fill a real need. He emphasizes that the refugees are good people, many of them young, a real element of strength if handled properly. He points out that while Reuter and Berlin are attractive figures, it is the Federal Republic which really puts up the money to take care of these people and eventually has to absorb them.

Would there be a chance of a loan for refugees from either the Export Bank or the World Bank? It is an enormous problem, but the psychological effect of say a $100,000,000 loan would be tremendous.

He will be prepared to sign the so-called Cultural Agreement on his visit. It will be prepared by that time. This provides for cultural exchanges but it is a good means by which we are permitted to carry on activities in Germany in their propaganda war, without which there would be a serious diminution of our propaganda front.

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[3] Documentation on the Soviet leadership crisis following the death of Stalin on Mar. 5, 1953, is presented in volume VIII.

He also wishes an exchange of views between his atomic experts and ours on the matter of air defense. He would like to have his experts come over—if not with him, shortly after. They need information from us in this field, but they also have some of their own to offer.

He urges that everything be done to convince the French that further dilatory tactics will not succeed.

I am leaving in this envelope the training schedules for the Army, the Air Force and the Navy (Streng Geheim!), which were handed me by Blankenhorn and which I feel should be looked at by the military people, and the hand-written (in German) proposal for the abolition of the "junctum", which is referred to above. As I think this was carefully drafted, I would prefer to have an expert translator make the translation, but the gist of it is as I have indicated above.

J.J. McC.

740.5/3-1653

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 16, 1953.

Subject: Foreign Minister Van Zeeland's Call on the President [1]

Participants: The President
Mr. Van Zeeland, Belgian Foreign Minister
Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
The Secretary of State
Mr. L. T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

At the outset of the conversation, the President reminded the Foreign Minister of talks they had had in the past concerning the necessity of the European countries taking additional steps in furtherance of their own defense. He stated that the United States is watching attentively developments in Europe at the present time and he referred to the difficulties of securing continued public and Congressional support for our aid programs in the absence of tangible progress abroad. The President then brought up the subject of the ratification of the EDC Treaty, recalling the fact that M. Pleven was its author. The President emphasized the importance of speed on ratification of the Treaty and suggested that, if the Benelux countries and Western Germany proceeded promptly with their own ratification processes, the pressures on France would be powerful and she would be compelled to move forward in the interests of the role of leadership on the continent to which she rightfully aspires.

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[1] Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland visited Washington, Mar. 14–18, 1953, for discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other government officials. Material on the visit of the Belgian Foreign Minister is in EUR files, lot 59 D 233, "Van Zeeland Visit".

The Foreign Minister expressed confidence regarding the ratification situation in Belgium. He said that there was no question at this time of its successful passage but that he had been working for and was continuing to seek to achieve the largest possible majority. He indicated a two-thirds favorable vote in Parliament as his objective and he assured the President that Belgium would not delay the going into force of the Treaty by a single hour. It was obvious from his remarks, however, that he had some reluctance in placing Belgium out in front and he expressed some real doubt as to whether advance action by certain of her partners would, in fact, be persuasive to the French Parliament. At a later point the President asked him what his view would be on a purely private inquiry (possibly by Mr. David Bruce) of M. Mayer to ascertain whether or not in the latter's view prior ratification by several of France's partners would be helpful or damaging to him in the French Parliament. The Foreign Minister gave the impression of being doubtful as to the wisdom of this, remarking that it was a question of how it was put and that it was important to avoid any impression of interfering in French internal affairs. He did, however, emphasize his complete conviction that Mayer and the French Cabinet are wholeheartedly seeking French ratification of the Treaty.

The Foreign Minister then raised two command problems,[2] the first relating to Marshal Juin's assumption of the Central European Ground Command. He stated that he thought it was important that if he assumed this command he surrender any purely national command over French forces. The President indicated that he regarded this as reasonable. The Foreign Minister then suggested that it was important that not all the major commands be held by officers of the three Standing Group countries and put forward Belgian claims for an important command for one of its generals with the thought that this would not be permanent and that he might be succeeded by a Dutch general or some other NATO national other than the big three. The President again indicated that this seemed personally reasonable to him but only if an officer of the proper qualifications could be provided. He also emphasized the importance of SACEUR's absolute right to remove immediately any officer who failed to display the necessary qualifications for command. The President went on to say that he did not know what arguments might be developed in a discussion of this matter but that personally he was in agreement that all the important positions of command should not be monopolized by the three Standing Group countries.

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[2] Further documentation on problems of command structure and jurisdiction within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is printed on pp. 1 ff.

In closing the conversation, the President agreed with the Foreign Minister that the Belgians in general had been among the leaders within NATO in its defense effort. He made it clear that whereas the U.S. by reason of its size, productive capacity and location must play the more important role in the material aspects of the alliance, we look to countries such as Belgium to provide a role of inspirational leadership and example on the continent.[3]

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[3] In telegram Edcol 20 to Paris, Mar. 18, Bruce was informed that the point had been pressed with Van Zeeland in his Washington talks that prior ratification by Belgium "would be helpful" in securing ratification of the EDC Treaty in France. "When pressed on this point last evening Van Zeeland indicated this was insufficient basis on which to proceed but he stated that if he received from Mayer or Bidault a message that prior action his part would advance their efforts for ratification he would be happy to move ahead. We doubt feasibility securing any helpful word from Bidault but if you see no objection suggest you take first opportunity sound out Mayer on possibility his sending through you confidential message for Van Zeeland along foregoing lines" (740.5/3–1753).

Editorial Note

In accordance with the decision of the Interim Committee taken at the meeting of March 4 (see footnote 2, page 755), the EDC Juridical Committee met for some 40 hours between March 5 and 21 to discuss and redraft the protocols to the EDC Treaty proposed by the French Government. The Juridical Committee was unable, because of the pressure of time, to do more than hold preliminary discussions on the protocol to Article 13.

On March 23, the Interim Committee took up the report of the Juridical Committee, and the following day, after further discussion and negotiation on the protocols to all articles, including Article 13, the French, German, Belgian, and Luxembourg Delegations agreed to present a text of the protocol to Article 13 to their respective governments recommending approval, while the Italian and Netherlands Delegations agreed to submit the text of the protocol with no recommendation for either approval or disapproval. The texts of the protocols to the other five articles were also accepted and were to be "shortly submitted to the Six Governments. While no decisions have been taken as to timing, it seems unlikely that any action will be taken on the texts until after Easter. The best estimate seems to be that the texts will be finally approved and signed by the Six Foreign Ministers at the meeting scheduled for mid-May" (Despatch Coled 11 from Paris, March 25, 1953, 740.5/3–2353).

740.5/3–1853: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Bunker) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET ROME, March 18, 1953—8 p. m.

4062. 1. Italian Ministers informed Bruce and me yesterday that they were not able to seek ratification EDC Treaty by Lower House before dissolution for election. De Gasperi said he knew the great importance of Italy going ahead now and was fully aware that his decision would be very bad news in United States. He deeply regretted necessity to make adverse decision. His parliamentary difficulties had worsened in past two weeks and after a most careful survey, it is clear that no hope exists of overcoming Commie obstruction before dissolution which he feels must take place by end next week. Election prospects[2] are already serious, with Trieste question[3] major unknown, and a successful commie filibuster would appear as defeat for government and would be most prejudicial to favorable election results.

2. De Gasperi asked that United States understand Italy's present difficulties and be patient, continuing strong and firm support. That Italy might change in her determination to bring about European unity is unthinkable. It is certain that Italy will ratify and fulfill its obligation to her partners. While it is not possible to obtain immediate ratification because of efforts of Communism to weaken Europe, Italian Government will take issue of EDC and European unity to Italian people as an election issue.

3. De Gasperi would not give possible date for ratification other than to say it would be late summer. He said speed depended in part on outcome of elections. Pella in separate conversation said ratification would be in September. Embassy will review prospects for different procedures and cable separately. Possibility of early ratification by Senate also seems ruled out.

4. De Gasperi said Germany might interpret his action as part of a deal with the French but he hoped they would also understand his real problems. He commented that Bidault, a "clever" person, was hard to pin down but we must nevertheless be sympathetic to very difficult domestic political situation facing Bidault.

5. Bruce and I saw separately Pella, Taviani, Campilli, Pacciardi and La Malfa. All repeated the same theme of sincere regret and determination by Italy and of patience by US. Taviani underlined European unity in all its forms as only hope for Italy and Europe; Pella stressed need for economic integration; La Malfa is worried over trade liberalization problem and feels may have to impose restrictions after elections; Campilli raised problems of Sardinian coal mines and high

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[1] Repeated to Paris, The Hague, Brussels, Bonn, London, and Luxembourg.

[2] Documentation on the Italian elections of June 1953 is presented in volume VI.

[3] Documentation on Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

cost steel industry; and Pacciardi dwelt proudly on the great improvement in morale and fighting capacity of new Italian Army.

BUNKER

740.5/3–1853: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 19, 1953—7:27 p. m.

3773. Reference: Rome Embtel 4062.[2] Request that following be brought attention De Gasperi:

1. US Government greatly concerned over reported decision Italian Government not to seek Lower House action on EDC before elections. We realize that Italian Government faces serious problems in connection with forthcoming elections and Communist efforts to block EDC. We also feel, however, that Italian Government must weigh these factors against effects of Italian Government's action outside of Italy. Italy up to now has been a leader in the effort to bring about ratification. After Germany, Italy was the first to submit the Treaty to parliament. Italy moved steadily ahead in getting approval of Treaty by Special Commission in Lower House on March 5. Italy has cooperated wholeheartedly in efforts to persuade other countries to move ahead, De Gasperi playing a particularly helpful role at Rome in helping bring French and Germans together.[3]

2. These actions have earned for Italy a position of leadership and respect in Europe, and US public and Congressional opinion has also admired Italy's role.

3. All this would be lost overnight if Italian Government fails to move ahead with ratification. Instead of being in forefront, Italy would slip to rear. Instead of being leader, Italy would probably be last to ratify.

4. Italian action would be particularly bad at this moment because it would contrast so sharply with favorable action by German Bundestag.

5. EDC opponents in France would seize upon Italian action at this time as ready-made excuse for further delays.

6. Italian estimates that ratification cannot be accomplished until late summer or even September cause particular concern because this means that contractuals, as well as EDC Treaty, could not go into effect until fall. Keenest observers German political scene forecast

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Knight, Kidd (paragraph 6 only), and Bonbright. Sent also to Paris, repeated to The Hague, Brussels, London, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Reference is presumably to the meeting of the six Foreign Ministers at Rome reported in telegrams Coled 4 and 1, from Paris, Feb. 26 and 27, pp. 740 and 741.

serious difficulties for Adenauer coalition if contractuals not fully in effect by time German election. If ratification delays result in SPD victory, effective implementation of EDC might either be postponed indefinitely or never take place at all, owing to SPD's strong anti-EDC position.

7. If there appears no possibility that Italian Government can alter its decision, US hopes that following can be done by Italian Government to help save situation:

a. Introduce bill in Senate now and push for its earliest possible action by Italian Senate.

b. Hold full foreign affairs debate in Lower House before dissolution on resolution giving full endorsement to EDC Treaty. This can be done without danger of Communists filibuster and would prepare favorable climate for prompt Senate action.

c. At earliest possible moment after election extraordinary session of Lower House to ratify EDC Treaty.

d. Avoid any public announcement that the Italian Government has decided to postpone Lower House consideration at this time. Public announcement would be particularly comforting to EDC opponents in France.

DULLES

740.5/3–2353 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Bunker) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT ROME, March 23, 1953—noon.

4115. Eyes only Secretary. I returned from Milan in order to talk to De Gasperi last evening. He came off the Senate floor to see me. I outlined to him in detail points contained Department's telegram 3773 of March 19,[1] stressing that the United States understood his domestic situation but hoped that he would be able to weigh relationship between his own political requirements and the effect which delay in ratification EDC would have on Europe. I pointed out that approval of EDC treaty by Special Commission of Chamber had been most helpful in securing European support and stressed the effect which delay would have, particularly in France. I also pointed out the bad effects which a delay in fulfillment of contractual agreements would have in Germany.

De Gasperi listened patiently to these points and replied that he was in a most difficult situation. He said that Communist obstructionist tactics and rowdyism in the Italian Senate were worse than he had ever experienced. He stated in strictest confidence that although it may be extremely difficult he may be required to replace Paratore as President of the Senate within the next day or two in order that orderly procedures can be restored. De Gasperi said there was question whether or not he would be able to speak himself, without risk of physical violence (see Embassy's telegram 4111, March 22).[2] He asked me to inform you that he was deeply concerned and humiliated by his failure to carry out the pledges made during your recent visit Rome,[3] but he had never anticipated this extreme obstructionism after having defeated the same tactics in the Chamber.

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[1] *Supra.*

De Gasperi stated that the risk in postponing the elections until summer was too great to bring the treaty to a vote in the Chamber at this time. Chamber must be dissolved by the end of this week. However, unless Senate is dissolved, he will, unless Parliamentary procedures preclude it, introduce treaty into the Senate after electoral law is passed. Either today or Tuesday, he plans to speak in Senate and will include a strong defense of EDC. At that time he will announce his decision concerning procedure for ratification. If he introduces the treaty, committee to examine the treaty can work during the campaign even if Senate is adjourned. Their report should be completed by the time of election. If so, he anticipates that final approval by the Senate would take place two or three weeks following elections.

We did not know precisely whether favorable report by Special Commission of present Chamber would be considered valid by new Chamber. He will receive a legal opinion on this question shortly. In any event, he will make ratification a campaign issue and first order of business in new Chamber. He does not anticipate that consideration by new Chamber will require a long time. He hopes that ratification could be completed before the summer holidays.

De Gasperi asked me to assure you that he is so closely identified with European integration his entire political fortune and future are involved in the ratification of the EDC. In this issue he considers that his whole policy is at stake. However, obstructive tactics have gone so far that he has even had to consider dissolution of the Senate as a last resort in order to avoid throwing elections into the summer, which he feels would be most dangerous. He would be most reluctant to take such a drastic step for it would mean abandonment of the new electoral law and going to the country on the present law. This, however, would be preferable to postponement of elections until later in the summer when people have left their homes for harvesting, making it impossible for them to vote.

De Gasperi told me that he had received a letter from Adenauer expressing concern about the delay in ratification. He has written to the Chancellor explaining his problem and assuring him that he will do his utmost to bring it about at the earliest moment.

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[2] Not printed. (765.21/3-2253)

[3] Reference is to Secretary Dulles' discussions with Prime Minister De Gasperi at Rome on Jan. 31; see telegram 4275 and Dulles' letter to the President, both dated Feb. 1, pp. 1551 and 1553.

It is my considered opinion that the foregoing represents the maximum position which De Gasperi can take. If he introduces the treaty into the Senate he will have gone as far as he can go without running the serious risk of postponing the elections. His government will suffer unless Chamber is dissolved this week and elections can be held in May or early June. I appreciate the additional point contained in Department's telegram 3794, March 21[4] and advised De Gasperi accordingly. I believe, however, that De Gasperi's hesitancy to force issue in present Chamber is not based on uncertainty concerning the French protocols or represents any wavering in his policy for European integration. He is preoccupied by the necessity for a victory for the center group in the elections and the difficulties which he will encounter in obtaining it. If this is prejudiced in any way our entire policy of European integration, including the EDC, would be seriously jeopardized.

Please repeat to other posts as you consider advisable.

BUNKER

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[4] Telegram 3794 priority to Rome, Mar. 21, reads in part: "One additional point for possible use by Ambassador with De Gasperi is that there have been significant developments in the protocol negotiations in Paris. There is good chance that final agreement will be reached on March 24 by the EDC Interim Committee on five of the six protocols. If protocols are substantially agreed, this eliminates one very important obstacle to ratification. Uncertainty over French protocols has been major reason why other EDC governments have been reluctant to push parliaments to complete ratification" (740.5/3–2053).

740.5/3–2753

Prime Minister De Gasperi to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET ROME, March 24, 1953.

MY [DEAR] SECRETARY OF STATE: It has been a great pleasure for us to receive in Rome during the last few days the visit of Ambassador Bruce. In his person and in the task entrusted to him we see another clear evidence of the interest and sympathy whereby the United States of America follows the process of European integration.

With Ambassador Bruce I have talked at length on that general Europeist policy of which—as you know—I have been since the beginning, and still am, a convinced advocate. We have also spoken of the ratification of the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community. However, I wish also to write to you personally on the subject, referring to the conversations I had the pleasure of holding with you during your welcomed visit in Rome.

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[1] Source text reads: "Copy of Translation." A covering memorandum of conversation, by Byington, dated Mar. 27, reads: "The Italian Ambassador informed me that he would ask to see the Secretary of State some time next week but that in the meanwhile he wished to give me informally a copy of a letter from Prime Minister de Gasperi to the Secretary of State concerning Italy's firm intention to ratify the European Defense Community" (740.5/3–2753).

There is no need for me to assure you that the realization of the European Defense Community occupies always the foremost place among the objectives of the Italian Government. It was my firm intention after the Treaty has been—as you are aware—approved by a large majority by the competent Commission of the Chamber of Deputies (already a notable result which has its value) to bring the debate on the floor. But the opposition's filibustering in the Senate against the electoral reform—a law of which I am sure the American parliamentary circles and public opinion appreciate all the special importance—dominates at the present moment the whole political situation and absorbs our efforts as it will certainly do for all the time available before the Chamber of Deputies dissolves.

Anyway, I hope to make during the next few days at the Senate or before the Chamber of Deputies precise statements such as will leave no doubts—in whomever might still have them—on the intentions of the Italian Government and on our maintaining our firm purpose to do all that is in our power so that, as soon as possible, the CED Agreements may obtain the sanction of Parliament, transferring, when necessary, the discussion of the Bill from the Chamber of Deputies to the Senate. Moreover, as I believe you already know, the Democratic Parties have publicly mainifested their decision to place among the fundamental elements of the electoral platform that of the policy of European integration; which will give to that policy a basis and an emphasis even more distinct.

I hope that the parliamentary and the public opinion of the friendly nations, and especially of the United States of America, will be able to fully understand the position of the Italian Government, a position that, allow me to say it, has always been absolutely clear and straightforward, such, in other words, as to represent a substantial contribution to the idea of European integration and an encouragement for all who believe in this cause.

Accept [etc.]

ALCIDE DE GASPERI

740.5/3-2653: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, March 26, 1953—7:39 p.m.

4992. Paris pass Bruce. This morning's meeting on board *Williamsburg* devoted to presentation of President's views and of Mr. Mayer's.[2]

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[1] Drafted by Knight; cleared with Merchant; repeated to London, Saigon, and Bonn.

[2] René Mayer and his party visited Washington, Mar. 25–28. Further documentation on this visit is presented in volume VI and in volume XIII.

Re EDC President stressed major importance attached thereto both by American people and himself. EDC vital not only because it provides best means obtain German contribution without which no real defense of Europe can be undertaken but also because it provides means for eventual European viability; also impossible keep Germany much longer under occupation status.

President declared that EDC so important in American eyes that American people would not support aid to France if they were given impression that France resorting to dilatory tactics in order to postpone ratification this vital development. Therefore when setting forth any conditions precedent to ratification French must be very careful to point out why these conditions are in fact vital to France and not inconsequential details or obstructionist moves.

Concerning Indochina President expressed full American sympathy for valiant French struggle as part of over-all fight against Communist aggression.

He recognized this struggle not just another colonial war but advised French to make this very clear as many Americans still under misapprehension. President expressed great American interest in French program leading to solution of Indochina problem making clear that he was not talking in terms of a complete victory. However requests for further American assistance could not be considered without full knowledge of French political and military plans permitting US Government to see why its assistance was required and how it would be used. President expressed great interest in measures being taken by French to obtain greatest possible support by local populations through convincing them they were fighting their own war for their own independence.

Referring to French position in Atlantic Alliance Mayer asserted that France had fulfilled her Lisbon goals in early 1953.[3] Re French 1953 budget he briefly mentioned $125 million short-fall in aid but did not press point. He emphasized importance April NAC[4] meeting when levels of forces should be established compatible with economic and financial possibilities of each country. He referred to Alphand memorandum and to great importance placed by French Government on long term planning instead of annual programs as best means use more efficiently limited resources at common disposal.

Re Indochina Mayer started by referring to NAC Resolution December 1952[5] re "continuing aid" from NATO Governments. He said French political and military plans would be communicated to us later during the talks. Meanwhile he stressed his full agreement with President that the task was two-fold: militarily, Associated States Armies had to be developed for victory and for internal pacification. Politically it was necessary to develop popular basis for national governments to protect them from eventual take-over by Vietminh forces. While expressing the greatest interest in Gen Clark's report following visit to Indochina Mayer was careful to point out differences between Korea and Indochina.

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[3] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, 1952, see pp. 107 ff.

[4] For documentation on the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris, Apr. 23–26, 1953, see pp. 368 ff.

[5] Regarding the Tenth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris, Dec. 15–18, 1952, see the editorial note and Acheson's letter to the President, pp. 348 and 351.

Letourneau said that details of recent Dalat agreements would be given to us later but that in meanwhile he can say that these will permit presentation of a Franco-Vietnamese plan which should lead within two years to reduction of Vietminh to a negligible factor in Indochina if no material increase in Chinese or Soviet aid in meanwhile. Letourneau expressed confidence that popular support for local governments was increasing day by day, pointing to success of January elections in Vietnam, to fact that much more officer material is now available for National Armies and that all enlisted men needed under present financial limitations were available on volunteer basis. Finally he expressed confidence that local populations supported local governments more vigorously now that Vietminh was clearly recognized as the agent not only of Communism but also of traditional Chinese enemy.

Mayer devoted considerable time to importance of Saar to France and to reasons why a Saar settlement with Germany had to be a condition precedent to French ratification. He did not specify how detailed such agreement should be but time and emphasis he gave to this question clearly indicate that he is thinking in terms of much more than agreement in principle. Specific substantive points which he made included fact that US in January 1950 had recognized, supported and accepted the French position on Saar which had been constant since 1945.[6] He also referred to exchange of letters between France and Germany when Schuman Plan signed[7] and which provided for Saar settlement either in peace treaty with Germany or in substitute therefor. In French opinion Contractual Relations represent such substitute. Mayer also pointed out several reasons Saar settlement necessary before EDC could become operative such as military status of Saarlanders, stationing of troops in Saar, industrial and strategic importance of Saar.

Re ratification Mayer also mentioned briefly need for closer UK association with EDC (to be covered in greater detail later with

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[6] Documentation on U.S. support for the French position on the Saar in January 1950 is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. IV, pp. 927 ff.

[7] Documentation on the exchange of letters between Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister René Pleven at the time of the signing of the treaty creating a European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, is presented *ibid.*, 1951, volume IV.

Secretary Dulles [8]) and also requirement that French people be sure that membership in EDC will not isolate her. Consequently, "longer association between EDC and Atlantic Community may be necessary" and France's role in Asia and Africa must be understood and recognized—hence requirement for protocols. Whether or not France can with her own resources play both her role in the EDC and in the world is another matter which will be discussed later in talks. Meanwhile he stated that non-impairment of French world position through membership in EDC is essential requirement for French ratification. Mayer stressed his determination and that of every member of his cabinet to achieve ratification of EDC Treaty as interpreted by protocols.

Meeting took place in frank and cordial atmosphere.

DULLES

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[8] At the First Plenary Session of the U.S.-French political talks on the afternoon of Mar. 26, the EDC was mentioned only briefly as the substance of discussion was taken up with Far Eastern matters. Secretary Dulles did congratulate the French for refusing to use the issue of the protocols as an instrument to further delay ratification. In reply, Bidault reiterated popular French concern at what might happen should France become a member of the EDC and the European Political Community, burdened as the country was by costly sacrifices in Indochina. Bidault asserted that it would greatly assist in calming the fears of French public opinion if the position of France in the Free World were confirmed by a tripartite declaration of the United States, United Kingdom, and France regarding their mutual intention to continue regular negotiations on world problems. In reply, Dulles stated he did not feel that the consultation question raised serious problems and felt sure that something could be worked out (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141). Dulles opened the Second and last Plenary Session on the afternoon of Mar. 27 by stating that the United States had nothing to add to the previous day's discussion of the European Defense Community, and Mayer replied that remaining French concerns in the matter revolved around the issue of the Saar which was then discussed at some length (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141).

740.5/4-353 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, April 3, 1953—9 a. m.

1301. Yesterday morning Bruce and I had hour and half with two Foreign Ministers and Minister Defense Staf regarding EDC. Bruce led off with rather full account his recent conversation with ministers other EDC countries and gave an informal summary of what he believed to be current attitudes and prospects for ratification in each country. Foreign Ministers were obviously taken by suprise at Bruce's statement that events of last week or ten days had greatly improved chances for consideration EDC treaty by French Assembly prior to summer recess and his feeling that because of progress made in obtaining British assurances two thirds of French Socialist deputies might vote for ratification thus providing necessary majority for passage in event Saar not obstacle. Foreign Ministers on other hand seemed to be aware and agree with Bruce's analysis of situation in other EDC countries.

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[1] Repeated to Rome, Bonn, Paris, London, Luxembourg, and Brussels.

Bruce then outlined reasons why United States Government attaches so much importance to early ratification by Netherlands of EDC and stressed confidence of United States people and Congress in stable considered character of Dutch. He pointed out very real value which early action by Second Chamber would have in giving encouragement to Congress in consideration of final Appropriation Committee reports and in action on floor two Houses. Luns and Beyen stated they fully appreciated the advisability of early Dutch ratification and favorable effect it and similar action by other EDC countries would have on program. They reiterated in some detail mechanical difficulties encountered under Dutch constitutional system of obtaining rapid ratification which have been set forth in several previous messages. Luns stated that action on preliminary report by Catholic Parliament group had been now completed and intimated he believed that some indication of urgency from Beyen might have produced similar action by other non-Communist parties. Beyen who appeared slightly on defensive, explained he did not feel that he could call for "urgent" action which he felt might be counter-productive. However, when asked for timetable all three Ministers agreed that it should be possible to start formal debates in Second Chamber last half May with vote almost immediately ensuing.[2] Beyen said main thing was of course to pass this first milestone since action by First Chamber and formal ratification would follow as matter of course.

During conversation there was some detailed discussion of protocols and Dutch Ministers stated that while they find them acceptable in principle as redrafted, they had of necessity convinced certain members of Parliament that protocols were interpretive only in character and did not really involve any change in substance of treaty.

In final discussion Staf expressed growing Dutch concern over number of high French command appointments in NATO, saying that he presumed effort would be made by France to duplicate this in EDF. In particular Staf said while Dutch Government had complete confidence in Juin as a soldier and commander there had been so much talk in press with regard to possibility abandoning north Europe in event of Soviet push that he had found it necessary make constant explanations to members of Chambers of Dutch Government confidence in Juin and other French Generals. Specifically it apparent Staf and other Dutch Ministers objected to retention by Juin and other

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[2] No conclusive action was taken on EDC by the Dutch Parliament during the spring of 1953.

French Generals of purely French functions such as that of inspector general army while holding concurrently high NATO command responsibilities. Bruce replied that this was interesting matter but felt this was subject entirely outside his jurisdiction. Staf expressed hope that perhaps in any further allotment of high command jobs Dutch objections could be taken into account.

Subsequently Bruce and I called on Prime Minister Drees, who with his usual candor stated his skepticism with respect to eventual success of EDC. He added, however, that he, far from opposing ratification EDC, thought it necessary take this action and he confident it would pass with very substantial majority both Chambers. He reiterated mechanical difficulties in obtaining early action. Drees appeared even more impressed than two Foreign Ministers had been at Bruce's optimism with regard to strong possibility of favorable action by French National Assembly prior to summer recess.

CHAPIN

611.62A/4–853 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 8, 1953—12:43 p. m.

4845. Summary of first day Adenauer talks April 7: [2]

Morning session held White House opened cordially, President welcoming Chancellor and expressing thanks for German offer of complete medical unit for Korea, and Adenauer thanking President for his attitude, both in present office and previously as SHAPE commander. Chancellor assured President Germany stands on side of West and determined press ahead with EDC and EPC and promised Bundesrat would during April ratify treaties.

President and Secretary both developed US views re current Soviet policies, former expressing hope that as result new developments, we may succeed in lessening some of world's tensions and burdens, and Secretary emphasizing that obvious lesson to be drawn from present is necessity for us to continue strong constructive policies which evidently now inducing latest Soviet moves. Settlements with Soviets best obtained through strength. Adenauer commented in reply Secretary's specific query that US need not fear Federal Republic will relax (for example, re EDC) even though there may be some Germans with such tendencies.

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[1] Drafted by Morris and Reinstein. Cleared in draft by Riddleberger. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.

[2] Chancellor Konrad Adenauer visited Washington, Apr. 7–8, 1953 for talks with American officials including President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. Further documentation on his visit is presented in volume VII.

President having already mentioned Saar as difficulty connected European unity, and Chancellor having indicated that he at full disposal US Government and hopeful issue may be settled, further discussion this problem then occurred in smaller group in President's office. President agreed with Adenauer that could not accept French linkage between Saar settlement and ratification. At same time, President and Secretary indicated their belief that as matter of practical politics, French ratification unlikely without Saar solution, and hence expressed hope problem might be solved through concessions both sides. Adenauer expressed doubts re this analysis French scene, suggesting French Government's Saar position is result trying to satisfy Gaullists who it now turns out cannot be won for EDC anyway, and key to French ratification now therefore rather problem of winning some 60 undecided Socialists, which best done if British able associate themselves with EDC. Adenauer commented here that British already asked do more than reasonable, in making firm promise re retention troops on Continent while French now wanting freedom withdraw theirs under certain circumstances. Adenauer welcomed closer British association with EDC.

Chancellor indicated he hopes "accidentally" to meet Mayer but without Bidault May 13 or 14 in order to discuss Saar. Adenauer claimed difficulty lies largely French insistence that solution now be definitive and final rather than leaving this to peace treaty. He rejected former position in usual German terms adding that in his view Saar people do not wish be either French or German. Expressed opinion that agreements he and Schuman already reached went far toward solution.

Secretary opened afternoon Plenary session held State Department by congratulating Adenauer on completion Bundestag vote for treaties expressing hope Bundesrat would do likewise and stating US now encouraged re general ratification prospects. During French talks fortnight ago it became clear Saar constitutes main difficulty. While US did not accept French position that Saar settlement valid condition to their ratification, we consider Saar issue important and grateful hear that Adenauer hopes some solution can be achieved next few months and thus remove last obstacle to great project European army.

In connection general ratification issue Adenauer then referred unexpected and protracted delays in ratification process and hence difficult problem in terms German public opinion and September Bundestag elections, especially if as now appears unavoidable latter are held under occupation status. Adenauer therefore asked whether US would agree as gesture in direction of new relationship that when German ratification completed three High Commissioners be given additional title Ambassador and German Missions in Paris, London and Washington status Embassies based on Austrian precedent.

Secretary replied we could not do this without consulting British and French but US certainly anxious help Germany in any way feasible once German ratification finished and therefore prepared approach British and French. Secretary suggested there should meanwhile be no public discussion proposal, though agreed Adenauer might mention it to British if he wishes.

[Here follows a discussion of current views of the Federal Republic on Soviet policy, the war criminals problem, and the German defense contribution.]

At Secretary's request Nash (Defense) outlined prospects for end-item aid for German EDC contingents. He recalled statement he and McCloy made last year to Adenauer. Congress had since provided additional funds. Taking into account equipment availabilities and requirements for EDC countries as whole and assuming continuation present world conditions, United States budgetary provision would enable us provide to EDC major equipment required from outside EDC for first six German groupements and twenty-one air squadrons on basis comparable to that used in providing equipment other EDC countries. Nash indicated types equipment included and stated material not restricted to items United States manufacture but included items obtained through off-shore procurement. He said delivery equipment would depend upon determination by SHAPE and United States authorities that units are ready receive equipment, upon conclusion bilateral agreements with EDC and Federal Republic and upon completion necessary arrangements by EDC. United States about present drafts bilaterals to EDC and Federal Republic. It would also be necessary that planning for buildup of German contingents by EDC/IC result in schedules upon which United States programming and delivery plans could be based. United States understands such planning has not progressed beyond preliminary stages. If detailed arrangements for receipt United States equipment are to be completed promptly necessary EDC/IC prepare required plans.

Dulles

Editorial Note

During the course of its Eleventh Session at Paris, April 23–26, 1953, the North Atlantic Council adopted a resolution stressing the "paramount importance" which the Atlantic Community continued to attach to the rapid establishment of a European Defense Community. The text of this resolution is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 11, 1953, pages 674–675. For documentation on the Eleventh Session of the North Atlantic Council, see pages 368 ff.

740.00/5-1353 : Despatch

The Consul at Strasbourg (*Andrews*) *to the Department of State* [1]

CONFIDENTIAL STRASBOURG, May 13, 1953.

No. 271

Ref: Consulate's Despatch No. 65, September 26, 1952.[2]

Subject: Conversation on the Saar problem with Mr. van der Goes van Naters, Netherlands Delegate to Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, and *Rapporteur* of General Affairs Committee.

In a luncheon conversation on May 12 with Mr. van der Goes van Naters, Netherlands Delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, and *Rapporteur* of the "Programme of Work for an Examination of the Future Position of the Saar by the Committee on General Affairs" (see Document AS/AG (4) 34 of September 24, 1952, transmitted with the Consulate's despatch under reference),[3] I asked him how he was getting along with his report to the General Affairs Committee.

Van der Goes van Naters replied that he had finished the sections of his report on the history of the Saar problem and its economic aspects and that he was still working on the political section, which would contain recommendations for the solution of the Saar question on the basis of the Europeanization of the region. The entire report would be finished by August 15 next for presentation to the General Affairs Committee, which would draw up a Report and Recommendations for a full scale debate by the Consultative Assembly during the third part of the 1953 session, to open on September 15. Contrary to the opinion held in some quarters that such a delicate and explosive problem should not be openly discussed in the Assembly, he believed that a debate by representatives of the twelve "neutral" countries, whose only aim was to help in finding a solution, would be most beneficial. (He did not imply that representatives of France, the German Federal Republic, and the Saar would be excluded from the debate.)

The Netherlands Delegate said that political and moral guidance and support from the United States Government was, of course, necessary in any settlement of the Saar issue. In this connection, he mentioned a report on the Saar which he had given to our Embassy in The Hague last month.[4] An effort will be made here to obtain a copy of the van der Goes van Naters report before the opening of the Consultative Assembly in September.

GEORGE D. ANDREWS

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[1] Distributed to Paris, The Hague, London, Rome, Brussels, Athens, Dublin, Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Vienna, Reykjavik, Ottawa, Wellington, and Canberra.

[2] Not printed.

[3] Council of Europe document, not printed.

[4] Not found in Department of State files.

740.5/4–1353

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington) [1]

SECRET [ROME,] April 13, 1953.

Subject: European Defense Community

Participants: Prime Minister De Gasperi
Mr. Byington

At the close of our conversation the Prime Minister referred to the extreme difficulty he had had in the Senate in connection with the passage of the electoral law.[2] This was a law which was not attractive to his party but which he had supported because it strengthened the smaller parties and made a coalition government possible. Likewise in terms of Europe, he felt that the EDC was the only answer. It was true that within NATO a solution could be found for the use of German troops, but it would not solve the basic problem of French-German relations and for that the EDC was the only answer. He reiterated his determination to do everything he could to help support the EDC in Europe and his certainty that Italy would ratify after the elections. One of the principal difficulties for France in his view was the problem of the Saar. There the fundamental question is economic. He felt that if it could be worked out that France could be assured of purchasing her coal from the Saar with francs then a solution would be practicable. He would use his own influence towards that end but he pointed out that it was going to be more difficult working with Bidault than in the case of Schuman.

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[1] Source text does not indicate the location of this conversation. However, in a memorandum of conversation, Apr. 22, Byington indicated that he had recently returned from Rome (765.00/4–2253).

[2] Documentation on the electoral law and the Italian elections of June 1953 is presented in volume VI.

740.00/5–1553 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, May 15, 1953—7 p. m.

Coled 75. In personal conversation with member my staff, one of Adenauer's principal advisers on European questions made following points:

1. Germans do not expect much progress in European policy until fall. Major reasons are Italian and German elections, impossibility of Saar settlement at this time and shadow of Soviet peace offensive.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn, London, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.

French ratification of EDC unlikely before autumn. German Government prepared to sign EPC statute in present form but does not expect decision from six governments until fall.

2. Federal Government apparently does not believe Soviets prepared to accept reunification of Germany on basis free elections and freedom of all-German Government to choose its own Allies. Next few months should be used to demonstrate this fact and show up insincerity of Soviet "peace" tactics. Resulting disillusionment expected produce more favorable climate in France and Germany for new progress toward goal of West European Federation.

3. This interim period should also be used to iron out differences of opinion among six governments concerning EPC statute so that when time for action arrives, governments need only take political decision to sign.

4. Chancellor will definitely not be in position to negotiate on Saar until after German elections. In meanwhile, Germans believe it would be useful to explore at technical level the economic implications of "Europeanization" as groundwork for new attempt at real settlement in the fall. Attitude of Cabinet and coalition leaders in Germany now much more moderate; there is growing feeling that European policy too important to be sacrificed to intransigeance on Saar. This will improve Chancellor's position in technical talks but will not have any public results until after elections.

5. In two conversations I have had this week with Adenauer, he has expressed general views in consonance with the foregoing. He realizes that his comparative intransigeance on the Saar problem until after German elections may well postpone action on EDC treaty by French Parliament until autumn, but he prefers this to political risks of settlement at this time even if he personally were satisfied with its terms.

Bundesrat as Department knows took favorable action today on EDC. Chancellor told me Wednesday that in such event he would not be worried about ultimate decision constitutional court.

Bruce

740.00/5–2653 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, May 26, 1953—8 p. m.

Coled 87. Lunched with Guy Mollet today. He considers his position as party leader stronger than at any time in the past. Believes that Reynaud will obtain necessary votes to become Prime Minister. Thinks

Reynaud's domestic policies would be bad from viewpoint Leftist parties but that his foreign policy would be satisfactory.

As to EDC, French Parliament will not act before autumn, because of Saar question, since Adenauer does not wish seriously to consider this matter until after German elections.

When European army comes up for vote, Mollet feels he will be faced with a cruel dilemma. Since Gaullists will be against government on this issue, latter will have to turn to party which presumably will not be represented in Cabinet, namely Socialists, to obtain necessary votes for ratification. If Socialists vote for ratification, they will be accused by Communists of supporting government which is reactionary in domestic field. As situation now appears to Mollet, however, he is willing to support European Defense Community even under such circumstances provided that: (1) Association of UK with EDC satisfactory to him (he has not seen present proposals which will be submitted to interim EDC committee on Friday this week and which I believe will be satisfactory to him); and (2) at some appropriate time President Eisenhower make statement that American commitment as member NATO indefinite in duration (Mollet recognizes present impracticability of seeking Senate approval extension NATO commitment to 50 years and would be satisfied with formula as to indefiniteness of commitment suggested in Department's cables on this subject.)

Mollet says he is personally strongly in favor of EDC and EPC provided powerful democratic controls exist on political side, but that he can enter into no pledge at this time as to final attitude, which will be influenced by future developments.

Bruce

740.5/2–653

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL [Washington,] June 16, 1953.

Subject: Letters to Representative Chiperfield[2] and Senator Wiley opposing House Foreign Affairs Committee's amendment withholding military assistance from EDC countries until treaty is ratified.

Discussion:

Chairman Chiperfield of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has requested a letter expressing your views on the amendment to the Mutual Security Act passed by his Committee which has the effect of withholding new military aid from the EDC countries until they ratify the Treaty.[3] Representative Chiperfield has informed us confidentially that he is personally opposed to the amendment. Senator Wiley is also opposed, and his Committee approved the Mutual Security Act without such amendment.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, concurred by Morton of H and Martin of S/MSA.

[2] Attachment, below.

Representative Chiperfield feels that the conference on the Mutual Security Act will afford the best opportunity for eliminating or modifying the amendment, since he and Senator Wiley will be the principal conferees. However, there is a good chance that the amendment will be discussed in the House, in which case Representative Chiperfield would like to have a letter from you for use on the floor.

The attached letter, along with a duplicate letter to Senator Wiley, has been prepared for this purpose. It states our full agreement with doing everything reasonable and practical to achieve EDC ratification, but opposes the House Committee's amendment as not achieving the purpose for which it was intended.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letters to Representative Chiperfield and Senator Wiley.

[Attachment]

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Chiperfield)[4]

MY DEAR MR. CHIPERFIELD: I am writing with reference to the amendment recently approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee providing that approximately half of all military assistance funds under Title I of the proposed Mutual Security Act will be reserved to the European Defense Community. I believe that the practical effect of this amendment would be to deny to the EDC countries any military assistance from fiscal year 1954 funds until the EDC Treaty is ratified.

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[3] Reference is to the so-called "Richards amendment" to H.R. 5710, a bill to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The text of the Richards amendment is printed in telegram Edcol 10 to Paris, July 13, p. 796. The Richards amendment, as its sponsor, Rep. James Richards of South Carolina stated, was actually no amendment at all, constituting lines 3–5 of page 2 of H.R. 5710. Richards' proposal was discussed at some length in the House on June 19 and July 13, 1953 at which times further amendments were unsuccessfully proposed. (*Congressional Record*, vol. 99, pts. 5, 6, pp. 6899–6900, 8689–8690) Documentation on H.R. 5710 is printed in volume I.

[4] Source text carries the stamped date June 18, 1953. It was drafted by Nunley on June 17 and cleared by Martin of S/MSA, Morton of H, and Merchant. There is no indication on the source text when the letter was sent or delivered to Representative Chiperfield. An identical letter to Senator Wiley bearing the same stamped date and the same names as drafter and clearing officers is in file 740.5/3-653.

The ratification of EDC is of the utmost importance to the strength and unity of our European allies, and I strongly favor all reasonable and practical measures on the part of the United States Government to encourage ratification. However, I am convinced that the Committee's amendment will not serve the purpose intended and may actually have a contrary effect.

As President Eisenhower said in his State of the Union message to the Congress, "the needed union of Western Europe manifestly cannot be manufactured from without; it can only be created from within." I believe this statement represents a profound truth which we must all fully appreciate if our efforts to assist Europe in obtaining unity are to be fruitful. We can and must encourage unity in Europe, but we cannot compel unity. It is true that EDC is very important to the United States because its success or failure will exert a tremendous influence upon the effectiveness of our common security system in the Atlantic area. But the final decisions on EDC must be taken by the nations directly concerned.

European statesmen conceived and developed the plan for a European Defense Community, and all the six governments concerned are urging their respective parliaments to ratify the EDC Treaty. Because there are no good alternatives to EDC, I believe their efforts will be successful. In the meantime, I believe that we should not embarrass these governments by measures which, rightly or wrongly, might be interpreted as coercive or as attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of friendly nations.

The Committee's amendment would prevent the use of a large part of our fiscal year 1954 military assistance funds until EDC is a going concern. However, we must recognize that the basic purpose of our military assistance to Europe is not solely to strengthen Europe but also to protect our own national security. Our assistance represents the United States contribution to a collective enterprise based upon plans mutually agreed upon among fourteen nations. Failure to make this contribution, or undue delay in making it, will directly affect the safety of the United States as well as its allies.

Even under the most favorable circumstances, it is evident that the EDC Treaty cannot be finally ratified until the European parliaments return from their summer recess. Thus, the principal effect of the amendment would be to delay still further the attainment of an adequate defense posture in Western Europe—to compound the delay already occasioned by the prolonged consideration of EDC by the European parliaments. For economic and financial reasons, the NATO defense schedule has already been modified, and I believe that further delay would involve risks greater than we can safely assume.

I am sending a similar letter to Senator Wiley.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

740.5/7–853 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET THE HAGUE, July 8, 1953—7 p. m.

24. In our conversation last night Stikker reiterated his position, of which I was previously aware, that he was not enthusiastic over EDC as a workable organization and even less so with regard to proposed six-nation EDC project. On other hand, he felt it was essential that Netherlands should ratify EDC at earliest possible date and that action would be forthcoming by second Chamber before recess.

His lack of enthusiasm for EDC appeared based primarily on what he felt was weakness of French and Italian positions which he thought had even deteriorated beyond that when he had evaluated situation some months ago. He said it was clear to him that France would never ratify. In this connection, he pointed out that recent Socialist Party instruction to deputies[2] introduced further obstacles ratification and just last week Massigli had told British Foreign Office that France would definitely postpone any action until it became clear what were Soviet intentions. Since it was well known that there are leaks amounting to a pipe-line from French Foreign Office to Soviet, it was clear that Soviets constantly informed French thinking were in position delay French action indefinitely. This was quite apart from French distrust, fear and jealousy of Germany. He felt then that the course leading to the only correct solution, namely eventual incorporation of Germany into NATO, was for smaller states to ratify EDC promptly, thus clearly pointing at France the finger of blame for all Western peoples to see. He tended discount importance of Italian ratification saying that France was the real culprit.

CHAPIN

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris for Bruce, Rome, Brussels, Luxembourg, Bonn, and USCINCEUR for Satterthwaite.

[2] The instruction under reference has not been identified further.

Editorial Note

European unity and early ratification of the EDC Treaty were discussed at the Meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France at Washington, July 10 to 14, 1953. Throughout the discussions, Lord Salisbury of the United Kingdom and Secretary Dulles continually reiterated their country's keen desire to see an early ratification of the EDC, and both men reminded Bidault of the strenuous exertions made on behalf of European unity by the United States and United Kingdom since the close of World War II.

Bidault, in turn, continually expressed recognition of the impatience generated in the United States and United Kingdom by French hesitancy to ratify, reiterated the many problems which stood in the way of early ratification by the French National Assembly, and pledged to work for ratification as soon as feasible.

Lord Salisbury and Secretary Dulles, in turn, pledged that proposed Four-Power talks with the Soviet Union concerning the future of Germany would not be permitted to re-open the question of EDC. For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers, see pages 1582 ff.

740.5/7–1353 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 13, 1953—2 : 34 p. m.

Edcol 10. Paris For Bruce and USRO.

1. Following is text Richards' EDC amendment as agreed in conference and released July 11:

> "*Provided*, That of the equipment and materials made available under section 101 (*a*) (1) with funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization contained in this section, 50 per centum shall be transferred to the organization referred to in clause (*c*) of section 2 (*b*) or to the countries which become members thereof, unless the Congress, upon the recommendation of the President, shall hereafter otherwise provide."

2. Conference report released July 11, after describing Senate and House versions of amendment, points out that agreed text "combines features both versions by requiring that 50 percent FY 1954 military assistance funds for Europe shall be used for equipment and materials to be transferred to EDC or to countries which become members thereof unless Congress upon Presidential recommendation otherwise provides. Thus, should the organization not come into being and should the President consider that conditions might nevertheless in his judgment warrant release of the funds, materials, and equipment earmarked for the organization, the Congress would reconsider the provision upon the recommendation of the President. The conference agreement expresses the importance which the United States attaches to the European Defense Community and gives assurance that the formation of the organization will be followed by United States assistance in helping the EDC contribute to the collective security effort. Equipment and materials may be procured, but delivery of the assistance shall not take place until the organization is formed."

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden. Cleared and initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright. Repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

3. Note amendment has effect of permitting procurement from FY 1954 funds, but prohibits actual delivery until after EDC has entered into effect. Because of lead-time, this means that amendment would probably not have appreciable effect on most items for from year to eighteen months. Also note that services (i.e., training) specifically excluded from the amendment, which applies only to equipment and materials.

4. FYI Phrase "or to the countries which become members thereof" may cause concern, since under treaty countries can receive aid only through EDC and phrase may be interpreted by Europeans as implying U.S. is contemplating direct bilateral military aid to EDC countries after treaty enters into effect. Actual purpose was to ensure maximum flexibility to meet future contingencies and to avoid tying us irrevocably and publicly to EDC. There was no intention of suggesting direct bilateral aid or possible alternatives to EDC.

5. Further telegram follows on interpretation of amendment and position to be taken in discussing with governments.[2]

DULLES

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[2] Telegram Edcol 13, *infra*.

740.5/7–1553 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, July 15, 1953—7 : 19 p. m.

Edcol 13. Paris for Bruce and USRO. Believe it important US representatives adopt consistent and positive position with respect EDC amendment, text of which reported Edcol 10.[2] Therefore following points should be made if occasion arises for comment:

1. It is because American people fully realize their own security inseparably linked with effective defense of Europe that they have shown such strong desire see EDC enter into effect. Furthermore American people regard EDC which originated in Europe as being so clearly in self-interest Europeans themselves that there can be no question as to its acceptance. Congress in this amendment has simply reflected these sentiments by providing new military assistance must be delivered to EDC.

2. Congress in this amendment has also reflected American people's strong support European unity. Ever since beginning our post-war aid programs Congress has encouraged European unity by voting money for aid to Europe in expectation Europeans themselves would

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared by Merchant and Bowie. Repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] *Supra*.

take the steps to move toward closer unity. Europeans have responded to this encouragement with significant progress in many fields. Coming into existence of EDC is next important step toward European unity.

3. Significant fact is that Congress has authorized funds for EDC countries and has clearly provided that procurement can go forward prior to coming into being of a European Defense Community. It is only actual delivery of equipment paid for from FY 1954 funds which must await coming into being of EDC. Because of time required for contract placement and production, actual delivery great majority equipment will not take place for twelve to eighteen months long after EDC should be in effect. Hence amendment demonstrates Congress's strong support EDC while at same time avoiding anything which will have disruptive effect on present operations.

4. Important to note that amendment applies only to aid which is directly tied in with integrated defense Europe and hence related to EDC. Specifically does not apply other types aid such as economic assistance, aid to France for Indo-China etc.

5. Finally should be pointed out that Congress provided for situation if EDC failed to come into being. Conference report provides that, if organization should not come into being and if President considers conditions warrant release military assistance earmarked for EDC, Congress will reconsider provision upon President's recommendation.

DULLES

740.5/7-2153

Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf)

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1953.

EDC RATIFICATION PROSPECTS AND CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES

As to the prospects for EDC ratification, our attitude continues to be cautiously optimistic. As of this writing, the chances appear good that the Dutch will ratify in their lower house before the summer recess. The Belgian parliament is scheduled to convene early after their summer recess and to ratify in September. France continues to be the major question mark, but there are several favorable signs. Dutch and Belgian ratification, if it occurs, will be very helpful. The Laniel Government imposed only three conditions on ratification, only one of which—the Saar—should cause any real difficulty. The other two, British association with EDC and signature of the French protocols, should not cause any real delay. No one knows, of course, with any certainty what will be the effects of the four-power talks in the fall; however, if things go as we want them to, the talks should provide a clear demonstration that Soviet intentions are basically unchanged. In this case, EDC ratification should acquire a new impetus, with the chances good for entry into force by the end of the year.[1]

As to alternatives to the EDC, there has been consideration of possible alternatives in the National Security Council[2] and in the Department, but all such exercises have come back to the same conclusion: that there is no really good alternative to the EDC. Three general types of alternatives have been considered, each of which has been rejected for different reasons. First, German national armed forces in whatever form are certain to be more objectionable to the French than the EDC. If we were to attempt to bull through German rearmament unilaterally, the net increase in European defence potential would be substantially reduced by the negative French reaction. Second, any plan for the neutralization or unification of Germany, whether armed or not, would entail sacrifices and risks out-weighing any possible gains. It would deny German strength to the West and open up the whole of Germany to Soviet subversion. Finally, the alternative of falling back on a "peripheral strategy" is a counsel of despair which has such obviously serious consequences for our long run security that no thought can be given to it while there is hope of making Europe secure.

Present policy, therefore, is not to consider any of these alternatives at this time, because there is nothing to be gained by considering these clearly less desirable alternatives to the EDC. To do so will arouse suspicions and fears among our friends that we have written off the EDC. If, however, some event should take place which made it clear that EDC is not coming into being or will be long delayed, we will then be faced with a crisis situation in which we must decide among the less desirable alternatives in order to see what we can do to obtain our basic and long range objectives. Whatever solution is worked out will have to be based on the principle of voluntary French-German collaboration in a united Europe. The first choice, but one which is likely to be more unacceptable than the EDC to the French would be immediate German membership in NATO. Failing this, the U.S. should immediately begin negotiating in the light of the emergency situation then prevailing to make new arrangements for German participation in Western defense.

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[1] The EDC Treaty was not finally ratified by any country in 1953, though it passed the lower houses of both the Netherlands and Belgian parliaments.

[2] At its 159th meeting on Aug. 13, the National Security Council, after making amendments, adopted the statement of policy in NSC 160, "United States Position With Respect to Germany". The President approved the amended statement that day, and it was issued as NSC 160/1 for implementation. NSC 160/1 stated that the EDC was a vital ingredient in the national policy toward Germany as it "is designed to harmonize three aims: (1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West". NSC 160/1 proceeded to note that "various factors, and especially French and Italian hesitation" had delayed ratification, and added "The United States should support with all available means the creation of the European Community and the ratification of the EDC Treaty. No satisfactory substitute for this solution has yet been found." If and when it became clear that the EDC could not be realized or would be indefinitely postponed, NSC 160/1 recommended as a preferable course West German membership in NATO, but observed that French concurrence for this course of action seemed, at the moment, "unlikely". The Financial Appendix to NSC 160/1 did presume ratification of the EDC by Nov. 1, 1953. Further documentation on NSC 160/1 is presented in volume VII.

The EDC continues to have strong support from the President, the Secretary, the Under Secretary and everyone else responsible for it. Pentagon spokesmen have also continued to hold the line for the EDC, although frequently being rather outspoken about the delay in ratification. As far as I know, Defense is not doing any planning on EDC alternatives. There is, of course, at lower levels in the military establishment a good deal of impatience over delay and dissatisfaction with the alleged unworkability of the EDC.

This is the situation as it now stands. If there are any changes, we will keep you informed so that you can take account of it.

740.5/9–853 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, September 8, 1953—2 p. m.

Coled 47. Limit distribution. Adenauer's magnificent victory [1] should enable us to create situation forcing French Government to present EDC for ratification this fall. We should immediately consult with Aldrich, Conant, Dillon, Hughes and other Ambassadors on tactics we might follow to bring this about. Would suggest that at Luxembourg meeting [2] reports be made as to how results of German election have affected ratification prospects in countries involved. Am leaving for Germany tonight to see Conant and Chancellor. Our first problem, assuming ratification debate in French Assembly this fall, is to begin immediately to help resolve those remaining conditions French Government has explicitly or implicitly established to ratification of EDC treaty.

1. On Saar problem, believe Chancellor should as soon as practicable negotiate at Laniel/Bidault level. A French-German agreement

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[1] National elections were held in the Federal Republic on Sept. 6 as a result of which Adenauer's Christian Democrat Union won a clear majority of the seats in the Bundestag with 45.2 percent of the votes cast. Further documentation on the elections is presented in volume VII.

[2] Reference is to the European Chiefs of Mission meeting at Luxembourg reported in telegram Colux 3 from Luxembourg, Sept. 20, p. 808.

on Saar may be very difficult if Quai d'Orsay officials instead of Cabinet Ministers are responsible for negotiations and also if they persist in their efforts to base treaty for European political community on coalition rather than on supranational approach.

2. Special provisions for support costs for French forces in Germany within Framework of EDC could be time-consuming negotiation. German EDC delegation should be prevailed upon to make concrete proposals giving French forces a status for nine months along lines of that foreseen for French in contractual agreements. An understanding on related problem of support costs for British and United States forces for a period of nine months after implementation of EDC treaty will probably also have to be reached before EDC treaty can be ratified.

3. German EDC delegation should submit immediately concrete proposals to EDC interim committee on organization and procedures insuring efficient receipt of end-item aid destined for EDC forces of German origin from first day EDC treaty goes into effect.

4. Draft bilateral agreement between United States and EDC on end-item assistance is substantially completed. We believe it preferable to delay final agreement until we have obtained concrete proposal from EDC interim committee on how end-item assistance, particularly that destined for forces of German origin, is to be handled during immediate period after ratification.

5. Understanding on conditions of protocol for UK association with EDC has been substantially reached but still needs to be drafted in final form. Before protocol is actually signed, we may need to take final position on question to making duration of NATO treaty identical with that of EDC. Now that British support for immediate ratification of EDC treaty firmly established, I believe it might be useful for us to explore means of bringing our combined influence to bear on early resolution of questions which might impede ratification or implementation of EDC treaty.

6. Failure in negotiations to create European political community could jeopardize prospects of French ratification. Nevertheless it may be inadvisable to press for any concrete agreement on European political community until unequivocal support of French Cabinet for a treaty based on a strong executive with supranational powers is brought to bear on Quai d'Orsay officials conducting negotiations.

7. Major obstruction to ratification continuously stressed by French should now be eliminated by agreement of United States to provide additional help to French in meeting burden of war in Indochina. It should be possible in these negotiations obtain definite commitment from French Government (if advisable expressed in written instrument separate from Indochina statement) that they will proceed with vote on ratification this fall. French Government should appreciate that United States administration cannot obtain necessary support from Congress in finding later funds for Indochina if further procrastination by France prevents creation and implementation of a firm European policy. Also a pledge of this sort from French Govern-

ment, written not oral, would strengthen hand of EDC proponents in Cabinet against any possible later malingering in Quai d'Orsay.[3]

BRUCE

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[3] In telegram 1090 from Paris, Sept. 16, Dillon reported that during the course of a 45-minute talk with Bidault the previous day the French Foreign Minister had stated that Adenauer's victory was the necessary stimulus to going ahead with European integration, including EDC. "He is now convinced," Dillon added, "that France should ratify EDC prior to the end of the year, and he is prepared to devote his full time to accomplishing this result." All was dependent on a Saar settlement "but Bidault said that he got on well with Adenauer, and he was confident that there would be no difficulty in his working out a European settlement with Adenauer". Bidault's position, Dillon observed, "is a dramatic change of front as far as tactics are concerned. While he has always maintained his support for EDC, he has never before given a date for ratification" (740.5/9–1653).

762.022/9–953 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 9, 1953—7:43 p. m.

1291. Now that Adenauer has won such impressive election victory, Department trusts that he and French may shortly be willing resume efforts work out Saar settlement or at least reach basic agreement on principles of such settlement. Though we do not agree with French that settlement constitutes bona fide condition for their EDC ratification, we have for some time considered serious effort desirable to attain same, both with view to settling this serious obstacle Franco-German relations and also just as we hope that 4-power meeting on Germany may help clear air for action by French Parliament re contractual and EDC treaties.

London requested approach FonOff along above lines, with suggestion that if Brit agree, we should informally but at about same time in both Bonn and Paris encourage Germans and French to resume Saar negotiations, this time with as little fanfare as possible. As was case during abortive negotiations year ago, would propose that we and British avoid becoming involved re substance, confining our efforts to urging both sides forward and to show willingness to compromise, and saving whatever influence we may be able exert re substance until negotiations reach critical, i.e. decisive, stages.

DULLES

[1] Drafted by Morris. Cleared by Knight. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Strasbourg.

740.5/9–1053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL BRUSSELS, September 10, 1953—7 p. m.

187. As noted Embassy despatch 230, August 25,[2] Van Cauwelaert told me definitely that Lower Chamber would meet October 6. Today

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce, to Frankfurt for Satterthwaite, and to Rome, London, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed.

in meeting of Chamber Commission on Constitutional Revision he repeated this. It had been clear for some time that he would hold out for that date. Van Zeeland en route to United States [3] and we do not believe in his absence government would press Van Cauwelaert on matter of calling deputies back. Embassy believes it might be helpful for Department to discuss EDC situation with Van Zeeland particularly in light of changed conditions resulting from German elections.

Rey, leading Liberal spokesman on foreign affairs in Chamber, told Embassy today that Van Houtte had given Liberals satisfactory assurance regarding timing of Senate action on constitutional revision question and that he, Rey, foresaw little or no difficulty this score. He estimated that EDC could be voted in Chamber before beginning of normal parliamentary session second week in November. View optimistic reports on EDC adoption by Belgian politicians in past, Embassy somewhat skeptical that Chamber will act this quickly. Rey added that there was "good chance" for Senate action on EDC before Christmas recess.

Position of Socialists following German elections not yet clear. We were told some days ago by Socialist Deputy that party plans hold meeting of General Council early October. He thought this meeting might result in change in party position relative EDC. Although this same optimistic note had previously been sounded by Leburton, Socialist Deputy and member party executive committee (now in States on leader grant), Embassy is somewhat less hopeful. Rigid position adopted by Socialists during latter stages last parliamentary session would make reversal difficult.

Government and pro-EDC parliamentarians expect Struye, Senate President, who opposes EDC, to adopt delaying tactics similar to Van Cauwelaert when treaty reaches Senate. However, Struye told me recently that ratification by Belgium was certain.

ALGER

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[3] See memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, Sept. 29, p. 818.

Editorial Note

On September 10, 1953, Marinus van der Goes van Naters, *Rapporteur* of the Committee on General Affairs, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, handed to the United States Embassy at The Hague a copy of his report on the future position of the Saar which he also submitted to the General Affairs Committee. "The report was given to the Embassy by Mr. van der Goes in advance of its publication because of his belief in the importance of United States support for a European solution of the Saar problem." The Committee subsequently authorized van der Goes van Naters to prepare a summary for a press conference on September 14, 1953 at which time he explained his Saar solutions as follows: the Saar would become "European territory", its foreign and defense policies placed in the hands of a European Commissioner who would be named by and held responsible to the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers and would not be of French, German, or Saar nationality. The Commissioner would be advised by a Committee of Five to include a Frenchman and German. All international agreements signed by the Commissioner would be subject to approval by the Saar Landtag. In all other matters the Saar would be governed by a freely elected government. All previous economic agreements with France would be replaced by a single 50-year treaty of economic cooperation which would maintain a common market between France and the Saar until the creation of a single market area among the Schuman Plan countries. The French franc would remain the currency of the Saar until the creation of a single European currency; a common market with Germany would be established as soon as possible, and a cultural convention would guarantee maintenance of German culture and the German language in the Saar. A copy of his report was transmitted to the Department as the enclosure to despatch 292 from The Hague, September 10, 1953. (762.022/9–1053) For further documentation on the report, see volume VII.

740.5/9–1053

Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON,] undated.

BRITISH ASSURANCES TO FRANCE ON MAINTENANCE OF TROOPS ON THE CONTINENT

The British are prepared to give assurances on the maintenance of their troops on the Continent[2] in the following form:

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[1] A covering memorandum from Fessenden to Merchant, dated Sept. 10, 1953 reads "Ridge Knight passed on to me your request for information on this subject. Attached is a brief statement of where it stands" (740.5/9–1053).

[2] Telegram Polto 2365 from Paris, June 11, reported *inter alia* that at the informal meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the morning of June 10 the U.K. Representative referred to the desire of his government to establish a close association with the EDC. "He had announced proposed arrangements for military association some time ago in council and was now authorized to state his government wished establish relations on political side as well. U.K. proposals had been communicated to EDC about two weeks ago and are now being studied by Interim Committee. He said proposals had been generally welcomed and it was hoped suitable method of achieving political association would soon be worked out. He would keep council informed of developments, but requested that nothing be said publicly about this development for present. French representative confirmed importance of U.K. proposals, said details must be worked out and EDC members must concert regarding timing of publication this development" (740.5/6–1153).

(1) British agreement to consult with the EDC on the level of forces to be maintained on the Continent, in particular whenever, within the framework of NATO decisions (i.e., the Annual Review),[3] a substantial modification is envisaged in the level or composition of forces placed at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Commander.

(2) British agreement to join with the EDC nations in supporting the extension of the North Atlantic Treaty to make it co-terminous with the 50-year EDC treaty.

When the negotiations on British association began last winter, the French had asked the British to give flat assurance that they would maintain the present level of their forces on the Continent for the duration of the EDC Treaty. This the British obviously could not accept, but they did come up with the above formula designed to go as far as possible in meeting the French desires.

At present these assurances are embodied in two documents (copies attached)[4] which are under discussion in the EDC Interim Commission and on which the British and the EDC countries are in general agreement. The British cabinet is reported to have agreed in principle, and the French also appear to be satisfied.

The first of the two documents will be in the form of an agreement between the U.K. and the signatories of the EDC Treaty. In addition to the provision for consulting on the level of British forces to be maintained on the Continent, it also provides the following: (*a*) technical military collaboration between the EDC and British forces, (*b*) the presence of a British Minister on the EDC Council of Ministers whenever questions concerning British-EDC collaboration are being discussed, and (*c*) the appointment of a British representative and a British mission to the EDC Commissariat. Supplementing this agreement will be an annex setting forth the details of British military association with the European Army. Although relatively little progress has been made on this, it should not necessarily hold up agreement on the main document.

The second document is in the form of a joint declaration by the U.K. and the six EDC countries in which the U.K. associates itself with the EDC countries in their previously announced desire to make the North Atlantic Treaty co-terminous with the EDC and to take the initiative in NATO to bring this about.

Agreement on the precise wording of the two documents is expected to be reached soon and the two agreements will then be ready for final approval by governments. There is tacit understanding among all concerned that announcement of these agreements, which are sufficiently far-reaching to have a very favorable impact on French ratification, should be withheld until the most opportune moment for influencing French public opinion. So far, all EDC countries have cooperated fully in this effort to avoid all publicity.

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[3] For documentation on NATO Annual Review procedures, see pp. 1 ff.

[4] Neither printed.

740.5/9–1653 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET PRIORITY BONN, September 16, 1953—3 p. m.

1055. In response HICOG request for elaboration Chancellor Adenauer's proposal for European security system,[1] Blankenhorn has informed us that Blank office and Foreign Office study groups formed to develop Chancellor's idea have evolved preliminary suggestions along following lines:

1. Demilitarized zone would be formed both sides Oder-Niesse line extending roughly from Elba to Vistula and from Baltic southward across Europe and converging on either side of Trieste.
2. Balance of Germany west of Elba line would be garrisoned only by EDC troops.
3. Europe west of Germany would be garrisoned by NATO troops.
4. Satellite areas east of Vistula line would be garrisoned only by satellite troops (except Rumania).
5. Soviet troops would be withdrawn to within Russian boundaries except for Rumania.

Questioned re latter point, Blankenhorn admitted it was logical Russian troops should also be withdrawn from Rumania.

Chief of Eastern Division of Foreign Office, Braeutigam, has given us following additional information in connection with above and press reports to effect that Chancellor was proposing that Soviet zone be demilitarized as part of reunification of Germany. He said Foreign Office had begun about two months ago under instruction from Blankenhorn preparations for Four-Power conference to which FedRep hoped to send observers if it took place. He explained that "team" had been set up of Foreign Office to work on Chancellor's "security proposal" to Soviet Union and that other study groups had been set up at Blank Office, All-Germany Affairs and Economic Ministries to deal with elections, economy and related matters. He thought that Foreign Office team's "suggestion" that present Soviet zone become free of "all" troops, whether foreign or German in return for which Moscow would accept EDC and agree to withdraw all troops, including Polish and Soviet, between the Oder and Vistula was "worth consideration". He termed "fanciful" plan suggested by study group at Ministry All-Germany Affairs proposing that all troops be removed from "all four zones". He thought creation of such a vacuum would be "highly dangerous". As for Blank office, he said thus far it had not submitted any plan along these lines for discussion at Foreign Office.

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[1] Reference is to a proposal which Chancellor Adenauer had initially raised on July 8 in a letter to Secretary Dulles as Chairman of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington; not printed.

Touching on various problems that would arise from German reunification, Braeutigam said that in unlikely event that Kremlin consented thereto, relations between Soviet troops and new All-Germany Government would be most thorny and accordingly Foreign Office was thinking along lines of freeing zone of "all troops" as sop to Soviet security considerations as well as means of simplifying political problems.

As for possibility of Four-Power conference in October,[2] he was most skeptical and thought Moscow would place so many conditions thereto that it would not be held at this time. He believed Kremlin might suggest conference at Prime Minister level to discuss global settlement in hope of agreeing upon Soviet zones of influence throughout world, but would refuse to discuss German problem on basis of our latest note.

Globke gave us today almost identical information adding that Chancellor had not yet even seen any of these "working papers" and that he would not study them until it became clear that Four-Power conference would take place. He assured us that Chancellor would not publicly discuss or propose any plans of this nature without first consulting with us.[3]

CONANT

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[2] Documentation on the Four-Power Conference proposed for Lugano in October and subsequently held in Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954 is presented in volume VII.

[3] Telegram 1086 to Paris, Sept. 22, repeated to Bonn, reported that Van Zeeland had discussed with Dulles the proposal which envisaged a neutralized East Germany and defense of West Germany solely by EDC contingents which seemed basically the same as that reported in the source text. "We also gather Spaak mentioned similar plan last few days in Strasbourg." Conant was requested to informally point out to the Federal Republic Government that any such proposal would have "very considerable implications in terms our present defense strategy" and that, therefore, it was hoped that West German officials would refrain from releasing any such plan as an official statement "in absence prior consultation with us". The Embassy in France was requested "to let us have any information or indications it can pick up as to what French reaction might be to such proposal" (740.5/9–1653).

740.5/9–1753 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, September 17, 1953—11 a. m.

1101. Re Embtels 961 [2] and 1090.[3] Twice in last two days Laniel [4] has dwelt at length on his determination to secure French ratification of EDC before end of year. One of his principal reasons for his decision not to go to Washington at this time was belief that communiqué after such a visit would inevitably mention EDC and his subsequent efforts here would be characterized by its opponents as due US pressure. He and his personal advisers feel that he is particularly well qualified to lead ratification fight. They cite his resistance record (as against Pinay), his party (Independent) in contrast to Bidault's membership in MRP (which has always been committed to EDC), his influence with rightist opponents of EDC and finally that he had not previously been known as proponent or opponent.

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Dillon and Maurice Schumann on Sept. 9 in which Schumann expressed pleasure with the outcome of the recent elections in the Federal Republic which had "provided much needed shock for French public opinion", predicted that as a result the EDC Treaty would be ratified in France by the end of the year, and stressed that this was contingent upon a satisfactory solution of the Saar issue which he proceeded to discuss at some length (740.5/9–953).

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 802.

[4] Joseph Laniel had formed a new French Government on June 26.

Laniel like Bidault (Embtel 1090) states he would give top priority to EDC ratification and would devote much personal time to working on uncommitted or opposing deputies. He asks that we not press him too hard publicly, and particularly that we restrain Adenauer rather than encourage him to push French.

Department's decision to deal with EDC informally rather than to bring it into exchange of notes on additional aid is bearing good fruit. So is our North African policy. Furthermore, great consideration shown by President, Secretary and MacArthur concerning Laniel's visit to US has inspired Laniel's profound gratitude. He is now more determined of his own volition to get EDC ratified than we could ever have made him through any form of pressure. We also have keen competition between Laniel and Bidault as to who can do most to get EDC through. While EDC barometer can rise or fall rapidly, it looks for first time as if French Government were prepared to launch aggressive campaign which has always been necessary but which government has never previously been willing to undertake and to do it with fixed and reasonable timetable in mind.

DILLON

740.5/9-2053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET LUXEMBOURG, September 20, 1953—3 a. m.

Colux 3. Limit distribution. From Merchant and Chiefs of Mission.[2]

1. Adenauer's remarkable victory, firm support of UK for EDC, and disclosure of negative position of Soviets[3] combine to make next few months auspicious for policy of European integration. In these favorable circumstances it should be possible to prevail upon governments of six continental nations to initiate and to push vigorously

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[1] Repeated to Paris, Bonn, London, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, and Moscow.

[2] The Chiefs of Mission meeting was held on Sept. 18–19, and was attended by all the Chiefs of Mission in Western Europe plus Ambassador Bohlen from Moscow. Further documentation on the meeting, including a summary of the various sessions, is presented in volume VI.

[3] Presumably a reference to the Soviet notes of Aug. 4 and 15 regarding a possible Four-Power Conference, which was eventually held in Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954; documentation on these notes is presented in volume VII.

process of EDC ratification in each of their parliaments this fall with view to ratification and implementation of EDC in early 1954. It is urgent that our continental partners demonstrate their intentions in this unequivocal manner for following reasons:

(*a*) Imperative to demonstrate to Congress at outset January session that US Administration has heeded Congressional structures in utilization of US aid and influence to bring about European integration. Inability to state positively to Congress that EDC is fundamental policy of our continental partners and that it will in every probability be reality in very near future would jeopardize continued appropriations by Congress of substantial funds for Western Europe.

(*b*) Uncertainty as to intentions of France on EDC continues to create confusion and differences among Western nations at very moment when common policy and trust are critically necessary in relations with Soviet Russia. German elections have improved this dangerous atmosphere but new delays and hesitations could quickly degenerate into serious and perhaps disastrous conflict between certain of Western nations.

(*c*) Adenauer's success in leading Germany back along road of sanity and to integration in Western Europe is an historic opportunity to resolve the German question. Response from all Western nations, particularly France, should be quick and generous. Procrastination in removing Germany from occupation status risks adverse reaction in Germany which might lead to extremism. We submit following comments with regard to each interested nation for your consideration in developing line of action for US Government in this urgent matter.

2. A statement from Churchill emphasizing in his inimitable prose belief of UK in development of a strong continental Europe to replace present national divisions, necessity for new political status for Germany as full partner in Western nations and implementation of EDC as a practicable military grouping and as most practical manner of contribution by Germany to Western defense, would be highly desirable and important.

3. Political fact in Italy is that Italian Government must have positive proposals on position of Western Allies with regard to Trieste before any initiation of ratification process. Response from US, UK and France on this question is urgent. Italy has linked Trieste question with EDC ratification. If quick action on tripartite proposals for solution is taken and solution is found, EDC ratification becomes real possibility. However, we should not permit the Italian Government to unlink the two questions after acceptable solution is worked out, and then increase the ante before it will proceed firmly with EDC ratifications. Also we should settle clearly with Italians that we do not approve of Italy's using delay in Italian ratification to enable France in turn to delay French ratification, particularly when Italian Government leaders have a firm understanding with US to follow the contrary policy.

4. Ratification process in Germany should be completed well before end of year. Federal Republic can, however, help greatly to facilitate ratification in other countries by clearing up court issue immediately and by taking active initiative in Saar negotiations and in certain other questions outstanding in EDC Interim Committee such as status of forces, support costs, US-EDC bilateral agreement, European logistical organization to receive US end-items in Germany, UK association with EDC, signature of protocols, et cetera.

Chancellor should also recognize that substantial progress on the Treaty for Europe Political Community is still necessary insure support of French Parliament. Therefore, in his dealings with Bidault and Quai d'Orsay he should remember that, if in the progress towards a Political Community Treaty the principle of supranational institutions—particularly executive—to control EDC is abandoned, supporters of EDC among the Socialists, MRP and elsewhere may be alienated. Therefore, compromises should not be made to the present negative position of EPC of the Quai d'Orsay just to hurry action because such compromises might jeopardize first US interest of obtaining ratification of EDC Treaty. Rather a general pressure should be maintained for a really supranational Political Community, and concrete agreement in Rome and The Hague meetings postponed until EDC is ratified or until the unequivocal support for supranational approach in the French Cabinet can be brought to bear on the French officials conducting negotiations.

US High Commissioner might also support a series of actions with his French and British colleagues which will force French to recognize that ratification of EDC and new political status for Germany is urgent in order to bring Federal Republic activities under guarantees of EDC and contractuals before steps are taken unilaterally by Federal Republic in advance of ratification and with US and UK acceptance. These actions include relaxation of certain controls over industrials production, including some armaments, talks with Blank office under umbrella of EDC Interim Committee on logistical handling of equipment for initial cadres of German-EDC forces, plans for first construction of military installations, and possibly other steps anticipating EDC and contractual agreements.

5. However, chief obstacle is uncertainty on intentions of French despite recent oral statements of Laniel and Bidault to proceed with EDC ratification before end of year. Serious doubts on EDC ratification have arisen ever since Mayer and Bidault, in their efforts to obtain Gaullist support for present government coalition, refused to restate clearly French policy on bringing about a strong United Europe incorporating Germany irrevocably into its framework. At that time even though EDC Treaty was heavily weighted in favor of France, tending to maintain her present position in Europe and in

the world, Bidault made new protocols, modifying delicately balanced EDC Treaty France had just formally signed with her partners, giving France even more preferred position a condition before France would proceed with ratification of her previous formal signature. Reason given by Bidault was that with these protocols he could obtain support for EDC from Gaullist Party. With US intervention, other European nations reluctantly agreed to protocols. Bidault then gave formal promise to us and to his EDC partners that French would not ask for any more protocols and would proceed with ratification. Now we receive unconfirmed reports that Quai d'Orsay suggests a new and more serious protocol changing EDC Treaty. It is same idea of gradual implementation of treaty once suggested by Bidault for Gaullist support and violently rejected by his own cabinet and other EDC countries except the Dutch, as in direct conflict with EDC Treaty and as necessitating time-consuming renegotiation of present treaty.

French also told their EDC partners that progress towards a political community based on immediate European elections for a European parliament and a supranational executive was necessary for EDC ratification by French Parliament. Bidault states that this French policy, now accepted by other European partners, should be revised in order to obtain Gaullist support for EDC ratification even though in doing so he risks losing support for EDC of French Socialists, some MRP and even such French advocates for Europe as Reynaud, Pleven, Teitgen, Mutter. Final position of French Cabinet on European Political Community, and indirectly EDC ratification, is still being debated in Paris thus increasing doubts of other nations on intentions of France.

Because French hesitations are so widely known and suspected, only public action by present French Cabinet can dispel them. This can be done in a number of ways. Easiest and most effective would be to prevail upon Laniel and Bidault merely to resume process of ratification of EDC Treaty already once started by the French Government, or, failing this, to make an appropriate public statement before any visit by them to the United States. In this way French action would appear as entirely normal and would not be subject to contention that it was dictated by United States. Such questions as Saar, support costs, and progress on EPC can and should be worked out by France with its European partners as ratification process proceeds. On most serious question, the Saar, Adenauer has already indicated to us his willingness to concede on question of currency which Mayer made clear was his real purpose when he took unfortunate action of linking Saar understanding with EDC Treaty. US, UK, Germany and other EDC countries have largely met all reasons raised by French for hesitating on EDC. Now we should keep France pinned to previous commitments to ratify EDC Treaty and not permit her to raise new questions and conditions which might create new delays in ratification in France or in other countries.

6. In Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg ratification process appears to be well advanced and no action by US administration is recommended at this time. We may, however, have to express our views if French renew tactics of creating doubts about ratification of EDC Treaty in present form.

DILLON

033.5111/9–2053

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Laniel[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, September 20, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I appreciated very much your message conveyed to me through Ambassador Dillon, and while I was disappointed that it was not possible for you to visit the United States at this particular time, I fully understand and appreciate the reasons why you deemed it inadvisable.

I was most encouraged to hear through Ambassador Dillon that both you and M. Bidault believe the situation now propitious for the French Government to move ahead quickly toward ratification of the EDC and that both of you now are concentrating your efforts to bring this about this year. You should remain confident of the continuing wholehearted support of the United States for the EDC concept, which sprang from French vision. It has always been our hope that this great project, which holds the promise of such magnificent permanent benefits for Europe, would come into being at the earliest possible time.

I know that you were encouraged by the results of the September 6 elections in Germany. In all our efforts to consolidate the foundation for a new Europe, I believe that perhaps the most important element is the state of mind with which the three Western nations who played the greatest part in defeating Hitler's Germany during the last war now approach their relations with the new Germany. Fortunately, the recent elections have demonstrated that contrary to the Weimar Republic, the Bonn regime has struck roots; in the four years since the first Bundestag elections, the forces of democracy and common sense have grown considerably in strength, and the new voters have overwhelmingly supported the center forces dedicated to European cooperation, and rejected the extremes of right and left. It is our responsibility both to develop this situation for the common good and to strengthen it further. Therefore, it is most urgent that in all our relations with Germany we be guided by a new spirit of friendship and trust and that the last vestige of a spirit of occupation disappear.

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[1] Transmitted to Paris in telegram 1049, Sept. 20, for the Ambassador with the following preliminary message: "We conveyed to President Eisenhower Laniel's messages of appreciation for consideration shown re his visit to US (urtels and telecons). [Laniel had visited Washington with Mayer, Mar. 25–28; see telegram 4992 to Paris, Mar. 26, p. 781.] President has now approved following reply Laniel which unless you perceive objection you should deliver to him. Original of following letter signed by President will be forwarded to you for subsequent delivery to Laniel. This letter is not to be made public although we would expect Laniel might wish show it to some of his Cabinet colleagues if he deemed this helpful. (Purpose of letter is to be helpful and also to nail down a bit the verbal statements to you by both Laniel and Bidault with respect to pushing forward with EDC and necessity for real Franco-German *rapprochement*.)"

We are not blind to history, and we know the difficulties this presents for the French people. But, we also know that the spectre of a Germany rapidly increasing its strength outside the ties of Western European unity would cause France even greater concern. Hence, we are confident that the leaders of France will not miss this historic opportunity for a Franco-German *rapprochement* which now offers itself, but which will certainly fade away if not seized resolutely and promptly.

Finally, Mr. President, I want to wish for you the utmost success in your approach toward the solution of France's problems and the realization of the common aims of the Western nations, an approach which to me reflects statesmanship and courage in the highest degree and is in keeping with France's traditions as a world leader.[2]

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

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[2] In telegram 1178 from Paris, Sept. 22, Dillon reported that he had delivered the President's letter to Laniel as directed and that Laniel had spoken "fully and frankly for 45 minutes" on EDC. Laniel stated he was "fully prepared to go ahead with EDC" as soon as (1) a solution could be found to the Saar issue, (2) a satisfactory relationship could be established between the United Kingdom and the EDC, and (3) completion of work on the protocols had been assured. Laniel added *inter alia* "that the first battle in the EDC ratification struggle had taken place last week in the cabinet over instructions to be given to the French delegation to the Rome conference on the EPC. He explained that he felt it was important that real progress be made on the Political Community before the EDC came to a vote in the French Parliament" (740.5/9-2253).

740.5/9-2953

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1953.

Participants: The President
Mr. Van Zeeland
Belgian Ambassador, Baron Silvercruys
Secretary Dulles

Mr. Van Zeeland outlined at some length his proposals for Germany and EDC with neutral and semi-neutral zones, etc., as previously submitted in writing to the Secretary.

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[1] Telegram Tedul 3, New York, Sept. 16, reported that Bruce had cabled from Paris that it "would be very helpful if President could see Van Zeeland during his US visit in order discuss with him EDC and European Political Community"

Footnote continued on following page.

I pointed out that we had asked the Defense Department to give their reaction to the program, having in mind that it raised some serious logistical problems. Van Zeeland said that he was glad to have it subjected to this study. He went on to say that he expected to discuss the matter with Mr. Churchill and Mr. Bidault and Chancellor Adenauer, and that if the idea seemed to be generally acceptable, he might want to give it some publicity.

The President suggested that it should not happen until after we had heard from the JCS and had a further exchange of views, but that assuming this did not produce serious objections and under the conditions of approval elsewhere indicated by Mr. Van Zeeland, he saw no objection to Mr. Van Zeeland putting it out as a kind of trial balloon, making clear, however, that it had not been agreed to by the United States and that it might have to be "sold" to the United States. The President thought it would be better to imply reluctance on our part rather than eagerness, as otherwise the Soviet would merely take out the parts they wanted as concessions and then go on and ask for more. Mr. Van Zeeland agreed.

The President spoke of the importance of pushing ahead with EDC and Van Zeeland agreed, pointing out that his plan assumed the creation of EDC. Van Zeeland said he hoped that the Belgian Parliament would have completed its action by about the first of November.

The President then spoke of the necessity for broader political and economic unity and Mr. Van Zeeland indicated that he was following this with interest and sympathy, and that he wholly agreed with the strong and eloquent statement which the President had made as to the large possibilities ahead of Europe, if only it could be unified.[2]

Footnote continued from preceding page.

(740.5/9–1653). On Sept. 18, MacArthur sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Smith recalling the Bruce proposal, noting that Van Zeeland would be in the United States to attend the Eighth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and reporting that Ambassador Silvercruys had stated the previous day "that Van Zeeland wanted very much to see the President, and suggested that he could come to Washington September 28, 29, or 30, if the President could receive him" (740.5/9–1853). Telegram 33, Sept. 18, to Merchant and Bruce at Luxembourg reported that the President would receive Van Zeeland on Sept. 29. "Van Zeeland had requested interview on own initiative." The telegram also reported that Dulles had had a talk with Van Zeeland regarding security guarantees and Van Zeeland was preparing a memorandum for the Secretary which outlined his ideas that appeared closely to approximate those contained in telegram 1055 from Bonn, Sept. 16, p. 806. A copy of telegram 33 is in file 740.5/9–1853.

[2] On Sept. 29, acting on instructions from Dulles, MacArthur telephoned Silvercruys "with a view to being sure that Mr. Van Zeeland would not publicly announce his proposal regarding a European security arrangement without consulting with us". Silvercruys replied that "he could state categorically that Van Zeeland would utter nothing publicly about this until he knew our views and had obtained our judgement on whether a public statement would be useful". In response to Silvercruys' query as to the length of time required for scrutiny of the proposal by the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur stated that a direct answer was impossible "but that I had the impression we would not have any considered views on Van Zeeland's idea for at least three weeks" (Memorandum of telephone conversation by MacArthur, 740.5/9–2353).

740.5/10-353 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1953—2 p. m.

1107. Development situation favorable to French ratification EDC November and extreme importance agreement on Saar and its timing (Paris tels 1335, 1339, 1340)[2] leads Department to concur with views expressed by Dillon that time has come to have frank talk with Adenauer.

Although we cannot rule out possibility need for our exerting pressure on French at appropriate time to accept reasonable Adenauer proposals, key to realization European policies appears now squarely in Adenauer's hand. We hope you can convince him that this opportunity must be grasped quickly (meeting with Bidault about October 20 and Hague EPC meeting by end of October) and that it is in interest entire western world that early agreement be reached. As indicated Paris 1339, framework of possible agreement for French Government remains approximately that given last spring to Adenauer by Mayer and Bidault. We strongly hope German position can be adapted to this and that in any event any German efforts to modify framework should take place in course of conversations with French as mutually agreed rather than frozen beforehand.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Fisher and Kidd and cleared by Bonbright. Repeated to Paris and London.

[2] None printed; telegrams 1335 and 1339 stressed the fact that recent conversations with various French officials had brought out the overriding importance of the Saar issue as the key to early ratification of the EDC by France. Telegram 1339 stressed that as a practical matter any Saar settlement would have to be along the lines demanded by the French Government and that since "Pressure on French to reach any other type of settlement would not be productive" the "only place we can use our influence usefully would appear to be with Adenauer." Telegram 1340 reported that the trend in the French Assembly was currently running in favor of ratification of the EDC Treaty and that this had been confirmed in recent conversations with opponents of ratification. All three telegrams are in file 740.5/10-253.

740.5/10-553 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1953.

CA-1860. Subject: Comments on Colux 3.[2] For Bruce and Ambassadors only.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Merchant, Knight, and Reinstein. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Rome.

[2] Dated Sept. 20, p. 808.

For your information and possible comments, we are sending you our views on Colux 3 of September 20, the cable from the Luxembourg Ambassadors' meeting outlining a program of action on the EDC. The primary purpose is to give our general reactions to Colux 3 and also to propose certain additional steps. Specific action along several of the lines suggested in Colux 3 is currently going forward, being covered by separate cables.

We fully concur with the need for a clear demonstration of intentions regarding the EDC by our Allies and with the conclusion that now is the time for an all-out push with a view to ratification and implementation by early 1954. We also concur in the need for action along a number of lines indicated in Colux 3, taking care of course to keep our efforts confined to behind-the-scenes activity.

As a general comment, we agree that we can usefully exert pressure on the French by working through the Germans because the latter are ready to negotiate and the government is strong enough to afford to make concessions to the French. However, we should not rely entirely on indirect pressure through the Germans. Too much pressure from the Germans is likely to antagonize the French. We should, therefore, also make representations in Paris, both to high level and working level French officials, on a number of matters as indicated below.

Below are specific comments on the suggested lines of action proposed in Colux 3 (Paragraph numbers correspond to those in reference telegram):

2. *United Kingdom:* A Churchill statement endorsing EDC would have an excellent impact. In addition to the subjects mentioned, we assume that this statement would be the forum for official announcement of UK proposals on association with the EDC, including the declaration regarding fifty year association. Perhaps the most appropriate means for suggesting a Churchill statement might be in the context of discussions with the British in the near future working out plans for a coordinated UK–US effort to bring about EDC ratification. (Such a discussion on EDC tactics with the British might be consolidated with the high level talks on over-all NATO problems which the British have proposed to us.) We also understand that Adenauer is planning a personal visit to Churchill. It would be helpful if he discussed with Churchill the desirability of the Prime Minister's making a statement on the EDC.[3]

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[3] On Oct. 10, Churchill addressed the annual conference of the Conservative Party at Margate and stated that the American alliance was vital, asserted that it would be a disaster if Germany were needlessly made an enemy of the United Kingdom and the free world, reminded his hearers of the overwhelming Soviet strength in Europe, reaffirmed undertakings already given, and specifically promoted the formation of a European army with a strong German contingent, promising that the United Kingdom, like the United States, would maintain its forces in Europe. The Prime Minister added that if France should reject the EDC, the United Kingdom would have to acquiesce in some new arrangement for joining German strength to that of the West through NATO. For the text of his address, see *Documents* (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, p. 95.

[3.] *Italy:* We agree that US direct efforts to encourage Italian ratification are unlikely to be productive until positive Western proposals are forthcoming on Trieste, and we are taking this into account in our efforts to deal with the Trieste problem. However, if France and the other EDC countries ratify and Trieste continues to be a condition to Italian ratification, we will have to consider alternative courses of action, including the possibility of going ahead with implementation before completion of Italian action. We believe it will be helpful if Adenauer carries out his intention of stressing to the Italians the need for early ratification. The close ties between Adenauer's and Pella's Governments and the fact that the Germans are not associated with the Trieste issue should make Adenauer's approach effective, particularly in breaking the informal French-Italian understanding whereby Italians agree not to ratify until the French are prepared to move. This understanding might cause Italian procrastination to continue even if progress were made on Trieste. If the Italian Government procrastinates after substantial progress has been made in other countries, we should consider exerting pressure on the government through our control of end-item allocations, similar to action suggested for military assistance with France in paragraph 5 below.

[4.] *Germany:* The reference telegram contains a number of suggestions for action by the Federal Republic. We concur generally on the need for action along the lines indicated, but as indicated above, we believe too much reliance should not be placed on indirect pressure on the French through the Germans and that there should be direct approaches to the French on a number of the matters listed. Our comments on specific subjects follow in the order given in paragraph 4: (*a*) On the court issue, no U.S. action appears necessary. (*b*) On the Saar, we are taking steps to encourage both the French and the Germans to hold a high-level meeting as soon as possible. At this stage, we and the British do not propose to become involved in the substance of the problem. We intend to save our influence until such time as the negotiations reach the critical or decisive stage. (*c*) On the interim status EDC forces, the major problem appears to us not so much to be German initiative, as French acceptance of the principle that agreement must be worked out within the framework of the EDC Treaty, rather than through amendment of the Contractuals. Therefore, we feel that we should make an approach to the French, at a high level if necessary, to obtain clear acceptance of this principle. (*d*) On support costs, it is not clear to us why any new agreement necessarily is a prerequisite to ratification, since the April 25, 1953 agreement on German financial contribution covers the period up to June 30, 1954. (*e*) On the US–EDC military aid bilateral, negotiations in the EDC Interim Commission have so far gone very well, and full agreement on the text apparently could be reached without too much difficulty. Up to now we have deliberately avoided reaching final agreement. This has been partly due to our desire to hold off French pressure to release the agreement prior to ratification. It has also been due to our desire for the Interim Commission to come up with concrete proposals on how end-item equipment, particularly for forces of German origin, is to be handled during the period immediately after ratification. (This latter is important to USCINCEUR.) We should continue to press for concrete proposals on this matter, which appears to depend primarily on the Germans taking the initiative. However, as soon as satisfactory progress has been made, we should also take steps to complete as soon as possible preliminary agreement on the text of the bilateral. After agreement has been reached, we should consider either releasing the agreement itself or making an announcement of its contents, if it becomes clear that publicity on the agreement will be definitely helpful in encouraging French ratification. We also feel that we should now take the initiative in beginning negotiation in Bonn of the supplementary military assistance agreement with the Federal Republic. As far as we are aware, negotiation of this agreement has not yet begun. For us to urge that negotiations begin now would be another way to make clear our general sense of urgency. Also, although negotiation of the agreement should not present any serious obstacles, it might prove time-consuming. (*f*) We do not feel that German initiative in the EDC/IC will be particularly effective with respect to U.K. association, since the real initiative obviously rests with the British and French. The British have just presented the EDC/IC with a revised draft, and negotiations on this subject appear to have acquired a new impetus. (*g*) On the signature of the protocols, we were encouraged to learn that Adenauer indicated in a conversation with Bruce and Conant on September 9 that he was willing to sign the protocols himself as Foreign Minister. Signature of the protocols is important because it will help ensure against any further protocol proposals by the French. (*h*) On the need for the Germans holding firm for a strong EPC, we understand that the German delegation at Rome is taking such a position. (*i*) Although it will be useful for the US High Commissioner to support measures in the High Commission which will impress the French with the urgency of ratifying the EDC and contractuals, we believe this should be only part of larger effort, involving parallel efforts in Paris making sure French are aware of what we are saying and doing in Germany. In this connection we should determine what anticipatory action we think desirable. Request that HICOG submit suggestions for possible anticipatory action which would have useful effects on the French as well as being of value in speeding up the German build-up.

5. *France:* On the general subject of pressing the French, we believe it is important that we make unmistakably clear to French generally our firm expectations that EDC must soon become reality. We fully agree that we should keep France pinned to her previous commitments to ratify and should strongly oppose any efforts to introduce new conditions, protocols, or delaying tactics. As to your suggestion that we prevail on Laniel and Bidault to press ratification, we have already moved forward on this front with Eisenhower letter to Laniel and other steps.

In addition to the actions suggested in Colux 3, we believe it is also important that the US use its influence in the EDC/IC to encourage constructive planning on the EDC build-up, particularly for German contingents. Compilation of the EDC submission to the NATO AR is one step which must move forward. We are taking steps to remove the security question as a preliminary to making possible a more meaningful questionnaire. The long-standing French unwillingness to permit planning must be overcome. We do not consider that planning would shock the French people and parliament. In France, as here, we believe that it is generally assumed that planning has been largely completed since we have been discussing German rearmament for three years and the EDC/IC has been meeting for a year.

In addition, we should also consider exerting indirect pressure through our control over military aid. The French military have a vested interest in delaying EDC because they realize it will mean the end of their right to receive end-items bilaterally. We are not in a particularly strong bargaining position with respect to future appropriations for military end-items, since the French requirements will not be great. However, we do have considerable leverage with respect to the allocation of 1954 aid in the light of the Richards amendment. We should consider making plain to French officials that the Administration will not take steps to have the Richards amendment ban lifted or modified with respect to countries which have not ratified the EDC.

6. *Benelux:* Finally, we feel that we must continue with present efforts to encourage ratification in the Benelux countries although avoiding pressure which will be counter-productive. Encouraging the British to work on the Benelux countries should also be helpful.

DULLES

740.5/10-853

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL–EYES ONLY BONN, October 8, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: This is another brief personal report which I hope may be of some value to you. The Chancellor is in an extremely optimistic mood about EDC ratification, so much so that some of us are worried lest he fails to act promptly enough on the Saar problem. I have done all I could with him and with Hallstein, and Bruce is going to have a talk with him next Wednesday. Bruce has a great deal of influence with the Chancellor and Hallstein who, quite rightly, value his judgment very highly. I think I can be of the most assistance in keeping Bruce and the Chancellor in contact with each other and repeating my feeling of urgency as to the French-German negotiations on the Saar, which reflects in turn our anxiety as to the consequences of the further delay in EDC ratification.

While the Chancellor's somewhat mercurial disposition is on the upswing as far as EDC is concerned, he seemed to have had more trouble than he expected in forming his Cabinet. As Hallstein pointed out to me, it was far easier for him to operate when he could continually threaten any recalcitrant members of his coalition parties with the possibility that the Opposition would take over. Now it is quite clear there is no Opposition that constitutes a threat for the next four years. So while the Chancellor has great power by his command of the two-thirds' majority of the Bundestag, this power in turn means he may have to wrestle more vigorously or compromise more readily with some members of his Cabinet or the different party leaders.

In my opinion the political situation in Germany is not quite as stable as superficially appears. While we can all rejoice at the size of the Chancellor's victory and the elimination of the extremist parties, we must not lose sight of the fact that there is no tradition of a stable democratic government in this country. There are endless intrigues now going on, as there have been for some time, not only within the political parties but within some sections of the Government bureaus. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick reminded me that this was a characteristic of German public life and that disloyalty to superior officers or to a party leader was to be expected. Nevertheless, it is a factor we should be careful not to overlook in estimating the next four years of German policy. Thus, while in terms of a parliamentary situation Germany is at the opposite pole from France, in terms of a disciplined loyal group of civil servants it is at the opposite pole from Great Britain.

I trust these observations, which you will realize are merely one man's opinion, may be of assistance to you. I take this occasion to hope your health remains good in spite of your Herculean labors with the tremendous problems of which I read in the papers and from the cables.[1]

Sincerely yours, JIM

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[1] Dulles replied to Conant's letter on Oct. 12 as follows: "Dear Jim: I have your letter of October 8 and I find the views expressed therein extremely interesting. You raise a number of points that I have not heard expressed before and I am passing your letter on to Livy Merchant and some of his people" (740.5/10–853).

740.5/10–853

Prime Minister Laniel to President Eisenhower [1]

SECRET [PARIS, October 8, 1953?]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I thank you for your letter of September 21[*20*] [2] and for having so well understood and appreciated my reasons for deciding not to advance the early date of the visit I plan to make you in Washington.

In answer to your hopes for an early ratification by the French Parliament of the European Defense Community Treaty, I wish to confirm that that major decision is my chief concern.

My Government's commitment in that connection is binding. In fact, when I was inducted into office by the National Assembly, I stated that

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[1] Source text is that transmitted to Paris for information in airgram 516, Oct. 8, along with the original French text. The Embassy was informed that "A reply from the President to the Prime Minister's letter does not appear to the Department to be indicated".

[2] *Ante*, p. 812.

I would have the parliamentary debate held as soon as certainty of the settlement of the Saar question, the signature of the interpretative protocols, and definite statements of the closest possible association between Great Britain and the future European Defense Community were obtained.

I have just had the opportunity to affirm my Government's position publicly and to point out that we are approaching those conditions, of which the last British statements and the anticipated results of the forthcoming meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and President Bidault will, I confidently hope, mark the achievement.

Just as the political facts did not permit the French Government to neglect anything in regard to what were considered by public opinion indispensable guaranties, under penalty of a parliamentary defeat the consequences of which would have been disastrous and incalculable, so it will be our concern, once these guaranties are obtained, to do everything possible to hasten and facilitate the decision.

I firmly hope that the increased freedom of action and authority that the results of the German elections have given the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany as regards its public opinion and its Parliament, will enable him to devote all the understanding necessary to the satisfactory solutions which, I am certain, he sincerely desires to see obtained.

Nor is this good will lacking on the part of France, and I am persuaded that, if it is put at the service of a reconciliation and an understanding which must be the very foundation of the European edifice to which we are dedicated, it will render possible the development of mutual trust and the success of the work of peace which is our sole aim and our supreme hope.

Please accept [etc.]

J. LANIEL

740.5/10-1453 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

BONN, October 14, 1953—6 p. m.

1388. Limited distribution. For some time we have been expecting German impatience over delays in EDC and contractual ratification to become more vocal. Issue did not become important during election campaign owing to coalition fear of public dissatisfaction over non-realization of treaty benefits on one hand and reluctance to discuss unpopular measures connected with EDC such as recruitment. However, Germans have long taken for granted advantages provided for by contractuals and more aggressive coalition leaders have been publicly voicing opinion that many features of contractuals already outdated by course of events since signature. Partially as result of elections, impatience is increasing and seems to be spreading to more moderate coalition leaders and press. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* October 10 insisted in strongly worded lead article that link between EDC and contractuals be cut and latter placed into force at once. Another more important expression of growing impatience was given us by Brentano, ardent pro-Europe CDU leader who has up to now, together with Chancellor, followed course of extreme German tact and self-restraint in order quiet French fears that Federal Government forcing pace on European integration for purpose of acquiring ultimate German hegemony over united Europe.

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Heidelberg.

In conversation October 15, Brentano made following points on European integration: Result of Rome conference [2] not actually unsatisfactory but inconclusive. However, French attempt postpone Hague meeting until January 1954 was both surprise and disappointment and was prevented mainly by strong German opposition. Postponement attempt was indication that French still trying to temporize in their unwillingness to take concrete steps toward European integration even though French desires for British associations with EDC and for assurance of continuations of pro-European regime in Federal Republic have now been fulfilled. Any further French arguments against ratification would be considered absurd by Germans. Only possible exception is Saar, and, Brentano said, "Way for solution now open if French prepared to make concessions too". He foresaw that German position on Saar would follow outline given to us by Strauss (see Bonn's telegram 1357 to Department, Paris 236, London 181, Strasbourg 17 dated October 10),[3] laying particular stress on approval any solution by freely-elected Saar Landtag and that such solution be provisional not only with respect to peace treaty but also to fit progress made by European integration. If French are really willing to further European integration to same extent as Germans, Saar issue will resolve itself.

Commenting on German preparedness to go ahead with implementation EDC, Brentano said he had proposed and Chancellor had approved idea of early amendment of Basic Law by legislature to give Federal Government defense powers. This would resolve constitutional issue and remove last remaining obstacle in Germany. While idea has not yet been formally discussed (by Germans) we have noted a great deal of support for this solution.

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[2] The Deputy Foreign Ministers of the six States who were members of the European Coal and Steel Community and signatories of the European Defense Treaty met at Rome, Sept. 22–Oct. 9, to discuss formation of a European Political Community. Documentation on the European Political Community is presented in volume VI.

[3] Not printed. (762.0022/10–1053)

Although Brentano was still confident French would ratify treaties early in 1954 he clearly stated that Germany's patience has definite limit. "If treaties are not in force by beginning of March 1954 as latest, Germans will be forced to insist upon new arrangements for German defense contribution in accordance with remarks made by Churchill in Margate speech." (NATO membership.) "We also have obligation to own voters to eliminate occupation statute and put into effect as soon as possible provisions of contractuals which we have been defending in theory for over 18 months."

While we doubt that there is general coalition agreement on fixed timetable of sort mentioned by Brentano, it seems likely that German pressure for alternative to EDC will greatly increase if there is no concrete progress toward ratification in France by early next year. While initially such pressure may be tactical step to bring about rapid French action on treaties, it might develop into more serious move away from EDC if there is no progress. Should this happen, Germans would maintain that they have not abandoned European idea but merely recognized fact that French Government either unwilling or unable to make necessary sacrifices of national sovereignty at this time.

CONANT

740.00/10-1553 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 15, 1953—3 p. m.

Coled 65. Re Deptel 1381, October 13, repeated London 1948.[2]

1. We face real possibility that Laniel Government will evade taking positive steps to bring about EDC ratification in France. Laniel, reversing previous statements of himself and Bidault, now speaks of bringing EDC to vote only after Presidential election around December 19. Presumably this decision is not unaffected by his own ambition to be President. We have seen no evidence that government even intends to initiate action to revive work of assembly committees on EDC treaty so that vote could be taken soon after elections. It would be helpful if you could press Bidault to do whatever is necessary to begin active committee hearings of himself, Pleven, Alphand and other gov-

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and to London for Secretary Dulles, who was attending a Foreign Ministers meeting; for documentation on this meeting, see the editorial note, p. 1709.

[2] Not printed; it requested any specific points that might have arisen at the recently concluded Rome EPC meeting that could be taken up with Bidault at London (740.00/10-1353). Documentation on the Rome EPC meeting is in volume VI.

ernment representatives. Committee has said it will accept government guidance in determining its schedule and under best of circumstances process will take some weeks. Bidault should also be pressed to proceed with Saar talks concurrently with parliamentary preparations. If we must accept Laniel's decision, goal should be to have everything ready for Assembly vote at latest immediately after Christmas holidays.

2. General consensus is that if Laniel and Bidault asked for vote on EDC treaty now they would have majority, and perhaps a respectable majority, assuming Saar settlement, United Kingdom association, and EPC progress. This favorable situation could change. As always in France, life of government is in doubt and in any case Laniel Government will most likely follow practice customary during Third Republic of resigning to give new President of Republic opportunity to name Prime Minister. Unless Laniel and Bidault take positive steps before Presidential election we therefore risk being thrown once again into confusion and delay which always attends formation of French Cabinet. Consequently another French Government through procrastination will have evaded its responsibilities, and horse-trading in forming new Cabinet may make it difficult to obtain commitment from new government to proceed without attempting to pose new conditions to ratification.

3. On European Political Community, it would be helpful if you could inform Bidault of firm view of yourself and the President that development should continue to follow supranational principle. Only in this way can momentum towards developing European unity be maintained and not be defeated by diversion into mere international organization. You might point out to Bidault that we favor supranational principle not only for its own sake but because we consider it necessary to fulfill condition for EDC ratification contained in French National Assembly resolution of February 1952 that European Army must be subordinated to supranational political authority with limited but real powers responsible to a directly-elected assembly. Unless European Political Community is developing on these lines and in particular unless French position in negotiations is consistent with this condition, we do not see how necessary votes from Socialists, Radical Socialists, and even most European of MRP leaders can be obtained for EDC ratification. See Coled 64,[3] repeated London 279 for comments on prevailing confusion as result Quai d'Orsay recalcitrance in obeying Cabinet instructions.

4. On Saar item talked yesterday with Chancellor in Bonn. He said French seem in no hurry about Saar talks and doubts whether French will even consider discussing any concessions on their part until after Presidential elections. He is however going to attempt to work out a

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[3] Not printed. (740.5/4–1353)

basis of discussion with Francois-Poncet after formation of his Cabinet next week. As Conant has reported to you,[4] the Chancellor is far from being an independent agent on Saar question and he is also discouraged because in present French domestic political climate he sees little evidence that he will receive any real cooperation from present French Government in pushing forward EDC and EPC despite its stated intentions.

BRUCE

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[4] See the letter from Conant to the Secretary of State, Oct. 8, p. 819.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 165

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY LONDON, October 16, 1953—10 p. m.

Secto 8. At meeting this afternoon Foreign Ministers considered security guarantees in relation to tripartite experts meeting in Paris next week.[2] Eden explained object of meeting to prepare tripartite positions on all possible phases Lugano meeting on assumption Soviets will accept invitation to meeting. He summarized British thoughts on security guarantees which based on fact that elements of security arrangements such as UN already in existence. British have three proposals none of which ideal:

(1) A NATO declaration or agreement that if Germany or EDC committed aggression NATO treaty would come into effect and victim would be defended even though it might be USSR or satellite.

(2) Agreement between UK, US, France, USSR, and Germany for mutual assistance in case of attack across German borders.

(3) Nonaggression pact between the EDC and USSR as supported by US and UK guarantees.

Bidault then summarized views outlined in Paris telegram to Department 1452, October 13.[3] He stressed that these ideas should be kept secret and that if we can agree on what to do there will still be question of when and how to do it.

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[1] Repeated to Paris. Regarding the Foreign Ministers meeting at London, Oct. 16–18, see the editorial note, p. 1709.

[2] For documentation on the meetings of the tripartite working group at Paris prior to the Berlin Conference, see volume VII.

[3] Not printed; it reported the new French position on security guarantees in Europe as part of an ongoing effort to induce the Soviet Union to join in a Four-Power Conference. The French proposed to frame the question of security guarantees "in terms of West preoccupations rather than those of Russians" in order to "quiet the worries of West public opinion" and to "demonstrate publicly our will for peace, and to reinforce our propaganda." Starting from this hypothesis the French envisaged (1) a declaration by all NATO governments reaffirming in the most solemn terms devotion to the U.N. Charter and the fully defensive nature of the alliance; (2) a declaration by the Federal Republic of Germany binding itself formally not to seek forceful modification of the territorial situation created by the surrender of 1945, and (3) a declaration by the occupying powers taking note of the German declaration and guaranteeing it with respect to the Soviet Union (640.611/10–1353).

Secretary expressed doubt that USSR, in view its own record, rates nonaggression pacts very high. He suggested emphasizing purely defensive character of EDC at every opportunity, mentioning particularly coming Hague meeting. Also explained that tying guarantees closely to UN Charter will greatly facilitate US ratification. He mentioned particularly Article II, Sections 4 and 6 of UN Charter and suggested experts keep these two sections in mind during Paris discussions.

It was agreed that discussions in Paris should begin October 21, last approximately 10 days, and be conducted in light of above.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 165

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

LONDON, October 18, 1953—1 a. m.

Secto 27. Secretary met privately with Bidault at French Embassy for about an hour afternoon October 16 with MacArthur, Bowie, Margerie present. Following is summary:

Bidault said his two principal concerns are Indochina and EDC.

Re Indochina, Reynaud, Pleven, Faure, and Martineau-Deplat were very difficult in French cabinet about five-power meeting proposed by Soviets. Differences within cabinet were reflected in French press which has not helped prestige of government. Bidault said he will continue to hold line in cabinet re Indochina but he has problem because two elements within cabinet who wish to negotiate. (This conversation took place before Bidault received word of action by Vietnam Congress reported in Secto 12).[2]

Re EDC position of French Government is set forth in Laniel's reply to President Eisenhower's letter.[3] Bidault said it essential for French Assembly to take positive stand on both EPC and EDC before The Hague meeting now tentatively scheduled for late November.[4] He said that if French Assembly does not give some form of preliminary approval to EPC and EDC he would not go to The Hague and would not remain as Foreign Minister. He outlined parliamentary steps as follows: October 27, debate in Council of Republic on EDC, (related to US aid legislation which envisages giving assistance to

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[1] Repeated to Paris.

[2] For text, see vol. XIII, Part 1, p. 828.

[3] Reference is to the letter from Prime Minister Laniel to President Eisenhower Oct. 8, p. 820, in response to the President's letter of Sept. 20, p. 812.

[4] Reference is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Political Community at The Hague, Nov. 26–28; for documentation, see volume VI.

EDC); November 12–13, hearings before Foreign Affairs Commission of Assembly and Council of Republic; followed by a debate in Assembly about November 20 when "Assembly must give preliminary approval to EDC and EPC".

On basis his present estimates, he believed it would be possible to obtain slim Assembly approval of EDC and EPC but mentioned great difficulties with Socialists and Gaullists.

Secretary said difficult to exaggerate our anxiety over coming weeks. US believes future of Europe and indeed Western civilization depends upon whether we grasp opportunity to integrate Germany with West. US has long hoped for European unity, and through Marshall Plan and military aid has provided about $30 billion. Furthermore, our strategic planning has been based on development real strength in Europe through unification. In past there have been disappointments but now point has been reached where unless Europe moves forward with EDC we will be forced against our will to explore new alternatives which will be presented to us by changed situation in Europe resulting from failure of EDC. It would be tragic if great opportunity now present escaped us and Secretary sure Bidault felt same way.

Secretary then mentioned apprehension over reports as to French attitude re EPC which seemed one of keys to acceptance of EDC, and made reference to elements in French Foreign Office and others who are opposed to it. Bidault appeared somewhat evasive. He admitted there was opposition in Foreign Office and elsewhere and said French Government's instructions to Rome had been too "narrowly" interpreted at beginning Rome conference.[5] However, French Government policy did support political community with supra-national attributes. Bidault reiterated French Assembly must discuss EPC and EDC before The Hague and said present *rapporteurs* in Assembly committees would have to be replaced, as they were hostile to EDC. He did not indicate how replacement would come about but implied it would be related to parliamentary hearings.

Bidault said agreement on Saar essential prerequisite to EDC ratification. Adenauer sincere and full of good intentions but latter has his own problem with rightist and other elements in coalition working against Saar settlement acceptable to France.

Secretary then said we had disquieting reports re extent French reforms in North Africa, and he hoped French would push forward vigorously with reforms, which essential to stability and progress.

Bidault said situation in North Africa complicated but staunchly defended French reform program, mentioning labor law reforms and increased participation in North African Assemblies. Universal suffrage not yet possible but France determined to push ahead with greater native participation in government. Bidault had report that US would vote for Bolivian resolution re North Africa and expressed unhappiness, saying "voting for a comparatively mild resolution creates more difficulties than for an exaggerated resolution". He explained that latter probably would not pass or get much real support outside Arab-Asian bloc. Furthermore, France does not recognize United Nations competence to intervene in internal affairs in North Africa.

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[5] Reference is to the meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the proposed European Political Community at Rome, Sept. 22–Oct. 9, for the purpose of formulating further proposals for the creation of an EPC. Documentation on the European Political Community is presented in volume VI.

In conclusion, Bidault again expressed deep gratitude for United States assistance in Indochina and said that next six weeks are going to be "terrible for me", but he was determined to push ahead with EDC and Indochina. He would not hazard when final French ratification might occur but reiterated that French Assembly must give some form of preliminary approval to EPC and EDC before The Hague meeting late November.

740.5/10–2353 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

PARIS, October 23, 1953—noon.

SECRET PRIORITY

1592. MacArthur[1] and I dined privately with Laniel October 21. He was much harassed with the Indochina problem. MacArthur outlined to him at some length Washington's views on Europe along following lines: As a result German elections and other developments, next 3 or 4 months are a period with real possibilities for settlement of Franco-German problem, which has been major source of friction and discord in Europe for many years. We sincerely desire France maintain her position of leadership in world affairs and particularly on European continent. If France does not grasp present opportunity to move ahead with Eden, we will be faced, a few months hence, with new and difficult alternatives not of our making but as a result of fact that Germany cannot be expected to accept present status quo much longer.

MacArthur recalled what happened after World War I and said we greatly fear that if German participation in EDC made impossible by French rejection or postponement, Germany will be tempted to go it alone. Given German desire, as shown in Federal Republic elections, to align itself solidly with West, we could not support any policy which would lead Germany to go it alone. We have no intention of publicly needling France to get on with EDC, but French leaders must know that if present opportunity not grasped, we will be faced with new situation involving re-examination of our European policy. Furthermore, if French boot EDC, their role of leadership will pass to other hands.

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[1] MacArthur was in Europe as Head of the U.S. Delegation at the Paris tripartite working group. Further documentation on his activities is presented in volume VII.

We recognize that Saar is serious problem, and we will do utmost to urge Germans to be as forthcoming as possible. At same time, we urge France to be reasonable and constructive with respect to Saar. In particular, we believe raising Franco-Saar convention in next week or two may cause violent reaction in Germany, which will limit Adenauer's ability to be constructive.

Laniel did not seem to know about Franco-Saar convention. He said he understood our position, and he was as determined as ever to go forward with EDC. However, presidential elections were complicating factor, but once these had occurred, France would move rapidly. It was evident, however, that he was so preoccupieed with Indochina and also with Cabinet meeting scheduled for 10 p. m. later same evening that he had difficulty in fully concentrating on European questions.

MacArthur saw Vidal this afternoon and went over same general ground with him. Vidal's position is similar to Laniel's. However, he volunteered to see what he could do to delay consideration of Franco-Saar accords in French Parliament.

DILLON

740.5/10–2453 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET PARIS, October 24, 1953—2 p. m.

1616. Limit distribution. MacArthur dined alone last night with Chaban-Delmas, Assembly group leader of URAS. Results of conversation were disquieting. Chaban commenced by saying that if EDC treaty could be amended to take into full account France's total military effort throughout world he, Chaban, was prepared to vote for ratification and would deliver up to 70 URAS votes for ratification.

He was not entirely clear as to what amendment should say but presumably he meant that France's voice in EDC would be weighted in accordance with her total military power rather than with forces assigned to EDC. MacArthur protested vigorously and said this would reopen treaty and contractuals from all sides and would mean indefinite delay which was now utterly inacceptable. Chaban then said that he envisaged prior full agreement on revision by France and Germany and that amendment might even be proposed by Germany. If this were case Chaban felt there should not be much difficulty in getting agreement from other signatory nations. As *quid pro quo* to German rede this arrangement Chaban said France could take Germany into full and equal partnership in development of some of French territories in Africa. Chaban said France, alone, did not have financial resources to develop all her African territories with sufficient speed. He particularly mentioned Mauritania as being suitable for partnership with Germany. Such partnership would, he said, include full freedom for German emigration and settlement. He said he was reliably informed Adenauer had on two recent occasions expressed real interest in such an arrangement. He emphasized such information from Adenauer did not come through French Foreign Office mail.

MacArthur expressed thorough disagreement with all these views but at insistence of Chaban agreed to pass them on to me. Chaban closed by saying that unless such an amendment were possible he and total URAS block would vote against ratification.

MacArthur and I are in agreement that this URAS proposition has already been outlined to Vidal and Laniel and has definitely met with interest on their part. Vidal made passing reference in earlier conversation with MacArthur to possible minor changes in EDC treaty that would make ratification very easy. When MacArthur protested vigorously and at length Vidal did not elaborate but attempted to minimize importance of proposed changes in language. It appears clear Vidal was referring to Chaban proposition.

Laniel on October 8 mentioned to me for first time that he felt he must see Adenauer personally regarding France-German arrangements. He repeated this to MacArthur and me the other night and MacArthur and I both now feel his reason for wanting to see Adenauer is to talk over something along line of Chaban proposition.

After MacArthur talk with Vidal we checked with Margerie re talk of possible new EDC amendments. He said there was always considerable talk on that subject but both Bidault and Pleven who were only Cabinet members who fully understood EDC were unalterably opposed to any further tinkering at this time and were in a position to prevent any serious consideration of such projects.

It appears that Chaban proposal has only been discussed with Laniel and that Bidault is unaware of it as yet. Proposal also clearly ties into Presidential campaign and Laniel's need for URAS support of his candidacy. Finally it is very possible Laniel does not realize full import of such suggested change in EDC as he appears very naive and uninformed on all matters of foreign relations.

I intend to tell Bidault next week of Chaban proposal to MacArthur naturally omitting any reference to Chaban's probable talks with Laniel and Vidal. I will inform him of our extreme concern over any such attempt to change EDC texts at this date. Bidault should be in position to head off this manoeuvre and I will report his reaction promptly.

This telegram not being repeated Bonn as MacArthur in position to inform HICOG orally today as far as he considers advisable.[1]

DILLON

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[1] In telegram 1592 to Paris, Oct. 27, Dulles expressed full concurrence "in strong stand against Chaban proposition" and in the advisability of informing Bidault of "our concern over any attempt change EDC Treaty at this late stage". Dulles added that the Chaban proposal would certainly be "very strongly opposed" by other EDC members and could not assure the delivery of URAS votes and that the approved protocol to Article 43 *bis* practically met Chaban's desire to give France a voice in EDC commensurate with her power (740.5/10–2453). In telegram 1709 from Paris, Oct. 30, Dillon reported he had seen Bidault who had stated "in the strongest possible terms that he would never permit any modification in the texts of the treaty and the protocols as they now stand. He said that the time had come to say yes or no, and he thought the answer would be yes" (740.5/10–3053). In telegram 1710 from Paris of the same day, Dillon added that he had also seen Chaban and informed him that Washington supported everything that MacArthur had said. Chaban did not appear overly impressed but did seem "somewhat taken aback" though not opposed to Dillon's intention to speak to Bidault. Dillon closed by reminding the Department of State that although Chaban was "hopeless where EDC is concerned", his support for current French policy in Indochina was indispensable (740.5/10–3053).

762.00/10–2853

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET EYES ONLY BONN, October 28, 1953.

DEAR FOSTER: This personal note will supplement the cables and at the same time bring you a somewhat more intimate picture of the way the situation here in Germany looks to me at the present moment.

Unless something unexpected happens in the next few weeks it seems we must be reconciled to a slower schedule for EDC ratification than I had hoped, and a slower schedule than the Chancellor had repeatedly prophesied before his election. There can be no doubt that the Chancellor has run into resurgent German nationalism in connection with the formation of his Cabinet. He has also run into political ambitions and party differences greater than he had anticipated. He told me the other day he had spent two very bad weeks forming his Cabinet and had finally told the quarreling party leaders that if the German people had overheard the quarrels they would be shocked, and he was going ahead and settle matters finally himself. How much his difficulty in forming a Cabinet will affect his eventual attitude toward the Saar question is problematic, but it certainly has delayed his meeting with Bidault.

The Chancellor is now blaming Bidault and the French for the delay. He has probably convinced himself that the French and not the Germans are responsible for the delaying tactics. Yesterday he refused to consider even on an off chance that he and Bidault could make a settlement of the Saar problem before the French presidential election, placing the blame on Bidault and his presidential aspirations. We shall see whether or not the Chancellor and Bidault can make some progress towards a Saar settlement in the next few weeks. I am not yet willing to pass final judgment on whether the Chancellor's own previously liberal point of view about the Saar has been altered.

The Chancellor seems quite aware of the dangers inherent in the delays. Likewise, the French High Commissioner, M. Francois-Poncet, is very disturbed about the growing impatience of the United States. Possibly the Chancellor believes the United States will force the French to ratify without a settlement of the Saar problem. There is even a remote possibility that under the influence of the more nationalistic elements in his coalition he may himself be flirting with the idea of a national German army within the NATO framework. If so, he has reversed himself recently. For as late as September 10, in the course of a conversation with Bruce and myself, he went out of his way to affirm strongly his belief that only an EDC solution would be acceptable to him and the more sensible Germans. He then said we do not want a national army.

If I may express my own personal views, I would be deeply concerned if there were any possibility of a national German army. I know some people in the Pentagon and in Congress feel otherwise. And the former British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, also was willing to consider the possibility, but from what I have seen I would consider the creation of a national German army a most dangerous undertaking. The basic German political situation is too unstable and the German governmental structure is too new to trust the final command of a national army to the hands of the unknown German leaders of the future. It could well be that such a national army would find itself allied with the East against the West. In short, the crucial decision of these months is whether we can bind West Germany to the West politically, economically, and militarily. If in the coming months there should be serious discussion in Washington of an alternative involving a national German army, I hope I may be permitted to return to argue my case at the highest level. If worse came to worse I myself would prefer the withdrawal of all but token forces from Europe and a so-called peripheral defense rather than a German national army.

I trust these personal observations may be of some value to you. You will readily understand why I am sending them in this personal form and for your eyes only. There are so many reasons why EDC must be put through that I have found it unwise to argue with most people about whether or not a German national army would be a good or a bad thing in itself. My standard argument is that I cannot imagine that French leaders in a rational mood would prefer a national German army, and France is as necessary for our defense as Germany.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

JIM

740.5/10-2653 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, October 29, 1953—6:44 p. m.

1623. From Secretary for Dillon, Conant, Bruce.

In connection with EDC, if we cannot get French ratification prior to French presidential elections, it is all the more imperative that period between now and presidential elections be used to work out basis for Franco-German Saar settlement (Re Paris Embtel 1636).[2] If agreement on principles of Saar settlement are not reached prior to presidential elections, we anticipate it will be extremely difficult if not impossible to bring EDC to vote in French Assembly immediately after elections.

Paris and Bonn should use every influence at their disposal to urge French and Germans respectively to push forward with Saar settlement on basis of reasonableness. If French insist on bringing Saar Conventions before Assembly, reaction in Germany will I believe be violent. In particular I am apprehensive Germans will take position that at very moment they prepared to sit down to work out Saar settlement, France is taking final action on Saar settlement by ratification of Conventions. If French insist on ratifying Saar Conventions and there is violent German reaction and breakdown in Franco-German talks on Saar, impression may be created French have deliberately injected Saar Conventions to prevent Saar agreement and thus to sabotage early French action EDC.

Amb Dillon should therefore continue do everything possible persuade French not act on Saar Conventions at precise time when they are getting ready to talk with Adenauer. In particular Bidault should be left in no doubt as to catastrophic effect on France's position if French take unreasonable action which makes agreement on Saar near future impossible. Bidault should also know that if French nevertheless proceed with ratification Franco-Saar Conventions, and as result are subsequently unable arrive at agreement on Saar with Federal

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[1] Drafted and initialed for the Secretary by MacArthur. Cleared by Dulles and Bonbright; repeated to Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported that barring unforeseen favorable developments it appeared impossible that debate on the ratification of the EDC Treaty in the French Assembly could begin prior to the inauguration of a new French president in mid-January (740.5/10-2653).

Republic, US Govt will find it exceedingly difficult give support to French position with respect to future status Saar.

Amb Conant should continue urge Adenauer be as forthcoming with French as possible re Saar and in particular prevent public utterances in Germany which may be interpreted as threatening French since these serve as ammunition to French opponents EDC and are resented by French supporters of EDC. Amb Dillon should likewise urge French not make any public statements which might aggravate situation.[3]

DULLES

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[3] On Oct. 30, the source text was repeated to London in telegram 2338 with the request that it be brought to the attention of the Foreign Office "so that British may be fully informed of actions we taking" with respect to the Saar issue (740.5/10-3053). The same day, in telegram 1629 to Paris, Dulles instructed the Embassy in France to maintain "continuous discreet pressure on French Govt to hold" the EDC Treaty debate "as soon as possible, in spite forecasted delay" reported in telegram 1636 from Paris. Dulles stressed that a "Most serious risk" existed in the possibility that the outcome of the presidential election "would bring on prolonged cabinet crisis, and likelihood further long EDC delay running on into 'critical' period next spring, when pressure resulting from Congressional impatience and German insistence on independent status will reach breaking point" (740.5/10-2653).

740.5/10-3053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

PARIS, October 30, 1953—9 p. m.

1711. I spoke to Bidault this afternoon regarding Deptel 1623.[2] After a good deal of thought, he said that he could well understand our concern, and he himself was not too happy about the timing of the ratification debate on the Franco-Saar convention. He said, however, that we must bear two things in mind. In the first place, the Saar Government was pressing very strongly for ratification, which would give it many advantages over present situation. If France refused to proceed at this juncture, it would seriously damage her relations with the Saar Government which are of great importance to France. Secondly, the conventions were coming up for ratification in the ordinary course of business. Bidault assured me that he had done nothing to precipitate the ratification debate, and that it would take strong interference on his part to put it off. He was sure that such interference would be most unwise and might very likely cause the loss of fifteen or twenty votes for the EDC. This was a loss that could not be risked.

In order to minimize the impact of the debate and to make it as routine as possible, Bidault said that he had recalled Maurice Schumann from New York to carry on in the Assembly. Bidault himself would not be present during the course of the debate (Assembly has set debate for November 6).

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[1] Repeated to Bonn.

[2] *Supra.*

He then said that, in talking with Adenauer about these conventions, we should bear two things in mind. In the first place, these conventions represent the relinquishment of very substantial amounts of French authority in the Saar, and it was difficult for him to see how Adenauer could object to more authority being given to the inhabitants of the Saar. Secondly, new conventions would be entirely subject to revision by any Franco-German agreement that was also accepted by the population of the Saar, and there was no intention whatsoever on the French side to use these agreements to set up pre-conditions for the Franco-German negotiations.

Bidault then gave a round-up of his reasons for feeling that the situation was now ripe in France for the EDC. In the first place, he said that Daladier's action in aligning himself with the Communists had been badly received by the Radical Socialists and had weakened the opposition to the treaty in the Radical Socialist Party. Secondly, he said that the decision of the great majority of the independents and, in particular, Pinay, to support the treaty was very encouraging. In the third place, he had just learned that the Socialists had decided to limit their speakers to three in the forthcoming debate on European policy in the Assembly, and all three of these speakers would represent the pro-EDC element of the Socialist Party. He said he felt sure that the necessary pre-conditions for ratification now existed, and, therefore, he himself was working night and day to bring it about. Incidentally, his speech in the Council of the Republic yesterday was outstanding and, from all reports, exerted a marked influence in changing previous air of hostility to EDC in the Senate.

DILLON

740.5/11-253 : Despatch

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Dowling) to the Department of State

SECRET

BONN, November 2, 1953.

No. 1387

Ref: Department's CA-1860, October 5, 1953 [1]

Subject: Suggestions for HICOG action to expedite EDC

Suggestions for possible anticipatory action which would have useful effects on the French and be of value in speeding the German build-up for the EDC were requested in the reference airgram.

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[1] *Ante*, p. 815.

The most fruitful area of exploration of possible action by HICOG is the possibilities which exist for implementing certain provisions of the Contractual Agreements in advance of ratification. The political background against which such action might be projected consists of (1) the long interim period since signature in May, 1952, and (2) the new political fact of the September elections. It would seem logical for the U.S. High Commissioner to confront his British and French colleagues with the proposition that the occupation authorities are now dealing with a new German Government elected on the platform of Adenauer's successful negotiation of termination of occupation controls. It could be argued forcefully that in the absence of ratification, steps should be taken to eliminate or amend substantially certain controls associated with the occupation. It might even be argued that if action is not taken with respect to some of these controls, the Germans might well unilaterally anticipate ratification and confront the Allies with some difficult situations to handle.

The obvious difficulty in such an approach through the Allied High Commission is the possibility that any such move might boomerang and result in stiffening French opposition to ending the occupation and ratifying EDC. One possible method of circumventing this difficulty would be to propose action with respect to a series of existing occupation controls without relating them to any pattern of pressure on the French. For example, a first step might be to urge relaxation of certain controls over industrial production, and in particular armaments production, administered by the Military Security Board. This could be done under the umbrella of the OSP program and on the basis of U.S. interest in solving the problem of the NATO-wide defense production deficit. The decision on relaxation of these industrial controls lies in some cases with a two-thirds majority in the MSB; in other cases the Council of the AHC may act on the basis of a 2 to 1 vote with the dissenting High Commissioner having the right to appeal to his government within 21 days during which time action is suspended. Some items of military production can be licensed by MSB only with the agreement of the three governments.

Relaxation of industrial controls offers a logical point of beginning in a policy of anticipating ratification of the Contractual Agreements because of the fact that the Germans are already violating these controls on a fairly wide-spread scale. The practical impossibility of applying sanctions to punish these violations under the political conditions which now exist in the Federal Republic should be obvious even to the French. Several other similar steps which would give recognition to Germany's new status are suggested by a reading of the General Agreement and the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Forces. If this series of moves were made in a seemingly unrelated pattern, the French would most certainly get the point, but would not be able to accuse the U.S. of open pressure.

Another possible line of action to influence French thinking on EDC suggests itself. It would be possible to open up on a number of fronts bilateral discussions with the Federal Government on problems connected with the German forces build-up. Talks could be held with the Blank Office on the details of the U.S. end item equipment assistance program, and by bringing in EUCOM and USAREUR, actual plans could be formulated for the logistical handling of this equipment by the initial cadres of German forces. These arrangements would include provision of temporary storage at ports and transportation. In addition it would be possible to discuss the construction of German military installations required for the first stages of the build-up in the American Zone, and the turning over of certain installations now held by the U.S. forces. Moreover, HICOG could work closely with the Ministry of Economics on developing a plan for the early undertaking of munitions production on a substantial scale in Germany. All of these unilateral steps could be justified on the basis of the need for advance planning, including planning for U.S. assistance, and might well have the effect of convincing the French Government of the firmness of the U.S. intentions with respect to German rearmament. Simultaneously, the High Commissioner might request his British and French colleagues to cooperate in certain aspects of this planning; for example, on the stationing of troops and the supply of troops, consultation on which with the Federal Republic is provided for in the General Agreement and in the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of the Forces.

There is a limit to the unilateral action by the U.S. within Germany which would be desirable given the overall political and strategic situation. We would not want to so alienate French public opinion and so frighten the French Government that they might be tempted to fall back on some alternative solution of the German question, such as a pact with the Soviet Union.

However, in considering the action which the U.S. HICOG might take to further ratification of EDC, a step which might be taken as a last resort would be to suggest within the High Commission that the Contractual Agreements be made effective without awaiting ratification of EDC. Article 10 provides for revisions of the Contractual Agreements, and a simple amendment of Article 11 would eliminate the interrelationship of the two treaties. This would have to be agreed to by the four governments concerned, after which Germany would be free to rearm. The French would of course take the position that such an amendment would require substantive changes in the Finance Convention, which would certainly be true, but by simply advancing this suggestion in the first place, the U.S. would have made its point and accomplished the political objective.

Any drastic change in occupation policy towards rearmament would require unanimous consent. However, border line cases could be construed as falling under the High Commission two-thirds majority vote rule. An example of such a case is the question of increasing the strength of the Federal border police. There is the possibility of obtaining British agreement that these border line cases do not constitute rearmament and then proceeding with a two-thirds vote in the face of out and out French resistance.

What must be avoided at all costs is a further long delay in ratification of the treaties with a consequent deterioration of the authority and position of the AHC in Germany. The French must be made to see that action must be taken because the Germans will not wait forever. Surely the French Government must realize that if the Federal Republic takes matters into its own hands, and asserts its sovereignty in a number of fields without recourse to the High Commission, there would be very little the Allies, as a practical matter, could do.

WALTER DOWLING

740.5/11–953

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, November 8, 1953—7:19 p. m.

1765. Eyes only for the Ambassador. I am deeply disturbed by contents your 1811.[2] You should encourage Laniel to face issue now but you should obviously take care to avoid assuming responsibility for internal political decision or his own personal fate. Laniel should know that patience of American people and Congress is running out on EDC; that France bears in public the major onus for delay; and that if EDC is not ratified promptly after presidential election those in this country who have held so firmly to our policy of supporting France in all her difficulties may well find the continuation of that policy rendered impossible by the further dwindling of Congressional and public support. In my view the latest Soviet note[3] starkly poses the issues for the free world. Unless we go forward together in our agreed purposes, we inevitably face the disintegration of all our great common efforts and achievements in the past few years to secure the safety and the prosperity of free Europe. Moreover, France's role as a world power which we have made every effort to support is inextricably tied in to France's action on EDC.

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[1] Drafted by Byington and approved for transmission by Dulles.

[2] Not printed; it reported a conversation between Achilles and Germain Vidal in which Vidal stated *inter alia* that "URAS and ARS Ministers had yesterday called on Laniel and told him that if debate were held and resulted in favorable vote on any motion which clearly committed government to ratification of EDC, they would at once resign, thus bringing down government." Laniel had reiterated his support of EDC and his determination to seek ratification as soon as the three conditions of the protocols, Saar, and firm agreement with the British had been met. But "According to Vidal downfall of government on EDC issue would mean presidential election would be fought primarily upon it. He said that in Laniel's opinion both downfall of government and waging presidential election on this issue would bode ill for ratification. Laniel's preliminary thinking was that in circumstances both Assembly debate and Hague meeting scheduled for November 26 should be postponed until after presidential election" (740.5/11–753).

[3] Documentation on the Soviet note of Nov. 3 regarding proposed four- and five-power conferences on Korea and Germany is presented in volume VII.

Dulles

740.5/11-953

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant), at Bonn

SECRET [Washington,] November 9, 1953.

Dear Jim: I have your letter of October 28th.[1] I read it with intense interest and considerable disappointment. I had hoped that the overwhelming success of Adenauer would have made his path easier rather than perhaps harder. I am particularly disappointed at the prospect of considerable delay on the Saar matter and the possible stiffening of the Chancellor's position.

From all the information we have, there is no basis for blaming Bidault on the French delays. Bidault now seems to be the strong, outspoken supporter of EDC, and the latest information we have from Paris is that it is he who is pushing for quick action, whereas Laniel and others are holding back.

I noted your views with reference to a national German army within the NATO framework. I myself consider that this would be a most unsatisfactory alternative to European unity. I read to the President this portion of your letter.

No doubt we are at the crossroads and if EDC fails, the consequences may have to be a change more radical than merely to bring Germany into NATO. Of course, Churchill and many of our military people would doubtless favor that course.

Sincerely yours, **John Foster Dulles**

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[1] *Ante*, p. 831.

740.5/11-953 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL Washington, November 9, 1953—7:23 p. m.

Edcol 48. Subject is EDC protocols: Department concerned over continued delay in signature EDC protocols. Until protocols have been signed by Foreign Ministers there will always be temptation for French to propose modification or introduce further protocols. In view of fact that Adenauer has now indicated his willingness to sign, there appears to be no further obstacle to signature.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared by Fisher and Hay. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, London, and Luxembourg.

Has occurred to us that November 26 Hague Foreign Ministers meeting[2] would be logical time and place for signature. Not only would this afford best opportunity prior to French Assembly debate, but it might also be useful to be able to cite signature of protocols as solid accomplishment of Hague meeting, particularly if difficulties encountered on other matters.

Would appreciate Bruce comments on feasibility this suggestion and whether steps might be taken to facilitate.

DULLES

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[2] Reference is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Political Community at The Hague, Nov. 26–28; for documentation, see volume VI.

740.5/11–1653 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

SECRET BONN, November 16, 1953—6 p. m.

1687. For the Secretary. General Gruenther and I called on Chancellor today in course of former's first official visit to Bonn. Hallstein, Blank, Heusinger, Speidel were also present for conversation, which continued during lunch between Chancellor and General Gruenther.

Prior to call on Chancellor, Speidel had expressed to General Gruenther German disappointment at lack of progress in Franco-German talks on Saar, saying that Germans felt French had completely backed away from Europeanization, and were concerned only with settlement which would provide facade for continued French economic hegemony in Saar. When this point was raised with Chancellor, however, he said he had been very discouraged last week at lack of prospects for success, but that he felt more optimistic since receiving a message from Bidault last Saturday which to him indicated that the way was still open for agreement. He added, however, that time might come when US intervention would be required to bring about full Franco-German agreement.

On other hand, fact that Adenauer still has some doubts re success of Saar talks and subsequent EDC ratification was evidenced by his tentative question to General Gruenther re a possible US-UK-German agreement in the absence of French action to move forward on European defense. General Gruenther had previously taken occasion to remark that close Franco-German relations were essential feature of European defense, and to Chancellor's question he replied that from military viewpoint it was impossible to leave France out of any European arrangements. Chancellor then commented that he meant such an agreement to be more in nature of a political, or psychological stimulus for West. General Gruenther remarked that he could not, of course, pass judgment on the political question involved, but that such a move ought to be carefully considered, as it might well backfire. He reiterated that, militarily, France was essential to defense of Europe.

At one stage, Chancellor asked General Gruenther re hydrogen bomb effectiveness, saying McCloy, when he was here, had told him alarming story re possibility of the Russians killing 16 million Americans in surprise attack and making it impossible for US to retaliate. He said he had discussed these figures in general terms with his nuclear expert, Dr. Hahn, who believed they were impossible.

Obviously much disturbed at story, he asked General Gruenther for his opinion. General Gruenther stated that in his opinion such stories were gross exaggeration. US military had reviewed situation and he had talked with Admiral Radford only recently. He felt he could say that military opinion was no such figures were to be credited. Chancellor seemed much relieved.

Conant

762.022/11-1853

Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, November 18, 1953.

THE SAAR PROBLEM

I. ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM

A. *The General Situation*

1. It is a political reality that there must be some Franco-German agreement on the Saar before the French ratify the EDC. The degree of agreement on broad principles or on details that is necessary remains a question. But it is extremely important that before the end of the year sufficient agreement be reached to clear the way for French EDC ratification and to stem the rising tide of impatience in Germany

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[1] Drafted by Fisher of WE. A covering memorandum from John Jones, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, to Merchant, also drafted by Fisher reads: "WE is pleased to note from your memorandum of November 11 that Jacques Reinstein has been assigned to concentrate during the coming weeks on the Saar problem. To assist in that task WE has prepared the attached paper containing a preliminary analysis of the elements of the problem and a consideration of the various alternative lines along which a solution might be sought in the event that the Franco-German talks bog down" (762.022/11-1853). Further documentation on the Saar is in volume VII.

and the US for several more weeks while the French get over their presidential elections and move into the ratification debate.

2. Adenauer and Bidault are expected to attempt to reach at least the broad lines of a Saar settlement while at The Hague for the November 26 meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries (which is to be devoted primarily to attempting to achieve agreement on a European Political Community). Adenauer and Francois-Poncet are holding a series of preliminary meetings in Bonn to clarify their respective positions prior to actual negotiations. The end of November and the month of December thus appear to be the most critical period and the period where US–UK active intervention may be needed if an agreement is to be reached enabling progress on EDC.

3. No purely ideal and logical settlement developed without full consideration of the political tolerances in France and Germany is possible of realization. Because only continued progress in European unification will finally settle the Saar issue, only a very general Saar agreement appears to be possible now. This is especially true when one considers the time that would be required to negotiate in full the necessary instruments which would include an international statute, a new Saar constitution, modified Franco-Saar accords and perhaps certain tripartite accords for cultural relations, trade, et cetera. The overall sequence would seem to be (1) a very general agreement on the Saar permitting French EDC ratification, (2) the creation of the EDC, (3) the development of the EPC and (4) a definitive European Saar settlement complete with all the necessary new instruments.

4. Previous conversations between Adenauer and Schuman or Adenauer and Bidault (and Mayer) indicate that there are three problems that are most troublesome in attempting to reach agreement on the substance of a settlement:

a. How can the French be assured that a settlement is definitive so that the Saar will never return to Germany while the Germans avoid prejudicing the possibility of eventual restoration of both western and eastern frontiers.

b. When and how can the Saar population be consulted under conditions of full political freedom involving the introduction of parties that are for the return of the Saar to Germany.

c. How can Germany have equality of economic privileges under the maintenance of a Franco-Saar customs and monetary union.

5. Although these previous conversations indicated that an agreement on broad principles was not too far from attainment (although the application of these principles in the economic field was far from near solution), both sides to the controversy seem to have hardened their positions recently: Adenauer, because he had previously negotiated on a very personal basis and now believes he must negotiate on the basis of a position cleared by his government coalition; Bidault, because by negotiating and obtaining ratification of the modified

Franco-Saar conventions it would now be impossible for him to agree to any outright abrogation of these symbolic conventions.

6. The Council of Europe is a new element in the picture since the van der Goes van Naters report was debated there last September.[2] The report itself lends general support to the French position yet in the economic field it apparently does not go far enough, principally as it calls for the substitution of a new treaty for the above-cited conventions. Also the Council has called for a special conference on the Saar in early 1954 if Franco-German talks fail; this might eventually be conducive to an agreement but in the coming weeks Bidault might remain more adamant in his conversations with Adenauer in the belief that the proposed conference might be guided by the van der Goes report which tends to support the French position.

The danger that the US and UK might use up their influence in December in attempting to bring about a solution, and fail, is somewhat less important now because there would still exist, if we do fail in coming weeks, the further resource of the Council of Europe sponsored conference to bring about a solution.

7. The French are under the impression that we do tend to support their point of view concerning a Saar solution because in the past we have publicly supported their detachment of the Saar from Germany (pending a peace treaty) and because they were informed that Mr. MacArthur on October 24 urged Hallstein and Blankenhorn to meet the French position. On the other hand, the Secretary sent a message to Bidault that if the French proceeded to ratify the Franco-Saar conventions (which they have done) and thereby ran into difficulties with Adenauer, we would find it most difficult to give support to the French position on the future status of the Saar. Happily, the French action on the conventions does not seem to have brought about the intense German reaction that was expected.

B. *Past Conversations*

1. *Francois-Poncet and Adenauer, November 1953.* Information on these conversations is unfortunately sketchy. About four meetings have been scheduled, the first apparently involving no matters of substance, the second a preliminary discussion (see below), the third an exposition of the French position in detail and the fourth (the week of November 16) the German position in detail. The second meeting (November 3) is described in Bonn's 1589 [3] as follows:

> "In discussing economic question, Francois-Poncet had justified French demand (which had had US and UK support) for Franco-Saar customs and economic union as in nature of reparation for losses France had suffered in war. Blankenhorn intimated that validity of argument had been admitted at least tacitly, but that Chancellor had

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[2] See editorial note, p. 803.

[3] Dated Nov. 5; printed in the compilation on the German Democratic Republic in volume VII.

replied that Germans could not accept such arrangement permanently and that way must be found for gradual termination. Chancellor had indicated that Germany was prepared to make economic concessions to France in this connection. He had expressly asked what France calculated the economic advantages arising from link with Saar to be, which Poncet could not answer but agreed ascertain.

"Berard, who present with Poncet, had taken line that French experts had given much study to possibility German economic concessions to France in lieu of Franco-Saar regime and had come to conclusion that such solution out of question. Poncet, according to Blankenhorn, had taken broader view than Berard and had given clear indication that he at least did not rule out such solution and was disposed to pursue further.

"As for political questions, Blankenhorn stated that 'Europeanization' formula for Saar had been accepted by both sides as general 'objective.' Adenauer had indicated readiness accept French thesis that Franco-German agreement on Saar should be submitted to Saar referendum. Poncet accepted participation pro-German parties in referendum and that latter should be promptly followed by election of Constituent Assembly.

"Chancellor had raised (as Blankenhorn said he also had with Schuman last year) question of French agreeing that minute French areas adjacent Saar (i.e., Forbach) should be 'Europeanized' along with Saar, to facilitate German action. Poncet alluded to extraordinary difficulties, including constitutional."

2. *Franco-German talks of May 12, 1953.* These talks in Paris included Mayer, Bidault, de Roziers, Adenauer, Hallstein and Blankenhorn and are described in Paris' 5950 [4] as follows:

"Adenauer opened by outlining his position as follows:

"1. As legal point, any settlement of final German frontiers must await definitive peace treaty. Therefore Saar frontiers can only be finally settled by peace treaty.

"2. He was willing to grant political autonomy to Saar with Saar Government to have own Parliament. But in some respects (not detailed by Adenauer) Saar must be subject to a European authority. He suggested coal and steel authority for this purpose.

"3. He had heard that monetary problem was considered important to French. To him it seemed not so important. He looked forward to general convertibility of European currencies in next few years and this should automatically take care of problem.

"4. On economic side Germany had special interests in trade with Saar. Also German business interests must have right to invest in Saar industries.

"5. Any Franco-German agreement must be subject to ratification by a newly elected Saar Parliament. Elections for this Parliament must be completely free with all parties allowed to take part in election.

"6. Due to proximity of German elections this not the time to make any agreement. He was confident that he would be successful in elections and at that time, after elections, but not sooner a Franco-German agreement could be reached.

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[4] Dated May 14; printed in the compilation on the German Democratic Republic in volume VII.

"7. He said that he realized that for economic reasons and in particular because of the burden of refugees from the east, the population of the Saar did not now and for foreseeable future would not want to return to Germany.

"Mayer for French then answered Adenauer's points in order:

"1. Settlement of Saar problem necessary now before ratification of contractual agreements. Problem must be settled if progress toward European unity to continue. French recognized problem of Germans re necessity postpone definitive boundary settlement to peace treaty. Saw no reason why language satisfactory to Adenauer on this point could not be worked out.

"2. Welcomed Adenauer's comments on this point but said it not clear exactly what powers should be reserved to European authority. Suggested that Council of Europe might well be preferable to coal and steel authority as over-all authority.

"3. Continuation of Monetary and Customs Union vital to France. Convertibility of currencies had nothing to do with problem which is simply that French economy requires that Saar trade with French for monetary purposes. Pointed out that French had stated this clearly last fall and after objection by Adenauer had asked him to submit his counterproposal. No German counterproposal received as yet. Mayer inquired if Adenauer now prepared to make a German proposal. Adenauer replied in evasive terms and question was dropped.

"4. France had no intention of interrupting normal Saar trade with Germany. France agrees Germany has an economic interest in Saar. Question of German ownership of Saar industries not insurmountable. French understand Germans completed a detailed study of German-Saar economic relationships some three or four months ago. French had requested copy of this study some months ago but had not received it. It would be useful to negotiations if French could have a copy of this study. Adenauer made no reply to this request.

"5. French could not agree to submitting accord to a newly elected Saar Parliament. This would not be a clear test as any election would be affected by other partisan political questions. Also any vote in Saar Parliament would also be subject to other partisan intrigues. French proposed as alternative a referendum to approve or disapprove the Franco-German agreement. If agreement approved there could then be new and completely free elections in Saar. Adenauer had no very good answer to French arguments and French had definite impression that Adenauer would in the end accept their position on this question.

"6. French regretted Adenauer's decision to postpone decision till after his elections but expressed understanding of his political problem. French suggested that interim conversations continue to prepare way for prompt agreement after German elections. Adenauer said he felt such talks would not be productive and suggested it would be better to put whole subject aside until fall."

3. *Schuman and Adenauer; 1952.* The following is a summary of reports from HICOG and Embassy Paris concerning the positions

taken during the conversations between Schuman and Adenauer during 1952:

Bonn: Settlement must be provisional in form. European status requires an acceptable European political authority. Adenauer could agree that, subject to a plebiscite, the Saar shall come under an EPC when it is formed, with self-administration in local affairs. Political freedom in the Saar would have to be conceded before the plebiscite . . .[5] French fears should be met by making plebiscite either approval or disapproval of agreed European solution. If vote favorable, this could be followed by "free elections" for a new Saar Landtag which would be bound by the results of the plebiscite. France may not be politically dominant.

Terms of settlement must be consistent with Europeanized status e.g., economic advantages to be guaranteed France must not exclude interests of other members. Germans are ready to agree to continued Saar monetary union with France and to agree that balance between France and Germany in CSC shall not be upset. Adenauer will probably propose that common market provisions of CSC apply to other factors Saar economy but as German interest is political, not economic, there is considerable room for compromise.

Paris: French Government cannot agree to electoral freedom until there is a broad Franco-German agreement. French desire that a definitive settlement be agreed upon, either in broad terms or in detail (degree remains to be seen), which will be only formally subject to confirmation in a later German peace treaty as French wish no loophole left allowing future return of the Saar to Germany.

The French desire to keep a permanent customs boundary between the Saar and Germany and to maintain the French economic predominance in the Saar. October 1 German proposals envisaged drawing customs boundary between France and the Saar, which is not a realistic basis for negotiations. There is a French conviction that there exists no workable alternative to a customs boundary either between the Saar and Germany or between the Saar and France.

On October 24, the French draft said that the economic union between France and the Saar would be "adapted" to the new status and its further evolution "as European integration progresses", would be the subject of study. The German draft envisaged that the "forms of economic relations between France and the Saar, now covered by the Franco-Saar economic union, would be the subject of study on the part of the interested states as European integration gradually progresses."

Greatest, and perhaps the only hope for an agreement that would meet French requirements without unduly unsettling Adenauer's position should lie in a joint declaration which would heavily emphasize the agreed basic features of the political settlement and gloss over the economic differences by general language and by the establishment of an expert committee. It would have to refer to the important French economic interests in the Saar and would have to define the objective of the consultations as determination whether those interests can be safeguarded otherwise than through maintenance of the Franco-Saar customs and currency union. Best possible face on a continuing disagreement appears to be the best that one can hope for in the immediately foreseeable future.

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[5] Ellipsis in the source text.

C. *Probable Respective Positions*

1. *Europeanization.* Except for some few members of Adenauer's coalition, there seems to be agreement in France, Germany and the Saar that the solution to the problem lies in the "Europeanization" of the Saar. Exactly what this means is a subject of dispute, other than that the Saar would be not a state but a European territory exercising local self-government under the control of a European institution (preferably supranational) which also handles its external relations; also that eventually Germany would have equal rights with those of France in the Saar through the development of the supranational European community with its common market among all participants.

The principal problems arise now because such a community is still something of the indefinite future, yet the French want now a definitive solution so that they can be assured that the Saar will not one day return to Germany. A Franco-German agreement thus should not only provide for the eventual status of the Saar but for the status pending the full development of the European community. It is in providing for this interim period that the principal differences arise.

2. *Definitiveness.* This has the potentiality of being a difficult problem but previous negotiations have indicated that a carefully worded compromise is possible to the effect that the Franco-German settlement would be subject to reaffirmation at the time of a peace treaty or whenever Germany's frontiers would be finally determined. This appears now to be largely a matter of presentation—provided agreement on the other controversial points is achieved—as the French should be able to accept a presentation to the Bundestag by Adenauer of the settlement as not necessarily, or finally, prejudicing the determination of Germany's borders in a peace treaty. It is possible, however, that the matter of definitiveness might be reexamined, if necessary, in order to resolve an inability to agree on other points (see Section II, B of this paper).

3. *Free Elections.* The admission of pro-German political parties (dedicated to the return of the Saar to Germany) was the issue upon which the Adenauer-Schuman negotiations broke down in face of the then imminent scheduled Saar elections. It is this issue which is probably of paramount political interest to the Germans. The foremost German objective in a Saar agreement has been described as to bring "political fermentation into Saar political life." However the French insist upon a delay of full political liberty in the Saar until the possibility of a Saar vote to return to Germany has been precluded by a Franco-German definitive agreement on Europeanization. The Saar elections indicated quite clearly that if the Saarlanders are presented in a referendum with such an agreement, they will vote overwhelmingly for it.

Blankenhorn, in reporting to Conant on the Adenauer–Francois-Poncet conversations of November 3, confirmed that Adenauer was ready to accept the French thesis that a Franco-German agreement on the Saar should be submitted to the Saarlanders in a referendum and Francois-Poncet accepted the participation of pro-German parties in the referendum after which there should be new Landtag or constituent assembly elected under full political freedom. Adenauer had previously indicated his acceptance of this procedure in his October 16, 1952 letter to Schuman and in his May 12 conversations with Bidault and Mayer. Conant has been instructed to express the US view that this procedure should be followed to solve this issue. Nevertheless, other Germans have continued to speak rather loosely about "free elections" in such a way that there is a danger that Adenauer might possibly not stick to his previous acceptance of the French position on this issue. Adenauer might feel that he needs a decision by the Saarlanders in favor of Europeanization, as the political basis of his authority to proceed with negotiations aimed at relinquishing the German claim to sovereignty over the Saar.

4. *The Economic Issue.* This promises to be by far the most difficult point. The French have maintained that the Franco-Saar conventions should remain intact though they felt they might be broadened to include Germany as European integration progressed. The German position was that the conventions must at once be modified in accordance with a "European" status of the Saar whereby Germany and others would be able to participate in the economy of the Saar on an equal basis, although legitimate special French needs would in some way be met. Both sides in negotiations have recognized the need to provide for the special economic interests of the other but there has been no discussion of any concrete proposals for solution or compromise.

In the November 3 conversations, Adenauer is reported to have tacitly admitted the Francois-Poncet thesis that the French were justified in demanding the maintenance of the Franco-Saar economic union as in nature of reparations for losses that France had suffered in the war. Psychologically, this is the test for the French of whether a Saar solution is satisfactory, i.e. whether it indicates that Germany lost the war and the French were on the winning side.

However, this point naturally is difficult for Adenauer. He reportedly replied to Francois-Poncet that such an arrangement could not be permanently accepted, that some way must be found for a gradual termination. The recently ratified conventions do provide for their modification as progress is made in integration. The French have stated on various occasions that they desire to see the economic union maintained, but that they envisage its gradual disappearance as European economic integration proceeds. There is perhaps a meeting ground here, for Adenauer is reported at one time previously to have held the view that due to the fact that European integration is only at the beginning of its development, the "Europeanization" of the Saar can also be developed concurrently with progress in European integration; this view was expounded in Adenauer's letter to Foreign Minister Schuman of October 1, 1952. Whether Adenauer will still hold this view remains to be seen, particularly in view of the symbolic importance now attached to the recently ratified Franco-Saar conventions which provide for the monetary and customs union.

The question of principle as to whether the French-imposed economic union is, or is not, to be maintained promises to be the bone of contention. The French are publicly committed, through statements in the past and more recently in the debate concerning the ratification of the Franco-Saar conventions, to substantial maintenance of the economic union and no abrogation of the Franco-Saar conventions. If the Germans can possibly sacrifice principle for the reality of gaining an economic foothold (by means yet to be determined) in the Saar—which is what they really seek, agreement should be possible. There are many detailed points that would be difficult to resolve and, as indicated previously, there has been no detailed discussion of concrete proposals for achieving such compromise; hence, the respective positions on a settlement of these issues—once an agreement has been reached as to principle—can only be guessed with very little accuracy.

Mayer, in the May 12 conversation, again called for concrete German proposals both in the monetary and trade fields and conceded in principle that Germany has special interests in the field of trade with the Saar and with regard to investments there. The Germans were willing, at one time, to accept at least initial complete retention of the Franco-German currency union, but the proposal was never made to the French (although Adenauer on May 12 "minimized the importance of the monetary problem"). The French can be expected to fight for retention of the currency union not only as a matter of principle but because it results in a net accretion of a fairly susbtantial amount of foreign currency to the French treasury.

With regard to trade and investments, the French will undoubtedly be sticky on concessions for they fear that any large-scale opening-up of the Saar to trade with Germany would in the long run have the effect of strengthening the political bonds between Germany and the Saar. Yet it is in this area that concessions will have to be made and where most of the hard bargaining will probably eventuate.

5. *Other Elements.* It is not expected that there will be any important disagreement on other elements of a settlement such as Saar representation in European bodies, defense arrangements, etc.

II. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION BY US

A. *Timing*

The Adenauer–Francois-Poncet conversations, from reports available so far, have not yet indicated what action might be called for by the US in an effort to intervene on matters of substance so as to bring about an agreement. The moment of decision will come only when we have full reports concerning the results of the Adenauer-Bidault meeting at The Hague. Then we will have to decide, and for fullest effect obtain British concurrence, as to how our influence can best be exerted. Bermuda offers an excellent possibility for working on the French.

In the meantime, little can be gained by attempting to work out the ideal, logical solution for we must work with the elements at hand within the realm of political possibilities. Furthermore, we seek no particular solution of our own conception for its own sake, but wish any solution mutually acceptable to the French and Germans.

B. *Possible Compromises That Might Be Proposed*

As indicated previously, there appears to be general agreement—and we should press for continued acceptance—concerning (1) the concept of Europeanization, (2) the agreement-referendum-full political freedom sequence of developments, (3) a definitive, if rather broad, agreement subject to reaffirmation at the peace treaty, and (4) local autonomy for the Saarlanders.

There seems to be no practical alternative to the maintenance of the present Franco-Saar currency union and this seems to be recognized by the Germans.

If, as expected, the main difficulty arises over the Franco-Saar conventions provisions concerning the customs union, variations or combinations of the following suggested compromises might be proposed (many of these most probably would not be acceptable to one or the other side without the very greatest of pressure exerted by the US and the UK).

1. That the terms of the conventions be incorporated in a new treaty—much as is proposed in the van der Goes van Nater report, so that from a practical standpoint France would have retained the economic union but, for the benefit of the Germans, under a different name.
2. That tariffs and quota restrictions on trade in commodities other than coal and steel (already part of a common market) between the Saar and Germany shall be progressively eliminated under a regular schedule.
3. That the Germans accept the maintenance of the economic union pending further European integration with the condition that if substantial progress is not made within, say, five or ten years, that this portion of the Saar settlement be reopened.

4. That the Germans agree to the maintenance of the union as established in the Franco-Saar conventions in return for specific concessions in the matter of trade.

5. That the French agree to modify the conventions in return for US–UK support of their other positions in regard to a Saar settlement (sequence leading to free elections, reaffirmation at the time of the peace treaty, et cetera).

6. That unresolved issues be submitted to a Saar plebiscite.

7. That the agreement should be valid only if the EDC is ratified and there is reasonable progress on the EPC.

8. That the French accept a statement of principles that gloss over the difficulties and do not constitute a settlement, and proceed with EDC ratification.

9. (If there is any substantial deadlock after US–UK efforts at mediation) That the conference provided for by the Council of Europe's resolution be held to help resolve the issue.[6]

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[6] Despatch 1670 from Paris, Dec. 30, 1953, reported *inter alia* that the Embassy had learned that Bidault did not intend to resume conversations with Adenauer regarding the Saar problem until the end of January 1954 at the earliest because of a possible forthcoming governmental crisis in France and the imminence of the Four-Power Conference at Berlin (762.022/12–3053). Documentation on the Berlin Conference is presented in volume VII.

740.5/11–1853 : Despatch

The Counselor of Embassy in Italy (Williamson) to the Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL ROME, November 18, 1953.
No. 1099

Subject: Present Prospects for EDC Ratification in Italy.

The Foreign Office official primarily concerned with EDC questions informed an Embassy officer on November 17 that there was increasing concern within the Foreign Office that Italy might be the last to ratify the EDC. The official said that shortly following the announcement on October 8 of the Anglo-American plan for Trieste,[1] the Foreign Office had drawn up a memorandum for Prime Minister Pella regarding the possibilities of ratification by Italy of EDC and indicating that unless some action were taken to commence the process, Italy might well be the last to ratify. The official said that the Foreign Office had received no reply to this memorandum from the Prime Minister, but that it was understood that Pella believed that given the present political situation, it would not be politically possible to submit EDC to Parliament at this time. The present government is endeavoring to stabilize its Parliamentary position and must first of all bring the Trieste question to a successful conclusion. The Foreign Office estimate at the present moment is that if EDC should be brought to a vote in the immediate future, it might fail of passage. The Foreign Office sees no early prospects, therefore, for action by the Government to present EDC to Parliament, at least until the Government has gained more ground on Trieste and has a solid working majority.

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[1] Documentation on Trieste is presented in volume VIII.

On the procedural side, the Foreign Office official said that in one of its early sessions the Council of Ministers of the present Government had approved bringing to Parliament all measures presented to the previous Parliament, including EDC. (As an aside, the Foreign Office official said that only one piece of legislation had been withdrawn and that was the bill ratifying the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.) This means that when the Government decides that the time is ripe to proceed with the EDC ratification, the bill can be submitted to Parliament without delay. The usual procedure would be to present the bill to one Chamber and for that Chamber to refer it to Committee. When action had been completed by one Chamber, the bill would then be considered by the second Chamber under the same procedure. The Foreign Office official believed that by applying the rule of urgency, at least 2 months would be required to complete Parliamentary action.

With respect to political trends, the Foreign Office official said that there were certain currents in Parliament, noticeably amongst the Liberal Party, to insist that the Trieste question should not be allowed to affect or to influence adversely the Atlantic policy of Italy. However, the Foreign Office did not believe that this trend would extend itself to a similar attitude on EDC. With respect to other parties, the Foreign Office had received information that the British socialists had recommended to the PSDI, through PSDI Deputy Treves who recently visited England, that it should support the EDC. The Monarchist attitude continues to be governed by the Trieste question.

Comment: It would appear that the future of EDC in Italy continues to depend on the Trieste situation. While the Foreign Office is fully aware that there may be increasing pressure on Italy to ratify EDC, particularly if the French continue their present favorable trend, no action can be taken by the Government to commence the ratification of EDC until the Government considers that it has a clear field with respect to Trieste.

For the Ambassador:
FRANCIS T. WILLIAMSON

740.5/11-2053

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1953.

Subject: Effect of EDC Proviso (Richards Amendment) on the Fiscal Year 1954 Mutual Security Program

Section 540 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953 (so-called Richards Amendment) requires that 50 percent of the equipment and matériel procured for Europe (Title I) with funds appropriated for the Fiscal Year 1954 MDA Program be transferred to the EDC, or to its member countries, unless the Congress, upon recommendation by the President, subsequently provides otherwise. In effect, this means that 50 percent of the equipment and matériel procured for Title I countries from these funds cannot be delivered until after EDC ratification. The funds can be obligated, however, and procurement action is proceeding without hindrance. The EDC proviso does not affect deliveries under prior MDA programs.

The Fiscal Year 1954 program for Title I was developed as follows:

(1) The total funds programmed for materiel for Title I ($1.5 billion) have been divided into two nearly equal portions; one spread among all Title I countries, both EDC and non-EDC (about $748 million of which $264 million is for EDC countries); the other reserved as required by the Richards Amendment for meeting solely EDC country requirements (about $776 million).

(2) To minimize the effect of any possible delay in deliveries, the amounts of the immediately deliverable portion programmed for the EDC countries (the $264 million) are being used primarily for procuring short lead-time items such as spare parts and maintenance equipment; the portion reserved specifically for the EDC program will be used primarily for procuring long lead-time items such as tanks and aircraft.

Using a realistic assumption of April 1, 1954 for EDC ratification, the Richards Amendment will have little delaying effect on the MDA Program and its objectives, except insofar as it renders the administration of the Title I program more complex because of its division into two components. It is anticipated that the negotiation of the MDA Agreements with the EDC and with Germany will be completed in time for them to be signed immediately after ratification. And although there is likely to be a delay of at least several weeks after ratification before the German buildup can begin, arrangements presumably will be made, so that there will be no interruption in the flow of equipment to the EDC countries, including Germany. In view of large undelivered quantities already funded in previous programs, long lead-time items funded from the Fiscal Year 1954 program would not normally be delivered in any quantity until the latter part of Calendar Year 1954.

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[1] Drafted by Miller of RA. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: "Sec[retary of State] saw. R[oderic] O'C[onnor]."

If, however, there is substantial delay in EDC ratification beyond April 1, 1954 two serious results will occur. First, the long lead-time items, particularly aircraft, which will become available for delivery in quantity in the latter part of Calendar Year 1954, will create an additional demand on U.S. storage facilities which in some instances are already overburdened. Secondly, existing units of the EDC countries will be hindered in achieving the equipment levels and reserves needed to make them fully combat effective. Moreover, if it becomes evident that EDC ratification has slipped to the point where the EDC itself becomes improbable, it will require a Presidential recommendation and legislative action to determine what disposition should be made of this equipment.

740.5/11–2053

The Secretary of State to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer)[1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1953.

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR: I am writing you this personal note at the suggestion of the President because of our very real concern over reports which have reached us from a number of sources indicating that certain elements within Germany are speculating on German participation in Western security arrangements by means other than the European Defense Community. Knowing as I do your own devotion and that of your Government to the principles of European unity, I am taking the liberty of writing you with complete frankness so that there may be no misunderstanding of our views on these questions.

The policy of the United States with respect to Europe is based on the imperative necessity of a Franco-German unity as the only solid foundation for the development of any real strength in Europe. If

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[1] Drafted by MacArthur. The source text was enclosed in a long letter from Dulles to Conant "to let you know of my continuing concern over indications that Chancellor Adenauer is more reconciled to a slower schedule for the settlement of the Saar issue, and hence the EDC, than he was prior to the German elections." Dulles then rehearsed all of the arguments in favor of speedy resolution of both the Saar and EDC issues, emphasizing the importance of Franco-German *rapprochement* to peace in Europe, and informed Conant that Under Secretary Smith had forcefully impressed them upon Ambassador Krekeler of the Federal Republic in a recent interview. Dulles particularly stressed the growing mood of impatience in Congress as symbolized by the Richards Amendment and promised to maintain pressure on the French Government at both the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meetings at Bermuda and the Twelfth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Paris in December (740.5/11–2053).

France and Germany cannot be woven together in a European fabric of mutual understanding and common endeavor, not only will there be no real strength in Europe, but the resources which the United States in its own enlightened self-interest has been pouring into Europe will be wasted and will not serve the long-term purpose for which they were appropriated. Our policy with respect to Europe does not, therefore, involve a choice between France or Germany. It is based on France and Germany. Insofar as the United States is concerned, we are convinced there can be no adequate security arrangements for the defense of Europe which are not based on full and effective Franco-German integration in the military and related fields, and we know of no alternative to the European Defense Community which would provide a basis for such cooperation.

In this connection, we strongly believe that a great remaining obstacle to ratification and entry into force of the European Defense Community is the Saar. It would be a tragedy for Germany, Europe, and indeed the Western world, if the solid basis for real European unification which has been laid by the European Defense Community Treaty should come to nought because of failure to reach agreement on the Saar. We know you have this very much in mind in your approach to the Saar problem. I recall your assurance to the President and me at the White House that the Saar matter would be solved. I do hope that no effort will now be spared to reach early agreement.

We recognize that a Saar agreement acceptable to France raises real difficulties because of certain currents of German opinion. However, it is our earnest conviction that we have reached a decisive moment—a moment of historic opportunity which may not recur. If we seize this opportunity which is now well within our grasp, we will be able to move forward on the course we have all worked out together to infinitely greater unity, strength, and hence security and well-being for our peoples. If we let ourselves be diverted by obstacles which we know we have the strength to surmount, it will be an infinite tragedy for all the free world, but particularly for Europe.

I realize that reports and speculation in the press and elsewhere could easily lead to false impressions about the attitude of the United States with respect to Europe. Therefore, my purpose in writing you is to assure you of our continued firm support for the policy of European integration which you have long advocated so vigorously and successfully. On our part, we will continue to do our utmost, as we know you will do, to bring about the realization of our great common objective. The President sends his warm personal regards in this letter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

740.5/11-3053

Memorandum of Conversation, by William D. Fisher of the Office of Western European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1953.

Participants:
Maurice Faure, Deputy, French Delegation to UNGA
Andre Dulin, Senator, French Delegation to UNGA
Roger Seydoux, French Embassy
Mr. MacArthur, C
Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Fisher, WE

Mr. Merchant welcomed Messrs. Faure and Dulin, noted that M. Faure had spoken in the recent French Assembly foreign affairs debate,[1] and asked for his views on this debate. M. Faure said that he and M. Dulin had come down from New York to speak to the responsible Department officers on this subject because they felt that the EDC could not be ratified unless there was some new shock to French public opinion. What was primarily needed, he said, was the development of British association to an extent much greater than anticipated in recent negotiations; the U.S. should urge the U.K. in this direction.

M. Faure continued, stating that the recent debate was very long—too long, very important, and did not have a very satisfactory ending. If a majority of the Socialists voted for ratification there was still a chance, but EDC is losing ground. Certain conditions laid down in the Assembly resolution of 1952 have not yet been realized, particularly the certainty of an agreement concerning the Europeanization of the Saar and, more important, a treaty of extensive UK participation. The UK has the same reasons as France to seek the aims of the EDC but excuses itself on the basis of Commonwealth ties; however, France has the French Union, which is more centralized and a more effective organization than the Commonwealth. If the EDC is not ratified, all would not be lost because in France there is a great majority which does not contest the North Atlantic alliance and would support, instead of the EDC, an armament pool along the lines of the Schuman Plan, with combined training schools and headquarters. In such a way the sentimental attachment to the French army would not stand in the way.

Mr. Merchant inquired whether what was being worked out with the UK now would not be sufficient. M. Faure said that basically it amounted only to having observers. As in 1914 and as at Dunkirk, UK troops might still be withdrawn from the continent in an emergency to defend the British Isles. Also, he continued, there was a fear that once EDC was established that France without its own army would no longer have a strong voice in international diplomacy while the UK would retain its army and its position.

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[1] The French Assembly debated the EDC Treaty, Nov. 17–21, after Bidault had headed off an effort by Gaullists to postpone debate through resignation from the government by threatening to submit his own resignation. After 5 days, debate was suspended while various parties and groups prepared motions.

Mr. Merchant stated that the next two or three years presented the greatest of dangers for all of us. As the Soviets had not abandoned their aim of ruling the world, there would be grave peril unless the West developed further strength and unity. We must consider public opinion in France, the US and Germany and the important factor of time. He said he appreciated the sacrifices which the French consider were involved in the EDC and mentioned that the US was also making considerable sacrifices. In Germany, public opinion desires to know whether Germany may be accepted in the western community on a basis of equality. At some time in the future Germany will be armed whatever France and the US do. For the sake of common survival we must assure that Germany is really integrated in the European framework. Time was very short, only a matter of weeks or months; there was no time to modify the EDC treaty or attempt to find a substitute for it, for we then would soon be faced with a totally new situation.

M. Dulin discussed the debate in the Council of the Republic and reiterated the arguments regarding UK participation and the necessity of a Saar solution. He said that if these two conditions were met, there would be a vote of 200 to 100 in the upper house for the EDC.

Mr. MacArthur said that he believed we had come to the most critical period in post-war history, a veritable crossroads. French, German and US opinion in the coming months would chart a course which would decide whether we are to go on together or separately. There is a parallel in the period before World War II, as Germany is making a tremendous comeback and the forces of nationalism are strong though still buried—a fact which Adenauer recognizes. If we missed this opportunity, there was a great risk that German public opinion, having been rebuffed, would force Germany to move ahead in some other way that might play the East and West against each other. The EDC was important not so much for the forces which would be brought into being but for the tieing of Germany in solidly with the West. The US had attempted to furnish the additional resources that were necessary to create a strong Western Europe but if Western Europe did not make the best use of its resources there would be a danger that the US would feel that the total effort was insufficient and that its added contribution was a waste. There is no time for an alternative to EDC. If the French reject the EDC and attempt to go down a different road than that which we have worked out together, the differences may not be apparent immediately but they will in twelve months or so, for we can't force an unwilling Germany into a particular role without forcing Germany to the side of the East. It has been our policy to support French leadership not only in Europe but in North Africa, Indochina and throughout the world. But if the present opportunity is missed in Europe, the onus will be on the French and everyone will look elsewhere for leadership.

M. Faure said he agreed completely that the decision must be made and made quickly. He said that he would work strongly for EDC ratification but he maintained that we must work together to create the necessary atmosphere. We must be realistic, he continued, and if EDC fails, we must work out other solutions for if the US were to withdraw its troops from the continent, France would be forced to turn to Moscow. We should work to avoid having the forthcoming French decision on EDC create a fundamental crisis in the North Atlantic alliance itself.

Messrs. Merchant and MacArthur replied that we were discreetly trying to help bring about an atmosphere conducive to ratification and would continue to do all that we could.

740.5/12–153 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, December 3, 1953—1:58 p. m.

2026. Subject is EDC Protocols. Ref Coled 107.[2]

1. In light Soviet note [3] and delays caused by French Presidential elections, will be important during coming weeks preserve momentum on EDC and eliminate certain specific obstacles to ratification. Signature protocols is one concrete step which can be taken, supplementing more important steps Saar announcement and UK association.

2. Consider it unfortunate protocols not signed at Hague and believe it very important they be signed this month. Meeting in Paris December 11–12 of Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe appears to provide only possible opportunity between now and February for signature. Understand Committee plans discuss EPC, so might be in order for EDC Ministers to sign protocols.

3. Request Embassy inform French views para 2 above.

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by McBride and, in substance, by Hay.

[2] Not printed; it reported that no action had been taken on signature of the EDC protocols at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the proposed European Political Community at The Hague, Nov. 26–28. It further reported that Bidault had raised the question of the protocols with Adenauer at a private meeting and had "apparently" told the Chancellor that the French Assembly had been informed that the protocols would have the same status as the Treaty and that, therefore, the protocols would have to be signed in the same way. Adenauer had replied that since this would involve his signature in the name of the Chief of State rather than Foreign Minister he could not agree as another vote would be required in the Parliament of the Federal Republic to whom he had promised no further votes on EDC (740.5/12–153).

[3] Reference is presumably to the Soviet note of Nov. 26 which continued to attack the EDC and demand a five-power conference, but nonetheless agreed to holding a four-power conference on Germany. Documentation on the Soviet note is presented in volume VII.

Editorial Note

The EDC was the topic of a number of discussions held at the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of the Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, December 4 to 8. Telegram Secto 4 from the United States Delegation, December 4, reported that Vidal, Laniel's Director of Cabinet, had informed Tyler, First Secretary of Embassy in France, that there was "no chance EDC Treaty can be ratified for several months and then only if greatly increased assurances and commitments given by British and US". French officials, including Laniel himself, reiterated and expanded upon this theme in subsequent discussions with Eisenhower, Churchill, and their delegations. For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see pages 1710 ff.; for text of telegram Secto 4, see page 1728.

The related issue of the final status of the Saar was also discussed extensively by the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government at Bermuda.

Editorial Note

Throughout 1953 various planning agencies within the Department of State continued their interest in seeking possible alternatives to EDC should the treaty fail of ratification. This interest had first arisen in the autumn of 1952. See editorial note, page 693. The RA paper of November 4 under reference in the memorandum by Jones of December 7, *infra*, has not been found in Department of State files, but a further draft, dated November 21, is in file 740.5/11-2153. This paper raised three possible alternatives to EDC and found fault and favor of various kinds with all three. The alternatives were: German membership in NATO as currently constituted; German membership in NATO with amendments to the North Atlantic Treaty which would incorporate a closer integration of forces approximating those found in EDC; U.S.-U.K.-German arrangements to rearm an independent Germany, which the RA paper found most attractive of all but "completely unsalable to France". The second draft of a lengthy S/P paper entitled "Alternatives to EDC", drafted by Fuller, November 20, 1953, is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Record Copies, Sept-Nov 1953", along with a lengthy summary drafted by Fuller on December 1 and sent to Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff. The summary raised and discarded a number of alternatives, including German membership in NATO, unilateral German rearmament, modification of EDC into "a looser association of national forces in order to satisfy French opposition elements", outright neutralization of Germany, and retreat to a peripheral defense of Europe. The paper closed with a series of proposed recommendations which stressed a series of interim steps that might salvage at least a part of the EDC objectives, including sounding out the French Government on German membership in NATO while making parallel efforts to realize European integration by other than military means (i.e., through economic union, the EPC, etc.), implementation of the Contractuals apart from the EDC Treaty, authorization of a German defense force, salvaging and application within the Community of Six of selected provisions of the EDC Treaty embodying self-imposed limitations on the size of defense forces, expenditures of war material and the like, and finally, implementation of the Contractuals with the further proposal that a modest German defense force be recruited "to be temporarily attached to the forces of the three powers." The paper concluded that the above proposals about exhausted the avenues of approach available.

A lengthy commentary on the initial S/P paper of November 20, submitted by Merchant to Bowie and drafted by Hay, Morris, and Palmer on December 23 is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Europe, 1952–53", along with a memorandum prepared by Henry Owen of OIR dated November 24, 1953 entitled "Alternatives to EDC".

740.5/12–753

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Jones) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) [1]

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON,] December 7, 1953.

Subject: Approach to French on EDC Alternatives

We have studied carefully papers prepared in S/P, RA, and GER on the subject of EDC alternatives.[2] We agree with the conclusion reached in RA's paper of November 4 that there will probably not be outright rejection of the EDC, and that accordingly the basic premise of the S/P paper probably does not represent the situation we will actually face. On the contrary it seems that in France the practical alternatives are further delay, ostensibly based on non-fulfillment of France's condition, or ratification about March.

If the results of the presidential elections (if, for example, Laniel is elected) and the formation of a new cabinet (if, for example, Pinay becomes Prime Minister with Bidault or Schuman as Foreign Minister) indicate that France will push ahead on EDC our problem is probably not so critical. On the other hand, if Auriol should be reelected President and/or a left-centre cabinet come into existence, further delays seem inevitable. In this event, even if an apparently satisfactory Saar settlement were reached, and the British association and U.S. assurances problem settled along the lines the Socialists have wanted, it is perfectly obvious that other conditions can easily be created if any of several major political groups so desire. A long-drawn out four-power conference would present another possibility for delays in France, and indeed might further put off ratification, even given the best will in the world of the French Government.

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[1] Drafted by McBride. Copies to Moore, Kidd, Fessenden, Elbrick, Fuller, and Galloway.

[2] Reference papers are presumably those discussed in editorial note, *supra*.

Therefore, it seems clear we may easily be faced with a situation where we can no longer permit more or less indefinite delay to continue. At that point we will have to consider our course of action with the French. There is very little chance of forcing a vote in the Assembly, and such a vote would probably be negative unless the French conditions had been met, new ones could easily be discovered, giving the Government a chance not to push to a vote on the grounds that it would be disastrous unless condition "X" had been satisfied.

At about this time, obviously we will be considering very seriously ourselves the alternative possibilities to EDC, and it occurs to us that perhaps it would be advisable in the fairly near future to disclose some of these alternatives to the French. Our reason for so doing would of course be the impossibility of holding the line further in the United States. Obviously we should consider what alternatives we presented very carefully. For example, it seems to us that direct German membership in NATO would not be satisfactory as an alternative to present to the French because it would be time-consuming, requiring the Parlimentary action of fourteen countries, (we would present the problem to the French as being urgent) and presumably could be vetoed by France.

Any alternative which we presented should be susceptible of implementation, to at least some degree, rapidly and without falling under a French veto. Alternatives as little distasteful as possible to France should also be sought, but one of the purposes of the exercise would be to demonstrate practically and on a case basis that EDC itself is more palatable to France than any alternatives we can envisage. Of the possibilities thus far presented, something along the lines of alternative "D" in the RA paper would be most desirable (see attachment). Obviously this is not a happy solution from the French viewpoint (nor from the German either probably). However, it does have certain advantages and meets the criteria of being susceptible of implementation without French concurrence (UK concurrence is an unknown quantity too), and would be speedy. Above all, it has the advantage of not killing off the EDC. It could be presented to the French as an indication of our thinking of EDC alternatives, with the stipulation that it was not intended to supersede EDC but merely to enable us to get on with some of the essentials of European Army plan while awaiting French Assembly action, the absence of which we so regretted.

Such an approach to the French should of course await the Presidential elections, and at least the investiture of a new Prime Minister. However, if at that time there are strong indications of considerable further delays in scheduling the definitive EDC debate, and if a Saar settlement still seems in the rather hazy future, it is believed that discussion of EDC alternatives with the French must be undertaken if only to demonstrate the relative painlessness of EDC as compared with other lines we might take. The basis for our talking with the French along these lines would be that neither Congress nor the Administration could continue on dead centre on this issue, and we now had reached the point where speedy progress towards obtaining a German contribution was a necessity.

[Attachment]

Alternative "D" to the Paper Prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs

TOP SECRET [WASHINGTON, undated.]

We have also considered a fourth possibility which is not really an alternative but rather an interim solution consistent with the attainment of EDC. Although it appears to meet more of our criteria than any of the foregoing alternatives and is perhaps worth further examination, it also involves serious drawbacks. This plan would involve the following elements.

1. The Federal Republic of Germany would complete its ratification of the EDC.
2. The U.S. and the U.K. would announce their intention of giving administrative effect to those provisions of contractual agreements which are necessary to begin the buildup of the German defense contribution to EDC.
3. Simultaneously, the U.S., U.K. and Germany would negotiate an interim defense agreement which would provide that pending the coming into force of the EDC and without prejudice to any of the provisions establishing it:

a. The U.S. and U.K. will cooperate with the West German Government in raising, training, and equipping German defense units.

b. The Unit contributions will be temporarily attached to U.S. and U.K. forces in Germany, until such time as the coming into force of EDC makes possible their transfer to that organization.

c. Interim command arrangements which would insure U.S.–U.K. control of these units.

Tested against the criteria, this solution would be:

(1) Acceptable from the Congressional timing viewpoint.

(2) Workable for a limited period, but must obviously be replaced by some definitive solution.

(3) a. More salable to the French than C and perhaps than A, but less so than B; but

b. Immune from a French veto.

(4) Deficient in that it is discriminatory towards the Germans, but nonetheless representative of an advance for them.

(5) A continued open door for EDC and EPC, perhaps even providing an added incentive to bring them into being as the best receptacle for the German units.

(6) Probably acceptable to Congress.

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Europe, 1952–53"

Memorandum by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Bowie)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, December 10, 1953.

Subject: EUR and JCS Views on EDC Alternatives

Certain recent developments seem to complicate the problem of getting an agreed State–Defense draft on alternatives to EDC.

EUR has been considering the S/P draft with a view to presenting a consolidated EUR position in the matter, but this has not as yet been forthcoming. Meanwhile there is evidence of substantial divergence of opinion within EUR on the question.

GER, in general, accepts the analysis and conclusions of the S/P paper but has offered a number of constructive comments, most of which were incorporated in the summary version of my paper I gave you on December 2 [*1?*].[2]

RA and WE, apparently, dissent from the S/P paper in important respects. First, they mistakenly assume that our paper is based on the premise that we will be faced with outright French rejection of EDC, and must act accordingly. There is, of course, no such assumption in the S/P draft—it merely recognizes the possibility that the French, whether by rejection, or delay, or counter-proposals, may eventually force us to the conclusion that we can no longer build our policy on hopes of getting EDC. It then faces frankly the necessity of an alternative course of action in such event.

An RA proposal (approved by WE in a memorandum from Jones to Bonbright of December 7)[3] avoids the issue by dismissing all actual alternatives as impracticable, and proposing what it frankly admits "is not really an alternative but rather an interim solution consistent with the attainment of EDC." This would be to have the US and UK give partial effect to the Contractuals within their zones and authorize the Germans to create military units to be attached to the US and UK forces in Germany under US–UK command. This, it would seem, would be intended as a tactical device to induce the French eventually to ratify EDC.

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[1] Sent also to Jacob D. Beam of the Policy Planning Staff.

[2] Not printed; but see the second editorial note, p. 859.

[3] *Supra*.

This seems to me characteristic of much of the thinking in EUR concerning the problem. Every attempt to grapple with the problem resolves itself into an effort to develop a tactical approach that is aimed mainly at getting the French ultimately to espouse EDC. The real issue of alternatives is avoided. It is quite natural that EUR desk people should do this, first because of the unsatisfactory nature of all conceivable alternatives, and second, because it is their main business to get EDC, from which they do not wish to be diverted even in their thinking.

Even as an interim measure, it seems to me that the RA–WE proposal is highly objectionable. It would be obnoxious almost equally to the French and Germans. It would constitute unilateral US–UK action to begin rearming the Germans without French approval in clear violation of present tripartite agreements. To the Germans, now more impatiently demanding full equality than ever, it would offer only the "privilege" of providing mercenary troops under alien command for an indefinite period, i.e., until France chose to ratify EDC. It must be that the real intent behind this proposal is to use it as a tactical device (the threat to go through with it) to induce the French to accept EDC.

Meanwhile the JCS have produced their own proposals[4] in the form of briefing notes for Admiral Radford in connection with NSC discussion of the problem. The line of thinking is much nearer the S/P draft than the RA–WE proposal, except that the JCS paper makes a purely military approach. The paper sees only full German membership in NATO as a possible alternative (most desirable from the military viewpoint) but considers that the French will almost certainly reject this. Other conceivable alternatives are dismissed for the same reasons as in the S/P draft. Its conclusion is that, in default either of EDC or German membership in NATO, we will be forced to review NATO policy, adapting it to a peripheral (insular-peninsular) defense strategy in Europe.

The JCS paper does not consider the far-reaching implications of withdrawal to a peripheral strategy with respect to US political objectives in Europe, but presents it solely as a course that military considerations may force upon us.

Thus at present there exist:

1. *An S/P draft* that attempts the difficult task of presenting an actual alternative to EDC, in the event one is needed, which seeks to salvage and extend our political gains in Europe while offering a

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[4] Not found in Department of State files. A memorandum from Beam to Bowie, Dec. 9, on the subject "Defense Department Paper on Alternatives to EDC" appears to summarize the reference proposals; a copy is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, "Europe, 1952–53".

compromise arrangement for getting a German defense contribution on terms conceivably acceptable both to France and Germany;

2. *An RA–WE proposal* that dismisses the possibility of real alternatives and presents an interim plan for building German armed units, mainly as a tactical device to induce the French to accept EDC; and
3. *A JCS draft* that dismisses all alternatives except full German membership in NATO, but, considering that unacceptable to the French, indicates that, lacking either EDC or admission of Germany to NATO, we will be forced to a retrogressive peripheral strategy of defense in Europe.

It seems to me that further thought needs to be devoted to this problem, with a view to arriving at what Mr. Cutler wanted—a single State–Defense position—before any decision is taken by the NSC. There is still, I hope, a possibility of reaching an agreed State position. Judging from the JCS draft, it should then be not too difficult to arrive at a joint proposal for presentation to the Planning Board.

740.5/12–1453 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, December 14, 1953—5 p. m.

2282. Following summary conversation afternoon December 13 Adenauer with Secretary Dulles[2] accompanied by Conant and MacArthur.

Secretary congratulated Adenauer results German elections. Later [*Latter?*] stated outcome elections gave German Government presently much needed stability and consistency. Secretary commented on importance of government on continent of Europe which could take strong and constructive positions with respect any common problems confronting us. Constructive leadership especially important now. Adenauer replied objectives Germany and United States alike in European as well as world problems.

Secretary stated implementation EDC immediate task and hoped EPC would follow shortly since without European unity Europe had little future.

Adenauer said he more optimistic after arrival Paris. Thought would be helpful if Italy ratified EDC near future and before vote in French Assembly. Secretary said he had impression Italian action improbable prior settlement Trieste. Added such settlement would require time although United States trying hard bring it about. Adenauer agreed adding his talks with Italian officials and Yugoslav Ambassador Bonn indicated firm desire both sides for settlement.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] Dulles was in Paris for the Twelfth Session of the North Atlantic Council; for documentation on the Council meeting, see pp. 454 ff.

On French Parliamentary situation re EDC, Adenauer said according his calculation there about 310 voted in favor EDC and 300 against. Much therefore depends on mood of Parliament when vote taken. He likened situation to that prevailing at time of vote on Schuman Plan. To help situation in France and create proper mood in Parliament Chancellor said he considering announcing a German decision purchase more wine and meat in France at appropriate moment. Believes this would have good effect among French farmers and in turn upon peasant and conservative vote in Parliament. Secretary expressed belief it possible obtain ratification through combined influences which might be exercised when EDC came to vote and that important thing was to bring EDC to vote in French Parliament.

Adenauer saw less difficulty bringing EDC to vote and felt after presidential elections new government would initiate parliamentary process leading to definite vote.

Secretary pointed to Saar and projected four-power meeting with Soviets [3] as delaying factors. Adenauer agreed vote would be delayed till after four-power meeting but confident Saar would be solved. Referred to communiqué following his talk with Bidault December 12 as best yet issued on subject.

Secretary said Saar settlement would require sacrifices on Chancellor's part but these would lead to tremendous benefits Germany and Europe.

Secretary referred to possible impression elements in Germany might have received from United States visitors and military figures to effect EDC not really important and failing EDC, United States would develop some alternative solution with Germany. Said he wished make clear this was not the case. Chancellor expressed full understanding of United States position in this respect.

Adenauer referred to four-power meeting and expressed concern over opportunity for delay which it presented. His principal worry is French would fall for Soviet delaying tactics. Said if conference came to dead end, it very important that public opinion, especially in France see failure as result Soviet obstructionism. Secretary agreed and replied that general agreement had been reached at Bermuda [4] that meeting should last no more than two or three weeks. Adenauer indicated that if conference could be terminated in four to five weeks West would be well out of it. Secretary assured Chancellor that if four-power meeting held we would work in close contact with him but in manner best calculated take account French sensibilities. Adenauer said he fully recognized French sensibilities had to be taken account particularly by Germany.

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[3] Documentation on the Four-Power Conference at Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954 is presented in volume VII.

[4] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, see pp. 1710 ff.

Secretary said from standpoint Europe's security presence United States forces in Europe is deemed very important. United States hoped to continue this kind of contribution so long as it serves really useful purpose. Chancellor replied everyone in Germany convinced usefulness United States forces in Europe and Germany, adding that relations between United States forces and German population excellent. Secretary referred to rumors that in event EDC and development German forces this would be signal for retreat United States forces from continent but stated in his opinion reverse is true.

In answer to Secretary's query regarding paper (United Kingdom-French draft) [5] which French had given him regarding declaration on European security, Chancellor said he had examined it and had some suggestions. He felt text of paper did not adequately reflect EDC–NATO relationship. He said paper in present form referred to "strictly defensive character of EDC, of which the forces cannot be employed except for the protection of the territory of member states against an armed attack in Europe". This phrase he said did not take account of (1) where NATO forces not in EDC are attacked; (2) if an attack is launched against UK or UK forces in EDC countries; and (3) if other NATO countries are attacked. He made reference to EDC–NATO protocols and to treaty between UK and EDC. He said Germans would give their comments to French but felt in general there should be deletions of existing text to bring it in line with envisaged relationship between EDC and NATO, and particularly to emphasize its defensive aspects. Secretary agreed paper in present form needed change.

In reply question we would receive German comments on German elections and formation and status of all-German government, Hallstein replied a short paper would be given to US, UK and French.[6] He added it essential this paper be amplified by oral explanation since conflicting views within different German ministries made it impossible to sum up entire situation in paper. He envisaged Dr. Grewe would be present in Paris during tripartite working group meetings so he could give oral explanations as required.

Secretary expressed personal agreement on desirability Dr. Grewe's presence Paris, but United States would have to consult with UK and French before giving definitive reply. He again emphasized United States desire have closest possible contact and cooperation with Chancellor Adenauer. Chancellor expressed great appreciation and said one of his guiding principles for long time had been belief in absolute necessity to cooperate with United States.

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[5] Not found in Department of State files.

[6] The paper under reference has not been identified further.

ACHILLES

Editorial Note

During the course of his statement before the North Atlantic Council on December 14, Secretary Dulles spoke as follows:

"If, however, the E.D.C. should not become effective; if France and Germany remain apart, so that they would again be potential enemies, then indeed there would be grave doubt whether continental Europe could be made a place of safety.

That would compel an agonizing reappraisal of basic United States policy."

For the full text of Secretary Dulles' statement, see page 461; for background relating to it, and further documentation on the North Atlantic Council, see pages 1 ff.

At a press conference following the North Atlantic Council meeting Dulles reiterated his comment about a possible "agonizing reappraisal". (See the editorial note, page 468.) The transcript of his press conference together with a version of the statement to the Council somewhat different from that printed on page 461, is in the *New York Times*, December 15, 1953, pages 1 and 14.

740.5/12–1553

Memorandum by the Minister in France (Achilles) to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET [PARIS,] December 15, 1953.

MR. SECRETARY: To obtain French ratification of EDC we need to do three things:

1) Arrest and if possible reverse the present trend against it, in which the opponents have been tending to develop a band-wagon psychology and the proponents becoming increasingly disheartened and prone to consider compromises.

2) Precipitate the decisive debate and vote at the earliest practicable time, probably February or March, and

3) Clinch ratification at that time.

It is too soon to tell whether your press conference [2] has arrested the unfavorable trend, but it has certainly provided food for thought and again posed clearly the issue and the urgency. After the initial violent reaction has passed the net effect may prove to be salutary. If it proves not to have reversed the unfavorable trend we will have to review the whole EDC in both the tactical and substantive aspects.

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[1] Copies to Bruce and Merchant.

[2] See editorial note, *supra*.

We must bear in mind the elementary factor that ratification is not going to be voted on its abstract merits, that it will occur only if a majority of members of the Assembly are convinced that it is in their individual interest to vote for it. The picture is complicated by the facts that the potential majority in favor of EDC does not coincide either with the present majority or, apparently, any new majority capable of agreeing on internal policy or continuing the war in Indochina, and that it is presently almost impossible to obtain a majority in the Assembly on any difficult issue.

Opposition to EDC stems primarily from three factors:

1) Nationalism. This combines patriotism, love of *la belle France*, nostalgia for its past military, political and cultural greatness and unwillingness to recognize the relative decline in France's world status, preoccupation with the effect of Europeanization upon the French Union, and natural political conservatism in face of the fateful step of abandoning a large measure of sovereignty.

2) Fear of German domination of Europe. This combines deeply ingrained painful memories ("Three times in 70 years they've invaded us"), well-founded fears that France, even with its overseas territories, cannot match the physical, psychological, political, military or industrial vitality of even Western Germany, fear of U.S. and perhaps U.K. favoritism for Germany as against France, fear that the U.S. and U.K. will withdraw and leave France alone to cope with Germany and fear that Germany will drag Western Europe into war to regain its eastern territories.

3) Unwillingness to face the decision. In addition to the present near-paralysis of the Assembly, this involves wishful thinking that procrastination may avoid German rearmament in any form, that the U.S. will nevertheless have to support France, that the problem may evaporate through a lessening of East-West tension, or that France may secure reinsurance against Germany by improving its relations with Russia without giving up its Atlantic ties.

Different tactics are required to deal with these three factors:

1) Nationalism requires understanding and sympathetic handling. French pretensions to being a great power are unrealistic, but the answer lies in stressing that (*a*) France's future depends on her influence in greater-than-national units, both European and wider, and at the same time that (*b*) it is inconceivable that either the EDC or the EPC could, in the absence of developments much more far-reaching than anything now contemplated, result in the loss of France's national identity or her position in the French Union. You handled this very effectively at Bermuda and the line should be continued and developed.

2) Fear of German domination is harder to combat because it is much more realistic. We must recognize it, try to avoid inadvertently encouraging it, and seek means of allaying it which (*a*) do not discriminate against Germany and (*b*) advance our own and the general interest without running into Congressional complications. The U.S. paper on Assurances to France re EDC (NACOM D-2) [3] is good, but

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[3] **Not printed. A copy of this NATO preparatory paper is in the CFM files, lot M 88, box 166.**

we still have considerable room for maneuver on this subject. The French hope for maximum U.S. and U.K. association as assurance against German domination and German adventures to the East could be further met by additional emphasis upon the integration of EDC forces, commands and logistic system into NATO and upon the strengthening of NATO in the political field. The line of the Bermuda communiqué[4] which you reemphasized here, that materialization of EDC will be the basis of durable and closer ties between the U.S. and Europe should be continued and developed as far as the Administration sees its way clear to go.

3) Unwillingness to face facts requires a measure of shock treatment, which your press conference administered. There is apparently no alternative to continuation of a hardboiled line on this, with emphasis upon the need for a clear decision and soon. How and how often this treatment is applied in the future should be carefully considered. It should definitely not be repeated in the immediate future.

It is difficult to see what further might be done until both the net result of your press conference and the French internal political situation become clearer. No final decision can be expected in any event until a Four-Power meeting has been held or proved impracticable due to Russian intransigence. We have time to study further what assurances against German domination we can give at the decisive time or what other courses should be followed.

THEODORE C. ACHILLES

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[4] For the text of the Bermuda communiqué, see p. 1838.

740.5/12-1753 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET

ROME, December 17, 1953—11 a. m.

1924. During conversation with DeGasperi December 15 he said that if Trieste were settled satisfactorily Pella government with Monarchist backing could pass EDC with big majority. He also believed that EDC could be ratified without Trieste settlement, but that price would be addition to protocol to effect that full Italian adherence to EDC could not take place until "reasonable solution of Italian Eastern frontier had been found".

DeGasperi said that government could announce before Christmas its intention introduce EDC when Parliament reconvenes in January. EDC would be referred to committee study which could take up to two months. DeGasperi believed that completion Parliamentary consideration in Chamber and Senate following committee study would be fairly speedy. However, he was certain that if by time of final Parliamentary action, Trieste not settled, Parliament would insist upon protocol mentioned above. He inquired what our reactions would be to passage EDC with Trieste limitation.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Secretary Dulles.

I have reason believe that Pella is now considering announcement before Christmas of government's intention introduce EDC when Parliament reconvenes. It is possible that DeGasperi's approach is attempt to place on us responsibility whether or not EDC is introduced with possibility of Trieste protocol. In this connection, recall that Pella has been at pains not to commit himself on such linkage and do not believe we should accept any such linkage.[2]

LUCE

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[2] In telegram 1963 from Rome, Dec. 22, Luce reported that a Foreign Office official concerned with EDC had informed her that Pella had decided that the political climate would not permit introduction of the EDC to the Italian Parliament before Christmas and, therefore, no announcement was being considered. Luce added: "Foreign Office official said Pella had impression from recent NATO Council meeting that US Government understands Italy's political problem and does not expect action here until Trieste problem resolved or French attitude clarified" (740.5/12–2253).

C. EVENTS LEADING TO THE REJECTION OF THE TREATY, JANUARY–AUGUST 1954

762.022/1–1354 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 13, 1954.

CA–3633. Now that Laniel government "reinvested" we hope Bidault though undoubtedly preoccupied with Berlin Conference[2] might as soon as possible seek further progress towards agreement with Adenauer on Saar. Understand from Paris despatch 1670[3] Bidault has not intended move before end of January due Berlin Conference and expected government crisis which, however, has not materialized so that Bidault might be persuaded take action once possibilities Berlin Conference clarified. Unlikely that final agreement sufficient EDC ratification purposes can be reached, and presumably should not be announced, until immediately prior Assembly EDC debate, but much further negotiation may well be necessary, particularly on economic aspects, before full meeting minds achieved with substance agreement cleared with respective cabinets, and early resumption serious bilateral conversations therefore desirable to prevent post-Berlin delays on EDC due Saar problem.

Although Adenauer understandably reluctant make substantial concessions until French ratification prospects clear, agreement by Bidault and Adenauer to make implementation of settlement conditional upon ratification EDC (penultimate paragraph reference despatch) seems possible and would go far to make earlier serious negotiations possible, perhaps during possible lull Berlin Conference by Francois-Poncet if not Bidault, or immediately after. If Bidault reaction favorable formula along foregoing lines, Adenauer would be urged in return embark upon serious negotiations at first opportunity.

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[1] Drafted by Fisher and Blumberg, cleared in substance by MacArthur, initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright. Sent also to Bonn and London, repeated to Strasbourg.

[2] Documentation on the Four-Power Conference at Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954 is presented in volume VII.

[3] Summarized in footnote 6, p. 851.

Presence of Secretary and Eden on continent with Bidault[4] and in contact with Adenauer would appear offer exceptional possibilities for accomplishments on Saar problem. Addressees' comments desired (London after consultation with Foreign Office).

DULLES

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[4] Both Dulles and Eden attended the Berlin Conference.

762.022/1-1354 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 13, 1954.

CA-3634. Embassy should discuss with Foreign Office Dept. Inst. CA-3633[2] and timing US-UK intervention and substance possible concessions to be urged upon negotiating partners at appropriate time.

Our tentative views re form and hypothetical outline agreement parallel those set forth Paris despatch 1670[3] with certain modifications.

If Germans willing agree substantial maintenance Economic Union, as transitional regime, French should make concessions on customs and trade matters to extent that Germans can derive some immediate advantage and be assured progressively greater and eventually equal access Saar markets and resources. Since desequestration steel mills and return to owners reportedly important to FDP, which significant for any Saar settlement as Adenauer's No. 2 coalition partner, we believe French should agree to desequestration under formulae that would allow participation former owners. Further, Saar should be reopened to some degree German capital investment. Question ownership Saar coal mines can possibly be left in abeyance, but believe management mines might be reorganized to include German participation.

We hope Adenauer not serious in insisting French cede some territory to Saar and trust this purely bargaining point. However, it believed French should, while refusing such concession, offer return those small areas unilaterally detached from what is now Federal Republic and annexed to Saar by French Military Governor. These are only minor value to Saar, being primarily agricultural in nature, and can hardly be regarded as belonging to Saar.

Re permanency solution, we hope French and Germans can agree on emphasizing permanency though settlement naturally subject (in accordance Article 7, para 2 Bonn Convention [4]) to confirmation by peace treaty, both governments agreeing support settlement at that time. US and UK could do likewise. While emphasis should thus be on permanence, provision perhaps possible for periodic review and possible mutually agreed adjustment in light experience and progress European integration.

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[1] Drafted by Fisher and Blumberg, cleared by BNA, initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright; sent also to Paris, Bonn, and Strasbourg.

[2] *Supra.*

[3] Summarized in footnote 6, p. 851.

Re timing intervention, present thinking is US–UK should not comment further on substance agreement or concessions until Bidault and Adenauer have had "cards on table" meeting or we determine such intervention required to accomplish such a meeting.[5]

DULLES

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[4] The text of the Convention on General Relations, signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, is in volume VII.

[5] Minister Butterworth replied to CA–3633 and 3634 in telegram 3143 from London, Jan. 22, stating that the Foreign Office was "chary of timing and substance of US–UK intervention with Bidault and Adenauer on Saar" because Bidault had little incentive to reopen the question before the end of the Berlin Conference. Butterworth added that the Foreign Office preferred to continue work on the problem through the Council of Europe and therefore "British prefer to postpone any efforts we might make to facilitate Saar agreement until results of February 5 meeting of general affairs committee at Strasbourg are known" (762.022/1–2254). In the course of a conversation with Blumberg on the Saar on Feb. 18, J. H. A. Watson, First Secretary, British Embassy, stated that the Foreign Office continued to feel "that we should not fritter away our influence but to keep it for such time when we have the greatest chance for success. Then we should press both Adenauer and the French to reach an agreement" (762.022/2–1854).

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 208

Paper Prepared in the Department of State [1]

SECRET

[WASHINGTON? January, 1954?]

[PTB D–3]

U.S. AND U.K. ASSURANCES ON NATO AND EDC

Proposed Position

Either the French or the British may wish to discuss Bidault's request at Bermuda [2] for American and British actions to assist French EDC ratification. It is recommended that we avoid detailed discussion of this subject if it is brought up at Berlin.

Discussion

Both we and the British feel that we should hold back with the announcement of assurances at this time, but should wait until the psychological moment arrives prior to the ratification debate in the French Assembly.

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[1] No date or drafting officer is given on the source text, which was prepared as a position paper for "Tripartite or Bilateral Discussions in Berlin" and bears the designation PTB D–3. Documentation on the Berlin Conference is presented in volume VII. While at Berlin, Secretary Dulles and French Foreign Minister Bidault discussed the EDC and the matter of U.S. and U.K. assurances at a meeting on Feb. 17. For a memorandum of their conversation, see p. 875.

[2] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see pp. 1710 ff.

However, it is important to prepare our position so as to be ready to move fast when the time arrives. On the U.S. side, steps are being taken to settle the basic policy questions involved, requiring clearance with Defense and probably Congressional consultation. We will then be in a position to discuss the problem meaningfully with the British and French.

Below is a summary of the principal points raised by Bidault at Bermuda, followed by a brief comment on what we might do to meet each one:

1. *Steps to create a more closely integrated NATO and to strengthen EDC–NATO relationships.* The French were not specific as to what they wanted under this heading. Apparently any steps taken, either in military or non-military fields, to provide for closer NATO integration can be used to help satisfy this requirement.
2. *Assurances that the U.S. and U.K. will not withdraw from NATO after 20 years.* This question requires a basic policy decision and Congressional consultation.
3. *Maintenance of an "equilibrium" between U.S.–U.K. forces and NATO forces through special tripartite consultation and agreement.* We cannot commit ourselves to maintain any specific ratio of NATO forces or to be bound by any special tripartite commitments on the subject. However, we might be able to meet the French on the consultation point. The British have already agreed to special U.K.–EDC consultations on level of forces in connection with British association.
4. *Assurance that France will continue in its "Great Power" role, specifically in the NATO Standing Group.* There should be little difficulty in giving the French general assurance that her Great Power role will continue because of her global responsibilities, and that tripartite consultations on matters of mutual concern will continue. However, will probably want to avoid any specific commitments with respect to the Standing Group membership.

740.5/2–454 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 4, 1954—5:28 p. m.

4014. 1. Dept concerned over numerous recent reports French Govt may be considering at this time proposing modifications EDC treaty. So far other EDC Govts appear to have held firm line against such efforts by French. Bruce Mission reports EDC/IC representatives govts other than France state their govts believe French committed themselves at Rome year ago [2] not to seek any further protocols to treaty; that this commitment has been reaffirmed on other occasions by both Mayer and Laniel Govts; that other govts have proceeded (and in some cases virtually completed) their ratification processes on basis this French commitment. EDC/IC representatives also stated that their govts are firmly opposed to any modifications in present text treaty or to any suggestions which would lead to new negotiations among six govts.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Fisher and Moore, and initialed for the Acting Secretary by Bonbright. Sent also to The Hague, Brussels, Rome, Bonn, and Luxembourg and repeated to Paris and Berlin.

[2] Regarding the meeting of the Interim Committee of the EDC at Rome, Feb. 25–26, 1953, see footnote 2, p. 755.

2. Although above indicates other EDC countries can be depended upon to hold line firmly against any modifications, likely that subject will come up again and US representatives should be in position express US views. Accordingly, following points should be made fully clear as opportunities offer to representatives EDC governments other than France (However, care should be taken avoid giving impression US launching major "campaign" on this matter):

(*a*) US opposed to any attempt to modify EDC treaty. In view of fact that other countries have proceeded so far with ratification, any changes in treaty inevitably will result in prolonged disruption and delay.

(*b*) Time factor of crucial importance to US. Congressional patience nearly at an end. Results will be most serious unless action completed in very near future.

(*c*) Facts of political life in Germany also make prompt action essential; further prolonged delay in granting German independence can very adversely affect present favorable orientation German government and people.

(*d*) Hence in our view any efforts now to re-open or modify treaty would seriously prejudice attainment our objectives.[3]

SMITH

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[3] In telegram Dulte 39 from Berlin, Feb. 5, Dulles informed the Department of State that Bidault had informed him at lunch that day "that he considered talk about amending EDC as rumors inevitable at this time but not serious. I think undesirable to send personal emissary to Laniel certainly unless Bidault knew and approved this tactic. Also feel we cannot wisely intervene until results Berlin are finalized. Hope all possible will be done to assure early Belgian action. Bruce has read and concurs this message" (740.5/2–554).

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 203

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, February 17, 1954.

Participants:	The Secretary of State	M. Bidault
	Mr. Merchant	M. Alphand

The four French prerequisites to EDC are:

1. Accord with the UK.
2. US undertaking re troops.
3. Saar settlement.
4. Question of "democratic control" of EDC Army.

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[1] The conversation took place at the Secretary's residence, 66 Miquelstrasse, Berlin, where Dulles was staying during the Berlin Conference; documentation on the conference is presented in volume VII.

Regarding *1*, Bidault felt that the arrangements now practically agreed upon would suffice provided there was a satisfactory understanding under *2*. The British would not give adequate undertakings if they thought the US was going to pull out. Bidault expressed the personal view that if they started out with close association with EDC, the UK would end up with membership.

Regarding *2*, there should be some undertaking to maintain Anglo-American forces on the Continent; also, some declaration that we did not regard the North Atlantic Treaty as expiring in twenty years, but as an agreement which normally would continue.

There should be agreement on maintenance of the forward strategy rather than peripheral strategy and acceptance of the concept of some contribution by the US to maintaining an appropriate balance of strength on the Continent. Also, it would be desirable that the US would indicate its willingness to sit in on talks which would otherwise confront the French with the Germans so that the French would not be left alone. There was some discussion as to the possible form the US action might take. Alphand suggested a Congressional resolution. I said that this matter of troop disposition was under our Constitution primarily a matter for the President. Even the proposed constitutional amendment would probably expressly reaffirm the authority of the President to make agreements as Commander-in-Chief without the necessity for any Congressional participation. I thought that an appropriate communication from the President, perhaps sent with the knowledge and informal approval of some of the Congressional committees, would give the maximum that could be expected under our constitutional provisions.

With regard to *3*, there would have to be a general settlement of the Saar matter, although not every detail would have to be settled. It could be contingent upon the EDC, as obviously you could not Europeanize the Saar unless there was going to be a Europe. Adenauer should realize the importance of this Saar matter and be willing to talk about it seriously and above all soon and quietly. Bidault complained that there had always been too much publicity, even by Adenauer to prior talks with him and with Francois-Poncet.

As to *4*, there was long discussion between Bidault and Alphand as to where the most votes could be gotten,—whether by playing to the socialists in favor of establishing democratic control or from the right which feared an all-European political organ. Since this was not a matter on which the US could be helpful, we did not take any part in this discussion. However, Bidault indicated he thought this was the most difficult point of all to solve.

Regarding procedure, Bidault indicated his belief that the present government would probably hold on until the EDC vote. He thought that whatever was done under points *1*, *2* and *3* should, as far as possible, be done simultaneously at the moment when they would have the greatest impact. I asked as to whether we could work this out in Washington with Bonnet. Bidault said Bonnet had his full confidence, but that he lacked technical qualifications. Alphand suggested working these things out with Bruce in Paris, but I said I doubted whether this was the best place. It should preferably be done where the President and I could be in personal touch with the matter. Also, Bruce, as former Under Secretary, could not, from a Congressional standpoint, usefully be given too great a role in this matter. Bidault agreed and said that he would send Alphand to Washington, but wanted him to come under some cover which would avoid wide-spread speculation in France.

I said that I wanted Bidault to know that we wanted to do everything possible to help put the EDC through. I saw no acceptable alternative. Some want to proceed at once to arm the Germans to a large extent and to proceed to put the contractuals in force without French concurrence. Others would want to adopt a peripheral strategy based on Britain and Spain primarily. Others would want to return to isolationism. I could not see what the outcome would be, but surely it would not be anything good, and it would almost surely mark the end to the role of France as a great power. Bidault said he fully accepted all of this, and he was dedicated to accomplishment of the EDC. It was not precisely what he would have liked, but it was better than any alternative. I said EDC was not precisely in the form I would have negotiated it, but the President and I either had to elect to go ahead on what was or had to try to make a fresh start, and the first course seemed preferable. Bidault said it was the same with him.[3]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[3] At its 186th meeting on Feb. 26, the National Security Council "Noted the President's directive that the Secretaries of State and Defense each designate a representative to prepare, for Council consideration at its next meeting, recommendations as to assurances which might be given the French, in connection with the European Defense Community, as to the retention of U.S. forces in Europe and continued participation of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (S/S-NSC files, lot 66 D 95, "Record of Actions by the National Security Council").

740.5/2-1954 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, February 19, 1954—7 p. m.

Coled 150. Restrict distribution.

1. Guy Mollet in reviewing his plans for obtaining ruling by extraordinary congress his party for disciplined vote by Socialist Deputies for affirmative vote on EDC informed Maurice Schumann that he would no longer demand that there be prior agreement by the six on

"subordination of EDC organs to supranational political authority." He stated he would however have to demonstrate that concrete action was being taken to bring about in near future democratic control over EDC by a directly elected European Parliament. According to our information, Mollet made concession on supranational executive in recognition of situation described in Coled 145 [1] and for same reason avoided any statement that Socialist Party would not vote for EDC Treaty unless it had a definite agreement on this proposal. In conversation with Monnet in Berlin Bidault stated that a "minimalist" himself he would find proposal such as this interesting and asked Monnet if he would work with Mollet in finding out precisely what Mollet and also Teitgen would accept as a minimum on European political community.

2. Mollet still has the precise terms of his proposal under active consideration but main provisions of last rough draft of convention approved by Mollet are the following:

(*a*) Next renewal of delegates to Common Assembly to take place on basis universal direct suffrage.

(*b*) Elections in each member state to be held according to prevailing system for electing lower house in that state.

(*c*) Number of Assembly delegates to be increased. Mollet has in mind formula recommended by *Ad Hoc* Assembly (Germany 63, Belgium 30, France 63 plus 7, Italy 63, Luxembourg 12, Netherlands 30).

(*d*) Elected Common Assembly to have power of confirmation of EDC Commissariat and ability to remove high authority and Commissariat by vote of censure (apparently in manner set out Article 24 CSC Treaty and Article 36 of EDC Treaty). In event Commissariat or high authority voted out, Assembly to dissolve and new elections held.

(*e*) Above provisions do not modify powers and responsibilities of CSC and EDC or field of competence of member states. Any new transfer of sovereignty would require approval of government and Parliament of each state.

(*f*) Proposed convention as approved by Mollet has been carefully drafted in attempt to avoid any linking with EDC Treaty. Rough draft provides only that elections will take place within six months after ratification of convention. Convention would also make clear that this arrangement for direct elections is merely transitional and does not in any way affect or prejudge conclusions of conference on European Political Community or subsequent work that may be undertaken on basis of Article 38 of EDC Treaty.

3. Mollet obviously would like as much progress as possible on convention before he must appear before extraordinary congress. He will probably ask for signature of convention by participating nations and perhaps presentation of convention to French Parliament during debate on EDC ratification. He may, however, have to be satisfied with

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[1] Dated Feb. 11; printed in the compilation on France in volume VI.

initialling by heads of delegations or even presentation of a concrete proposal by French Government to the other nations.

4. It is not clear whether abandonment by Mollet of agreement on "supranational political authority" will make it possible for French Government to agree on the convention as proposed by Mollet, nor is it clear that Laniel and Bidault will wish to take such a new initiative in the development of the European integration policy at this time. Furthermore, strong initial resistance may be expected from Dutch and Belgians. However, this alteration of Mollet's position is encouraging in that it offers definite prospect of cooperation between Bidault and Mollet in obtaining EDC ratification. We hope it will be possible during the next few days to ascertain views of Teitgen and Pinay as well as Bidault on precise terms of Mollet's proposal.

5. Particular care should be taken to safeguard our knowledge of Mollet's proposed convention. Therefore think it preferable you make no distribution this information at present to foreign posts.

Bruce

740.5/2-2354

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Bidault[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, February 23, 1954.

[My Dear Foreign Minister:] Like you and Eden, I am now reporting to our political leadership on the results of the Berlin talks. I am in considerable hot water with reference to the Indochina portion of our Resolution.[2] However, I am confident that the outcome will be support of my position so long as the French Government proceeds promptly to action on EDC.

I have confidentially explained to many critical persons that I shared your view that refusal on the part of the US or of your Govt to be willing to talk peace in Indochina would put the principal proponents of EDC in a most difficult position in France. If, however, it should turn out that the April 26 conference at Geneva[3] was used as a reason for not proceeding promptly with EDC the results would, I think, be grave from the standpoint of Franco-American relations. I am confident that delay is not your purpose. The confirmation of your view at the luncheon which you and Alphand had with Merchant and me then and now satisfied me that the situation in France justified my willingness to support the final version of the Resolution which departed considerably from the original US position.

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[1] Transmitted to Paris in niact telegram 2914, Feb. 23, with instructions for Achilles to deliver it to Bidault. At the close of the telegram, Dulles informed Achilles "You and Bruce to whom this message should be shown may find it useful to draw on general line my views as expressed in above message during course your conversations on the EDC with French leaders."

[2] The text of the Berlin Conference communiqué, which included a statement on Indochina, is printed in volume VII. For text of the portion on Indochina, see vol. XIII, Part 1, p. 1057.

[3] Documentation on the Geneva Conference is presented in volume XVI.

I feel that the fine relationship which we have had for many years and which was further developed at Berlin permits and, in fact, requires me to tell you frankly what the political situation is here. I think you and President Laniel will thereby better understand why I urge in the strongest possible terms that EDC should be brought to a vote before the Easter holidays and without awaiting the Geneva Conference. Otherwise the outcome could be deferred for many months. Soviet Russia must know that by obstruction and delay at Geneva it could consign EDC "to the archives" (in Molotov's phrase) and do tragic, lasting damage to Franco-American relations. This would mean that the Soviets would have gained through Geneva all that they failed to gain at Berlin.[4]

I had a good talk with Adenauer at Wahn Airport Thursday night and pressed him on the Saar.[5]

We are hard at work here to put into words of assurance our own particular contribution which you and I discussed. The essential is, however, that all of this be concentrated into quick and decisive action. Otherwise the situation will fall apart not only here but also I fear in Germany.[6]

[Foster Dulles]

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[4] In telegram Dulte 89 priority from Berlin, Feb. 18, Dulles reported that he had "mentioned to Bidault at lunch today the fact that if EDC failed ratification in France many unpleasant *things* would happen, including great pressure in certain American quarters for resumption of special US–UK relationship which existed during World War II" (740.5/2–1854). It has not been determined from Department of State files if this was the same luncheon to which the Secretary alluded in paragraph 2 of the source text.

[5] For a memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Adenauer at Wahn Airport, Feb. 20, see the compilation on reports and analyses of the Berlin Conference in volume VII.

[6] In telegram 3046 Paris, Feb. 24, Achilles reported delivering the source text to Bidault that morning and pressing the Foreign Minister for a firm date as to when he and Laniel planned to call for debate on the EDC Treaty in the Assembly. Bidault "said that he would want to think carefully and take more soundings than he had yet had time to make before replying to your message." After further queries from Achilles, Bidault "reiterated his hope that it would start about March 31 and that he would let you have his considered views as soon as he could" (740.5/2–2454).

740.5/2–2654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, February 27, 1954—3 : 45 p. m.

4432. Limited distribution. Reference Coleds 157, 158, 159,[2] repeated London 696, 697, 699.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared in substance with Merchant and Raynor. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] None printed; Coled 157 reported Bruce's belief that "To bring EDC ratification to a vote in Assembly prior to our deadline Easter holidays April 16 debate should start not later than end March. In order set in train necessary actions and bring required parliamentary, inter-party and inter-governmental negotiations to completion in time, French Government should announce this time for debate by March 10 at latest." The balance of the telegram dealt with desired United

Ambassador requested inform Eden urgently of following:

1. US has come conclusion essential EDC ratification debate be held in French Assembly prior Easter holidays April 16. Debate unlikely take place during Geneva, even if initial discussions confined Korea. Soviets will do best to prolong Geneva and otherwise seek deter French parliamentary action until summer, when prospects ever getting EDC will be very dubious.

2. If pre-Easter deadline to be met, debate must start not later than end March. If this date for beginning debate to be met, French must announce not later than March 10 that Assembly debate will begin end March. Immediate problem is therefore do everything possible induce French Government set date. Our conclusion is that best way do this is give French Government assurance that three main conditions (US assurances, UK association, Saar) will be fulfilled in time for use in end March debate.

3. We for our part are doing everything possible complete difficult intra-governmental clearance on text our assurances re our NATO policy and maintenance troops, and are hopeful have agreement within next ten days. We therefore propose inform Bidault next week to effect that we have every hope having US assurances ready for issuance around March 15; that this assurance from us on timing is dependent on French Government's firm decision bring EDC to vote prior Easter holidays; and that we are attempting meet time-table on assurances in order make it possible for French Government make decision on debate in time.

4. Strongly urge that British join with us in this program and give French similar assurance with respect timing announcement UK association: i.e., that UK will announce UK association around March 15 in order enable French make firm decision on end March for timing debate.

5. We are making approach Adenauer urging him do same with respect Saar: i.e., urge Adenauer inform Bidault that he is ready to hold meeting on Saar first week in March in order give Bidault assurance Saar settlement will be ready in time for pre-Easter debate. British might also wish consider making similar approach Adenauer.

6. Our concept of tight schedule which must be met, as outlined Coled 158.

FYI Are not in position at present moment discuss substance assurances with British, which we realize has an important bearing on British position with respect UK declaration on duration NAT, which is an essential element in UK association package. We hope in very

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States strategy to bring about such a result. Coled 158 presented a "hypothetical schedule of required actions involving French Government during March if National Assembly is to ratify EDC Treaty before April 16". Coled 159 dealt with the subject of a possible United States declaration on the maintenance of forces in Europe in relation to the proposed Tripartite Security Declaration. Bruce reiterated the view of French ignorance "of our constitutional limitations on the exercise of executive discretion and power" adding "If we negotiate with them bilaterally on a subject which lies wholly within the competence of the US Government, they may well use such an opportunity to demand the impossible" in the way of United States security guarantees to the EDC "and thereby to excuse themselves for not proceeding vigorously to implement their own declared policy on EDC" (740.5/2-2654).

near future and prior to our announcement assurances inform British of substance of what we propose say, particularly with respect duration NAT. End FYI.[3]

Dulles

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[3] Ambassador Aldrich replied in telegram 3721 from London, Mar. 1, that he had discussed the subjects raised in the source text with Eden, who while anxious to get action on EDC by France at the earliest possible moment, thought the proposed timetable was probably impossible for the French to fulfill. While promising to give further thought to the problem, Eden suggested as an alternative an immediate conference in Paris between Bruce, Bidault, and British officials to work out a timetable which the French would find satisfactory. Eden then "gave me following information which he said no one outside British Cabinet has at present and which he authorized me to communicate only to you. Since his return from Berlin, he has proposed to Cabinet that British actually commit troops to EDC. He said he had not mentioned this to Secretary in Berlin because he was not then sure Cabinet would even consider it. He has, however, found Cabinet receptive. It will take a short time to work out details but he will advise us of progress earliest possible. He thought sometime within next few days. He is fearful if French should learn of this possibility they would increase their demands on HMG. He wishes, therefore, to withhold this offer until last possible moment" (740.5/3–154). Telegram 3721 was transmitted to Secretary Dulles at Caracas in telegram Tedul 8, Mar. 2 (740.5/3–254), where he was attending the Tenth Inter-American Conference; documentation on the conference is presented in volume IV.

740.5/3–254 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT

Paris, March 2, 1954—5 p. m.

Coled 166. For the Acting Secretary. I have the impression from talks with Maurice Schumann and others that Bidault and Laniel for different reasons are attempting to evade difficult decision to bring EDC to vote before Easter. This impression is strengthened by Bidault's initial and perhaps renewed reluctance to talk to Chancellor this week and by repeated references in government circles to "impossibility" of opening debate before mid-April.

If, as I believe, this week is the decisive one for the resolve to move before Geneva, we must be ready to bring maximum desirable pressure on Bidault and especially on Laniel. The next step must await Bidault's response to the Secretary[1] which Schumann said could be expected today or tomorrow. But I think Department should be considering not only a prompt reply to whatever Bidault answers but also a communication in the absence of the Secretary from the President to Laniel tactfully implying that our confidence in his protestations over the past eight months depends on this decision. Such a message might well be followed up by sending MacArthur to see Laniel as latter requested during Berlin conference.

These *démarches* will be facilitated if we can tell French officially within next day or two that US assurances will be ready by March 12. I am working uncertain basis without having this in hand.

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[1] Reference is to Dulles' message to Bidault, Feb. 23, p. 879.

I had lunch with Reynaud today. During it I was called out and informed from reliable source that Bidault was again disposed to avoid meeting Adenauer before latter's departure for Greece and to have Saar conversations conducted for present through subordinates. Reynaud has undertaken to see Laniel and Bidault on this subject this afternoon and tell them it would be catastrophic to EDC chances of early ratification to follow such course of action. Meanwhile I have sent direct personal appeal to Bidault about this affair.

Also, I told Reynaud of our concern over Laniel's hesitation to accept principle of European elected assembly as demanded by Mollet in recent Brussels speech. He had talked to Mollet yesterday regarding this, and said he would attack Laniel this afternoon for his attitude which consisted of trying to win 40 extremely doubtful URAS votes by compromises which would certainly cost him at least 80 Socialist votes.

I am seeing Pinay tonight. I cannot overemphasize precarious situation we are in, facing an irresolute government which could infinitely prefer as usual to procrastinate hoping like Mr. Micawber for some outside power to save it from its own irresponsibility.[2]

BRUCE

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[2] Source text was received in the Department of State at 1:11 p. m. At 6:45 p. m. telegram Edcol 82 was sent to Paris, stating that careful consideration was being given to the suggestions contained in the second paragraph of the source text and that meanwhile encouraging progress in Washington on the security guarantee issue permitted Bruce to tell the French "we have every hope of being ready with firm decision by Mar. 12. You may use this info in any way you see fit to encourage French to set date for vote and to adhere timetable, including vital Bidault–Adenauer Saar conversations which we know you, Achilles and Conant will continue to urge take place this weekend." It added that a British suggestion contained in telegram 3722 from London, not printed, regarding further tripartite negotiations in Paris regarding security guarantees "does not appeal to us. Our assurances in final form are expected to go to limit of our capacity and hence not subject to negotiation" (740.5/3–254).

740.5/3–254 : Despatch

The Counselor of Embassy in France (Joyce) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, March 2, 1954.

No. 2239

Subject: Call for Anti-EDC Meeting in Paris of European Representatives.

A group of thirty-two French personalities—Gaullists, neutralists, fellow-travelers, and Communists—including nineteen Parliamentarians, have launched an appeal for representatives of the six EDC countries and England who are opposed to the EDC to meet together shortly in Paris.

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[1] Copies to Brussels, The Hague, Rome, London, Moscow, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

This message (Enclosure No. 1)[2] stresses that the EDC Treaty will jeopardize not only the national independence of the nations involved, but also the "political basis for liberty." It goes on to say that the Treaty "risks putting European forces at the service of German militarism" and concludes by urging Parliamentarians and other leading personalities from the six signatory countries who share the same doubts as to the EDC to meet in Paris on March 20 and 21 to map out a common line of action.

The signatories of the message (Enclosure No. 2)[2] represent the hard core of those violently opposed to the Treaty—starting with Gaullist Senator Michel Debré and Deputy Jacques Soustelle, working through former Premier Edouard Daladier, neutralist Claude Bourdet, and ending up with Progressive Deputy Gilbert de Chambrun and CPF Politburo member Laurent Casanova, the Communist Party's delegate in the Peace Movement. This alignment of ill-assorted bed-fellows is not new, some of them being the same as those who accepted the Polish Government's invitation last December to study the Oder-Neisse frontier problem. However, it is of interest that the rank and file Gaullists are reportedly now getting fed up with those RPF leaders joining with the Communists in their anti-EDC campaign. The appeal so far has received only limited publicity, Communist *Humanité* being the only paper to devote prominent front-page treatment to the "invitation from eminent French personalities."

The Embassy is reliably informed that this initiative is the result of decisions taken recently by representatives of the French and other Western European Communist Parties in Berlin, and that the Paris meeting is designed to be one of the culminating points in the campaign here against EDC ratification. It is understood that the invitation to the meeting is being mailed by the Committee for a Peaceful Settlement of the German Problem, in coordination with the World Peace Movement, to all members of the Parliaments of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and England, as well as educators, scientists, writers and trade-union representatives, who are known as opponents of the EDC. The purpose of the meeting is obviously to coordinate parliamentary and other opposition to the EDC in all countries concerned, and to make such opposition as articulate as possible, on the eve of the French Assembly debate. Casanova is to be in charge of preparations so far as the French Communist Party is concerned. The French Communists are believed to be confident that the Government will not ban the meeting, as so many non-Communist deputies are involved in its sponsorship, and that numerous non-Communist and even conservative foreign parliamentary and other leaders may be expected to attend.

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[2] Not printed.

ROBERT P. JOYCE

740.5/3-354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT CARACAS, March 3, 1954—10 a. m.

Dulte 7. Eyes only Acting Secretary, Merchant, MacArthur from Secretary. Re: Coled 166.[2]

I raise question of whether we should submit formal note to French Government asking to be promptly advised as to when the government proposes to attempt to secure vote on EDC. Basis would be US being party to German contractuals which in turn dependent upon EDC and that we are now approaching two years since US signed and ratified, and French Government which signed has taken no effective steps to ratify. US cannot allow its own vital relations with others to be subjected to grave jeopardy because of indecision on part of another government. In this connection it could be informally pointed out that US policy during the past two years has been predicated on assumption that French would at least endeavor with reasonable rapidity to honor its signature to Bonn and Paris treaties and thus demonstrate its capacity to be one of the great powers. We have, on this assumption, continued to include France in all of our planning and have insisted on French participation in conferences such as London, Washington and Bermuda with US and UK.

At Berlin the US reluctantly accepted the French position with reference to Indochina conference, on basis of assurances that this would facilitate prompt action on EDC and that EDC would not be enmeshed in Soviet tactics at Geneva, which Molotov made clear would be deliberately calculated to obstruct EDC and commit it "to Archieves."

The US believes that by its loyal conduct, its patience, its faith in France, it has won the right to get clear answer as to whether and when the French Government proposes to attempt to secure a parliamentary vote on EDC which will at least end the uncertainty and permit the US to make its own plans on the basis of knowledge rather than vague speculation.

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[1] The Secretary was attending the Tenth Inter-American Conference, at Caracas.

[2] Dated Mar. 2, p. 882.

In the same connection French Government could be informed of US readiness to give strong pledges in sense which French have always desired.[3]

Dulles

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[3] Source text was received in the Department at 11:38 a. m. At 6:18 p. m. Smith replied in telegram Tedul 23 that "I personally believe there is much merit in your suggestion of a formal note to French on EDC vote. Timing of such a note would of course be important and it might be that it could most effectively be presented in conjunction with our informing Bidault of contents of President's proposed statement on assurances. In any event I thought we should take no action before receipt of Bidault's reply to your personal message which we have been expecting daily" (740.5/3–354).

Eisenhower Library, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 187th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 4, 1954

TOP SECRET — Washington, March 5, 1954.

[Here follow numbered items 1–6 in which the Council discussed significant world developments, the status of programs, the Soviet Bloc, South Asia, Laos, and Stassen's trip to the Far East.]

7. *Assurances to the French in Connection With the European Defense Community* (NSC Action No. 1048–*b*[1])

Mr. Cutler pointed out that no paper had yet been received with respect to this problem, but that he understood that Secretary Smith was prepared to discuss the matter.

Secretary Smith said that there was no question whatever in the mind of the State Department but that it was necessary to give some further assurances to the French, and that the State Department had already drafted a statement containing such assurances.[2] He was not clear, however, whether the Defense Department, which had been instructed to join in the preparation of this draft statement, had completed its scrutiny of the State draft or, indeed, whether the Defense Department was in agreement with State that further assurances should now be given to the French.

Secretary Wilson answered that Secretary Smith's latter point was the fact. The Department of Defense, he said, did not believe that it would do any good to provide further assurances to the French in order to induce them to ratify the EDC.

Turning to Secretary Smith, the President inquired, somewhat irascibly, whether Secretary Smith's references to the stern necessity of further assurances to the French were really true. Must we go on forever coddling the French? We have stationed forces in Western Europe, we have constructed bases, and lots of other things. How much more must we do?

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[1] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 877.

[2] See footnote 2, p. 892.

Secretary Smith replied that although he had not personally been at the Bermuda Conference,[3] the Secretary of State and the others who had been there had plainly foreseen that the EDC situation was reaching the crisis stage and that if EDC was to be ratified by the French this would have to be done by the Laniel Government. Accordingly, we had between now and March 12 to give Laniel what he says he requires to secure ratification. There was very slight prospect that any successor government to Laniel's would ratify EDC. According to Laniel, there were three more assurances needed by his government. First, that the U.S. and the U.K. would live up to their commitments to maintain troops on the continent. Secondly, that we would not exercise our option at the end of the first twenty years to withdraw from NATO. In this instance there was French anxiety over the so-called "new look" in U.S. strategy.[4] The third point was a U.S. commitment to continue strengthening the Atlantic community.

With respect to the draft statement prepared by the State Department, Secretary Smith assured the Council that there was in this statement very little in the way of additional commitments by the United States to the French. It was mostly a rehash of older assurances. Nevertheless, Secretary Smith was absolutely certain in his own mind that unless we could provide such a statement, Laniel would fail to secure ratification of EDC. If we did, he believed there was a reasonable chance that Laniel would win.

Secretary Smith then turned to Mr. Bowie and asked if he had further comments. Mr. Bowie repeated the view expressed by Secretary Smith, and reiterated the assurance that the present statement contained very little by way of new assurances. He believed, however, that it would assist in overcoming doubts which had recently been spreading in France over our intentions with respect to the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe.

Secretary Smith then referred to Ambassador Bruce's view that these new assurances really constituted nothing more than an effort "to get timid men to overcome their own uncertainties." Accordingly, concluded Secretary Smith, if the National Security Council could now decide the basic question whether or not to give the French the assurances they sought, the Departments of State and Defense could very quickly iron out the differences in language between them. He asked Secretary Kyes to confirm this opinion.

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[3] For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see pp. 1710 ff.

[4] For documentation on the U.S. "New Look" strategy in NATO, see pp. 482 ff.

Secretary Kyes,[5] however, stood up and stated with great emphasis that he took a radically different view of the whole problem. His recent two weeks in France had convinced him that the French Socialists would back EDC, and he was accordingly quite confident that no further assurances need be given. He said that he feared that we might find ourselves in a bad crosscurrent at the forthcoming Geneva Conference, and he feared we would presently reach the point of being mere whipping boys for the French. Certainly, he predicted, we will never get anywhere on EDC by appeasing the French, and if we do so we are very likely to destroy the usefulness of the "new look" in U.S. military strategy. According to Secretary Kyes, the time was now at hand to warn the French to get ahead and ratify EDC or else we would pull out our forces from Europe.

The President replied that this was certainly one area in which he felt that he could speak with the authority of experience. He noted that we had met one severe test when we had prevailed on the French to initial the EDC plan. That had taken six months, said the President, of the hardest work he had ever done. As for Ambassador Bruce, continued the President, he was one of the most loyal of our officials and perhaps the shrewdest judge of the French character he had ever met. The President said he wholeheartedly agreed with Bruce's statement that we were trying to get timid men to overcome their own doubts. There were far too many Frenchmen who genuinely despaired of ever building an adequate defense of Western Europe against the Soviets. In the face of this fact, any threat by the United States to remove its forces from Europe would have absolutely no effect in securing ratification of EDC. Accordingly, the President said he disagreed completely with Secretary Kyes' view. The President confessed that he was very worried about this constant addition to the assurances we were providing the French. He admitted that we could not keep United States ground forces indefinitely stationed all over the world. He expressed irritation over French demands that we compel Adenauer to settle the Saar question by recourse to threats. We must remember that the French had proposed the EDC plan to save France and not the United States. We must certainly find firm ground in our relationship with France and stand on it. Despite all these qualifications, however, the President stated that he had no objection to reiterating again our past assurances to France.

Secretary Smith said that this matter was so controversial and so absolutely critical that it was perhaps best that he should read the draft statement prepared in the State Department. He then proceeded to read the greater part of the statement, pointing out from time to time the sources of the major assurances to indicate that in nearly every respect they were a rehash of old commitments.

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[5] Roger M. Kyes, Deputy Secretary of Defense.

At the conclusion of Secretary Smith's reading of the statement, Secretary Humphrey observed that the first of the assurances to the French, namely, to maintain in Europe such U.S. forces as are necessary and appropriate to defend the North Atlantic area against attack, was really the guts of the problem. What, precisely, did this assurance mean?

Secretary Smith said that before answering Secretary Humphrey's question, he desired to read a portion of the Concurrent Resolution by the Congress in 1951, since the two statements were almost identical.

Governor Stassen commented that what was worrying the French were all kinds of rumors and tales about the new look strategy adopted by the United States, and that if a restatement along the lines proposed by Secretary Smith would serve to discount these stories, it was very important that further assurances be given, even if they were not new.

The President said that he agreed that much as it irritated him, some kind of reassurance to the French was plainly necessary. He directed, therefore, that the new assurance be firmly based on the Congressional Resolution, which should itself be requoted.

Secretary Humphrey, however, reverted to his question as to the meaning of the Resolution. Who, he asked, decides how many U.S. troops shall be stationed in Europe and for how long a period?

Secretary Smith pointed out that this decision rested solely with the President of the United States. Once the Congress authorizes the President to station U. S. forces abroad, it is for the President to determine where they go and how long they stay.

The President commented that we must never allow ourselves to forget that in stationing U.S. forces abroad we are defending ourselves and not merely the French. Our front line now runs east of the Rhine; our commitment in Europe boils down to doing whatever our national security interests dictate. Certainly, said the President, he had no slight idea of reducing the number of our forces in Europe in the next two years. The European nations are not yet ready to take up the slack.

Secretary Wilson said that what concerned him was the great cost of keeping these American divisions in Europe indefinitely. We had gone to the assistance of the French and bailed them out in the course of two world wars, and as for himself, said Secretary Wilson, he was sick and tired of seeing the United States pulling France's chestnuts out of the fire.

The President counseled Secretary Wilson not to try this argument on a Frenchman, for the Frenchman would reply that on the contrary, France had held the fort while the United States was making up its mind and getting ready to save its own skin.

Secretary Smith then proposed that once the Departments of State and Defense had agreed on the wording of the assurances, it would be desirable for the President to call in the Congressional leaders of the two parties and explain the matter to them. The actual public release of the statement should be determined by the Secretary of State, so that its release would have the maximum possible effect on the French.

The President said he was not sure that it was not the obligation of the Secretary of State to meet with the Congressmen, but that he was willing to do so.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed a proposed statement on the subject as read by the Acting Secretary of State at the meeting.

b. Agreed that assurances should be given to the French and other EDC nations, along the lines of the proposed statement, essentially reaffirming previous assurances given by the United States, in connection with the European Defense Community, as to the retention of U.S. forces in Europe and continued U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would prepare for the President's consideration a statement of such assurances.

Note: The actions in *b* and *c* above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation.

740.5/3–554 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 5, 1954—1 p. m.

Coled 170. Alphand last evening said it appeared he would have to accept that United States would not "negotiate" or "consult" on contents of Presidential statement. He asked, however, on behalf of Bidault that we send following draft statement to Washington as a suggestion of what Bidault believed would be helpful to him with understanding that Department would accept or reject ideas expressed in statement as it found necessary in its conversations with Departments and Congress. Alphand said Bidault believes what is said is important and also how it is said. Therefore he wished to be certain that the Secretary knew what he believed would be helpful to him. In order to have maximum support from Bidault when statement is made we believe that the Department should draw on Bidault's actual language to maximum, wherever it is possible to accept substance of his suggestions. Further comments from Achilles, Hughes and myself in immediately following telegram.

Begin text: Proposed American declaration.

1. The Government of the United States considers the North Atlantic Treaty to be a fundamental and permanent element of its foreign policy and of the security of the United States.

In accordance with the unanimous conclusions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Government of the United States considers that the treaty is of indefinite duration and will remain permanently in effect.

The provisions of Article 13 whereby any state may withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty after a period of twenty years constitutes only an option that is open to the various member states. For its part, the Government of the United States does not intend to avail itself of this option and reiterates its intention to ensure that the treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.

2. The Government of the United States emphasizes that the establishment of the EDC, an integral part of the constant developing Atlantic Community, will lead to the strengthening of the existing ties among the member states of the Atlantic organization as well as the ties between the two communities. It will ensure the most favorable conditions for intimate and lasting cooperation on the continent of Europe between American and British forces and forces of the EDC. It will facilitate implementation of the present concept of forward strategy for the defense of Europe.

3. In carrying out this essential policy of constant support of NATO and in keeping with the principles set forth above, the United States Government states that it attaches the greatest importance to the mutual consultations which, in accordance with established procedures, it intends to pursue with the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty on the size and the nature of the forces indispensable for the common defense of the territories of the member states, and on the level as well as the composition of the forces that each state is to place at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in order to meet the defense requirements of the European continent. These consultations should lead to decisions reached in common, which, taking into account the views of the Supreme Commander, will determine annually the level of forces required on the European continent to ensure the success of the "forward strategy". These decisions should take into account the individual capacity of each nation and permit a balanced distribution of the forces of the EDC and those of the states not members of the Community.

To achieve the purposes determined in the course of these consultations, the Government of the United States will continue to place all necessary forces at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander on the European continent in cooperation with the signatory states of the Atlantic Treaty and those of the EDC.

4. The Government of the United States recalls that while retaining the right to proceed, in consultation with the Supreme Commander, with the exchange of units and formations stationed on the European continent and placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, it

may do so only provided that the size, the composition and the value of its contribution to the total forces at the immediate disposal of the Supreme Commander remain fundamentally unchanged. *End text.*[1]

BRUCE

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[1] In telegram Coled 172 sent priority from Paris, Mar. 5, Bruce stated: "We appear to have definitely eliminated hope on part French officials that US will 'negotiate' with them on the US assurances. It has been a fight that has left some scars. Particularly call your attention to Coled 170 suggesting that if and as far as practicable we now use language suggested by Bidault in our final declaration this subject. Such action on our part would not merely be graceful gesture but should be helpful when parliamentary debate occurs. Believe this point has great importance. If you could possibly do it, would be great assistance if you discussed this with General Gruenther on his return to Washington tomorrow" (740.5/3–554).

740.5/3–654 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, March 6, 1954—7:08 p. m.

3067. Paris for Dillon and Bruce. Verbatim text.[2]

As the time approaches for historic decision on the remaining measures required to put into effect the European Defense Community Treaty, it is appropriate for me to state clearly the United States position on the relation between the European Army and the European Community on the one hand, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the broader Atlantic Community on the other hand. The essential elements of this position, which have been discussed with leaders of both political parties in the Congress, may be simply stated.

The United States is firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty is in accordance with the basic security interests of the

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[1] Drafted by Moore, cleared by Trulock, and initialed for the Acting Secretary by Bonbright; repeated to Caracas, London, and Bonn.

[2] A draft "Proposed Presidential Statement on EDC Assurances", bearing the date Mar. 2, 1954, was submitted as an enclosure to an undated, unsigned memorandum for the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council which stated that the proposed statement was being submitted to the NSC for approval and that it had been prepared by the Departments of State and Defense in response to action taken at the National Security Council meeting of Feb. 26. (See footnote 2, p. 877.) The draft proposed statement was identical to that included in the source text.

For a memorandum of the discussion of the draft at the 187th meeting of the National Security Council, see p. 886. On Mar. 5 in a memorandum for the President, Acting Secretary Smith wrote that "Pursuant to your decision in the National Security Council yesterday, the Secretary of Defense and I have given further thought to the form of the assurances to be given the French in connection with the European Defense Community problem. It is our considered view that the text of the statement which we went over yesterday and which is attached hereto [Proposed Presidential Statement on EDC Assurances of Mar. 2], is the best that can be devised having in mind our own national interests and our aim of going as far as possible in assisting the French Government to obtain prompt ratification of the EDC Treaty. This draft has the concurrence of Secretary Dulles. I recommend that you approve the attached sheet." A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that it was hand carried to the White House on Mar. 5. Smith's memorandum, containing as enclosures all the documents summarized above with the exception of the Mar. 4 NSC meeting is in file 740.5/3–554.

United States and will steadfastly serve these interests regardless of the fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country. The obligations which the United States has assumed under the Treaty will be honored.

The North Atlantic Treaty has a significance which transcends the mutual obligations assumed. It has engendered an active practical working relationship among the Atlantic nations. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without the devastation or occupation of any NATO country. These nations are also seeking to make the Atlantic alliance an enduring association of free peoples, within which all members can concert their efforts toward peace, prosperity, and freedom.

The European Defense Community will form an integral part of the Atlantic Community and, within this framework, will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United States forces and the forces of the European Defense Community on the continent of Europe. I am convinced that the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty will permit the scars left by the age-old conflicts of Europe to be transformed into the new and vital tissue of an ever-developing community of nations and will provide a realistic basis for consolidating Western defenses.

The United States is confident that, with these principles in mind, the Western European nations concerned will proceed promptly further to develop the European Community through ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. When that Treaty comes into force the United States will conform its actions to the following policies and undertakings:

(1) The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of our armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense in this area.

(2) The United States will encourage the closest possible integration between the European Defense Community forces on the one hand, and United States and other North Atlantic Treaty forces on the other, in accordance with approved plans with respect to their command, training, tactical support, and logistical organization developed by the military agencies and the Supreme Commanders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(3) The United States will continue to seek means of extending to the Atlantic Community increased security by sharing in greater measure the fruits of its science and industry with respect to new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense.

(4) The United States will consult fully with its fellow signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and with the Commissariat of the European Defense Community on questions of mutual concern, including

the levels of the respective armed forces of the European Defense Community, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty countries to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander in Europe.

(5) In consonance with its policy of full and continuing support for the maintenance of the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens that integrity or unity as a threat to the security of the United States, and in such event will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

(6) In accordance with the basic and enduring interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as reflected in the desire of the United States Senate, expressed at the time of ratification, that the Treaty be of indefinite duration rather than of short fixed duration, the United States will consider sympathetically any specific proposals which may be made in the North Atlantic Council for extending the provision regarding the right of withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty beyond the present period of twenty years. The United States calls attention to the fact that withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would require a specific step by the United States Government which is unthinkable given a solid core of unity on the Continent of Europe such as would be provided by the European Defense Community.[3]

SMITH

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[3] In telegram 3066 to Paris, Mar. 6, Smith reported that the President had approved the text on U.S. assurances on the EDC contained in the source text. Smith regretted "that process of interagency consideration and approval here" developed in a way which made it impossible to take into account the language suggested in telegram Coled 170, Mar. 5, p. 890. Smith added that the text met in part all major points raised by the French "and in our judgement provides maximum assurances which is possible for us." Consultations with Congressional leaders were scheduled to take place on Mar. 8, Smith continued, and if these consultations were successful, the Department of State hoped to be able to authorize the Embassy in France to transmit the text in strict confidence to Bidault on Mar. 9. (740.5/3–554).

In telegram 4579 to London, Mar. 6, Smith reported that the British Embassy had that day been given the text of the U.S. assurances contained in the source text. "We emphasized that text represented firm U.S. Government position subject only to result of Congressional consultation Monday. We stressed also importance of not permitting any leak. British Embassy reaction favorable" (740.5/3–654).

740.5/3–1154

Foreign Minister Bidault to the Secretary of State[1]

[MARCH 7, 1954.]

TOP SECRET

I thank you for your message[2] in which I recognized your frankness and your friendship. If I could not answer it earlier, it is because the assurances called for adjustments, in particular with regard to the dates. Our parliamentary regulations, the nature of the government coalition and the need to constitute a sufficient majority raise problems for the Prime Minister and myself, whose solution runs into very great difficulties even for determined wills.

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[1] A note on the source text, by Merchant, directed to Acting Secretary Smith, reads: "Copy of Bidault message to the Secretary of EDC—obtained by D[ouglas] MacA[rthur, II] from Amb Bonnet 3/11/54". In telegram Dulte 27 from Caracas, Mar. 9, Dulles informed Smith that he had received that day from the French Ambassador in Venezuela a "highly secret telegram from Bidault dated March 7". Dulles' subsequent summary of the contents of this telegram indicates that it contained the same message as the source text (740.5/3–954).

[2] Reference is to Dulles' message to Bidault, Feb. 23, p. 879.

The courage of the decision which you took in Berlin concerning Indochina was both understood and admired in France. I was particularly happy to read the tributes which were paid to you in the United States in spite of the efforts of those who find it hard to understand. I do not need to repeat to you my gratitude with which the French Government associates itself. I am convinced like you that the fact that a conference on Asia is to take place must not bring about new delays for the EDC, quite the contrary. And there is absolutely no question, as I have stated several times since my return to Paris, of the French Government subordinating to a new Indochinese "preliminary stage" the opening of the parliamentary debate on the ratification of the EDC.

Nothing is changed in this matter with regard to the will and the intentions of the Government as I expressed in Berlin.

Taking into account all of the factors of the political situation, Mr. Laniel and myself are working to bring about the necessary conditions for the rapid start of the debate.

This requires on the one hand that the parliamentary commissions should have finished the examination of the treaties of Paris and of Bonn; on the other hand that the "preliminaries" expressed by the French Government should have found a solution.

I appreciate the conversation which you held with Chancellor Adenauer with regard to that matter, as with regard to the matter of the reinforcement of the association mentioned by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons and of our preoccupation relating to the maintenance of Atlantic forces on the continent of Europe. Our concern is to be able to carry forward the negotiations with all the speed and discretion possible, and to bring them rapidly to a conclusion. I continue to consider desirable that the whole of the necessary assurances should be provided simultaneously, as I think we had agreed in Berlin during the conversation which we had in your house with Merchant and Alphand.

If, as we hope, all the outstanding questions can be settled, Mr. Laniel and myself have agreed to find the means of opening the debate on the EDC at the beginning of April. This will certainly not happen without votes having to be taken. Our task which may, from afar, have seemed to cause unnecessary delays, has been to transform patiently a lost cause into a cause which can and must be won. In order to achieve this, there must be absolute discretion on all the subjects having to do with this affair, including the question of the date. An article by Callendar in the *New York Times*, whose exploitation could have been explosive, has fortunately not, up to now, aroused the comments which I had reason to fear. I pray God that a calendar of American origin, unofficially proposed for our labors, and whose existence is known to several people, will not be brought to the attention of the public. It is up to the French parliament to pronounce itself and up to us to convince it. You know what we want. It is dangerous at this time to give advice whose detailed character would strike people more than its good intentions.

I repeat to you my will to maintain the close association of our countries for liberty, and the confident affection I feel for you.

740.5/3–954 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, March 9, 1954—7:57 p. m.

3091. For Dillon and Bruce. Reference Deptel to Paris 3067,[2] rptd info Caracas Tedul 29, London 4581, Bonn 2500. Following changes in US assurances text made as result Congressional consultations which are not yet completed.[3] Bidault should not be informed until you receive further word.

Second sentence in fifth unnumbered paragraph changed to read: "When that Treaty comes into force, the United States acting in accordance with its rights and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, will conform its action to the following policies and undertakings:".

First numbered paragraph to read: "(1) The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic Treaty strategy for the defense of this area.".

Third numbered paragraph revised to read: "(3) The United States will continue, in conformity with my recommendations to the Congress, to seek means of extending to the Atlantic Community increased security by sharing in greater measure information with respect to the military utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense.".

In fourth numbered paragraph eliminate word "fully" in first line.

In fifth numbered paragraph revise last clause beginning "and in such event will act" to read as new sentence beginning "In such event the United States will consult in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.".

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[1] Drafted by Moore. Repeated to Caracas, London, and Bonn.

[2] Dated Mar. 6, p. 892.

[3] No record of these consultations has been found in Department of State files.

Sixth numbered paragraph revised to read: "(6) In accordance with the basic interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed at the time of ratification, the Treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide.".

SMITH

740.5/3–1154 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, March 11, 1954—7 : 12 p. m.

3125. Paris pass Bruce and USRO. Limited distribution.

1. We have completed Congressional consultation on and President has approved statement of US assurances on EDC. Paris requested cable final text [2] to all action addressees. Text should not be delivered until instructions received from Department. Meanwhile, believe you should be informed our plans re form and purpose of statement and its release.

2. Statement is to be in form of personal message from President to Prime Minister of each EDC country. Timing for delivery of messages will be determined after obtaining recommendations Dillon and Bruce in Paris. Text will be delivered simultaneously by each of you to EDC Prime Ministers and Hughes will at same time inform NAC in secret session. Day or so after delivery, text will be released publicly by White House. You should request recipients of message not to release text of message publicly until time of White House release concerning which you will be notified.

3. For your background information, we have decided to put assurances in form of letter to all EDC countries for several reasons. We desire avoid having assurances directed solely and obviously at French. Furthermore, assurances can be important in other EDC countries, particularly with respect Italian ratification. We wish avoid getting into negotiation with French or others on text of assurances. Since we anticipate other EDC and NATO nations will welcome statement, this will make it more difficult for French to ask for changes.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden and Moore, cleared by Jones of WE, and initialed for the Acting Secretary by Merchant. Sent also to The Hague, Brussels, Rome, Luxembourg, and Bonn. Repeated to London.

[2] No further revisions of the text prior to Mar. 11 have been found in Department of State files. The text herein under reference is presumably that in telegram 3067 to Paris, Mar. 6, p. 892, as amended by telegram 3091 to Paris, *supra*. Dulles was informed of the procedures being followed in reference to release of the Presidential statement of assurances in telegram 38 to Caracas, Mar. 10 (740.5/3–1054).

4. We have already informed Eden and Pearson in strictest confidence of substance assurances since we believe this will have favorable influence on what British are willing do in UK association with EDC. We also have authorized Dillon show text Bidault in strictest confidence in order assist in setting date for French ratification debate.

SMITH

740.5/3-1754 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 17, 1954—1 p. m.

3393. Limit distribution. Alphand came to see me this afternoon at Bidault's request to avoid publicity of another visit by me to Quai d'Orsay. He said that Bidault was very pleased with substance of US assurances.[2] However, after careful consideration they would like to make following observations as to ways in which document could be improved from their point of view without any change in substance.

1. Omission of phrase in last sentence of paragraph 3 [*4*] dealing with scars left by age-old conflicts of Europe and rewording of that sentence approximately as follows: "I am convinced that the coming into force of the EDC treaty will provide a realistic basis for consolidating Western defenses and will contribute to an ever-developing Atlantic community".

2. The omission of the first sentence of unnumbered paragraph 4 [*5*], beginning "The US is confident that . . ." Bidault feels that this sentence would be interpreted as bringing undue personal pressure by the President on the French Assembly and cause resentment. Alphand suggested second sentence could then be reworded to start "When the European Defense Community treaty comes into force . . ." (Comment: The United States administration is very often accused here, particularly by Socialists, as in fact being opposed to European community and wishing EDC only as a device to rearm Germany. This first sentence admirably restates longstanding US position on Europe and we recommend that the idea stated in it not be omitted. According to Alphand, Bidault is concerned primarily with eliminating the idea of pressure in the words "The United States is confident that nations concerned will proceed *promptly*." Bruce and I leave it to Department whether this aspect of sentence can be changed in view of fact date for ratification debate will already be fixed before statement is made public.)

3. Change the order of paragraphs, moving present paragraph 4 up to paragraph 2, after which present paragraph 2 would become paragraph 3 and present paragraph 3 would become paragraph 4.

4. Bidault also hopes that the new paragraph 2 could then be introduced by a linking word such as "therefore" or "consequently". (*Comment:* We do not recommend such a linking word be inserted. I specifically discouraged Alphand on the possibility of inserting such

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Reference is to text in telegram 3067 to Paris, Mar. 6, p. 892, as amended by telegram 3091, Mar. 9, p. 896.

a word as I told him that I thought it might mean a change in substance.)

5. To omit in present paragraph 4, i.e. new paragraph 2, the words "The Commissariat of". Alphand pointed out that it is clear that the Commissariat does not have full responsibility for levels of armed forces and to specify the Commissariat in this paragraph might well cause unnecessary argument in the National Assembly about the respective powers of the Commissariat and the Council of Ministers.

6. Alphand then rather apologetically added that Maurice Schumann had asked him to say that he was not particularly happy with the last sentence of paragraph 6. He felt that the statement would be better if this paragraph were omitted. Alphand expressly stated that Bidault had made no request regarding paragraph 6, with which he was perfectly satisfied. We recommend no action be taken on this suggestion.

After discussion with Bruce, we both feel that the changes suggested by Bidault in paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 of this message do not represent any request for a change in substance. We recommend that these changes be made if changes are possible in light of your consultations in Washington.

Reference Deptel 3186.[3] Alphand states that Bidault fully understands substance paragraphs 2 and 3.[4]

DILLON

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[3] Not printed; it informed the Embassy in France *inter alia* of the Department of State's concern that Bidault understand (*a*) that United States assurances would be in the form of simultaneous letters to the Prime Ministers of the EDC countries and (*b*) that an obligation existed to Congress to obtain a definite French commitment as to the time of the ratification debate before the text of the assurances could be made public (740.5/3–1554).

[4] In a memorandum to Dulles of Mar. 18, Merchant recommended approval of the changes requested by Bidault in the source text with the exception of (*a*) the omission of the first sentence of the fifth unnumbered paragraph whose deletion was deemed unwise in light of Congressional consultation which had taken place, and (*b*) linking of the first two numbered paragraphs, as suggested in numbered paragraph 4 of the source text, which Merchant opposed "because it is a change in substance, and we have in any case already helped meet the French point by re-arranging the order of paragraphs" (740.5/3–1854). The following day, Dulles submitted to President Eisenhower a revised text of the United States assurances which had taken into account those changes desired by Bidault which had met Merchant's approval. In a covering memorandum, Dulles informed the President that Dillon, Hughes, and Bruce "have recommended that we accept those of the French suggestions which do not alter the substance of the statement", and he recommended Presidential approval which was indicated on the memorandum by the words "OK, DE", and by a memorandum for the Secretary of State by Presidential Secretary Ann C. Whitman, Mar. 20, 1954 (740.5/3–1954). In telegram 3536 to Paris, Apr. 7, the Embassy in France was informed of the Presidential approval of the changes in the proposed statement of assurances as well as the reasons for the disapproval of several of Bidault's requests (740.5/4–654). In telegram 3794 from Paris, Apr. 8, Dillon reported that he had given the changes in the text of the assurances to Alphand who had then stated that as the schedule stood, the British statement of assurances would be made on Apr. 14, the French Cabinet would set the date of ratification debate on Apr. 15, and that, therefore, the text of the U.S. assurances should be released no later than Apr. 17 (740.5/4–854). For the text of the message sent by President Eisenhower to the Prime Ministers of the six nations signatory to the European Defense Community Treaty, entitled "U.S. Assurances Concerning EDC", released by the White House on Apr. 16, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.

740.5/3–1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, March 20, 1954—2:37 p. m.

3246. For Dillon and Bruce. Limit distribution.

Department deeply disturbed implications Coled 195.[2] In our view May one date for opening EDC debate contains dangers which go far beyond mere slippage in present timetable. Specifically we fear that Bidault's absence in Geneva would further weaken already hesitant leadership in Paris on this problem, and that disposition avoid action regarded as possibly prejudicial to successful negotiation on Indo-China would increase pressures for further delays, possibly extending through summer Parliamentary recess in July. Should this happen, as we fear, there would be no possibility of definitive action until Fall. Problems this would pose in terms Congressional and German pressures and strains on NATO alliance need no emphasis here.

British Embassy today informed us of instructions to British Ambassador, Paris, to see Bidault and press him for statement French Government's intentions. He will take line that French now know what US prepared to do and that discussions re UK association should be concluded by end of next week. Assuming Saar agreement can be reached when Adenauer returns March 26, French could then make simultaneous announcement by end of month of successful resolution their 3 principle pre-conditions. They could then begin debate within week. Ambassador is to add that if this is to be timetable, tripartite discussions should be held in Paris to work out details. Instructions also state that if Bidault indicates debate cannot start before Easter, Ambassador is to express dismay and press for statement of French plans. If Bidault says debate cannot start until May one, Ambassador is to say that further delay seems very dangerous and ask whether debate would be practicable while Bidault is away. Finally, British Ambassador instructed inform US colleague of foregoing and encourage similar action.

Foregoing instructions are consonant with Department's concern, with possible exception necessity for simultaneous announcement Saar settlement. In your discretion, you authorized make similar representations to Bidault. In any event, Department would like earliest coordinated analysis by Embassy and Bruce mission re current situation, as well as recommendations for future action.

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[1] Drafted by Palmer. Cleared by Merchant and MacArthur (in substance); repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Telegram Coled 195 reads as follows: "Alphand told us in strict confidence this morning that in conversation yesterday Bidault had been inclined to agree with his views (1) that date should be fixed for ratification debate before Saar settlement with understanding Saar settlement would have to be reached before debate started and (2) that it is now too late to try to have debate before Geneva Conference opens so date should be set for first part of May. Alphand said that Bidault would now discuss this question with Laniel and then would send letter to the Secretary. He said he would comment on program of French Government to make ratification debate possible when he had something more definite from Bidault" (740.5/3–1954).

DULLES

740.5/3-2154 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 21, 1954—8 p. m.

Coled 202. Limit distribution. Re Department's telegram 3197, March 17.[2]

Although I have never seen Bidault's letter to Secretary,[3] I should like to expand on reasons stated in Coled 200 [4] why I fear we must acknowledge disappointment of the favorable expectations this letter or other professions by French Government of impending action on EDC may have aroused.

If we deal realistically, forcefully and imaginatively with the causes of such disappointment there would still be reasonable hope of obtaining EDC ratification by French Parliament though at a date later than we had a legitimate right to anticipate. Otherwise we will be faced with a crisis in our European policy most difficult to resolve.

1. To be realistic we must contemplate probability that Laniel will continue to evade taking positive steps to push for speedy vote on EDC treaty in Parliament. Under ex-Gaullist pressure he has enlarged his investiture declaration that Saar settlement, United States assurances, and United Kingdom/EDC association were conditions of ratification by French Assembly to point where he appears to have decided that even fixing a date for debate will not be discussed by French Cabinet until these conditions have been completely fulfilled. This attitude is not inconsistent with his skill in persuading the anti-EDC URAS ministers that he was not to be feared on this issue, while simultaneously telling United States he was bending all his efforts to its early ratification.

2. In justification of not having thus far scheduled an EDC debate, Laniel may try to attribute failure to do so to recalcitrance of Chan-

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[1] Repeated to Bonn eyes only for Conant and to London eyes only for the Ambassador.

[2] Not printed; it reported that as Bidault's present commitment as to the date for a ratification debate fell "considerably short of what we would like and believe essential", events of the coming few days "may well lead us to re-consider advisability pressing Bidault directly very hard to advance date public announcement prior to definitive Saar settlement". For these reasons, it was suggested that both Dillon and Bruce "make known to French Govt US view as to importance presenting proposals requiring Six Country negotiation to EDC/IC at earliest possible moment, in advance Saar settlement, in order permit negotiation in time for pre-Easter debate" (740.5/3-1554).

[3] Dated Mar. 7, p. 894.

[4] Not printed; it stated that "slippage" in the French timetable for ratification debate had already occurred and that of the three French preconditions for the debate, two, the U.S. and U.K. assurances regarding EDC, had been met. "Nothing can sufficiently moderate excessive French demands embodied so-called Maurice Schumann draft in connection with Saar except personal meeting between Bidault and Adenauer" (740.5/3-2054).

cellor Adenauer in Saar negotiations, to intransigent demands of French Socialists, to failure of British to go far enough in their proposed association with EDC, to nature of United States declaration, or to government-inspired press comments that United States has exercised undue pressure. The fact is that all parties to the "package" requested by Laniel for ratification—the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, Mollet and the Socialists, Pinay and the independents—have made clear their willingness to support his avowed program in every practicable manner.

3. Laniel now has in hand assurances from United States and United Kingdom that conditions set for United States and United Kingdom will be fulfilled in fashion that should be satisfactory to him. These assurances were given on United States and United Kingdom initiative so that French could go ahead and fix date for debate. In response to United States insistence that Germany abandon most of its previous contentions on Saar, Adenauer has reversed his position and accepted almost *in toto*—with exception of Article 19—general lines Council of Europe proposal for Saar settlement.[5] Chancellor has approached limits of his concessions without receiving in return from the French concessions on their part which he could use persuasively in his now-restive Parliament. French Government in official negotiations maintains its unreasonable deviations from Council of Europe report, even though orally Bidault has suggested to United States he might recede on certain points.

4. Moreover, Laniel has still taken no steps either to give Mollet satisfaction or to reject long-standing Socialist request for a directly elected CSC and EDC assembly, even though Mollet has drastically reduced his previous demands which initially were same as condition for EDC ratification proposed by French Assembly in its resolution of February 1952.

5. Furthermore, Laniel can continue indefinitely to prevent fulfillment of very conditions which he has established, and thus escape necessity of setting a date for debate on EDC. He can do this by postponing Saar settlement through refusal to make reasonable deal with Adenauer, or through claim that terms on which United States and United Kingdom are willing to guarantee such settlement are unsatisfactory. Also, he can use for same purpose Mollet's refusal to call Socialist congress until French Government has given him satisfaction on direct elections.

6. I sincerely hope above analysis will prove to be largely mistaken. Bidault may decide to force Cabinet decision fixing date for debate immediately after recess. (Bidault could presumably relieve pressure of URAS threats to resign whenever he is personally, or under impulse from his party, prepared to threaten resignation of MRP ministers). If such decision should be forced we must obtain from French Government, and this time in form of a definite commitment, its promise with regard to Saar settlement, to Mollet's request for directly elected assembly (so as to make certain of a disciplined vote of Socialist deputies during debate on EDC ratification) and assurances ratification debate will be uninterrupted and Laniel will change his views

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[5] Reference is to the van der Goes van Naters report of Sept. 10, 1953; see editorial note, p. 803.

against calling for a vote of confidence on the EDC so that this weapon will be used if it should prove necessary.

7. A vote on EDC treaty is out of question before Easter, and while we could continue to ask for debate to open before then, failure of Laniel Cabinet to take action necessary now makes even this almost a frivolous expectation. However, we must somehow persuade Laniel to reverse his refusal to fix date for debate before French Government conditions on ratification, as interpreted by him, have been fully met. This means date would be set but progress would be contingent upon accomplishment Saar settlement in principle.

8. The later the consideration of the Indochina problem is taken up at Geneva, the better.[6] The United States is certain to be asked to offer concessions to the Chinese Communists of a nature which we cannot grant. This will engender bitterness on both sides of the Atlantic and will affect in some measure the final result of the EDC debate in the French Parliament.

Therefore, the sooner debate on EDC commences after the Easter recess the better. As previously said, it is of the greatest importance it be scheduled as an uninterrupted debate, and recourse to a vote of confidence be available.

9. The following suggestions surpass the competence of this mission but I present them in conviction problem can still be solved by forceful approach.

(We are dealing with a government of men operating under one of most ineffective constitutions where a Cabinet member may, without any impeachment of disloyalty, openly defy his Prime Minister. Nor are the Parliamentarians subject to any of the ordinary vicissitudes of political fortune. It worries them little if Cabinets shuffle or fall; only under the most unlikely circumstances do they nevertheless fail to remain in function for their allotted five years.

(Under such fickle conditions we are not warranted in having faith in other than a solemn engagement on the part of French Government. After almost two years experience with French instability of political purpose on EDC we have a proper right to demand an answer from a nation whose standing as one of the three great Western powers has been almost entirely dependent on our good offices.)

I recommend that amongst many choices we seriously consider the following, which I mention only as examples of what might be done.

1. Henceforth as far as practicable, we should present a united front with the British on all demands and negotiations regarding EDC. United States and United Kingdom should ask the French Government to fix prior to Easter recess a date for an uninterrupted debate in which a vote of confidence may be used. This should be done regardless of status Saar negotiations.

2. Secretary Dulles should shortly announce he will stop in London on his way to the NATO meeting to talk to Churchill and Eden. It will

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[6] Reference is to the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, Apr. 26–July 21, 1954; for documentation, see volume XVI.

not require any cunning to make the French conjecture that object of this meeting is Anglo-American review of European affairs to possible French disadvantage. The continuance of a tripartite relationship with the United States and United Kingdom is the very cornerstone of French policy. The most innocent conjunction of British and American officials always frightens the French into a nightmare in which they see the spectre of a revived and exclusive Anglo-American alliance.

3. Without any publicity, we might immediately undertake unilateral measures in Germany, and concert the same with the British, calculated to warn the French of the impossibility of their maintaining indefinitely, through the use of their veto, the Allied occupation status. Ambassador Conant would have, I imagine, some interesting proposals on this point.

4. A slowing down of military end item deliveries to the French metropolitan forces, and retarding for the time being the placement of offshore procurement contracts in France.[7] Few high French officers realize the overwhelming extent to which maintenance of a national army is dependent upon United States bounty in furnishing of equipment. Even Marshal Juin may cease his invectives against the EDC if he thinks we will not continue indefinitely to keep pouring military supplies into France. Moreover, many French industrialists opposing EDC will think again if they no longer take it for granted that offshore procurement contracts will be placed with them regardless of France's policy on EDC.

5. I believe we should do nothing to jeopardize an eventual discussion at Geneva of the Indochina problem. However, we can be sticky about procedural matters relating thereto. This might be, if tactfully handled, extraordinarily effective.

6. United States and United Kingdom should advise France and Germany that since a guaranty of any Saar settlement by the two of us is apparently being taken for granted, we wish to consult urgently with France and Germany on nature their proposed settlement. This would afford opportunity to tell Bidault that Maurice Schumann draft is in large part unacceptable to us as basis for guaranty or assurances.

Comment: If such measures as above are not effective there are many further actions we could take, such as in connection with aid bill, designed to show we intend to behave like a nation which may have to change its basic military strategy for European defense and to adjust its political alliances. We have tried reason, persuasion, generosity, understanding, sympathy, patience: All have failed and I see no alternative but to deal with French as cold bloodedly as they deal with us. They have, it is true, grave domestic political preoccupations, but they are not unique in this regard.

BRUCE

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[7] Documentation on economic aid by the United States to France is in volume VI.

740.5/3–1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 22, 1954—7:01 p. m.

Edcol 93. British Embassy representative called[2] to give substance Steel's instructions from FonOff re his approach to Alphand on UK assurances to EDC. Text[3] being pouched Bruce Mission and Embassy London. Also understand Steel instructed inform Bruce of same points. Following are most significant points in Steel's instructions:

1. Eden plans make UK assurances statement public in form of paper to be read to Parliament as a Govt position. In addition, Steel was instructed suggest to Alphand consideration of NATO resolution, which might be approved at April FonMinisters meeting,[4] incorporating substance US and UK assurances, appropriately adopted to fit into overall NATO policy. This would be on assumption US and UK documents had been issued by that time. (*Comment:* We question advisability and need for such resolution. US and UK assurances in themselves serve somewhat different purposes and in any case do not appear readily adaptable to NATO-wide resolution. Furthermore, from French point of view important assurances are those from US and UK; NATO resolution, which inevitably would be difficult to negotiate and be watered down, would not contribute much additional impact in France.)

2. British are prepared to make major important concession in that they are willing agree in principle to integration UK and EDC ground forces. As indicated para (5) Coled 197,[5] this could have very important impact on position French Socialists.

3. British are prepared authorize Bidault to say during French Assembly debate on EDC Treaty that British Govt accepts principle that France continue have special role along with US and UK both as member NATO SG and in periodic consultations on political mat-

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden and repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] A copy of the memorandum of Moore's conversation with Leishman on Mar. 19 concerning British assurances to the French on EDC is in file 740.5/3–1954.

[3] Not found in Department of State files.

[4] For documentation on the Thirteenth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, at Paris, Apr. 23–24, see pp. 508 ff.

[5] Not printed; it informed the Department of a luncheon conversation between Bruce and Mollet. Paragraph 5 ranked French Socialist conditions about control of the Coal and Steel Community and the EDC in order of importance as (*a*) British association with EDC; (*b*) democratic control over the European army; and (*c*) United States assurances. "If all three are satisfactory and if the British assurances by any chance would include the integrating of a British 'military land unit' in the EDC, not only would the 90 Socialist votes be delivered in favor of the treaty but he [Mollet] estimated there would be 400 votes in the Parliament for the treaty, provided, of course the British assurances in other respects would be along the lines previously represented to him" (740.5/3–1954).

ters between the three FonMinisters, because of her overseas commitments.

4. With respect French proposal made at Bermuda for bringing under EDC German service units now attached British forces, British view is that something along this line could be done and British representatives had been instructed take it up directly with Germans.

5. Have not received here latest texts agreements on UK political and military association. Would appreciate receiving latest information on changes in political association agreement. Text of November 23, 1953 is latest we have seen. Would also appreciate information on general content military agreement which we have not seen in recent drafts.

DULLES

740.5/3–2254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 22, 1954—5 p. m.

3467. Limit distribution. I have now been in Paris long enough to develop a personal feeling of the present situation regarding EDC. The views which I am about to express are my personal views and should be considered solely as such.

I find that since I left Paris last November, situation in National Assembly regarding EDC has evolved very considerably and in a favorable direction for EDC. Maurice Schumann told me Saturday that although French hoped for minor modifications of language, in both cases they considered that US and UK assurances represented a very substantial step forward and would be of great help. Subject to finding a satisfactory solution for Mollet problem of an overall European Assembly, and conclusion of a satisfactory agreement on Saar, it now appears probable, if and when EDC can be brought to a vote in National Assembly, that it will be passed by a substantial majority. Bidault's figure of 350 votes as minimum does not appear out of line and figure might even go higher.

This evolution in favor of EDC has been recognized publicly even in opposition press, which now states that it would have been better for opponents of EDC if treaty could have been brought to a vote last December. As a corollary and probably partially as a result of this evolution in favor of EDC, non-Communist opposition to EDC has become much more violent and bitter. In realization that they will almost certainly be defeated in National Assembly if EDC comes to a vote, these opponents can now be counted on to use every possible tactic and strategy to delay final vote. Typical of increased bitterness is position of Herriot who, a year ago, was making more or less reasoned arguments against EDC but who now is using bitterest sort of propaganda arguments. Another example is case of Chaban-Delmas, leader of URAS, who, I am reliably informed, refused to sign national unity appeal in favor of election of Madame Peyroles in Seine et Oise runoff election against Communist Stil, because of fact that she was a member of MRP and was for EDC.

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

This bitterness can make it very difficult to bring EDC to a vote in Assembly as opponents of EDC, by adding their votes to those of present Communist and Socialist opposition, can bring down government on any domestic issue whenever they so desire. Therefore, we must envisage possibility that after Laniel Government sets a date for debate, it may be overthrown prior to commencement of debate. Ordinarily this would lead to most difficult kind of government crisis which could be expected to last for a long time, only viable majority being majority for EDC which would include Socialists. It might be that only kind of government that could be formed would be a temporary government with Socialist support formed for sole purpose of bringing EDC to a vote. However, this situation is severely complicated by approaching Geneva conference at which French would certainly not want to be represented by a caretaker government. It seems to me impossible to foretell what will happen in these circumstances, but I do feel strongly that we should not relax our pressure for EDC because of fear of a governmental crisis, as it may be that only way to get to a vote on EDC will be through such a crisis.

Concerning two remaining blocks to EDC I have not as yet any clear opinion as to Socialist problem. Bidault apparently thought he had reached agreement with Commin last week but this agreement, if there was one, apparently was not satisfactory to Mollet. This question can only be settled by direct negotiations between Bidault and Mollet and I was glad to hear from Bruce that Mollet now has an appointment with Bidault for this Thursday. Mollet apparently still feels that he needs to have texts of US and UK assurances available publicly three weeks or a month prior to meeting of his party congress. In event he and Bidault reach agreement on European Assembly question, I feel that we and UK should seriously consider making our assurances public whether or not Laniel government has set a definite date for opening of debate on EDC. This publication would enable Socialists to go ahead with their party congress, which is an essential prerequisite to opening of debate on EDC.

As to Saar problem, after my conversations with Bidault and Schumann, I feel that great progress has been made since last fall, and that basis of an agreement is clearly in sight given a minimum of good will and a modicum of serious negotiation between Bidault and Adenauer. Germans have made a great concession in agreeing to accept Van Der Goes report [2] as a basis of negotiation and, on other hand, French have also made a real contribution by their concession granting freedom to all political parties prior to referendum. It seems to me only remaining serious point at issue is economic question. On this question both sides have assumed rather unrealistic bargaining positions and Van Der Goes report is of little help as it had to be purposely vague on this subject in order to achieve agreement. However, I feel that French came up with a formula on which agreement can be reached when they told me that they were prepared to settle this question on basis of limiting free German trade with Saar by reasonable upset figures that would prevent German products from entering France duty free. This French thought has never been given to Germans and presumably will not be, until final negotiations. Bidault has told me that in last analysis he will not insist on representation for Saar as a separate state in various European bodies. This apparently was only other really serious question from German point of view.

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[2] See editorial note, p. 803.

One remaining difficulty on Saar is how to complete negotiations. Bidault, while continuing to praise Adenauer as a European statesman, has expressed considerable personal resentment at way Adenauer has handled Saar negotiations. He says that on one pretext or another Adenauer has never been willing at any time to discuss the Saar seriously with him. He even told me that in December Adenauer told him that there was no point in discussing Saar further until a more stable French government had been formed. As a result of this, Bidault now takes position that he will not have any further meetings with Adenauer on Saar, except for purpose of signing a completed agreement. Bidault's annoyance with Adenauer is probably increased because of realization by French that they were out-maneuvered by Adenauer during last meeting here in Paris. At that time Germans orally presented to French, through Hallstein, a detailed proposal which departed from Van Der Goes report in a number of important respects and which was obviously not satisfactory to French as a solution. In answer to this, French made a counter proposal which they gave to Germans in written form. It is clear now to French, and they have so told me, that this was a tactical error as it enabled Germans to complain to all and sundry about unfair provisions in French document while at same time, German representations having been oral, there was no corresponding German document to which French could point to counter-balance German protests.

As I still feel that only way to reach agreement is for Adenauer and Bidault to sit down together, it seems clear that Bidault must be forced to abandon this position. Only way in which I see that this can be done is for Adenauer to ask for another meeting with Bidault and to give Bidault full assurances that this meeting will continue as long as necessary to reach an agreement and that Adenauer will this time discuss issues directly and personally with Bidault. On French side, this is preferable to having negotiating done by Maurice Schumann, who has become too much of an expert on Saar and, therefore, has developed considerable rigidity in his ideas. Bidault is also not happy that Adenauer chose this particular time to absent himself for nearly three weeks, therefore delaying negotiations by that length of time. I feel that we must do all we can to persuade Adenauer to make necessary arrangements for an early meeting with Bidault and that we and UK must be prepared at this meeting to use our good offices if necessary to ensure an agreement. If we can obtain a meeting under these conditions I consider chances of a successful conclusion are good.

DILLON

740.5/3-2254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, March 22, 1954—8 p. m.

3476. Anti-EDC conference of representatives from EDC countries and UK held Paris March 20 and 21. Reported that about 200 attended.

In addition to French representatives from almost all parties with exception Socialists (reported Embdesp 2239, March 2 [2]) representatives from other countries who took active part reportedly included: Italy—Pietro Nenni, Ricordo Lombardi, Terracini; UK—Archibald McDougall, Hughes Delargy, Jennie Lee, Bedford, William Snow; Belgium—Henri Roark; Federal Republic—Helen Wessel, Herbert Mochalski, Gustav Heinemann, Rosel Ihellebrand.

Edouard Herriot, honorary President of Conference, did not attend but sent message hoping that "union of all French might come about on formula which would save national sovereignty of our country and spare it from risks of new catastrophe which illusory guarantees of EDC treaty in present form would not prevent".

Fellow-traveling Andre Denis was entrusted with advancing proposal that USSR develop its project on European collective security as alternative to EDC. *Le Monde* tonight headlights this as central theme of conference, which is also confirmed in final motion.

Labor MP Hugh Delargy reported to have warned against putting hopes in "vague gestures" which British Government might make "perhaps on eve of Assembly debate". Stated Labor Party which "constitutes one half of House and which will undoubtedly soon return to power" had resigned itself to German rearmament by majority of only two votes and was officially opposed to two years military service. "If military service reduced, how could we undertake new commitments in Europe?—day that Germany rearmed, it will be Germans and no one else who will decide in which direction their army will march".

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[1] Repeated to Brussels, Moscow, The Hague, Rome, London, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] *Ante*, p. 883.

Daladier developed argument (somewhat in contrast to statements he has made in past solely for benefit French audiences) based on contention that EDC was obstacle to building necessary Franco-German *rapprochement.* Moreover he ridiculed Western position at Berlin Conference stating Russian people after great sufferings during war could hardly be expected accept German reunification, elections and "withdrawal 300 kilometers to East without being offered something in exchange".

Two days discussions by curious mixture of persons holding widely divergent views on every issue with exception EDC ended with unanimous adoption of catch-all motion condemning EDC "which would provoke climate throughout world of increasing tension which could result in war". It reportedly demanded "reopening Berlin negotiations with view to solving various international problems including peaceful reunification of Germany, free elections, conclusion German and Austrian peace treaties, renewal normal commercial and cultural relations between East and West, as well as organization of system of collective security and disarmament based on association of European states, respecting UN Charter and treaties in force, excluding any preponderance etc.".

Conference given extensive publicity by Communist *Humanité* and was also well covered by left wing and neutralist papers. Gratuitous publicity resulted from police's maladroit handling of Nenni case. Latter reached Paris without difficulty March 12 but at 6:30 a. m. March 13 police ordered him to leave country on basis 1951 order against him. Following *démarche* by members of conference and protestation of Charles Lussy, President Socialist Deputy group Assembly, order was annulled and Nenni permitted to return Paris evening March 13 and take part in conference. *Humanité* also reports that French Government refused visas to five representatives from Eastern German Government.

DILLON

740.5/3–2354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 23, 1954—1 p. m.

3483. Bidault only returned to Paris at 4 Monday afternoon so I was unable to see him regarding AHC problem until this morning. I went over with him briefly the arguments I had presented to Maurice Schumann on Saturday and Bidault then said that he realized that the French had come up with the idea of the link between AHC approval and the signature of the protocols[2] very much too late in the game and that as a result it was susceptible of serious misinterpretation in Bonn and elsewhere.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Reference is to the additional protocols to the treaty instituting a European Defense Community drawn up in February and March 1953; see pp. 702 ff.

Bidault said that what he was concerned about was the final result and not the means of achieving it. Therefore, he was prepared to drop the linking of AHC approval and the question of the protocols signature provided he could feel sure that Conant would use his full influence with Blankenhorn in support of the French position on protocols. Bidault said that his whole personal position in the National Assembly depended on proving that the protocols were fully as valid as the treaties themselves, and that if could not do this there was no hope of the EDC ever passing the French Assembly. The only way to prove to the French Assembly that they were fully valid would be to have them signed by Adenauer on behalf of and with the authority of the Chief of State.

Bidault said that what he would like would be for Conant to tell Blankenhorn quite frankly that it would be impossible to obtain ratification of the EDC in the French National Assembly unless the protocols were signed in the manner desired by the French.

I told Bidault that we felt his willingness to drop the link between protocols and AHC approval was most constructive attitude. I also said that we now fully realized the importance to him of the manner in which the protocols were signed by Germany, and that Conant was prepared to give his endorsement and full support to the French position after the question of AHC approval had been settled. On that basis, Bidault said, he would forward new instructions to Francois-Poncet today telling him that he need no longer insist on a definite link between AHC approval and the signature of the protocols. Poncet will probably wish to receive direct assurances from Conant regarding his support of the French position on the protocols before finally giving his agreement to the AHC ratification of the constitutional amendments.

Finally, Bidault told me that he had a four or five page memo which dealt in detail with the reasons why the protocol signature question was vitally important to EDC ratification in the Assembly. He said he would have a copy of this memo made and send it to me this afternoon.[3]

DILLON

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[3] See telegram 3499 from Paris, Mar. 24, p. 913.

740.5/3-2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 24, 1954—noon.

3498. Limited distribution. London eyes only for Ambassador.

Hughes and I dined last night with Laniel and he confirmed fully opinions expressed in Embassy telegram 3467 [2] and Embassy telegram 3497.[3] He told me categorically that British and United States assurances were satisfactory and that United Kingdom in particular, would change the views of a considerable number of deputies. He said that the only problem remaining was the settlement of the German problem, i.e., signature of the protocols and a Saar agreement. Once these two requirements had been met he said that he would proceed immediately to submit EDC to ratification debate.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

On the Saar he said the only real question was the economic one and here he felt that the Germans were definitely attempting to break up the Franco-Saar economic union. This, he said, France could never accept, although if Franco-Saar union was maintained they were prepared to make broad trade concessions to Germany in the Saar.

I told him that I thought it was vital that agreement should contain a promise of eventual economic equality for Germany in the Saar with adequate safeguards for the French economy. He said he saw no reason why this could not be possible, provided the safeguards were clear and adequate. It seems clear that final settlement must be one which French Government can claim with reason maintains the present Franco Saar Economic Union and which Adenauer can also claim opens the possibility for future equality for Germany in the Saar market.

In view of these statements by Laniel, it seems to me that it is of the utmost importance to get Adenauer and Bidault together immediately after Adenauer's return and to press for agreement on both the signature of the protocols and the Saar prior to the end of the first week in April. If this should be achieved we could then ask Laniel to live up to his agreement and to take action before the Easter recess to set the date for the opening of debate. The period of the Easter recess could then be used by the Socialist Party in preparing for their congress and debate could begin promptly after the return of Parliament. This would have the advantage of protecting Laniel's government from being overthrown on a domestic issue during the period the Socialists are getting their house in order.

DILLON

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[2] Dated Mar. 22, p. 906.

[3] Not printed; in it Dillon first reiterated the points made in telegram 3467 from Paris, then added that the pressures Bruce had proposed would be counterproductive. Dillon stated that he refused to believe that Laniel was about to repudiate his commitment to EDC, though he "has proved himself to be a rather weak figure". Dillon concluded by stressing again Laniel's "very precarious" political situation (740.5/3–2454).

740.5/3-2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, March 24, 1954—noon.

3499. Following is rough translation of note mentioned last paragraph, Embtel 3483: [2]

"Additional protocols to the treaty instituting a European Defense Community.

1. When the additional protocols were drawn up in February and March 1953, it was agreed by the six Foreign Ministers that these protocols would be interpretative but that they would have the same legal force as the treaty itself and the annexes signed on May 27, 1952.

2. The French Foreign Minister confirmed the position of its government as it concerned the legal force of these protocols in the following terms:

a. In his speech before the Conseil de la Republique on October 29, 1953:

> 'I want to tell the Senate that these protocols are destined to have the same force as the treaty and its annexes. I believe I can say today that they will be signed by the Foreign Ministers of the six countries as were the treaty and its annexes on May 27, 1952.
>
> 'Insofar as France is concerned, our constitutional procedure obliges us to submit to the Parliament the whole of the texts instituting the community, that is to say the treaty, its annexes and the additional protocols added on later. In each signatory country the ratification of these texts will take place according to its respective constitutional procedures.'

b. In his speech to the National Assembly on November 20, 1953 in the following terms:

> 'I will not go into the details of these protocols which will be discussed at the same time as the treaty to which they refer. I will only say for the moment that they are to be signed by the Foreign Ministers of the six countries as was the treaty itself on May 27, 1952.
>
> 'They will also be ratified by each signatory country according to its own constitutional procedure, that is to say, as concerns us, after the approval of Parliament.'

3. In order that the additional protocols may have the same legal force on the international level as the treaty, particularly since they do not appear in the list of annexes mentioned in Article 127, they must then require an action on the part of the authority which, in each of the interested countries, has the power to engage the country on the international level. That is, they must be signed in the name

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Dated Mar. 23, p. 910.

of the Chief of State. If the forms of ratification are different on the political level, that is, as concerns the existence or no of a parliamentary authorization, this ratification, in a form to be determined by each country, is no less indispensable on the part of the appropriate constitutional authority.

All other solutions, and in particular one which would consist of considering the protocols as simple government agreements not requiring the intervention of the authority expressly empowered by the constitution to engage the country, would not permit it to be maintained in France that the additional protocols have the same legal force as the treaty.

4. According to the terms of Article 59 of the fundamental law of Bonn, the President of the Federation represents, and thereby engages the country on the international level. This power is given to him alone by the fundamental law. Consequently, it is indispensable in order to comply with the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph that the additional protocols be signed in the name of the President of the Federal Republic.

5. Nevertheless, in order to allow for the difficulties that the Federal Government believes it has come upon if it applies to the case of the additional protocols an identical procedure to that followed for the treaty, requiring notably on the political level the passing of the bill in the Bundestag, it has been envisaged on the French side to try to find a solution which would reduce to a legally indispensable strict minimum the action as concerns the President of the Federation.

One might think that the fact Article 59 of the fundamental law enumerates in its paragraph 2 those treaties which must receive parliamentary approval before ratification shows 'a contrario' that the President's power of ratification exists independently of legislative approval and could eventually exercise itself without this approval since one of the treaties cited expressly in Article 59 is not involved. This solution is that which prevails in France, for example, for the interpretation of the constitutional dispositions which are quite analogous to those of Article 59 of the fundamental law.

6. Since the German delegation to Paris raised doubts as to the political as well as to the juridical possibility of interpreting Article 59 of the fundamental law as we do, a compromise formula was envisaged by the French delegation. This formula would consist in the granting to the Federal Chancellor by the President of the Federal Republic full powers specially designed for the signature of the additional protocols. There would then certainly be, which is essential to us, an act on the part of the constitutionally competent authority to engage the Federation on the international level. But this formula, while citing Article 59 of the fundamental law, might not require the mention 'under reserve of ratification'.

7. Such a solution represents the extreme limit of the concessions that the French Government can make without abandoning its position which has been stated several times before the two houses by the Foreign Minister. Since the political force of these protocols will in any case be challenged during the parliamentary discussion in France, seeing that the Bundestag had not examined them at the same time as the treaty and had expressed, insofar as they are concerned, reserves during the third reading of the treaty in March 1953, it is indispensable at least that their formal juridical force on the international level not be contested."

DILLON

740.5/3–2454 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BONN, March 24, 1954—2 p. m.

2959. For Secretary from Conant and Bruce. We believe situation here so serious it requires your personal intervention. We have just returned from conversation lasting over hour with Vice-Chancellor Bluecher and several of his assistants including his legal adviser.

Bluecher reports events of last two weeks involving French objections to prompt approval constitutional amendment and yesterday's coupling of it with demands for signature protocols by Chancellor on authority granted by Heuss have received such wide and adverse publicity in Germany that atmosphere embittered. This endangers not only future Franco-German relationship but also prestige Chancellor. This parliamentary opponents as well as public opinion in general will increasingly regard association of two French demands as being blackmail.

Blankenhorn has twice recently urged Chancellor to send word to Bidault asking for meeting on Saar almost immediately after Adenauer's return here Saturday night. Chancellor apparently unwilling do so unless matter of amendments and protocol signatures first settled. Vice-Chancellor stated governments so weakened by recent developments Adenauer's ability to carry through his previous intentions re Saar settlement appreciably diminished and his own (Bluecher's) political standing greatly damaged by apparent impotence of Bonn Government to achieve reasonable arrangement with French on constitutional amendments. Since Bluecher represents FDP Party, ability to hold that party in line for Saar settlement has been materially and adversely affected.

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[1] Repeated to London and Paris; transmitted in two sections.

Previous cables have indicated the resentment engendered by failure of AHC to agree to approval of parliamentary action on amendments.[2] The calculated Quai d'Orsay leak which couples matter of amendments with demand re nature signature protocols is having serious influence on domestic politics here and threatens to divide coalition parties and even split Chancellor's own party. State of excitement has been aroused which given nature of German temperament may well explode in undesirable ways with increasing bitterness. We feel resolution of AHC position on amendments must be achieved within 48 hours at latest.

As to protocols, French position clearly unreasonable as Germans insist delegation of authority from Heuss to Adenauer for signature would involve submission to Bundestag which all agree politically impracticable and undesirable. Would also involve whole question of interpretation of Chancellor's constitutional powers and serve if acceded to as precedent for future demands by a Chancellor for delegation of powers. Adenauer has gone, in our opinion, as far as he can be expected to proceed in offering to sign either as Chancellor or as Foreign Minister. It was clearly stated by French when protocols were submitted to Interim Committee that they were of interpretive nature. It was also understood during action on EDC Treaties taken by other Parliaments that they were of interpretive character only.

Furthermore, it was understanding of all parties to EDC Treaty that manner in which protocols were to be handled by interested government would be done in light of constitutional requirements of each country. The French are now attempting to elevate the protocols to a status where they might be considered amendatory to rather than interpretive of the treaty. This is dangerous even in France.

In view of the urgency of the present dilemma which can only be solved by immediate reversal of present French official attitude, suggest you consider sending telegram today message to be delivered verbatim to Bidault essentially as follows:

"I am deeply disturbed over situation which has arisen in re to AHC approval of recent amendments to German constitution enabling President Heuss to sign the Paris and Bonn Treaties. Since our three governments have always maintained Bonn Government had the power to ratify these treaties in spite opposition case in constitution courts, we have welcomed clarification of constitutional problem by action of Bundestag and Bundesrat. The High Commissioners are now agreed on language of a letter by which AHC may act on these amendments enabling Heuss to sign treaties at once without creating false public impression that Germans are permitted to rearm before EDC comes into effect. The introduction by the French Government of signature of protocols as a pre-condition to French High Commissioner joining with the British and French in this action creates a most dangerous situation and would put all of us in position of trying to defend an impossible case.

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[2] Reference is to amendments to the constitution of the Federal Republic which would permit President Heuss to sign the Paris and Bonn treaties of May 1952 on EDC and German Contractuals.

"It is our position first that protocols should not be linked with action of AHC on amendments and second that French proposal that President Heuss authorize Chancellor to sign protocols is not in accord with understanding that protocols would be dealt with according to constitutional requirements of each participating nation. Other Parliaments have acted on the assumption that protocols were interpretive and that requirements of each country would be construed by that country in light of its own constitution practices. I am convinced on the basis of reports from London, Paris, and Bonn that unless the AHC acts on constitutional amendments tonight or tomorrow the German situation will have so deteriorated as to make Chancellor's position on his return so difficult that he will be without authority to proceed even if he wishes to negotiate Saar settlement on basis acceptable to your (French) Government.

"I ask you with the utmost seriousness to consider instructing your Allied High Commissioner to agree with his British and American colleagues at once on vote in favor of AHC action on amendments in exact form which the three Allied High Commissioners were prepared to sign yesterday".

We have discussed procedural problem with Ambassador Dillon over phone and he agrees only effective course is for him to deliver verbatim text of message from you to Bidault. In our opinion further Saar negotiations impossible until these constitutional amendments settled, and every day's delay makes atmosphere for final Saar settlement worse.

Have placed phone to you or Merchant this subject this afternoon 5 (11 a. m. Washington time).

CONANT

740.5/3-2454

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Bidault [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, March 24, 1954.

I am deeply disturbed over situation which has arisen in re to AHC approval of recent amendments to German constitution enabling President Heuss to sign the Paris and Bonn Treaties. Since our three governments have always maintained Bonn Government had the power to ratify these treaties in spite opposition case in constitution courts, we have welcomed clarification of constitutional problem by action of Bundestag and Bundesrat. The High Commissioners are now agreed on language of a letter by which AHC may act on these amendments enabling Heuss to sign treaties at once without creating false public impression that Germans are permitted to rearm before EDC comes into effect. The introduction by the French Government of signature of protocols as a pre-condition to French High Commissioners joining with the British and Americans in this action creates a most dangerous situation and would put all of us in position of trying to defend an impossible case.

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[1] Transmitted in niact telegram 3286 to Paris, Mar. 24, with instructions to the Ambassador to deliver it in writing. Repeated to London with instructions to the Ambassador to inform the Foreign Office of its contents "expressing hope Eden may wish take parallel action".

It is our position first that protocols should not be linked with action of AHC on amendments and second that French proposal that President Heuss authorize Chancellor to sign protocols is not in accord with understanding that protocols would be dealt with according to constitutional requirements of each participating nation. Other Parliaments have acted on the assumption that protocols were interpretive and that requirements of each country would be construed by that country in light of its own constitutional practices.

I shall be glad to urge Adenauer to give his signature the most formal character possible without resubmission of the treaties to the Bundestag. I have been informed by US High Commissioner that he is agreeable to signing the protocols in his capacity either of Chancellor or of Foreign Minister.

I ask you with the utmost seriousness to consider instructing your High Commissioner to agree with his British and American colleagues at once on vote in favor of AHC action on amendments in the form which the three Allied High Commissioners were prepared to sign yesterday.

I know how difficult these days are for you and I would not press my views on this matter unless I felt that the circumstances were really grave.

With best personal wishes,

FOSTER DULLES

740.5/3–2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, March 25, 1954—1 p. m.

3530. Last night Maurice Schumann asked Harvey and me to come and see him this morning. Our appointment was set for 11:00 and I obtained an appointment with Bidault at 11:30 to deliver letter from Secretary contained in Deptel 3286.[2] When Harvey and I arrived, Maurice Schumann said that he had sent for us to tell us that the French Government had become disturbed over the public airing of the problem of the signature of the protocols and the ratification of the German constitutional amendments by the AHC. He said they had been particularly concerned by the press story attributed to a source in the Quai d'Orsay stating that France was demanding a satisfactory solution of the protocol signature problem prior to giving her assent in the AHC to German constitutional reform. Therefore, he said, the French Government had now decided to instruct Francois-Poncet this morning that he could agree in the AHC to the prompt approval of the German constitutional amendments, in accordance with the text which had previously been agreed upon.

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[1] Repeated to Bonn and London.

[2] Not printed; it transmitted the text of Dulles' letter to Bidault, *supra*.

Schumann then reiterated what he had told both of us previously, that the signature of the protocols by Germany in the name of the Chief of State was an absolute unqualified necessity if EDC was to be debated and passed in the French Parliament. Harvey assured him of the British Government's support for this position with the single reservation that it would not require further action by the German Parliament. Schumann replied that it was the view of the French legal experts that the German constitution did not require parliamentary action for the president to delegate the right to sign the protocols in his name and with his authority. He said that the French legal expert had been in informal contact with Ophuls, the German legal expert on this subject, and that Ophuls' informal reaction had seemed favorable to the French view. In view of contents of Secretary's letter regarding protocols I said nothing on this matter except to assure Schumann that we now fully understood the French position on this subject and the importance of it to EDC ratification in France.

In view of the fact French, through Schumann, had agreed to go ahead immediately with ratification in the AHC and that Schumann had taken some pride in saying that this was a decision that they had taken completely on their own and without public pressure from either of our governments, I decided not to deliver letter contained in Deptel 3286 to Bidault. I told Schumann that I now had no reason to see Bidault as my visit to him was to have been for the purpose of delivering a letter from the Secretary urging them to take the action that they had already decided to take.

Bidault wished to see me anyway, primarily on other matters, but during my visit to him he also emphasized the absolute necessity of obtaining signature of the protocols in the name of the German Chief of State. As I pointed out yesterday in Embtel 3508[3] this subject is also felt by Bidault to concern his personal honor in view of public statements which he has made from time to time in the French Assembly and the French Senate.

British view, as expressed by Harvey to Schumann, is that French position on protocol signature is reasonable and that they will give it full support. Therefore, in the interest of prompt action on EDC here in France, I must recommend most strongly that we reconsider position outlined in Deptel 3286 and use our influence to help find a way in which Germans can sign the protocols in the name of the Chief of State without again going to the Bundestag.

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[3] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* that Bidault had told Dillon "that unless the protocols were signed by Germany in the name of the Chief of State, there was no further hope for EDC" (740.5/3-2454).

After my interviews I called Conant on the phone and told him that French had agreed to go ahead prior to the delivery of the letter so that I had not delivered letter.

Dillon

740.5/3–2654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PARIS, March 26, 1954—noon.

3550. With the help of a cryptic remark by Bidault yesterday regarding the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly and certain other information which has come to our attention, I am now clear as to the reasons behind the apparent zig-zagging in French policy on German Constitutional reform during the last few days. It now seems clear that Bidault never swerved from the basic decision to proceed with the approval of the AHC amendments which he announced separately to Harvey and me on Tuesday morning.[2] However, shortly after he gave us this news he apparently was reminded that he could not properly take action on this subject until he had informed and obtained the tacit approval of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly which necessitated a day or two of delay. The reason for this unusual requirement was that immediately after the Bundestag approved the Constitutional reform measures, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly unanimously (including Schumann) voted a protest against the wording of these texts and warned the government not to approve them. Therefore, in order to avoid an explosion in the Committee, it was necessary for Bidault to inform them in advance of what he proposed to do.

There was a meeting of the full Committee on Wednesday at which they were informed of Quai d'Orsay plans to approve the Constitutional Amendment in accordance with the agreed tripartite text. Bidault was satisfied with the reaction and thereupon authorized Maurice Schumann on Wednesday afternoon to inform Harvey and me that they were now ready to implement the policy which had been outlined to both of us on Tuesday morning. This, Schumann did early Thursday morning.

This explains why Francois-Poncet was originally told on Tuesday that there would be no decision for a day or two. When Conant protested this delay vigorously to me and I passed on our protest to Maurice Schumann by telephone on Tuesday night, it is now evident that the French were embarrassed and that Maurice Schumann's answer to me was a somewhat clumsy attempt to stall matters for a day or two. His instructions to Francois-Poncet at that time to hold the line firmly were obviously designed to prevent any possible leak from Bonn of the French intention to approve the Constitutional Amendments before the subject had been cleared with the Foreign Affairs Committee here.

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Regarding this conversation, see telegram 3483 from Paris, Mar. 23, p. 910.

I still regret that Bidault and Schumann did not tell me frankly on Tuesday of their political problem with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly.[3]

DILLON

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[3] In telegram 3012 from Bonn, Mar. 29, Conant reported that he had been informed by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic "that President Heuss today signed instruments of ratification for Bonn conventions, for EDC treaty and for special agreement between members of EDC and Great Britain. Instruments on Bonn conventions will be deposited Bonn tomorrow, for EDC treaty in Paris tomorrow and for special agreement in London March 31" (740.5/3-2954).

740.5/3-3054

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1954.

Subject: Announcement of UK Assurances re EDC

Participants: The Secretary of State
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Douglas MacArthur, C

In the course of a call on the Secretary the British Ambassador showed to him and Mr. MacArthur a telegram which had just been received from Mr. Eden. In essence the telegram repeated the information contained in London's 4213, March 29,[2] to the effect that H.M.G. believes that it is imperative to release the text of its assurances to the French regarding EDC by April 5. Mention was made of the fact that the budget will come out on April 6, which is a major news story; that there is mounting parliamentary pressure in the UK to ascertain the substance of the UK assurances; that Ambassador Harvey in Paris believes that early release of the UK assurances may assist Bidault in obtaining a definite date for the debate etc. The message also stated that the UK would greatly prefer to have the US and UK assurances released at the same time but if this were not possible for the US, the UK would understand and go ahead and release their assurances on April 5.

Secretary Dulles mentioned that he had been away in Caracas when we had consulted with the Congressional leadership regarding the US assurances and asked Mr. MacArthur to outline the considerations which our Congress had had in mind. Mr. MacArthur said that although he had not attended the consultations with the Congressional leadership, he had understood that it had been firmly agreed that the US assurances would only be released when the French Government had set a specific date for the EDC debate. It was his understanding that this did not mean that the French Parliament would have had to agree to that date but the government would have made an official request for debate on a certain date. Mr. MacArthur gave the personal view that if we now went back on the Congressional leadership and asked them to agree to the release of the US assurances before the French Government requested a date, the whole question might be reopened with the Congressional leadership. He added, however, that he was not qualified to talk on this point and it was agreed that he would make a report to Mr. Merchant who would in turn discuss this matter with the Secretary. It was also understood that in due course we would get in touch with the British Embassy on this.

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[1] A typewritten note on the source text reads: "Above was dictated but not read by Mr. MacArthur".

[2] Not printed (740.5/3-2954).

740.5/4–154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Palmer)

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 1, 1954.

Subject: EDC

Participants: Mr. F. J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Director, RA

Mr. Leishman called today at his request and informed me of the contents of two cables from Paris describing the conversations on March 30 between Steel and Alphand, and between Harvey and Bidault, along the lines reported in Paris's 3611 of March 31.[1] (It will be recalled that Alphand had passed to Steel a message from Laniel in which the latter indicated that he had been informed by the URAS Ministers that if the French Government signed the agreement before the Easter recess on UK association with EDC, the URAS Ministers would not resign but would seek immediately to bring down the Government on an extraneous issue.)

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[1] Not printed; it reported that Laniel had informed Steel through Alphand that the URAS Ministers had stated that if the French Government signed any agreement on U.K. association with EDC before the Easter recess, then the URAS Ministers would not resign but would immediately seek to bring down the government on an extraneous issue. In a subsequent conversation with Harvey, Bidault had also indicated that he had learned of the URAS Ministers' action, adding that Laniel had three preoccupations: "One was that Cabinet must authorize Alphand signature on United Kingdom–EDC agreement which presented dilemma; without knowledge of assurances declaration anti-EDC Ministers would find agreement inadequate; given such knowledge, declaration would leak. Second was that if Assembly voted on date for EDC debate before Socialist Congress held, there might be general or sufficient Socialist abstentions to defeat Government. (Bidault stated he did not share this fear.) Third was Laniel's desire that if Government fell, it do so squarely on EDC issue". (740.5/3–3154)

Mr. Leishman then informed me that in response to Ambassador Harvey's report of these conversations, the Foreign Office had sent instructions to the U.K. Ambassadors in the six EDC countries, reemphasizing the parliamentary pressure on HMG to make a statement regarding the UK–EDC negotiations on British association. The message went on to express the hope that the agreement would be signed in time for Mr. Eden to make his announcement in the Commons on April 5 and directed the UK Ambassadors to each of the EDC countries to press for early signature which would make this timing possible. The message concluded by saying that if the signature were nevertheless impossible, Mr. Eden would still propose to make his statement on this subject on the 5th, casting it as a description of what the U.K. has offered.

I told Mr. Leishman that I thought that the British difficulties in withholding release of their agreement and assurances were understood. Our problems are somewhat different and we continued of the opinion that we could not release the text of our assurances in the absence of a French decision to set a date for the debate. Mr. Leishman said that he thought it was too bad that we could not announce our respective assurances simultaneously, but recognized that our somewhat different problems probably made this impossible. I suggested that there might, in fact, be some advantage in different release dates from the point of view of maintaining an impact on French opinion and Mr. Leishman agreed.

I also took occasion to inquire whether Mr. Leishman had any further information as to the French reasoning in proposing the deletion of the proposal in the U.K. assurances for the extension of the duration of NATO to 50 years. He replied that Alphand had maintained that this deletion was desirable since it would bring the U.S. and U.K. assurances into closer conformity and since it appeared improbable that such a proposal could, in any event, be adopted by all member nations.

Mr. Leishman subsequently telephoned me to say that he had just received a further telegram from London indicating that Mr. Eden had decided, as the result of a strong plea from "his colleague" (I gathered: Bidault), to delay any statement on UK assurances until April 12.[2] Mr. Leishman noted that this did not correspond with the April 14 date for which M. Laniel had indicated preference, but would nevertheless be after the presently contemplated date for the adjournment of the French Assembly on April 9.

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[2] Ambassador Aldrich reported from London in telegram 4331, Apr. 2, that the Foreign Office had stated that the United Kingdom "intends to release EDC assurances and association agreements on April 12, unless unforeseen contingencies again intervene" (740.4/4–254).

762.022/4–254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 2, 1954—noon.

3663. I saw Bidault Thursday in accordance with Deptel 3399.[2] He told me that the Socialists had been unreasonably difficult and had made it impossible for him to carry out his original schedule. Mollet had told him that the Socialists would abstain en bloc in any vote that might take place prior to the Socialist Party Congress. Bidault said that Laniel was willing and ready for his government to fall squarely on EDC issue but was not willing to be defeated on some side issue, such as national education budget, Marshal Juin,[3] et cetera, because of Socialist attitude. Therefore, it had become vitally important to hold everything up until Parliament had adjourned.

Bidault said that it would be disastrous if Eden should insist on making public United Kingdom assurances next Monday. This would mean that French Government would probably fall on Wednesday or Thursday. He said he had so informed Harvey and that he now proposed the following schedule which had Laniel's concurrence.

On the first day after Parliament goes on vacation, i.e., either April 9 or 10, Cabinet would approve United Kingdom agreement which could be signed immediately and Eden could make his announcement on Monday, April 12. This action by French Cabinet would bring about resignation of URAS Ministers, who would then be replaced and Cabinet would promptly announce that it would request steering committee immediately on return of Parliament to set date (most probably May 25) for debate on EDC. After Cabinet had taken this action, Bidault said he would be ready and willing to go to Bonn to meet with Adenauer in order to conclude a Saar settlement.

After publication of United States and United Kingdom assurances, Socialists would issue call for Party Congress which most likely would take place about May 18, immediately following May 16 by-election in Mollet's district of Pas-de-Calais. Socialist candidate there is campaigning on pro-Europe and pro-EDC platform and should run second in May 2 election, and then with support of other parties should win runoff election on May 16.

When asked about progress on arrangements with Socialists for democratic control Bidault did not mention arrangements described Coleds 215, 218, 222.[4] He did, however, say that he thought there would not be too much difficulty in making a suitable arrangement and he did say that Laniel had softened his position and was now willing to give Socialists something that should satisfy them.

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[1] Repeated to London eyes only for the Ambassador and to Bonn eyes only for Conant.

[2] Not printed. (762.022/3–3054)

[3] Reference is to the incident created by Marshal Juin, commander of the NATO Central sector, who publicly criticized the existing NATO command structure during the spring of 1954. Documentation on this incident is in file 740.5.

[4] None printed. (740.5/3–2754, 3–2954, and 3–3154)

Bidault then said that after Easter recess government would be ready to pose question of confidence on the question of setting of date for EDC debate. I asked him when he would like United States assurances made public and whether it was necessary that they be made public at same time as United Kingdom assurances. He said there was no necessity for them to be made public on the same day but that he hoped they would follow promptly so that socialists could get on with calling their congress. If all goes as Bidault described, date for publication of United States assurances could well be set some time in week of April 12, after allowing necessary time for Hughes to inform NATO and for text to be shown to Prime Ministers of EDC countries.

Regarding Saar negotiations, Bidault said that Adenauer had informed him that he was in no particular hurry to negotiate with Bidault as he was very busy at the moment putting out political fires that had sprung up in Germany during his absence in the Middle East. Bidault said that Poncet was continuing negotiations in Bonn but that he did not feel that they would result in much as Poncet was frankly not up to negotiating on this subject with the German experts that were available in Bonn. Some time next week Bidault said he intends to look over results of negotiating to date and then invite Hallstein and Blankenhorn to come to Paris to continue negotiations with Maurice Schumann. He said that Grandval would not have anything to do with these negotiations in Paris, which would be handled by Maurice Schumann. He hoped that in this way differences could be reduced to three or four major points on which it would be possible to brief him and Adenauer so that they could decide these final points together. He said that quite frankly when it came to discussing the whole subject, neither he nor Adenauer felt confident enough in their own knowledge to undertake really serious negotiations. He further said that he felt he would need our aid and assistance at some point and I said that we would be prepared to give him our ideas, together with the United Kingdom, prior to his meeting with Adenauer. If Bidault program for negotiation should make progress and if Schumann and Hallstein should be able to reach agreement on a substantial number of points, leaving only a few major points for settlement by Bidault and Adenauer, it would appear to me that present United Kingdom paper would have to be revised, putting less stress on general adhesion to Van Nater's plan and more stress on solutions for major points still at issue between French and Germans.

I did not press Bidault for a definite commitment on date when he would be willing to meet Adenauer,[5] as it was obvious that he is for the moment entirely engaged in the effort to obtain public announcement of the commencement of debate by the Cabinet as outlined above. Furthermore, it is clear that controlling item in scheduling EDC debate is now date on which Socialist Party Congress will be held. It may well be that Bidault and Laniel will not wish to arrive at a final solution for the Saar until a week or ten days prior to the opening of debate, so as to avoid a separate debate in the assembly on the Saar. This could be the explanation for the May 15 date given Bruce mission as date for final settlement of the Saar.

DILLON

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[5] Telegram 3096 from Bonn, Apr. 6, reported that German officials had stated that Hallstein had been negotiating the Saar problem with French officials (762.022/4–654). Telegram 4552 from London, Apr. 14 reported that the "Foreign Office working level informed us today that it was recommending to higher level that UK and US now begin to intervene in Franco-German negotiations on Saar owing to recent 'degeneration' in Franco-German talks" (762.022/4–1454).

740.5/4–554 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 5, 1954—7:11 p. m.

Edcol 102. 1. Secretary today opened Mutual Security Presentation with public appearance before House Foreign Affairs Committee. EDC aspects summarized below for your background information:[2]

2. In prepared statement Secretary pointed out importance EDC to NATO. Emphasized NATO needs both German contribution and Franco-German unity. EDC was French proposal for accomplishing these ends. Two years since EDC Treaty signed. Netherlands, Belgium, and FedRep so far have ratified; Luxembourg may act very soon. In France and Italy parliamentary process not yet begun, but early date may soon be set. Secretary then went on to say: "These delays constitute a negative factor from the standpoint of the free world. They delay the capacity of NATO to draw on Germans for building the strength needed to implement NATO's forward strategy. Also they prevent West Germany from joining the family of sovereign free nations. This is because the treaties to restore sovereignty to the West German Republic are by their terms contingent on EDC coming into force. There is, of course, a duly elected West German Government. But it is not yet a sovereign government.

It is obvious that the present status cannot continue much longer."

3. In question period following statements, Secretary was asked for forecast on EDC. Secretary replied that there was hope, with some basis, that in France date will be set at beginning of Easter recess for Assembly debate to take place latter part of May. He pointed out that

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, London, and Luxembourg.

[2] For the text of Dulles' statement and the questions and answers that followed, see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations . . . on the Mutual Security Act of 1954* (Washington, 1954),

French authorities have not yet taken final decision. In Italy Cabinet has drafted bill necessary to put treaty into force and has indicated willingness make matter vote of confidence.

In response to question as to what US could do to assure success EDC, Secretary replied that there was little we should do at this time and certainly should exert no pressure. Only coercion involved is that of hard facts. Secretary felt confident that result of failure of EDC so grave that those with whom decision rests cannot do otherwise than approve.

4. No questions asked on Richards Amendment, and Secretary did not cover subject. Will cable later on this aspect.[3]

Dulles

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[3] On Apr. 7 the Department of State reported further on the hearings in telegram Edcol 103 to Paris, 740.5/4-754, stating that Stassen had testified against reenactment of the Richards amendment. For the text of Stassen's testimony, see *ibid.*, pp. 27 ff. On the following day, the Administration's bill was presented to the Committee without the amendment, in the firm belief that the EDC would come into being.

Editorial Note

Throughout the early winter and spring of 1954, the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic of Germany moved steadily toward ratification of the treaty to establish a European Defense Community. The Netherlands became the first country to complete legislative action approving the EDC Treaty when, on January 20, the First Chamber voted approval. That same day, President Eisenhower released a brief statement of congratulation. For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1, 1954, page 142.

Belgium became the second country to ratify when, on March 11, 1954, its Senate completed parliamentary action begun by the Chamber of Deputies which had approved the EDC Treaty on November 26, 1953. A brief message of congratulation from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, dated March 12, is printed *ibid.*, March 22, 1954, page 433.

Action to ratify the EDC Treaty was completed by the Federal Republic of Germany on March 29, 1954 when President Heuss signed the Treaty. Congratulatory messages from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were released the same day and are printed *ibid.*, April 12, 1954, page 554.

Luxembourg completed ratification action on April 7 when Parliament voted ratification. The statement by President Eisenhower applauding the action of the Belgian Parliament was released the same day and is printed *ibid.*, April 26, 1954, page 621.

Documentation on the events leading to ratification of the EDC Treaty in these four countries is in file 740.5.

740.5/4–954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, April 9, 1954—7 : 59 p. m.

5333. Paris for Embassy and Bruce. Limited distribution.

1. British Embassy today gave us suggested reply which Eden will make in Commons if, during announcement UK assurances and association agreement scheduled April 14, he is queried as to US position and asked whether US Govt prepared make commitments similar to those of UK. Proposed Eden reply is as follows: "Position US and UK not quite same. US has same commitment as UK as member NATO and signatory Tripartite Declaration May 27, 1952, but US has not got Treaty with EDC and has not therefore same need for an agreement on forms of association. US Govt has, however, frequently declared that their policy is to give EDC all possible support. We have been in close consultation with US Govt throughout; we know they welcome steps now being taken; and I understand that a full statement of US position may be expected shortly".

2. We intend informing British here along following lines: Proposed reply is generally satisfactory and we have no objection to Eden's saying that statement US position may be expected shortly. However, would like to make suggestion which we feel might improve statement from point of view of impact on French. Instead of beginning with statement that US and UK position are not same, might be preferable begin with commitments which US and UK have in common, including specific reference to NAT protocol on guarantees to EDC as well as Tripartite Declaration. Could then lead into fact that UK also has treaty with EDC making necessary agreement on forms of association, etc.

3. Request that same points be discussed FonOff as well as our views on timing. See separate cable to Paris on this subject.[2]

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared with Palmer, Ladd of BNA, Fisher and Tyler of WE, and initialed for the Secretary by Bonbright; repeated to Paris.

[2] Reference is presumably to telegram 3583 to Paris, Apr. 9, in which Dulles stated that the United States "would be prepared transmit US assurances message immediately if French cabinet on Thursday April 15 has made decision and announcement re requesting early and specific date for ratification". (740.5/4–1054). On Apr. 12, Leishman informed Palmer "that he had received a telegram from the Foreign Office indicating that it agreed with our suggestion that any statement which Mr. Eden might make in response to Parliamentary inquiries regarding U.S. assurances on EDC should start with a statement of the similarities between the U.S. and U.K. positions and then lead into an indication of the differences which necessitated an agreement on forms of association in the case of the U.K." Palmer expressed satisfaction with the British course of action (Memorandum of conversation, by Palmer, Apr. 12, 740.5/4–1254).

740.5/4–1054

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Scelba [1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, April 10, 1954.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: It was with great appreciation that I received your letter dated March 27, 1954,[2] confirming the intention of your Government to present the EDC treaty to Parliament for ratification [3] and confiding in me your Government's views on the relationship of the Trieste question to the ratification process. The frankness of your comments encourages me to be equally frank in response, and I welcome the opportunity for establishing clear understanding of our respective viewpoints.

I should like first to confirm to you the assurances given your Ambassador, that my Government views the resolution of the Trieste question not only as of fundamental importance to Italy and Yugoslavia, but as of high concern to itself. Because of both the importance it attaches to the security of Southern Europe and the special responsibilities it bears in the free world, my Government has every interest in the earliest possible development of an agreement satisfactory to Italy and Yugoslavia. The earnest efforts to find the basis for a solution, which have been proceeding in London for two months represent evidence in this regard. The next step in the efforts of the U.S. and U.K. Governments, i.e., the initiation of discussions with representatives of your Government, will, I hope, take place in the near future. I also hope you will agree that the chances of success for the negotiations will be enhanced by continued secrecy.

Your letter demonstrates that your Government believes in the necessity of ratification of the EDC treaty for the long term security and stability of the members of the Community and of Western Europe as a whole. That being the case, we are dealing with two separate problems, each of great importance to Italy, as well as to many of its friends. The conclusion seems inescapable that we are well advised to gain success on each of these problems as quickly as our most determined efforts will permit.

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[1] Drafted by Freund of WE; cleared in draft with Fessenden, Jones of WE, and Barbour and Hooker of EUR; initialed by Bonbright and Merchant. In a covering memorandum to the Secretary, dated Apr. 8, Merchant recalled that Ambassador Tarchiani had delivered to Dulles on Mar. 30 a letter from Prime Minister Scelba, dated Mar. 27 (see footnote 2 below), concerning the importance of a Trieste settlement to Italian ratification of EDC. The source text, Merchant added, had been drafted for Dulles' approval as a suitable reply. A notation on the covering memorandum reads: "Letter signed & dated April 10, '54. Sent to the Amb with covering [Memorandum?]" (740.5/4–854).

[2] Not printed; it expressed Scelba's sense of duty to explain "with all frankness the views of my Government" on EDC ratification and its relationship to the Trieste question. A copy of this seven-page letter is in file 750G.00/3–3754.

[3] In telegram 3157 from Rome, Apr. 9, Ambassador Luce reported that the "First skirmish" on the EDC ratification law had taken place in the Italian Chamber on Apr. 8 (740.5/4–954).

I quite appreciate that the circumstances under which the debate on EDC ratification will occur would be improved if a solution to this Trieste problem had already been reached. However serious parliamentary difficulties had also to be overcome in Germany and exist in France, where it is our hope and expectation that the EDC debate will be inaugurated in May. As regards Trieste, you may depend on the continuation of the most determined efforts of the United States and, I am sure, the United Kingdom through the medium of the present discussions on [*and?*] those to follow with your representatives,[4] to assist in reaching an acceptable solution. Given the desire of the two Governments principally involved also to reach a solution, I am confident that a just one will be found.

In any event, it seems clear from the Berlin conference and ensuing events that, more than ever, the creation of the European Defense Community marks the critical turning point in the long and arduous battle by the North Atlantic Community lastingly to halt the advance of Soviet imperialism and to promote the cause of European unity. That deep conviction prompts me to urge that nothing deter you from use of the majority, however slim, which supports your Government to cement Italy's place in the Community of Six. Permit me to stress the view of the U.S. Government that the necessity for speed is paramount.

Trusting in the mutuality of interests of our Governments and peoples, and appreciating the frankness with which you have written to me, my confidence in the success of our joint endeavors is increased.

Sincerely yours, JOHN FOSTER DULLES

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[4] Reference is to the secret negotiations between representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia at London, February–May 1954 and between representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and Italy at London, June–August 1954; for documentation, see volume VIII.

740.5/4–1354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, April 13, 1954—1 a. m.

Secto 5. For Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Limited distribution. At morning meeting with Eden April 12, I raised question EDC saying that of all problems we face the general situation of France seems the most serious. I said that I feared France has reached position where government no longer capable taking hard decisions required of great power and that possibility existed her weakness would leave vacuum in Asia, Africa and the continent into which our enemies would be tempted to move. I noted that even in Morocco, Spain in reflection on French weakness was giving signs of attempting to improve her position at expense of French. I said we could find no alternative to EDC and that time was of the utmost importance, particularly with growing restlessness of Germans.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Dillon and Bruce and to Bonn for Conant. Dulles and MacArthur traveled to London and Paris, Apr. 11–15 for talks with British and French officials on a variety of topics. Memoranda of their conversations with French officials concerning EDC on Apr. 14 are printed on pp. 932 and 936.

Eden confirmed his conviction likewise that there is no good alternative to EDC. He said that as far as he could see Juin and certain Frenchmen were thinking in terms of admitting Germany to NATO, subject, however, unilaterally to restrictions of EDC treaty. We agreed this was totally unrealistic.

Kirkpatrick suggested that if EDC fails of ratification, we should place contractuals in effect, notwithstanding French objections which could be expected, and encourage Adenauer to build up police to strength proportionate to East German police. This he calculated would run to equivalent of six to eight divisions. The High Commissioners would, of course, be abolished.

I cited problems inherent in moving in this fashion without French concurrence and sequential necessity of renegotiating contractuals.

Eden, this point, suggested that it might be better to bring Germany directly into NATO and indicated that he was far from certain that the French would veto such action if they rejected EDC. The closing note of discussion was Eden's statement that he knew of "no better hole" than EDC.

[Dulles]

740.5/4–1354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, April 13, 1954—6 p. m.

3873. After lengthy and stormy Cabinet session April 12, government finally authorized signing agreement re UK association EDC which was done by Alphand this morning.

Gaullist Deputies apparently surprised when Bidault presented text to Cabinet and they demanded that signing be delayed to permit further study. Bidault reportedly insisted that decision be immediately taken on grounds action would have to be completed before British Parliament recesses April 14. URAS and ARS Ministers objected strenuously stating it would indicate government committed to EDC and were indignant that Bidault had withheld text from Cabinet until Parliament adjourned. MRP Teitgen stated to have urged Cabinet decide immediately in favor early Assembly debate on EDC.

Edgar Faure reportedly added to confusion and tension by demanding that action on EDC, including UK guarantees, be suspended pending settlement IC conflict. Moreover other Radical Minister Martinaud-Deplat held that British guarantees were insufficient. Stormy exchange reportedly followed between Faure and Bidault, latter accusing Faure of going back on his earlier position in favor EDC. Faure's stand surprising and may perhaps represent bid for heading new government, should Cabinet crisis ensue, Faure might calculate majority in favor of him possibly composed of EDC opponents and those in favor of stalling on issue especially until IC conflict resolved.

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[1] Repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

Laniel reported to have backed Bidault pointing out that British guarantee and not IC settlement was "prior condition" set by him in investiture speech and thus by government that now that it had been [apparent garble] should be accepted.

President Coty stated to have supported this position and majority Cabinet favored signing, despite Gaullist objections and demands for delaying decision.

Gaullist Ministers and leading Deputies and Senators subsequently held series of meetings and also conferred several times with Laniel. Meeting continuing today and announcement may be made this evening as to their decision whether or not to stay in government.

Laniel issued communiqué this morning on agreement for UK association, which included statements that text would have to be approved by Parliament and that its application would depend on EDC going into effect.[2] This has somewhat mollified Gaullist Ministers who appear at present reluctant leave government.

Cabinet now scheduled to hold next meeting April 15 re decision on timing EDC debate Assembly.

DILLON

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[2] In telegram Coled 225 from Paris, Apr. 13, Bruce reported that the Heads of Delegations of the EDC Interim Committee and the U.K. representative to the EDC Interim Committee had signed the U.K. association agreement on the morning of Apr. 13. Bruce observed that the British declaration contained no mention of their willingness to extend the NATO right of withdrawal to 50 years (740.5/4–1354). The United Kingdom released the text of the association agreement on Apr. 14. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 620–621.

740.5/4–1454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[1]

TOP SECRET PARIS, April 14, 1954.

Participants: Prime Minister Laniel
Douglas MacArthur, II

At the request of Prime Minister Laniel I called on him privately last evening at 10:15 p. m. (he had sent word to me at the airport by

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[1] The meeting took place at the Prime Minister's private residence at 15 rue Leroux from 10:15 p.m. to midnight on Apr. 13. MacArthur had accompanied

M. Vidal, the Director of his Cabinet, that he would like to see me at the above-mentioned hour). We were alone except for Mme. Laniel, who sat quietly in another corner of the room.

After the usual exchange of amenities I said to M. Laniel that we were very glad to know that on Thursday, April 15, the French Cabinet would at last fix the date for the Assembly debate on the EDC. M. Laniel immediately replied that the entire EDC situation was extremely difficult. The URAS and ARS were making great difficulties and he was apprehensive that a political crisis might ensue when the date for the debate was fixed by the government, and this crisis would involve the fall of the present government. If the present government fell, he did not see how it could be succeeded by any other government which would put the EDC through. He felt that if someone like Mendès-France formed a new government the situation with respect to both the EDC and Indochina would be virtually hopeless. Furthermore, to get a majority for EDC in the French Parliament he needed a few of the URAS and ARS votes, which he thought he could get if he maneuvered properly. Therefore, he was not certain that it would be wise tactically to insist on fixing the date for the debate on Thursday.

I said to M. Laniel that I had known Chaban-Delmas, the leader of the URAS group, for some 15 years. Chaban was intelligent and clever, but was tremendously ambitious and lacked moral scruple. His lack of such moral scruple had been clearly shown, not only by the way he treated his first wife, but in his political intriguing and maneuvering. I said that I did not believe that Chaban-Delmas and his friends would ever go along with EDC. They were opposed to it and their efforts to postpone the fixing of the Assembly debate was simply a maneuver to postpone any decision until such time as EDC was virtually down the drain. I thought that if the consideration for postponing the debate was the hope of bringing Chaban-Delmas and his friends along in support of EDC, it was unsound.

M. Laniel said that his position was very difficult and he did not wish to take steps which would involve the fall of the French Government prior to Geneva. He was inclined to agree that most of the URAS and ARS would, in the final analysis, oppose the EDC but he still thought he could carry a few of them along with him.

I replied that I did not share his view. I said that the Secretary

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Secretary Dulles to London and Paris; see footnote 1, p. 930. In telegram 3245 to Paris, Mar. 20, Dulles had suggested to Dillon that in view of the fact that "early EDC ratification in France seems to be slipping out from under us", it might be useful to send MacArthur to Paris within a week "carrying strong oral message to Laniel from President (who has not yet been consulted concerning this possibility)". Dulles added that if either Dillon or Bruce felt that such a visit "might cause damage to our cause and I see some risk in that respect", then MacArthur would not come (740.5/3–2054). Dillon replied in telegram 3481 from Paris, Mar. 23, that both he and Bruce agreed that a MacArthur trip would be most useful, and that Bidault concurred (740.5/3–2354).

expected upon his return to the United States on Thursday, to be able to report to the President that M. Laniel and his government had finally set the date for the EDC debate. If this were not possible I thought that very grave consequences would ensue. I said that I would like to speak very frankly. In the past few weeks the United States had been approached by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Benelux countries with a view to discussing alternative plans for the EDC which would ensure German association with the West, and participation in collective defense. These approaches had been made because there was a growing belief that France had lost the capacity to act or take any decisions which required courage. This incapacity to face up to reality was rapidly undermining France's position as one of the leading powers of the free world. Thus far we had not discussed alternatives and other courses of action with our U.K., German and Benelux friends. However, if the French Government could not even fix the date of the debate, M. Laniel should know that we would be obliged to go quietly ahead and work out alternative courses of action. We would not announce publicly that we were doing this, since the French would construe any such announcement as a threat or blackmail. However, he should have no illusions. If France, by its inability to act, forced us to leave her behind, we would go on with the other nations which wished to survive. If the French Government did not fix the date of the debate on Thursday, I felt that we would soon have to begin to explore other courses of action to which we had given a great deal of thought and for which we had some plans.

I said that the countries that were joined together in the collective enterprise of making Europe were like a group of mountain climbers who were roped together. They had left the last resting camp and were attacking the peak. The peak or summit as we saw it was our very survival. Halfway between the last camp and the peak one member of the group, France, suddenly refused to go forward or backward. It simply wished to camp on a ledge and remain there until it perished. It apparently not only wished to remain there alone, but wished the other members of the party to remain there and perish with it. The United States, as one member of the group, was not prepared to die simply because France wished to commit what amounted to suicide. Furthermore, we did not believe that the other members of the team who were roped together in this enterprise wished to perish because of lack of collective action. Therefore, the time had come when, if France would not budge, the rest of us must cut the rope and leave her on the ledge.

In conclusion, I said I had one final observation to make about all this. M. Laniel and I were very old friends. We had worked together in the Resistance. I knew his courage and his devotion to the cause of Franco-American understanding. To me it would be infinitely sad if he were Prime Minister presiding over a French government which, by its inaction, deliberately separated France from the United States and the other Western Allies and who would be responsible for France losing its position as a leader of the free world and becoming in effect another Belgium.

M. Laniel said he recognized that the rest of the world could not wait indefinitely on France. However, his problems were very great. The constitution and the electoral law had resulted in a situation where it was impossible to govern France under the existing system. He wished to make clear that he had not taken a decision not to fix the date of the Assembly debate on Thursday, but it was all very complicated.

[Here follows a discussion on Indochina; for text, see volume XIII, Part 1, page 1327.]

Douglas MacArthur II

740.5/4–1354 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, April 14, 1954—1:19 p. m.

3647. Limit distribution. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary.

1. Fully concur Paris telegram 3882.[2] We will authorize immediate transmittal assurances to EDC to Prime Ministers upon notification by Embassy that French cabinet has set and announced date for debate in satisfactory terms to be held during week beginning May 24 and will release text as early as possible Friday. We will also send circular to missions in EDC countries today making sure all have received text pouched over week-end and informing them of likelihood that they will be called upon transmit text tomorrow urgently.[3]

2. If proves impossible for Hughes call NAC meeting on such short notice, assume Hughes can make suitable arrangements inform Ismay and Permanent Representatives.

3. Would appreciate information on *New York Times* story today that Laniel has given commitment for separate and prior debate on

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared with Palmer, Tyler of WE, and the Acting Secretary.

[2] Not printed; it reads as follows: "If French Cabinet decision Thursday morning on EDC sets and publicly announces definite date for debate during week beginning May 24, believe US assurances should be communicated to 6 Prime Ministers and NAC immediately thereafter in order that they may be made public late Friday. This necessary to enable Socialists promptly to issue call for party Congress" (740.5/4–1354).

[3] The definitive text of the U.S. assurances to the European Defense Community had been transmitted in circular airgram 5728, Apr. 9, to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, Paris, and Rome. On Apr. 15, this text was formally transmitted to the Prime Ministers of the six nations signatory to the European Defense Community Treaty in the form of a message from President Eisenhower. The text was released to the press on Apr. 16 and is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619–620.

three conditions of UK association, US assurances, and Saar before EDC debate. Although these matters bound be extensively discussed during EDC debate itself, we would consider it very unfortunate if they were debated separately and prior to EDC debate. This would present excellent opportunity for opposition to delay and disrupt debate.

SMITH

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238

Memorandum of Conversation, Held at Prime Minister Laniel's Office in Paris, April 14, 1954, 5:30 p. m.[1]

TOP SECRET [PARIS, ?] April 14, 1954.

Present: The Secretary
Prime Minister Laniel
Foreign Minister Bidault
Ambassador Dillon
Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
Lt. Col. Walters

After exchanging the usual amenities and after some talk concerning previous conversations which the Secretary had had on this visit in Paris, the Secretary said that he had talked with the British in London and felt that they had moved in considerable measure towards the position of France and the US. Mr. Laniel commented that this must have been difficult indeed. The Secretary said that he had the text of Mr. Eden's statement in the Commons today, which he understood had not been too well received by the opposition. The Secretary then said that the question of EDC was a vital one for the US. Events were taking place and things were happening, and for a country like the US, it was extremely difficult on one hand to stand still with France and on the other to go forward with the other nations. Both the President and the Foreign Minister said they could understand this difficulty, and Mr. Bidault said that it arose in France from the nature of the majority.

The Secretary said that he was very happy to learn that President Laniel had the intention of making public on the following day the date of the opening of the debate on EDC. The President said that this was so, and that he had been waiting for the appropriate moment to do this, as the risks were great. However, now the Government was going ahead and face these risks. The Secretary said that it was our intention to issue the U.S. declaration after the French Government had fixed the date for the EDC debate. He believed we could make public our declaration about 36 hours after the date of the debate was fixed. He felt that this, in conjunction with the official British paper and the statement that Mr. Eden was making in the Commons today, would have a very beneficial effect on French opinion. The Secretary then said that he felt that it was important that the French Government demonstrate its capacity to act, as there was no weakness greater than indecision. The President said that there had never been any indecision on his part, that his mind had been made up from the beginning, but that he had been awaiting the most opportune time to present this very difficult problem. The Secretary then said that he felt that when the Deputies realized the strength of the position which France would occupy within EDC with the support and assistance of the UK and the US, they would realize that this would be far stronger than anything that might be envisaged under any possible alternative scheme.

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[1] Drafting officer not indicated on source text, but the source text does carry the handwritten annotation "Approved by Sec Dulles. D. MacA".

Mr. Bidault then said that Mr. Laniel was a block of Norman granite on this subject. There was a jocular exchange at this point between Mr. Laniel who maintained that granite was found only in Brittany and not in Normandy, and Mr. Bidault who maintained that there was granite in Southern Normandy which he knew, having been a candidate for Parliament from a district there. Mr. Bidault then went on to say that under Mr. Laniel's direction there would be nothing lacking in the political skill which was important and which was Mr. Laniel's department as was courage. He also said that the Government would do all that had to be done. Mr. Laniel had shown his courage in removing a man who had not wished to be removed from his position. He had been compelled to remove Marshal Juin, difficult though this was in a country as divided as France, because this would show that no man was above the law. A "band of intriguers, imbeciles and men blinded with ambition" had seized upon this event to exploit it for political ends. There were always people avid to "inherit power and control of the government."

The Secretary then said that if this matter did not go forward and the ancient bonds that united France with the United States and other Western Powers were changed, the man who would aspire to the office of President of the Council of Ministers or Minister of Foreign Affairs in France would have a task which he would not envy and which would be virtually impossible.

The Secretary then said that he felt that there could be no more unfortunate position for a free nation today than to stand alone and apart from the others. He himself had constantly repeated to the American people and to Congress that we ourselves were not strong enough to stand alone, and he felt that this was in a greater measure true for France. Both President Laniel and Mr. Bidault said they shared completely this view. The Secretary said that he felt that much more was at stake here than the signature and ratification of a treaty. It was a concept of the fraternity of nations—whether we could live with such a concept or whether losing our illusions each one turned in upon himself. He feared that if France were to choose to stand alone, the weight of public opinion in America would move towards isolationism, and as he had stated previously, he did not believe that we could live in security in isolationism. Therefore what he sought of France was something more than what was needed to save France, it was also something France could do to help save the free world including the United States. The Secretary said that he did not in any degree minimize the difficulties of this task, the complexity of the problem, and the degree of courage required to deal with it. While he probably did not comprehend the whole problem in France, he did feel he had some appreciation of it.

[Here follows a discussion of Indochina; for text, see volume XIII, Part 1, page 1336.]

740.5/4–1454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, April 14, 1954—7 p. m.

3895. Reference: Embtel 3873, April 13.[2]

Uneasy truce now exists between opposing factions within Cabinet, URAS and ARS ministers have decided against leaving government at least for moment.

Considerable confusion and tension resulted from Laniel's conciliatory statement given April 13:

"In carrying out policy set forth and approved by very large majority, government took steps to bring Great Britain to specify modalities of cooperation it would be disposed to set up with EDC, which treaty, approved during last few months by Federal Republic, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg, is still subject to ratification by Italian and French Parliaments.

"Such is purpose of document which was taken note of by Council of Ministers during meeting April 12 and which Minister of Foreign Affairs was authorized to sign.

"Text will have to be approved by Parliament.

"Its execution is subordinated to EDC going into effect.

"Government also continuing negotiations with Federal Republic to obtain settlement Saar issue, which is still under discussion and whose aspects have been clearly set forth by France for very long time.

"Government hopes this settlement may be arrived at shortly. However, it considers that limit must be set to current discussions. Government thus has intention in any event to propose to Parliament that date be established for consideration of EDC treaty; this consideration will be preceded by debate covering fulfillment of prior conditions outlined in investiture declaration."

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] *Ante*, p. 931.

Artfully worded statement somewhat mollified Gaullist ministers. URAS group subsequently issued communiqué to effect that French signing agreement for UK association EDC thus merely indicated "taking note" of document (Embtel 3881).[3] This was later contested by Foreign Office communiqué issued evening April 13 which affirmed that signing had Cabinet approval and therefore committed government although not Parliament to which document would eventually be submitted for approval.

MRP ministers on other hand obviously pleased by Laniel's mention of setting date for assembly debate on EDC. However, concluding sentence re holding preliminary debate on "prior conditions" disturbing, as any such debate could highlight such issues as Saar and might entail at minimum further delays before acting on treaty. In view increasing tension between Gaullist and MRP ministers, Cabinet meeting still scheduled for April 15 bound to be stormy.

DILLON

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[3] Not printed. (740.5/4-1354)

740.5/4-1554 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

UNCLASSIFIED NIACT PARIS, April 15, 1954.

3900. Inform Bonbright immediately. Cabinet meeting adjourned this morning 11:30. Next meeting April 24. Issued following communiqué:

"Cabinet, considering necessity of parliamentary discussion on EDC,

Considering furthermore prior conditions placed on ratification,

Decides that, if the negotiations on these conditions are concluded, the government will ask the Conference of Presidents of National Assembly in its meeting of May 18 to take all action necessary so that the debate will take place immediately thereafter on British and American guarantees, the Saar Agreement, the additional protocols, and the Treaties of Bonn and Paris.

It directs the Foreign Minister to inform those meeting with the French Government in the present negotiations of the interest that exists in obtaining their reply to the French requests within a period of time permitting the debate on the ratification to begin on the date foreseen."

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[1] Repeated to Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, Luxembourg, and London.

DILLON

Editorial Note

In conformity with the pledge given by Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Laniel during the course of their talks at Paris on April 14 to "make public our declaration about 36 hours after the date of the [EDC] debate was fixed" (memorandum of conversation, April 14, page 936), and as a result of the decision by the French Cabinet to ask the National Assembly on May 18 to "take all action necessary so that the debate will take place immediately thereafter" on all aspects of the EDC question (telegram 3900, *supra*), the United States Government on April 16 released the text of its "Assurances Concerning EDC" which President Eisenhower had sent on April 15 to the Prime Ministers of the six nations signatory to the European Defense Community Treaty. For the text of the assurances, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 26, 1954, pages 619–620.

740.5/4–2254

The Secretary of State to the President [1]

TOP SECRET

PARIS, April 22, 1954.

Ambassador Dillon and I have just finished a conversation with Bidault on EDC and Indochina. Bidault was alone except that General Ely was present during part of the conversation regarding Indochina.

Regarding EDC, Bidault stated that the repudiation of Mollet's leadership by the Socialist Party last night, when its Executive Committee refused to call Party Congress as recommended by Mollet and had attached additional preconditions relating to EDC, was a grave and perhaps mortal blow to hopes of ratifying EDC treaty. Bidault said he had not yet fully appraised the consequences of this action, and it would require some further study, but his initial impression was that it would now be necessary to think in terms of some new short-form treaty which would gain support from the Right. He felt Socialist support was now so problematical and the party so divided that it would be useless to look to it as a primary source of parliamentary strength. Others at Quai d'Orsay indicated that Bevan's attacks on EDC had swung the balance in Executive Committee against Mollet.

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[1] Transmitted in telegram Dulte 2, Apr. 22, addressed eyes only for the President, Acting Secretary, Secretary Wilson, and Admiral Radford.

Regarding Indochina, Bidault said he had just spoken with Laniel and had suggested that Laniel might wish to see me. However, Laniel had preferred that Bidault represent him in this matter. Bidault expressed the opinion, which Ely confirmed, that the situation in Dien Bien Phu was now virtually hopeless. He stated that situation was complicated by disagreements and recriminations as between the generals. Ely expressed the view that break out was impracticable, involving abandonment of wounded and equipment. Bidault and Ely suggested that nothing could save the situation except perhaps "massive" air intervention which the US would have to supply. I said our information was that there were already more planes there than could be handled by crews and technicians, but Ely denied this situation was as bad as I seemed to think. Bidault suggested there should be emergency consultation between Navarre and US military commanders on spot, and indicated that while he had been opposed to internationalizing the war, he would favor it now with US if it would save Dien Bien Phu. He recalled that I had said that I thought US participation was impracticable without UK participation, but Bidault said this would not amount to much anyway and urged that our government should give the most serious consideration to armed intervention promptly as the only way to save the situation.

Ely left at the conclusion of this phase of the conversation, which then turned to organization of defense coalition. Bidault indicated that if Dien Bien Phu fell, he doubted whether there would be any French interest in this. I urged that this was essential to give some cards to work with at Geneva so as to have a chance of obtaining acceptable peace. However, if Dien Bien Phu fell, Bidault doubted that coalition would be looked upon by French nation as designed to accomplish peace at Geneva but rather as designed to keep France in the fighting in southeast Asia. His impression was that if Dien Bien Phu fell, the French would want to pull out entirely from southeast Asia, and assume no continuing commitments and the rest of us would have to get along without France in this area.

My comments and evaluation will follow.[2]

Dulles

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[2] In telegram Dulte 8 from Paris, Apr. 23, Dulles informed Eisenhower *inter alia*: "The situation here is tragic. France is almost visibly collapsing under our eyes. There is, of course, no military or logical reason why loss of Dien Bien Phu should lead to collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC. It seems to me that Dien Bien Phu has become a symbol out of all proportion to its military importance. It does not seem possible to change this situation, although we are not giving up hope and are doing everything possible to keep their spirit up. The position today is a little better as regards EDC, but probably if Dien Bien Phu falls, the government will be taken over by defeatists" (740.5/4–2354). This message is printed in full in vol. XIII, Part 1, p. 1374.

740.5/4–2354

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) [1]

TOP SECRET [PARIS,] April 23, 1954.

Participants: Prime Minister Laniel
M. Vidal
M. Bougenot
Mr. MacArthur
Mme. Laniel (also present but did not enter into conversation)

I had lunch privately with Mr. Laniel today at the Matignon. Messrs. Vidal and Bougenot were present for most of our conversation, as was Madame Laniel, who did not enter into the conversation.

Laniel opened by referring to our conversation last week regarding EDC.[2] He said that he was determined to push ahead with EDC as rapidly as possible. Delays by his government in having the Assembly debate EDC would be disastrous and play into the hands of EDC enemies.

I said I was not familiar with the details but the French Socialists seemed to be the key, and I understood that Mollet was having difficulties with his Party. Laniel said that Mollet had agreed to the announcement which had been made and had told him that it was adequate for his purposes. Subsequently, Mollet had encountered difficulties within his own party. Laniel was convinced that Mollet was sincere in trying to bring French Socialists solidly into line. Laniel wished us to know privately that he was approaching Spaak (whom he described as an outstanding and moderate European Socialist) with a request that he use all his influence on Mollet. He was also asking Maurice Schumann to see Mollet so that Mollet's difficulties could be straightened out by French governmental action. Vidal interrupted to say that he thought Laniel should see Mollet. Laniel assented and asked Vidal to try to arrange a quiet night meeting with Mollet at Laniel's private residence in the next couple of days. Bougenot then said that in view of the delay of the French Socialists in calling their Party Congress he did not think that the EDC debate would be possible until the first half of June. Laniel said that any such delay would, he knew, create great difficulties with U.S. opinion and every effort must be made to have the Socialist Congress meet in time for a subsequent Assembly debate about May 25.

Laniel then referred to the activities of the URAS members of his government who yesterday issued a statement saying they had no confidence in his foreign policy. Laniel said that he had refused to receive the URAS Ministers since, if he had done so, they would have issued untrue and contentious statements about his position after the meeting.

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[1] The meeting took place at the Hotel Matignon from 1 to 4 p. m. on Apr. 23. A summary of this conversation was transmitted in telegram Dulte 9 from Paris, Apr. 23 (740.5/4–2354).

[2] For a report on this conversation, see the memorandum of conversation, p. 932.

At this point in our conversation Laniel was informed that Delbos wanted to speak to him on the telephone. Laniel accepted the call in our meeting room and came away from the telephone encouraged. He said that Delbos had called to congratulate him for refusing to receive the URAS Ministers yesterday and had also told him that he (Delbos) would do his utmost to get further support for EDC among the Radical Socialists. Laniel asked Delbos on the telephone whether he thought there was a majority for EDC in the Assembly. Delbos replied he believed that there would be a small majority in a public vote but a considerably larger majority if there were a secret vote. Laniel then said that he was having great difficulties within his own cabinet. For example, Edgar Faure (Radical Socialist) who had been a strong proponent of European unity including EDC, now had suddenly taken the position that Molotov's European security proposal[3] had real merit. This was preposterous but indicative of the difficulties he had within his own cabinet. Faure was also strongly supporting Mendes-France's views on Indochina. He said that Bidault was the only member of his government on whom he could really depend, with respect to EDC and Indochina. Bidault was courageous and absolutely solid but he had no one else to support him vigorously in these two vital questions. Laniel asked me to assure the Secretary that he was doing everything in his power to move, with respect to EDC, and he believed that the French Parliament would ratify unless Dien-Bien-Phu fell, which would be a disaster vitally affecting French policy both in Indochina and in Europe.

I said that I was very glad to hear Laniel was determined to push forward swiftly on EDC. If France could not ratify EDC we, and other of the Allies, would be obliged to move without her. In particular I felt we would be obliged to put the contractuals agreement with Germany rapidly into effect and readjust our entire European strategy.

I asked Laniel how much trouble the Juin affair was causing for EDC.[4] He said it had created additional problems for his government which were difficult to handle without making a martyr of Juin. He hoped that The North Atlantic Council would ask for Juin's relief. A request from NATO would facilitate his removal of Juin without giving the enemies of EDC a single target—the French Government to shoot at. It was, of course, essential that Juin be replaced by a French officer and he had General Guillaume in mind.

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[3] Reference is to the proposal set forth by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the Berlin Conference on Feb. 10 for a general European collective security treaty and a subsequent Soviet note of Mar. 31 along similar lines. See the editorial note, p. 487.

[4] On Mar. 30, Marshal Juin declared in a public speech that the EDC was neither workable nor capable of being made so. As a result of his remarks, the Marshal was removed from all his posts within the French Army and was reprimanded by the NAT Council. Documentation on this incident is in file 740.5.

Reverting to Indochina, Laniel then said that if Dien-Bien-Phu fell the entire French picture would be changed. With all Bidault's qualities he did not think that he, or any other French Foreign Minister, could avoid reaching an agreement with the Communists at Geneva—even if unfavorable—if Dien-Bien-Phu fell.

He said that he had seen General Ely yesterday and asked him the following two questions:

1. Could Dien-Bien-Phu be saved? General Ely replied that if the US would intervene with about 200 to 300 carrier aircraft, he was convinced Dien-Bien-Phu could be saved, but hours were of the utmost importance and in 3 or 4 days such intervention would be meaningless.
2. Could the garrison of Dien-Bien-Phu fight its way out? Ely replied that under existing circumstances it could not make a fighting withdrawal. However, if US aircraft intervened massively, there was the possibility of a French relief column of a few battalions moving up from Laos. This was not a good prospect but might be feasible with US air intervention. Otherwise, it was not possible. Laniel summed up as follows: If Dien-Bien-Phu falls, France will have no choice but to accept a cease-fire. Also, this defeat will have a profound effect on EDC, probably destroying the possibilities of favorable French action.

I said to Laniel that the picture he had painted seemed to me catastrophic in terms of France's future. In essence, what he was saying was that the fall of a small outpost—important though it might be psychologically—would result in a capitulation by France and other decisions which would nullify all progress made in the past few years in our collective endeavors. It seemed to me that France would be left in a position of weak and defeated isolation. I could not conceive how any Frenchman could reason that the fall of an outpost in Indochina must result in the abandonment of that area and the destruction of the collective defense system which we had together developed for the defense of Western Europe. Laniel replied that he agreed it was not logical but the Dien-Bien-Phu had become a symbol in the minds of the French people and Parliament. It had became a tremendously emotional thing and Frenchmen were no longer capable of reasoning about it. I said that in essence the picture he painted would seem to leave the US no choice but to rethink, not only its strategic policy, but its entire political relationship with respect to France. Laniel said this would be a tragedy and one which he would do his utmost to avert, but he did not think that he could control the ground swell which would follow the loss of Dien-Bien-Phu and doubted that he would be long in office after its fall.

I said that while Laniel had made no direct requests to me for US air intervention, he had certainly implied such a request. On a personal basis I could only tell him that I saw little possibility of any US intervention if it were not part of an effective collective arrangement for united action in that area. In confidence, I could tell him that we had had consultations on a bipartisan basis with members of the US Congress. We felt that if there were effective collective arrangements we would probably be in a position to participate more actively but to ask us to intervene with aircraft to save Dien-Bien-Phu was in effect asking us to commit US prestige to save not only that fortress but the rest of Indochina without any political basis for such action. To me this did not seem possible. Bougenot said that US prestige need not be committed. The carrier based aircraft could be under nominal French command for the strikes and it need not be more than an isolated action lasting two or three days. If necessary, the aircraft could be painted with French insignia. They could, for example, be construed as part of the Foreign Legion for this limited action.

I replied that it just was not possible to commit US forces to battle in the way envisaged. There would certainly have to be Congressional support for such action. We could not commit US forces on a temporary basis as part of either the Foreign Legion or the French military establishment without the support of the US Congress.

Laniel said that if we could do nothing to save Dien-Bien-Phu, he thought the future was very dark. He repeated his conviction based on General Ely's estimate, that massive US carrier based aircraft would permit the holding of Dien-Bien-Phu.

I said that I was not a military man and, therefore, not capable of any military judgment. Personally I doubted seriously that intervention by aircraft would save the garrison. With respect to the future I thought that one had to always envisage the worst happening and if Dien-Bien-Phu fell in the coming days, I wondered what position his government would take, quite aside from the question of French Parliamentary and public opinion. Laniel said that he could not tell me what would happen. He personally was opposed to any agreement which would lead to the turnover of Indochina to the Communists, whether it be by a territorial division or the fusion of the VietNam and VietMinh governments. However, he thought there would be an irresistible ground swell in France calling for a cease-fire on almost any terms and he did not think any government could remain in power, which did not take this into consideration. He said that no one who did not live in France could understand the depth of French feeling against continuation of the Indochinese war. One might call this psychological, but it was nonetheless a deep and burning reality. Furthermore, if the fortress fell he thought all the Viet Nam fence sitters, including members of the present Viet Nam administration, would scramble toward Ho Chi Minh's bandwagon. He did not exclude defections by Viet Nam military units.

I said that I could only repeat what I had said previously, to the effect that it would be a tragedy for France and the free world if everything we had achieved together over the past few years were cast aside because of the loss of a relatively minor outpost in Indochina. I recognized the psychological implications but it seemed to me that the French must think how to limit the damage if Dien-Bien-Phu falls, rather than to throw up their hands in abandonment. Laniel said that he agreed but thought there was no possible way he could see to limit the damage.

In conclusion, he said that he would be glad to have General Ely give the Secretary a first hand estimate of the situation in Indochina from the French military view if the Secretary so desired. I said I believed the Secretary had seen General Ely yesterday but would pass on this message. Laniel also said that he understood Admiral Radford was arriving tomorrow. He would like to see Admiral Radford if this were possible. He understood that Radford was sympathetic to the idea of supporting Dien-Bien-Phu with US aircraft and he would appreciate the latter's estimate on what was possible. I made no comment.

740.5/4–2354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 23, 1954—1 p. m.

4026. For Acting Secretary. The following joint Bruce Mission-Embassy analysis of present prospects for Socialist Congress to fix party position on EDC has been given Secretary and advisers.

Begin text: "The regular weekly meeting of the directing committee of the SFIO on April 21 does not appear to have been as disastrous to the convocation of the Socialist Congress as was first thought.

"We have discussed the matter with Mollet and Daniel Mayer. We will continue to see the Socialists today, but all discussions so far indicate the following:

> "Mollet was not 'beaten' (battu) on April 21. Rather he was convinced by his enemies and friends for that matter that the 'communiqué' attributed to a government spokesman (and not put out as a government position) was insufficient for the committee's purposes and could not be presented to the congress as the answer to the Socialist demands. (Mollet states he never indicated satisfaction with the one sentence 'communiqué'.) Mollet then retreated from the position he had intended to take in the committee and accepted its view that a congress will be held but only after some formal action by the French Government has been taken to meet Socialist demands.

"It would therefore appear that what is now required is:

> "1. To obtain formal statement of the French Government that it supports the policy of a democratically elected common as-

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[1] Repeated to The Hague, London, Brussels, Rome, Bonn, and Berlin.

sembly to which the EDC Commissariat will be responsible and proposes the adoption of this policy by other EDC countries. Such a statement would meet Mollet's requirements in that he has stated that the Socialists believe that the other five countries have accepted this principle and that the French Government is the only stumbling block.

"This could either be done unilaterally by the French Government, or in the form of a statement by the six Foreign Ministers. Spaak's presence in Paris this afternoon and Hallstein's possible arrival here tomorrow could permit the latter since the other Foreign Ministers are here for the NAC". *End text.*

It was accordingly recommended that:

1. Mr. Spaak be approached to assist in the foregoing.
2. The Secretary speak to Laniel or Bidault in an effort to persuade them formally to issue the required statement without of course going into any details of substance which would be worked out between government and Socialists.

Secretary seeing Spaak this afternoon after NAC meeting and MacArthur is lunching with Laniel.

Overall joint analysis EDC situation follows.[2]

DILLON

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[2] Telegram 4028, *infra.*

740.5/4–2354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, April 23, 1954—4 p. m.

4028. For Acting Secretary. Limit distribution. Joint Embassy Bruce Mission message.

The problem of the Socialist Party's condition for democratic control of the European army seems presently complicated by misunderstandings. Maurice Schumann is reported to have said that Mollet had confessed to a defeat at the hands of his own executive committee on Wednesday night. Bidault is reported to have felt that the Socialists had failed him in the understanding he thought he had reached with them, and to have said that lacking Socialist support the only alternative would seem to be the so-called "short treaty" which in effect would be a fundamental concession to right-wing anti-EDC elements in the French Government, and would require a re-negotiation of the question of a German military contribution. Such action at its best would be time-consuming and there is no assurance that it would be acceptable to the four nations which have already ratified EDC, and are now openly suspicious of the French Government's sincerity in regard to the implementation of the North Atlantic Organization's military strategic plan.

A conversation with Mollet yesterday indicates that as far as he is concerned he feels that the public manifestation of the assurances given him by Bidault, presumably speaking on behalf of the French Government, has been inadequate and ambiguous. The one sentence so-called communiqué, which as Mollet terms it "was not a communiqué", very obviously bound the government in no substantial degree. Mollet has had his directing committee give him permission to convoke it as soon as an official response is received by the Socialist Party to its demand for its formula regarding democratic control over the European army. (See Embtel 4026[1] for further explanation of Socialist situation.)

Under the circumstances, it appears that either Messrs. Laniel, Bidault or Mollet or all of them have been lacking in candor with us.

There is nothing in this complication which is irremediable. If the French Government would immediately issue an endorsement of Mollet's demand, coupled with an announcement that it was referring the matter, under its sponsorship, to the other five participating nations, the way would be cleared for Mollet to schedule his party congress.

Perhaps Mr. Spaak, who will arrive in Paris this afternoon, can be usefully employed as a stalking horse in this affair. There is reason to believe he will not be coy in trying to effect an accommodation that will not reflect discredit on the pretensions to integrity of the respective potential partners to this combination.

But if this intermediate obstacle to an EDC ratification debate in France is hurdled there will still remain the formidable obstruction of agreement on the Saar. Maurice Schumann's recent assurances to Dillon are more constructive than any of his preceding ones, but we will have to await a further meeting between Schumann and Hallstein before we can make any reliable assessment of this situation. A discreet intervention by the US and UK in this complicated imbroglio may soon be timely, since both nations have, because of the demand for their guarantees, a distinct interest in a settlement at once fair and decisive. Without questioning the good faith of the French Government, we must recognize the fact that a postponement or even procrastination over this issue can easily make impossible the fixing of early definite date for EDC debate.

Above and beyond these matters of detail, the US should be unceasingly aware that nothing in the conduct of French governments over the two year period since the EDC treaty was initialled should lead even the most trusting of friendly nations to believe in its protestations. An undertaking by Laniel's Cabinet to ask the steering committee on May 18 to fix a date for debate—presumably on May 25—is sound and fury unless that Cabinet, and particularly the Prime Minister, will, after showing a reasonable and honorable spirit of cooperation on the Saar and democratic control issues, be ready to employ all the powers of government to bring about the desired result.

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[1] *Supra.*

The debate in the steering committee will be in effect the first action of the National Assembly itself, as distinct from the government, on the EDC. Full governmental support will be required for a favorable result including the willingness to pose question of confidence on setting date for debate. Bidault has told Dillon this will be done, but we have no governmental commitment on this point.

The US and UK have deeply engaged themselves in this venture, so promising for the future of Europe and of peace. To falter now, to turn back when we have neared the end of the furrow, would be politically stupid and morally indefensible. It is true that few factors of influence remain to us. With Anglo-Saxon generosity, and perhaps what might be viewed as credulity, we have more ardently espoused the cause of European integration than its formal originators, the French. However, the US and UK owe a duty not only to themselves but to their global responsibilities to make a realistic attempt to bring this wayward, unreflecting, illogical neighbor to a sense of its responsibilities if it expects to share with them the prestige as well as the burden of leadership of the free world.

The great issue in Europe is not German rearmament, important as that is. It is whether or not federal Germany (and eventually the whole of that divided country) shall be oriented to the west or to the east. Its balance in the scales may well be decisive in determining whether peace will prevail or aggression will pay.

It is, therefore, suggested that the Federal Republic of Germany, if not admitted by France to a respectable association through the EDC with its fellow nations of the free world, should, upon the initiative of the US and Great Britain, be accorded the right to separate the contractual agreements from the EDC treaty, and enjoy that measure of sovereignty provided for it under the provisions of the Treaty of Bonn. The French Government should be advised at once that if it is unable or undesirous of precipitating debate on EDC, the US and UK expect publicly to suggest the implementation of the Bonn Treaty, regardless of EDC.

DILLON

740.5/4–2454 : Telegram

The United States Delegation at the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, April 24, 1954—6 p. m.

Secto 11. Limit distribution. Secretary met with Spaak this morning [2] and was informed three Benelux Foreign Ministers had agreed present to EDC interim committee next week formula to meet Mollet's demands for democratic control EDC. Spaak will see Mollet this afternoon to attempt satisfy him, and will also see Hallstein today to endeavor obtain consent German Government. His contacts with French Government officials lead him believe such Benelux initiative can be effective. He feels sure Italians will interpose no objection. He hopes IC can agree April 28 on measures which will permit Mollet proceed convocation Socialist Congress.

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[1] Repeated to Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] A copy of the memorandum of this conversation is in file 740.5/4–2454.

Spaak feels majority for EDC exists French National Assembly if government pressed issue. He did not indicate great concern over coming to power Mendes-France as such but feels circumstances attendant any such change of government in France would cause long and perhaps fatal delays EDC. He feels serious political errors of De Gaulle have eliminated possibility his return to power which otherwise would have been virtual certainty, especially if disaster in Indochina.

In response Secretary's outline gravity in US failure bring EDC into being promptly, Spaak said French parliamentarians simply did not believe US would basically alter its European policy though smaller states vividly aware danger caused by failure French leadership. Finally, Spaak said possibly Germans should make statement re Saar indicating their ultimate position (which would be, however, contingent on EDC ratification). However, in view atmosphere France especially due Indochina problem, Spaak thought it undesirable threaten French with restoration German sovereignty in event EDC fails.

Spaak promised all possible help and De Staercke will remain in close contact US officials Paris.

740.5/4–2754 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

SECRET PARIS, April 27, 1954—7 p. m.

Coled 230. 1. De Staercke informs us that informal agreement has been reached between representatives of 6 EDC governments regarding problem of French Socialist request for action on democratic control of EDC. Compromise resulted directly from talks held by Spaak over weekend with other Foreign Ministers in Paris for NATO meeting. De Staercke expects text (quoted below) to be approved in EDC/IC tomorrow but that publication will be delayed until next Tuesday because of Dutch insistence on necessity Cabinet approval in their country. De Staercke spoke to Mollet today, who said that he would accept this text as basis for calling Socialist Congress if it were best obtainable under the circumstances. De Staercke also indicated that Bidault has approved this text. Because the communiqué cannot be published before next Tuesday, Mollet informed De Staercke that his Socialist Congress could not meet before May 30.

2. Following is text which De Staercke gave us:

Begin verbatim text. Draft communiqué of six governments signatory to EDC treaty. The six Foreign Ministers of the governments signatory to the EDC treaty have reached agreement in principle with a view to reinforcing democratic control of the European communities in existence or in the process of creation.

It is understood that this provision does not involve any modification in the treaties which have been concluded and ratified by a certain number of the signatory states. It also does not in any way extend the competencies as these are defined by these treaties. It in no way prejudices the continuation of the negotiations undertaken with a view to the creation of a European political community.

The six governments will concert, after ratification of the EDC treaty, with a view to preparing the necessary conventions to apply the agreement in principle which they have reached concerning the replacement of the present assembly by an assembly elected by direct universal suffrage before which the High Authority of the CSC and the Commissariat of the EDC will be responsible. These conventions will be submitted for a vote to the Parliaments of the signatory states. *End verbatim text.*

BRUCE

740.5/4–2954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET GENEVA, April 29, 1954—8 p. m.

Dulte 28. Acting Secretary from Secretary. At luncheon today Spaak gave me report on his weekend activities in Paris re democratic control of EDC along lines of Coled 230.[2] Spaak said agreement reached in Paris not perfect and not entirely satisfactory to Belgium and certain other EDC governments. Provision for popularly elected Assembly would probably slow down EPC and delay real economic integration of Europe. However, in final analysis this would depend on composition of Assembly and will of EDC governments to move forward in making a united Europe. Essential point was that all had to make sacrifices now to do maximum to put EDC through. In Spaak's judgment we have two months left in which France can do this, following which it will probably not be possible.

Spaak said real problem was inability of French Government to take action. He felt reasonably certain if French Government got behind EDC and pushed it, it would pass. However, French Government had not felt able to do so. Now delays should be avoided at all costs, since they played into hands of French EDC opponents.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce, to Brussels for the Ambassador. and to Bonn for Conant. Dulles was at Geneva to attend the Four-Power Conference on Korea and Indochina, Apr. 26–July 21: for documentation, see volume XVI.

[2] *Supra.*

He said that he had been turning over in his own mind possibility of some additional form of pressure on French at an appropriate time. His thoughts not crystalized but he leaned toward declaration by five other EDC members, US and UK. Declaration would be a solemn appeal to French to ratify. It must not be couched in terms which could be construed as pressure or threat. It might review history of EDC (i.e.) fact that it was French proposals; that after signature of treaty French added additional protocols which other members agreed to; that French next insisted on prior resolution of further conditions such as US and UK declaration and Saar; that other countries had met every French request; and finally (appeal to France to take necessary steps). This was on assumption that there could be agreement on Saar which he thought possible. (He had talked to Hallstein and suggested Adenauer come forward with constructive proposals but clearly link Saar settlement to French ratification of EDC.)

Referring again to possible declaration by five EDC powers, US and UK, Spaak said he believed it would take political leaders in France, even some who favor EDC stop taking US for granted and begin to realize that if France did not ratify EDC other countries would be obliged to move without her, leaving France in isolation. The very fact that seven powers he enumerated were able to formulate common declaration without France would cause French politicos to stop and begin to think seriously, and in addition would make French public aware of situation.

I said I warmly welcomed Spaak's arrival on EDC scene. He brought new European vigor and energy to problem and we were counting on him and would support to our best any ideas he might develop working to EDC ratification. I said US had done everything it conceivably could to bring EDC into being and did not see what more we could do on our own. Spaak said we had done everything possible and he was aware of catastrophic effect on American opinion if Europe could not unite. He recognized we would have to make other plans, and this would be tragedy for Europe. I said it would be also a tragedy for us but one we would have to face if EDC could not be brought into being.

I then said idea of declaration seemed to have much merit but I was not quite clear how Italy could join in such declaration if it had not ratified. He replied that if Italy had not ratified it could not join declaration and declaration would have to be also aimed at Italy. This would not make France entirely isolated. I told Spaak that I too had been thinking of ways of further influencing French. One possibility was for four EDC countries which have ratified EDC [3] invoking article 132 of EDC treaty which provided that if EDC has not been ratified 6 months following signature of treaty, governments which have deposited ratification instruments shall consult on measures to be taken. Four governments might invite US and UK to meet with them and then issue a declaration. The US and UK having ratified NATO–EDC protocol and German contractuals could legitimately be asked to be present, at least as observers. Spaak said this was very interesting idea and he would give immediate thought to it. It was agreed that he would keep in close touch with Bruce through Andre de Staercke. I also told him I plan to stop for dinner in Paris next Monday evening, May 3, en route to US and that if he had any ideas by that time I would be glad to receive them, either through Bruce or directly from Andre de Staercke, who could see me briefly at Dillon's residence if this seemed best.[4] We also agreed above possibility should be kept very confidential for moment since tactics and timing important. Spaak mentioned that he had spoken briefly to Hallstein about some form of declaration but indicated that he had not discussed it in any detail.

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[3] The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See the editorial note, p. 927.

DULLES

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[4] No record of Dulles' brief stay in Paris on May 3 has been found in Department of State files.

611.65/5–454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET

ROME, May 4, 1954.

3514. Limit distribution. While Italians advised previously in firmest manner Secretary [2] would not bring up Trieste question and wished to talk on broader aspects of international problems, particularly EDC, Scelba spent most of his time discussing Trieste. Following is summary of frank 2½-hour Milan discussion May 3:

Scelba in first hour brought out following points:

1. He stated wished to speak in the most friendly but frank manner on mutual problems. He pointed out absolute necessity all democratic nations stick together to fight Communist menace, that what was needed was actions not words. Stated while he had only parliamentary majority of 8, he would continue De Gasperi's firm policy for NATO and EDC. Added Italy has done much in military field as proof of her adherence to Atlantic Community.

2. Trieste: Although Italy's particular problems are basically small compared to others, solution of these problems would greatly help her progress toward EDC and European Community. However,

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[1] Repeated to London and Belgrade; transmitted in two sections. The full text of this telegram is printed in the compilation on Trieste in volume VIII.

[2] Secretary Dulles was returning to Washington via Milan after attending the opening sessions of the Geneva Conference.

stated unequivocally and confidentially that unless Trieste solved satisfactorily for Italian public and Parliament, would be impossible pass EDC despite government and democratic parties full realization EDC essential to Italy. Added while he had tried to divorce EDC and Trieste, this proved impossible because of internal political factors. Stated while he obliged make categoric statement re impossibility EDC without Trieste, he would not state so publicly. Scelba then said urgency re Trieste due to lack of implementation October 8,[3] adding Italian public believed we could now implement October 8 and could not understand delay. Pointed up urgency Trieste solution since knew it imperative for Italy pass EDC soonest.

[Here follows an extended discussion by Scelba of Trieste, Italian economic problems, the hydrogen bomb, and the Balkan pact.]

Secretary in frank reply brought out following points:

(1) He and US public opinion had received good impression of vigorous and realistic policies being followed by Scelba's Government and his anti-Communist moves.

(2) Secretary was pleased to learn views of both governments re Communist peril were similar. Threat can only be met by vigorous methods. Secretary pointed out Kremlin had formed monolithic, highly-disciplined groupings of some 800 million persons, and was trying now to expand its control, particularly in Southeast Asia. The Soviet type of enforced unity calls for vigorous efforts, for voluntary unity by others which entails voluntary sacrifices, many of which US has already made in trying to assist its friends financially and militarily since war. Unless Europe voluntarily is united, it might well be united in the Communist fashion. This, of course, would also include Italy.

(3) Lack of European unit: Secretary stated he would be lacking in candor if did not state there is rising discouragement in US at lack of European unit. Our economic aid since the beginning had as its objective the unification of Europe, but many Americans now feel this aid may have been used merely subsidize old systems and maintain disunity of Europe. There are some in US who feel might bring about greater unity by stopping US aid so that force of reality and consequences would cause Europeans on their own to unity. There is great disappointment in US over slow progress EDC ratification by Italy and France. Europe facing critical situation; unless they should immediately take vigorous steps to unify, time might well pass when unification would be possible. Some countries seemed believe only reason for unity was to please US, but there are many more fundamental reasons for unity than this.

[Here follows further discussion on Trieste, economic aid, the facilities agreement, and Scelba's request for greater cooperation in coordinating anti-Communist propaganda.]

LUCE

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[3] Reference is to the Anglo-American plan for Trieste announced on Oct. 8, 1953; for documentation, see volume VIII.

740.5/5–1754 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Tomlinson) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, May 17, 1954—9 p. m.

Coled 244. Department pass Bruce. Alphand states government will not bring question of fixing date for EDC debate for Committee of Presidents tomorrow and will oppose fixing date if question is raised on grounds prior conditions of Saar and protocol signature are not fulfilled.

Intentions now are to wait until after extraordinary Socialist Congress is held before asking committee to fix debate. In this way Socialists will be under discipline in committee and in Parliament in setting date. According to Alphand, procedures have approval of Mollet and Teitgen. Alphand mentioned around June 15 or June 20 as possible dates for debate assuming Government does not fall and Indochina situation does not deteriorate.

TOMLINSON

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[1] Repeated for information to Bonn and London.

740.5/5–1854 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1954—6 : 01 p. m.

4130. Eyes only Ambassador. Although I realize Laniel is submerged in Indochina crisis and Geneva, I believe we must keep pressure on with respect to EDC. This is essential not only in light impending Congressional action on mutual security program but also because of evidence that Adenauer's political position is steadily worsening as result French delays on EDC. Moreover it is by no means inappropriate to reiterate to Laniel importance we attach to EDC ratification at moment when he is considering request to us for participation in Indochina hostilities.

President issued his assurances on EDC on basis reported agreement French Cabinet for certain ratification timetable which has not been lived up to.

I would appreciate your comments on following steps now under contemplation:

(1) Delivery formal communication to Laniel recalling Bonn Treaty signed almost exactly two years ago and ratified long since by three parties other than France, and asking in light this lapse for

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[1] Drafted by Merchant. Cleared by Bruce, Lyon, MacArthur, S/P, WE, and RA. A handwritten note on the source text reads: "Approved by the Secretary. L[ivingston] T. M[erchant]". Initialed for the Secretary by Merchant. Repeated to Geneva, eyes only for the Under Secretary.

formal expression French intentions and expected timing ratification Bonn and Paris treaties.

(2) Request that reply in writing confirm: (*a*) Government's intention seek prompt conclusion Saar agreement with Adenauer (in order avoid debate on Saar question at Council of Europe May 27 session it seems to us essential that Adenauer and Bidault be able to announce prior such date that agreement had been reached); (*b*) Government's intention work out equally prompt agreement with Adenauer on signature of protocols; and (*c*) Government's determination (on assumption Socialist Congress successfully concluded and Saar settlement as well as agreement on protocols signature reached by June 1) to call not later than first week of June for immediate uninterrupted debate on EDC ratification with vote made issue of confidence if necessary.

It is not contemplated that this exchange of note would be published or directly linked with question of Indochina.

We are awaiting your comments before discussing the foregoing initiative with British. Our plan is to seek their agreement to parallel and concurrent approach to French.

Text draft note (see (1) above) being transmitted in immediately following cable.[2]

DULLES

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[2] Telegram 4131, *infra*.

740.5/5–1854

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, May 18, 1954—6:01 p. m.

4131. Eyes only Ambassador. Following is text draft note to Laniel referred to in immediately preceding telegram:[2]

"Excellency: I have the honor to refer to conversations which we have had regarding the intentions of the French Government with reference to the ratification of the Paris Treaty, establishing a European Defense Community, and the Bonn Treaty, otherwise known as the contractual agreements with Germany. These treaties were signed on May 26, 1952 by the duly authorized representatives of the governments concerned. Shortly thereafter, the Bonn Treaty was ratified by the US Senate in accordance with our constitutional processes. The Governments of the UK and the Federal Republic likewise promptly ratified the Treaty in accordance with their own constitutional processes. Of the four parties signatory to the Treaty, only France has failed to act in similar fashion. Moreover, as your Excellency is aware, four of the six members of the proposed European Defense Community have now completed action on the Paris Treaty.

After such long delay, I therefore find it necessary to ask on behalf of my Government a formal expression of the intentions of your Government with respect to the Bonn and Paris agreements.

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[1] Repeated to Geneva, eyes only for the Under Secretary.

[2] Telegram 4130, *supra*.

My Government has a particular interest in these questions at this time not only because of its concern regarding its present overall policies with regard to Europe and the possible necessity to bring about some alteration in those policies, but also because of the imminent consideration by the US Congress of the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year 1955. As you know, the status of the European Defense Community will be a question of special concern during these debates, and will doubtless play a major role in the outcome thereof.

With regard to the Bonn Treaty, it seems to me unwise and indeed objectionable further to deprive the Federal Republic of the rights, privileges and obligations provided for in that Treaty. I therefore find it necessary to inform you that unless the Bonn and Paris treaties are shortly brought into force, my Government will consider it necessary, in consultation with the British Government, to consider with the Government of the Federal Republic, what practical step or steps can be taken to grant the Federal Republic a position at least equivalent to that provided for in the Bonn Treaty.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration."

Dulles

740.5/5-1954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY Paris, May 19, 1954—4 p. m.

4440. Eyes only Under Secretary. Department limit distribution. Re Deptel 4130.[2] I have been much concerned about EDC situation for some time. Two things are perfectly clear.

1. That as long as present state of acute crisis exists regarding Indochina there is no hope of a sucessful debate on EDC. The single-minded effort for a period of at least two weeks of all pro-EDC elements in government will be necessary in order to have chance of ratification of EDC by French Parliament.
2. Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before Indochina crisis has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postponement or defeat of EDC.

While pro-EDC members of French Government originally saw no connection between EDC and Geneva,[3] the fall of Dien Bien Phu and present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed situation. EDC is for the moment inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and Franco-US negotiations regarding united action in Indochina. While there is no direct logical connection between the two, the way in which we handle present Indochina negotiations with French is bound to have great effect on our friends in French Government who are supporting EDC. The two key elements in this situation are (1) the finding of a solution to the clarification of the independence of Associated States that will not require France to publicly proclaim right of withdrawal from French union and (2) the question of Marines for Indochina as raised by Schumann and Embtel 4416.[4] Unless we can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come.

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[1] Repeated to Geneva.

[2] Dated May 18, p. 955.

[3] Reference is to the Four-Power Conference on Korea and Indochina held at Geneva, Apr. 26–July 21, documentation on which is presented in volume xvi.

Indeed, if we fail to reach agreement with French for joint, effective and hopeful action in Indochina, the Laniel government which is living on borrowed time granted by National Assembly in the hope that, thanks to United States support, an honorable solution can be reached at Geneva, will probably fall. A government pledged to peace in Indochina at any price is then likely and such a government is also likely to bury EDC for good. As regards Geneva, I am sure that Soviets must be well aware of the reaction of Indochina crisis on EDC situation here. Therefore, I would assume that they would, while endeavoring to appear reasonable in public and before world opinion, take action to prevent any agreement in Geneva other than ignominious surrender at least until July when there would no longer be time to debate EDC here prior to summer recess. Therefore, the only way that I can see to push EDC to a vote here with a reasonable chance of success is to bring present United States-French negotiations on Indochina to a successful conclusion in next two or three weeks. Such a result would enable us to give solid support to French at Geneva and would recreate the spirit of alliance between our two countries which has been lacking since Dien Bien Phu.

Meanwhile, technical progress on EDC has continued. I do not consider that French have failed to live up to agreement regarding setting date for debate as Saar precondition has not yet been met. Delay on this is clearly a joint Franco-German responsibility and cannot by any stretch of the imagination be imputed solely to French. There has been real progress in these negotiations which as reported are now concerned almost entirely with the two words "corresponding relations" in Article 12 of Naters' report.[5] Schumann told me that if Teitgen and Adenauer could not reach complete agreement at Strasbourg he expected another meeting with Hallstein. He also told me that if no new points were brought up by Hallstein, it should be possible to reach complete agreement at this next meeting. There has also been real progress on protocol signature problem as has recently been reported by Bruce mission. If Socialist Party Congress should live up to Mollet's expectations, Laniel's position regarding EDC will be greatly strengthened, not only in Parliament, but also in committees and, in particular, in Steering Committee where first test of strength will take place. MRP Congress due May 27 and 28 also expected take strong pro-EDC position.

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[4] No copy of this top secret telegram, dated May 17, has been found in Department of State files.

[5] Regarding van der Goes van Naters' report on the Saar, see the editorial note, p. 803.

In view of above, I feel that present is not quite the time for letter such as described in reference telegram. I feel we should concentrate our immediate efforts on conclusion of Indochina negotiations with France and on bringing about a Saar settlement and agreement on signature of the protocols, all prior to June 1.

Delivery of letter of type indicated in reference telegram at this time, in the midst of crucial Franco-US negotiations on Indochina, would in my opinion not have effect of exerting pressure on French, but would simply ensure defeat or indefinite postponement of EDC and would greatly strengthen group in French Government favoring peace at any price in Indochina.

By June 1 situation should be much clearer and then if, after further conversations with Laniel, there still should be no progress on EDC I feel that the time would be ripe to consider seriously the delivery of a formal letter regarding intentions to the French. Status of Indochina crisis will, however, still have to be taken into consideration in reaching our final decision. Meanwhile I suggest that our action be limited to oral communications by me regarding importance of EDC to Schumann or Laniel or both the next time I see them regarding Indochina.[6]

DILLON

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[6] In telegram 4184, May 20, the Embassy in France was informed of the decision that delivery of the note to the French Government concerning the "German occupation status and also communication re fixing date EDC debate" should "not be taken until after Socialist Party Congress and further consideration situation Geneva." Meanwhile, however, the Embassy was instructed "orally make vigorous effort achieve signature Protocols and Saar Agreement". (740.5/5-2054)

740.5/5-2054 : Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, May 20, 1954.

CA-6753. Subject: U.S. Assurances on EDC. Paris pass Bruce Mission and USRO. Since there will be public discussion of U.S. assurances to the EDC during forthcoming debates on the EDC, U.S. officials, both in France and in other EDC countries, are likely to be asked for interpretations of the assurances and may be called upon to answer criticisms. The present despatch is designed to provide U.S.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Tyler of WE, Moore, and Colonel Gerhardt of Defense. Sent also to Bonn, Brussels, London, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.

representatives with background information for appropriate use in this connection.

There have been three principal criticisms of the assurances from opponents of the EDC: (1) that the assurances contain nothing new; (2) that the old assurances are now made conditional on EDC ratification, which constitutes a threat that we will not live up to our NATO obligations unless EDC is ratified; (3) that the assurances represent a policy declaration by the President only and in no sense are binding on the Congress.

The following general points can be made in answer to these criticisms:

In the first place, as indicated in the detailed commentary below, there are a number of important new elements in the assurances. Although some of the points have been made before in various contexts and at various times over the past five years, either separately by the Congress or by the Executive, they have never been brought together in a single clear statement of U.S. policy.

In the second place, it is important to bear in mind the basic purpose of the assurances. They were not intended to be a new commitment or "concession" to the French; their real purpose was to clarify U.S. policy because of doubts as to U.S. intentions which had been fostered by critics of the EDC. Through erroneous press stories and rumors concerning U.S. troop withdrawals and the "New Look", EDC critics in France and elsewhere sought to create the false impression that the U.S. was advocating the EDC as a substitute for U.S. participation in NATO defense. The impression had been created that we wanted German forces in the EDC to replace U.S. forces. The basic purpose of the assurances was to show that the best way to assure continued U.S. participation in the defense of Western Europe was to strengthen NATO through establishment of the EDC as its core of strength on the Continent.

Third, it is erroneous to charge that the assurances represent a retraction of, or a placing of a condition on, our NATO obligations, with a threat that we will withdraw from them if the EDC is not ratified. As the statement itself makes plain, our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty "will be honored". The significant fact is that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which obligates the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, does not obligate the U.S. to do any of six things listed under the numbered headings. The six numbered items are undertakings we are prepared to take in addition to our minimum obligations under the NAT, provided NATO is strengthened through the EDC.

Finally, in answer to the charge that the statement is only a unilateral statement by the President not representing full U.S. Government policy and not in any way binding the Congress, it can be pointed out that the message is a statement of full U.S. Government policy for the following reasons. The purpose of the statement, as indicated above, was to provide a single clear statement of basic U.S. policy toward NATO and the EDC to remove doubts as to U.S. intentions which had been fostered by critics of the EDC. Although the message was not by its nature the type of document which could or should receive full formal Congressional approval, it nevertheless was discussed fully in advance with the Congressional leaders of both political parties in order to assure that the President's message would reflect U.S. Government policy. The Congressional leaders concurred in its issuance after certain changes were made in the text to meet points raised by them. Finally, it should be noted that two of the most important items are based on policies which have already been formally approved by the Senate or the Foreign Relations Committee. Item (1) on maintaining our "fair share" of forces is based on the Senate's "Troops for Europe" [2] resolution and item (6) on indefinite duration of the North Atlantic Treaty is based on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's unanimous report on the Treaty.[3]

There follows a more detailed commentary on the text of the assurances.

"As the time approaches for historic decision on the remaining measures required to put into effect the European Defense Community Treaty, it is appropriate for me to state clearly the United States position on the relationship between the European Army and the European Community on the one hand, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the broader Atlantic Community on the other hand. The essential elements of this position, which have been discussed with leaders of both political parties in the Congress, may be simply stated."

> [*Comment:* As indicated above, the text was discussed well in advance of issuance with the Congressional leaders of both political parties and textual changes were made to incorporate the views.] [4]

"The United States is firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty is in accordance with the basic security interests of the United States and will steadfastly serve these interests regardless of the fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country. The obligations which the United States has assumed under the Treaty will be honored."

> [*Comment:* The second and third sentences of this paragraph have been adapted from the language of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's June 6, 1949 report on the North Atlantic Treaty. The Committee's report reads as follows: "The Treaty is in accordance with the basic interests of the United States, which should be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in the international situation."]

"The North Atlantic Treaty has a significance which transcends the mutual obligations assumed. It has engendered an active practical working relationship among the Atlantic nations. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without the devastation or occupation of any NATO country. These nations are also seeking to make the Atlantic alliance an enduring association of free peoples, within which all members can concert their efforts toward peace, prosperity and freedom."

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[2] Regarding the "Great Debate" in Congress regarding troop levels in Europe during early 1951 which culminated in the adoption of Senate Resolution 99 of Apr. 4, see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 14.

[3] Documentation on Senate approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is presented *ibid.*, 1949, vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.

[4] Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.

"The European Defense Community will form an integral part of the Atlantic Community and, within this framework, will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United States forces and the forces of the European Defense Community on the Continent of Europe. I am convinced that the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty will provide a realistic basis for consolidating western defenses and will lead to an ever-developing community of nations in Europe."

[*Comment:* These paragraphs emphasize the desire of the U.S. not only to support, but to develop further, obligations assumed under the original NAT. In the first of these two paragraphs, emphasis is laid on two NATO objectives, both very important to the Europeans: (*a*) the need for strength which will enable NATO to halt aggression, if it occurs, *without devastation or occupation of any NATO country;* and (*b*) the importance of making NATO an *enduring association of free peoples* concerned with non-military strength. The purpose of the second paragraph is to point out that the EDC, when it comes into being, will be an integral part of the Atlantic Community and will play a very important role in enabling NATO to attain the two highly desirable objectives listed in the preceding paragraph.]

"The United States is confident that, with these principles in mind, the Western European nations concerned will proceed promptly further to develop the European Community through ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. When that Treaty comes into force the United States, acting in accordance with its rights and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty will conform its actions to the following policies and undertakings:"

[*Comment:* This paragraph is a logical extension of the argument in the preceding paragraph. It first expresses our confidence that the European countries will do their part to develop the European Community because of what this means toward making NATO a stronger and more effective organization. It then goes on to point out the specific steps which the U.S. will be prepared to take toward a NATO thus made stronger and more effective. These steps are listed in the numbered paragraphs which follow.]

"(1) The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area."

[*Comment:* There are two commitments here:

(*a*) A commitment by the U.S. Government if EDC is ratified to maintain our "fair share" of forces in Europe as long as a threat to Europe exists. Hitherto the United States has given no formal commitment on this subject. The actual language used here is adopted from that of Senate Resolution 99 of April 4, 1951 which concluded the "Troops for Europe" debate. The text of that Resolution reads: "It is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the U.S. to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area."

(*b*) A commitment to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy, i.e., the "forward strategy." Although we have agreed to this in connection with NATO planning, we have up to now given no explicit public commitment of this sort. This is an important commitment to the Western European countries because the "forward strategy" is the key to the effective defense of their national territories.]

"(2) The United States will consult with its fellow signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and with the European Defense Community on questions of mutual concern, including the levels of the respective armed forces of the European Defense Community, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty countries to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander in Europe."

[*Comment:* Consultations currently take place with NATO in connection with the Annual Review. However, there has never been an explicit public commitment to hold these consultations and there has never been a commitment to consult with the EDC after it comes into being. It should also be noted that this paragraph singles out consultations on the levels of armed forces in Europe, which is obviously tied in with the reference in the preceding paragraph to the maintenance of our "fair share" of forces.]

"(3) The United States will encourage the closest possible integration between the European Defense Community forces on the one hand, and United States and other North Atlantic Treaty forces on the other, in accordance with approved plans with respect to their command, training, tactical support, and logistical organization developed by the military agencies and the Supreme Commanders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

[*Comment:* Again, although what is described here has been our general policy, the new element is the public declaration of our intention to support these measures for military integration between US, EDC, and other NATO forces.]

"(4) The United States will continue, in conformity with my recommendations to the Congress, to seek means of extending to the Atlantic Community increased security by sharing in greater measure information with respect to the military utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense."

[*Comment:* The Administration declares its intention, to seek greater sharing among the NATO countries of information concerning the military application of atomic and other new weapons and techniques. This is confirmed by the announcement of the Secretary of Defense at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December of 1953,[5] by the President's State of the Union message in January of 1954,[6] and by the President's subsequent transmittal to the Congress of his recommendations for revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,[7] which are currently being considered by the Congress.]

"(5) In consonance with its policy of full and continuing support for the maintenance of the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens that integrity or unity as a threat to the security of the United States. In such event, the United States will consult in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty."

[*Comment:* Although this is similar to the Tripartite Declaration of the US–UK French Foreign Ministers on May 27, 1952, it is significant that it is reaffirmed at this time by President Eisenhower and that, along with the rest of the statement, it was discussed with Congressional leaders.]

"(6) In accordance with the basic interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed at the time of ratification, the Treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide."

[*Comment:* The concept of the indefinite duration of the North Atlantic Treaty was incorporated in the Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the North Atlantic

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[5] For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting, at Paris, December 1953, see pp. 454 ff.

[6] For the text of President Eisenhower's Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, Jan. 7, 1954, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954*, pp. 6–23.

[7] For the text of President Eisenhower's Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, Feb. 17, 1954, see *ibid.*, pp. 260–269.

Treaty, but it has never been explicitly and officially stated to be the policy of the U.S. Government. Hence this statement also is an important new element. It is particularly significant when read in conjunction with the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the preamble.]

DULLES

740.5/6–254 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, June 2, 1954—6 p. m.

Coled 267. Department limit distribution strictly. Had dinner in Brussels last night with Spaak, DeStaercke and Rothschild (Spaak's *Chef de Cabinet*).

Spaak thinks votes now available in French Assembly to pass EDC and that recent favorable events such as MRP and Socialist Congress and by-elections in Pas de Calais and Maine-et-Loire make it desirable and imperative for every effort be made to bring matter to vote in French Parliament soonest possible before this new impetus has spent its force.

Spaak thinks Laniel too immobile temperamentally to take such action unless hard pressed. Suggests Teitgen be given until Wednesday June 9 to get Saar agreement concluded. Meanwhile, has instructed DeStaercke to tell Alphand Belgian Government wishes dispose of protocol affair, and suggest meeting first of directing committee EDC/IC to settle procedure and then of six Foreign Ministers to affix signatures. Ministers' meeting might provide opportunity Adenauer and Bidault or Laniel to conclude and sign Saar agreement.

If by middle of June French Government has not disposed of above two conditions and definitely fixed early date for EDC debate, Spaak proposes to communicate with Secretary on subject discussed by them in Geneva—namely what constructive action might be taken by Benelux, German, British and American Governments to bring French to their political senses.[2]

BRUCE

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[1] Repeated to Brussels eyes only for the Ambassador.

[2] In telegram 1200, June 5, to Brussels, Dulles stated: "We believe tactics proposed by Spaak to be used with French (Coled 267) seem sound. Therefore you should inform him we agree no outside action should be taken with French on Saar settlement until June 9. We also agree urgency settling EDC protocols problem and will be glad to discuss with him possible lines of common action if June 15 rolls around without final action on protocols or without date for French EDC debate having been set. Any indication Spaak can give you as to nature action he plans with French on June 9 in absence of Saar settlement would be helpful here" (740.5/6–254).

740.5/6–554

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Tyler)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 5, 1954.

Subject: Visit of the French Ambassador with the Secretary on the Subject of the German and Allied Tripartite Security Declaration

Participants: The Secretary
Mr. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador
Mr. Merchant, EUR
Mr. Tyler, WE

The Ambassador said that he had been instructed to raise with the Secretary the question of the issuance of the German and Allied Tripartite Declaration which had been discussed in Paris last December. Mr. Bonnet said that his Government felt that it would be helpful to the prospects of the ratification of EDC from the point of view of parliamentary opinion if such a declaration were issued now. He noted that final agreement had not been reached on the text and that, in particular, the French version of the key paragraph concerning sanctions to be taken against a country in the event of its attempting to withdraw from EDC, is stronger than ours. Mr. Bonnet said it would be desirable to see whether we could reach agreement on the French version. Otherwise, it might be better not to issue the declaration at all.

The Secretary pointed out that the integrity of EDC had been taken into account in the formulation of the US assurances, which had been made public in mid-April on the assumption that the EDC debate would shortly take place. The debate had in fact not taken place and the situation today was technically the same as it was two years ago. Mr. Merchant observed that this latest suggestion by the French Government seemed as though it might be another pre-condition to the debate being held. If this were the case, it would be a very serious matter, in the light of the assurances which had already been given by us after assuring Congress that such action would insure that the debate would shortly be held. The Ambassador said that the proposal was not being submitted as a pre-condition but rather as a move which, his Government felt, would be helpful with regard to Parliamentary opinion.

The Secretary reviewed the delays that had already taken place, and the growing sense of exasperation at the continued postponement of action on this vital treaty by the French Government. He said it would be most inadvisable to raise again at this stage a proposal which would inevitably look like yet another condition, after all that had already been done by the US to help the French Government without the debate yet having taken place. He therefore felt he must discourage the Ambassador from pressing his proposal. He said that when once the debate had started, and if it were a matter of the vote coming soon and of the possibility of some action being taken by us at that time to help put it over the top, we should of course be glad to see what we could do.

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[1] A summary of this conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 4440, June 7 (740.5/6–454).

In the course of further conversation, the Ambassador said he felt confident that the EDC debate would take place shortly. He qualified this, however, by saying that the outcome of the negotiations at Geneva would have great influence on this matter. He said he hoped and expected that the debate would take place this month or at least before the summer recess of the Assembly.

With regard to Geneva, the Ambassador said that there are two alternatives between which there is no middle ground: either increased military operations through the intervention of the US, designed to hold Indochina in general and the Delta in particular; or cease-fire and a settlement on the best terms obtainable. He said that the terms of settlement would be better in proportion as the Soviet Union and Communist China were in doubt as to the possibilities of US intervention, assuming that they did not want the war to expand. If, however, they were convinced that the US would not intervene on any account, the enemy could be expected to impose proportionately more unfavorable terms which it might nevertheless be politically impossible for France to reject. At all events there was no question of France continuing to fight in Indochina alone.

Editorial Note

On May 22, 1954, Chancellor Adenauer and French Deputy Prime Minister Pierre Teitgen initialed an agreement on the Saar issue at Strasbourg. Subsequently, "the French immediately attempted to obtain modifications of the agreement. The US and UK embassies in Paris, on an informal basis, advised the French Foreign Office that we thought the Teitgen–Adenauer agreement was the best they could get and we thought they should approve it as quickly as possible. Under Secretary Smith transmitted similar views to Foreign Minister Bidault at Geneva. On June 4, Maurice Schumann asked the US and UK Ambassadors for official confirmation that US and UK guarantees to support the Saar settlement at the peace treaty were forthcoming. He said this was the most important part of any Saar settlement as far as the French Parliament was concerned. Ambassadors Dillon and Bruce recommended that we orally inform the French and Germans of the statement we were prepared to make. On June 8, after receiving

Departmental approval, Ambassador Dillon informed Maurice Schumann that if the French and Germans reached Saar agreement in their negotiations based on Van Naters plan US and UK were prepared to support that agreement in the peace treaty provided EDC had come into being." (Memorandum by Lyon to Merchant, November 19, 1954, 762.022/11–1954) Ambassador Dillon's account of his meeting with Maurice Schumann on June 8 in which United States assurances in reference to the Saar were conveyed is printed in telegram 4764 from Paris, June 9, *infra.* Further documentation on the Saar is presented in volume VII.

762.022/6–954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET PARIS, June 9, 1954—11 a. m.

4764. I informed Schumann yesterday afternoon following lines of paragraph 2 of US–UK brief [2] that if French and Germans reached Saar agreement in their present negotiations based on the Nater's plan, US in conjunction with the UK was prepared to support that agreement in the peace treaty, provided that the EDC had come into being. Schumann raised his eyebrows a little bit at this proviso and referred, as he and Bidault often have, to the US guarantees, as he described them, which were freely given in 1947 and 1951.[3]

He then said that the matter was of no real importance since there would be no Saar settlement unless EDC was ratified because of the informal link between the two imposed by the German situation. I took this occasion to tell Schumann that while I had no specific instruction on the subject from my government, I felt personally certain that if the worst came to the worst and the US had to reappraise their European policies, that the declarations of 1947 and 1951 on the Saar would very definitely be included in such a reappraisal. Schumann made no particular comment.

He then said that he was very pleased at the news I had brought him about the US willingness to support the Saar settlement in the peace treaty as this was an absolutely essential part of the Saar "prealable" as far as the French Parliament was concerned.

He then observed that our Ambassadors meeting in London was taking place about a week too soon. He said that if the French Government survived the Indochina debate, as he hoped it would, they would move immediately to set a date for the Bidault-Adenauer meeting to finalize agreement on the Saar. He said he hoped this meeting could take place at the end of this week but observed that this might not give enough time to arrange the meeting. It might have to wait until next week. This would certainly be the case, he said, if the Indochina debate turned into a question of confidence which would put off the final vote until Friday.

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

[2] Reference is to the Text of Brief agreed by United Kingdom/United States Working Group (May 1954), not printed.

[3] For text of the 1947 U.S. guarantee under reference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. II, pp. 1082–1083. For information concerning the 1951 guarantee reaffirming U.S. policy that there should be no change in the status of the Saar pending a final peace treaty, see the editorial note, *ibid.*, 1951, vol. III, Part 2, p. 1979.

DILLON

740.5/6-1254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 12, 1954—2:59 p. m.

Edcol 122. I have heard with interest Merchant's report on Ambassadors' meeting in London,[2] particularly recommendation proceed with message from President to Coty and foreign ministers' meeting under Article 132 of EDC treaty along lines my conversation with Spaak in Geneva (Dulte 28 April 29).[3] On assumption fall of Laniel [4] will not result in new elections, I believe we should push ahead promptly but quietly to develop this scenario. I suggest Bruce let Spaak know of our approval in principle and Aldrich should inform British, subject to Bruce's determination timing of these approaches. Believe Bruce should bear in mind importance of getting British agreement in principle, including, if possible, idea of message from Churchill, before Spaak gets too far out on limb.

In meantime, we will urgently consider here best form of message from President to Coty. For this purpose we need Bruce and Dillon's comments on text of note given in Deptel 4131 May 18 [5] which, modified to take form of Presidential message, seems more suitable for present purpose than text in Deptel 4408 June 4.[6]

Timing proposed conference of six difficult from point of view my schedule even assuming meeting would last only one day or two at most. June 30–July 1 look possible now but it would be virtually out of the question for me to accept an earlier date. Any later feasible date would run toward middle July as I am now thinking in terms Montevideo Conference opening July 5.

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[1] Drafted by Moore, cleared by GER, BNA, WE, and MacArthur. Transmitted by Dulles. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Geneva.

[2] On June 9–10, Merchant had chaired a meeting of Chiefs of Mission at London which included Aldrich, Bruce, Conant, Dillon, Deputy U.S. Representative to NAC Edwin M. Martin and others. Further documentation on the meeting is presented in volume VI.

[3] *Ante*, p. 951.

[4] On June 12, the Laniel government was defeated in debate over Indochina, amidst charges that it had schemed for an American intervention there, by a vote of 304–292. See editorial note, p. 972.

[5] *Ante*, p. 956.

[6] Not printed. (740.5/6-254)

Dulles

740.5/6–1554 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 17, 1954—9:32 a. m.

6882. Limited distribution. Refs Paris 4857,[2] Coled 276,[3] London's 5519.[4]

1. Department seriously concerned over effect of British Embassy activities reported in Paris's 4857. This activity appears entirely at variance with Foreign Office statement (reported London's 5519) that great care being taken not to give French idea that we would accept anything less than EDC.

2. Suggest therefore that Embassy London, without specific reference reported activities British Embassy Paris, express following to British at this time: (*a*) We agree with British concern (London's 5519) over serious consequences in Germany as result French failure ratify EDC and contractuals prior summer recess; (*b*) we desire dis-

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Jones of WE, Lyon, and Palmer. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it was sent by Dillon on June 15 and reads, in part: "We have recently discovered that British Embassy here is actively covering opponents of EDC apparent[ly] in an attempt to come up with a substitute solution in the event EDC should fail. British Embassy's present ideas are similar to those expressed in London's 5519 to Department, and are probably basis of British Foreign Office thinking. This approach may be somewhat unrealistic because it presupposes there will continue to be discrimination against Germany justified principally by 'strategic considerations' " (740.5/6–1554).

[3] Not printed; it was sent by Bruce on June 15 and reported that De Staercke had asked that Bruce meet Spaak in Brussels on June 17. Therefore, "I suggest that Aldrich should not bring possible action by Spaak into his conversations with British on French situation until I am in a position to inform Aldrich of results of my conversation with Spaak." Moreover, inasmuch as the timing and contents of any Presidential message should be tied into action by Spaak, both Bruce and Dillon expressed the wish to defer comment on the text of the note contained in telegram 4131 to Paris, May 18 (p. 956), until after Bruce's meeting with Spaak. (740.5/6–1554)

[4] Not printed; it was sent by Aldrich on June 3 and reads, in part: "Foreign Office informed us today in strict confidence that it is most anxious about the serious consequences that would ensue within Germany as result of French failure to ratify EDC prior to summer recess of French Parliament and are busy preparing plans to take immediate action and consult with us 'as soon as it becomes clear that Paris will postpone action beyond summer.' " The Foreign Office had then given an affirmative answer to the query as to whether it was preparing possible alternatives to EDC, adding that the present line of thinking at the working level was along lines of a modified EDC that might be described as " 'combination of EDC and NATO' " and that when the " 'opportune moment' " arrived, the United States would be approached "but that great care was being taken not to give French idea that we would accept anything less than EDC. It was also intimated that considerable thought was being given to full British participation in any modified EDC that might be devised" (740.5/6–354).

cuss with British as soon as possible problems of general strategy for immediate period and means proceeding on contractuals and EDC questions as soon as it becomes clear French will not act before summer; (*c*) we also feel extremely important during next few weeks to avoid giving any impression French EDC opponents that they can hope for alternatives to EDC through further delay.

3. We will make similar approach British here. Preliminary working level discussion beginning today with British on problems of implementing contractuals. We also believe important that plan for meeting under Article 132 be discussed with British by you as soon as possible after Bruce conversation indicated Coled 276. We also will wish discuss such plan and general strategy regarding EDC and German problem with British here concurrently.

DULLES

740.5/6–1754 : Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET BONN, June 17, 1954—2 p. m.

3934. Re ourtel 3933, June 17.[2] Staff appraisal position Federal Republic Government on eve NRW elections:

The fall of Laniel Government and failure thus far to call new French elections have profoundly discouraged German supporters of Western integration. CDU faction leader Krone reports Chancellor deeply worried by development. This confirmed by FDP faction leader Dehler. Both tended to minimize effect this development on coming North Rhine-Westphalia elections but clearly alive to new grounds for criticism of Chancellor's policy now placed in hands of SPD. Ollenhauer has already exploited situation by claiming this the worst defeat for Kleineuropa policy in 5 years. Symptomatic of this SPD tactic is virulently sarcastic lead editorial in June 15 SPD *Pressedienst* (see Bonn telegram 745, June 16).[3]

Furthermore Geneva has up to present created impression in Germany of Western division and faltering leadership. We fear that any prolonged period in which France without a government and during which the US appeared inactive would create in Germany the impression that the US is failing to provide leadership in the field of Western integration and defense upon which it has placed so much emphasis. Majority press, although uncertain and even pessimistic about EDC prospects evince confidence that American leadership will produce some satisfactory solution if EDC fails. Visit of Churchill and Eden to Washington[4] generally felt will lead to some agreement as to EDC alternatives if latter found necessary. Thus, while German confidence in us still high and belief prevalent that positive action will be forthcoming, lack of such action in due time would result in tremendous disillusionment. Indications that notion is spreading that changes in policy are in the wind are:

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[1] Repeated to London, Paris, and Berlin.

[2] Not printed; it reported on a conversation between Conant and Adenauer during which Adenauer "assured me he would find way solve protocol problem and neither I nor Bruce should worry further about it. He seemed appreciate fully point which I emphasized on my own behalf and that of Bruce, namely, that no one would understand breaking down of negotiations on German refusal meet French request on question President Heuss sending letter to French Government requesting deposit protocols. But he did not specifically assent to any particular solution this problem." (740.5/6–1754)

[3] Not printed.

(1) Play in some German papers given to putting Bonn convention into force independently of EDC;

(2) Reports that German steel circles stepping up their criticism of Schumann plan on ground that it involved economic sacrifices for German industry justifiable only as first step towards integration Western Europe which is not taking place;

(3) German Foreign Office Saar expert beginning to speak of evolving Saar settlement not based on Europeanization concept.

We believe developments noted above may have some bearing upon NRW elections to disadvantage of CDU. If Chancellor's party should suffer significant losses there to SPD or FDP this would be interpreted generally in Germany as proof Chancellor is slipping and would encourage more and more his supporters to back away from his Western integration policy. Under such circumstances we doubt Chancellor could hold Germany in present foreign policy course after Bundestag reconvenes in fall if no effective progress made during summer towards European integration, restoration of German sovereignty and building European defense.

CONANT

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[4] Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden conferred in Washington with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles between June 25 and 29. See editorial note, p. 984.

Editorial Note

On June 12, the Laniel government was defeated on a vote of confidence, 304–292. Laniel and his Cabinet resigned the following day, and on June 14, President Coty designated Pierre Mendès-France to form a new government. Mendès-France immediately began "ardently going through preliminaries of preparing investiture" (telegram 4856 from Paris, June 15, 751.00/6–1554). With respect to EDC, Mendès-France informed a meeting of the Radical Party on June 15 "that he will propose plan which, in brief, will give both pro- and anti-EDC factions limited time to adjust their differences, with or without the inclusion of 'an exchange solution' and then, if they fail (they undoubtedly would), agree to bring the debate to the Assembly floor before the summer recess" though it was unclear from his remarks whether Mendès-France would bring the debate to the Assembly floor with or without government support (telegram 4889 from Paris, June 16, 751.00/6-1654). In telegram 4893 from Paris, June 17, Dillon reported that he had seen Maurice Schumann and Pierre-Henri Teitgen, leader of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire, at dinner the previous evening, and both men had assured him "that MRP will stand absolutely firm and will only support a new government favoring the EDC" (751.00/6-1754). On June 18 Mendès-France won his investiture vote 419 to 47 with 155 abstentions.

Editorial Note

Throughout the spring of 1954 House and Senate committees conducted hearings on a proposed new mutual security act. The so-called "Richards amendment" which had been passed in 1953 as part of H.R. 5710 and which had stipulated withholding a portion of the aid funds destined for those countries that had not yet ratified the EDC Treaty, again received prominent attention from both Representatives and such Administration spokesmen as Foreign Operations Administrator Harold Stassen and Assistant Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant. As indicated in telegrams Edcol 102 to Paris, April 5 (page 926), and Edcol 103 to Paris, April 7 (see footnote 3, page 927), Administration spokesmen originally did not favor reenactment of the Richards amendment. But sentiment in favor of reenactment was strong in Congress. As Representative Vorys noted in floor discussion of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 on June 29, the Richards amendment was brought out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee by unanimous vote. Discussing the Richards amendment the previous day, Representative Bentley stated that the Administration then softened its opposition and agreed to a compromise version of the amendment which would prevent delivery of arms to France and Italy, the two nonsignatories, while permitting full delivery to the four countries which had ratified, including the Federal Republic of Germany. Discussion of the Richards amendment on the floor of the House is in the *Congressional Record*, volume 100, part 7, pages 9110, 9193, 9200-01, 9205. The testimony of various Administration spokesmen on the Mutual Security Act of 1954, including the Richards amendment, is in *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on the Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.

Regarding the origins of the Richards amendment in 1953, see footnote 3, page 793. Further documentation on the Mutual Security Act of 1954 is presented in volume I.

740.5/6–1754 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1954—8:03 p. m.

Edcol 126. House Foreign Affairs Committee today approved and released to press following:

"The Committee on Foreign Affairs today, by a vote of 18 to 2 and 1 voting present, adopted the following provision limiting deliveries of military equipment to nations which have signed the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community, making it part of the new Mutual Security Bill now under consideration. This provision was sponsored by the Honorable James P. Richards, South Carolina, and replaces the 'Richards Amendment' which was included in the Mutual Security Act of 1953. The Department of State concurs in the Committee's action.

"The provision prevents the delivery of military equipment programmed for Fiscal Years 1954 and 1955 for the six nations which have signed the EDC Treaty. The nations which have ratified the Treaty as well as signed it can receive delivery of this equipment, but only on condition that they have joined with each other in a new organization for collective defense or are jointly developing collective defense programs in a manner satisfactory to the President.

"The four nations eligible to qualify for military aid financed with funds appropriated for Fiscal Years 1954 and 1955 under this provision would be Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. France and Italy, although they signed the Treaty, have not yet ratified, and can continue to receive only such shipments of military equipment as remain to be delivered out of appropriations for Fiscal 1953 and earlier. These remaining amounts are substantial.

"The text of the provision follows:

> "*Provided* that in order to promote an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area and to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration and economic unification in Europe equipment and materials programmed for Fiscal Years 1954 and 1955 for nations signing the Treaty constituting the EDC shall, pending the coming into force of the Treaty, be delivered only to such of these nations as have ratified the Treaty and have joined together in or are developing collective defense programs in a [manner?] satisfactory to the United States as determined by the President."

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden, repeated to Brussels, London, The Hague, Rome, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

740.5/6-1854 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 18, 1954— 5 p. m.

Coled 281. Department limit distribution. Attention Secretary.

De Staercke, Rothschild, Tomlinson and myself had dinner with Spaak last night in Brussels.

Spaak reserved his greatest emphasis for two observations.

a. He is gravely concerned over prevalent rumors, mostly French inspired, that the UK especially, but also the US, are now seeking alternatives to EDC treaty as drafted. If French Government makes any suggestion for renegotiation before it has voted on present text, he will refuse to enter into such negotiations, and thinks he can answer for same attitude by other Benelux countries. Spaak hopes US and UK at Washington meeting will take strong stand against consideration any alternatives or modifications whatever unless and until French Parliament has previously voted against present text. He felt it would be important to curb current intrigues EDC opponents by having Eisenhower-Churchill communiqué evidence US-UK solidarity this regard. Spaak said that if France rejects EDC treaty and proposes new negotiations, Benelux countries and FedRep should reply that they will consider only one alternative and that is Federal Republic with full membership in NATO without discrimination.

b. Spaak says newspaper comment in France, Belgium, and Holland shows that the mere notice of US-UK bilateral meeting has had psychological consequences of a most useful and profound nature on French and other continental opinion in indicating possibility that Western policy will not necessarily continue to be enfeebled or suspended because of the absence of political stability in France. Spaak hopes US and UK will not take any action calculated to diminish existing French uneasiness over US-UK meeting in which there is no French participation. He expressed the further hope that no indication be given to the French in the near future that they would be readmitted to a three-power relationship unless their government and Parliament had previously demonstrated ability to assume their responsibilities. He says feeling on this subject in Holland and Belgium is vehement, and there would be bitter disappointment if US were to be apologetic to French for holding meeting without them or were to promise later high level bilateral conversations with them similar to US-UK talks.

Spaak made following additional points.

1. Until French Government is constituted no use calling meeting of Benelux countries and FedRep under article 132 with US and UK invited as observers. Actions to be taken such meeting cannot be determined until we know composition such government and its European policy. Therefore improbable his opinion Secretary would be invited to attend before middle July.

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[1] Repeated to London eyes only for Aldrich and to Bonn eyes only for Conant.

2. Meanwhile he hopes protocols procedure will be agreed. He will press for meeting of Foreign Ministers to sign protocols as soon as France has formed government. He would use this occasion to spur French on to completion Saar accord. If appropriate at that time to obtain firm pledge to debate EDC before summer vacation of French Assembly, other countries would warn French Government of their plans to hold meeting without them under article 132.

3. Spaak will today contact Beyen, Bech and Hallstein to advise them of his plans. Spaak will take lead in conducting conversations with other countries and will keep me currently informed. Subject of these conversations should not come to attention of French officials until Benelux countries and FedRep are prepared to inform them.

4. At Geneva Spaak sounded out Eden on article 132 meeting and found him sympathetic and interested but made no attempt to obtain British commitment as he says he has introduced idea into Eden's consciousness, where it should be given ample time to reach maturity. Therefore he suggests next discussion on this subject be in Washington between President, Secretary, Churchill and Eden.

5. He thinks secrecy essential to ultimate success any such scheme designed influence favorable French action EDC. Under no circumstances should reports of possible meeting under article 132 leak to press during US and UK talks.

6. Regarding Presidential letter he previously proposed, he now thinks it inopportune to consider it at this time since its contents should be framed in light of situation as it later develops. He is emphatic letter should not be directed to implementation of contractual agreements since this should not be used as threat unless intermediate attempts secure ratification have failed, when it will cease to be merely a threat and relief from occupation status will be a burning issue with Germans.

Suggest Department decide under circumstances whether Aldrich should discuss subject with Eden before latter's departure Washington. In such event, participants in conversation should be restricted to Aldrich and Eden, especially in view reputed Foreign Office activities in considering plans alternative to EDC. Above conversation took place before investiture of Mendes-France. De Staercke is returning to Paris from Brussels Monday. I have asked him to obtain Spaak's further views after he has read Mendes-France's investiture Speech.

BRUCE

740.5/6–2154 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 21, 1954—4 p. m.

Coled 285. Department limit distribution Secretary. Re Coled 281.[2]

1. De Staercke informed us this morning that Spaak received approval of B[illegible] and Bech Sunday night of scheme to press French

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[1] Repeated to London eyes only for Aldrich and to Bonn eyes only for Conant.

[2] *Supra.*

Government to vote on EDC treaty before summer recess. Spaak, Beyen and Bech plan to dine tomorrow night in Luxembourg to draft joint position. Spaak has sent word to Chancellor Adenauer that he wishes to work out a common position with him and Spaak intends to talk to Hallstein today.

2. De Staercke tells us meeting of 6 Foreign Ministers to sign protocols is not likely because probable French refusal so Spaak now intends to call for meeting under Article 132 and invite France and Italy to attend as observers. De Staercke will try to have invitations for this meeting sent before Thursday of this week for meeting next week. In this way meeting should demonstrate to British in particular that EDC is not moribund and that continental countries intend to do something about situation. Knowledge of invitation to such a meeting would also complement joint US–UK communiqué suggested in Coled 284. De Staercke approves idea of such a communiqué.

3. During this first meeting under Article 132, the US and UK would not be invited to attend. De Staercke envisages that the Benelux countries and FedRep would warn French Government along following lines:

a. France has had full cooperation and support of other EDC nations and US and UK in fulfillment of conditions French Parliament posed before it would vote on EDC treaty, which was fruit of French initiative and insistence. "Ad referendum" agreements on Saar and signature of protocols now depend entirely on good faith of French Government in completing final details. France gave repeated commitments to present EDC treaty to French Assembly for vote once preliminary conditions had been fulfilled.

b. No new negotiations on any aspect of EDC treaty are possible until French Assembly has voted on treaty. Four signatories of treaty, as well as in a lesser degree US and UK, have debated matter lengthily and thoroughly in their parliaments and have given their decision.

c. If French Assembly does not act favorably on EDC treaty, or if Assembly approves a "new compromise" or changes in present EDC text which would reopen negotiations and parliamentary action, Benelux nations intend to propose full membership of Germany in NATO.

d. French Assembly should vote on EDC treaty before its summer recess, or other signatory nations in the interest of their own security will have to consider under Article 132 immediate step or steps they might take to associate Germany politically and militarily with western nations.

4. If French Government does not respond satisfactorily to this warning, then Spaak envisages second meeting under Article 132 would be held with US and UK invited to attend as observers, with France and Italy excluded.

5. Spaak is irritated by view of British Foreign Office that EDC is moribund. He intends to inform them of his plans today to demonstrate that this is not the case. He also wishes British to say unequivocally that they favor German membership in NATO as least

harmful alternative to EDC and to stop conveying impression to French that UK might consider participation in some futile compromise scheme involving discrimination against Germany and controls on German rearmament.

BRUCE

740.5/6–2154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 21, 1954—11 a. m.

4946. During the Undersecretary's visit with Mendes-France, the Undersecretary brought up the question of the EDC and stated that Secretary Dulles was personally very disturbed by the press reports that the US and the UK were now considering alternatives for EDC. He said at least as far as the United States was concerned, these reports were entirely untrue as the United States was still wholeheartedly in favor of EDC and saw no other possible solution.

Mendes said he was glad that the Undersecretary had brought the question up and said that he had meant to outline his position on EDC in any event. Mendes said that he now was and always had been strongly and solidly in favor of the movement for European unity in every field. However, he said that he also had always believed that it would be most unfortunate for France to take such a serious decision as joining the EDC by a narrow majority of a few votes over the opposition of an embittered minority. Therefore, he said he would try to see if he could obtain a large majority. His attempt would be to find a means of uniting all of those who believed (1) in working towards European unity or integration and (2) who also believed that German rearmament was necessary. He said that he felt that there was a substantial majority of the French Parliament in favor of these two basic policies and it would be his idea to ask all concerned to make compromises so as to reach an agreement.

Mendes then said that he felt that Indochina had had a serious effect on EDC in France and that if the Indochina crisis was settled and the French people could look forward to the return of the Expeditionary Corps to France they would be more willing to proceed with EDC. La Chambre (Republican Socialist Minister for Associated States) heartily seconded this statement. Secondly Mendes said that if he could settle the Indochina crisis, he would have a greatly enhanced personal prestige and would be able to ask the Assembly to take a decision on EDC which it might otherwise be unwilling to do.

Mendes then stated that if his search for compromise resulted in any suggestions for changes in the EDC, it would be his idea to put the

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn.

EDC, with these reservations, to a vote before the summer recess of the National Assembly. He said it was his firm resolve to have a vote in the National Assembly on the EDC prior to the summer vacation provided only that he first could reach a settlement of the Indochina problem which had priority. In this connection he emphasized the fact that he wished the EDC vote to follow an Indochina settlement because of the enlarged prestige such a settlement would give him in the Assembly. Mendes said that he felt that if he could obtain ratification in France by a large majority, he would then be entitled to go to France's partners in the EDC and ask them to accept changes because of the fact that they guaranteed the wholehearted and enthusiastic support of France for the EDC concept. He said any changes in the EDC treaty that would not be acceptable to France's partners would obviously not be useful, and he would only accept such changes as he felt he could honestly recommend to the other EDC countries. He said that in no case would he negotiate with the other countries on such changes before the French National Assembly had actually ratified the treaty as he was sure that the other countries would rightfully regard any such attempt to negotiate changes as a new method of delay. However, he felt the situation would be different after the French National Assembly had actually ratified as in that case France would be already fully bound. The Undersecretary emphasized the importance of reaching an early solution and said he understood and sympathized with Mendes-France's feelings that ratification by a narrow majority would not be a satisfactory solution.

Dillon

740.5/6–2154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, June 21, 1954—9 p. m.

4971. I am becoming quite concerned over what appears to be growing divergence between US and UK policy on EDC as expressed by embassies in Paris. The British embassy here, in addition to activities mentioned in Deptel [*Embtel*] 4857,[2] were openly enthusiastic about possibility of Mendes-France being able to form a government and they expressed great satisfaction when he succeeded. After luncheon meeting at British embassy between Eden and Mendes-France, in which Mendes-France among other things presumably outlined his views on EDC, British embassy issued a press release which received wide publicity here and which stated that "in this very difficult period it is obviously very important for France and Great Britain to keep their policies in accord. It was gratifying to find such a large measure of agreement."

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[1] Repeated to London and Bonn, eyes only for the Ambassador.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 970.

Also in the last week British embassy, which up to this time had been very frank with my staff in exchanging views and information on EDC, suddenly backed away and commenced to show considerable reticence.

I am clear that at this point no statement or action regarding EDC made unilaterally by the US would have any effect upon the French except to irritate them. However, the French would still be greatly impressed by any joint US–UK statements of position. Therefore, I feel it is of utmost importance to fully clarify the British position on all aspects of the EDC and German problems during the course of the Churchill-Eden meeting in Washington. Unless conversations at that time are thorough and specific, I fear the possibility of another misunderstanding such as that which arose over the April 13th US–UK communiqué on Southeast Asia.[3] It is needless for me to point out how serious any open US–UK difference of opinion upon European matters would be here in France.

I am in full agreement with thoughts expressed by Bruce in Coled 283,[4] and I feel that a communiqué along general lines of Coled 284,[5] while it would of course arouse resentment in quarters hostile to European unity and German rearmament, would on the whole have a most salutory effect here in France.

I feel some such shock is needed to speed up consideration of EDC problem, including the Saar settlement. Unless forcefully prodded Mendes apparently intends to simply forget EDC and Europe until he reaches an Indochina settlement.

DILLON

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[3] Reference is to a joint statement issued by Eden and Dulles on Apr. 13, 1954 expressing the readiness of their respective governments "to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibilities of establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific." For text of the Southeast Asia portion of the statement, see telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, vol. XIII, Part 1, p. 1321. For the complete text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.

[4] Not printed; it contained a message to Dulles, June 21, in which Bruce stated *inter alia* his opinion that in view of the comparative political weakness and indecisiveness of the Western allies "it is very important for the US vigorously to reaffirm its belief in the necessity and advisability of further progress toward European integration." Bruce added that "we have an unique opportunity at the time of the Eisenhower–Churchill meeting to present a united front in this particular; otherwise we may postpone indefinitely a decision on how we can assure our security in the west." Bruce concluded that "The tone of the British press indicates a tendency to throw in a hand before knowing what cards the adversary holds in reserve. If the President and yourself are insistent with Churchill and Eden, I hope they will agree to a joint declaration that will be effective with the French Government and Parliament. The French have no policy. We have. If we stick to it the positive should be stronger than the negative" (740.5/6–2154). Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower were scheduled to meet June 25–29.

[5] Not printed; it contained a suggested possible text on the EDC for issuance as a communiqué following the Anglo-American talks (740.5/6–2154).

740.5/6–2354 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 23, 1954—7 : 28 p. m.

Edcol 128. Limit distribution. Ref Coled 285.[2] Subject to comments below Department endorses Spaak's plan outlined reference cable and believes he should be encouraged proceed. We intend seek British concurrence in this plan at forthcoming meeting Washington.

In light Spaak's view that first meeting should be confined four EDC countries, concur in holding this meeting without US and UK participation. There is logic in confining first meeting to EDC countries only since meeting called under Article 132 and will be confined to a final effort on EDC. However we question advisability inviting French and Italian observers to attend and also consider it likely they might refuse to attend if invited. Consider warning to French and Italian Governments might be more effective if delivered after restricted meeting. Also like to suggest that warning include reference to need for second broader meeting with US and UK if EDC not approved before summer recess. We note Spaak is apparently thinking in terms only of private warnings to French and Italian Governments. Would appreciate clarification this point.

Following are comments on substance of warning itself contained paragraph 3. Assume statement in sub-paragraph *b* that no new negotiations possible until after French Assembly has voted on Treaty is not intended be invitation to procedure Mendes-France is contemplating, i.e., approval of Treaty by Assembly provided certain changes made which are to be subsequently negotiated with other EDC countries. We would prefer omission reference at this time to full German membership in NATO indicated sub-paragraph C, since mention of a specific alternative is likely to play into hands of those seeking delay as indicated Coled 283.[3]

DULLES

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared by Lyon, Jones of WE, Merchant, and MacArthur; approved for transmission by Dulles; sent also to Brussels, London, Bonn, and The Hague.

[2] Dated June 21, p. 976.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 4, *supra*. In telegram Coled 288 from Paris, June 23, Bruce reported that "At meeting held on Spaak's initiative in Luxembourg last night, three Benelux Foreign Ministers agreed to issue joint Benelux invitation to meeting of six signatories to EDC treaty. Spaak expects meeting to take place next week. Spaak will call in Ambassadors this afternoon and inform them of this proposal. He is also considering possibility of issuing direct invitation tomorrow to governments presumably because this would permit him to make public statement with regard to purpose of meeting" (740.5/6–2354). In telegram Coled 289 from Paris, June 23, Bruce transmitted the text of the memorandum which Spaak had dispatched to the Luxembourg and Netherlands Foreign Ministers which was accepted by them as the basis for the meeting of June 22. This memorandum stressed American uneasiness and impatience as well as recent developments in France as the basic reasons why early action to secure French ratification of EDC had become imperative (740.5/6–2354). In telegram Coled 291 from Paris, June 24, Bruce stated: "De Staercke informs us five EDC countries have accepted invitations for meeting next week; France has not replied" (740.5/6–2454).

740.5/6–2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Luxembourg (Buchanan) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET LUXEMBOURG, June 24, 1954—7 p. m.

123. Limit distribution. Reference Paris telegrams Coled 288 and 289[2] June 23.

Benelux Foreign Ministers met in Luxembourg last night at Bech's home where they had dinner and conferred until after midnight. No other persons present. Bech stated all unanimous in opinion that France should not be "schoolmastered". They also feel strongly that France as signatory of EDC owes it to other members to make every effort to ratify. Bech believes chances for French EDC ratification still good; Spaak not so sure; no comment from Dutch. Bech feels that now crucial moment for Benelux members to pressure France and that they can do it where United States could not. Further stated that final alternative if France does not cooperate would be "entry of Germany into NATO as equal partner".

Bech frequently reiterated his belief that United States should not be too impatient with France; that she knows only too well consequences if she fails to ratify; and further United States pressure only aggravates situation. In his opinion is too early to try proceed without France as participating member in any type of union. Bech feels despite her signs of weakness France still highly important factor in European unity. Thinks Mendes-France might be successful in collecting "fruit of Bidault's and Laniel's hard work".

While with Bech, Spaak telephoned to set meeting date of six signatories for next Friday or Saturday. Spaak advised Bech there had been leak to German press re proposed meeting and they were both annoyed by this fact. Bech and other Benelux Ministers are unhappy with reports received from Germany re German's general attitude and desire for sovereignty. Bechs feels Ruhr elections this weekend will be Gallup poll of German situation. Bech states, "Germany frequently voices her disappointment at not having gotten her sovereignty and questions why it is attached to EDC which France won't ratify".[3]

BUCHANAN

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[1] Sent also to Paris for Bruce; repeated to London, The Hague, Brussels, and Rome for the Ambassador and to Bonn for Conant.

[2] Neither printed, but see footnote 3, *supra*.

[3] In telegram 1018 from Brussels, June 25, Alger reported that Spaak had given him the roundup on the latest developments on the Benelux invitation for a meeting of EDC Foreign Ministers at Brussels. The chief points which Spaak made were: the Italians had accepted and Hallstein had given informal German approval, but no reply had yet been received from the French Government; the story of the proposed meeting had been leaked at Bonn on June 24 and that as a consequence the Belgian Foreign Office was issuing a communiqué immediately confirming the invitations; and "Spaak feels very strongly there should be no American or British pressure on French at this stage and he considered it undesirable have US or UK observers present at proposed meeting on grounds it might give impression such pressure" (740.5/6–2554).

740.5/6–2454 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1954—7 : 01 p. m.

Edcol 130. Limit distribution. For Bruce, Dillon, and Hughes. References Coled 284[2] and 291[3] Paris' 4994[4] Bonn's 4017[5] Hague's 1470.[6]

We are concerned over Benelux and British position that mention to France at this time of German membership in NATO as only other alternative to EDC is effective tactic for pressuring French into action on EDC. Department would like make clear reasons why it believes mention this alternative to French publicly or privately at this time is unlikely spur French action on EDC. We plan make these views known to British here and request that addressees take appropriate steps to make same points to Benelux.

First, as general principle any mention that US, UK, or Benelux willing consider alternatives indicates lack of firm support for present EDC and therefore plays directly into hands efforts of Mendes-France Government to work out "compromise" on EDC.

Second, mention of NATO membership for Germany can be exploited by French like other alternatives because it depends in last analysis on French consent. Danger is not so much that French will veto NATO membership in NAC, which would put French in very invidious position vis-à-vis NATO partners. Real danger is that French Government might say in response to suggestions or hints of NATO membership that it is willing to consider matter or even to accept NATO membership in principle subject to working out acceptable means of incorporating Germany in NATO and subject also of course to approval by French Parliament. Opponents of German rearmament in French Government would make every effort prolong indefinitely negotiations for working out "acceptable means" of incorporating Germany in order to make it acceptable to French Parliament. In order make German NATO membership acceptable to French Parliament, French Government would argue that some form of control over Germans in NATO would have to be worked out in advance. This would involve either (1) making NATO as a whole more closely integrated organization or (2) imposing special restrictions on Germany in NATO. Former would require prolonged negotiations and pose difficult problems for US; latter completely unacceptable to Germans.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared by Jones of WE, Kidd, and Moore. Repeated to Brussels, London, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 980.

[3] Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 981.

[4] Not printed; it contained Dillon's strong assertion that his agreement concerning the value of a communiqué along the lines suggested in telegram Coled 284 "does not imply agreement with last sentence of proposed communiqué which in effect poses German admission to NATO as best alternative to EDC. I would personally much prefer to limit communiqué to a reiteration of all-out support for EDC. Mention of the NATO alternative which may well be British policy at present could be seized upon by opponents of EDC in France as indicating that US had given up the fight and was now prepared to accept alternative solutions" (740.5/6–2254).

[5] Not printed; it transmitted Conant's "view of situation in Germany" which "leads me to urge you oppose any British proposal looking favorably on membership Germany in NATO with National Army as substitute EDC." Conant advanced three reasons for his opposition: (1) the "nuisance" that an independent German Army would have in view of the existence of a divided Germany; (2) impact on German psychology of a recreated German General Staff and independent Ministry of Defense "which would certainly be demanded by Germans as they will not accept membership in NATO except under conditions which are parallel those of France"; (3) the hindrance which an independent German Army under NATO would create to the growing acceptance within the Federal Republic of the concept of a united Europe (740.5/6–2354).

[6] Not printed; it reported *inter alia* the concern of Foreign Minister Beyen "that certain circles in UK as well as British press are talking of possible alternatives to EDC. Beyen said if EDC finally fails, German membership in NATO is the only possible acceptable alternative to EDC and a poor one at that" and he believed furthermore "that this should be said privately to the French by Benelux partners and it might be desirable for US and UK to say the same privately to Mendes-France. He was not, however, convinced that public reference in a communiqué was wise tactic at least until after the meeting next week Spaak is calling. He said he would like to think about it a while" (740.5/6–2354).

Finally, any indication US supports or willing consider NATO membership or other alternative can seriously undermine position of pro-EDC elements in France, particularly MRP. Their position already difficult and essential do everything possible not to undermine their morale further. In this connection assume that Embassy Paris is taking appropriate action to assure individual pro-European leaders that US has not wavered in support of EDC and that they should not be misled by press reports that we are considering alternatives.[7]

DULLES

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[7] Bruce replied in telegram Coled 294 from Paris, June 27, that "It is a matter of judgement whether proposing NATO membership for Federal Republic as 'least objectionable' alternative to present EDC treaty text would spur favorable French action on EDC. Spaak believes it would and has and no doubt will proceed to that basis. This idea was suggested by us for incorporation in communiqué primarily as inducement to Churchill, who is still widely believed in Europe to cling tenaciously to decided preference for NATO membership Federal Republic, to accept American insistence on EDC, and to join in strong statement this effect. Secondarily because prior to our recommendations this regard Spaak had informed us he intended to present this alternative to French believing it would alarm them into favorable decision on EDC text. Under circumstances if British do not insist on reference possible NATO membership for Federal Republic, suggest matter be dropped" (740.5/6–2754).

Editorial Note

Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden visited Washington June 25 to 29, 1954 for talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on a wide range of matters of mutual interest, including EDC. Extensive documentation on the Churchill–Eden visit to Washington in June 1954 is presented in volume VI.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 336

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 27, 1954.

Participants:

United States	*United Kingdom*
The Secretary	Mr. Anthony Eden
Mr. Merchant	Sir Harold Caccia
	Christopher Soames

Subject: Germany and E.D.C.

At noon today while waiting to join the President and Prime Minister, there was a considerable discussion of the problem of Germany. The Secretary and Mr. Eden agreed that their estimates coincided on the importance of taking positive action in support of Adenauer if the French Assembly recessed this summer without ratifying EDC. They were in general agreement that a way should be found to separate the contractuals from the EDC, without prejudice to possible later action by the French Assembly in approving EDC in the fall. This would require some undertaking from Adenauer that Germany would not unilaterally rearm during the period in which the fate of EDC would be settled. The Secretary explained the constitutional requirements with which we were faced in connection with modifying the Bonn Treaty so as to remove the link with the EDC Treaty. Mr. Eden was obviously unaware of this complication but recognized it when it was pointed out. There was agreement that Adenauer should be consulted before any approach to the French.

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[1] The source text bears the designation CEV MC–1 and indicates that the conversation took place at the White House at noon on June 25.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 336

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 27, 1954.

Participants:

United States	*United Kingdom*
The President	The Prime Minister
The Secretary	Mr. Anthony Eden
Ambassador Aldrich	Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Merchant	Sir Roger Makins

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[1] The source text bears the designation CEV MC–3 and indicates that the conversation took place at the White House between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. on June 25. The memorandum is printed in full in volume VI.

[Here follow discussion of agenda items and suggestion of talks with the U.S.S.R.]

The President then turned the discussion to the EDC and Germany. He said that we could not afford to lose Germany even though we were to lose France and he raised the question as to the point at which action to preserve Germany would be required on our part.

The Secretary said that in his opinion that point would be reached if the French recessed for the summer without ratifying EDC. Under these circumstances he said that both of us must be prepared to move rapidly. His view was that the contractual agreement should be placed in effect with, however, some reservation or qualification regarding unilateral rearmament by Germany. Mr. Eden indicated agreement and emphasized the desirability of the UK and US jointly approaching the French in the hope of seeking their concurrence.

The Secretary explained the constitutional requirements which presented themselves to us in modifying Article 11 of the Bonn treaty. He explained a proposal under consideration whereby the Senate would grant approval for the severance of the two treaties in advance and indicated that in his judgment there would be little difficulty on this score with the Senate.

The President indicated that something of this sort would be necessary. After some discussion between the President and the Secretary they agreed on the desirability of exploring the passage of a resolution by the Senate along the following lines: "When the President determines that the welfare of the United States would be advanced by bringing the Bonn Treaty into effect, irrespective of any other condition, he would be empowered so to act."

There was some discussion of the point that this action would not prejudice passage of EDC but that if EDC failed, another executive agreement would be required with Germany to cover rearmament.

Mr. Eden noted that he supposed that would require some form of Parliamentary action also and said that he would look into it. He also stated that if something were not done to restore sovereignty to Germany by October (in the absence of French ratification of EDC), the Soviets would be able "to pull the Germans across the line."

At this point Sir Harold Caccia distributed a one-page memorandum on the subject of Germany.

The President closed the discussion by saying it was necessary urgently to study what must be done and what was feasible in the event the French failed to ratify this summer. He noted that it was important that our program be put to the French in the most effective light and in the absence of open threats.

Mr. Eden suggested and it was agreed that he and the Secretary work out the technical details along the general lines of the agreement reached in principle. He said there was no need to trouble the Prime Minister and the President further on this subject at this conference.

[Here follows discussion pertaining to the Churchill speech, Egypt, Iran, and Trieste, Southeast Asia, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and Buraimi.]

740.5/6-3054

The French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, June 26, 1954.]

Press despatches having reported that, during the conversations which are now taking place between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, certain initiatives may be taken with regard to the Federal Republic and the restoration of German sovereignty, which would be of such a nature as to compromise the freedom of action of France, the French Embassy wishes, upon instructions from its Government, to inform the Department of State of the most recent decisions taken in Paris in this connection.

Yesterday, June 25, M. Mendes-France, Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed M. Spaak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, of the reasons why it had unfortunately not been possible for him, at a time when he had just assumed his post, to go to Brussels at once, in accordance with the invitation of the Belgian Government, in order to participate in a conference of Foreign Ministers of the Governments of the signatory countries of the Bonn and Paris treaties.

M. Mendes-France reminded M. Spaak that, as he had stated in his investiture statement of June 17, he was obliged to devote himself entirely to a settlement of the Indochina question first. He has, as a result, asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium to permit him certain delay before fixing the date of a meeting, the principle of which he accepts even more willingly since, at the proper time, it will respond to an evident need.

On the same date, M. Mendes-France decided to send to Chancellor Adenauer a representative who will be the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Guerin de Beaumont, or the Secretary General of the Ministry, M. Parodi, in order to establish the initial contact with the Chancellor and to bring him up to date regarding the intentions of the French Government.

The Embassy of France is also conveying the foregoing to the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Washington.

[HENRI BONNET]

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[1] The source text is that transmitted to the Embassy in France in telegram 4883, June 30, with the explanation that this was a verbatim text of the note delivered by Bonnet to Dulles on June 26. (740.5/6-3054)

740.5/6-2854

Agreed United States–United Kingdom Secret Minute on Germany and the EDC[1]

SECRET [WASHINGTON, June 28, 1954?]

The President and the Prime Minister have today agreed that:

(1) Failure of the French Assembly to ratify EDC before recessing for the summer would create an extremely difficult situation in Germany and threaten the position of the Chancellor.

(2) In such event, it would be necessary in the interest of retaining the alignment of the Federal Republic with the West promptly to take such steps as were open to them to restore to the Federal Republic the measure of sovereignty contemplated by the contractual agreements.

(3) Such restoration of sovereignty should be accomplished in a fashion which would as little as possible militate against ratification by France of the EDC in the fall.

(4) Until the French Assembly has in fact recessed without favorable action, the Govts of the US and the UK should maintain in full force their public and private support of EDC. They should discourage any public discussion of alternatives.

(5) The action contemplated in (2) above will require parliamentary action in the case of those who participate. For this reason, parliamentary authorization should be sought prior to recess for the summer. The US and UK will approach the French Govt with a view to explaining their purpose in obtaining parliamentary authorizations to place the contractuals into effect, if necessary, in the absence of a concurrent coming into force of the EDC Treaty or French ratification of the contractuals. French participation or acquiescence should, however, be sought.

(6) Concurrently with the action necessary to place the contractual agreements into effect, at least as regards the UK, US, and Germany, provisions should be made in agreement with Chancellor Adenauer that Germany will defer for the time being the unilateral exercise by Germany of the right to rearmament.

(7) In the event that the French refuse to participate in the foregoing course of action, they should be told that the Govts of the US and UK were resolute in their determination to place in effect, insofar as their relations with the Federal Republic were concerned, the provisions of the contractual agreement to the maximum extent practicable.

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[1] The source text was transmitted in telegram 7143 to London, June 28; repeated to Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn, and Luxembourg. At the time of transmission the text had been agreed to by U.S. officials and by Eden but had not yet received Churchill's final approval. Telegram 7179 to London, June 29, reported that since the Prime Minister had now approved the minute in telegram 7143, that minute was now official U.S.–U.K. policy (740.5/6–2954).

(8) The Chancellor should be consulted as appropriate in placing the above program in effect with a view to securing his views and cooperation.

(9) Experts from the US should meet in a matter of days with British experts in London with a view to working out the legal, procedural and chronological aspects of the program described above.[2]

(10) In the event that the French Assembly before recessing should reject the EDC Treaty, there would then exist all the greater reason to proceed resolutely and expeditiously with the above program. In addition, it would then be necessary for the Govts of the US and the UK, together with their partners in NATO, urgently to consult regarding alternative measures for securing a German defense contribution.

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[2] Regarding the work of the experts in London, see editorial note, p. 997.

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 341

Joint Statement Issued by Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower, June 29, 1954[1]

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1954.

At the end of their meetings today, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"In these few days of friendly and fruitful conversations, we have considered various subjects of mutual and world interest.

I

WESTERN EUROPE

"We are agreed that the German Federal Republic should take its place as an equal partner in the community of Western nations, where it can make its proper contribution to the defense of the free world. We are determined to achieve this goal, convinced that the Bonn and Paris Treaties provide the best way. We welcome the recent statement by the French Prime Minister that an end must be put to the present uncertainties.

"The European Defense Community Treaty has been ratified by four of the six signatory nations, after exhaustive debates over a period of more than two years. Naturally these nations are unwilling to disregard their previous legislative approvals or to reopen these complex questions.

"In connection with these treaties, the United States and the United Kingdom have given important assurances, including the disposition of their armed forces in Europe, in order to demonstrate their confidence in the North Atlantic Community and in the EDC and the Bonn Treaties.

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[1] The complete text is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 12, 1954, p. 49 and in volume VI.

"It is our conviction that further delay in the entry into force of the EDC and Bonn Treaties would damage the solidarity of the Atlantic nations.

"We wish to reaffirm that the program for European unity inspired by France, of which the EDC is only one element, so promising to peace and prosperity in Europe, continues to have our firm support."

. . . .

611.65/6–2654 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET ROME, June 26, 1954—9 p. m.

4307. I saw Scelba June 26 at his request. Our meeting was most cordial and we covered following points:

1. US–UK talks. Scelba inquired regarding substance Eisenhower-Churchill conversations and expressed view it was utmost importance that US–UK policy should develop common line soonest. By this he meant UK should swing behind US. Scelba believed that UK attitude on dealings with Soviets had done "incalculable harm" in Europe and he cited Eden's recent speech in Commons[2] as having had adverse effect in Italy. Scelba recalled disastrous effect of Churchill's speech last year prior to Italian elections[3] and asserted that UK attitude ever since had aggravated this damage. UK, by fostering illusion that peace with Soviets is possible in years ahead, has reduced its own support of EDC to mere lip service. UK attitude toward USSR had and would continue to strengthen PCI arguments against EDC, increase neutralist trend through Europe and augment general disorientation against EDC in Italy. Scelba said that he had told Nutting exactly this. Scelba added that while US showed fear of opening to left in Italy, where no such opening had been made in spite of millions of Communists, a world opening to left was being executed by Eden even without Communists in UK. Scelba also believed that French situation had contributed to difficulties on EDC and to general NATO confusion although French attitude did not confuse Italian opinion so much as British attitude.

I told Scelba that Washington talks had no fixed agenda and that they should more accurately be termed "friendly discussions". Future of EDC and plans for pacific security would undoubtedly figure prominently. Naturally there would be important consequences of talks to US–UK relations, and we all hope results would be greater unity and coherence between US and UK policy, as we have no fundamental doubts that UK objectives are the same as ours. In response my question whether Eden's recent speech would adversely affect EDC passage here, Scelba replied negatively and said he did not share UK view on Soviet's peaceful intentions. In his view Soviet foreign policy consisted in making conquests and digesting them and what UK erroneously interpreted as Soviet desire for peace was in fact another digestive phase".

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[1] Repeated to London, Belgrade, and Trieste.

[2] Reference is presumably to Eden's comments in the course of his report to Commons on Apr. 13 concerning his discussions with Dulles on Apr. 12. Regarding this, see telegram Secto 5, Apr. 13, p. 930. For the text of Eden's remarks, see *H.C. Debs.*, 5th series, vol. 526, cols. 969–975.

[3] Reference is presumably to Prime Minister Churchill's speech in Commons on Foreign Affairs, May 11, 1953, *ibid.*, vol. 515, cols. 883–898.

2. EDC: Scelba said he had "every intention" of bringing EDC to Chamber floor immediately after reaching agreement on Trieste. In reply my query, he said debate would commence on signature of accord and not await conclusion of take-over phase. He earnestly hoped Trieste accord could be reached by July 15 because he felt that between July 15 and August 15 (beginning of traditional Italian vacation period), EDC could be passed. He believed that with Trieste out of the way and with safe majority he now enjoys, he could threaten Parliament with summer session which would bring about quick action and would even disrupt Communist delaying tactics. He considered that government could count on PNM support for EDC since their abstention in Senate confidence vote on June 23 had been due only to absence Trieste settlement. Scelba feared that if Trieste agreement not reached by July 15, would be impossible hold Parliament in session any longer. This would mean that EDC could not be brought to Chamber floor until autumn and debate would then be protracted. In addition, opposition would have time to express dissatisfaction and pick holes in whatever Trieste agreement might have been reached following Parliamentary recess.

3. Facilities and SOF. I have reported Scelba's remarks on facilities and SOF agreements in mytel 4306, June 26.[4] Main point that Scelba stressed on these questions was that with Trieste agreement in hand, he would have no difficulty in obtaining prompt Parliamentary approval of facilities and SOF agreements. On facilities he indicated that he was prepared to approve present text. I did not mention minor modifications necessary as I did not believe it wise to embark on detailed discussions at this juncture.

4. Trieste: Throughout our conversations, Scelba kept returning to thesis that quick Trieste settlement indispensable if government were to move forward on EDC, facilities and SOF rapidly. According to Scelba, essential such agreement be reached by July 15. He emphasized that immediate decision by Yugoslavia to reopen frontier between Zone A and Zone B would make conclusion of agreement much easier. He pointed out that 63,000 Istrians now in Zone A are separated from friends and relatives in Zone B. Scelba considered that opening of frontiers would have 2 important results: (1) Would be gesture of confidence and friendliness by Yugoslavia and would be indication their faith in ultimate success outcome negotiations; (2) would remove nervousness and bitterness of Italians in Zone A and

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[4] Not printed. (765.5 MSP/6-2654)

Zone B who are physically separated from families and friends. This in itself would pave way for acceptance compromises which have to be made and would lessen interim possibility of demonstrations and incidents. I expressed my belief that all evidence pointed to fact that Yugoslavia desired rapid agreement as much as Italy. We sincerely hoped that following Trieste accord there would be new era in Italian-Yugoslav relations which would in turn lead to closer Balkan and Mediterranean accord.

Scelba then requested me to assure the President and Secretary that Italy's foreign policy was still and would continue to be firmly anti-Communist and pro-Atlantic. In his view Italian Government had made remarkable comeback since elections last year. Italy's determination to ratify EDC and to work firmly and increasingly with West all the more remarkable when considered in relation to pre-June 1953 government which had safe majority and was not working in false atmosphere of "distension" engendered by UK. With only slim majority and with difficult job of balancing quadripartite formula he had preserved and increased anti-Communist measures. This progress was justification his tactics of opening to left-center while continuing to broaden base to right. "Real opening had been made by both sides to center". Evidence success his tactics was compactness quadripartite and fact that monarchists would probably support EDC and in some measure Trieste settlement.

Scelba said US should have every reason to have confidence in Italy. He was convinced that with Trieste settled Italy would be able pursue more active and fruitful foreign policy and exert leadership for European integration of which it had given many indications in past. He wanted President and US Government to understand Italy's profound pro-West orientation by which he meant Italy would follow US not UK, lead.

My comments on above in immediately following telegram 4308.[5]

LUCE

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[5] Not printed; it began: "Suspension of facilities negotiations and general indications of our dissatisfaction with lack of progress on EDC, facilities, SOF and other questions coupled with Scelba's success in Senate confidence vote June 23 have served to clear air here and to give Italians reason to take long hard look at their international position. There is little doubt that Scelba feels he is now in a much stronger parliamentary situation." The telegram then proceeded to discuss the Trieste situation in gloomy terms, stating that failure by the Scelba government to reach an accord by July 15 might well be used as an alibi for further delay in coming to grips with the EDC issue (750G.00/6–2654).

750G.00/7–154: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (*Luce*) *to the Department of State*[1]

TOP SECRET ROME, July 1, 1954—noon.

9. I called on Piccioni afternoon June 30 at his request. I opened conversation by stating how grateful I had been for my recent talk

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce, to London for Thompson, to Trieste, and Belgrade.

with Scelba (Embtel 4307)[2] particularly his assurances he would sign facilities agreement within twenty-four hours Trieste settlement, and with introduction SOF in Parliament June 30. Piccioni then said that Cabinet meeting, scheduled for the thirtieth, had been postponed until July 1 but that bill for SOF ratification would be presented shortly after Cabinet approval, which he implied would emerge from Cabinet meeting July 1.

I went on to say that I was reasonably confident that Trieste solution could be found and that Italian Government could move ahead with such great problems of foreign policy as EDC ratification. Although I had not seen Bruce's Coled 298[3] prior to my conversation, I pointed out implications of President's conversations with Churchill concerning necessity for immediate action on EDC, Piccioni interjected to say that he could not see what difference a delay of few months would make. I replied such delay would adversely affect Adenauer's position since German political situation required either implementation of EDC or restoration sovereignty this year. I told him it was a mistake to delay ratification because of feeling that French would modify treaty; while modifications might help perfect treaty, there was simply not time enough due German developments to await modifications which would require time-consuming negotiations with other EDC members.

I hinted that Italians must be aware that if they took leadership in passing EDC now their action would undoubtedly be well viewed when question of allotting commands in EDC army arose. I tried persuade him that since we are on way to FTT settlement, to wait on settlement before taking action on EDC ratification might mean losing for Italy psychological moment. Ratification of EDC might strengthen not only Italian position in Trieste settlement but would also materially aid Italian position re Balkan pact.

Piccioni bluntly asked if US were linking settlement FTT to Italian ratification EDC. I replied in negative, stating that although Italians had made such link, we wanted to handle each question on its merits. Piccioni then said that it was highly unlikely, even if Trieste settlement reached prior to July 15, government could obtain parliamentary action on EDC before summer recess. Government feared that, if EDC debate protracted, as is likely, Gronchi would recess Chamber for summer, leaving government with task of repeated ratification operation in fall.

I then reverted to requirements of German political situation for implementation of EDC this year and made strong plea that Italians continue leadership they have thus far shown in furthering European integration. Failure to ratify EDC now would mean dissipation of fruits Italian leadership in this field over past several years. Piccioni admitted this possibility but said "government would not dare move without Trieste solution".

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[2] *Supra.*

[3] Not printed; it reported on French satisfaction with the language of the Churchill-Eisenhower communiqué of June 29 (p. 989) and on a French request "to have Italy take some positive action before July 20 in direction of ratification". It then requested Ambassador Luce to approach the Italian Government to press for action along these lines (740.5/6-2954).

When Piccioni raised opening frontiers Zones A B, I said that we viewed Scelba's suggestion with sympathy and that action of this nature could not be ruled out when talks had progressed to point where there was no possibility of their collapse.[4]

LUCE

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[4] In telegram 10 from Rome, July 1, Ambassador Luce amplified these remarks, stating *inter alia* that Piccioni had expressed discouragement about prospects for bringing the EDC up for parliamentary debate prior to the parliamentary summer recess even if Trieste was settled by July 15. In view of the fact that Piccioni's attitude was in contrast with that indicated by Scelba on June 26 (telegram 4307, *supra*), Ambassador Luce suggested the advisability of Secretary Dulles writing directly to Scelba "congratulating him for his firm decision concerning Trieste settlement and EDC" as indicated in telegram 4307 (750G.00/7–154). There is no record in Department of State files of any direct communication between the Secretary and Scelba on EDC at this time.

740.5/7–854

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, June 25, 1954.

Subject: EDC Alternative Planning

1. In response to the request contained in your memorandum dated 22 June 1954,[2] subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding alternative measures of securing a German defense contribution to Allied defense organization in Europe.

2. From the military viewpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the alternatives to EDC in order of vital United States security interests would be:

a. Full NATO membership for West Germany.
b. Independent rearming of West Germany by the United States and the United Kingdom.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States now initiate positive measures which will serve either to bring about early ratification by France of the EDC or French agreement to the alternative stated in subparagraph 2*a* above. As a possible measure of

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[1] The source text was attached to a letter from Vice Admiral Davis to Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, dated July 8, which noted the provisions of the secret minute on Germany and the EDC (dated June 28, p. 988), especially the need for consultations expressed in paragraph 10, and for this reason was forwarding the views of the JCS on the military aspects of alternative planning. Admiral Davis stated that the Department of Defense concurred in the JCS views and recommended that they be given great weight in determining U.S. policy with respect to German association in the collective defense of Western Europe. He requested Department of State views so that contingency defense planning could be initiated.

[2] Not found in Department of State files.

influencing the French in this direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend an immediate United States-United Kingdom approach to France which would leave no doubt that, in the absence of early French agreement to EDC or to the entry of West Germany into the NATO, we would proceed bilaterally toward the restoration of German sovereignty in the British and American Zones and would assist the Germans in their rearmament efforts with the full intent of eventual integration of German forces into the NATO.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider further that:

a. The security interests of the United States require that a decision be reached as early as possible. The NSC has selected 1 October 1954 as the planning date by which German rearmament would be initiated. This date should be anticipated if possible.

b. If none of these courses of action can be implemented, the United States should then reappraise its basic policy toward Western Europe and its NATO commitments.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the foregoing views be considered at an early date in connection with the application of United States policy with respect to the association of West Germany in the collective defense of Western Europe.[3]

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ARTHUR RADFORD
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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[3] In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles on July 9, Murphy indicated that Admiral Radford had been anxious to discuss the contents of his memorandum at a joint meeting "but I explained we had not had an opportunity to consider their paper but that I would bring it to your attention as soon as possible." Murphy added that he had informed Radford of Dulles' belief that it was unwise to discuss alternatives to EDC at the moment because of the adverse effect this might have and Radford had replied that Defense Secretary Wilson had specifically requested the Joint Chiefs to consider alternative proposals. "The Joint Chiefs feel strongly," Murphy continued, "that we cannot afford to wait indefinitely for the French to act or we will run the risk of losing both Germany and France. I made clear my feeling there was no difference in principle between us on this" (740.5/7-854). On July 19, Murphy wrote Admiral Davis that "With the approval of the Secretary, the Department of State is now giving active consideration to the problem of German association in the defense of Western Europe in the event of rejection of the EDC or continued delay in its entry into force. The views expressed in your letter of July 8, 1954 and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of June 25, 1954 are being taken into account in the preparation of the Department's position. It is anticipated that the Department will be prepared to discuss this matter with the Department of Defense in the very near future with a view to developing an agreed U.S. position as soon as possible" (740.5/7-1954).

740.5/7-1054 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT WASHINGTON, July 10, 1954—8:57 p. m.

126. For Dillon and Bruce and Rhinehart [*Reinhardt*] for General Gruenther.

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[1] Drafted by Claxton of H; cleared with Nolting of S/MSA, Bonbright, and the Department of Defense.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee has revised Mutual Security Act EDC Amendment to provide December 31, 1954 cut-off of shipment of all matériel and equipment programmed 1950 to 1955 for all EDC countries except countries which have ratified EDC or agreed to or are in process of developing a substitute satisfactory to President.

Drafting of language left to Executive Branch. Proposed draft follows:

"(1) In order to promote an integrated defense of the North Atlantic area and to support concrete measures for political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe, equipment and materials of the value programmed for nations signing the treaty constituting the European Defense Community shall, pending the coming into force of the treaty, be delivered subsequent to December 31, 1954, only to such of these nations as have ratified the treaty, or have joined together in or are developing an alternative collective defense program in a manner satisfactory to the United States as determined by the President."

Note effects of proposal:

(1) Diminishes pressure on France and Italy to join EDC by allowing delivery of programmed equipment in case country agrees to or is satisfactorily in process of developing alternative to EDC.

(2) Involves danger of complete cut-off to France and Italy and consequent effect on NATO if conditions not fulfilled.

(3) Applies to 1950–1953 programs (1,300 million for France and 700 million for Italy) as well as 1954 and 1955 programs (197 million for France and 214 million for Italy) as of December 31, 1954 but releases 1954 and 1955 programs until then.

Apparently possible obtain reconsideration Monday morning if Executive Branch takes firm position with strong reasons.

Please consider with General Gruenther and advise your views and his by six p.m., Sunday EDT.[2]

DULLES

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[2] Bruce replied in telegram Coled 7 from Paris, July 11, that from his standpoint he had no objection to the proposed draft terminating with "as have ratified the treaty", but he hoped the remainder commencing "or have joined together, et cetera" would be completely eliminated. "Bruce felt this language or any like it would provide French EDC opponents with golden opportunity to open interminable negotiations on program alternative to EDC. Moreover, it will encourage them to think US Government has relaxed its firm stand in support present EDC treaty and is prepared for new negotiations" Nothing, Bruce concluded, could be worse at the present time (740.5/7–1154). In Army telegram EC 9–2878, July 11, from Paris, Gruenther objected that the proposed amendment would reduce significantly and immediately the combat effectiveness of the air forces of France and Italy and would also have a serious long-term impact on the French and Italian navies. "If, in spite of my recommendation in paragraph one above, the amendment becomes law, I hope that we will be given a chance to submit recommendations in connection with the implementation." Gruenther added that he had seen Bruce's message and that if the amendment were to be adopted, "I favor the change suggested by him" (740.5/7–1154). The Embassy in France replied in telegrams 135 and 136 from Paris, July 11, that it believed the show of Congressional impatience with delays in EDC ratification would be helpful, but added that some of the proposed language was self-defeating as was the provision for a mandatory aid cut after Dec. 31 which was too explicit. (Bruce Mission files, lot 57 M 38, "Richards Amendment")

Editorial Note

In conformity with paragraph 9 of the secret United States–United Kingdom minute on Germany and EDC of June 28 (page 988), telegram 7171 to London, June 29, reported that Cecil Lyon, John Raymond, and Jacques Reinstein planned to arrive in London on July 4 in order to commence work July 5 with British officials on the legal, procedural, and chronological aspects of the program outlined in the minute (740.5/6–2954). Telegram 37 from London, July 2, reported that in response to inquiries concerning the "EDC contractual talks here next week", the Foreign Office "is stating that meeting is technical level discussion stemming from Washington conversations which is to consider details of various hypothetical situations but not draft agreement on specific steps to be taken now. Foreign Office also expects informally give French Embassy here appropriate reassurances" (740.5/7–254).

This United States–United Kingdom Working Group met July 5 to 12 and after the first two meetings, July 5 to 6, had drafted papers dealing with (1) a chronological program for implementation of Anglo-American policy; (2) two protocols for use in the event France prepared to join in a proposed four-power action to place contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany into immediate effect; (3) a paper on political concessions by the three powers to the Federal Republic without conclusion of four-power protocols (telegram 75 from London, July 7). Thereafter, the American delegation to the London Working Group exchanged a series of telegrams with the Department of State transmitting, clarifying, and modifying draft texts of the various papers written by the Working Group. The file of telegrams exchanged between Washington and London is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 343. The final report of the Working Group, dated July 12, is printed *infra*.

662A.00/7–1554

Report of Anglo-American Study Group on Germany, Held at London, July 5–12, 1954[1]

SECRET [LONDON, July 12, 1954.]

A Study Group of officials of the United States and the United Kingdom met in London from July 5 to July 12, 1954. The task of the Study Group was to work out the aspects of the programme set forth in the minute agreed between the President and the Prime Minister in

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[1] A covering memorandum drafted by Reinstein and sent by Elbrick to the Secretary and Murphy, dated July 15, stated that the source text and accompanying annex and documents comprised the report of the Working Group. The covering memorandum added that the source text and accompanying documents printed below "reflect the final form of the report as adopted on July 12." Two copies of the report were sent to the Department of Defense.

Washington on June 27 (Document 1). The Study Group proceeded as directed in point 9 of that minute.

2. The results of the Study Group's work are set out in the following documents:—

(*a*) A chronological programme (Document 2) for the carrying out of Anglo-American policy. This programme is based on the premise that, in the event of a French failure to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty before recessing for the summer, the restoration of sovereignty to the Federal Republic "should be accomplished in a fashion which would as little as possible militate against ratification by France of the E.D.C. in the fall". (Point 3 of Document 1.) Accordingly the programme provides for an Anglo-American suggestion to the French Government of Four Power Protocols bringing into force the Bonn Conventions less all references therein to the E.D.C. Treaty.

(*b*) Two Draft Protocols and exchanges of notes* (Document 3) to carry out the procedure indicated above. These Protocols provide for the entry into force of the Conventions and in addition, make provision, during a period to be determined, for

(i) reserving the position in regard to German rearmament.

(ii) the financial support of the Allied forces in Germany. The Protocols are so drafted as to provide for two different eventualities, viz. either that the French Assembly might debate the E.D.C. Treaty during the present session and reject it or that the session might come to an end without the Treaty having been brought to a decision.

The reason why there are two Protocols is that, so far as procedure in the United States is concerned, it is necessary to submit to the Senate only the proposal to separate the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. Treaty. Therefore the first Protocol is designed for this purpose, while the second Protocol, reserving the position in regard to German rearmament and covering support costs, etc., would be put into force as an executive agreement by the United States Government. The two agreements would have the same validity and are to be ratified together by the German Federal Republic.

The Group were agreed that there should be an Article 3 of the second Protocol the object of which would be to preclude its use by a Signatory, viz. France, to maintain disarmament controls in Germany for what might be the considerable period pending the entry into force of the E.D.C. Treaty or the conclusion of a final agreement between the Four Powers about a German defence contribution. The Group were unable in the time at their disposal to agree on how this should best be done. The various drafts which have been under consideration are set out at the Annex to this Covering Report.

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*The first exchange of notes confirms the assurances and obligations contained in the letters exchanged in connexion with the signing of the Bonn Conventions and the E.D.C. Treaty; the second relates to the specific deletion of references to the E.D.C. in the Bonn Conventions and certain consequential amendments. [Footnote in the source text.]

(*c*) A short paper (Document 4) on political concessions by the Three Powers to the Federal Republic failing the conclusion of the Four Power Protocols. This method might be employed in the event of a French refusal to join with the Two Powers as at (*b*) above.

(*d*) A paper (Document 5) on action to be taken in respect of the Bonn Conventions in the event of a French refusal to cooperate on the lines suggested in (*b*) and (*c*) above. Most of the provisions of the Bonn Conventions could be brought into effect without French agreement insofar as they would be

(i) matters within the competence of each High Commissioner in his own Zone;

(ii) matters which could be dealt with by the Allied High Commission acting by majority vote, the British and American High Commissioners outvoting the French High Commissioner.

The only things which could not be done as above, i.e. by overriding the French without infringing the tripartite agreements, would be to put an end to the Occupation in the U.S. and U.K. Zones of Germany and to deprive of authority the Allied High Commission and its organs including the Military Security Board. The termination of the Occupation is of course the major German requirement. As against this, the consequences of breaking the tripartite agreements would be serious.

The suggestion will be noted that the U.S. and U.K. elements in Bonn should work out the detailed application of the various courses discussed.

As is explained in the paper referred to in (*a*) above, the German Federal Chancellor would be consulted before action of the sort under consideration, i.e. independent of the French was decided upon.

3. The Study Group did not consider point (10) of the agreed minute (Document 1) because in the view of the U.S. Members the question of alternatives to the E.D.C. was one for study at a later time. The United Kingdom members of the Group however explained the lines of British thinking at the working level on the lines of the attached Document No. 6. The U.S. members took note of these views and undertook to report them to their Government.

4. The Study Group submit their report for approval. The immediate action required is the approach to the French Government, the consequent approaches to the other Governments and the action to be taken in Congress and in Parliament.

Annex

DRAFTS OF UNRESOLVED ARTICLE IN SECOND PROTOCOL

(1) For a reasonable time in order to permit the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, or other arrangements for comparable objectives regard-

ing the form and manner in which the Federal Republic will make a contribution to Western defence, the Federal Republic undertakes not to establish military forces.

(2) If the Treaty on the establishment of the European Defence Community shall not have entered into force by (*90 days from signature of this Protocol*), the Signatory States shall, at the request of any of them, review the provisions of Article 2 of the present Protocol with a view to obtaining an immediate contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to the defence of the free world.

(3) If the Treaty on the establishment of the E.D.C. shall not have entered into force by 90 days from signature of this protocol, the signatory states shall at the request of any of them meet for the purpose of making arrangements for obtaining an immediate contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to the defence of the free world.

[The above draft would be accompanied by changing paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Second Protocol to read as follows:

> "Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the establishment of the E.D.C. or until 60 days after one of the signatories shall have called for a meeting as provided in Article 3 thereof the following provisions of this Article shall apply".] [2]

(4) If the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community shall not have entered into force by 90 days from the signature of this Protocol the Three Powers shall, at the request of any signatory state, meet with the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of agreeing, jointly or severally, with the Federal Republic upon comparable arrangements for obtaining its immediate contribution to the defence of the free world.

[The above draft would be accompanied by changing paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Second Protocol to read as follows:

> "Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the establishment of the European Defence Community or of the comparable arrangements referred to in Article 3, the following provisions of this Article shall apply".]

(5) If the Treaty on the Establishment of the E.D.C. shall not have entered into force by ninety days from the signature of this protocol, the three Powers shall, at the request of any signatory State, meet with the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of agreeing, jointly or severally, with the Federal Republic arrangements for obtaining its immediate contribution to the defence of the free world as part of a system of mutual collective security.

[The above draft would be accompanied by changing paragraph 1 of Article 2 of the Second Protocol to read as follows:

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[2] Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.

"Until the entry into force of the Treaty on the establishment of the E.D.C. or of the arrangements referred to in Article 3, the following provisions of this Article shall apply".]

Note: The above drafts are based on the assumption that the French Assembly adjourns without voting on the E.D.C. Treaty. It should, however, be noted that not all the above formulae would be equally applicable to a situation in which the French Assembly had rejected the E.D.C. Treaty.

[Enclosure 1—Document 1]

MINUTE AGREED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER IN WASHINGTON ON JUNE 27, 1954

[Here follows text as printed on page 988.]

[Enclosure 2—Document 2]

PROGRAMME FOR CARRYING OUT ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY

The object of Anglo-American policy remains to secure the early ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty and Bonn Conventions. If, however, it becomes clear that French ratification cannot be obtained before the French Assembly rises in August, the two Governments must then endeavour to persuade the French Government to join with them in bringing the Bonn Conventions into force at an early date independently of the E.D.C. Treaty. There are indications that French officials are themselves contemplating a solution on these lines. But the French Government may wish to defer any such action until after the French Assembly reconvenes in October.

Meanwhile we must prepare for a less favourable situation, viz. that the French may not at the end of their present Parliamentary session have ratified the E.D.C. Treaty and that they may have resisted or temporized upon the U.S./U.K. suggestion for bringing the Bonn Conventions into force separately. In that situation the two Governments would have to reveal to the French Government their intention to proceed by themselves if necessary. This could not be done in any detail until the two Governments had first consulted the Federal Chancellor and made sure that he approved.

On the foregoing basis, we might aim at the following timetable:—

(i) As soon as Governments have approved the recommendations of the Anglo-American Study Group, the United States and United Kingdom Ambassadors in Paris would inform the French Government that, while the entry into force of the E.D.C. Treaty and the Bonn Conventions remains their object, they wish, in the event of a French failure to take Parliamentary action upon the E.D.C. Treaty before the summer recess, to separate the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. Treaty. This would in effect be a general indication of the

(All dates approximate)
July 12

action which the two Governments would wish to take in detail at a later stage (see (iv) below). At the same time the French would be informed of the intention of the two Governments to inform their legislatures, so that the two governments would be free to act as necessary during the parliamentary recess. The French Government would not at this stage be shown the draft Protocols or informed of their existence.

(ii) Very shortly afterwards a communication would be made to
July 13 the German Federal Chancellor and to the Benelux Governments in the same sense. A more general communication to the North Atlantic Council would also be appropriate shortly thereafter.

(iii) Action insofar as may be necessary would then have to be
July 15 taken in Congress and in Parliament. Action in the former might take the form of a Presidential message asking for a resolution advising and consenting to the necessary action on the part of the President. On the British side, so far as Parliament is concerned, it is intended to make a statement in
July 15 the Foreign Affairs Debate on July 14 on the general lines of the draft Protocols (though without mentioning their existence). The object would be to enable Her Majesty's Government to sign the Protocols and ratify them during the recess without any presentation to Parliament.

(iv) If (*a*) it becomes evident about two weeks before the French
Aug. 1 Assembly is scheduled to recess that no action is likely
Aug. 16 to be taken on the E.D.C. Treaty or (*b*) the French Assembly reject the E.D.C. Treaty, we should open formal negotiations with the French Government for the separation of the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. by means of the Protocols. We should show them whichever of the Protocols would be appropriate to (*a*) or (*b*) above.

(v) The Federal Chancellor, the Benelux Governments and the
Aug. 2 or Aug. 17 North Atlantic Council would then be informed.

(vi) If the French Government return a favourable reply to our proposal for Four Power Protocols in either form, the necessary Four
Sept. 1 Power negotiations would take place in Bonn with as little delay as possible. The Protocols as agreed might be signed on behalf of the Western Powers by their High Commissioners.

(vii) The Benelux Governments and the North Atlantic Council would be kept informed.

(viii) If the French Government express agreement in principle with the proposal to separate the Bonn Conventions from the E.D.C. Treaty, but are unwilling, for Parliamentary or other reasons, to do so through the medium of the protocols, it would be necessary to consider how nearly the same result could be achieved by action on the
Sept.† 2 part of the three High Commissioners. We should ascertain from the French whether in practice they would be willing to go far enough on this basis to sat-

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†Dependent on what action is taken on (iv) above, this action might be taken about two weeks earlier, i.e. August 16. [Footnote in the source text.]

isfy the Germans. If not, we should not allow discussion of such a procedure to cause delay.

(ix) If the French return either a temporizing or a negative reply Sept. 10 to the proposal in (viii), we would convey to them a grave warning that there must be Anglo-United States action to restore German sovereignty independently of France. Consultation would then take place with the Federal Chancellor.‡ When we had obtained the Chancellor's views, and if the threat of independent action had meanwhile had no effect upon the French, we would then inform them in somewhat greater detail of our intention to proceed without them and make a public statement of our intentions.

Note: The above timetable is tight and can only be approximate since it endeavours to cover so many hypothetical situations. It will of course be necessary for the two Governments to consult together in the light of the circumstances at each stage.

[Enclosure 3—Document 3]

PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE THREE POWERS AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic of the one part, and the Federal Republic of Germany of the other part:

WHEREAS there was signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, a Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany; a Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany; a Finance Convention; a Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation; and an Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members;

WHEREAS the above-mentioned Conventions do not enter into force in accordance with their terms until the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defense Community;

WHEREAS it remains the common aim of the Signatory States that the Federal Republic of Germany shall take its place as an equal partner in the community of Western nations where it can make its proper contribution to the defence of the free world;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Subject only to the provisions of the present Protocol and the related Protocol mentioned in Article 2, the provisions of the Convention on

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‡The German Bundestag reassembles on September 5. [Footnote in the source text.]

Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and their Members shall enter into force on the entry into force of this Protocol, except that references to the European Defence Community shall be deemed to be deleted but only until the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community.

Article 2

The Three Powers and the Federal Republic have concluded a related Protocol which will enter into force simultaneously with the present Protocol.

Article 3

1. The present Protocol and the related Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States at the earliest possible date. Instruments of ratification or approval shall be deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The present Protocol and the related Protocol shall enter into force immediately upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or approval of both protocols by all the Signatory States.

In Faith Whereof, etc.

PROTOCOL ON A DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

[*Note:* The protocol has been drafted to cover two eventualities:—

(*a*) The French Assembly having adjourned without voting on the E.D.C. Treaty.

(*b*) The French Assembly having rejected the Treaty. Certain Articles of the Draft which apply in either case are printed across the page. Those in the left-hand column will apply only in case (*a*) and those in the right-hand column only in case (*b*).]

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic of the one part, and the Federal Republic of Germany of the other part

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany agree on the need for a contribution, at the earliest possible date, by the Federal Republic to the defence of the free world.

2. Negotiations shall commence immediately with a view to concluding an agreement to that end.

Article 2

§ 1. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, the following provisions of this Article shall apply.	§ 1. Pending the entry into force of the agreement mentioned in Article 1, the following provisions of this Article shall apply.

2. The Federal Republic of Germany agrees that the rights and powers of the Federal and Land Authorities under Chapter 1 of the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation to repeal, deprive of effect or amend legislation enacted by the Occupation Authorities shall not be exercised in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation. The production in the Federal Republic of Germany of the war materials listed in Annexes I and II to Article 107 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community, and the manufacture of prototypes of and technical research concerning such materials shall remain prohibited. Exemptions from this prohibition may, however, be granted by a Joint Commission, to be immediately established, in which representatives of each of the Signatory States shall participate on a basis of equality.

3. The Federal Republic shall continue to meet the costs in Deutschemark of the support of the Forces of the Three Powers and of other Sending States and the members of such Forces stationed in the Federal territory, provided, however, that such costs shall not exceed a monthly average of DM.600 million. Funds for such costs which have been made available to the Three Powers before the entry into force of the present Protocol and which have not been expended to meet commitments made prior to the effective date of this Protocol shall remain available for twelve/eighteen months[‖] thereafter and be used for payment of such commitments.

Article 3

[See Covering Report]

In Faith Whereof the undersigned representatives duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments have signed the present Protocol being the related Protocol mentioned in Article 2 of the Protocol to the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

[§] See annex to covering report. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is printed, p. 999.]

[‖] Dependent on what period is agreed upon in current Occupation Costs negotiations in Bonn. [Footnote in the source text.]

DRAFT EXCHANGE OF NOTES

Federal Chancellor to the three High Commissioners individually

Mr. High Commissioner

In the course of negotiation of the Protocol to the Convention on Relations between the three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and the related Protocol signed to-day, note was taken of the various letters exchanged in May, 1952 in connexion with the signing of the Convention on Relations and the related Conventions and in connexion with the signing of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community. The texts of these letters are set out in the Federal Republic's Official Gazette (*Bundesgesetzblatt*) 1954, Number 3, Part II at pages 242 to 320 inclusive and at pages 416 to 418 inclusive.

In the name of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, I have the honour to advise you that the Federal Republic for its part confirms the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by the Federal Republic in these letters and I request confirmation that the Government of the United States of America/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/French Republic for their part confirm the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by them in these letters.

The High Commissioner to the Federal Chancellor

Mr. Chancellor

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of to-day's date in which you, in the name of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, confirm the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by the Federal Republic in the various letters referred to in your note.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/French Republic I confirm the assurances given and the obligations undertaken by the Government of the United States of America/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/French Republic in these letters.

DRAFT NOTE FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

MR. CHANCELLOR: The three Powers advise you that the references to the European Defence Community which "shall be deemed to be deleted pending the entry into force of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Defence Community", within the meaning of Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention on Relations between the three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed today, are, in the English [French and German] texts, the following:

Convention on Relations	
Article 4, paragraph 4.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 5, paragraph 2.	Delete the words—"and the European Defence Community".
Article 11.	Delete whole Article.
Forces Convention	
Article 17, paragraph 8.	Delete second sentence.
Article 38, paragraph 1.	Delete the separate clause at end of second sentence.
Article 39, paragraph 2.	Delete second sentence.
Article 44, paragraph 2.	Delete eleventh to thirtieth words, inclusive.
Article 47, paragraph 2.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 49.	Delete whole Article
Article 50.	Delete whole Article.
Annex B to Forces Convention	
Paragraph 3.	Delete second sentence.
Annex C to Forces Convention	Delete whole Annex.
Finance Convention	
Article 1, paragraph 2(*b*).	Delete from "provided that" to the end.
Article 3, paragraph 4.	Delete "by adhering and contributing to the European Defense Community in accordance with the agreements and arrangements pertaining to the Community and" and "which are not members of the European Defence Community".
Article 3, paragraph 5(*a*).	Delete "not members of the European Defence Community"; "the Community", and "not members of the Community".
Article 3, paragraph 5(*b*).	Delete whole sub-paragraph.
Article 4, paragraph 2.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 4, paragraph 3.	Delete from the beginning of the paragraph to the end of sub-paragraph (*c*).

It is the understanding of the three Powers that references in subsequent Articles of the Finance Convention to Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof are to be understood as references to Article 4, paragraph 3 as amended above and paragraph 3 of Article 2 of the Protocol on a Defence Contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Article 4, paragraph 4.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 5, paragraph 3.	Delete last sentence.
Article 6, paragraph 1.	Delete "and the arrangements made thereunder for effecting the transit of the funds through the budget of the European Defence Community".
Article 8, paragraph 18.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 13, paragraph 3.	Delete "the European Defence Community".
Article 14.	Delete last sentence.
Article 16.	Delete from "especially" to the end.
Article 18, paragraph 1.	Delete whole paragraph.
Article 18, paragraph 2.	Delete "which are not members of the European Defence Community".
Article 19, sub-paragraph (*a*).	Delete "paragraph 4 of Article 4".
Annex A Section 9.	Delete whole section.

It is the understanding of the three Powers that the Finance Convention shall be applied as if all references to dates therein were references to . . . . . .¶ and the Settlement Convention as if references in Chapter 11 thereof to 1st October, 1953 were references to . . . . . .¶

We shall be glad to receive your confirmation that you are in agreement with the understandings set out in this letter.

[Enclosure 4—Document 4]

POLITICAL CONCESSIONS BY THE THREE POWERS TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WITHOUT CONCLUSION OF FOUR POWER PROTOCOLS IN THE FORMS PROPOSED IN DOCUMENT 3

A possible alternative to proceeding by means of the Protocols (Document 3[3]) would be for the United States, the United Kingdom and France to conclude agreements with the Federal Government (in the case of the United States they would be "executive agreements") to bring about substantially the result which the Protocols would achieve. The extent to which this could be done would depend on how far Governments (more especially the French Government) were prepared to go in the absence of parliamentary approval of the Protocols.

2. The French might on the other hand propose Allied High Commission/Federal Government Agreements as the form, rather than strictly intergovernmental Agreements. While this would be legally possible, it would not end the Occupation, which is the major German requirement. Moreover in those circumstances the content of the Agreements might be so small that independent United Kingdom/

¶This will be subject to later negotiation in Bonn. [Footnote in the source text.]

[3] Above.

United States action on the lines proposed in Document 5 would be the only way of holding the position in Germany.

3. The considerations in paragraph 2 above would apply equally to any French proposal to proceed to put the Bonn Conventions into force by Occupation legislation.

[Enclosure 5—Document 5]

ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN RESPECT OF THE BONN CONVENTIONS IN THE EVENT OF FRENCH REFUSAL TO CO-OPERATE

I. *Introduction*

1. If the French Government refuse to be a party to protocols to bring the Bonn Conventions into force (Document 3), and if they likewise refuse to be a party to any similar agreement not requiring Parliamentary action or to Occupation legislation (Document 4), the U.K. and U.S. Governments would nevertheless wish to give effect to the Bonn Conventions to the maximum extent possible.

2. The provisions of the Bonn Conventions may be divided into four classes according to what authorities are competent to act in each case:

(*a*) Matters which are within the competence of each High Commissioner acting separately in his own Zone. (Revised Charter of the Allied High Commission V (2).) Examples are war criminals, displaced persons and restitution.

(*b*) Matters which may be dealt with by the Allied High Commission acting by majority vote, either with or without appeal to governments resulting in a thirty days delay. (Revised Charter of the Allied High Commission, Annex A.) This would cover a large number of matters such as civil aviation, external assets, decartelisation, deconcentration, foreign interests in Germany.

(*c*) Matters outside the competence of the High Commission on which the U.K. and U.S. Governments can agree with the Federal Government without requiring French consent. Examples are some of the political clauses of the Convention on Relations.

(*d*) Matters which require French agreement before any action can legally be taken (see next paragraph). Any decision to override the French in such cases would entail a clear breach of the Tripartite Agreements relating to the control of Germany. These are the revised Occupation Statute, the revised Charter of the Allied High Commission, the revised Agreement on Industrial Controls with the related governmental instructions and the Charter of the Military Security Board.

3. It will thus be seen that we can put into effect all the provisions of the Bonn Conventions, except for those in (*d*) above, without the agreement of the French, but equally without breach in our treaty relations with them. The only things which we could not do by this means are unfortunately those to which the Germans attach most im-

portance, that is to put an end to the Occupation in the U.S. and U.K. Zones and to deprive the Allied High Commission and its organs of authority. The two major results which cannot be avoided would be:—

(i) The Germans would still have to submit amendments to the Basic Law for the unanimous approval of the Allied High Commission.

(ii) The present Military Security Board could not be abolished nor could controls in the disarmament field be restricted to those provided in the E.D.C. Treaty.

Another result would be that international agreements would also have to be submitted to the Allied High Commission but the French alone could not prevent their entry into force at the end of 21 days delay.

4. The question at issue is whether, in order to take these additional steps towards granting Germany her sovereignty, it is worthwhile, in our own or the German interest, to break international agreements with consequent serious risks. Whatever action is taken under the following heads should be so framed as to make it as easy as possible for the French to join with us at the time or later.

II. *Action Under the Existing Agreements*

5. There are three methods by which we could give effect to provisions of the Bonn Conventions in categories (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) above, without infringing existing agreements:—

(i) By means of an agreement or agreements between governments reproducing the provisions of the Conventions suitably amended. These agreements would then be approved by the German Parliament and would thus become German law. They would then be submitted to the Allied High Commission which would approve them by a two to one vote, though in some cases an appeal to governments by the French would be expected which would result in thirty days delay. They would then enter into force. Some related Occupation legislation would be necessary in certain cases.

All the provisions of the Bonn Conventions in Categories (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) could be dealt with in this way, but see (iii) below.

(ii) Many provisions, and particularly those in the Settlement Convention, could be enacted as Occupation legislation. We could simply enact the substance of the Bonn Conventions by ordinances, which would be adopted as appropriate by a two to one vote of the Allied High Commission or by the individual High Commissioners for their respective zones.

(iii) Some matters, such as those concerning the relations between the U.S. and U.K. and the Federal Government and the exercise of Allied powers, could be dealt with in letters to the Federal Government setting out the intentions or assurances of the U.S. and the U.K. towards the Federal Republic and vice versa. An advantage of this would be that although such matters are not subject to the French veto, they do affect the whole status of the Allies in Germany and it would be asking for trouble to submit them to the French in the Allied High Commission.

6. The methods discussed above can be applied as follows. Many of the provisions of the Convention on Relations, the whole of the Forces Convention and some parts of the Settlement Convention can most easily be put into effect as agreements between the Governments of the U.K., the U.S. and the Federal Government (method (i) in paragraph 5 above). With respect to other provisions, however, there is some doubt as to the best method of proceeding:—

(*a*) Much of the Settlement Convention can be enacted as Occupation legislation (method (ii)). The U.K. element of the Study Group prefer this method because they feel that it has the following advantages:—

(i) Such legislation can be put into effect immediately without awaiting German ratification;

(ii) The French might prefer to submit to, and so might later join in, measures prepared by their Allies rather than measures presented to them by the Germans.

The U.S. element on the other hand prefer method (i) to Occupation legislation because it would doubtless be more acceptable to the Federal Republic to obtain the Bonn Conventions as part of an agreement on a basis of equality.

(*b*) The U.K. members of the Group attach importance to making full use of method (iii) above, i.e. declarations of intention and assurances which will not be submitted to the Allied High Commission, as they consider this an additional means of avoiding friction with the French. It will also get round the doubtful question as to whether some of the matters in the Convention on Relations are in fact properly within the competence of the High Commission. Here again, the U.S. element prefer the maximum use of method (i).

Both of these differences can only be resolved after eventual consultation with the Chancellor.

7. Whatever may eventually be decided as to the best methods to adopt, the provisions of the Conventions would be followed as closely as possible. Some provisions could be applied throughout the Federal territory (e.g. the provision permitting civil aviation); others would be effective only in the U.K. and U.S. Zones (e.g. Restitution). Some would be omitted, (e.g. the undertaking to disband Civilian Service Organisations—C.S.O.). References to the E.D.C. would have to be deleted, certain dates changed, the composition of the various boards and tribunals adjusted, and so on. It is considered desirable to set up an Arbitration Tribunal similar to that to be established under the Convention on Relations but it would be preferable to do this by a separate agreement, clearly defining the jurisdiction and standing of the Tribunal in relation to the Occupation Authorities.

8. One particularly important matter of substance that will have to be covered is the use of our powers under the Occupation Statute

after these arrangements have been put into force. It is considered that we should give an assurance to the Germans that we would not exercise those powers except in the reserved fields set out in Article 2 of the Convention on Relations, in the circumstances of emergency envisaged in Article 5(2) of the Convention on Relations, in the field of disarmament and demilitarisation, or upon request of the appropriate German authorities.

III. *Action entailing a breach of existing Agreements*

9. After consultation with the Federal Chancellor we may consider it essential to take additional steps towards re-establishing German sovereignty in the matters listed in Section I, paragraph 3 above. We could then proceed in the following manner. The Bonn Conventions would be re-cast as Agreements between the U.K., the U.S. and the Federal Republic. In particular, Article 1 of the Convention on Relations would have to be re-written to state that the U.K. and the U.S. will no longer regard the Occupation Statute as having any force and that they will not recognise the Allied High Commission as having any authority. At the same time we should take action vis-à-vis the Russians to safeguard our position in Berlin similar to that planned for the entry into force of the Bonn Conventions as signed.

10. It may be doubted whether such action by the U.K. and U.S. alone would be fully effective. For example, it is conceivable that the Federal Constitutional Court would take the view that amendments to the Basic Law could still not enter into force without the unanimous approval of the Allied High Commission.

11. The risks involved in this course of action cannot be accurately appraised in advance, particularly since we cannot know how the French will react. Some indication of the nature of the risks can be given, however:—

(i) Disagreement on policy in so important a matter would place a very severe strain on our relations with the French and on the N.A.T.O. alliance. It might encourage a drift towards neutralism, and possibly even a turning towards Russia, in France.

(ii) One of the most likely results of this course would be that it would tend to set the Germans and French in opposition to each other. The U.S. and U.K. action would, in effect, invite the Germans to disregard any claim by the French to the maintenance of occupation controls and would create a legal situation conducive to the development of clashes between the French and German authorities. This would militate against our objective of promoting Franco-German *rapprochement* and make settlement of the issues of a German defence contribution and the Saar more difficult.

(iii) If divergent legal regimes develop in the French Zone on the one hand and the U.K. and U.S. Zones on the other, the effect would be that of a further division of Germany. Any such development would detract considerably from the political effectiveness of the move to restore German sovereignty.

(iv) A very serious strain might be imposed on the tripartite front in Berlin.

(v) Large American contingents and two Canadian Air Force Wings are stationed in the French Zone. Their presence there, and some aspects of their maintenance, depend on agreements with the French authorities in Germany made pursuant to the inter-Allied agreements which we would have infringed. While it seems doubtful that the French would, in the absence of a major change in the character of the French Government, question their continued deployment in the French Zone, the French authorities could undoubtedly create difficulties for these forces if they chose. It will be recalled, however, that the deployment of these forces is in accordance with SHAPE plans.

(vi) It might become difficult to take concerted tripartite action in Western Germany in the event of an emergency.

12. On the other hand, it is always possible that the French might acquiesce in the new situation while reserving their rights. The degree to which the Germans displayed moderation in their dealings with the French might well be an important factor.

IV *Future Procedure*

13. Although the Study Group has surveyed the Conventions sufficiently to conclude that the above methods are practicable, it could not in the time available, work out the detailed application of the alternative solutions discussed in this paper. In any event this course of action would not be initiated for at least two months. Meanwhile the U.K. and U.S. elements in Bonn could draw up a detailed report for further consideration by the two Governments.

[Enclosure 6—Document 6]

BRITISH PAPER ON RESTRICTIONS ON GERMAN REARMAMENT WHICH MIGHT BE FEASIBLE IN THE EVENT OF GERMAN ADMISSION TO N.A.T.O.

Public opinion in France and other N.A.T.O. countries will not readily accept German membership of N.A.T.O. without some restrictions on German rearmament. Those restrictions, if they are to be acceptable to German opinion, must not discriminate too obviously against the Germans and must apply to other countries as well. The ideal solution would be to transplant to N.A.T.O. as many of the essential E.D.C. safeguards as we can persuade the Germans to accept as the price of joining the leading Western "club" as a full member.

We might aim at agreements on the following subjects:—

(*a*) *Germany's initial contribution.*

The size and character of the initial German defence contribution to N.A.T.O. would be agreed with the Federal Republic as part of the negotiations for her admission to N.A.T.O. It would be based on the E.D.C. figures of twelve divisions and 1,300 aircraft. It would comprise neither submarines nor strategic bombers. The agreement might include a clause to the effect that any change in the composition or strength of the German contribution could only be made in consultation with the North Atlantic Council (i.e. through the Annual Review process) and in accordance with agreed N.A.T.O. strategy.

(*b*) *Strategically exposed areas.*

A protocol might be added to the North Atlantic Treaty to reproduce the E.D.C. agreement that within "strategic areas" certain types of arms production and research, including atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons, submarines and military aircraft, would only be permitted by decision of the North Atlantic Council. In order to avoid obvious discrimination against the Germans it will probably be necessary to define as "strategic areas" not only the Federal Republic but also parts of the N.A.T.O. area also contiguous or nearly contiguous to the Soviet "empire" such as N. Norway, Denmark, Thrace and Turkey north of the Straits.

(*c*) *A European arms pool.*

A European arms pool would have political and psychological value. The six E.D.C. countries might adopt within N.A.T.O.: a plan for an arms pool, incorporating the essential features of the relevant provisions of the E.D.C. Treaty (i.e. control over production, import and export of war material). The drafting of the plan for such an arms pool would have to be left primarily to the E.D.C. countries.

(*d*) *Commitment of forces to N.A.T.O.*

In order to prevent Germany from maintaining forces other than those committed to N.A.T.O., an agreement might be concluded between all members of N.A.T.O. on the lines of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the E.D.C. Treaty. Thus N.A.T.O. members might agree that apart from forces placed under SACEUR no armed forces will be maintained except:

(i) police and *gendarmérie* intended for the maintenance of internal order;

(ii) troops for the personal protection of the Head of State;

(iii) forces required for international missions (e.g. U.N.O.) or for any other purpose approved by the North Atlantic Council;

(iv) Forces which any member required to fulfill its defence responsibilities in the North Atlantic area other than the European mainland or outside the N.A.T.O. area.

(*e*) *Integration and deployment of N.A.T.O. forces.*

(i) Measures might be taken to give effect to what is already agreed to be SACEUR's first responsibility, namely, the creation of a genuine and effective integrated force, notably in the air, so that all German air units could be grouped with other nationalities in N.A.T.O. air formations.

(ii) The position of Western Germany in the centre of the N.A.T.O. front line, coupled with the obvious temptation for German forces to cross the Zonal frontier to assist their compatriots in the Soviet Zone or even later on to modify the Oder-Neisse frontier, make it essential to establish effective N.A.T.O. control over the location and movement of the German forces. We can reasonably expect the Germans to agree, as the United Kingdom and the United States agreed in the recent Declarations about the E.D.C., that their forces shall be deployed in accordance with agreed N.A.T.O. strategy. In addition, it might be agreed that national forces placed under SACEUR shall not be moved within the N.A.T.O. area nor revert to national control for use within the N.A.T.O. area without the consent of SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council. We could not in the case of Germany allow a repetition of the Italian action in September 1953 in sending troops and ships to the Yugoslav frontier without any consultation with N.A.T.O. The presence of allied forces in Germany would of course be an additional and effective safeguard.

(*f*) *Maintenance of U.S. and U.K. troops in Europe.*

To supplement these suggested measures of control probably the most satisfying assurance that could be given to the French (particularly from the phychological point of view) would be some guarantee of the continued presence of United Kingdom and United States forces on the Continent. Their presence would be essential in connexion with, e.g. paragraph (*e*)(*i*) above. The United Kingdom and the United States have already stated, in connexion with their proposed links with E.D.C., their intention to keep on the Continent their fair share of forces required for European defence as long as the threat exists. New declarations on similar lines might be made by both Governments.

(*g*) *Extending the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty.*

An additional reassurance to the French (which would be particularly effective if guarantees as envisaged in paragraph (*f*) above were given) would be the addition of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty to remove the possibility of denunciation before fifty years. The idea that the Treaty should be considered of indefinite duration has already been ventilated in the North Atlantic Council and in a broad sense approved. A legal life of fifty years might greatly help to reconcile public opinion to German rearmament. This provision might be included in the protocol inviting German accession to N.A.T.O.

(*h*) *German assurance against any attempt to modify existing frontiers by force.*

One of the main objections to German admission to N.A.T.O. is undoubtedly the fact that the Federal Republic (and probably a future reunited Germany) would be a territorially dissatisfied Power, under constant temptation to modify its Eastern frontiers by force and to drag the whole of the N.A.T.O. Alliance into war for that purpose. This objection is a real one and cannot be completely met.

But we should at least require the German Federal Republic to make the type of declaration (suitably amended to meet the altered circumstances) which Dr. Adenauer last December agreed to make over the proposed security guarantees to be offered to the Russians in connection with the entry into force of the E.D.C. This would be buttressed by a version of the accompanying statement by the three Western Powers amended to take account of the new situation and to include all other N.A.T.O. Powers.

662A.00/7-1254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT LONDON, July 12, 1954—11 a. m.

47. Paris pass Hughes and Bruce. From Lyon. Verbatim text. Reference Department's 201 repeated Paris 132, Bonn 103.[2]

Following is clear text of study group's draft instruction for action by US and British Ambassadors Paris referred to paragraph 2 Department's 188 [3] to London repeated Paris 122, Bonn 97.

"HMG and the US Government are now considering the report of the Anglo-US study group. It will be forwarded to you by [omission in source text].

2. In consultation with your US colleague, you should approach the French Government on the evening of Monday, July 12, and make an oral communication in the following terms. You should begin by recalling that, as was made clear in the Washington statement and in my statement in the House of Commons on July 7, HMG, like the US Government, are still working on the assumption that the German contribution to Western defense will be made through the European Defence Community. We are, however, concerned about what would be the political effect in Germany if the French Parliament were to rise at the end of their present session without having taken a vote on the EDC. No progress has been made since the treaty was signed over two years ago in improving the international status of the Federal Republic. Any further delay would have a most unsettling effect on Germany, gravely weakening the position of the Federal Chancellor and bringing his policy of European cooperation into disrepute.

3. As the French Government will be aware, both Congress and Parliament adjourn towards the end of this month. Both Governments

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[1] Repeated to Washington as telegram 196. Source text is that found in Department of State files. Repeated also to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; during the deliberations of the London Study Group, the Foreign Office had drafted the instructions for action by the British Ambassador in Paris contained in the source text. Telegram 201 reported that Dulles was agreeable to informing the French of agreed U.S.–U.K. policy regarding German contribution to Western defense along the lines contained in the source text (662A.00/7-1254).

[3] Not printed; it reported that Dulles had by July 10 considered the initial text of the proposed U.K. instruction to its Ambassador at Paris and with two reservations agreed to it. Should the United Kingdom agree to two revisions proposed by Dulles, then Ambassador Dillon was authorized to make a parallel statement to the French Government on July 12 (662A.00/7-1054).

therefore feel that before such adjournment they should formulate their positions so that they can inform and consult with their parliamentary bodies as seems appropriate in each case. They have considered most sympathetically the French Government's suggestion that any public statement in Parliament might be avoided or perhaps deferred. HMG will, however, undoubtedly be questioned on the recommendations of the study group in the course of the foreign affairs debate on Wednesday, July 14, which is in any case the last opportunity for the discussion of foreign affairs before the House arises. They understand moreover that consultations between the President and Congress cannot be delayed much longer. They do not therefore feel that they can avoid making some public reference to this problem during the debate, although they are confident that this can be done in a way which need not embarrass M. Mendes-France. For your own information, the intention is for the Minister of State to deal with this matter in passing and in reply to what will have been said by other speakers in winding up the debate.

4. As the French Government knows, the Anglo-US study group was set up in London to consider on a purely hypothetical basis and in all its aspects the question how the international status of the German Federal Republic could be improved were the EDC treaty not to enter into force in the very near future. The two Governments have come to the conclusion that, in that event their aim could best be achieved by dissociating the Bonn Conventions from the EDC treaty by means of a short and simple agreement to be concluded between the Four Powers who signed those conventions. Such an agreement would provide, in agreement with Chancellor Adenauer, that German rearmament would be deferred for the time being. It would also provide for the continued financial support of the Allied Forces in Germany.

5. In making this communication, you should of course, leave the French Government in no doubt that the two governments maintain in full force their support of EDC and that it is their confident hope that the French Assembly will vote the treaty during the present session.

6. You should inform the French Government that we shall be making a subsequent communication in the same sense to the German Federal Government, the Benelux governments and the North Atlantic Council.

7. For your own information, you will see when you receive the study group's report [4] that it includes drafts of Four Power protocols. The existence of such drafts should not, however, be mentioned to the French now because (*a*) the texts have not been finally cleared; (*b*) they cannot be submitted to Parliament at this stage; (*c*) knowledge of their existence might only encourage further delaying tactics on the part of French opponents of the EDC and (*d*) we could only usefully enter into negotiations upon them with the French at a later stage, if at all.

Nor, of course, should you mention the possibilities of action which might be taken if the French were unwilling to proceed on the basis of the protocols. We should regard these parts of the study group's work as being covered by the words (paragraph 4 above) "on a purely hypothetical basis and in all its aspects".

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[4] *Supra.*

8. Should the French Government suggest that the work of the study group might now be resumed with their participation, you should explain that this seems to us premature and suggest that it could only confuse the issues while the EDC issue is still before the Assembly. We shall, of course, be anxious to consult fully with them if to our great regret the problem becomes actual rather than hypothetical.

9. We understand that your US colleagues will be receiving parallel instructions. The wording of your respective statements need not be identical. No written communication should be made.

10. I shall probably take the opportunity of my meeting with M. Mendes-France in Geneva on Monday to speak to him on similar lines, but the formal notification of our intentions should be made by you and your US colleague in Paris. You should request that this notification should be regarded as confidential pending whatever public statement is made in Parliament."

Aldrich

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 344

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)[1]

SECRET [Paris, ?] July 13, 1954.

Participants: The Secretary
M. Pierre Mendes-France
Mr. MacArthur

M. Mendes-France opened the conversation by expressing his deep appreciation to Secretary Dulles for having come to Paris to meet with him and Mr. Eden.[2] The Secretary replied by saying that there is nothing that replaces personal contacts and exchanges of views, and that he had been very happy to have the opportunity to sit down with the French Prime Minister and talk things over on a basis of complete frankness and intimacy. In particular, he said that he had been concerned over the possibility that there were misunderstandings developing regarding the position of the U.S., and his trip would enable him to set forth at first hand the views of the U.S. Government, and at the same time obtain a clearer understanding of the position of the

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[1] According to the source text the conversation took place at Ambassador Dillon's residence from 7:30 to 8:30 p. m. While the drafting officer is not indicated on the source text, presumably it was MacArthur.

Secretary Dulles was in Paris, July 13 and 14 primarily to discuss with Mendès-France the possibility of expanding the role of the United States at the Geneva Conference. Further documentation on their discussions of the Geneva Conference is presented in vol. xvi, pp. 1348 ff. The record presented here deals only with the EDC.

[2] A photograph of Secretary of State Dulles with Prime Minister Mendès-France and Foreign Secretary Eden taken after this meeting is printed on p. 568.

French Government. M. Mendes-France said that he would be very glad to hear the Secretary's views. In the field of foreign affairs he, Mendes-France, was a complete neophyte. He had supposed that one day he might become Finance Minister, Minister of Economic Affairs, or even Prime Minister, but had not supposed he would ever be Foreign Minister since much of his background was in financial and economic matters.

The Secretary said he would like to begin by making three points before engaging in general exchanges of views. The first of these points was that the U.S. had confidence in M. Mendes-France and welcomed his fresh approach to some of France's most pressing problems in which the U.S. also had a common interest. Speaking with complete frankness, the Secretary said that French indecision and inability to make difficult decisions had in the past created a real problem with respect to France's relations not only with the U.S. but also with other allied countries. The U.S. wishes to work in closest harmony with France, and asked nothing better than to march step in step with her. This had been difficult because when French Governments had apparently agreed to certain decisions, they were not carried out. Traditionally there is a great sentimental attachment for France in the U.S., but there is growing concern in the U.S. over apparent French vacillation and backing out on commitments. M. Mendes-France's forthright statements that he would press for decisions on urgent problems was therefore greatly welcomed.

The second point that the Secretary said he wished to make related to France being overextended. He said that he understood the French people and Government felt that France was overextended in Indo-China. He was inclined to agree. He earnestly hoped that there was not a feeling in France that we were pushing them to commitments which they could not fulfill. This was not the case. On the contrary, we had recognized that France was overextended, and for this reason, had given billions of dollars of economic and military aid to France so that she could meet the commitments she had undertaken both in Europe and in Indo-China. In effect, the U.S. had done its utmost to bridge the gap between the responsibilities which France had undertaken and her capabilities to meet these responsibilities. In other words, far from pushing France to commitments that she could not meet, we had done our utmost to assist her in bridging the gap; and had extended to her very substantial aid which had in effect enabled her to increase her dollar reserves. Fundamental to U.S. policy with respect to France was the desire to assist France in reaching a situation where her responsibilities would be balanced by her resources.

The third point which the Secretary said he wished to mention was connected with Germany and the EDC. He believed that the basic Soviet objective was to keep France and Germany divided and to prevent all moves towards European unity whereby Germany would be solidly associated with the West and a viable and strong Europe created. The primary Soviet objective was to create disunity in Europe and ultimately obtain control over Germany. The Soviet Union had very important cards which it could play in this game, and if it played them, it might indeed neutralize and ultimately reach an agreement of some sort with Germany. Until there was some form of organic European unity involving France and Germany, the Soviet Union would continue to harass France in every possible field, concentrating on Europe but also in North Africa and elsewhere and would make life extremely difficult. If France and Germany joined together in some form of organic European unity as is provided in the EDC, the Soviet Union would not have the same incentive to continue its harassing tactics aimed at dividing Germany and France. The Soviet Union was realistic and recognized accomplished facts. However, as long as EDC was not ratified and the Soviets believed there was a chance of neutralizing and winning Germany over, France could expect no mercy from Soviet harassments, propaganda and pressures.

Referring to the meeting between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill, the Secretary mentioned the U.S.–U.K. group which has been meeting in London. He referred to the proposed protocol restoring sovereignty to Germany,[8] and said that while this was a most difficult question, the U.S. felt strongly that German sovereignty must be restored. This involved the question of whether there should be a full or partial restoration of sovereignty. The Secretary said that he had been present during the work of the Versailles Treaty and felt that the results of that Treaty clearly demonstrated that it was folly to believe that permanent restrictions could be imposed on a great power.

Furthermore, if Germany were not permitted to participate in Western European defense, he believed that the next Congress would not appropriate a dollar for European military aid connected with NATO. From conversations which he had had with leading members of Congress—of both the Republican and Democrat parties—the Secretary could only say that there is a growing sentiment that it is illusory to believe that France will agree to Germany being included in European defense. Therefore, if this does not soon occur, it would be better to write off what we have tried to do to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive experiment. There would be the strongest pressures for the U.S. to engage in a peripheral form of defense involving the U.K., Spain, Greece, Turkey and other peripheral countries. The situation is generally portrayed as follows: for two years the French Government has been promising that ratification of the EDC was just around the corner. After actually signing the Treaty, the French added protocols to the Treaty which they had insisted to be signed by the other European partners. They have received the most far-reaching kind of commitments from the U.S. and the U.K. on the basis that they would ratify the E.D.C. If now France again procrastinates, the damage would be incalculable. The Secretary concluded by saying that he had come to talk about the Geneva Conference and Indochina, but felt obliged to speak with complete frankness to M. Mendes-France about the German and EDC questions. As long as the decision on EDC is postponed, it is a direct invitation to the Soviets to increase their action to drive a wedge not only between France and Germany but also between the NATO powers. If this question were settled and Germany were brought into the Western family, we would then be in a position to really negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of real strength.

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[8] Reference is to Document 8 to the U.S.–U.K. Study Group report, July 12, p. 1008.

M. Mendes-France said that he appreciated the Secretary's very frank statement. In view of the time, he would like to comment first on the point the Secretary made regarding EDC. He said that he personally had long been a staunch advocate of European unity. He felt that the U.S. had been misled with respect to the possibilities of EDC ratification. He did not believe that there was at present a majority for EDC in the French Parliament. The French Parliament was at present divided into three groups:

1. A pro-EDC faction.
2. A group which was agreeable to German rearmament, but opposed to EDC.
3. A group which consisted of the Communists and a few others who were opposed to German rearmament under any form.

At present he felt that groups 2 and 3 above had a majority. However, if he could detach 60–80 members of group 2 above and join them with the pro-EDC group 1, he would have a majority. This was what he was endeavoring to do. What he did not wish was to put EDC to a vote and have it turned down. This would represent a Soviet victory of the first magnitude, and would be a disaster for France, NATO and Western unity. The EDC Treaty had been signed over two years ago and had not as yet been brought to a vote, because the French Government in power during this period which favored EDC did not believe that it had the strength to marshall a majority. M. Mendes-France said that he was working for an affirmative vote on a solution which would correspond as closely as possible with the present EDC Treaty. His efforts in this direction had not been helped by Spaak's initiative in calling a meeting of the EDC Foreign Ministers, by Adenauer's statement or by the publicity given the US–UK Working Group in London.

The Secretary then said that when he made his first trip to Europe after assuming office in January-February 1953, he had counselled other European countries subscribing to EDC not to agree to the French protocols until the French Government committed itself to act. Finally, on the basis of assurances of the French Government, the other EDC countries with the U.S. urging had agreed to the protocols, and the French Government had postponed further action on ratification. The U.S. itself had made a commitment of the most far-reaching kind on the basis that the EDC would be brought to a vote. This had not happened. M. Mendes-France seemed to suggest modifying the existing Treaty. This, the Secretary felt, would lead to an unacceptable situation on the part of the four other countries which had ratified the Treaty or accepted it by the "contractuals." In particular if France reopened the EDC Treaty, Germany could be expected to reopen the Bonn and Paris agreements. If any interpretations were envisaged, they must be strictly within the four corners of the existing Treaty. Changes of a substantive nature would require all the countries to go back to their parliaments. Indeed, the U.S. and UK legislative bodies had taken action with respect to the Treaty, and if the French reopened the Treaty, we would have to consult further with the Congress.

M. Mendes-France said that he agreed with the Secretary about French procrastination and could not condone the action of past French Governments. He said that he must reiterate that his primary objective was to get a result which was not a negative result rejecting EDC. He implied that this could be achieved by agreed applications of the treaty rather than by formal amendments.

The Secretary said he wished to raise another point. He understood that M. Mendes-France believed that slender majority in the French Parliament would be unacceptable in that it would leave the country divided. The Secretary said that he wished to make quite clear that he believed that the essential thing was to have the EDC voted regardless of the size of the majority, and added laughingly "even if it is only one vote". M. Mendes-France replied that he did not believe there was a majority at present. Fifty-eight Socialists were opposed to EDC, and while some might vote for it as matter of party discipline, at present the majority of these 58 would certainly oppose it. He said that even if he were wrong in this and there were a slight majority, he would not favor putting it to a vote if the majority was only that of a few votes. He said that the Treaty would have to go to the Council of the Republic "where there is a tremendous majority against it." Then it would have to be brought back to the Assembly where an absolute majority of 314 votes would be required to override the Council of the Republic. There was no hope of getting 314 votes. Therefore, his whole objective was to find an acceptable formula which would give a substantial majority in the Assembly. The Secretary said that he understood that the Constitution of the Third French Republic had been passed by only one vote. With respect to the U.S. Constitution, two of the key states, New York and Virginia, had ratified the Constitution by only one vote. He therefore felt that history proved that a very small majority in such matters did not indicate that the results would be disastrous. M. Mendes-France said that the issues with respect to the adoption of the Constitution of the Third Republic were oversimplified, and the Secretary said that he had only repeated what he had heard and was not an expert on this matter. However, he believed the reference he had made to the close votes connected with the adoption of the U.S. Constitution was approximately correct.

M. Mendes-France reiterated that the worst thing that could happen would be for the EDC to be rejected. Therefore, he would continue to strive for a formula which would enable its acceptance by a reasonable majority in the French Assembly. He recognized that this created difficulties for the European states which had ratified the Treaty, but felt that the long-term interests of all would be served by an arrangement which was acceptable to a reasonable majority in France.

M. Mendes-France concluded by saying that discussions relating to the Geneva Conference and Indo-China would take place at the dinner meeting with Mr. Eden.

740.5/8–554 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) and the Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 5, 1954—5 p. m.

504. From Bruce and Dillon. Re Deptel 447.[2] Following information representing summary of EDC ratification picture has been checked and rechecked with various French officials participating in these questions.

As of first of this week, Mendes-France was still insisting, in conversations on the EDC with his Cabinet ministers and advisers, that EDC treaty cannot be ratified in its present form and that a "compromise" including substantial changes must be found. Mendes still has no proposals to make himself. He now thinks that other EDC countries will accept almost any reasonable change that he will propose. He does not agree with position of Bourges-Maunoury that any French proposal on EDC must be limited to "improvements" in present text which would not require action by parliaments of other EDC countries.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, and Rome.

[2] Not printed; it expressed the Department's concern at the implication in recent telegrams from Paris that Mendès-France intended to approach the United Kingdom and United States before consulting further with the Foreign Ministers of the EDC countries and that Mendès-France might still be considering a compromise substantially different from the existing EDC Treaty text contrary to prior indications. It asked Dillon and Bruce "your views soonest on above points" (740.5/8–454).

Mendes had been impressed by firm and clear position of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic and US on EDC a few weeks ago and was inclined to believe that he had been left very little room for maneuver. Now he has put this aside as an initial reaction on part of the other countries. This unfortunate change in attitude of Mendes can be in large part attributed to activities of Spaak during last ten days. Spaak has presumably given impression that other EDC countries might accept almost any change proposed by France. In particular, he is reported to have seen no special difficulty with the ideas calling for unanimous voting by the commissariat and postponement of many features of the treaty for a 5-year period.

Now that confrontation between Bourges-Maunoury and Koenig has failed and has given Mendes-France breathing spell on the EDC that he wished, he is conducting his own confrontation with a small group of advisers in process of making up his mind about what to do.

De Seynes is to present pro-EDC side of confrontation and Gros, the anti-EDC side. Unfortunately, De Seynes is almost entirely new to EDC treaty and does not fully understand real objective of present European policy. On positive side, he is in close contact with pro-EDC officials in Paris. Gros, on other hand, knows treaty backwards and forwards and is most intelligent man in the anti-EDC group in the French Foreign Office which has been trying to kill or thwart European policy for last three years. Additional advisers working directly with Mendes are Boris, Parodi, and Chatenet, all confirmed opposers of EDC.

At least three other groups have also been asked to work up the proposal that Mendes might make in connection with EDC:

1. The old anti-EDC group under Parodi, Chatenet, Gros, Bergner, Wormser, etc.—is now back in business and is in direct contact with Mendes. This group has drawn up a new treaty of about 14 articles based on the "little NATO" concept of a 7-nation coalition of national armies including the United Kingdom. There are, of course, special limitations and restrictions on Germans. An armaments pool of 6 nations with some supranational features is included as usual so that France can take advantage of all the EDC features on armaments production which the French like so much. This scheme is very similar to first scheme that Nutting, Kirkpatrick, Roberts and others in British Foreign Office suggested might be possible a few weeks ago.

2. Guerin de Beaumont also has a small group. They now seem to be on right line of limiting themselves to proposals which would not require new actions by parliaments of other countries. The change in De Beaumont's position is said to be due to strong position taken by Dutch, particularly the rather insulting attitude Beyen took on De Beaumont's ideas of postponing certain supranational features of the treaty. The report sent by De Beaumont to Mendes-France after his trip to The Hague is supposed to have been very good from a pro-European point of view. Apparently, idea of commissariat voting by unanimity has now been dropped by De Beaumont. Also, French Embassies in the various European capitals may cease to advocate this idea as the possible solution.

3. Bourges-Maunoury is continuing to prepare a French position limited to "improvements" which would not require new parliamentary action by other countries. Quai d'Orsay officials have leaked a large part of the possible suggestions to press. This publicity plus Alphand's efforts to take credit for nearly every suggestion will not help in convincing Mendes that this should be his policy.

Bourges-Maunoury seems to be getting along very well with Mendes. The esteem is said to be mutual. Mendes was apparently helped a great deal by Bourges during difficulties in his Cabinet over Tunisia. It is nearly certain that Mendes will consult Bourges almost daily on EDC question and, presumably Bourges could force Mendes to present a reasonable proposal to the Brussels meeting by resigning, as he promised, if something other than present text of EDC treaty is presented for ratification.

Various pro-European officials are nervous about tactics that Mendes might adopt. They fear Mendes may try to maneuver as follows: He would decide at last minute to propose a "compromise" changing or postponing supranational features of treaty and creating overtly or otherwise a German national army; he would not at that stage seek support of political groups in French Assembly but would first seek approval from the US and UK probably in the form of "we cannot write the EDC treaty and we will accept whatever the other EDC countries will accept"; he would force an anxious Adenauer and a mediating Spaak to agree to submit whatever is necessary to their parliaments; he would then face the MRP, the Socialists, and Independents and the Radical Socialists with this "*fait accompli*".

In summary, tension is mounting in Paris on both sides of EDC question as Mendes continues successfully to conceal his views and intentions. Pro-European leaders have indicated that they are prepared to force resignation of Mendes if his "compromise" goes beyond changes considered eligible by Bourges-Maunoury. Guy Mollet has stated publicly that he will firmly oppose any which by postponing or watering down supranational features of treaty would lead to recreation of German national army. Chalban-Delmas, on other hand, states that ex-Gaullists will overthrow Mendes Government around

August 20 on EDC issue and create political situation which will lead to "crisis of regime" in September.[3]

DILLON

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[3] Telegram 504 was a subject of conversation at the Secretary's staff meeting on the morning of Aug. 6. Following that meeting, Merchant called Bruce at Paris and informed him that the Secretary was extremely disturbed that Spaak seemed to have given the impression to Mendès-France that other EDC countries might be willing to accept any changes proposed by France. Merchant "told Mr. Bruce that we thought he should consider a prompt trip to Brussels with a view to getting Spaak back on the rails . . . that we considered the next week or so critical in this enterprise and we are anxious to do anything from this end that he might consider helpful. Mr. Bruce said that he did not think Spaak was in any real sense wobbling but that he had again been guilty of loose talk. He said that he would bear in mind the possible utility of a trip to Brussels but that for the moment he felt he could accomplish all that needed to be accomplished through André de Staercke. He thought that at this particular juncture it was well for the United States to give no appearance of great activity." (Memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Aug. 6, 740.5/8-654)

740.5/8–1254 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 12, 1954—2 p. m.

603. I saw Mendes-France for about 45 minutes this morning in company with Reilly, as Jebb is still on vacation. Mendes opened by saying that the difficulties facing him on EDC had proved even greater than he had expected. He said that his position was personally most difficult as many of those who had been strong and consistent supporters of his govt are strongly opposed to any EDC type of solution. He said that he will have to lose many votes from the right and among the socialists and will have to replace them with votes from parties who have been consistently opposed to him, i.e. MRP. He said this made his task unpleasant and difficult.

He then said that he is submitting preliminary drafts of his ideas to a cabinet meeting scheduled for 11:30 this morning, and he hopes that a definite governmental position will be established in the ministerial meeting scheduled for Friday afternoon. He said it was possible however that an additional meeting wld be required on Saturday Morning.

He said he expected the resignations of some anti-EDC ministers and possibly also some pro-EDC ministers. However, he said his present expectation was that the resignations would be rather limited in number and he mentioned 3, 4 or 5 as an example of his ideas. He said he plans to distribute the responsibility for these ministries on an interim basis among the remaining members of his cabinet. If the government shld survive the EDC debate he would then remake his government on a permanent basis.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

Mendes then said that the pressure on him personally was very strong and that it came from people and parties who had always supported him. He felt he had to take their views into account and it was because of this that he would suggest changes when he went to Brussels. Mendes said he still hoped and expected to circulate his proposals to the EDC countries and to the U.S. and U.K. on Saturday the 14th, but it was possible that this might be delayed for one day. In talking of the Brussels conference he mentioned in passing that the Saar would have to be discussed as well as his ideas for changes in EDC treaty.

Mendes then came to the main point of his interview, which was the following:

He said he felt that the changes which he would suggest in the EDC treaty would not of themselves be sufficient to guarantee passage at this time. He said he felt that he must take account of the Russian proposals for a further meeting on Germany[2] and the effect these proposals had had on French public opinion and in parliament. He said he was under no illusions that there would be any chance of a favorable result from a four-power meeting in the situation as it stands today. However, he said he did not know what the Russians would do in the next two weeks.

Mendes said that John's press interview[3] was obviously directed entirely against France and was an attempt to defeat the EDC. He said he did not feel that John's statements would have any effect but that they were indicative of Russian tactics and, therefore, he wld not be surprised if the Russians made some other move within the next two weeks.

He said that pressure for another meeting with the Russians on Germany was very great. Nevertheless, he was not prepared to accept discussions at this time as they would be of no use. However, he felt that after the national assembly had passed the EDC in first reading, a position of strength would have been created which might make possible further negotiations. He felt that the reply to the Russian note should be made around the first of September after the EDC had been passed in first reading and that this reply should not accept the Russian offer for negotiations, but neither shld it give the appearance of closing the door to such negotiations. If the Russians should give some proof of willingness to negotiate reasonably on Germany, he felt that the west should be agreeable to holding another four-power conference. He said that if there should be no further meeting with the Russians, it was imperative that the west, particularly France, show that they were not responsible for the failure to meet.

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[2] Reference is presumably to the Soviet note of July 24 to the Western Powers suggesting a meeting to discuss collective security in Europe and an oral presentation along similar lines on Aug. 4; see the editorial note, p. 521. Documentation on the Soviet proposals and the Western response is presented in volume VII.

[3] Reference is to Dr. Otto John, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and chief of the Federal Republic's Intelligence Service who crossed to East Berlin on July 20, 1954, under mysterious circumstances. On Aug. 11, 1954, John publicly denounced what he claimed to be Chancellor Adenauer's policy of unilateral cooperation with the United States which was leading to the remilitarization and renazification of West Germany with world war an inevitable result. Debate on the "John defection" took place in the Bundestag shortly thereafter and the government was faced with a vote of confidence which it won 228–128 on Sept. 17, 1954. John subsequently "redefected" to the Federal Republic in December 1955 where he was promptly charged with and convicted of "treasonable activities." John was given a prison term of 4 years but was released in July 1958 under an amnesty granted by President Heuss.

Mendes then said that the time table for EDC ratification fortunately fitted this thesis. He said he had inquired of Rome regarding the length of time that would be required for Italy to ratify the EDC and had been informed that completion of the Italian ratification process could not be expected until some time in December. He said the French Assembly would recess probably the end of the first week in September and this would not in any event allow time for consideration of EDC by the Council of the Republic.

French parliament would reconvene during the latter part of October and at that time EDC would come up before the Council of the Republic. He then said that the Council of the Republic was more strongly anti-EDC than the national assembly, but he seemed far less positive on this point than in any previous discussions I have had with him. Whereas previously he has always stated that there was a constitutional majority against the EDC in the Senate, today he confined himself to saying that the Senate would probably vote against the EDC and might even do so by a constitutional majority.

He then said that the National Assembly would consider the EDC in second reading toward the end of November and would complete the ratification process probably in early December, either at the same time or slightly before the completion of the ratification process in Italy. He pointed out that this would give ample time for another attempt to reach an agreement with the Russians during which time the Russians would clearly be on notice as to what the alternative would be. He said it was *most* important for French public opinion that it be made very clear that the Russians were solely responsible for any lack of progress.

In answer to a question of mine, he said that the French were completing a draft of a reply to the Russian note embodying these ideas which should be ready for submission to the working group in London tomorrow. He said there was no great hurry in completing the draft as as he would not want to make any reply until around September 1, after EDC debate.

In answer to a further question from me, he said he would want to make some statement during the course of the EDC debate as to what his position was on the Russian note. This would be necessary to obtain the extra votes which he felt were necessary. He said he realized such a statement would have to be very carefully worded so as neither to indicate acceptance of the Russian request for a conference, nor refusal. It should indicate that the door was being kept open and that the Russians were being encouraged to give some sign of willingness to negotiate. I purposely did not ask him if he wished the US to associate themselves with him in such a statement during the course of EDC debate, and he did not at this time make any such request.

Reilly then observed that while His Majesty's Government would of course feel that negotiations with the Russians would be facilitated by the passage of EDC in first reading, he was sure that His Majesty's Government would much prefer not to negotiate again with the Russians until the ratification process had been fully completed. Mendes replied that he felt such a position would be impossible for him as he was sure he did not have the political strength to obtain the completion of the ratification process unless the Russians had been given the opportunity for another conference, and that the holding of such a conference had been made impossible by Russian intransigence, or alternatively that such a conference had been held and had failed to achieve any results.

Mendes then said that in yesterday's Cabinet meeting two Ministers, who had been consistently anti-EDC, said that if such a course were followed regarding Russian negotiations, they would feel that they would have to change their position to one of support for EDC. Mendes asked that the greatest care be taken to keep these opinions of his in strictest confidence, so as to facilitate his task during the coming days. He said that leak in this morning's *Figaro* had been most unfortunate but that in spite of this he wanted to emphasize his desire that these views of his be treated in strictest confidence for the time being.

In closing Mendes said he wanted to re-emphasize that because of the Italian time table for ratification his proposal would not cause any delay in the entry into force of EDC.

DILLON

740.5/8–1254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 12, 1954—11:26 p. m.

552. For Ambassador from Secy. Mendes-France's plans as reported urtel 603 [2] have deeply shocked and disheartened me. I am most

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[1] Drafted by Merchant and Bowie. Cleared by Tyler of EUR. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

anxious that he fully understand their implications as I see them before taking any irrevocable action. Accordingly, please convey to him the following points from me.

1. Mendes-France has said that he would obtain French decision on question of German rearmament before adjournment of present assembly this summer. In our own plans and in our presentations to Congress, we have relied on this assurance and I have said I believed this assurance reliable. To impose a new delaying condition prior to completion of ratification process will be considered by all concerned here as final evidence that the last hope has proved vain.

2. The proposal to hold still another meeting with Soviets before completion ratification will be considered here as further proof of French unreliability. Berlin meeting, which was intended to satisfy European opinion that the West was seeking in every possible way to reduce tension clearly demonstrated Soviet fundamental purpose to block EDC and destroy defenses of West. If Mendes-France now proposes defer final action on EDC pending still another meeting, this country will be convinced that France cannot be counted on as a reliable partner able to reach decisions.

3. Implications of Mendes-France's position as outlined to you are equally serious. It would undermine very basis of Franco-American relations and future of NATO alliance. His position seems to me to amount to this: That France is prepared to abandon EDC if Soviets will agree to unify Germany by free elections. This can only mean that France is prepared to agree to neutralize Germany as basis for unification. A neutralized Germany will completely destroy NATO defense plans. Military experts agree that no effective defense strategy can be based on a Europe from which Germany has been excluded. Consequently, if Mendes-France submits to Assembly views outlined to you he will be offering to sacrifice the basis of Western security for German unity. You also know our firm conviction that an attempt to neutralize unified Germany will be illusory and seriously menace European stability and security. This thesis has been keystone of Western policy. The Mendes-France proposal would split basic Western position and solidarity, thereby providing Soviets with opportunity they have sought for years.

4. Finally Mendes-France's proposal would probably destroy Adenauer. Opponents his European policy will exploit Mendes-France proposal as supporting their thesis that German unity should have priority over EDC. Evidence French acceptance this thesis and further delay in EDC ratification will dismay his supporters and breed further disillusion regarding French intentions.

5. US remains firmly convinced that our common European policy is basic to Western security. This policy was clearly presented at Berlin. There is not slightest evidence that Soviets are prepared to accept German solution consistent with that security. Indeed their August 4 note states that under present conditions it is not possible to agree on solution of basic questions in Germany and merely holds out prospect of agreement on less important issues. If, as Mendes-France seems to feel, the Soviets may make some dramatic offer in near future, it will be soon enough to deal with that when it comes. The West should certainly not do its cause needless damage in advance.

6. It is of course not for me to pit my judgment of French political

situation against that of Mendes-France. I feel, however, that he may perhaps under-estimate his own standing and prestige. It is my belief that respect which his decisive actions have won him abroad must also be reflected in French domestic opinion. If this is so, I believe that his forthright support of EDC, based on the fundamental reasons for its soundness, would carry the day despite determined opposition.

7. Note for Embassy London. Present these views urgently to British at highest level available in effort to secure their support of similar *démarche* to Mendes-France before noon Friday.[3]

DULLES

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[3] In telegram 616 from Paris, Aug. 13, Dillon reported that the British Chargé, Reilly, who initially had no instructions to support the United States *démarche*, had been able to secure authorization from the Foreign Office "to express to Quai d'Orsay first reactions of official level of Foreign Office to the effect that London was 'disappointed, anxious and alarmed' by what Mendes-France had said to Dillon and Reilly yesterday". (740.5/8–1354)

740.5/8–1354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 13, 1954—1 p. m.

614. Reference Department telegram 552.[2] I saw Mendes-France this morning and went over with him carefully the first six numbered paragraphs of reference telegram. He replied as follows to each paragraph:

1. He stated that his position, as outlined to me yesterday, did not constitute a new delaying tactic. He said he was moving just as rapidly as he could to obtain ratification. He said that the situation in the French Parliament was very difficult on this subject, and that his present best estimate was that there were between 300 and 310 votes against EDC as of now. He stated he felt that even with such changes as might be agreed upon at Brussels, there would still probably not be a majority for EDC unless it was possible to show that France's decision in favor of EDC is a peaceful one and does not shut the door on negotiations. He feels that only by placing the ratification of EDC in a context where it is used to force the Russians to show their cards and to put them "au pied du mur" can ratification be assured. He repeated what he had said yesterday that two or three of the anti-EDC Ministers in his Cabinet had said that on this basis and this basis only would they support and vote for EDC.

2. Mendes said he was not proposing to hold another meeting with the Russians. What he was proposing was to make such a reply to the Soviet notes as would force them to clarify their position. In order to clear the way for another meeting he repeated what he had said yesterday that the Russians must give clear proof of their good intentions by proposing something new. He then mentioned the three subjects listed at the end of the first draft of the working group's paper, i.e., agreement to sign an Austrian treaty, or agreement on free elec-

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] *Supra.*

tions in Germany, or real progress on disarmament. He emphasized that the Russians must give such clear proof before a new meeting could be called and if they made no such concessions there would be no meeting as far as he was concerned. He then said that he is not deferring action on EDC. He said he is proceeding as he had planned and will put EDC to the French Assembly as a question of confidence in his government. In other words, he will stake the existence of his government on passing the EDC, and therefore he wants to have some chance of a successful result.

3. Mendes said he could not understand how Department arrived at the line of thinking contained in this paragraph. He said he is not in favor of a neutralized Germany. He also said that he had always felt, and still feels that Germany, whether united or not, must be politically and militarily tied to the West.

4. Mendes said he felt that if the French Assembly should reject the EDC, Adenauer would be in grave difficulties in Germany. However, if the French Assembly should pass EDC, he felt that this could only result in strengthening Adenauer's position. He further said that if he could arrive at a Franco-German agreement at Brussels and have this agreement ratified by the French Assembly, he thought it would strengthen both his own and Adenauer's positions, and in this respect their interests were identical.

5. Mendes said he fully agreed that there was no present evidence that the Soviets are prepared to make any of the concessions required. He referred to his talk with Molotov at Geneva[3] which had been wholly negative in this respect. He said that this is why he is not prepared to go to a four-power meeting under the present circumstances. In order for him to change his mind regarding a meeting, he would have to have (1) passage of EDC in first reading by the National Assembly and (2) a new proposal from the Russians equivalent to the acceptance of one of the three alternatives proposed in the last draft of the working group paper.

6. Mendes said he was afraid that the US over-estimated his personal prestige when it came to the difficult decision of EDC. He said that discussions in the Cabinet showed that his personal prestige did not count for much in this matter. He asked me to emphasize to Washington the extreme difficulty of the Parliamentary situation regarding ratification. He said again that if the treaty came to a vote as is, it would certainly be rejected. He said that such rejection would, he was afraid, put an unbearable strain on the Western alliance, and therefore, his whole effort was directed to finding a way to achieve ratification. He then re-emphasized the fact that his proposal did not contemplate deferring the entry into force of EDC and stated that in any event, French ratification process would be completed before that of Italy. He emphasized that what was important was the decision of the French National Assembly on first reading. He said that after the Assembly had once voted, everyone will know where France stands. He said he is hopeful that constitutional reform will be enacted before consideration by the Assembly on second reading, and will remove the right of the Senate to require a constitutional majority on second reading in the National Assembly. He also is hopeful that there will not be a constitutional majority against the EDC in the Senate. In any event

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[3] Documentation on the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina is presented in volume XVI.

he emphasized that he felt that the decision of the French Assembly on first reading would show the world where France stood and would be a great step toward clarification of the international situation.

After completing this response to reference telegram, Mendes reiterated the difficulty of his Parliamentary situation. He said that of the 59 Socialists who were against EDC, only 7 would change their position as a result of the action of the party congress. He said that he might get another 2, 3 or 4 to change their positions for personal reasons but that at least 48 Socialist votes would be cast against ratification. He would also lose a very substantial number of votes on the right. The total of what he would lose would be far larger than what he could gain from the MRP. He reiterated that he felt that the most telling argument for ratification, and in fact the vital argument, will be that the Russians must be forced to show their cards and that the only way to achieve this result is for France to ratify EDC.

In order to make sure that there had been no misunderstanding, I showed Mendes a copy of Embassy telegram 603[4] which he read with care. He said that it accurately reflected his position with one slight exception. This is, that he does not propose to answer the Russian note "around the first of September" but rather during the first 10 days of September, and specifically after the French Parliament goes on vacation.[5]

DILLON

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[4] Dated Aug. 12, p. 1026.

[5] In telegram 630 from Paris, Aug. 13, Dillon reported that Reilly had told Parodi, based on instructions from London, that Prime Minister Churchill wished to associate himself with the remarks which Dillon had made to Mendès-France, as reported in the source text (740.5/8–1354).

In telegram 566 to Paris, Aug. 13, Dulles stated that the United States was far from reassured by Mendès-France's explanations, but that for the time being did not think it would be useful to approach him again (740.5/8–1354).

740.5/8–1354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) and the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 13, 1954—5 p. m.

620. Limit distribution. From Dillon and Bruce. Re Embtel 548, August 9.[2]

"Little NATO" proposal of Parodi group was flatly rejected by Mendes-France. Document prepared by De Seynes was adopted as

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[1] Repeated to London, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, eyes only for the Ambassadors, to Bonn eyes only for Conant, and to Luxembourg eyes only for the Minister.

[2] Not printed; it reported that at that time Mendès-France had not yet made known his intentions regarding EDC but that he had before him two possible

Footnote continued on following page.

basis for Cabinet negotiations. After two days' discussions, draft working document before French Cabinet this morning included suggestions for "improving" the present text of EDC treaty summarized below. Summary is prepared from memory. No notes could be taken. Parentheses are ours.

1. French Government would unilaterally give an undertaking to consult the Parliament before taking any decisions on a wide variety of subjects which require the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers, i.e., decisions on recruitment, mobilization, weighted voting, etc.

2. General directive would be issued by Council requiring commissariat to carry out administration through decentralized services. Services would be European and not national.

3. Agreement would be reached promising unanimous concurrence of Council to extend 18-month period for interim territorial organization along national lines if commissariat recommends extension as feasible.

4. General directive would be issued by Council, noting statements of the US and UK Governments regarding the unlimited duration of NAT and maintenance of forces on the Continent of Europe, and stating that if there is a change in these policies, an immediate re-examination of the situation by the EDC participants would be held under Article 128 of the treaty with each participant free to determine whether it can continue to participate in EDC treaty. (Change in treaty as presently drafted but acceptable presentation possible.)

5. General directive would be issued by Council requiring an immediate re-examination of situation in case of reunification of Germany with each participant free to determine whether it can continue to participate in EDC treaty (Change in treaty as presently drafted but acceptable presentation possible.)

6. Lisbon decision would be made public and concurred in stating that each nation would keep its present position in NATO institutions (France does not wish to lose position in standing group).[3]

7. France and Germany would issue resolution stating intention to always have equal representation in EDC institutions.

8. General directive would be issued by Council under Articles 68 and 77 of the treaty permitting integration of forces only in forward areas (Forces de Couverture). (Purpose is to assure that no German units would be stationed on French soil. Presentation without changing treaty might be possible.)

9. General directive would be issued by Council permitting commissariat to place orders for military production net of production

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Footnote continued from preceding page.

approaches. One, embodied in a paper drafted by Parodi, was apparently an elaboration of the "little NATO" concept referred to in telegram 504 from Paris, Aug. 5, p. 1023; the second, embodied in a document drafted by De Seynes, included new suggestions for changes in the existing EDC Treaty text. "Most of the new suggestions would, in fact, change EDC treaty and would probably require new action in Federal Republic and Benelux Parliaments unless other countries stretched interpretation of treaty beyond reason or would go much too far in discrimination against Germany to be acceptable" (740.5/8–954).

[3] For documentation on the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council at Lisbon, Feb. 20–25, 1952, see pp. 107 ff.

taxes. (Military production would be given standing similar to exports.)

10. General directive would be issued by Council stating that common budget expenditures for heavy military items listed in Annex II of Article 107 would not be included within 85%–115% transfer provisions of financial protocol but would be budgeted separately with payments freely transferable. (Change in treaty but different presentation might be acceptable. Purpose is to make placing of new orders for soft military supplies in France easier.)

11. General directive stating that if any Parliament wishes to propose changes in EDC treaty in first three years after ratification, a conference would be held immediately to consider them.

12. General directive stating that any nation a member of NATO can join EDC automatically without requiring action under Article 129. (Presentation without change in treaty should be possible.)

13. The commissariat would be invited not to have recourse to the court against any action of a member state for a period of five years.

14. Provisions of protocol giving France right to decisions on appointment, rank, advancement and personnel generally are to be strengthened. (Discrimination against Germans and change in treaty.)

15. For three to five year period all common regulations on military doctrine, recruitment, discipline, schools, languages, etc. will be held up and national regulations applied except that all changes (or new regulations in Germany) must be in direction of common European regulations in consultation with Commissariat. (Discrimination against Germans.)

16. General directive stating that Commissariat shall not have any licensing action over atomic energy for civilian uses. (Change in treaty but acceptable presentation is possible.)

17. General directive stating explicitly that Federal Republic cannot use option under Article 31 permitting national authorities to confer ranks. (Change in treaty and discrimination against Germans.)

18. General directive stating that, in view of changed circumstances, Article 38 is no longer applicable. Committee of Prime Ministers would be established to survey movement towards Europe and to give instructions on steps to be taken. Direct election of members of EDC Common Assembly would go through as proposed. (Saar settlement would have to come under Council of Europe thus knocking out basic feature of Adenauer-Teitgen "ad referendum" agreement. (Change in treaty).)

19. General directive stating that any one nation by mere announcement that its vital interests are adversely affected can suspend any decision of Commissariat until such time as there is conciliation between Council and Commissariat. This suspension would remain in effect until lifted by unanimous vote of Council. The suggested directive would exist for an eight-year period. (Change in treaty and basic violation of "real but limited" powers to a supra-national executive institution.)

This document is not final. It is still opposed vigorously by both anti-EDC and pro-EDC Ministers. It now appears possible that anti-EDC Ministers will not resign as they threatened to do. In these circumstances it is difficult for pro-EDC Ministers to resign and it may be wise for Bourges-Maunoury to accept invitation of Mendes to go with him to Brussels. Pro-EDC Ministers are still confident that tactics reported in paragraph 5 of Embtel 548 will succeed. They are said to believe that they can obtain approval of Mendes to change number 19 above which they consider most unacceptable of the suggestions. Pro-Europeans would propose that veto of a nation could not apply in cases where treaty makes specific provision giving powers Commissariat or where Council had previously given Commissariat a directive.

Reported attitude of Mendes towards Brussels meeting is encouraging. According to our information, he intends to present texts for negotiation and not a "take it or leave it" basis. Mendes is said to insist that he must reach a final proposal acceptable to the other EDC countries and that he will not insist on any change which would require new parliamentary action in other countries.

Above is for your information only. We are doing what we appropriately can do to influence final outcome. In this internal struggle acceptability or unacceptability of changes in EDC Treaty is less at issue than position of party groups in domestic political situation.

DILLON

740.5/8–1354 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 14, 1954—4 : 12 p. m.

159. Dept repeating separately Paris' 603[2] and 614[3] to Dept and Dept's 552[4] to Paris re Mendes-France's plans for EDC ratification. As Dept reftel makes clear, Dept deeply disturbed both by Mendes' outline his plans and by what Dept firmly believes to be inevitable implications thereof. In this connection Dept not reassured by Mendes' subsequent statements contained Paris' 614. Dept firmly believes whole tactic of tying Western reaction to Soviet notes with French ratification process is one which is fraught with danger for Western security and is therefore most anxious assure that other countries intimately concerned with EDC developments should understand and, we strongly hope, support US in our efforts dissuade French from this line approach.

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[1] Drafted by Palmer, cleared with WE, GER, S/P, and Merchant and Elbrick in draft. Initialed for the Acting Secretary by Murphy. Sent also to London, Ottawa, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn. Repeated to Paris for Bruce and Dillon.

[2] Dated Aug. 12, p. 1026.

[3] Dated Aug. 13, p. 1031.

[4] Dated Aug. 12, p. 1029.

Mendes-France requested his plans be held in confidence by us. However we now feel widespread press leaks from Paris justify our discussing matter with other countries concerned. If you are approached by Government which accredited or other suitable opportunity is presented you may in confidence explain substance US position this matter, as outlined Paras 1–5 Dept reftel, in effort persuade them adopt similar position when they receive Mendes-France proposals. You should also point out foregoing does not cover problem changes in EDC which French Govt reportedly considering but which have not yet been communicated to us. US of course remains strongly opposed any alterations which are discriminatory or require resubmission to Parliaments and trusts other countries will remain firm this point.

FYI only Churchill has associated himself with Secretary's message (Deptel 552 to Paris) and British Chargé Paris so informed Quai d' Orsay.

Embassy London should inform British at appropriate level of foregoing instructions to EDC countries and endeavor obtain UK support in those capitals.

Embassy Ottawa also authorized inform Canadian Govt.

SMITH

740.5/8–2054

Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET

LONDON, August 14, 1954.

[MY DEAR FOSTER:]

1. I have strongly supported your line in my messages to Mendes-France. I have indeed for a very long time, as you know, been wearied with this deeply injurious French procedure of delay. I hope however you will not fail to grip the NATO solution which I am sure can be arranged.

2. I am telegraphing to you because in Anthony's absence on holiday I have been promoted to the Foreign Office. I hope therefore you will treat me as kindly as you did when we talked about my Boston speech. I suppose you are watching the Attlee and Bevan excursion. How lucky you are in Washington never to have to worry about party politics.

Kindest regards,

[WINSTON CHURCHILL]

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[1] Source text was transmitted to the Embassy in the United Kingdom in telegram 1030 to London, Aug. 20, together with the texts of a similar message dated Aug. 19 (p. 1050) and a message from Dulles to Churchill dated Aug. 20 (p. 1051).

740.5/8–1454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 14, 1954—8 p. m.

647. Re Embtel 614 August 13, 1954.[2] In order to help evaluate Mendes position at Brussels and on reply to Russian notes[3] our views of over-all parliamentary prospects for EDC in national assembly may be helpful.

1. Up to last June we had felt that there was a majority in the National Assembly for EDC if the Treaty was presented with vigor and force by a Government willing to stake its existence on ratification. The problem at that time seemed one of maneuvering so as to get EDC to a vote without the Government fall on other issues as soon as it became clear that it was moving toward ratification.

2. The Laniel Government was overthrown in June largely because it was trying to move ahead with EDC. Mendes-France on the other hand has overcome this problem and achieved unanimous agreement of all non-communist parties that EDC should be brought to a vote this month. Assembly has now set debate for August 28 with vote of confidence scheduled for September 2.

3. Since June our feeling regarding EDC majority has changed. We now feel that there is probably a majority against present treaty and that in no event is there any possibility whatsoever of obtaining a constitutional majority of 314 for the present treaty if that should be necessary to override the council of the Republic. The reason for this change of view regarding EDC prospects is the failure of Mollet to provide the 80 to 85 Socialist votes for the treaty which he has always claimed he could furnish after a party Congress had decided to enforce party discipline. He admitted only a maximum of 20 to 25 Socialist votes against EDC. Mollet's attempt to enforce discipline has however failed and there are 45 to 50 Socialist votes against EDC. If Mollet had succeeded we had estimated a total of about 310 or 315 votes for EDC which would have assured its passage. This in time would have attracted band wagon jumpers and was reasoning behind our feeling and Bidault's that majority might have reached 340 or 350. Loss of 25 Socialist votes to the opposition reduced maximum EDC vote to 285–290 and may have lost some additional fence sitting votes, leaving situation as described in first sentence this paragraph. British Embassy estimate is slightly more pessimistic. They estimate 300 votes against present EDC, in other words—sure majority against.

4. In face of this situation it has become necessary for Mendes to

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.

[2] *Ante*, p. 1031.

[3] Reference is to the Soviet communications of July 24 and Aug. 4; see the editorial note, p. 521.

modify treaty unless he wants to see it rejected. There is no possibility of influencing Socialist opponents of EDC who are fundamentally opposed to German rearmament and take a line akin to Bevanism in England.

5. Only hope for Mendes is to get additional support on the right without losing present support on the left. This is what Mendes is trying to do now. It is impossible for us as yet to form any valid judgment as to whether modification he suggests will be adequate to obtain necessary support on the right or contrariwise whether they go further than necessary. In this connection it must be remembered that Mendes does not expect Brussels conference to accept his proposals verbatim. Mendes problem is to obtain changes at Brussels satisfactory to other EDC powers and which will not cause them parliamentary difficulties, and which at same time will be adequate to obtain 25–40 more votes for the EDC from right wing members of the assembly who have opposed EDC up till now.

Dillon

740.5/8–1554 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 15, 1954—7 p. m.

Coled 19. As indicated in Coled 18,[2] French proposals are unacceptable beyond our worst expectations. Development is in large part due to Parodi, Boris and Gros. Once "little NATO" proposal was rejected by Mendes, this trio devoted their energies to making French suggestions for Brussels meeting as "anti-EDC" as possible. In these endeavors they received great help in Cabinet discussions from Edgar Faure and Mitterand who, it is alleged, found their motivations in ill-concealed hopes to replace Mendes as Prime Minister.

Our informants, pro-European, insist that this anti-EDC group in Quai d'Orsay, helped by Sauvagnargues, who saw opportunity to push a few pet projects of his own about political community and security declarations, was left to do actual drafting. They claim that Mendes is still receiving a painful education and is only now becoming aware of how unacceptable and ill-advised final document really is. Our informants further insist that Mendes can and will accept complete abandonment of his proposals at Brussels if other EDC countries are firm and demonstrate that proposals do change EDC treaty or would require new Parliamentary consideration in other EDC countries.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it provided "a preliminary listing by each subject heading of major difficulties with French proposals on EDC" (740.5/8–1554).

Pro-Europeans persist in their optimism that Mendes will present to French Assembly solution acceptable to EDC countries, and will receive a surprisingly large majority vote for EDC treaty.

Mendes has drawn up his proposals for Brussels without any consultation with pro-European leaders outside his cabinet. In last days of the confrontation he even took specific action forbidding individuals working with him to see pro-European leaders and experts. Results of the confrontation, if accepted, would lose not only votes of pro-EDC socialists but also of pro-EDC factions in MRP, radical socialist and independent parties. At same time Mendes has no commitment for a favorable vote from rightist deputies opposed to EDC treaty. On contrary, they used his pathetic efforts to get their support by making changes in EDC treaty to help wreck document to be presented at Brussels; then they kept their hands completely free by continuing to oppose publicly treaty in any form. Number of anti-EDC deputies will vote for EDC treaty when day for decision arrives. However they will do so primarily because they cannot afford to be in opposition for domestic political reasons and not because of modifications in EDC treaty.

We are advised that Pinay at his request saw Mendes yesterday to inform him that Pinay and his friends would not support changes in treaty as proposed. Pinay apparently found Mendes deeply discouraged and confused. Mendes is said to have admitted that he now realized that changes he had proposed would not get EDC ratified. Pinay is said to have replied that this was true but that treaty could be ratified if Mendes would work out a solution at Brussels in framework of present text of treaty and acceptable to other EDC countries and to United States and United Kingdom. Pinay said French Assembly would vote such a solution if treaty were defended vigorously and vote of confidence used as necessary. We are informed that Mollet, who has not been consulted by Mendes, shortly will issue a warning statement to effect that new socialist party congress must be called if Brussels meeting should agree on any changes in present text contrary to agreed socialist conditions. In such an event it would be expected that entire socialist party would vote unanimously against such a proposal for German rearmament.

I believe Mendes has committed a perhaps irretrievable error even in terms of French domestic politics. There remains a possibility that situation might be saved by judicious firmness on part of other governments at Brussels, and by United States and United Kingdom not deviating from a resolute course.

Dillon

740.5/8–1654 : Telegram

The Chargé in Belgium (Sprouse) to the Department of State[1]

TOP SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 16, 1954—1 p. m.

116. Deptels 159[2] and 160,[3] August 14. Rothschild, Foreign Minister's *Chef de Cabinet*, told me this morning that Spaak's preliminary reaction to French EDC proposals presented by French Ambassador late afternoon August 14, was that although many points were acceptable, document in "its present form and substance" was unacceptable. Rothschild described as nonsense French Ambassador's statement to Spaak that French Foreign Office legal experts' opinion was that proposals would not require negotiation or resubmission to Parliaments. He emphasized that Belgian opposition to discriminatory alterations or resubmission to Parliaments remains firm. Spaak and small group chief assistants beginning detailed study of proposals this morning.

Rothschild's inquiry re US Government reaction to Mendes-France proposals gave me opportunity to explain US position on Mendes proposal regarding Soviet note along lines suggested Deptel 159. In view importance this matter Rothschild asked that we continue discussion with Spaak. Latter was fully in accord with US position that it would be disastrous to tie EDC ratification process in any way with reply to Soviet note and saw same dangers as did US Government although he pointed out it was not his idea to reject Soviet note out of hand or to put Western powers flatly in position of refusing to negotiate with Soviets. Spaak told me that French Ambassador in presenting Mendes proposals had said that French Foreign Office had instructed him to deny press reports that Mendes had in mind tying EDC ratification to reply to Soviet note.

Spaak strongly recommends that US and UK make official *démarche* orally or by note (and not just in confidence as was now being done) to EDC countries other than France prior to Brussels conference urging that no steps be taken which would in any way tie EDC treaty or its ratification to the reply to Soviet note or to other policy measures relating to Soviets. He believes that this should be done without any reference in *démarche* to Mendes proposal in order that other EDC countries may themselves bring up matter to ensure that French do not carry through this idea. Spaak speaks critically of French effort to tie overall Franch policy questions to EDC and feels that this practice can in effect distort original purpose of Brussels conference to extent that it might even be desirable to consider larger conference with US and UK participation. He is not asking for such conference but points out that French proposals tend to move in that direction. I believe he also has in mind Mendes proposal for joint declaration.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce and to London, Bonn, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.

[2] Dated Aug. 14, p. 1036.

[3] Not printed; it transmitted to Brussels the texts of telegram 603 from Paris, Aug. 12, p. 1026, telegram 614 from Paris, Aug. 13, p. 1031, and telegram 552 to Paris, Aug. 12, p. 1029.

Spaak obviously expects reply to his recommendation that US and UK make formal *démarche* prior to Brussels conference to other EDC countries as outlined preceding paragraph.[4]

SPROUSE

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[4] In telegram Coled 16 from Paris, Aug. 15, Bruce reported that "De Staercke, who until now has been optimistic about outcome of Brussels meeting, was dismayed last night after reading French proposals. He termed them almost completely unacceptable and highly insolent. He found document loaded not only with flagrant changes in EDC treaty but also with basic violations of concept of European movement. He said he had informed Spaak that 'Mendes has just presented us with corpse of Europe' " (740.5/8–1554). In telegram 480 from Bonn, Aug. 16, Conant stated that "Hallstein was deeply discouraged this morning re French proposals for Brussels meeting, saying they were beyond worst expectations. He has not had opportunity to discuss proposals in detail with Chancellor, who is returning to Bonn this afternoon for discussions with Cabinet, but says he is confident Adenauer will weigh them in light following four principles: 1. No changes can be accepted which would require further Bundestag ratification. 2. Proposals seriously damaging supranational character of EDC must equally be rejected. 3. No new discriminations against Germany can be agreed to. 4. Efficiency of defense machinery under EDC must be maintained" (740.5/8–1654). Telegram 118 from Brussels, Aug. 17, reported that Rothschild stated that after detailed study by Spaak and his assistants of the French proposals "throughout yesterday and until late last night Spaak's conclusion is that proposals are, in effect, unacceptable. Spaak finds proposals contradictory, confused and in some cases insolent towards Germans" (740.5/8–1754).

740.5/8–1554 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 16, 1954—1:30 p.m.

Edcol 10. Paris for Bruce and Dillon. Coled 17.[2] Dept in agreement characterization reftel French EDC proposals which we regard as unacceptable.

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[1] Drafted by Palmer. Cleared in draft with Under Secretary Smith, Bowie, Phleger of L, and Merchant. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, London, Luxembourg, and Rome.

[2] Not printed; it requested that in view of the "confused, chauvinistic and destructive nature of proposals submitted by France for Brussels meeting", which Bruce attributed to Mendès-France having "ignorantly outsmarted himself", that Bruce be authorized to send a letter on Monday, Aug. 16, to the President of the EDC Interim Committee, first recalling that on June 14, 1954, Bruce had informed the Committee that he was authorized at any time to sign on behalf of his government the proposed agreement on external aid between the EDC and the United States, but that "considering the nature of the proposals put forward for consideration at the proposed meeting of the participants in the European Defense Community at Brussels on August 19, 1954, I must now advise you that my authorization to sign the agreement on external aid has been withdrawn until such time as the results of the Brussels meeting are known and have been considered by my government." Bruce then also suggested that Dulles make a press conference statement to the effect that the guarantees offered in President Eisenhower's statement of Apr. 16 "may have to be reconsidered after the Brussels meeting," and recommended in paragraph 3 that Dillon be instructed to inform Mendès-France that "we will not enter into any discussion on possible tripartite declaration on security until such time as results of Brussels conference are known and French Government's policy on EDC is definite" (740.5/8–1554). Regarding Eisenhower's Apr. 16 statement, see the editorial note, p. 940.

There remains question of tactics to bring French to inject some note reality and responsibility into their present maneuvering. In view anticipated strong adverse reactions other EDC powers to French proposals we believe our best tactic is to look primarily to them take initiative in formulating and pressing objections. We should seize every opportunity however make clear other EDC countries our concern and to encourage them stand firm against unrealistic concessions or destructive compromises. In general Dept believes that publicly we should avoid putting US in lead in this matter although it undoubtedly will be necessary for us make clear our opposition.

Inline foregoing following are replies recommendations in Coled 17:

1. Ambassador Bruce authorized immediately despatch letter quoted reftel to President EDC/IC with copies to national representatives.
2. For present at least we feel we should defer decision re press statement by Secretary specifically on US assurances.
3. Ambassador Dillon should take line Para 3 Coled 17 either at time formal French *démarche* or if already made soon as possible. Acting Secretary will similarly inform Bonnet today.

Note statement Aug 16 Dept spokesman re *NY Times* article.

Embassy London should inform and exchange views with British on basis foregoing and pertinent Paris reftels.

SMITH

740.5/8–1654 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 16, 1954—7 : 35 p. m.

589. Ambassador Bonnet called on Acting Secretary August 16 to transmit Mendes-France's expressed hope U.S. would support his proposals for modification EDC Treaty at Brussels with other five countries. Ambassador went on to say Mendes-France had communicated his fear there was a misunderstanding arising from his conversations last week with Dillon regarding his attitude on negotiating with Soviets between first and second French vote on EDC ratification. Ambassador said Premier was anxious we recognize: (*a*) Mendes-France's dedication to integration of Germany with West economically, politically and militarily; (*b*) fact he was not in favor four-power conference unless Soviets gave some indication intent negotiate seriously; (*c*) he did not desire nor intend delay on EDC ratification; and (*d*) his own estimate, his personal official prestige and political strength in France was lower than Secretary's estimate.

Ambassador went on to argue Mendes-France's proposals represented only possible solution capable obtaining majority in French Assembly.

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[1] Drafted by Merchant, and initialed for the Acting Secretary by Murphy. Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, and Rome.

Acting Secretary referred to past conversation with Mendes-France in which latter promised to press for ratification but on basis no renegotiation of Treaty. He pointed out present proposals obviously required renegotiation and that in fact they substantially destroy EDC's supranational character as well as inject serious element discrimination against Germany.

Acting Secretary went on point out that making first French ratification vote in effect provisional pending effort negotiate with Soviets offered Molotov opportunity for which he had long been looking. He stated there was no reason suppose Soviets had altered their basic insistence on neutralization Germany as price its unity and that if this constituted in Mendes-France's mind an alternative to EDC then we were headed for ultimate disaster of a Germany which could not be kept neutralized and which would not be aligned with the West.

In conclusion Acting Secretary said U.S. could not accept nor support present Mendes-France proposals here or at Brussels. He added he saw nothing in our study so far which could lead him recommend to the Secretary on his return a departure from this position.

French Ambassador argued at length but unconvincingly and left impression answer which he had received was far from unexpected.

SMITH

740.5/8–1654 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 17, 1954—7 : 16 p. m.

172. Re Embtel 116,[2] tell Spaak we appreciate his concern re Mendes-France's proposal tie EDC ratification process to reply to Soviet proposal for meeting Western powers. You should further inform him of reportedly strong impression made on Mendes as result US and British reactions (Paris' 654 to Dept repeated Brussels 35 [3]). Although we still do not know whether Mendes intends pursue his proposal further we believe it might make it more difficult for him drop

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden and Palmer; cleared by Merchant and Tyler of WE. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] Dated Aug. 16, p. 1041.

[3] Not printed; it reiterated Dillon's intense disappointment with the French proposals for EDC. It reported that Dulles' "vigorous and reasoned reaction", (telegram 552 to Paris, Aug. 12, p. 1029) "made a deep impression and was most helpful" particularly in light of the fact that this reaction "has been kept to diplomatic channels and not made officially public", and that "Churchill's violent reaction was perhaps even more of a shock as it was totally unexpected". In conclusion, it urged that the Department "should remember Mendes' good points" which included sincere efforts to resolve problems in Tunis and Morocco "along lines we think proper" and a determination "to fundamentally remake the French economy so that France can assume a respectable position in the world, and he has a chance of succeeding". For these reasons, "I feel we should in the next crucial two weeks use the utmost discretion in our official statements" (740.5/8–1654).

it at this point if we were to make formal *démarches* other EDC countries. This would undoubtedly become known to Mendes and run risk of freezing him in his position. Under circumstances and since we have already confidentially approached most other countries concerned we believe it best let matter rest for present.

DULLES

740.5/8–1754

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1954.

Subject: British Views on French Proposals on EDC.

Participants: Mr. Adam Watson—Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick—Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Watson called at his request this afternoon to inform me of the British Government's thinking with respect to the new French proposals for amending the European Defense Community Treaty. He left with me a copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office to the Embassy in Washington [1] setting forth the British Government's views in some detail. While recognizing that the new French proposals would disappoint many proponents of closer European union and raise problems for the countries which have already ratified the EDC Treaty, the British Government places emphasis upon the need for all concerned to go as far as possible to meet the French proposals and above all not to reject the proposals "out of hand". While there are certain aspects of the proposals which affect the UK (and the U.S.) the British Government feels it is primarily for the EDC members to decide whether or not the proposals are acceptable. The British apparently agree with us that the proposals should meet certain criteria viz. (1) the ratification process should not be further delayed by the necessity for resubmissions to parliaments; (2) there should not be further open discriminations which Germany could not now accept. The Foreign Office has pointed out to the Embassy that the proposals amount to very substantial amendments which will considerably weaken the force of the Treaty. On the other hand, the British feel that it is more realistic to recognize that EDC will not work in any event unless the major decisions are accepted by all members of the Community. The fact that one proposal provides a veto on future decisions of the commissariat does not, in the British view, give undesirable liberty of action to Germany. The proposals which weaken the whole "European" idea seem to the British to be based on a realistic assessment of the limits to which the powers can go in abandoning national sovereignty.

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[1] Not printed. (740.5/8–1754)

Mr. Watson said he hoped the U.S. would agree with the UK view that we should not intervene with the EDC powers at the present time but that we should leave it up to them to make their decisions at the Brussels meeting where, the British Government hopes an agreement can be reached which will permit Mendes-France to go back to Paris "not entirely empty-handed". I told Mr. Watson that the State Department is disturbed by the implications of the French proposals and that we felt that the acceptance of any of the amendments which would require reference to parliaments would result in an unacceptable delay in ratification. I told him that we are also disturbed by the fact that the proposals contain discriminatory features which it is doubtful that Chancellor Adenauer could accept. In addition, the supra-national features of the Treaty seem to be watered down to the point of non-existence.

While we do not expect to make any public statement along these lines, at least prior to the meeting of the EDC powers in Brussels, we feel that we should express these preliminary views to the EDC governments privately in any discussion of the French proposals.

Mr. Watson said that he felt that his Government is not at all sanguine about the results of the Brussels meeting but that the Foreign Office felt that we should not "rock the boat" at this time. He felt that anything that might come out of Brussels that would be acceptable to the EDC powers should be acceptable to us. I reminded him that the U.S. and the UK, as well as NATO, will have a direct interest in the results of the Brussels meeting and that we will have to take a very serious look at the proposals that may come from that meeting.

C. BURKE ELBRICK

740.5/8–1754 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium [1]

SECRET WASHINGTON, August 17, 1954—7:16 p. m.

173. For Bruce. Subject is French proposals for EDC modifications.

Although detailed consideration French proposals primarily matter for EDC countries at Brussels meeting Department believes it important General US views on proposals should be made very clear both to French and other EDC countries. Accordingly following statement US views has been prepared in amplification Edcol 10 [2] for use US Ambassadors all addressee capitals in discussing French proposals with Governments which accredited.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared by Merchant and Tyler. Sent also to Paris, The Hague, London, Rome, Luxembourg, and Bonn.

[2] Dated Aug. 16, p. 1042.

In general Department feels French proposals are open following basic criticisms:

(1) Many if not most involve basic modifications of Treaty requiring reconsideration by Parliaments which have ratified. Such reconsideration can only result in unacceptable delay.

(2) French proposals water down postpone or virtually eliminate supra-national features EDC. This has effect in certain respects of giving German EDC force status tending toward that of German national army, which would be disturbing to those in France and elsewhere whose primary concern is danger uncontrolled German rearmament. On other hand elimination or emasculation supra-national features in certain cases gives French, Germans, or any other nation virtual veto over important EDC decisions.

(3) French proposals contain several serious discriminations against Germans. Certainly out of question attempt impose anything on Germans more discriminatory than appeared in original draft. Aside from our objections to principle involved such proposals pose cruel dilemma for Adenauer whose position in Germany of such fundamental importance to West.

(4) Certain of French proposals raise fundamental questions relationship EDC to US, UK and NATO.

US representatives will probably not become involved in detailed discussion French proposals but if specific items are discussed arguments used Coled 18 [3] can be used.[4]

DULLES

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[3] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1039.

[4] In telegram 131 from Brussels, Aug. 19, Alger reported that Bruce had discussed the U.S. position outlined in the source text with Spaak at lunch the previous day. This was presumably the same meeting reported upon in part in telegram 128, *infra*. Alger added that the United States position had also been made known to De Staercke and Rothschild subsequently. "Rothschild observed that Belgian Government fully agreed with first three points our position regarding French proposals but added that British position as conveyed to Belgians was certainly much less opposed to proposals." Both Rothschild and De Staercke characterized the British reaction as paradoxical; opposing modifications which would require resubmission of the treaty to Parliaments, while simultaneously calling on EDC countries to in effect accept the substance of the French proposals as a means of obtaining French ratification" (740.5/8–1954).

740.5/8–1854 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET

BRUSSELS, August 18, 1954—6 p. m.

128. 1. Spaak and De Staercke reviewed with Bruce and Tomlinson today at lunch their tentative views on procedure to be followed at conference.[2] Mendes France would be asked to speak first. In accord-

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, The Hague, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

[2] The conference of the representatives of the six signatories to the EDC Treaty was held at Brussels Aug. 19–22. See the editorial note, p. 1052.

ance conversation with French Ambassador at Brussels, Spaak expects Mendes to attempt to defend proposals as being within framework of treaty and as not requiring new Parliamentary action in other EDC countries. Tentative procedural plan is that Spaak would then call on Beyen to speak. (Chancellor had proposed this in order to avoid putting Germany in lead position in refusing French proposals and in conversation with Beyen in The Hague last night he agreed to do this.) After other Ministers had expressed views, Spaak as chairman would conclude. Purpose of first session would be to make clear two points.

(*a*) Under no circumstances can other EDC nations agree to any suggestions which would even risk new Parliamentary action in their countries.

(*b*) French proposals involve such risk and therefore suggested French protocol cannot be accepted even as a basis for discussion.

Spaak would then ask for recess to see if some other basis of discussion might be found.

2. Spaak reviewed a paper he had hurriedly drafted early this morning that he might bring forward at second session. He stated that any form of protocol is out of question because a protocol would require new action in Parliaments. He suggests a draft declaration by the six governments. This draft recalls that France initiated the EDC, that France had obtained a number of interpretative protocols after signature, that France had obtained agreement of partners to a certain number of prior conditions, that France still faced difficulties in ratification and this was reason EDC countries were meeting at Brussels. Draft declaration then takes up nine points in French document stating that six governments agree to call a conference as soon as EDC treaty goes into effect in order to have Council of Ministers put these suggestions into force within 1 month. We made a few observations on certain suggestions in light of comments made to us at Bonn and at The Hague. De Staercke promised to have consultations with Dutch and German legal experts. He promised us copy of declaration as soon as Spaak is satisfied with it. Spaak's suggested declaration is in line with ideas of Dutch and Germans to do everything reasonable for Mendes within framework of treaty.

3. Spaak is meeting with Mendes this afternoon and probably later with Chancellor and Mendes because Chancellor does not wish to see Mendes alone. Spaak believes it will be most unfortunate if Mendes raises question of Saar and Moselle Canal with Chancellor at this stage, particularly when Mendes proposal on Article 38 does away with basis of Saar agreement. Spaak repeatedly expressed his irritation with British statements that Mendes document did not appear to be in conflict with EDC treaty and that it could be used as basis for discussion.

ALGER

740.5/8–1854

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1954.

MY DEAR SIR WINSTON: I returned yesterday from a weekend vacation and found your kind message.[2] I am honored and heartened that you occasionally follow the low-level of the Foreign Office and not merely the summits.

I am glad that we are following a common line as regards Mendes-France. I agree with you that it is time to bring this chapter to an end. I hope that it will be an EDC ending. I am not clear in my mind as to any alternative which will be both practical and not subject to another succession of parliamentary wrangles.

Our papers fully report the Attlee-Bevan excursion with many pictures. From our standpoint they do not make a helpful exhibit. I fear we can only exchange condolences on the subject of your last sentence.

FOSTER DULLES

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[1] Transmitted to London in telegram 984, Aug. 18, with instructions to the Ambassador to deliver to the Prime Minister.

[2] Presumably the message of Aug. 14, p. 1037.

740.5/8–1954 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1954—8:18 p. m.

632. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. FYI Following memo of conversation dictated by Secretary:

"Andre Mayer came to see me at 4:30 yesterday. He said that he had talked personally with Mendes-France the evening before. Mendes-France had been particularly upset because he inferred from the cabled message, which I had sent via Dillon, that I had lost confidence in his personal integrity and determination really to try to push EDC through.

Mayer then gave me a long letter from Mendes-France,[2] addressed to me, explaining his reasons for acting as he was. This letter, in substance, covered the same ground as had been covered by his statements to Dillon.

Mayer also said that Mendes-France had pointed out the great difficulties under which he was laboring, that he was surrounded by people who were anti-EDC, that he himself did not have time to replace them, and this meant that he had to try to do much of the technical work personally. He was very critical of the prior government for having, on the one hand, pretended to espouse the EDC and, on the other hand, allowed to stay in the Foreign Office the strongest opponents of EDC. This confronted Mendes-France with a very difficult technical situation.

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[1] Drafted by Dulles.

[2] Not printed (740.5/8–1754).

I told Mayer that I had no doubt whatever of Mendes-France's intellectual honesty and good intentions. However, I felt that he was ill-advised and did not appreciate the gravity of the situation.

Mayer indicated that Mendes-France had the impression that it was the United States which was instigating opposition to his plan on the part of the Low Countries and Germany. I denied that the United States had made any effort at all to create opposition and said that anything Mendes-France and Adenauer could agree on would almost automatically have our approval. It was, however, my impression that Mendes-France's proposals could not be accepted by Adenauer, and if he tried to take them he would be defeated in his own parliamentary bodies, and that would mark the end of the last German with whom France could negotiate an organic unity which would prevent a repetition of the past.

I reviewed the past history and pointed out that what was going on was apparently nothing but the repetition of the old cycle. Over a year ago, there had been the 'Protocols', which France had insisted upon as essential to ratification. These had been agreed to by the other five. Then there had come the Soviet proposal and the French demand that there must be a meeting on Germany before they could act. That meeting had been held fruitlessly, but still there was no French action. Then Britain and France were told that they had to make firmer and more far-reaching engagements. These were given on the explicit understanding that the matter would at once be put to a vote but nothing had happened. Now we were starting again with new protocols, a new meeting with Soviet Russia about Germany and requests for further U.S.–U.K. guarantees. Mendes-France could hardly be surprised if the friends and allies of France felt that France had lost the capacity for effective action and they could not be reassured by Mendes-France's mere words at a time when in fact what he was doing was merely a repetition of the futile past. Meanwhile, time was running out, particularly in Germany, and we were threatened with stark disaster.

Mayer asked what he should say to Mendes-France, and I told him that he could repeat in substance what I had said to him." [3]

DULLES

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[3] In telegram 150 from Brussels, Aug. 20, Alger reported: "Mendes-France told [EDC conference] ministers this morning that he had just received message from Secretary Dulles stating that it was imperative conference reach agreement at once and that United States would accept any agreement they reached. . . . Delegations disbelieve statement but are very nervous". (740.5/8–2054)

740.5/8–2054

Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of State [1]

SECRET LONDON, August 19, 1954.

[MY DEAR FOSTER:] Thank you so much for your message.[2] If EDC falls through the impotence of the French Chamber we surely ought to create some variant of NATO. I am having the problem studied here and may have some ideas to put before you and the President. I am distressed at Adenauer's position. I feel we owe him almost a debt of honor after all the risks he has run and patience he has shown. It ought to be possible to devise some safeguards for a NATO arrangement.

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[1] Source text is that transmitted for information to the Embassy in the United Kingdom in telegram 1030 to London, Aug. 20.

[2] Presumably the message of Aug. 18, p. 1049.

2. Mendes-France has proposed to visit me here at Chartwell on his way back from Brussels on Saturday, Sunday or Monday. I shall do all I can on the lines on which we agreed.

Regards,

WINSTON CHURCHILL

740.5/8-2054

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill[1]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1954.

MY DEAR SIR WINSTON: 1. Thanks for your message of August 19.[2] I certainly agree with you that we are under heavy obligation to Adenauer. It would be an incalculable disaster if there was a failure of his pro-Western policy to ally Germany with the West and to prevent the revival of German militarism.

2. I shall be greatly interested in knowing the outcome of your talks with Mendes-France.[3] From here it seems that Mendes-France seems to think that only he has parliamentary difficulties and that all of our other parliaments will happily dance to the tune which his Parliament sets.

3. So far as the U.S. Congress is concerned, it is pretty well convinced that EDC is a test of the reliability of France and if by this test France seems dedicated to indecision and unreliability then that fact undermines the whole NATO concept because French soil is essential to an effective continental defense system.

4. I cannot, therefore, be optimistic about a NATO substitute although we shall of course try to limit the scope of the disaster which will be caused if the French Government again proves undependable.

5. However, as I suggested in my reply to your earlier message, even if a NATO solution is acceptable in principle, I foresee a repetition of

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[1] The source text was transmitted in telegram 1030 to London for delivery to Churchill. Telegram 1030 also contained texts of messages from Churchill to Dulles, Aug. 14 and 19, p. 1037 and *supra*, respectively. This telegram was repeated to Bonn and Paris. Dulles had cleared this message with the President (Dulles to the President, Aug. 20, with enclosures, 740.5/8-2054).

[2] *Supra.*

[3] In telegram 1037 to London, Aug. 21, Dulles stated: "In view uncertainty line Churchill may take with Mendes-France at Chequers meeting and importance US avoid appearance immediately entering tripartite conference with France on Brussels results, I feel strongly that you should use any plausible excuse to avoid presence yourself or any other American official at such meeting if as indicated invitation is offered you" (740.5/8-2154).

past indecision and procrastination in relation to the question of whether Germany will become a member on a discriminatory basis—which I doubt—or whether France will admit Germany on a basis of full equality—which I equally doubt—I imagine that even you might find it a bit difficult to get your Parliament to accept the latter view and I think that Adenauer will now find it impossible to get his Parliament to accept discrimination.

6. I am of course keeping the President fully informed of our correspondence as "Foreign Ministers".

With highest regard, **Foster Dulles**

Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers of the six nations signatory to the Treaty establishing a European Defense Community met at Brussels, August 19 to 22, 1954 to consider modifications to the Treaty proposed by France. After 4 days of debate and discussion during which a series of counterproposals, submitted by Spaak in the form of a draft declaration for the interpretation and application of the Treaty and accepted by the Federal Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, but rejected by Mendès-France, the conference adjourned in failure. Documentation on the Brussels Conference including a copy of the original French proposals, Spaak's draft declaration, and the text, in French, of the final communiqué admitting failure to obtain a general agreement on Treaty modification, is in the Bruce Mission files, lot 57 M 38, "Brussels" and "Outgoing Paris and Brussels". The exchange of telegrams between the Department of State and United States officials at Brussels is in file 740.5.

740.5/8–2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 20, 1954—4 p. m.

152. Eyes only from Tomlinson. Limit distribution strictly. Member of French delegation asked to see me urgently this morning. He said he had just come from stormy meeting of French delegation which had led him to fear that Mendes-France wished to have Brussels meeting end in failure with blame placed on other nations. He acknowledged his previous conviction that Brussels meeting would succeed. All this only made it more difficult for him to express his fear and uncertainty now.

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[1] Repeated to Paris for the Ambassador and Bruce.

My Informant said that Mendes last night and this morning was furious with French experts because of promising talks held between French experts and Belgian, German, and Dutch delegations yesterday on French initiative. Mendes refused solutions for compromise suggested to him by his experts on each point. Mendes said he had to demand that other EDC countries take action in parliaments. Mendes said solemn declaration and promises to issue Council directives had no political value to him at all. Other governments had to go back to parliaments to show that "they really want France to join".

My Informant said Mendes had told De Seynes, Clermont-Tonnerre and Sauvagnargues that they were to stop all their contacts and to see no one. He rebuked them severely for taking action that he had not expressly requested.

My source said that if Mendes persists in efforts to defeat conference, Bourges-Maunoury will resign Monday in Paris. He asked if I thought US Government would wait for new government to be formed to act on EDC if Mendes were to be overthrown.

I tried to calm my Informant by telling him that Mendes might be resentful with his delegation because Mendes wished to make his own deal and had not been ready to indicate his willingness to compromise. My Informant agreed this would be in character of Mendes. On point of blame of other countries I told my Informant that my information was that President Spaak and his colleagues were doing everything they could to help Mendes short of any agreement which would require new action in other parliaments. Other EDC ministers had made it quite clear that this could be only solution at Brussels because delay and uncertainty of new negotiations and new ratifications were tantamount to certain defeat of EDC treaty. Hope of everyone had been that Mendes would realize this and return to Paris from Brussels with a solemn declaration which would in fact be great success and guarantees nearly certain approval by pro-European majority. Even if Mendes did not like EDC it appeared that this desire to stay in power would lead him to this course.

My Informant said he still had this hope but in view of attitude of Mendes this morning he and others feared Mendes would rather have failure of Brussels Conference and gamble on staying in power by putting EDC treaty before Assembly without vote of confidence or with crippling amendments. Mendes did not believe pro-European majority could be organized against his. Informant suggested that after defeat of EDC or after dropping EDC Mendes would try to talk on another basis about Germany with US and UK. My source said that Mendes announced he had sent letter to the Secretary through Andre Mayer about his problems and that reply had been satisfactory.[2]

We will not know whether fears of my Informant are well-founded until Mendes has taken position on acceptance of declaration to be put forward by Spaak.[3]

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[2] See telegram 632 to Paris, Aug. 19, p. 1049.

ALGER

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[3] In telegram 155 from Brussels, Aug. 20, Tomlinson reported that "Bourges-Maunoury confirmed substance of my message of French delegation meeting to De Staercke, including his intention to submit his resignation. De Staercke insisted experts should continue meetings, arguing that 'Ministers cannot fail where experts have succeeded'. Bourges, according to De Staercke, agreed but said that Mendes-France refused categorically to give them any mandate to continue. De Staercke said that during lunch Edgar Faure came out openly with remarks previously confined to French delegates such as 'let Brussels fail and let the Americans arm the Germans so we can forget this EDC nonsense'." (740.5/8–2054)

740.5/8–2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 20, 1954—6 p. m.

154. From Tomlinson. Limit distribution strictly. According to De Staercke, Spaak and Mendes-France had sharp exchange after this morning's session. Mendes said conference would have to fail unless other countries agreed their Parliaments should take some new action. Spaak said that if France insisted on this, five countries would issue common declaration. Mendes angrily said it was unthinkable that other western European nations emphasize divergence by isolating France in such a manner.

ALGER

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[1] Sent also to Paris for Bruce and the Ambassador eyes only. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

740.5/8–2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 20, 1954—8 p. m.

157. Limit distribution strictly. From Tomlinson. Following are highlights of this morning's session checked with number of sources:

1. Nearly entire morning taken up with rather confused discussion of French proposal. Beginning with title I, Ministers were only able to reach numbered paragraph 3 before futility of continuing became evident and Spaak presented his draft declaration for discussion.[2]

2. On paragraph one of title I, Mendes prodded by Bourges-Maunoury finally agreed to accept declaration on this point instead of including it in protocol. On paragraph two, Dutch led long exchange attacking inclusion of "subordinate commands" which they and others maintained violated treaty. Mendes said this had been put in

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[1] Sent also to Paris for the Ambassador and Bruce eyes only. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] See editorial note, p. 1052.

to satisfy Marshal Juin. No agreement reached. On paragraph three, Mendes insisted that EDC institutions had to be near NATO and he had to specify Paris to satisfy psychological problem in France. When asked whether this did not upset one of keystones to Saar agreement, he replied that he was not bound by proposals on this question made by previous French Governments. Adenauer then appealed to Mendes to carry out European Saar settlement as only chance for solution. Mendes' only answer was that CSC institutions could be moved to Saar, to which Bech replied that Luxembourg would not approve such a suggestion. Question was postponed.

3. Spaak pointed out it was now 12:30 and less than 1 page of draft protocol had been covered. He had to suggest new procedure and submit prematurely "ace-in-hole" he had been saving for later. Spaak then presented declaration translated in following cable. See Embtel 128.[3]

4. Mendes at this point made another scene more violent than those he made at yesterday's meeting. He accused other Ministers of not wishing to help him. He wished them to realize that his situation was desperate; his government would certainly fall if Brussels conference failed to accept his proposals. He made number of accusations as to Spaak's intentions.

5. Spaak finally intervened to say if Mendes did not find first page of his declaration helpful he would withdraw it. Spaak immediately asked for copies back but Piccioni first wished Ministers to read it. First pages were then returned. Spaak then explained purpose of his proposed declaration, emphasizing that he felt himself limited only by need to avoid new action in parliaments. He reminded Mendes that his own party in Belgium had put him formally on notice that Belgium Government would be brought down if he agreed on anything reducing supranational aspects of EDC treaty or if he tried to come back before parliament on EDC before ratifications were completed.

6. Beyen asked Mendes to consider Spaak's proposed declaration in confidence that other EDC nations wished to go to their limit in helping him. He suggested that attitude with less show of temper and pathos would help discussions. Mendes replied that situation before France and his great efforts to solve it justified some pathos.

7. Adenauer reminded Mendes that situation was not only serious for France; it was desperate for all Western nations and particularly Germany. He then made appeal in almost sentimental terms that

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[3] This transmitted the draft declaration for the interpretation and the application of the EDC Treaty approved by the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, but subsequently disapproved by France. See editorial note, p. 1052. A translation of this draft declaration was transmitted to the Department in telegram 159 from Brussels, Aug. 20 (740.5/8–2054). The draft was an elaboration of the views and proposals which Spaak and De Staercke had conveyed to Bruce and Tomlinson as reported in telegram 128 from Brussels, Aug. 18, p. 1047.

Mendes not in effect force Western Germany to create a German national army, reminding Mendes of how easy it would be to submit to increasing pressures in Germany for national solutions and of how ominous such developments might be for Germany, France and other nations. He asked Mendes to listen to him and to realize that declaration proposed by Spaak would be a great diplomatic victory for him to present in Paris. Adenauer was certain that Mendes with this six-nation agreement and full support and sympathy of other European nations and US and UK bring to culmination European policy so desperately needed by all nations.

8. Spaak adjourned meeting until 5 o'clock to give Ministers opportunity to study his proposed declaration.

Alger

740.5/8–2054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Alger) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 20, 1954—7 p. m.

158. Limit distribution. Mendes-France asked me to see him this afternoon and I called at French Embassy shortly after lunch. Present during conference were also French Ambassador and Sasouse.

Mendes opened conversation by referring to personal message from the Secretary transmitted to him through Andre Mayer by cable from the French Embassy at Washington[2] and asking that I convey to the Secretary his appreciation of the Secretary's complimentary statements regarding his recent efforts.

Mendes then gave a brief résumé of the course of the conference and said that, while it might be possible to arrive at some agreement, the prospects at present were not good. He said, therefore, that in anticipation of possible failure he felt that the US, UK and French should consider what measures or action could be taken to minimize possible damage to western unity and to show continued solidarity. He emphasized this was matter of immediate importance and not something for next month or next week. He said he was ready and willing to join in any such steps but he had nothing definite in mind. Asked whether he envisaged joint declaration, he repeated that he had no proposals to offer.

Mendes then said that, prior to conference and at time when he had not even considered possibility of failure, he had envisaged talks with the UK and US after the conference to take stock of the situation and see what should be done next. He said that he had made arrangements before conference to stop off in England for a few hours on way back to Paris to see Winston Churchill at Chequers. He said he believed

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[1] Repeated to Paris for Bruce and to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

[2] See telegram 632 to Paris, Aug. 19, p. 1049.

Churchill had been in touch with American Ambassador in London to arrange that latter be present at meeting in order to have US participation.

He gave impression of being very pessimistic regarding outcome of conference. Referring to Spaak proposal presented at conference this morning (which called for declaration of principles outlining points to be made subject for discussion between EDC partners after French ratification with view to possible amendment of treaty), he said he had only brief look at document and expected to study the proposal with his assistants prior to meeting this afternoon. His preliminary reaction was that declaration would not be acceptable to National Assembly as it did not have juridical status and would not be binding. He said that right to ask for amendment of treaty after ratification need not be embodied in declaration of principles as this right was already provided in treaty itself. He said that he had made all concessions this morning and his EDC partners had conceded nothing and that he could not return to National Assembly empty handed. He believed that he would probably have majority for the treaty if his proposed protocol were approved by conference, but that without agreement upon his proposals by his EDC partners, he could not obtain ratification. He realized that the other EDC countries had good reasons for their objections to his proposals and he could not blame them but they did not seem to be sufficiently aware of his problem with respect to National Assembly. He said that his proposals actually represented "new things" added to treaty and that only these, and not entire EDC treaty, would have to be submitted to Parliaments. He did not think Parliamentary approval other EDC countries would take a long time.

When he spoke of unwillingness of his EDC partners to accept his proposals even though he had made many concessions, I pointed out that his proposals had not made US Government happy. In reply to my query, he said that he was aware US Government views in this regard.

I asked him whether he expected to present EDC treaty to National Assembly in event Brussels conference failed. He said that he could not answer that question as this was decision for his Cabinet. He spoke of likelihood of "excitement" in France if Brussels conference failed and the damage that would be done. When I reminded him that it was my impression that feeling in US was that decision should be reached in any event in order to avoid continued delay, and that it would be preferable to have decision one way or other rather than present uncertainty, Mendes replied that decision regarding EDC would be made here in Brussels if conference failed and not in National Assembly in Paris.

I inquired whether in event failure Brussels conference individual members National Assembly would not make reappraisal their positions and that of France with view to avoiding situation where France would be isolated. Mendes replied that on contrary reappraisal would be unfavorable rather than favorable in relation to EDC partners and blame would be on them for failure to meet French difficulties.

I asked whether in the event EDC were not ratified by National Assembly French Government would make reappraisal of its policies in order to see what solution might be found. He said that many courses were possible but he was not considering them at present. He did not elaborate.

Asked whether he expected the conference to end soon, he enigmatically replied that it might end this afternoon, tomorrow or Sunday.

At end of conversation we agreed to answer any press queries regarding our meeting by stating Mendes wished to keep US Government informed progress of conference and conversation devoted to this subject. We learn that French delegation press officer informed press in advance of our meeting but both Mendes and French Ambassador said they were not aware that meeting had been publicized.[3]

ALGER

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[3] In telegram 185 to Brussels, Aug. 20, Dulles stated: "Only message regarding EDC which I have sent to Mendes-France in past few days was authorization to mutual friend to communicate to Mendes-France discussion I had with former on this subject August 18". Dulles then proceeded to quote copiously from the memorandum of conversation he had dictated at the time of his visit with André Mayer (telegram 632, p. 1049). Dulles concluded by stating: "If Mendes-France has already received this expression of my thoughts through intermediary with such surprising rapidity and if it is to this conversation that he refers, I am at a loss to understand construction apparently being placed upon it. You are authorized in your discretion to inform delegations including French of general content of above quoted conversation and fact that I have dispatched no other recent message to Mendes-France on this subject". (740.5/8–2054)

740.5/8–2154

The Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Spaak [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1954.

I have been following with the closest interest the developments at the Brussels Conference, which is so crucial to all our efforts to build strength and unity in Europe. I have noted with particular appreciation your skillful and patient efforts to bring about agreement under the most difficult conditions.

It is my most earnest hope that the Conference will reach agreement on a formula which all participants can freely accept. However, I also feel that we must be prepared to deal urgently with the serious situation which would arise if, in spite of every effort, the Conference failed to reach agreement. I am sure you will recall our luncheon conversation at Geneva at which we discussed the possibility of a meeting under Article 132 of the EDC Treaty,[2] with the US and UK in attendance, along with the ratifying countries. I feel that the failure of the Brussels meeting would be a matter of such grave consequence as to make such a meeting necessary.

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[1] The source text was transmitted to Brussels in telegram 194 at 3:45 p.m. on Aug. 21 with instructions to Bruce to deliver it if he thought it would be helpful. Telegram 194 was repeated to London at the same time with the instruction that a copy of the source text be delivered to Churchill together with Dulles' personal message to the Prime Minister (p. 1060). In telegram 170 from Brussels, Aug. 22, sent also to London, Bruce reported that he had delivered a copy of the source text to Spaak and that he had also delivered a copy of Dulles' message to Mendès-France (*infra*) to the French Prime Minister (740.5/8–2254).

If you agree and if in your judgment circumstances at Brussels make it desirable, I for my part would not object to your informing the Ministers at Brussels that you propose calling a meeting immediately to be attended by the Benelux countries, Germany, the US, and the UK. I believe it should be made clear that the purpose of this meeting will be to consider with urgency how best to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West and to bring about German rearmament. US would be willing to accept an invitation on assumption UK would do likewise.

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[2] For a report on this luncheon, see telegram Dulte 28, Apr. 29, p. 951.

740.5/8–2154

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Mendès-France[1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1954.

1. I am deeply disturbed at the report I have received of the difficulties being encountered at the Brussels meeting and I conceive it my solemn duty to address this appeal to you and your fellow conferees.

2. I need not recount the vicissitudes which we have faced in common during the post war [era] in our efforts to assure an enduring peace in Western Europe in the face of an external threat of formidable proportions; nor in our efforts to achieve stability with the memories still unfortunately vivid of the internecine strife which has threatened the survival of the cradle of our civilization twice in this century. Now all that we have worked for stands in a very real and immediate sense at the crossroads. The decision is between resolutely choosing the path of statesmanship or that leading toward disunity and chaos.

3. There is, I know, no question in our minds as to which road we must choose. Our problem is how we can all get on this road together.

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[1] The source text was transmitted to Brussels in niact telegram 195 at 4:09 p.m. on Aug. 21 with instructions to Bruce to deliver it if he thought it would be helpful. Telegram 195 was repeated to London with the instruction that a copy of the source text be delivered to Churchill, together with the message to Spaak (*supra*) and Dulles' message to the British Prime Minister (*infra*), only after Bruce had delivered it to Mendès-France. In telegram 170 from Brussels, Aug. 22, sent also to London, Bruce reported that he had delivered copies of both messages (740.5/8–2254).

4. The grave problems which are presently facing France and her partners at Brussels are primarily and in the first instance their own concern. We must therefore accept the judgment of the Brussels Conference on any points unanimously and willingly agreed. In achieving such a meeting of the minds, however, there are certain considerations which must be borne in mind:

a. Any changes in the EDC Treaty which would result in further unacceptable delay, such as would result from resubmission to parliaments, should be avoided.

b. Any changes in the EDC Treaty which seriously impair or indefinitely postpone its surpranational and integrative features strike at the basic concept of European unity, which in my judgment is the best and last hope of Europe, and should therefore be avoided.

c. Any changes in the EDC Treaty which discriminate against any of its participants sow the seeds of resentment and breed future peril and should likewise be avoided.

5. In addition, I must recall the various engagements which my Government stands ready to assume at such time as the EDC comes into effect. We must, of course, review, in the light of changes, whether these undertakings remain justified.

6. If the Brussels Conference breaks up with no agreement, we shall be faced with a great crisis. Our disposition would be, first, to consult immediately with the UK and those EDC countries which have ratified the Treaty to determine urgently what steps should be taken to associate Germany in sovereign equality with the West and to bring about German rearmament.

7. I have felt this message necessary in order that there be no doubt as to the vital importance we place on the EDC in its essential features and on the need, in all our interests, for its coming into force with the very minimum of further delay.

8. Since I believe that the other EDC powers and the British should know clearly where the U.S. stands on these problems, I am making the preceding paragraphs of this message available to them.

740.5/8–2154

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 21, 1954.

I am gravely disturbed at the situation at Brussels. We simply cannot afford the consequences inherent in failure. I am asking Winthrop [Aldrich] to inform your officials of the reports which we have received from Brussels and which have prompted me to send the attached messages to Spaak and Mendes-France.

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[1] The source text was transmitted in niact telegram 1041 to London at 4:21 p.m. Aug. 21, with the instruction that it not be delivered to Churchill unless Bruce reported that he had delivered one or both of the messages to Spaak and Mendès-France (p. 1058 and *supra*). London was also instructed to inform the British of the substance of Brussels telegrams 157 and 158, Aug. 20, pp. 1054 and 1056.

I know that you share my views on the importance of a German defense contribution. If we should have to explore alternative means of achieving it, we would face further protracted delays during which Adenauer's situation will deteriorate. And we would still face the problem of a French veto.

In this situation there are in my opinion two essentials: First, in line with the decisions you and the President reached,[2] we must while there is still a chance for the EDC keep our eyes exclusively on the EDC; we must do everything possible to ensure success at Brussels, which would permit early implementation of our plans. Secondly, we must not permit Mendes-France to think that in the event of failure we can forget all that has happened and start afresh with France in a position to block what we know to be vital to our interests. We cannot and do not desire to ignore France, but decisions of this importance must be related to a sense of responsibility.

I hope you will feel able to support me in the substance of the positions set forth in my messages to Spaak and Mendes-France. We need to stand together on this.

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[2] Regarding the U.S.-U.K. talks, June 25-29, see the editorial note, p. 984, and subsequent documents.

740.5/8-2154 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 21, 1954—7 p. m.

165. Limit distribution strictly. Saw separately this morning Adenauer, Spaak, Bech and Mendes-France. Adenauer, Spaak and Bech still hopeful the five nation declaration will be finally accepted by Mendes. If not, and conference breaks down, they intend issue statement and also text rejected declaration. Possibility of such a statement is irritating and depressing to Mendes who repeatedly said it would arouse bitterness in France and reflect on his government against partners and so that to defend French prestige he would have to retort.

He has voiced this same objection, now almost become a plea, to Spaak but Spaak and the others are thus far adamant, esteeming their position would be false if impression were allowed to be created that conference might have failed because of their unreasonable intransigence rather than because totally unacceptable language French protocol requiring resubmission their parliaments.

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[1] Sent also to Paris, eyes only for Dillon and Hughes. Repeated to London; Rome; The Hague, eyes only for the Ambassador; Bonn, eyes only for Conant; and Luxembourg, eyes only for the Minister.

Moreover they believe this resolution most effective one to date in attempt influence Mendes at least to moderate his insistence on their embracing his protocol.

In general my conversation with Mendes, consequent upon his invitation, too closely parallels report of Tomlinson's visit to him late last night being reported separately [2] and Alger's interview of yesterday (Embtel 158 [3]) to warrant recounting. My general impression is he was thoroughly fatigued, cynical, pessimistic, but fully confident of his own judgment of French parlimentary situation. Robert Schuman's article in *Figaro* had not seemingly convinced him there would be any French pro-EDC defections if the other five ministers would accept his proposal almost in its entirety. He said he thought under such circumstances even Robert Schuman would vote for the changes as would all the pro-EDC Socialists. (I feel he underestimates the depth of their convictions).

He described himself as the unlucky inheritor of his predecessors gross errors and lack of good faith in carrying out their EDC engagements. He was being abandoned by his Benelux allies, suspect by the United States, thrown unfairly on his own courage and resources when he sorely needed sympathy and aid, all because his foreign colleagues would not realize that [form] was nothing and the spirit of his proposal respondent to his political necessities was alone important. He asked for greater faith in him and in his intentions, and observed he was operating in a hostile atmosphere unjustified by his record.

Mendes did not know what action he would take next week in Paris. He might put original text to vote without government endorsement (saying ruefully that his prestige will have been so diminished by his lack of success at conference it will matter little if he sponsors bill). At any rate he will make no determination until he has consulted President Coty and his own Cabinet. Meanwhile he says his political enemies are licking their chops and organizing against him. He had heard this morning that certain members MRP were considering demanding from the floor vote on original text. (Additional color is lent to this by statement to me yesterday in Paris by intimate friend of Pinay that Pinay was seriously canvassing prospects of rallying or allying himself to movement to bring original text to vote).

Mendes expressed himself vigorously on the importance of orienting Germany to the west, of helping Adenauer remain dominant in Fed Rep, of his abiding belief in the supreme importance of unity amongst the allies. He only hoped if he fell from office he could be succeeded by a French statesman possessing and implementing similar convictions.

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[2] The account of the Tomlinson–Mendès-France meeting late in the evening of Aug. 20 was transmitted to the Department in telegram 166 from Brussels, Aug. 21, not printed. It reported *inter alia* that Mendès-France appeared to be "very shaken" by the breakdown in communication and understanding between himself and Dulles (reported in telegram 185 to Paris, Aug. 20; summarized in footnote 3, p. 1058) (740.5/8–2154).

[3] Dated Aug. 20, p. 1056.

[BRUCE]

740.5/8–2154 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State [1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 21, 1954—8 p. m.

168. 1. Belgian, German and French sources describe Friday evening session as nearly futile. Meeting lasted until 1 a. m. Discussion centered on Spaak text with Mendes reiterating why his proposals necessary and Belgian draft not satisfactory. He accepted discussion on basis Spaak draft but repeatedly said essentials not there. For this reason reserved right to reject draft if all drafting changes [not] approved.

2. Most heated exchange took place on interpretation of Article 7 of Bonn agreements. Mendes insisted that he must have individual right of withdrawal just as Germans have under Article 7. Chancellor, Hallstein and Spaak insisted that no such right in Article 7. Chancellor said he would refuse to accept right even if offered. Spaak asked Mendes how he could insist on giving Germany this right when he had before him a German Chancellor who refused to accept it. Finally, Spaak proposed compromise language that if situation is or should arise where one party had right to leave EDC, other EDC nations would then have same right. Bourges-Maunoury tried to get Mendes to accept language but he refused. All other delegations accepted.

3. Second item of importance was Article 38. Mendes said it was absolutely impossible to agree to document which mentioned May 4, 1954 communiqué on direct elections. Piccioni disagreed completely. Spaak recalled that under great pressure other EDC countries had accepted communiqué on urgent request from French Government that it was absolutely essential for French Socialists to vote for ratification. We would all look ridiculous, Spaak added, if we withdrew approval and Spaak told Mendes that he would look even more ridiculous because he would lose remaining Socialist votes.

4. Ministers finally gave up and decided to give experts a chance. All this morning and afternoon experts have been meeting to continue discussions. Ministers meeting has been postponed from hour to hour and now scheduled for 8 p. m. We have neither humor, force nor physical stamina to report on work of subcommittees whose number is now swollen to eight.

[BRUCE]

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[1] Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, The Hague, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

740.5/8–2254 : Telegram

The Chargé in Belgium (Sprouse) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 22, 1954—5 a. m.

169. Limit distribution strictly. From Tomlinson. Re Embtel 166.[2] After Mendes-France had finished with his comments on the Secretary's memorandum,[3] Mendes asked me to stay to discuss situation on personal basis even though the hour was then two o'clock in the morning and his delegation, including Faure and Bourges-Maunoury, were waiting for him in next room. Mendes said that as a friend he wished my full and frank views. He said he was thinking more of future than of present because Brussels Conference had already failed. Meeting would be held tomorrow but continued discussions seemed pointless. Mendes insisted over and over again that fault was not his, listing examples in effort to show that other Ministers had not given him "one single" concession.

I said that I did not believe that attitude of other delegations justified writing off conference as failure. Each of EDC partners and US and UK as well seemed to be prepared to do best they could in answer to French appeal for help with French Assembly. They were asking only that French Government recognize that there was a limit to their possible help. Other Ministers could not risk creating political difficulties in their own countries. In some cases, even their personal careers would be placed in jeopardy by this questionable gamble. It seemed clear to me that, if EDC governments agreed to reopen parliamentary debates on EDC, it would be 18 months or 2 years before West would have answer on European unity and German rearmament. No one could say these Parliaments were to be limited to purely rubber stamp action taking not more than 3 months. In my opinion, it was a contradiction to argue that countries should go back to Parliaments to help get quick action in France when resulting delay and doubt of new parliamentary consideration made defeat of EDC a near certainty.

Mendes repeated argument that his jurists did not believe parliamentary action in other countries was necessary on protocol, but observed this was not his responsibility and was matter for other EDC countries to decide. He insisted that some way could be found to minimize any parliamentary action if other Ministers would only appreciate magnitude of his problem and his efforts to overcome it.

Mendes said facts of political difficulties in France had to be faced. He had to have essentials of protocol for passage in French

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[1] Sent also to Paris, eyes only for Ambassador Dillon. Repeated to London, eyes only for the Ambassador and to Bonn, eyes only for Conant.

[2] Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1062.

[3] Presumably a reference to Dulles' message to Mendès-France, Aug. 21, p. 1059.

Assembly. He had to try to obtain 80 anti-EDC votes on right because Socialist Deputies would not follow discipline. He explained his "pointage" on basis of signature by 49 Socialist Deputies in last 2 weeks or a promise to vote against EDC. Perhaps he had been wrong, he had received some promises from anti-EDC Deputies but not enough, although he expected others to change position if there were a success in Brussels. Mendes admitted he had not consulted Mollet on his "pointage".

I said it could be expected that Mollet would hold back his real disciplinary campaign until EDC debate was in true progress. Socialist Deputies might act quite differently at that time. I pointed out that his "pointage" could not be expected to overcome skepticism of other governments. Everyone seemed to have a "pointage" and they differed widely depending upon assumptions used in preparing them. Pro-EDC Deputies had always urged immediate debate and tactics of anti-EDC Deputies had been to postpone it. I continued that a "pointage" prepared by pro-Europeans might promise more favorable results.

Mendes insisted that we could count on all pro-European votes despite statements made by Schuman, Pinay, Mollet, Phillip and their followers. With astonishing cynicism he said they had no alternative but to vote for EDC treaty even if protocol left nothing but a skeleton of EDC treaty. Mendes stated that Bourges-Maunoury and Rene Mayer agreed with his gloomy analysis of prospects for EDC treaty and with his conviction that EDC could not be ratified unless protocol was obtained at Brussels.

I said that I did not wish to speak for these gentlemen but understood their position to be that EDC treaty could be ratified if it were presented vigorously to Assembly along with government endorsement of maximum that was acceptable to other EDC countries at Brussels. I said that I also understood their views on vote-catching possibilities of protocol in its present form to be quite different from his.

Mendes repeatedly stated that time was too short to work out anything useful to him in Brussels. Spaak's proposed declaration would be interpreted as merely empty promises. I replied that a formal signature of 6 governments to act in common in future should have real value. French Government should extend same confidence to other governments that it was asking for itself. I continued that, if it was too late to act, I thought it fair to attribute situation to excessive unreasonableness of French protocol and to continued French insistence that other parliaments must take new action on EDC treaty. There was still real hope, in my opinion, for a settlement very useful for French Government before its Parliament if these unreasonable positions could be quickly changed. Problem as I saw it was to undo damage done by anti-EDC advisers who had been asked to help on protocol.

Mendes replied that he had inherited anti-EDC advisers in Quai d' Orsay from Bidault. He then argued that Bourges-Maunoury was pro-European, had helped draft the protocol, and was in full agreement with it except for veto provision. I replied that I was under a different impression as to position of Bourges-Maunoury on protocol, and assumed that Bourges would make his position clear if it were necessary to do so next week.

Mendes said he had two immediate points for the future. First, he thought a common 5-nation declaration trying to put blame for failure of Brussels Conference and EDC on France would only cause disunity and bitterness between western nations. Such divisions could only help Russians.

Second, he was going to visit Churchill and he hoped US would be represented so that three nations could map new plans for European policy and limit damage for failure of EDC.

I replied that Western Nations were not divided. They were all firmly united in fulfilling agreed objectives except France. Failure of Brussels Conference could only reflect this situation of isolation of France and of inability of France to deal with her own problem. On second point, I said I thought it inconceivable that Germany and other EDC nations could be left to stand aside and have France pretend to leadership on continent after history of past three years on fulfillment of commitments on European policy.

Mendes said he had not decided on course to take next week. He had to consult his Cabinet Tuesday. One possibility was to present EDC treaty with whatever he could get at Brussels; second possibility was to present treaty without vote of confidence; third possibility was to take responsibility himself as head of government and turn down EDC treaty; fourth was to agree with US and UK and try to obtain Assembly approval to put Bonn conventions in effect; and there were others. Mendes said he was so concerned with damage to Atlantic solidarity by rejection of EDC treaty by French Assembly that he was seriously considering taking responsibility for rejection himself as head of government.

I pointed out that, if French Assembly did not vote on EDC treaty after asking and receiving maximum help other EDC countries could give at Brussels, it could certainly be said that Mendes-France government had added to "futile history of past". I said that France had taken international commitment to present EDC treaty to Assembly. France could not expect to be excused from this commitment just because Mendes-France had come to power any more than other countries could expect to be excused from their commitments to France because of this event. If answer in French Assembly had to be no, then it seemed better to obtain that answer clearly so that Atlantic policy could be built on some other basis even if it were far less acceptable.

This morning Bourges-Maunoury asked me to call on him. He said he had just finished long talk with Mendes-France on above conversation. Bourges said he was sorry that conversation had not taken place night before. It had helped him clear up an equivocal situation. Mendes had told him that I had suggested he would resign. Bourges said he replied that his intentions were to resign but that he was surprised that I was aware of it. Mendes appealed to him not to do so, urging that they must continue to work together and that resignation of Bourges might lead to his own. Bourges said Mendes still had not made definite decision on Brussels Conference and there was still some hope. In any case he was now not bound by delegation loyalty and could work more effectively. He urged that Chancellor agree to see Mendes as soon as possible.

SPROUSE

740.5/8–2254 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State[1]

SECRET NIACT BRUSSELS, August 22, 1954—6 a. m.

171. Limit distribution strictly. At end of tonight's session Mendes made statement rejecting declaration proposed by other five countries as redrafted by experts. He said it was useless for him. All essential aspects of his protocol had been left out. He listed veto by each nation over commissariat, article 38, right to withdraw from EDC, his language on German unification, among others. He said he could give no indications of his intentions until he had consulted his cabinet. He asked that nothing be published; that controversy should not be aired publicly; that press release be made saying agreement had not been reached but "will to form European community was even stronger".

Other delegations said these requests were unrealistic. Spaak suggested three alternatives:

(1) A communiqué of five-nations be issued but he thought it best to avoid this if possible because it emphasized disagreement.

(2) French text and counter-proposal of other EDC nations be published by six-nations. This seemed best because French Government could still use offer of other EDC countries if it wished to do so. Mendes at first refused this but later agreed to meet tomorrow to consider what could be done.

(3) Spaak said effort might be made to meet with representatives of US and UK as guarantors before conference broke up. Beyen said he

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[1] Also sent to Paris. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.

would prefer to meet tomorrow before taking position on this proposal. It was agreed experts of five-nations would meet tomorrow at nine to put final touches on counterproposal of five nations. Ministers of all six would meet at 12 o'clock.

Spaak did not read his message from the Secretary [2] to open meeting. He had long meeting with Mendes afterwards. He showed Mendes message from the Secretary. Spaak told Mendes that he thought it preferable to show him message rather than face him with it in open meeting. Mendes thanked Spaak saying that no representative of France had suffered humiliation such as he had suffered today and that reading this message tonight would have been too much. (Mendes saw Secretary's message to him [3] during meeting before making his statement.)

Mendes told Spaak he would present treaty to Assembly on day scheduled with copy of concessions that other EDC nations would have made. He would not, however, put question of confidence. He also thought that he might do this alone rather than divide his cabinet on this question.

Bourges-[Maunoury] later told De Staercke that situation was not disastrous. He believed there were many important contributions made by other EDC countries. He said pro-Europeans in France will actually find encouragement from decision taken at Brussels not to abandon essentials of EDC treaty.

[Bruce]

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[2] Dated Aug. 21, p. 1058.
[3] Dated Aug. 21, p. 1059.

740.5/8–2254 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Penfield) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT LONDON, August 22, 1954—1 p. m.

909. Strictly limited distribution. Upon receipt Brussels telegram 170 [2] action taken as instructed Deptel 1041.[3] Only change made in message to Churchill was substitution of words "our Embassy" for "Winthrop" in view absence Ambassador (see Embtel 809, August 16).[4] Messages should have reached Churchill at Chartwell before noon.

At Downing Street's suggestion copies of messages also handed Kirkpatrick. He said he felt they would fit in closely with Churchill's thinking. He added parenthetically that when he asked Churchill yesterday whether he had any message for Mendes he replied "No, unless it is to tell him not to follow in the path of Petain."

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[1] Repeated to Paris, The Hague, Bonn, Brussels, and Luxembourg.
[2] Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1058.
[3] Not printed; it transmitted the text of Dulles' message to Churchill, p. 1060.
[4] Not printed. (123 Aldrich, Winthrop)

Speaking personally, Kirkpatrick said he felt there should be US–UK Adenauer meeting perhaps in connection with meetings suggested by Secretary in order make sure what is now practical from German viewpoint. He mentioned in this connection this morning's news of defection of a West German Bundestag member as evidence of deteriorating situation in Federal Republic. He also speculated upon whether it might be advisable include Italy in Secretary's proposed meeting in order to give greater impression European unity and avoid driving Italy into France's arms. Kirkpatrick retains a hope if not expectation that French will at eleventh hour finally ratify.

In view prolongation Brussels meeting Mendes now plans arrive here at 11 tomorrow morning and lunch with Churchill at Chartwell. Foreign Office expects to announce visit tonight and requests information be held very closely until announcement made. Kirkpatrick said Churchill is well aware that Mendes will try to use meeting to show he still has a friend and that Churchill will see that no opportunity is given Mendes to exploit this angle.

PENFIELD

740.5/8–2254 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce), at Brussels[1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 22, 1954—2:40 p. m.

197. Limit distribution. Reference Embtel 172.[2]

1. Our disposition generally regarding proposed special conference suggested Deptels 194[3] and 195[4] is to follow lead EDC countries which have ratified, particularly lead of Spaak.

2. Countries may be reassured generally on following:

(*a*) We concur fully that no steps should be taken toward holding special conference of type proposed until French Assembly has had opportunity to vote on day scheduled next week. Prior to scheduled vote, any public discussion proposed meeting should of course be most carefully avoided. Steps should be taken to call meeting promptly, however, if becomes clear French will fail to vote as scheduled or if vote results in rejection EDC.

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[1] Drafted by Fessenden; cleared with Merchant and Palmer. Repeated to Paris, London, Rome, The Hague, Bonn, and Luxembourg.

[2] Not printed; it dealt with the question of convoking a consultative meeting between the United Kingdom and the EDC ratifying countries following the Brussels conference and reported that all the delegations at Brussels with whom Bruce had consulted "seem agreed no steps should be taken this direction until French National Assembly has voted end month or else EDC definitely not to be taken up by it" (740.5/8–2254).

[3] Not printed; it transmitted Dulles' message to Spaak, p. 1058.

[4] Not printed; it transmitted Dulles' message to Mendès-France, p. 1059.

(*b*) We believe that any recommendations of proposed special conference concerning German defense contribution should be referred to emergency NAC meeting.

(*c*) Benelux, Germans, and Italians can be reassured we are firmly opposed any tripartite US–UK–French consultations prior to steps proposed for special meeting with other EDC countries. London's 909[5] to Department (repeated Brussels niact 13) contains encouraging evidence British agree fully with this position.

3. Re problem Italian participation in proposed conference, we note Kirkpatrick's suggestion to this effect in London's 909. We see merit in Italian participation, which can be justified on grounds Italian parliament commissions have approved EDC and Italian Government has subscribed to declaration other EDC countries at Brussels. Therefore, if you agree, you may inform Spaak, Italians, and others as appropriate that we would see no objection to Italian presence.[6]

DULLES

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[5] *Supra.*

[6] In telegram 177 from Brussels, Aug. 22, Sprouse reported that the Brussels conference had ended, and Bruce had departed for Paris prior to receipt of the source text. "As Adenauer was scheduled return to Bonn this evening and other delegations expected to depart either tonight or tomorrow morning, Embassy will convey these assurances only to Spaak and will take no action with respect to representatives of other countries. Pending receipt of further instructions, we will not communicate to Spaak point in paragraph three of reference telegram". (740.5/8–2254)

740.5/8–2354

Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, August 22, 1954.

1. Very many thanks for all your telegrams today. You and I have never been closer together on a live issue. I send you the telegram I sent on Nineteenth to Adenauer which has already been published. Here are the two messages I have just received from him and his circle. They look good.

2. Mendes-France arrives here noon tomorrow (August 23) and I shall urge him to stake his political fame on getting E.D.C. through. I shall make plain the awful consequences which might follow a flop. It is a choice between peace through strength and subjugation through weakness. Anthony returns in time for the meeting. We might all of us

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[1] The source text was transmitted to London in niact telegram 1047, Aug. 23. Telegram 1047 also contained an exchange of messages between Churchill and Adenauer, Aug. 19 and 22, as well as the text of a telegram of Aug. 22 from the British Ambassador at Brussels to the Foreign Office, none printed.

be in on a winner. We must keep in closest touch. This is a time for vehement moral action. I suppose you could come over if need be.

3. Give this with all my respects to the President. The climate of opinion he is building makes the best results possible. Code name "Bite" quite like old times.

WINSTON

740.5/8-2354

The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Churchill [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, August 23, 1954.

Am greatly cheered by your message. Let us "bite" hard and I think we should get something not only digestible but invigorating. I eagerly await the results of your talk with Mendes-France. I agree that we must keep in closest touch and I could come over at your call, although I must be in Manila September 3, which is our September 2.[2]

Give my best regards to Anthony and be sure to let me know what happens.

FOSTER DULLES

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[1] The source text was transmitted in niact telegram 1046 to London at 11:29 p.m. on Aug. 23.

[2] Secretary Dulles would be in Manila for the signing of a Southeast Asia collective defense treaty. Documentation on the Manila Conference, Sept. 6–8, is presented in volume XII.

740.5/8-2454 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

TOP SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, August 24, 1954—2 p. m.

747. I saw Mendes-France this morning at 10 o'clock and talked with him for over an hour. He was very serious and seemed somewhat depressed. He started the conversation by outlining his views in retrospect of what had happened at Brussels. He said it was obvious to him now that the other 5 EDC countries had a feeling of distrust toward France and toward his government that was far deeper than anything he had realized before. This, he felt, was fundamentally the cause of the failure at Brussels. He said that this distrust was apparently based on irritation felt by the other countries because of France's long delay in giving her answer on EDC, and because of the action of the previous French Governments in continually making new demands, and after these demands had been satisfied, not taking any action. He said the

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, and Rome.

representatives of the 5 countries at Brussels could not seem to realize that his government was really different from previous French Governments in that it was prepared to take action. The second reason for the failure at Brussels, he thought, was the fact that the other 5 countries all along considered that he was merely bargaining, and that in the end he would give in and accept their position. He said he had made his own position and problem quite clear on the first day of the conference, but that no one had believed him and that when the conference finally broke up early Sunday morning, both Spaak and Adenauer expressed surprise that he had not finally given in. He commented that maybe he should have asked for a great deal more in order to get what he really needed, but that that was not his way of conducting negotiations. He then said that the third difficulty at Brussels was the attitude of Adenauer which he felt to be completely incomprehensible. He said, Adenauer refused to see him for 4 days. In Mendes eyes, this was a personal insult which it was impossible for him to understand. He said that he understood that Bruce had finally persuaded Adenauer that he must see Mendes, and that that was the reason for the meeting at the end of the conference.[2] Mendes said that he overcame his personal feelings in the interest of the general good, and talked with Adenauer at length. He felt that this talk was good psychologically, and that in the public mind it repaired some of the damage done by Adenauer's previous refusal to talk with him. He said that this refusal of Adenauer's to talk frankly with him was a proof of the depth of German misunderstanding of his government and, as such, indicated clearly one of the reasons for the failure of the Brussels conference. Mendes then said that during the negotiations at Brussels, the 5 other countries stuck together at all times and that never once, even on a most unimportant issue, did he find himself supported by a single one of the 5. He said that this solid bloc of 5 against 1 obviously made negotiation and compromise impossible.

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[2] In telegram Coled 24 from Paris, Aug. 22, Bruce had reported that "Hallstein insisted Tomlinson had to stop on way to station [at Brussels] to receive hurried report on talk between Chancellor and Mendes-France to send urgently to the Secretary." Hallstein had said that Mendès-France insisted his call be a personal one and had put on a "most charming and accomplished performance" for Adenauer. Mendès-France had introduced himself and told about himself and his views emphasizing his belief in the need for Franco-German accord and harmony. He had then explained the post-war situation in France, placing emphasis upon the difficulties arising from the psychological attitude of inferiority of the French people engendered by the war and occupation. Questions of the Saar and Moselle Canal did not arise, but Mendès-France expressed interest when Adenauer suggested that French agriculturalists might sell wheat in Germany. "Chancellor asked Mendes which suggestion in his protocol was most important to him. Mendes replied that veto in commissariat was essential feature of his protocol. Hallstein intervened to ask if Mendes really wished Germany with an army of 12 divisions and substantial reserves to have a veto over any action of commissariat. In ensuing discussion Mendes avoided answering." At the close of the conversation, Mendès-France had stated that the major purpose of his visit to Churchill was to see what could be done about restoring political sovereignty to the Federal Republic. (740.5/8–2254)

Mendes then said that he felt that the U.S. may have been misinformed regarding the situation in the French Parliament. He referred to his conversation with Tomlinson.[3] He said that Tomlinson had told him that not more than 30 Socialists would vote against the EDC Mendes said this was in error as in the last 2 weeks 49 Socialists had signed a written pledge to vote against the EDC or any variant thereof. Mendes also said that Tomlinson told him that Bourges-Maunoury would resign as a result of Mendes attitude in Brussels. Mendes said he had spoken to Bourges-Maunoury and he had no intention of resigning and that this indicated that the information Tomlinson was passing on to Washington was erroneous, and may have caused serious misunderstanding of the French position.

Mendes then said that the concessions which the 5 countries had offered to him were nil. When I objected to this characterization of the Spaak declaration, Mendes said that he would like to explain what he meant by saying the concessions offered were nil. He said that there was a large bloc of votes in the Assembly in favor of EDC, but definitely no majority. There was also a large bloc of votes against any German rearmament. In addition, there were approximately 80 Deputies who were willing to accept some form of German rearmament but who were publicly committed against EDC as it is. Mendes said these were the only Deputies that he ever had in mind on whom he was working. They had taken public positions and needed a real excuse to change their vote. In Mendes's view, the concessions offered by the other 5 countries did not have enough political impact to effect any substantial number of these Deputies, hence Mendes said he could not accept what was offered.

Mendes then said that the EDC debate would take place as scheduled. He expected that it would last 3 days and be finished on Monday, the thirtieth. During the debate, he said that he would (1) explain what had happened at Brussels, (2) announce that France was in favor of granting sovereignty to the German Federal Republic, (3) announce that France would keep in close contact with the 5 EDC powers and the United States and the United Kingdom in order to work out the means of obtaining a German contribution to the defense of the West, (4) make the Deputies realize that the defeat of EDC would give the government authorization to proceed with (2) and (3) above. He was not clear as to just what parliamentary device would be necessary to obtain this authorization but he said he would obtain it. He then said that he expected that the Parliament would vote against EDC. He said there was no possibility of posing the question of confidence as that required prior agreement of the Cabinet and that the Cabinet would not be able reach agreement on the question of confidence in any form. He then said that this posed an embarrassing situation for him as the members of the government would then have to decide how they would vote. He said that he felt that it would be embarrassing and a sign of weakness to have some Cabinet Ministers vote for the EDC and some vote against it, and he said that he had always publicly opposed such action by any government. However, he said that Poincare, whom he considered the greatest French Premier in recent times had allowed his governments to do this very thing on 2 occasions, so maybe this was what he would be forced to do. Another solution which he did not feel was very serious but which nevertheless was still a possibility would be to have all the Cabinet Ministers resign except himself. This would leave them free to speak and vote their own convictions during the debate.

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[3] Reference is to Tomlinson–Mendès-France discussion on the night of Aug. 20 reported on in telegram 169 from Brussels, Aug. 22, p. 1064.

Mendes then said that if the EDC should be rejected, the 6 countries and the United States and the United Kingdom must move very promptly, within the next 2 months or less, to reach an agreement on German rearmament. The type of agreement he visualized was a short 2 or 3 page agreement that could be understood by everyone. According to Mendes, there should not be any more 120 page treaties which no one could understand. The 2 possibilities, as he saw them, were (1) direct German entry into NATO. Mendes said that he felt that this was unlikely to be accepted in France, (2) and the most likely, the creation of a loose 7-power military agreement including the 6 countries and the UK. This agreement would have no discriminations against Germany and would have no supranational features as the British would not accept any supranationality. This seventeen power group would be, as Mendes described it, a little box in the big NATO frame. He felt that because of the tie-up with England this would be a way of getting the French Parliament and people to accept German entry into NATO.

Mendes finished his remarks by saying that he had felt very much upset and distressed by certain misunderstandings between himself and the Secretary. He said that Bruce and/or Alger reported to him that the Secretary thought that he had stated in the conference that the US was supporting the French proposals and also that he had stated that the US had stirred up the opposition to his proposals in the Benelux countries and Germany. Mendes said that what he had said regarding the first item was the following: "My guess is that if we six countries agree to something here at Brussels, the US will accept and approve it. The responsibility and the decision is ours." He said that whenever implied that the US accepted and agreed with his proposals as in fact that he well knew that we did not approve of or like them. He then denied categorically that he had ever made any statement that the US had stirred up any other countries to oppose the French proposals. He said that these misunderstandings made him realize the great difficulty of carrying on international negotiations and relations; what he asked, he said, was to be understood and trusted when he gave his word. He said that he could accept criticisms and differences of opinion which he recognized were inevitable, but lack of trust was very difficult for him to understand. He then finished his remarks by repeating his opening thesis that lack of trust on the part of the other five countries have caused the breakdown at Brussels, and said that if he had been understood and helped, he felt that something might have been worked out.

I then told Mendes that I would like to make a few remarks.

In the first place, regarding the French Parliamentary situation on EDC, I said that I had accepted his analysis of the original situation and that the Embassy had agreed with him that in order to pass EDC it was necessary to make some changes, which would attract 30 or 40 anti-EDC votes from the group of possibly 80 which he had said were subject to persuasion. I told him that I felt that the Department had accepted these views which had been reported by the Embassy and that there had been no misunderstanding as to the political situation. However, I told him that we had heard that if his protocol as drafted had been accepted, the pro-EDC Socialists would have voted against ratification and so have brought about the defeat of the treaty. Therefore, we had hoped that he would have reached agreement in Brussels on a compromise similar to the Spaak proposal that would have retained the Socialist vote and at the same time attracted the votes necessary for ratification. Mendes said that he had never seriously considered the possibility that the pro-EDC Socialists or the MRP could vote against the treaty as they could not take the position of being more royalist than the King. In other words, they would have had to accept anything which Spaak, in particular, and the other five EDC countries had accepted at Brussels. He said he recognized that they might have made speeches during the debate indicating their disappointment with the results at Brussels but that when it came down to a question of vote, they simply could not have voted against the solution accepted by the other five countries.

I then said that I had been very depressed and distressed during the course of the Brussels Conference to observe the isolation of France. The spectacle of France, which three years ago had been the intellectual and moral leader in Europe, finding herself in complete isolation had been very upsetting to me. I said that because of my affection for France and for the good of the West and world, I hoped that this would not continue. I then pointed out that a vote by the French Assembly against the EDC, even though it would represent an answer, could scarcely be expected to encourage the other countries of Europe to work with France. In fact, I was sure that such a vote would only increase the distrust and suspicion which had been so manifest at Brussels. I said that I was sure that the Secretary and the President would share these feelings of regret for the isolation of France. I then said that, speaking strictly personally, I would like to say something else. I then told Mendes that in my opinion the failure of Europe to get together would naturally strengthen the feelings of that section of American opinion which was beginning to lose confidence in Europe. This I told Mendes would tend to weaken the Western alliance and thereby would increase the danger of an eventual collision between the East and the West. Only through strength did I feel that we could maintain peace in the world and anything which tended to dissipate that strength would tend to work against the maintenance of peace. Mendes replied that he recognized that this was true and that this was why he felt that it was so important to maintain the unity of the western powers no matter what happened in the EDC debate.

I closed by asking Mendes what he planned to do regarding filling vacancies in his Cabinet. He answered by saying that this depended on whether he faced the Parliament alone during the debate or whether the government as a whole stayed together during the debate. In the former case, he would obviously have to remake his government immediately after the close of the debate. In the latter case, he proposed to let tempers die down for a couple of weeks before he attempted to fill the vacancies. He said that immediately after the close of the debate he hoped that the Parliament would adjourn and that he then intended to take a vacation of a week or two in the south of France. This statement brought up the question of representation at the SEATO conference,[4] and Mendes said that he intended to ask LaChambre to represent France in the Philippines, assisted by Chauvel.

Mendes said practically nothing about his conversation with Churchill except to say that he had given him very much the same information as he gave me. He made no comment as to what the

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[4] Documentation on the Manila Conference, Sept. 6–8, which resulted in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, is presented in volume XII.

British had said. It appears to me that Churchill and Eden must have stood entirely firm behind the EDC.

DILLON

740.5/8-2454

Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, August 24, 1954.

[MY DEAR FOSTER:] The visit passed off as follows. The first thing Mendes-France said, and we affirmed, was that he was absolutely sure that the Chamber would not agree to E.D.C., but were also determined that the matter should be debated. The French Cabinet were resolved to have a free vote. They would certainly be beaten but not probably by enough to have an election. Mendes-France seemed much hurt that everybody should have voted against France at Brussels. We made the obvious reply.

2. I was surprised to find that Mendes-France was himself much keener about N.A.T.O. I suppose it is because of the deep feeling in France that in E.D.C. they will be bound up in civil and military affairs with the much more active and powerful Western Germany, whereas in the N.A.T.O. system the United Kingdom and the United States of America counter-balance Germany to her proper proportions. He furnished no solution about how to persuade Germany to make some substitute for the E.D.C. safeguards. We told him that France would never get so good a bargain with Germany as they had got in E.D.C. He did not contradict this but pleaded helplessness. I was very sorry for him but gave him no comfort and pointed out that we should not agree to be governed by the impotence of the French Chamber. I was pleased at his attitude towards Adenauer and Germany.

3. Anthony who was with me for the three out of our four hour talk was in full agreement though we had no chance of talking things over beforehand. He said he would send you a fuller account from the Foreign Office.[2]

4. Thank you very much for your message just received. I think that there is nothing that can be done before the impending debate in the Chamber and there will be time enough for our discussion after that result is known and you have finished your Manila expedition. I am now handing back to Anthony and wishing you all luck.

Kindest regards,

WINSTON

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[1] The source text was transmitted in telegram Edcol 13 to Paris, Aug. 24, with the explanation that the message from Churchill had been received in Washington that day. Also transmitted in Edcol 13 was Eden's message to Dulles (*infra*) with a similar explanation.

[2] See message from Eden to Dulles, Aug. 24, *infra*.

740.5/8–2454

Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State[1]

TOP SECRET LONDON, August 24, 1954.

At our meeting with Mendes-France today the Prime Minister and I impressed upon him with all the force at our command the grave dangers which France and the whole Western world would incur if the French Assembly refused to ratify the E.D.C. Treaty. The Brussels Conference had shown that France was isolated from her European partners and she would be altogether isolated if the French Chamber continued to refuse a decision on the German Defence contribution. We urged Mendes-France strongly to put all his authority behind the E.D.C. treaty with the Spaak interpretations as much the best solution for France. He said he would put this issue to the vote next week, but he was quite definite that it would be rejected and that his Cabinet would not agree to make the vote a question of confidence. He agreed however that the attempt must be made, although the strength of his advocacy is uncertain.

2. We urged Mendes-France to make it clear to the Assembly that, if they rejected the E.D.C. some other solution of the German problem must be found, with or without France, without delay. He did not dissent and was ready to consider German entry into N.A.T.O., with or without some smaller grouping within N.A.T.O. He said he was ready as a first step to give Germany her political sovereignty without any delay and to announce this in the debate. A simple solution to the problem of German rearmament must then be found within two months. We warned him of the difficulties of finding and bringing into force any such solution which Germany and everyone else concerned could accept in so short a time. We concluded on the note that he must try to persuade France to accept the E.D.C. as much the best way out but that if this were impossible the Germans must receive their political equality immediately and be included within some acceptable defence framework, preferably N.A.T.O. very shortly thereafter. We impressed upon him in particular that we intended to work in close agreement with the United States Government and that we had a debt of honour to Adenauer and those European countries who had ratified the E.D.C.

3. Mendes-France argued strongly against a meeting of U.S., U.K., Germany and Benelux. Though we did not tell Mendes-France so we

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[1] Source text was transmitted to Paris in telegram Edcol 13, Aug. 24, with the explanation that it had been received in Washington that day. Also transmitted in Edcol 13 was Churchill's message to Dulles (*supra*) with a similar explanation.

also see difficulties about such a meeting and think that the other countries concerned must be expected to do so. In any event, nothing of the kind can take place until after the French vote next week. We are giving urgent thought to some alternative procedure which would meet your objective and I will telegraph to you again very soon.

4. Meanwhile a fuller account of today's proceedings is being given to U.S. Embassy here.[2]

[EDEN]

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[2] In telegram 785 from Paris, Aug. 25, Dillon reported *inter alia* that at a joint briefing that morning Mendès-France had given the clear impression that his talk with Churchill had prepared the way for an alternative solution in event the EDC was defeated. "Opponents of treaty consider that this has greatly strengthened their hand. There is also considerable press speculation that if and when EDC is defeated it will be possible to agree in relatively short time, and with British participation, on a seven-nation formula involving military pact within NATO framework." Dillon suggested that if such innuendos were to be effectively countered, high level protestations by the United Kingdom of their endorsement of EDC would not be enough. "What would be required is clarification that if EDC fails, Great Britain will move in concert with US for creation of German National Army." Otherwise, Dillon stated, "erroneous impression will persist here that there is easy way out" of the EDC crisis. (740.5/8–2554)

740.5/8–2654 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 26, 1954—2 a. m.

Coled 29. Limit distribution. Thorough canvass of the political leaders who are pro-EDC and will have to carry the burden of the debate shows them unanimous in view that Mendes-France is doing and will do his utmost to defeat the EDC Treaty. Accordingly, they are convinced they will be unable to obtain a favorable vote after the forthcoming discussions in the national assembly even with such amendments added as wld not require resubmission to the other parliaments.

There remains one possibility of which I strongly advocate the adoption. I am assured it wld have the full support of Adenauer. It has been discussed with no one else since unless the American and Brit Govts shld be in agreement, it might be inadvisable to propose it, and also the dangers of a leak as to this intention might well prove fatal to its implementation. The great advantage of this proposal is that it wld strike at the weakest point in Mendes-France's armour, namely, his great fear that the French public and French Parliamentarians will become aware of his Country's isolated position vis-à-vis its partners. If the United Front displayed by the five at Brussels were reinforced at such a mtg by the presence of U.S. and U.K. Govt Representatives the consequences of French isolation wld, in my opinion, be effectively dramatized.

Therefore, I suggest that if you shld be favorable to this suggestion, and if the president consents to it, you at once consult the Brit Govt, seek its cooperation, request Pres Eisenhower to communicate by telephone with Sir Winston, and dispatch the foll joint message in the personal names of the president and prime minister:

Begin Text. Message from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the U.K. to Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, president of the Brussels conference.

We have studied the communiqué of the six ministers of foreign affairs of the states parties to the EDC Treaty, as well as the two accompanying documents, namely, the proposed French protocol and the draft declaration approved by the ministers of the other five states.

We have noted with satisfaction that the communiqué of the Brussels Conference reaffirms the agreement of the six ministers upon the fundamental principles of European policy.

A comparison of the two documents indicates to us that agreement was nearly reached on a number of points at issue during the conference.

The decision that the French govt is called upon to take on the ratification of the EDC Treaty is of capital importance, not only for the signatory states, but also for the whole free world, its security, its liberty, and the maintenance of peace.

We are convinced that governments adhering to the same fundamental principles shld make a final effort to reach agreement. We suggest that the six governments shld meet again in order to reach an understanding on the application of the EDC Treaty. This is particularly important, since the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, after exhaustive examination, have been unable to discover any practicable and desirable alternative to the principles of the treaty.

We are prepared, if agreeable to you, to designate our personal representatives to attend such a conference, which cld be held in Paris on Monday, August 30, which might postpone for a few days the scheduled sovereign decision of the French Parliament.

We are informing each of the signatory governments of this message. *End Text.*

It wld be essential, if this is to be done, that the message be transmitted so that receipt wld be had by other governments not later than noon Friday, since assembly debate commences Saturday. It is most unlikely that Mendes wld refuse it. I am confident I can answer for the other countries concerned. Since it is already after midnight, I have not had a chance to clear this with Ambassador Dillon but will inform him of it the first thing tomorrow and ask him to make his comments directly to you.[1]

BRUCE

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[1] The source text was preceded by telegram Coled 28 from Paris, Aug. 26 from Bruce which reads as follows: "Hold your hat and read immediately following telegram. Believe it our only chance, and we might win on it. If recommendation accepted, requires swift and decisive action" (740.5/8-2654). Dillon supported the recommendations contained in the source text in telegram 792 from Paris, Aug. 26 (740.5/8-2654), and Hughes recommended adoption of the program outlined in the source text in telegram Polto 279 from Paris, Aug. 26 (740.5/8-2654). Acting Secretary Smith transmitted the source text to President Eisenhower at the summer White House in Denver, Colorado, on Aug. 26 via White House facilities. Smith had received and noted for the President Dillon's support, but did not mention Hughes' favorable recommendation. Smith then added: "While we see merit in views set forth above, there are also rather cogent considerations on other side. Since British attitude matter greatest importance to success of move, we are immediately sounding them out informally before recommending whether you should approach Churchill." Smith then suggested deletion of the third paragraph of Bruce's letter and changes in the fourth through sixth, if the approach was to be supported. (740.5/8-2654). In telegram Edcol 15 to Paris, Aug. 26, Smith informed Bruce and Dillon that telegrams Coled 29 and 792 were receiving urgent consideration and reiterated the reservations and recommendations that he had submitted to President Eisenhower (740.5/8-2654).

740.5/8-2654 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

TOP SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 26, 1954—8:32 p. m.

Edcol 16. Eyes only Bruce and Dillon. Following is paraphrase Eden's message today [2] re suggestion Coled 29: [3]

Begin paraphrase. Please tell Acting Secretary that Churchill and I do not believe proposal would attain objective Bruce and Dillon have in mind. Briefly our reasons are as follows:

1. Eight-power meeting of this kind would be useful only if Americans or we had some new proposal to place before it. As far as we are aware, no such proposal exists and even if it did exist, it would only serve as encouragement to French to shy away from EDC.
2. Brussels Conference clearly revealed limits within which five EDC powers on one hand, or French on other, could compromise to get EDC through. We perceive no advantage in repetition of Brussels Conference, adding representatives of UK and US.

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[1] Drafted by Palmer. Cleared in substance with Merchant and Kitchen, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat.

[2] In telegram 705 to Paris sent at 7:08 p. m. on Aug. 26, Acting Secretary Smith reported that he had just received through the British Embassy in Washington "strongly negative reaction of Prime Minister and Eden to proposal contained Coled 29. I had myself inclined to believing this worth the try and the President had indicated willingness to go forward provided, however, that British went along with us shoulder to shoulder. In light negative British reaction I am now informing President project dropped." (740.5/8-2654)

[3] *Supra.*

3. Object of exercise stated to be to bring home to waverers French isolation. As result Brussels Conference and statement issued London today, however, this must be crystal clear. There can be no doubt in mind any waverer about US attitude. This should be made clear by our representatives in Paris.

4. We also perceive danger that isolation argument may boomerang. Many Frenchmen, including some who support Treaty, are arguing already that if EDC means France to be placed in minority of one and bullied, as at Brussels, before Treaty even signed, she had better avoid membership in Community at all. If Brussels Conference repeated with US and UK participation, reactions of this kind will become more strong and widespread.

5. Surely overriding consideration must be to avoid giving French any further excuse for delay and avoid driving Germans to exasperation. At least, both sides in Assembly are now agreed on necessity for decision. Even this agreement may disappear and Assembly recess if we provide such a good reason for further delay. Also, if arguments set forth above in paragraphs 1 and 2 are valid, basic position would not be changed in any way by conference and decision which Assembly faces would be same as now.

6. Further risk exists that such an obvious effort to interfere with the French Parliamentary program may only incur resentment and receive strong rebuff. Remaining chances of favorable vote and of agreement on acceptable alternative if vote unfavorable would be prejudiced by such reaction. *End paraphrase.*

SMITH

740.5/8–2754 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France [1]

SECRET NIACT WASHINGTON, August 27, 1954—1:32 p.m.

1139. For Bruce and Dillon. Tell Eden we are pleased note Foreign Office guidance on EDC (London's 1013).[2] We hope this helpful line will counter impression Mendes-France appears to be trying to create that UK will support Little NATO with discriminatory provisions toward Germany, but we are disturbed at continued reports such as those contained Paris' 808 to Department[3] (repeated unnumbered to London) that impression British support still remains.

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[1] Drafted by Palmer, initialed for the Acting Secretary by Merchant. Repeated to Paris and Bonn.

[2] Not printed; it reported that, as a result of a suggestion made in a conversation on Aug. 26 with Roberts of the Foreign Office, the Aug. 27 morning edition of the London *Times* contained an article by its diplomatic correspondent which read, in part, "Official circles in London were insistent yesterday that no British proposals for an alternative to the European Defense Community were discussed with the French Prime Minister during the Chartwell talks on Monday." (740.5/8–2754)

It seems important both in situation we now face and that which we may face after French Assembly vote that we make clear now:

1. There is no prospect for any solution involving discrimination against Germany and that this was made clear to Mendes-France at Chartwell.
2. There is complete accord between US and UK in support of EDC as best solution.

We strongly hope that if impression persists that British would support solution in conflict with foregoing, Churchill or Eden will consider issuing first-person statement before or during debate making clear two points enumerated above.[4]

Smith

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[3] Not printed; it reported that certain French and British officials believed a plan set forth by Antoine Pinay for a probationary period for the EDC was receiving favorable reaction among other Europeans, but that Pinay was concerned that Mendès-France's planned strategy was to allow the Assembly to vote down the EDC Treaty, to then work for implementation of the 1952 Bonn agreements regarding Contractual Relations between the Federal Republic and other Western Powers, while simultaneously proposing an alternate solution to EDC. (740.5/8-2654)

[4] In telegram 708 to Paris, Aug. 26, Acting Secretary Smith conveyed the text of a statement released that day by the Foreign Office in London to counteract press speculation regarding the position of the United Kingdom on the EDC. The statement categorically denied that U.K. proposals for an alternative to EDC were discussed with Mendès-France at the Chartwell meeting on Aug. 23, and added: "Her Majesty's Government remains firmly convinced that the EDC Treaty with the accompanying treaties and agreements pledging the support and intimate cooperation of the UK and the US provide much the best method for securing a German defense contribution and give France greater assurances and stronger guarantees than she could obtain under any other arrangement" (740.5/8-2654). In telegram 813 from Paris, Aug. 27, Dillon reported that the official French news agency, AFP, appeared to have suppressed the Foreign Office statement, and added that Paul Reynaud asserted that this represented positive proof of the intention of Mendès-France "to kill what little hope remains at this point for EDC" (740.5/8-2754).

740.5/8-2754 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, August 27, 1954—11 p. m.

832. EDC developments this afternoon and evening.

1. Cabinet has decided not to oppose motion adjourning debate until September 15 and calling upon government to resume negotiations re modification or interpretation of treaty. Communiqué issued after Council of Ministers was vague and spoke only of Cabinet unanimity and willingness to "associate itself wholeheartedly with

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, and Rome.

anything that would allow conciliation" between proponents and opponents of treaty. However, Cabinet meeting preceding decision was quite dramatic.

2. Strategy meeting of pro-EDC elements in Assembly had disclosed their growing cohesion and determination to block any alternative policy which Mendes might propose. Group led by Schuman, Rene Mayer, Pinay and Reynaud had decided to introduce motion for adjournment of debate and resumption of negotiations in the light of Spaak proposals and London Tementi of UK support for alternatives.

3. Assembly sources agree that Mendes would probably have been able to defeat such motion if, as he originally contemplated, he put question of confidence against it. However, he would only have succeeded by accepting Communist support which in this case would have been decisive in allowing him to stay in office. This would have resulted in additional doubts about his long-range intentions and would have greatly decreased his prestige and action potential.

4. Most important, three pro-EDC Ministers led by Bourges-Maunoury offered their resignations at beginning of meeting and persisted in decision despite all of Mendes persuasive powers. According to Ulver (Social Republican Cabinet member) whom we consulted this evening, radical Berthoin brought Ministers back after meeting had already been terminated and got them to agree on formula that appears to save Mendes' face because it does not disavow his Brussels' negotiating position.

5. What Cabinet seems to have agreed upon, although information is not yet completely clear, is that it would not oppose adjournment motion provided it instructed government to resume negotiations "on basis of proposals Mendes put forward at Brussels". Since he is expected to negotiate, there is clear implication however that this time he would not cling intransigently to that position. Much now depends upon actual wording of motion.

6. Assembly pro-EDC leaders met later tonight with the three pro-EDC Ministers (Bourges, [Claudius]-Petit and Hugues) and appear to have agreed on simple text of motion which would not spell out Spaak proposals, Pinay formula [2] and other elements of compromise by which Premier is supposed to be guided. However, it seems clear that critical battle may occur over wording of motion.

7. Cabinet has made no decision re confidence question but if it is possible Mendes may seek to put it against any language implying outright disavowal of his Brussels' position. On other hand Ulver told us anti-EDC Cabinet members will quit if Mendes compromises on his original demands re French right to withdraw from EDC and suspension of supra-national feature for long period. Battle is likely to commence Sunday.

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[2] See footnote 3, *supra*.

8. Situation is thus considerably improved over yesterday but now that Mendes has decided to roll with the punch everything depends upon whether he will seek to divide pro-EDC forces by seeking rigid instructions re his negotiating position or whether he will make sincere attempt to compromise even at expense of losing several anti-EDC Cabinet members. On this crucial question no recent evidence is yet available.

DILLON

Bruce Mission files, lot 57 M 38, "French Ratification August 1"

Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared by the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS, August 27, 1954.

Participants: Henri Ulver, Secretary of State for Budget;
William M. Gibson, First Secretary of Embassy;
Martin F. Herz, Second Secretary of Embassy.

Ulver gave the scenario of today's cabinet meeting as follows: First Bourgès-Maunoury, Hugues and Claudius-Petit offered their resignations and insisted upon maintaining their decision despite all the persuasive powers of Mendès-France. Next, the Council of Ministers was formally terminated and Coty left the meeting. So did Ulver. But as Mendès-France was leaving the room, Berthoin (Radical) implored him to make one last effort. So the meeting was resumed. (Ulver was thus no longer there and all that follows is second-hand.) After much heated discussion, it was agreed that the three would withdraw their resignations and that they would enter negotiations with the pro-EDC "camp" in order that the expected motion of adjournment would include a statement to the effect that the French Government would, at a new conference, take as a point of departure the self-same proposals that Mendès-France had defended at Brussels.

Then there was, according to Ulver's information, a discussion of possible amendments to the instruction to Mendès-France to defend his Brussels proposals at a new conference. The anti-EDC group insisted that he must not only stick to his Brussels position, but it must be the position he took "at the beginning of the Brussels conference." They insisted that they would on their part resign if Mendès accepted any modifications to the amended motion of adjournment. But it appears to have been left rather vague whether the motion might imply his departing from his original position in the course of the negotiations—for, after all, he is supposed to negotiate. But according to Ulver there was agreement that Mendès would not put the confidence question and that the cabinet, moreover, would be neutral in any vote on the Moch report.

The rest of the conversation was not about today's cabinet meeting, but it was interesting for it gives an indication of the position of a "moderate" Gaullist cabinet member. Ulver said the two most objectionable features of the treaty, and the two most galling disappointments of the Brussels conference, relate to France's inability to withdraw in the event of German unification and "the supranational element." On the first point, he would not accept the explanation that the Germans do not want to have a right of withdrawal: He claimed that that right was clearly confirmed at the Berlin Conference and France should have the same right to the same extent. Discussion of the supranationality question revealed two things: Ulver is in favor of controlled German rearmament and opposes outright entry into NATO, but he will accept a formula without any effective control as long as Britain is a party to such a combination. He claimed that all but 150 of the 627 deputies feel the same way: They will accept anything, even if it involves no controls, as long as the British are a party to it.

Regarding the ratification of the treaty as it stands (or insufficiently amended) he did for us a "pointage" to prove that it can "never, never, never pass—tell this to your government: never, never, never": 100 Communists, 50 Socialists, 12 UDSR, 29 Radicals, 4 MRP, 30 Independents and Peasants, 15 ARS, 66 Social Republicans and 6 unaffiliated deputies would vote against it, making a grand total of 312. On the other hand, if Britain would come into a loose confederation controlling Germany—or even not controlling Germany—the picture would be changed with one stroke. He would not hear of our argument that there are at least some "Europeans" who sincerely believe in the necessity of effective controls and sincerely believe supranationality to be the only effective means of providing them. But he listened with interest when we said that the US would much prefer controlled German rearmament but will have to resort to uncontrolled German rearmament if EDC fails.

This brought us to the climax of this friendly but very serious interview: Ulver was easily convinced that there already is tremendous pressure in the US to get Germany into NATO and override any French objections to German rearmament. But he refused to believe that in the event France did object, the US would withdraw from the Continent. After all, the Continent has too large an industrial capacity. ("It would of course have to be destroyed in the case of war," we replied. "But it is very much dispersed," he rejoined. "C'est là le drame" we retorted.) Then he took another tack: If the US and France should come to a parting of the ways, would this not lead to a *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia? We said there are already some who think that Mendès knowingly has decided to take that risk. But Ulver came strongly to Mendès' defense: The Prime Minister, he said, is sincerely opposed to any reversal of alliances. There seemed no doubt that Mendès had completely convinced Ulver on that score at the many cabinet meetings he had attended.

Many strictures about Adenauer and the Brussels conference. Mendès-France was "insulted" by Adenauer when the Chancellor refused to see him at the beginning of the conference. As the younger of the two, the Prime Minister had even offered to visit the Chancellor at his hotel, an unthinkable thing only ten years after the war. Adenauer had made no effort at conciliation. And the solidarity of the other five had repelled ("physiquement dégouté") Mendès so that he returned from Brussels with the conviction that in EDC France would stand alone against all the others. Our reply that the others would stand equally with France against Germany if the latter violated the supranational principle of EDC did not convince him. Nor did our argument that the Chancellor must have declined to see Mendès at the beginning because he did not wish to be the first one to say no. Ulver just said that if Mendès-France is now convinced that France must have Britain on her side in any dealings regarding Germany, it is the behavior of the five at Brussels that is to blame for it.

740.5/8-2754 : Telegram

The United States Observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community (Bruce) to the Department of State

SECRET NIACT PARIS, August 27, 1954—10 p. m.

Coled 30. Limited distribution. If conference such as contemplated Coled 29 [1] is called and this time by French, and question of U.S. and U.K. attendance is raised have I authorization to say U.S. will accept? Your reply is urgent and I trust will be favorable. Interesting developments are in course.

Another but related subject for General Smith the crystal clarity of the British position as regards the French is like the beaver kill after torrential rains. As you know fishing in troubled waters is not easy and I need a little discretion which I would not abuse about matter mentioned in first paragraph.[2]

BRUCE

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[1] Dated Aug. 26, p. 1079.

[2] In telegram Edcol 18 to Paris, Aug. 27, sent also to London, Bruce and Dillon were informed that "If movement develops in Assembly to call conference such as contemplated Coled 29, Bruce authorized in his discretion to convey appropriate assurances that despite resultant delay in vote, US would look on such conference with sympathy" and would, if invited, accept. The Embassy in the United Kingdom was instructed to inform Eden of this possibility "and urge British concurrence foregoing. Department leaves it to Bruce in his discretion to stimulate receptivity other EDC powers. Department repeating Coled 30 to London" (740.5/8-2754).

Editorial Note

Debate on the EDC began in the French Assembly on the afternoon of August 28 "with Jules Moch's Report hostile to Treaty. All benches and public galleries completely filled and atmosphere tense" (telegram 851 from Paris, August 28, 740.5/8-2854). Mendès-France spoke at length on August 29, and the substance of his remarks was transmitted to the Department in telegrams 856, 857, and 860 from Paris, printed *infra*, pages 1090 and 1091. The Treaty was effectively voted down on August 30 over a procedural question by a final tally of 319 to 264 (telegram 893 from Paris, page 1092).

740.5/8-2954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRIORITY PARIS, August 29, 1954—4 p. m.

856. Part I. High point of Mendes-France speech[2] so far was assertion other five at Brussels were right when they enumerated past concessions to France and insisted time had come for decision one way or another. Tremendous applause greeting this remark, and his protestations re French reasonableness and intransigence of others, left no doubt that if Mendes does not endorse the move for new negotiations he has capability of getting Assembly to reject EDC while placing blame on unreasonable inflexibility of France's partners.

Mendes was equally successful in placing blame for this inflexibility in turn on his predecessors: "I told them (in Brussels) that these proposals of mine were the last ones and that if they were accepted they would have immediate reply because Parliament would be seized on August 28. They asked me if I was sure France would accept. I replied that I thought so and that I would make every effort, that I would put confidence question and that Parliament would ratify if I brought (their) agreement. And they replied, that is what we have been told by all your predecessors." Strong applause of his investiture majority once more greeted reference to Adenauer's post-Brussels statement that "for first time" he had learned of preoccupations of French Parliament re EDC.

Following is summary Mendes principal points re negotiations on his Brussels protocol:

1. Discussion of preamble already showed French were up against stonewall. In itself unimportant (anodin), it would have had symbolic value but in face of opposition he gave in and withdrew text.

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[1] Repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, and Bonn.

[2] See editorial note, *supra*.

2. Status of protocols on other hand was question of principle. Political value of simple declaration cannot be minimized but since treaty is for long duration juridical value is essential for governments change and declaration could not be appealed to court. Moreover, 1953 resolution of Bundestag that protocols not binding unless ratified underlined questionable value of both 1953 and 1954 protocols unless their legal value confirmed. Brussels five however would not even agree to having new protocols signed and persisted in offering only joint declaration.

3. Re relationship EDC and NATO, the formulas offered by Brussels five (Mendes once spoke of "our opponents" and quickly corrected himself, "I mean, our partners") merely spoke of cooperation between EDC and NATO which is obvious.

4. Re right to withdraw France obtained agreement (though again only in context of declaration) for contingency of Atlantic Pact coming to end. For contingency of substantial diminution US and UK forces on continent, he could obtain acceptance only with requirement for unanimity among EDC countries, and of course again only in context of declaration. (Mendes stressed he did not believe present US administration intended withdraw troops after EDC comes into effect but there are "certain quarters" in US which view European unity as means of reducing US manpower commitments.)

Considerable weight was put by Mendes on question withdrawal in the event of German reunification, and we are left with impression he managed to convince not only EDC opponents and undecided deputies but also some proponents. Argumentation was as follows: After Bidault, Eden and Dulles statement at Berlin that unified Germany would not be bound by EDC treaty, conclusion to opposite effect by Robert Schuman and *Rapporteur* Gaborit has less value, and even vote by Assembly in contrary sense would have little value particularly since Federal Republic Government did not take exception to Berlin statement at time when it was made. If Germany is free to withdraw in event of unification, it could obtain additional commitments or modifications of treaty in return for its consent to stay.

Since Brussels five opposed French proposal that all EDC members should be free to withdraw in event of German unification, Mendes continued, he proposed "compromise" that it should be specified none of participants could withdraw. Spaak's counter-proposal, "which must be given credit for cleverness," to the effect that general right of withdrawal should exist to the extent that Germany possesses such right, has two weaknesses: (*a*) France would only have right to withdraw from an already truncated EDC after Germany has made use of a right that would be hers alone; and (*b*) question of German right of withdrawal would be left undecided, which is undesirable for it would have to be settled at time of unification, which will quite possibly be time of crisis, and at time when German interpretation of whether or not it has right to withdraw is likely to prevail. Consequently if Germany wants to remain she can prevent others from leaving, but if she cites Berlin declarations and wants to leave one will not be able to prevent it. France on other hand has no similar right to determine whether she wishes to stay or leave.

DILLON

740.5/8–2954 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State[1]

OFFICIAL USE ONLY PRIORITY PARIS, August 29, 1954—5 p. m.

857. Part II. 5. Supranationality. After good exposition of importance of supranationality principle if there is to be effective control, and equally good exposition of objections of its opponents, Mendes spent some time minimizing effect of his Brussels demands: He had accepted recourse to court to decide what are vital interests. He did not believe unanimity provision for first eight years or so would paralyze EDC because many decisions would be taken on level lower than Commissariat and most important ones would be taken by NATO. But if France is to make commitment of such magnitude (as EDC) there must be assurances that her interests would not be "stamped underfoot" or sacrificed to interests of other participants. The mere existence of such proviso would discourage Commissariat from flaunting vital interests of individual participants. Mendes noted that Brussels five had said such change would require action by their Parliaments and that they did not wish to seek such approval.

Mendes noted Spaak post-Brussels proposal[2] "which addresses itself to French preoccupations", but since it excludes unanimity provision it results only in delaying effectiveness of decisions appealed to Council of Ministers. He then launched into question whether members of Commissariat could be expected to be truly impartial and concluded this would take time. Having himself served in international organizations, he could say that while France may have some persons who could place themselves above national interest, such quality is rarely encountered among foreigners.

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[1] Repeated to London, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Rome, and Bonn.

[2] According to Spaak, on Aug. 24, "Without disclosing the matter to my partners", he submitted to Mendès-France through the Belgian Ambassador at Paris, a fresh draft proposal regarding the vital interests of a member state within the proposed community. This proposal read: "In the event of a member-state considering its vital interests endangered by the working of the Community's institutions, the state concerned may submit the matter to the Ministerial Council. The latter must take immediate steps to end this state of affairs. A member-state may at any time request the Court to rule whether or not the issue invoked is in fact of vital importance. The Court's ruling will be final." According to Spaak, Mendès-France reacted to this fresh initiative with impatience, declaring that after Brussels it was all too late (Spaak, *The Continuing Battle*, pp. 173–174).

6. Condemnation of member state by Commissariat. After debate he had accepted compromise that there would first be attempt at conciliation before Council of Ministers.

7. Various provisions re transitional period. Compromise was achieved on basis French concessions.

8. Incompatibility of functions in CSC and EDC. Brussels 5 considered it was desirable to enhance status and functions of supranational officials whereas France felt that each should be left to his particular speciality.

9. Separateness of CSC and EDC courts. Here Mendes "being jurist himself" insisted at length on difference of problems raised in two insititutions, first being primarily economic and second often, particularly at beginning, involving inevitably political or "para-political" elements. Consequently while CSC court includes in addition to eminent jurists also economists and labor specialists, it is important that EDC court consist of jurists alone.

10. Territorial chambers. French withdrew their proposal.

11. Military articles. French withdrew their proposal.

12. Integration only in "zone de couverture." Mendes propounded the old proposition that discrimination exists only where same situation is treated differently but since German situation is different (both geographically since Germany is located at most unstable point and because of France's overseas commitments) French proposals involved no discrimination.

13. Transitional four-year period for military grades would have been important particularly to protect rights of personnel returning from Indochina, but faced with unanimous opposition and German claim it involved discrimination, this proposal was also dropped.

DILLON

740.5/8–3054 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, August 30, 1954—2 a. m.

860. Not only did Mendes-France not mention possibility of resuming negotiations as pro-EDC elements had hoped, but in wind-up of his speech (Embtel 858) [2] he rejected as spurious the alternatives of EDC or unrestricted German rearmament and in effect told Assembly that it need not worry about consequences of rejecting the Treaty. There are, he said textually, "always intermediary formulas and possibilities of reaching understanding." Moreover, he said, vari-

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[1] Repeated to London and to The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg, Rome, and Bonn.

[2] Not printed. (951.21/8–2854)

ous hypotheses have been formulated in discussions after Brussels as well as "in various messages and diplomatic contacts" but France's allies had indicated that real discussions could not take place as long as decision on EDC has not been made. (Full text in separate message.)

Under these circumstances, chances of EDC which were already bad have further deteriorated. Proponents of Treaty had of course long given up hope that government would support it but they had been under impression that Mendes-France would not discourage resumption of six-power talks on basis of implied endorsement of his Brussels position. It is not impossible that he may yet change his attitude, but at this writing it seems improbable.

Procedural aspects of balance of debate are now of less importance but are necessary to understand how ratification bill is likely to be defeated: Pro-EDC forces have united behind new "motion prejudicielle" which will presumably be introduced late in debate. At that time, however, "question prealable" is sure to be raised again and as we explained in Embtel 846 [3] latter move has priority under Assembly regulations. Had Mendes-France opposed the "question prealable" today, the motion of postponement would have had chance of being voted but toward end of debate the opponents of Treaty will find it much easier to unite on that procedural means of blocking motion of postponement and at same time defeating the Treaty. In that case motion of postponement would not even come up for discussion on Assembly floor.

DILLON

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[3] Not printed. (740.5/8–2954)

740.5/8–3154 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State [1]

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY PARIS, August 31, 1954—2 a. m.

893. We shall report by despatch [2] additional observations on EDC debate which are now largely of no more than historical interest. Following are our views on significance of rejection of EDC [3] in terms of the future and specifically on likely developments during coming months:

1. As slight consolation it may be recalled first of all that Assembly debate constituted only first of four hurdles: second would have been Council of Republic, next the second reading in Assembly and finally the constitutional issue which might have been raised by Upper House.

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[1] Repeated to London, Bonn, The Hague, Brussels, and Rome.

[2] See the memorandum by Herz, *infra*.

[3] See editorial note, p. 1088.

Had treaty passed Assembly in first reading it might still have taken three months before it became clear whether French ratification would actually take place.

2. There will be interminable discussions whether lineup of 319 to 264 actually constituted strength of anti and pro-EDC forces and whether under different circumstances results would have been different. From point of view of future developments, it may be concluded that margin is so large that chances of bringing treaty up once more for discussion appear slight. In any event such action would presuppose not only overthrow of Mendes-France government but also major international crisis.

3. Government does not seem in danger in immediate future. Assembly will doubtless go on vacation on Tuesday. There are no major outstanding issues other than German defense contribution on which government could encounter difficulties prior to budget debate, since Indochina issue disposed of for time being, North African policy approved by large margin and economic powers voted until April 1955. Mendes-France still has no cohesive coalition but he is not in particularly vulnerable position in Parliament at present.

4. Despite fact that he will be criticized from many sides and of course particularly by EDC proponents, we should therefore prepare ourselves for possibility he may continue in office for considerable time. He is no longer the miracle man who can make difficult decisions or pull rabbits out of his hat, but he has hardly exhausted his credit in country even though doubts are increasing as to his ultimate foreign policy objectives. He may undertake some new spectacular initiative to assuage those doubts.

5. We do not anticipate major difficulties in putting contractual agreements with Germany into effect. Possible that Mendes will seek in this context new assurances that Germany will not be armed without France's consent, but we believe he will make effort to avoid any break in Western solidarity over contractuals issue. He has stated Assembly will probably be recalled for special session to approve revised Bonn treaty and Daniel Mayer has stressed that Foreign Affairs Committee's endorsement of Aumeran motion did not imply desire to block contractuals.

6. Believe it deserves to be stressed that major factor in rejection of EDC was nationalistic reaction to attitude of France's partners at Brussels conference, as represented by Mendes-France. This reaction was evident throughout the brief debate and will have to be taken into account in future dealings with government. Rejection of EDC represents triumph of nationalist elements which according to Mendes' own estimate have increased during the few months of his administration.

7. Mendes' position on alternative policy to EDC is not yet clear but whatever his personal views may be on desirability of German rearmament he has reiterated its political necessity to maintain Western solidarity. We expect he may propose formula voiding outright NATO membership and may in other respects align himself closely with British position on safeguards. After debate there is still stronger impression than before that he has received British assurances that unrestricted German rearmament can be avoided.

DILLON

740.5/9–1654

Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in France (Herz)[1]

SECRET

PARIS, September 16, 1954.

POST-MORTEM ON THE REJECTION OF THE EDC TREATY

1. *Introduction.*

The defeat of the EDC treaty in the French National Assembly was preceded and followed by such a large number of conflicting statements and accusations of bad faith that it appears desirable to review, in the light of the information available to this Embassy, the principal disagreements concerning this most important and tragic event in the post-war history of Western Europe. While it is always futile in politics to speculate on what might have been, the Embassy's answers to some of these questions should be of interest not only to future researchers who may find themselves insufficiently illuminated by the record of the debate itself: The following discussion should also shed some light on the personality of Mendès-France and to that extent represents a contribution to the current reporting on his attitudes, intentions and capabilities.

It has been said, for instance, that there never was a majority for the treaty in the National Assembly; that there would have been a majority only if the Brussels proposals of Mendès-France had been accepted; that, on the contrary, there would have been a majority only if the Brussels proposals had never been put forward; that the National Assembly would have approved the treaty if the government had accepted the Spaak counter-proposals at Brussels; and that the treaty could have been ratified at any time if the government had thrown its prestige behind it.

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[1] Transmitted to the Department in despatch 554 from Paris, Sept. 16. The note of transmittal by Minister Achilles reads in part: "The enclosed memorandum on the rejection of the EDC treaty by the French National Assembly represents an effort to analyze the controversy which attended that event and to give the Embassy's best appreciation of the truth or falsity of various claims and counter-claims that were made before, during and immediately after the ratification debate" (740.5/9–1654).

It has also been said that Mendès-France must have gone to Brussels with the deliberate intention of torpedoing the treaty; that whether or not this is so, he returned from Brussels with such a deliberate intention; that even before Brussels, he had received British encouragement for his conduct there and for his conduct afterwards during the debate; that the U.S. position, on the other hand, contributed to the failure of the Brussels conference; that EDC was defeated by a procedural device which beclouded the real issue; that if it had not been for that procedural device, the debate would have been suspended, negotiations resumed and the treaty passed; that, on the contrary, if the battle of procedure had not taken place the treaty would have been defeated by an even larger margin. As will be recognized, most of these statements are matters of opinion. Nevertheless, a fair amount of evidence is available for a judgment to be given in each case.

The Embassy has submitted three basic despatches [2] on the French ratification situation which analyzed in considerable detail the various factors which were involved and which will not be discussed here: no. 3283 of June 16, 1952, entitled "The Prospects for French Ratification of the EDC Treaty"; no. 685 of September 1, 1953,[3] entitled "The Opposition to EDC in the French Parliament"; and no. 1680 of December 31, 1953, entitled "The Salient Psychological Factors in the EDC Ratification Situation in France".[4] These despatches discussed the various political conditions required to bring on the ratification debate, the attitudes of the political parties, the shifting psychological climate, the strategy of the treaty's opponents, and the policy elements involved in influencing the French decision. While the present memorandum deals principally with the events leading directly to the failure of the treaty, some of the more basic political and psychological factors accounting for its defeat are recalled in a separate section toward the close of the discussion.

2. *Was there ever a majority for EDC?*

The fortunes of the EDC treaty have fluctuated during the years. Whereas at any one time the opinions of political observers and analysts have of course differed, there is general agreement among qualified observers in Paris that the prospects of ratification were worse in 1954 than in 1953 and that there was no chance at all of bringing the treaty to a vote in 1952. (On the latter point, see reference despatch no. 3283.) Leaving completely aside the opinions of the leading proponents of EDC who may justly be suspected of bias, there is available sufficient evidence from opponents to substantiate the belief that in the fall of 1953, after the reelection of Chancellor Adenauer, there existed a strong, genuine trend in favor of ratification. (At that time the Saar settlement was still outstanding and was held to be an essential precondition. Moreover, the impending French presidential elections prevented Laniel from pushing for a showdown.) Thus, a leading rightist opponent of the treaty, Senator Michel Debré, who now claims there was never a majority for the treaty, conceded to the Embassy on November 9, 1953 that the treaty could be ratified; and even after the disastrous November foreign affairs debate when Laniel failed to prevent a split in the pro-EDC forces, a leading left-wing opponent, Daniel Mayer, indicated privately his belief that the treaty could still pass, though by a close margin.

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[2] Unless otherwise noted, the many despatches and telegrams cited in the source text are not printed, but may be found in file 740.5.

[3] Not printed. (751.5/9–153)

[4] Not printed. (751.5/12–3153)

It is thus important to differentiate post-defeat comment from comment made by the same persons at an earlier time: Jacques Fauvet, the moderately anti-EDC political commentator of the newspaper *Le Monde*, and Georges Altschuler, internal political editor of the anti-EDC newspaper *Combat*, both indicated immediately after the vote that they had never believed the treaty to have a chance. But in the Embassy's files there are detailed breakdowns of the likely vote which were furnished by those two commentators on a confidential basis in November, 1953, before the foreign affairs debate: At that time—and always assuming a Saar settlement and the prior holding of the presidential elections—Fauvet estimated the treaty would pass by 337 to 206 votes with 88 abstentions, and Altschuler that the treaty would pass by 321 to 190 with 115 abstentions. Both of these journalists have excellent parliamentary contacts, possibly the best of anyone in the Assembly. The pro-EDC trend at the time was such that Fauvet estimated 70 Socialist, 20 URAS and 20 ARS votes in favor, and Altschuler even 75 Socialist, 30 URAS and 24 ARS votes.

After the November 1953 debate, the chances of ratification declined. Moreover, the prospect of the Berlin Conference once more precluded an early decision. But on December 10, Guèrin de Beaumont (who later had an important role in the attempts to dilute the supranational character of the treaty) envisaged a compromise between the pro- and anti-EDC forces on the ground that at that time ratification could be obtained only by a majority of 20 votes which he deemed insufficient. (Mendès-France, during the November debate, advocated such a compromise solely on the ground that a narrow decision was undesirable.) After the Berlin Conference, there was another brief flurry of optimism among the treaty's supporters and of corresponding pessimism among its opponents: On April 28, Debré indicated to the Embassy that the principal purpose of the opponents was to put off the debate and to see to it that when it took place neither Bidault nor Pleven would hold key cabinet positions, because under the latter circumstances—given patronage and political "pressure"—he thought the treaty would pass.

The foregoing does not take into account the many extravagant statements about the chances of ratification which were made by politicians such as Bidault who on March 11, 1953 assured the Ambassador that (if only Guy Mollet would compromise on his demand for "democratic control" of the Commissariat) EDC would be passed with "350 to 370 votes." (Embtel 3319)[5] No serious analyst has even foreseen such a majority. In fact, all observers are in agreement that if EDC was to be ratified at all in 1954, it could only be done by a narrow majority; which is precisely what Prime Minister Mendès-France did not wish to see.

3. *What were Mendès-France's intentions before Brussels?*

The Prime Minister's statement to the Secretary of State on July 13[6] that there was no majority in the Assembly for EDC at that time was probably correct as far as it goes. Mendès-France has subsequently declared (Embtel 892) that his personal cabinet had information that there were no more than 295 votes in favor of the treaty at the time when he talked with the Secretary. All the more striking was his statement to the Secretary that if he could detach "60 to 80 votes" from the anti-EDC camp he would "have a majority." 295 plus 60 or 80 yields again the kind of fanciful majority which Bidault had ventilated before the Ambassador. As regards the Council of the Republic, Mendès-France declared to the Secretary that even if EDC should pass in the Assembly by a small majority, it was certain to be defeated in the upper house by a "tremendous majority." On August 12, however, he told the Ambassador (Embtel 603)[7] only that the Council of the Republic would "possibly" vote against EDC and "might even do so by a constitutional majority." It is worth recalling that the telegram calling attention to this important nuance was shown to the Prime Minister who suggested a correction of another point (Embtel 614)[8] but otherwise confirmed the rendition of his remarks as accurate.

If Mendès-France desired ratification at all, it is thus clear that he was still, immediately before the Brussels conference, in search of a compromise yielding that "large national agreement" which he had termed essential in his investiture declaration; which is something entirely different from seeking to obtain a working majority to put through the ratification bill. It should be added, however, that it is quite likely that the pro-EDC contingent in the Assembly had shrunk further between July 13 and the Brussels conference, as Mendès-France pointed out to journalists after the defeat of the treaty. In its August 7 issue, the magazine *L'Express*, which often reflected information and opinions furnished the Prime Minister by his personal cabinet, estimated that there were 287 votes for the treaty and 301 against at that time. On August 13 (Embtel 614), Mendès-France used the latter estimate (300 to 310) when he spoke to the Ambassador. (That estimate, incidentally, assumed that there would be 40 Socialists voting against the treaty.) If he desired a majority, he thus needed to switch about 20 votes or otherwise add about 30 to the pro-EDC side.

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[5] The telegram in question is dated Mar. 12, 1954. Presumably the Bidault-Dillon conversation alluded to in the source text took place in March 1954, not March 1953.

[6] For a record of Dulles' meeting with Mendès-France, see p. 1018.

[7] Dated Aug. 12, p. 1026.

[8] Dated Aug. 13, p. 1031.

Not too much importance should probably be attached to the statements which Mendès-France made, or failed to make, about EDC prior and immediately after his investiture. It is now known that he gave private assurances both to the pro- and anti-EDC elements in the Assembly, but in this he did not differ significantly from the earlier behavior of Pinay, Bidault, Mayer and Laniel on similar occasions when those leaders (who now protest a readiness to have gone down fighting for the treaty) had to contend with the same problem that confronted Mendès-France: to secure a majority which of necessity had to include both proponents and opponents of EDC. What is more, Mendès-France established a working program—Indochina, North Africa, economic projects—which required the votes of anti-EDC elements but which, when implemented, could have furnished him with powerful arguments in favor of ratification of the EDC treaty. Why, then, did he not use those arguments when he could safely use them, or why did he not at least adjust his behavior to take into account those potential trumps in the debate?

If the ratification prospects deteriorated during the two months of Mendès-France's government prior to the debate, as indeed appears to have been the case, this was surely due in large measure to the behavior of his government, for the manner in which it dealt with the preceding problems was vigorous and Mendès-France himself was highly effective in marshaling public support for his policies. Thus the "confrontation" exercise in which proponents and opponents of EDC failed to meet on common ground could have been presented by him as proof that any compromise will have to be favorable to the proponents, all the more so since at the time of his investiture he had declared that the government's own proposals would "take into account the international situation, the position of our allies and the requirements of Western defense." (Embassy despatch no. 3268). But Mendès-France appears to have clung until the end to his view that ratification of the treaty by a narrow margin would be worse for France than failure to ratify. This position, of course, was found only among the opponents of EDC and among a handful of right-wing pro-EDC deputies like de Beaumont and de Moustier. Certainly it can be said that Mendès-France, during the pre-Brussels period, did not consider non-ratification to be a disaster.

But did he hope for and seek rejection of the treaty by the instrumentality of his Brussels proposals? It has been suggested that this might even have been his deliberate objective as a result of an understanding with Molotov at the Geneva conference. (Rome's 652 and 653.) What evidence is available does not point in that direction: There is, first of all, the consistency of his position ever since his investiture attempt in 1953 when he also spoke of the need for a compromise and a "large national majority." There is, next, the official Foreign Office record of his conversation with Molotov (which may of course be worth little) from which it appears that Mendès-France sought but failed to obtain any indication of a possible Russian quid-pro-quo for EDC. There is, furthermore, the evidence given to the Embassy by Daniel Mayer, the anti-EDC chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee who despite his anti-American sentiments has in the past proved a reliable informant and who admitted having proposed to Mendès-France that he offer to trade defeat of the EDC for a neutralization of Germany. The Prime Minister is supposed to have replied to Mayer that he had received no indication whatever that any such deal would be possible. There are, of course, finally, the protestations of the Prime Minister himself but these need not be accepted as evidence of his innermost thoughts.

To assume that Mendès-France did not go to Brussels with the deliberate intent of killing EDC does not imply that he went there with a desire to win and to put the treaty quickly into effect. The significant exchanges with the U.S. and U.K. which took place just before the conference, when Mendès-France ventilated the idea of another attempt at a four-power conference prior to action in the Council of the Republic, indicated two things: First, that he envisaged the possibility of favorable action in the Assembly on first reading which would, after all, have been a precondition for any overtures to the Soviets. Secondly, however, he was prepared to go to considerable lengths to prevent an early definitive decision on Germany: witness his amazing statement to the Ambassador on August 13 (Embtel 614) that "the changes which he would propose (at Brussels) would not be sufficient to assure passage" unless there remained the chance of another four-power meeting prior to actual ratification. On August 13 his new protocol, presumably designed to obtain the "large majority" he was seeking, was just being finalized. It incorporated after all the very changes which later, at Brussels on August 19, he claimed would obtain him 80 additional votes for EDC. (Brussels' 140.)

The Embassy has, during the "confrontation" phase when Mendès-France was himself still concentrating on Indochina, North Africa and his economic program, reported various opinions of pro-EDC leaders that the Prime Minister might in the end come out with mere "face-saving" proposals at Brussels and that, with his newly increased prestige and political power, he could succeed in making those changes palatable to a sufficient number of opponents of the treaty. It should be emphasized that reports and press speculations along such lines were never based on first-hand information. If the disappointment was so great, it was in part because of wishful thinking on the part of some pro-EDC leaders, including some (like Bourgès-Maunoury) who were in Mendès-France's own entourage. It was only on August 20 (Brussels' 158)[9] that it was learned that even before his departure from Paris, Mendès-France had made arrangements to stop off at London on his way back—arrangements, as he put it, "made at a time when he did not even envisage the possibility of failure." There seems little doubt that he did envisage that possibility, that he contemplated it with relative equanimity and that, in fact, he already laid plans before Brussels to minimize the damage from failure of the conference.

4. *Mendès-France's Brussels performance analyzed.*

Having contended that Mendès-France went to Brussels neither with the precise purpose of torpedoing EDC nor, however, with a real desire to succeed, the hypothesis must first be examined that he may have nevertheless deceived himself as to the possibilities of success. Here there are three elements: (*a*) the positions of the other EDC partners; (*b*) the U.S. and British positions; (*c*) Mendès-France's appreciation of the acceptability of his proposals to his own parliament. After these elements have been discussed, the performance of France's partners at Brussels will have to be reviewed to see to what extent his violently nationalistic reaction to the conference was understandable or justified.

It has been contended that the French Prime Minister must have known that his proposals would prove to be totally unacceptable at Brussels. However, there is countervailing evidence: On August 5 (Embtel 504)[10] it was reported by Bourgès-Maunoury that Mendès-France had the impression that Spaak might be brought to accept the unanimous voting provisions and that, moreover, the fear of French rejection of the treaty would lead the five powers to accept "almost any" changes proposed by France. That Spaak's position might be misinterpreted by Mendès-France possibly as the result of a misinterpretation by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, was also feared at Brussels (Brussels' 96). On August 9, there was still evidence of divergences between the Belgian and Dutch positions (The Hague 219). It is thus not completely unreasonable to suppose that Mendès-France may have hoped to find soft spots in the phalanx confronting him, which he might exploit. His almost neurotic disappointment at finding himself faced with complete unanimity on every point might thus be explained.

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[9] *Ante*, p. 1056.

[10] *Ante*, p. 1023.

As regards the U.S. and British positions, the considerable divergence between them has not escaped the attention of observers and may well have led Mendès-France to believe that the Benelux countries would yet show themselves conciliatory on some points. The British *aide-mémoire* of August 17 [11] was in fact a veiled encouragement to the five powers to be conciliatory with regard to Mendès-France's proposals. ("Her Majesty's Government recognize that the Protocol will be a severe disappointment to many protagonists of closer European union and will raise serious problems for those Governments which have already ratified the EDC Treaty. But they hope that these Governments will not overlook the vital need for obtaining an early solution to the problem of German association with the West. The most hopeful course still remains that of getting quick agreement on the EDC even with the limitations now proposed by the French Government so long as it is not rendered unworkable.") The contrast between this position and that of the U.S. Government as expressed in Coled 18,[12] approved in Deptel 600, is indeed telling. The U.S. condemnation of the Mendès-France proposals was conveyed to the Belgians and the Dutch in separate meetings on August 18, the day the conference opened.

At the opening of the conference, Mendès-France showed himself relatively conciliatory. He said he was not asking "judicial" assurances but only "psychological" assurances that EDC would not mean the abandonment of national forms all at once (Brussels' 140). He claimed that he was not seeking a veto but only assurances that prudence and understanding would prevail in not applying the treaty over the protests of an individual participant, etc. He told France's five partners what he had told the U.S. on earlier occasions, that he was trying to obtain "80" additional votes for EDC. He claimed that there were 49 Socialist votes lined up irrevocably against the treaty. He said that if the treaty were defeated, this might lead to a Popular Front type of government in France. Immediately, however, he ran into unanimous opposition and even the figures he had given were questioned. In fact, it was questioned that the protocol he proposed would yield the desired additional votes in the French National Assembly.

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[11] No record of this document has been found in Department of State files. However, the summary and quotation in the source text would indicate that it closely paralleled the Foreign Office telegram to the British Embassy at Washington handed by Counselor Watson to C. Burke Elbrick on Aug. 17. See memorandum of conversation by Elbrick, Aug. 17, p. 1045.

[12] Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1039.

Whether the Mendès-France protocol, if accepted, would have yielded the large majority for EDC which he was seeking, will of course never be known. There is an arithmetical as well as a psychological factor. If the Prime Minister had defended the treaty as amended by the protocol with the same vigor with which he disparaged the unamended treaty and extolled the rejected protocol, he might have succeeded but he would certainly have had a most difficult time in retaining the support of the pro-EDC Socialists and perhaps even of the MRP. The evidence was certainly not conclusive on whether he could have held the pro-EDC forces together: As far as the Socialists are concerned,* there was the negative reaction of Guy Mollet and André Philip but some countervailing evidence from Albert Gazier (Embtel 679). Regarding the MRP, there was the negative reaction of Robert Schuman (Embtel 702) but some countervailing evidence from Maurice Schumann (Embtel 657).

In any event, though Mendès-France's comment was justly termed cynical when he said that the French pro-EDC elements would have to swallow anything which the five would accept because they could not be more royalist than the King, one may suppose that he actually held that opinion, which he gave in his off-the-record press briefing in Brussels on August 18. Moreover, that it was not entirely unjustified appeared during the ratification debate when the pro-EDC forces, faced with the likelihood of defeat, were prepared to endorse Mendès-France's position at Brussels if only the negotiations were resumed. It is a moot point, of course, whether all the original pro-EDC deputies would also have voted for a treaty amended by the Mendès-France protocol. In the case of the Socialists, it would seem most likely that they would have split along different lines and without voting discipline being applied; and it is of course possible, as Guy Mollet subsequently said, that they would all have been united against the amended treaty. (On balance, however, this does not seem likely in the light of the position taken by Pineau during the ratification debate.)

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*Because the question of how many anti-EDC Socialists there were in mid-August has been highlighted in many exchanges with Mendès-France, it should be stressed that the 53 anti-EDC Socialist votes (52 after rectification) cast after the Prime Minister in effect washed his hands of the treaty, are of course no true index of the Socialist opposition to EDC under other circumstances; particularly since many of the anti-EDC Socialists were strongly committed to Mendès-France and his policies in other fields and could thus have been expected to respond favorably if he had put the question of confidence. Mendès-France's remark to the Ambassador (Embtel 747) that a member of the Bruce Mission had contended there were only 30 anti-EDC Socialists is not quite correct, since in a wager in which one side takes the figure of 59 and the other 30, the effective difference of opinion starts when the figure is above or below 44½. An officer of this Embassy made a similar wager with Daniel Mayer on May 26 when the latter contended there would be 45 anti-EDC votes cast by members of his party; but he would wager only that the figure would be above 35. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that if Mendès-France had defended the original treaty and put the question of confidence, the number of anti-EDC Socialist votes would have been closer to 35 than to 45. [Footnote in the source text.]

The early apparent conciliatoriness of Mendès-France subsequently evaporated and there resulted the fiasco which has been reported. The Prime Minister himself attributed the failure to "distrust of France and of himself" and to the mistaken belief of the other five that he was only bargaining. He protested (Embtel 747)[13] that he had never been critical of U.S. actions directed to stiffening the attitudes of his partners. However, it seems there were at least four elements which produced a reaction on his part which made it distasteful for him, if he had ever intended it, to defend the treaty after the conference: First, Adenauer's failure to see Mendès-France for four days. (This has been remarked upon by two cabinet contacts of the Embassy as a matter which greatly distressed and annoyed the Prime Minister, as also reported Embtel 747. Once publicized, it also had a highly adverse effect in the Assembly.) Secondly, the doubts expressed by Adenauer that the treaty would pass if the protocol were accepted, and his citing of Schuman, Philip, Mollet, etc., pitting this information derived from newspaper statements against the French Prime Minister's analysis. Thirdly, the lecturing to which he was subjected by Spaak (who told him at one point, according to Brussels' 168, that not only the five powers would find it difficult to go back on the May 4 declaration on democratic control, but that Mendès-France "would look even more ridiculous because he would lose the remaining Socialist votes."). Fourth, there is little doubt that the U.S. position and activities at Brussels also greatly upset and annoyed Mendès-France. When Spaak showed him the Secretary's message[14] after the last meeting, he indicated that "no representative of France had suffered humiliation such as he had suffered today, and reading this message (during the conference) would have been too much" (Brussels' 171).

It is the Embassy's belief that the substantive position taken by Mendès-France at Brussels was in no way justified by the exigencies of the ratification situation if it is assumed that he only needed an effective majority and not the "large national" one which he was apparently seeking. It is the Embassy's opinion, moreover, which was given in Embtel 729 after the failure of Brussels, that the Spaak declaration, if properly presented to the French National Assembly, could have been of considerable help to Mendès-France in influencing undecided deputies. When the increased credit which he enjoyed after Geneva is taken into account, as well as his impressive forensic ability and the leverage he could have exercised with the question of confidence, there seems little reason to doubt that he could have turned "defeat" at Brussels into victory for EDC in Paris if he had desired to, all the more so since the Brussels conference could have been used as evidence with which to disarm opponents of the treaty who claimed that an alternative solution might be acceptable to France's partners.

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[13] Dated Aug. 24, p. 1071.

[14] Presumably the message dated Aug. 21, p. 1058.

That he did not accept the Spaak proposals, that he in fact rejected them as "useless", seems best explained by the fact that he has consistently advocated, and sought, a compromise between the friends and enemies of EDC and that elusive "large majority" which occasionally also seems to have tempted Bidault. It is explained, furthermore, by a fatal psychological reaction of wounded pride and a further loss of faith in the supranational principle because he wrongly deduced that France would find herself as isolated in the Defense Community as he found himself at Brussels. This almost pathological reaction, which is well-authenticated by pro-EDC officials who were with him in Brussels (Embtel 788), was also evident in all his contacts when he returned to Paris. He did not merely return to Paris a disappointed man—indeed, his disappointment cannot have been very large, given his advance preparations for defeat—but above all an angry man who did not see in Brussels the vitality of the European idea when an attempt is made to pervert or debilitate it, but rather a humiliating defeat for France whose spokesman and leader had been lectured, doubted, snubbed and utterly rebuffed. But the animus which Mendès-France displayed after Brussels testifies to a certain extent to his honesty at least in the sense that it shows he could hardly have anticipated the reaction which he encountered there.

5. *The anti-EDC campaign after Brussels.*

The Prime Minister's position after the Brussels conference requires little analysis since it was now overtly hostile to the treaty. Even before he left Brussels, he emphatically and threateningly remarked to newspaper correspondents at an off-the-record conference that there was no majority for EDC in the National Assembly but that there would be an early clear-cut decision (Brussels' 185). It deserves to be stressed, however, that after Mendès-France decided to return to Paris empty-handed (he reminded the Assembly that the Spaak declaration would become operative if it ratified EDC but that statement was of no value after he had publicly depreciated the declaration), the chances of ratification did indeed drop precipitously: After Mendès-France had undertaken to obtain new concessions from France's partners and then rejected as worthless those that were offered, the undecided or doubtful deputies who might have been won over were obviously disappointed. A public opinion poll taken during this period shows a sharp drop also in public support for EDC after Brussels.

The first official decision which was made upon his return to Paris was that the government would not put the question of confidence on passage of the treaty. "Leaks" quickly appeared in the press making it seem that Mendès-France had received important encouragements at Chartwell, in his talk with Sir Winston Churchill, regarding possible alternative solutions to EDC. Hints also found their way into the press that the American Ambassador was more understanding of Mendès-France's position than other representatives—an obvious attempt to depreciate the activities of the Bruce Mission. At the joint meeting of the three key committees involved in the forthcoming Assembly debate, the Prime Minister dwelled heavily on the slights he had suffered from Adenauer, Beyen and Spaak, mentioned the contentions of certain American observers at Brussels regarding the ratification situation, and gave a detailed defense of his position at Brussels, apparently much the same which he subsequently put forward with telling effect in the plenary debate. With the stage thus set, he was strong enough to counter the pro-EDC move for adjournment of the debate which was gradually getting organized. He wanted a showdown, and he wanted it now.

When the three most strongly pro-EDC ministers threatened to leave the cabinet, on August 27, Mendès-France finally agreed not to oppose a motion calling upon the government to resume the negotiations "on the basis of (his) Brussels proposals." (Embtel 832.) But that this was no more than a tactical maneuver, rolling as it were with the punch, became obvious when in his speech he did not even mention the possibility of resuming the negotiations. The government, moreover, practically denied the existence of the new Spaak proposal (Brussels' 214) which it claimed contained nothing new, and it moved to suppress the British press "guidance" which tended to contradict Mendès-France's hints that the British government saw eye-to-eye with him in the matter of alternatives to EDC (Embtel 830). On August 28, Mendès-France seemed still relatively neutral on the matter of resuming the negotiations. On August 29, he prevailed upon the pro-EDC leaders to withdraw their postponement motion in return for action on the part of the anti-EDC camp withdrawing its own motion to kill the debate. (Only during the night from August 29 to August 30 did the pro-EDC leaders recognize that this action, far from helping them, drove a major nail into the coffin of EDC.) On August 30, after René Mayer's speech attacking his conduct in Brussels, the Prime Minister rejected the Chupin motion for postponement of the debate.

Since it is not the purpose of this memorandum to make a substantive analysis of the Brussels proposals, only that part of the Prime Minister's speech will be discussed here which dealt with the worthlessness of a declaration as compared to a protocol: It is significant because what he said in Paris on August 29 may be usefully compared with what he said at Brussels on August 18 and what he said, about another declaration, in the Indochina debate on July 23.[15] During the EDC debate, Mendès-France contended that a declaration of the six foreign ministers at Brussels, while it would have had "a certain political value," would hardly have stood up over the years in the light of subsequent changes in the situation. France's partners, he complained, had not even been able to agree to sign the declaration "which would have given it, to a certain extent, the appearence of a contract." But no declaration, he explained, could be binding to the extent that a treaty, or a convention or a contractual agreement is binding upon its signatories.

It is interesting to compare this statement with Mendès-France's initial statement at the Brussels conference (Brussels' 140) that he was not asking "judicial" assurances but only "psychological" assurances from his partners. The whole weight of his argument in the relevant portion of his speech during the EDC debate was directed to demolish the value of any "psychological" assurances. It is even more interesting to compare his depreciation of an "unsigned" declaration offered at Brussels with the remarkable description he gave of Under Secretary Smith's unilateral and "unsigned" declaration at Geneva at the time of the Indochina settlement,[16] which merely took note of the agreement, indicated that the U.S. would refrain from threats or use of force to disturb it, and would "view with grave concern" any violation of those agreements. At that time, Mendès-France did not hesitate to describe the U.S. declaration as a "guarantee" and he surrounded it with so much verbiage that his listeners were doubtless led to believe that a signed international guarantee of the Geneva agreement existed.†

The most telling blow to the fast-dwindling chances of EDC, however, was struck in the passages of Mendès-France's speech which dealt with the question of alternatives to EDC. (Embtels 860[17] and 862.)[18] In that part of his speech he rejected the choice of "EDC versus Wehrmacht" as an oversimplification, as a false choice, and as unrealistic. ("Reality is always moving and fluctuating. There are always intermediary formulas and possibilities of understanding . . . German rearmament . . . could take different forms. It has been said that only one alternative would exist for there is no other solution than EDC. Actually there are several . . . During the last days of Brussels when it appeared that we would not reach agreement, in subsequent conversations, in messages and various diplomatic contacts, various hypotheses have been formulated . . .") The main object of the debate was thus to come to a decision, and one unfavorable to EDC was not necessarily undesirable. Presented in this light, it is surprising that the EDC treaty did not lose more adherents than it appeared to have lost since Mendès-France's advent to power.

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[15] Regarding this Indochina debate, see telegram 292 from Paris, July 22, vol. xiii, Part 2, p. 1871.

[16] For text, see telegram Secto 711 from Geneva, July 21, vol. xvi, p. 1500.

†As an indication of the lengths to which Mendès-France is capable of going when he wishes to give the impression that he has secured something of great value, even when that thing is only a simple declaration, it may be of interest to quote the passage from his July 23 speech in which he extolled the Bedell Smith declaration: "We wanted to succeed, and to succeed with the American guarantee. That is why it took the unilateral form with which you are familiar. The Government of the United States first declares that it will interpose no obstacle to the agreement, that it will respect it: that means that it does not intend to destroy the equilibrium which was established at Geneva and that guarantee is of great importance even for our opponents. It added that it would not tolerate that anyone should destroy that equilibrium, that it would consider any act of aggression in the zones envisaged in the Geneva agreement as a threat to world peace. I do not believe that one should minimize that undertaking . . . If poor Czechoslovakia had benefited from such a guarantee, it would no doubt not have been attacked. If the U.S., Great Britain and France had signed such a clause in 1938, . . . it is probable that Germany would not have dared to attack Czechoslovakia six months later." Here the impression was thus given that a simple declaration was a momentous development and the full equivalent of a signed international guarantee. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. *Was EDC defeated or "smothered" by procedure?*

The claim that EDC was defeated by a procedural maneuver before its principal proponents could be heard is true as far as it goes, but it is misleading: The majority that voted in favor of the Aumeran-Herriot "question préalable" was perfectly aware that it was defeating the ratification bill, and the minority which refused to withdraw its postponement motion was perfectly aware that it was taking a terrible risk in refusing to do so. (Embtel 949). The procedural background of these moves (Embtel 846) seems complicated at first but is actually very simple: Under French Assembly regulations, any motion to postpone or interrupt a debate has a lower priority than a move to defeat a bill without debate. Consequently, the pro-EDC forces were never able, and could never have been able, to obtain discussion of their proposal for postponement prior to action on the "question préalable" to end the debate and defeat the treaty.

The first time the motion for postponement came up (see the preceding section), it was immediately overtaken by the "question préalable" and Mendès-France prevailed upon the sponsors of both motions to withdraw them. The circumstances in which this took place are significant. Paul Reynaud had given an impassioned speech objecting to the "strangling" of the debate, and he called upon the Assembly to reject the Aumeran move as a matter of decency, orderliness and republican respectability. Daniel Mayer, speaking for the Foreign Affairs Committee, had explained that the supporters of Aumeran did not so much wish to cut off the debate as they wished to block any postponement. He then explained that Mendès-France had come to a room next to the Foreign Affairs Committee and had met with Mayer during the recess period and that they had decided that it would be best to ask both the proponents and the opponents of EDC to withdraw their motions.

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[17] Dated Aug. 30, p. 1091.
[18] Not printed.

It soon became clear that the opponents had stolen a march on the pro-EDC forces, for if the "question préalable" had a fairly good chance of being beaten at the beginning of the debate, those chances would naturally decrease as the debate unfolded, and Mendès-France's assurance that the motions "could be reintroduced when it seemed convenient, after a certain number of deputies had expressed themselves" were really less than worthless: The backers of the "question préalable" wished precisely to prevent a vote on postponement of the discussion, and the more of the discussion had actually taken place by the time the guillotine was hoisted again, the less plausible would be the arguments of those who, like Reynaud, appealed for continuance of the debate in the name of republican respectability; also, the fewer would be those who might vote against cutting off the debate because they themselves had not yet spoken.

The pro-EDC forces therefore took a calculated risk in reintroducing their motion on August 30. By that time, however, René Mayer had already attacked Mendès-France's conduct at Brussels. Moreover, the author of the new postponement motion, Alfred Chupin, could not bring himself to approve the Prime Minister's speech even if he refrained from criticizing his actions at Brussels. (The motion only "acknowledged" the government declaration and proposed to send Mendès-France back to negotiate "on the basis of the draft French protocol of Brussels.") One can imagine how deeply humiliating it must have been for the pro-EDC forces to vote even such a motion, but Mendès-France declared himself dissatisfied with Chupin's declaration because it lacked a clear endorsement of his position. The Prime Minister made it perfectly clear that the vote on the "question préalable" was not a procedural matter but involved the actual decision on the EDC treaty. So did Herriot when he spoke in favor of that move, which he had co-sponsored. So did the anti-EDC deputy Jacques Isorni who disagreed with Herriot on a number of other points.

The pro-EDC forces, under these circumstances, made one last effort to press their contention that the battle was a procedural one, but they were convincing only in one respect: They contended, through their spokesman Christian Pineau, that whereas voting of the "question préalable" would irrevocably end the debate, its defeat would leave the final decision completely open and that even if the postponement motion were voted, that would still in no way prejudice the final decision. Pineau's appeal to Mendès-France was in fact heart-rending. He did everything he could without losing all dignity, to salve the Prime Minister's pride and to convince him that if he returned to Brussels he would "not represent only those who would have voted for his return there, but France itself." He alluded to "certain psychological misapprehensions" at Brussels which might yet be corrected, particularly if France's partners after the debate were to "better understand the need to make another effort." Mendès-France did not respond, and immediately after Pineau's speech the vote was taken and the treaty defeated.[19]

After the vote, the specialists started to analyze the results and each came up with a different conclusion. The newspaper *Figaro* contended that the "question préalable" received a majority only because many deputies did not wish to be confronted with a vote for postponement, which to that newspaper proved that the postponement motion would have carried if it had come to a vote. The newspaper *Le Monde*, on the other hand, calculated that no less than 29 deputies who voted against the "question préalable" would nevertheless have voted against the treaty if the showdown had come at the very end of the debate, because those deputies had on earlier occasions expressed themselves or voted against the treaty. The paper thus contended that if the vote had not been a procedural one the treaty would have been defeated by 348 to 239. This, however, is pure sophistry because under the conditions which accompanied the debate an important shift had taken place: Some opponents of Mendès-France on the right who had also been opponents of EDC, switched to support of EDC as soon as he attacked the treaty, because they wished to be separated from him on as many issues as possible (Embtel 809). This is the same phenomenon in reverse which the proponents of EDC had counted upon in the event Mendès-France had defended the treaty: There were deputies who had hitherto been committed against EDC, particularly among the Gaullists and Socialists, who could have been brought to vote for EDC for the government's sake if the government had been for the treaty and had staked its existence on ratification. In actual fact, considering the tremendous handicaps of the EDC proponents, it is surprising that 264 votes could be marshaled, at least by implication, in its favor.

7. *The questions and answers recapitulated.*

By way of a partial summary and conclusion, the questions cited in the introductory portion may thus be recapitulated and the answers once more brought out: Was there ever a majority in favor of EDC in the French Parliament? Those who would deny it have short memories, for some of them gave the treaty a substantial majority less than a year ago. On the other hand, Mendès-France may quite possibly have been right in Brussels when he said that most of the pro-EDC elements in the Assembly would have to accept any agreement reached by the six powers—for the performance of those elements when the treaty was teetering on the brink of defeat seemed to show that they preferred a watered-down EDC to no EDC at all. But the true answer, particularly as regards the Socialists, will never be known. It is doubtful whether even with maximum effort Mendès-France could have obtained a satisfactory majority for EDC if he had not at least gone through the motions of seeking new concessions at the Brussels conference. Could the treaty have been passed on the basis of the Spaak declaration?[20] It is fairly certain that, considering Mendès-France's prestige, forensic talents and political leverage, he could have sold the French Parliament the Spaak declaration if he had desired to do so; but he apparently never intended to push the treaty through by a simple majority—he always sought a compromise that would yield a "large, national" majority and that was unobtainable through the Spaak proposals. It was probably unobtainable, moreover, even if Mendès-France's own protocol had been accepted.

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[19] See editorial note, p. 1088.

Did Mendès-France go to Brussels with the deliberate intention of torpedoing the treaty? It does not seem so, but he appears to have gone there with no keen desire to succeed, with some advance preparations against possible failure, and with surprising misconceptions about the likely position of his negotiating partners. His poisonous reaction to the conference must be attributed to a psychological mechanism of wounded pride and a loss of what faith he may have had in the supranational principle. Did he return from Brussels with the deliberate intention of torpedoing the treaty? Whether the intention was conscious or not, there is little doubt that it existed, for all the actions of Mendès-France after Brussels were effectively directed to defeat of the treaty. The British and U.S. positions, possibly both misunderstood by Mendès-France, quite likely contributed, each in its way, to his negative attitude.

Was EDC defeated by a procedural device which beclouded the real issue? No, for the real issue was not beclouded when the showdown occurred, as a majority was not only against the treaty but also against any discussion of the motion for postponement. Under these circumstances, the question what would have happened if the postponement motion had been allowed to come up is a theological one. Is it true that if the battle of procedure had not taken place, the treaty would have been defeated by an even larger margin? Not necessarily, for in any vote of such momentous importance there are elements which transcend the immediate issue at hand. Just as Mendès-France, by putting the confidence question and vigorously defending the treaty, would have been able to marshal some pro-Mendès-France anti-EDC votes, so a trend of anti-Mendès-France votes was discernible in favor of the treaty as it became obvious that the Prime Minister sought its defeat. But that trend could never have yielded a majority as long as Mendès-France opposed EDC. As of August, 1954, he was so strong that his position was decisive.

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[20] See telegrams 158 and 165 from Brussels, Aug. 20 and 21, pp. 1056 and 1061.

8. *Other, more basic factors of long standing.*

The view is expressed in the foregoing discussion, and to a large extent documented, that Prime Minister Mendès-France played a decisive role in the defeat of the EDC treaty in the French National Assembly, that he thus in a sense stood at the switch of history and pulled it in a direction away from European federation. But it must be recognized that he bears that responsibility only in the limited sense that he, with his peculiar talents and accomplishments in the particular constellation of August, 1954, would have been capable of setting the switch with considerable effort in the right direction—but considerable effort would have been required; and it is entirely fair and appropriate for the anti-EDC forces and for Mendès-France himself to have pointed out that none of his predecessors had been willing to put forward such an effort. Everybody, opponents and proponents of EDC alike, is in agreement that the Laniel government in the fall of 1953 would have required much less effort to obtain a favorable vote. If the Pinay government, which signed the treaty, can be less blamed for not bringing it to a vote, the responsibilities of the Mayer and Laniel governments are considerably larger. And those two governments have two important things in common: They were the first governments with the support or participation of the Gaullists (URAS) and they had Georges Bidault as foreign minister.

The role of Bidault in the procrastination and compromising over EDC was much less a personal one than that of Mendès-France in the treaty's defeat because Bidault never stood at a turning point where the direction in which he threw his own weight could have been decisive. Rather, Bidault typified the political necessity of broadening the coalition on the right which existed for any politician who desired to stay in office at the time. The replacement of Schuman by Bidault in January, 1953, as a matter of fact, was precisely part of the price exacted by the Gaullists for support of the Mayer government. His arrival at the Quai d'Orsay and his activities there can thus now be recognized as the product of a trend unfavorable to EDC. Outwardly a proponent of EDC, Bidault as foreign minister actually tried to reconcile European unity with French great-power politics and thereby sapped the vitality of the European idea: It was Bidault who coined the phrases that France must not go down (sombrer) in the new Europe and that one must "faire l'Europe sans défaire la France." Thus Bidault's objection to using the words integration and unification in the communiqué after the Dulles–Stassen visit in Paris in February, 1953, was already symptomatic. He preferred, and insisted upon, the ambiguous formulation "faire l'Europe" which was meant to be less objectionable to the opponents of federation. Shortly afterwards, the project of a European Political Community was in effect buried at the Rome Conference.

Only a small fraction of the proponents of EDC ever advocated its ratification as a step toward outright European federation. The European ideal, as a matter of fact, was virtually absent from the ratification debate and its sequel on August 31. The arguments of the proponents centered on the reasonableness of ratification as involving a lesser evil, as warding off or minimizing certain dangers—the danger of German dynamism and irredentism, the danger of American withdrawal or lessened support, and in the last place the danger of Soviet aggression. The dynamics and the propaganda initiative, as was pointed out in the Embassy's despatch no. 685 of 1953, were always on the side of the opposition: While the opposition attacked the proponents of the treaty as visionaries, amateurs, fools or even as traitors and grave-diggers of France, the proponents themselves for the most part considered the non-Communist opponents of EDC as honorable men, moved by considerations of high patriotism albeit perhaps mistaken in some of their reasoning. No French government ever dared to challenge the opponents of EDC and carry the battle to them. Indeed, they could not have done so without breaking up the governing coalition. Many were the times when the Gaullists could have been split by confronting them with the choice of opposing EDC or remaining in the coalition. But the operation could only have succeeded by risking a crisis. In the case of Mendès-France, who had the Socialists in his majority, the risk was smaller than for his predecessors. But the point to recall is that, for whatever reason, the EDC forces never possessed the tactical initiative. Under those circumstances, again, one may marvel at their large number when it came to the showdown.

It has been said above that the danger of Soviet aggression, i.e., the need for a German defense contribution, figured among the last arguments adduced in favor of EDC. This is true partly because perhaps one-half of the opponents of EDC favored a German defense contribution in some other form. But it is also true because of the basic fact that in 1954 the fear of Russia was less than in 1953, when it was less than in 1952 and much less than in 1951 and 1950. Correspondingly, there existed, perhaps not only in France, a greater fear of some future action or reaction on the part of the U.S. which might lead to world war; and in the specific case of EDC a greater fear that the U.S. might in some way back the irredentist aspirations of Germany in a manner detrimental to French security interests. The French Communists doubtless deserve credit for having exploited fear of German and American intentions and pictured Soviet intentions as intrinsically peaceful. But the spontaneous reactions of non-Communists to events in Germany (e.g., Adenauer's repeated statements that EDC was the best way of restoring unity), in America (e.g., 1952 campaign state-

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ments implying an objective of rolling back the Soviets) and in Russia (e.g., Stalin's death and the "peace offensive" under Malenkov) probably played a larger role than the Communist propaganda machine, whose importance must nevertheless not be minimized.

Many other factors could be cited as operative in the defeat of the EDC treaty, such as economic pressures, anti-clericalism, many appeals to chauvinism and incredible intimidation (many deputies received letters informing them that in the event of "internal disturbances" they would be "shot upon simple identification" if they voted for EDC). But only two more points deserve to be stressed: First, when it came to the showdown the various "préalables", notably the unfulfilled precondition of a Saar settlement, played a surprisingly small role in the discussion—none at all in the case of the Saar, which had paled into insignificance compared to the unfulfilled French demands at Brussels. Secondly, and far more importantly, the whole debate took place in an atmosphere of a tremendous national inferiority feeling of which the reaction to Brussels was only a symptom among many. One of the most important, though usually unspoken, arguments against EDC had long been the belief that in any community including France and Germany the latter would inevitably gain the upper hand because the Germans are more capable soldiers, organizers, businessmen and politicians. This deep pessimism, it must be recognized, is perhaps justified at least in part.

The great tragedy of the defeat of EDC, in terms of the political development of France, is that it came precisely at a time when the country might have rid itself of this inferiority feeling and when European integration might have been plausibly presented to it as the road into a safer and better future for most Frenchmen. For the incipient disengagement in Indochina, the moves to settle the smouldering conflicts in North Africa, the voting of powers for what seemed to be a bold program of economic reform, the "new style" of Mendès-France himself, were giving the country a new optimism about the future that might have greatly facilitated the acceptance of EDC. Instead, the new-found optimism was channeled into national assertiveness and a resentful reaction to the attitudes of France's friends and partners. That reaction was not a necessary one although it was perhaps not unnatural under the circumstances. But there is no reason to believe that it will be a lasting attitude. Many non-Communist enemies of EDC still go to great pains to stress that they are not against European unity. This is a testimony to the vitality of the idea of European unification, whose value may also become more clearly apparent in the search for alternatives and substitutes for the defeated policy.

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